An account of reason & faith in relation to the mysteries of Christianity / by John Norris.

CHAP. IV. That Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth. (Book 4)

1. WE have gain'd a most wonderful Point in the foregoing Chapter, by proving the Distinction between things Above and things Contrary to Reason, and such as of it self alone is suffici∣ent Not only immediately to de∣cide, but even forever to Silence the Controversie between us and our Socinian Adversaries concerning the Belief of things above Reason. For the only Objection that is or can pos∣sibly be pretended against the Belief of things above Reason being the supposed Contrariety of the same things to Reason, if it be shewn that to be above Reason involves no such Contrariety, then the Ob∣jection against the belief of such things is fairly and wholly remov∣ed,

and consequently there remains no Reason why they may not be Believ'd. So that I cannot but look upon the Substance of my Work as most effectually done already, and those of our Adversaries that have any reasonable Measure of Pene∣tration and Sincerity must needs be sensible of it. And I dare appeal even to their own Consciences whe∣ther they are not. However con∣sidering the importunity of those I have to deal with, as well as the weight of the Cause it self, I shall endeavour the further establishment of it upon some other Considerati∣ons, whereby I shall also give fur∣ther Confirmation, and so repay what I am endebted to the Point contended for in the preceding Chap∣ter, since we may as well argue backwards from the Believableness of things above Reason to their not Contrariety, as forwards from their not Contrariety to their Believable∣ness, the Consequence being full as good, thus, Above Reason Believa∣ble, therefore not Contrary, as thus, Above Reason not Contrary, therefore Believable. Now in order to the

fuller Conviction and demonstration of the Believableness of things a∣bove Reason I set out upon this Ground, that Humane Reason is not the Measure of Truth.

2. 'Tis agreed among the Masters of Reason that as all Proof ought to be only of such things as need it, so there are Propositions so Clear and Evident of themselves that they have no need of being demonstra∣ted, and that there are some again that are not capable of Demonstra∣tion, the Fulness and immediateness of their Evidence rendring them strictly indemonstrable. And it has been charged by one of the most Considerable of them as a Fault in the Method of the Geometricians that they set themselves to prove things that have no need of Proof,* 1.1 where∣of he gives an Instance in Euclid, who goes formally to work to prove that two sides of a Triangle taken together are greater than one, al∣though this be most Evident even from the Notion only of a Right Line, which is the shortest that can possibly be between two Points, and the Natural Measure of Distance

from one Point to another, which it could not be if it were not also the shortest of all Lines that can be drawn from Point to Point.

3. Now though I cannot say that the Proposition of this Chapter is so Evident of it self as not to be ca∣pable of Demonstration, yet I must Confess I cannot but think it of the Number of those that do not need any, that is I mean, to those who will but take the Pains to consider it with Attention, and are withal so sincere as to say ingenuously what they inwardly think. For to un∣attentive or Captious Persons no∣thing is plain (since there is No∣thing but what some will contradict, and there are those who profess to doubt of every thing) and even the Sun it self can't make a Man see, if either he want eyes, or will shut 'em. I cannot therefore say that to such men either this or any other Proposition is plain, but I would venture to be tried by any compe∣tent and indifferent Considerer whe∣ther this be not indeed a very plain and certain Proposition, as plain as most of those which pass for Prin∣ciples

and Maximes in Discourse, that Human Reason is not the Mea∣sure of Truth. And accordingly I should justly fear incurring the same Censure that is charged upon the Geometricians, of going to prove what is evident, were there not something peculiar in the present Case that makes it very different from theirs. For they dealing in Mat∣ters of an Abstract and indifferent Nature, and such wherein the Lusts and Passions of men are altogether uninteressed, have no real need to prove evident things, because for that very reason their Evidence is never Contested; whereas the Point I have now in hand being of a Mo∣ral Concernment and such as in∣counters the Partialities and false Biasses of Humane Nature, parti∣cularly that great and governing one of Self-Love, though it should be of equal evidence with some of their Maxims, will yet not be e∣qually secure from Opposition, and pass alike uncontested. And so there may be need of proving it, if not to do any necessary Service to the Pro∣position it self, yet to satisfie the

importunity of the Men I argue with. Which indeed is the present Case, since (as was intimated in the Beginning) the Sentiment of these Men concerning the disbelief of things above Reason resolves at last into this Principle, that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth. Which therefore both for their Sa∣tisfaction and Refutation must be shewn to be False.

4. Now when I say that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth, my meaning is, that it is not that Common Standard whereby Truth in the General is to be Measured, so that of every thing it may be safe∣ly Concluded that it is either true or not true according as it accords with this Measure, as 'tis comprehensi∣ble or not Comprehensible by Hu∣man Reason. 'Tis true indeed there is a certain Sense in which Human Reason sometimes is, and may be truely said to be the Measure of Truth, in as much as whatever the Understanding does clearly and di∣stinctly Perceive may be concluded as most certainly true, it being im∣possible that a thing should be other∣wise

than as we clearly perceive it to be, without supposing our Per∣ceptive Faculties to be in themselves Naturally False, and without sup∣posing it also necessary that we should fall into Errour even in the right use of these Faculties (it being impossible to conceive a More right use of them than to Assent only to what we clearly Perceive) which are not only in themselves manifest Absurdities, but such also as would necessarily infer the Authour of our Natures to be also the Authour of our Errours and Deceptions. It must therefore be admitted by all what the Philosophers of the Car∣tesian way so earnestly stand and Contend for, that Clearness of Per∣ception is the great Rule and Crite∣rion of Truth, so far that whatever we do clearly and distinctly perceive to be true is really in it self True. But then this is only to be a Partial and inadequate Rule, and in some certain limited respect only, not ab∣solutely and in general. For though I grant that whatever we clearly perceive is true, yet I deny that it follows likewise Backwards, that

whatever is true we do also clearly Perceive, and so consequently that whatever we do not clearly Perceive is therefore not True. By which it is plain that this Cartesian Maxim must be very much abused to prove that Human Reason is the Common and General Measure of Truth, and I dare say the Great Authors of it never intended it to that purpose.

5. Reason or Understanding in general may be safely said, and must necessarily be allow'd to be the Measure of Truth. For Truth in general carries a necessary Relation to understanding in general, as fully adequate and commensurate to it. So that all Truth is simply and ab∣solutely intelligible, the greatest and sublimest Truths as much as the least and meanest, those which the Angels study and desire to look in∣to, as much as those which employ the narrow Thoughts of the poorest Rustic. The Former are in them∣selves as intelligible as the latter, and if not actually so well under∣stood 'tis not because of any incapa∣city in the Objects, but by reason of the Disproportion of the Faculties

that are Conversant about them. But this disproportion must not be Universal, nor extend throughout the whole Order of Being. For what is intelligible must be so to some Understanding (since what no Understanding can Comprehend is the same as not to be intelligible) and consequently there must be an Understanding that Comprehends all that is truly intelligible, that is, all Truth. And accordingly it may be truly said of this All-Compre∣hensive Understanding, that it is the Measure of Truth, so that whatever this perfect Understand∣ing does not understand is not intelli∣gible, and if not intelligible, then also not True. Besides that it might be further Consider'd (were this a proper place for so Abstract and Metaphysical a Speculation) that Truth it Self, as to the real Nature and Essence of it, is one and the same with the Divine Ideas as they are related to one another, and does therefore exist Originally and intirely in the Mind of God, who is Substantial Truth, and accord∣ingly does Comprehend all Truth,

and so consequently is the Measure of it. And because this All-com∣prehensive Understanding is con∣tain'd within the Extent of Reason or Understanding in General, there∣fore it may be truly said also of Reason or Understanding in Gene∣ral that it is the Measure of Truth, it being most certain that what is above all Reason, or what no Rea∣son whatsoever can Comprehend is as much above Truth too, and can∣not possibly be true.

6. But though it be thus neces∣sary to allow this of Reason in Ge∣neral, the same cannot be allow'd of Human Reason. For whatever is the Measure of Truth must be fully adequate and Commensurate to Truth. That's Certain. And therefore if Human Reason be the Measure of Truth it must have the same compass and extent with Truth, and possess it whole and in∣tire, if not Essentially and Substan∣tially as God does, yet at least Noe∣tically and by way of Theory, so as to be able thoroughly to Per∣ceive and Comprehend all Truth. But now that this Qualification can∣not

possibly agree to Human Rea∣son (though it be somewhat un∣reasonable that I should be put to prove such a Proposition as this) I hope fully to demonstrate upon a Double Consideration, one taken from the Nature of Human Rea∣son, and the other from the Nature of Truth.

7. And first to begin with Truth. This, as the Most thinking and Metaphysical Persons Conceive of it, is supposed to consist in the Relations of equality or inequality, or Agreement or Disagreement. Now we are to Consider that these Relations may be of Three Sorts, either such as are between Created Beings, or such as are between In∣telligible Ideas, or such as are be∣tween Created Beings and their Ideas. And we are also to Consi∣der that there are two General Sorts of Truths extremely different one from another, and therefore care∣fully to be distinguish'd. Those that regard only the Abstract Na∣tures of things, and their immuta∣ble Essences, independently on their actual Existence. And others a∣gain

that do regard things that do actually Exist. The former of these Constitute that Order of Truths which we call Necessary, the latter that which we call Contingent. And this double order of Truths results from that threefold Relation be∣fore-mention'd. From the first and third Relations arise Contingent Truths, which are nothing else but the Relations of agreement of dis∣agreement that are either between Created Beings themselves, or be∣tween Created Beings and their I∣deas. And these I call Contingent Truths in opposition to those that are Necessary and Eternal, partly because these Relations could not begin to exist before those Beings were produced (it being impossible that there should be Relations be∣tween things that are not) and partly because these Relations might not have existed, because those Be∣ings might not have been produ∣ced. And as Contingent Truths arise from the first and third, so from the second and middle Rela∣tions result those Truths which are Necessary, Eternal, and Immutable,

and which I understand to be no∣thing else but the Relations of Agree∣ment or Disagreement that are be∣tween Ideas.

8. I go here upon the common and allow'd Distinction between Necessary and Contingent Truths, and upon the as much allow'd Sup∣position that there is such an Order of Truths as are Necessary and Eter∣nal, which therefore I take for granted as a Principle, not to de∣cline the trouble of proving it, but because it is a Confess'd as well as Evident thing, and I care not for proving any more evident things than I needs must. And that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are in this precisely distinguish'd from those that are Contingent, that they are the Relations that are between I∣deas, I think is plain from the very Notion and Nature of them, be∣cause they are supposed to be such Truths as regard the Abstract Na∣tures and Essences of things as they are in Idea, and not as they have an actual Existence in rerum Naturâ, since then they would not be ne∣cessary, but Contingent Truths,

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which would be contrary to the Supposition. And Because these Ne∣cessary Truths are the most consi∣derable and principal sort of Truths, as being the Ground and Founda∣tion of all Science, and the true and proper Objects of our Theory and Contemplation, and because for the same Reason whenever we speak of Truth Absolutely and in General we are presumed to mean necessa∣ry and immutable Truth, hence it is that Truth is commonly said by Metaphysical Writers to consist in the Relations that are between Ideas, though indeed this be strictly true only of Necessary Truth. But it is sufficient to the present purpose that it is true of this. And so much I suppose will readily be granted me at least, that the general Nature and Reason of Necessary and Eternal Truths consists in the Relations that are between Ideas.

9. I further add that these Ideas must be the same with the Divine Ideas. 'Tis true indeed that exact∣ly speaking all Ideas are Divine I∣deas, even those which we use to call our own, it being most Cer∣tain

(as might easily and with the greatest Evidence be shewn) that the immediate Objects of our Un∣derstandings are no other than the Ideas of the Divine Intellect, in which we see and contemplate all things. But not to enter into this sublime Speculation at present, it will be sufficient to consider that unless the Ideas whose Relations Constitute those Truths which are Necessary and Eternal be the Di∣vine Ideas, it will be impossible that Necessary and Eternal Truths should be what we suppose they are, that is Necessary and Eternal. For Ne∣cessary and Eternal Truths must be Necessary and Eternal Relations, and it being impossible that Rela∣tions should be more Necessary or Eternal than the Subjects from which they result, unless these Ideas the Subjects of these Relations be Ne∣cessary and Eternal, how can their Relations be so? 'Tis plain there∣fore that these Ideas must be Ne∣cessary and Eternal. But now I pray what Ideas are so but the Di∣vine? What is there in the whole Compass of Being that is Necessary,

Eternal and Immutable but God and his Divine Perfections? As there∣fore we say that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are Relations between Ideas, and not such as are between either Created Entities themselves, or between them and their Ideas, because then they would be of the Order of Contingent, not of Necessary Truths, For the same reason we must say that they are the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas, those only being suf∣ficiently steddy and Permanent Sub∣jects to sustain such Stable and Im∣mutable Relations. And indeed were it not for those Representa∣tive Perfections of the Divine Na∣ture which we call Ideas, there would be no Necessary and Eternal Essences to support these Necessary and Eternal Relations, and then there could be no such Relations, and if no such Relations, then there could be no Necessary Truths, and is no Necessary Truths then no Science Which by the way would most Convineingly prove to any Ca∣pable and Attentive Understanding the absolute Necessity and Certainty

of a God, as the most inmost Ground and Central Support of the whole Intellectual World.

10. Well then it can no longer be doubted but that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are the Relati∣ons that are between the Divine Ideas. But now as these Ideas are Infinite as being the Essential Per∣fections of God, and really identi∣fy'd with his Divine Nature and Substance, so it must necessarily fol∣low that the Relations that result from them, and subsist between them must also be Infinite. And then since these Truths do essen∣tially Consist in, and in their Rea∣son and Formality are no other than these Ideal Relations, it no less evi∣dently follows that Truth also must be Infinite too.

11. Which also will be necessary to Conclude upon another Account. For I confider again that since Re∣lations do not in reality differ as di∣stinct Entities from their Subjects and Terms (as the Relations of two Circles supposed to be equal to each other do not really differ from the Circles themselves so related) these

Ideal Relations must in the reality of the thing be one and the same with the Divine Ideas themselves, and consequently with the Divine Na∣ture with which these Ideas are i∣dentified. And accordingly Truth which is the same with these Ideal Relations must also as to the real Essence and Substance of it be one and the same with the Divine Na∣ture.

12. And that indeed it is so may be further, and somewhat more di∣rectly, demonstrated thus. That God is the Cause of whatever is be∣sides himself, or, that whatever is, is either God or the Effect of God is a clear and acknowledg'd Princi∣ple. Necessary Truth then is either God or the Effect of God. But it is not the Effect of God, and there∣fore it can be no other than God himself. Now that it is not the Effect of God, the many gross Ab∣surdities which that supposition draws after it I think will oblige him that Considers them to acknow∣ledge. For First, if Necessary Truth be the effect of God either it would not be necessary, which is against

the Supposition; or if it be, then as being a necessary Effect it must have a necessary Cause, that is a Cause necessarily determin'd to act, and so God would be a necessary Agent, even ad extra. He would also be an unintelligent Agent. The Conse∣quence is not to be avoided. For if Truth be the effect of God then an∣tecedently to the effecting of it, there was no Truth, and consequently no Knowledge, because there could be nothing known; and so God in the production of Truth (if indeed he did produce it) must be supposed to act altogether in the dark, and with∣out any Intelligence. Again, if Truth be the Effect of God, then the Perfection of the Divine Under∣standing must be supposed to depend upon something that is not God, nay upon something created by God, whereas God is the true perfective Object of all his Creatures, and is himself completely Happy in the sole Contemplation of himself. 'T••will follow again that God has constitu∣ted an Order of Realities which he has not ••ower to abolish; that he has made some things which he can∣not

unmake again. And lastly to add no more, If Truth be the Ef∣fect of God then it cannot be God, (because God cannot produce what is Himself) and if it be not God, then by the Supposition there will be something Necessary, Immuta∣ble, Eternal and Independent, &c. that is not God. Which last Con∣sequence as it contradicts the Com∣mon and Natural Sentiment of Man∣kind, so it struck so hard against a certain very Thoughtful and Meta∣physical Head,* 1.2 that he could not forbear urging this as One Argu∣ment against the very Being of Ne∣cessary Truth; because then (as he pretends) there would be something Necessary besides God, not consider∣ing that this Necessary Truth is re∣ally one and the same with the Di∣vine Substance. Which one Con∣sideration puts by the whole force of his Argument against the Being of Necessary Truth, though however it be sufficiently conclusive of the Point we now contend for, that this Truth is not the Effect of God. For if it were then his Allegation would take place; that is, there would in∣deed

be something Necessary besides God, which though it does not fol∣low from the Supposition of the Being of Necessary Truth, is yet plainly inseparable from the other Supposition, that of its being the Effect of God. For then the very next Consequence is, that there would be something Necessary be∣sides God, which no Religious, nor indeed Rational Ear can bear. 'Tis plain therefore that Truth is not the Effect of God; and since it is not, it remains by vertue of the premised Disjunction that it can be no other than the very Substance and Essence of the Deity.

13. And to this purpose I further consider, That the whole Perfection of the Mind does consist in its union with God, who is her only true Good. This seems to me a Propo∣sition of a very shining Evidence. For the good of the Mind must of necessity be something Spiritual, o∣therwise it would be of a Nature inferiour to herself, and so not capa∣ble of being her Perfection. But neither is that enough Whatever is the good of the Mind must not

be only of a like Nature with the Mind, that is, of a Spiritual, but of a superiour Nature too. It must be something above the Mind that can be its Perfection, and that can act upon it, and inlighten it, and affect it with pleasing Sensations, otherwise how can it be able to add any thing to its better Being or Per∣fection? And in order to all this it must also be intimately present to it, and united with it, otherwise how can it so act upon it? But now God is the only Spiritual Being whom we can possibly conceive thus qualified to be the good or perfective Object of our Minds. Whence it follows that he only is so, and that we can∣not become either more Perfect or more Happy in any Kind or Degree but by our Union with, and Posses∣sion of God. And hence it further follows, that Truth could not be any Perfection of our Understandings if it were not the same with the Divine Essence (since that is our only per∣fective and beatifying Object) and that therefore since it really is per∣fective of our Understandings, and that in the very highest measure

(the Understanding being then most Perfect when it has the clearest and the largest view of Truth) it can be no other than the very Essence of that Infinite Mind who is the only true Good and Objective Perfection of all Spirits.

14. 'Tis true indeed Des Cartes makes all Truth, even that which is Eternal to have been positively instituted and establish'd by God, to depend upon him as the Summus Legislator, to be the effect of his Will and Pleasure, and by Consequence to be Absolutely and Originally Ar∣bitrary and Contingent. So that ac∣cording to him 2 and 2 might not have been 4, or 3 Angles of a Tri∣angle might not have been equal to 2 Right ones if God had pleas'd so to Order it. But this Notion of this Great Man does so rudely Shock the Natural Sense of Mankind that it cannot find Admission even where the rest of his Philosophy does, but is generally exploded notwithstand∣ing the eminency of its Author, and that even by one of his greatest Ad∣mirers,* 1.3 and (as I think) by far the Most Considerable of his Disciples.

And truly I think this Opinion is treated no worse than it deserves, since besides the Absurdities already Mention'd, it shakes the Foundati∣ons of Science, yea and of Mora∣lity too, by supposing the Natures not only of Metaphysical and Ma∣thematical Truth, but even of Mo∣ral Good and Evil to be of a Posi∣tive and Arbitrary, and Consequent∣ly of a Contingent Ordination. It is therefore deservedly as well as generally rejected, but then let those that reject it have a Care that they fall not into a worse Absurdity. As they would not suppose Truth to be of a Positive and Alterable Na∣ture and that the Relations of Ideas might have been otherwise than they are, so let them have a Care how they make any thing Neces∣sary and Immutable that is Not God. Let them be Consistent with themselves, and as they justly re∣ject the Opinion that makes Truth the Effect of God's Free and Arbi∣trarious Constitution, and conse∣quently of a Mutable and Variable Nature, so let them own and Con∣fess (as they are Obliged to do) that

it is no other than God himself. For there is no other way of avoid∣ing Des Cartes's Absurdity. For if Truth be not God then 'tis the Ef∣fect of God, and if the Effect of God then since the Constitutions of God are Free and Arbitrary, the Natures and Relations of things might have been quite otherwise than they are, the whole Science of Geometry might be transposed, a Circle might have the Properties of a Square, and a Square the Properties of a Circle, 2 and 2 might not have been 4, or what else you will instance in. And so in Morality too (which is of far worse Consequence) there might have been the like transposition, what is Vertue might have been Vice, and what is Vice might have been Vertue. These are the Na∣tural Consequences of Truth's being the Effect of Divine Constitution, and they are intolerable ones too, and therefore the Principle from which they flow is by the general Current of Writers well denied. But then unless they proceed, and acknowledge Truth to be one with the Divine Essence they cannot help

relapsing into the same or worse Absurdities. For whoever says that Truth is not God must say that it is the Effect of God, and whoever says that, must either say that 'tis Arbitrary and Contingent, or if he says it is Necessary and Immutable, he must allow of something Neces∣sary and Immutable that is not God. But now it being most Evident that there is nothing Necessary that is not God, if Truth be not God then 'tis plain that it cannot be Necessary (which presently runs us into the Cartesian Absurdity of the Arbitra∣ry Position of Truth) or if it be Necessary then 'tis as plain that it must be God. The short is, Truth is either God or the Effect of God. If it be not God, then 'tis the Effect of God as Des Cartes says. But if not the Effect of God (as the Con∣sequent Absurdities from that Prin∣ciple demonstrate, and as is gene∣rally granted) then 'tis God him∣self as we say. It must be one or the other, there is no Medium. To say that Truth is God, or to say that 'tis the Effect of God are each of them Consistent Propositions,

though from the gross Absurdities of the Latter the Former only ap∣pears to be the right, but to deny that 'tis the effect of God and yet not to say that it is God, that is to affirm that 'tis neither the Effect of God nor yet God, is all over un∣maintainable and inconsistent. If it be not the Effect of God (as is both generally and justly acknow∣ledg'd) then it must of Necessity be God, since whatever is, is either God or the Effect of God.

15. And indeed if Truth be not God how comes it to be Cloath'd with the Glorious Ensigns of his Majesty, to wear the Characters of his Divinity, and to have so many of his peculiar and incommunicable Attributes? How comes it to be Necessary, Immutable, Eternal, Self-existent, Increated, Immense, Omni-present and Independent, and that not only upon the Conceptions of any Minds whether Human or Angelical, but even all things what∣soever, which might never have been made, or might now be anni∣hilated without any Prejudice to the being of Truth, which does not

respect the natural and actual Exi∣stencies but only the Abstract Es∣sences of things. For were there no such thing as any real Circle or Triangle in Nature it would still be never the less true that their Ab∣stract Essences would be determi∣nate and invariable, and that such and such distinct Properties would belong to them. Which by the way plainly Convinces that Truth is none of the Effects, Works, or Creatures of God, since it did exist before them, does not now depend on them, and would remain the self-same Immutable thing without them. But then I demand whence has it this Self-subsistence and Inde∣pendency of Being? Whence again has it its fix'd and unalterable Na∣ture, such as we can neither add any thing to, nor diminish ought from? How is it that it is Present in all Places, and to all Minds, so as to be Contemplated by them all at the same time, and after the same Manner? How comes it to pass that we cannot so much as dis-imagine it, or by way of Fiction and Supposi∣tion remove it out of Being; but

it still returns upon us with a strong and invincible Spring, since even the very Supposition that there is no Truth carries a Formal Proposi∣tion in it whose Ideas have a cer∣tain Habitude to each other, and so Contradicts it self. Besides how comes it to be a Perfection of the Divine Understanding? Is any thing a Perfection to God but himself? How comes it also to be the Rule and Measure of his Will, which can be determin'd by nothing but what is just Reasonable and True? Can any thing be a Rule to God that is not himself? Does he Consult or Follow any thing but what is One with his own Divine Nature and Essence? And yet God consults and follows Truth, and cannot act but according to its Immutable Laws and Measures. It is not therefore really distinguish'd from him, but Coeternal and Consub∣stantial with him, and so in Consulting Truth he Consults his own Essence* 1.4, even the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the E∣ternal and Increated

Wisdom, the true intelligible Light, in whom are all the Ideas and Essences of things, the Fulness of Being and Truth, who in the Be∣ginning was with God, and was God, who is Eternally Contem∣plated by him with Infinite Joy and Complacency, and who said of himself Incarnate, I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life. I would fain know how all these incom∣municable Attributes of God should agree to Truth if it be any thing less than a Divine Nature. Par∣ticularly I demand, whence has it that unshakeable Firmness and Sta∣bility, that invincible Permanency and Sted••astness, that Necessity of Existence, that utter repugnance to Not Being, but only because it is really Coessential and Consubstan∣tial with him whose Name is Ie∣hovah, and who is Being it self, to whom it is Essential to Exist, or rather, whose very Essence is Exi∣stence.

16. But now from this Coessen∣tiality and Consubstantiality of Truth with the Divine Nature (a Noble and Sublime Theory, but which I

do but lightly touch over, having not room here to pursue it at large) it evidently and necessarily follows again that Truth is Infinite. There cannot be a more immediate, nor a more necessary, nor a more insepa∣rable Connexion between any two things than between this Conse∣quence and that Principle. And indeed if Truth were not Infinite how can the Knowledge of God be so? Not sure as Concretely and Objectively Consider'd, for that ma∣nifestly implies the Infinity of its Object. And what is the Object of the Divine, or of any other Under∣standing, but Truth? And should Knowledge here be taken for the Power or Faculty of Knowing, to what purpose is an Infinite Power of Knowing unless there be an In∣finite to be Known? And would not such a Power be uneasie and afflictive, as well as useless, to him that had it, unless the Object be supposed to carry due Proportion to it: For if it be so uneasie a Re∣flexion to some of us to have such short and narrow Faculties when the Compass of Truth has so large

and spatious an extent, to be able to know so little when there is so much to be known, how much more troublesom and painful would it be to the Supreme Intelligence to have an Infinite Understanding when all that is intelligible is but Finite? Would not that Infinity of his Ca∣pacity serve to vex and disquiet him more than the Narrowness of ours does us, the difference being as much as between having a great Stomach and but little Meat, and a little Sto∣mach when there is a great deal of Meat, whereof which is the greatest Punishment is Obvious to imagine. And we may judge of this in some measure by our selves. We have in us a Capacity boundless and unlimited. For tho' our Understandings be Finite, our Wills know no Measure, and are in a manner Infinite. As God has made us capable of enjoying an In∣finite Good, so Nothing less than that can satisfie our Desires. For we desire Good as Good, and con∣sequently all possible Good. Now we find this to be a great Pain to us at present to desire an Infinite Good when all that we can enjoy

here is Finite. The greatest part of the Uneasiness, the Melancholy, the Disconsolateness, the Aridity that accompanies Human Life will be found, if traced to the Original, to proceed from hence, viz. from the little proportion that is between our Capacities and our Gratificati∣ons, between what is desired and what is enjoy'd. And this Desire of an Infinite Good will be a far greater Punishment to us Hereafter when the Activity of our Faculties shall be more invigorated and in∣larg'd, if we have not then an Infi∣nite Good to enjoy. ••Twill be at least the worst ingredient of Hell and Damnation, if not all that is to be understood by it. And yet we are still to Consider that our Will is In••••nite only Ex parte Objecti, be∣cause it desires an Infinite Good, and not Ex parte Actûs because it desires it infinitely or with an unlimited Force and Activity. For 'tis im∣possible that a Finite Nature should have any Power or Force in it that is strictly infinite, or that any such Act or Operation should pro∣ceed from it. But then what would

the Affliction be if the Act were Infinite as well as the Object, and we were to aspire after an Infinite Good with an Infinite Desire! What Conception can Frame a just Idea of the Misery of such a State! And can it be much less for an Infinite Intelligence to have only a Finite Intelligible for its Object? But there is Nothing Painful or Afflictive in the Condition of the Supremely and Completely Blessed. And therefore we must Conclude that as the In∣finite Will of God has a Good fully Commensurate and Adequate to its unlimited Activity, whereon it may Center and Repose its Weight, so the Infinite Understanding of God has also an Infinite Intelligible for its Object. And since the Formal Object of Understanding in General, and Consequently of the Divine, is Truth (as that of the Will is Good) hence it follows again that Truth must needs be of an Infinite Nature.

17. And do we not find it so when we Convert our selves to it by Study and Meditation? When we apply our Minds to the Con∣templation of Truth, and set our

selves to muse and think, do we not find that we launch forth into a vast intelligible Sea, that has neither Bottom nor Shore? And the more we think and the more we Meditate are we not still more and more con∣vinc'd of this, and do we not disco∣ver the further we go in our Intel∣lectual Progress, that there still lies more and more beyond us, so that the more we advance in the Know∣ledge of Truth the more we inlarge Our Idea of it, as the greatest Tra∣vellers think most Magnificently of the World? Do we not find as in a Spatious Campaigne, so in the im∣mense Field of Truth, that our Eye wearies, and our Sight loses it self in the boundless Prospect, and that besides the clear view which we have of a few things at a little di∣stance from us, there lie all round us vast Tracts unmeasurably diffused, whereof we have only Confuse and indistinct Images, like the Faint Blew of the far distant Hills? Are not the Relations and Combinations of things with one another Infinite, and should but one link in this End∣less Chain be alter'd would not in∣numerable

Alterations ensue upon it? Should but One Proposition that is False be supposed True, or One that is True be supposed False, what Understanding but the Divine could go on with the Train of New Con∣sequences that would result from such a Supposition? I say New Con∣sequences, For we are to consider that besides the Absolute Systeme of Truth which contains the Relations of Ideas with their settled Coheren∣cies and Dependencies one upon a∣nother according as they really stand in their Natural Order, there is a Secondary Systeme of Truth which I may call Hypothetical, that results from any supposed Change made in the Absolute Systeme, whence will still arise new and new Consequences even to Infinity. But not to consi∣der Hypothetical Truth, can the Bounds of that which is Absolute be ever fix'd, or its Stock ever Ex∣hausted? Does it not after all the Study that has been employ'd about it, and the Numberless Number of Volumns that have been written up∣on it furnish perpetual matter for our Contemplation, and is it not a

Subject for everlasting Thoughts and Considerations? Has it not been the great Research of the Thoughtful and Inquisitive for many Ages, and yet does not every Age refine upon its Predecessour, and produce New Discoveries? Are not the Sciences continually improved, and yet are there not still Depths in every Sci∣ence which no Line of Thought can ever Fathom? What a vast Fe∣cundity is there in some plain simple Propositions, nay who can number the Conclusions that may be drawn from any one Principle! Take the most simple Figure in Geometry, and where is the Mathematician who after a Thousand Years Study can reckon up all the Properties that may be affirm'd of it, both as Ab∣solutely Consider'd, and as it stands in relation to other Figures? And what then shall we think of the whole Science in all its Branches and Dependencies, Particularly of Al∣gebra, the Main Ocean of this Bot∣tomless Sea? And what shall we say of Metaphysick's, another un∣measurable Abysse, and what of the endless Circle of Truth, if not the

same which one of Iob's Friends says of God,* 1.5 Canst thou by searching ••ind out Truth, Canst thou find her out unto Perfection? It is as high as Heaven, what canst thou do? deeper than Hell, what canst thou know? The Measure thereof is longer than the Earth, and broader than the Sea. And that because they after all are Fi∣nite, whereas this is truly and strict∣ly Infinite. Which by the way suf∣ficiently proves a God, and that this God is Truth, whose Eternal and Glorious Majesty be Blessed for Ever.

18. But then let us Consider, if Truth be indeed (as you see) of an Infinite Nature, then to prove that Human Reason is not fully adequate to it, does not intirely possess it, nor all over and wholly comprehend it, and consequently cannot be the Measure of it, there will be no need of laying open the great Weakness and Deficiency of our Understand∣ing: I need not represent the Im∣perfection of its Light, nor the Shortness of its Views, nor the Slen∣derness of its Attainments, nor the very Narrow Extent of its Know∣ledge,

nor the very little Progress it is able to make in the Contempla∣tion and Comprehension of Truth; That there are a great many things whereof we have no Ideas (for which we need go no further for an Instance than our own Souls) and that even where we have Ideas of things we cannot always discern the Relations and Connexions that are between them, and that either for want of sufficient Clearness in the Ideas themselves to have their Re∣lations perceived immediately with∣out comparing them with other mediate Ideas, or else for want of such due and proper Mediums wherewith to compare them, and that therefore the extent of our Knowledge is not only vastly ex∣ceeded by the Natures of things, but also very Considerably even by our own Ideas, there being many things whereof we have Ideas, and sometimes very clear ones too, and yet which we know no more how to reason upon or discourse of intel∣ligibly, or with any Certainty, than we do of those things whereof we have no Ideas at all, being, for Ex∣ample,

no more able to tell what proportion such a Circle bears to such a Square though we have clear Ideas of both, than we are to tell what proportion there is between Angels and our own Souls, things whereof we have no Ideas. A very remarkable Instance of the Shortness and Contractedness of our Under∣standings, which it seems are not only destitute of the Ideas of many things, and Consequently of the knowledge of them (it being im∣possible that the extent of our know∣ledge should exceed that of our I∣deas) but are also Blind to those ve∣ry Ideas which they have, and can∣not see even when they have the advantage of the Light. But I say I need not present my Reader with a Night-piece of Human Reason, de∣scribe great Blindness and gross Darkness, how ignorant she is when she does not adventure to judge, and how Erroneous when she does, stumbling and falling (as is usual in the dark) out of one mistake in∣to another, out of one Errour into another, either by im••racing false Principles, or by drawing wrong

Conclusions from true ones, so that Ignorance seems her safest Retreat, and to suspend her best Wisdom; These I say and such other of our intellectual Infirmities I need not in∣sist upon or make any advantage of, it being sufficient to conclude the Point in hand that Human Reason in its largest Capacity and Extent and with all the advantages of both Nature and Artificial improvement is after all but a Finite thing (and that to be sure the most Zealous of its Votaries and Advocates must confess that it is) since 'tis impos∣sible that what has Bounds should be able totally and adequately to Comprehend what has None, or that Finite should be the Measure of Infinite.

19. I know but of one thing that can with any Pertinency be replied to this Argument, and that is, that though Human Reason (as Finite) be not able to comprehend all Truth (as being Infinite) yet however there may perhaps be no one Truth in Parti∣cular but what, when presented to it, may be comprehended by it, and so Human Reason may be rightly said to

be Adequate and Commensurate to Truth as Distributively, though not as Collectively consider'd. But to this I have several things to return. First of all I say that such is the re∣ciprocal dependence and concate∣nation of Truth that the want of a thorough and intire Comprehension of all Truth in its widest and most diffused Extent must needs very much Eclipse the view and darken the Perception of any one Solitary Truth in particular, so that how∣ever we may have some tolerable Perception of it, and such as we may call Clear in Comparison of some other Truths which we do not see so clearly, yet it cannot be near so clear and Distinct a Perception, as that Infinite Being has of it who sees not only the Truth it self, but also the Manifold Relation, Con∣nexion, and Combination that it has with all other Truths. The diffe∣rence between these two ways of Perception being of a like Nature with that which is between seeing a Proposition as it stands singly by it self, and seeing the same Propo∣sition with all its Relations and

Dependencies, and in conjunction with the whole Context and Cohe∣rence of the Discourse whereof it is a Part. I say again Secondly, that though we may have a competent Perception of some plain and simple Truths without pursuing them tho∣rough all the Relations and Depen∣dencies that they have with other Truths (since otherwise, as I have hinted already, we should be able to understand nothing, and every thing would be above Reason) yet how∣ever we do not know but that there may be some Truths of such a Na∣ture as not to be understood without the adequate Comprehension of those Relations and Dependencies; which since we have not, we do not nor can ever know but that there may be some Truths that are so a∣bove us as to be out of our Reach, and to lie beyond all possibility of Comprehension, and consequently that Human Reason is not adequate and commensurate to Truth even Distributively consider'd. I say we do not know, and 'tis impossible we should ever know but that thus it may be. For how should we be

able to know it, or upon what shall we ground this our Knowledge? It must be either upon the Natural Force and Penetration of our Under∣standings, or upon our Actual Views and Perceptions, or upon the Nature of Truth it self. As for the Capacity of our Understandings though we do not know the pre∣cise and exact Bounds and Limits of it, yet we know in the general that it is Finite, and has its fix'd and de∣terminate Measure, which it would strive in vain to exceed. As for the Nature of Truth, that we both ex∣periment, and from the foregoing Considerations must of necessity con∣clude to be Infinite. And what Ground of Assurance can we have from either or both of these, which are apt rather to lay a Foundation of Diffidence and Distrust? And then as for our actual Views and Perceptions, though we should sup∣pose them to have been hitherto ne∣ver so clear and distinct, never so numerous and extensive, and never so fortunate and successful, so that our Victorious Understandings never yet met with a Baffle, nor sounded a

retreat from a too difficult and im∣pregnable Theory, suppose in one word, that we never yet applied our minds to the consideration of a∣ny one Truth but what we fully comprehended and were perfect Ma∣sters of (which yet he must be a ve∣ry Presumptuous, or a very little experienc'd Thinker that shall affirm of himself) how notwithstanding do we know, considering the Finiteness of our Intellect, and the Infiniteness of Truth, but that there may be O∣ther Truths of a Nature so far above us, and so disproportionate to us, as not possibly to be Comprehended by us. For we cannot argue here from the past Successes and Atchievements of our Understandings to the Fu∣ture, or because there has been no∣thing hitherto proposed to us but what we Comprehended, that there∣fore there can be nothing proposed but what we can Comprehend. If we conclude thus, we forget the vast disproportion between Truth and Human Reason, that the one is Finite and the other Infinite, the due and attentive Consideration of which would convince us that tho'

we have thought never so much, and never so well, and comprehend∣ed never so many Truths, yet for ought we know there may be Truths which our intellectual Sight though aided with all the advantages of Art, that may help the Mind as much as a Telescope does the Eye, can yet never penetrate, and which (by the way) it may be Worthy of God to reveal to us if 'twere only to Check and Controle the daring Progress of our Understanding, to make us un∣derstand our Measure and remember that we are but Men, to be sensible of the defects of that part upon which we most value our selves and despite others, and that even the Light that is in us is but Darkness. Whether there be any such Truths I do not now say, but only that upon the Supposition of the Infinity of Truth 'tis impossible for us to be sure but that there may be such, which is enough to hinder Our Reason from being (at least as to us) the Measure of Truth, since if it be so 'tis more than we know, or can possibly be assured of, which makes it all one (to us) as if it were not. For we

cannot make use of it as a Measure, or draw any Consequence from it to the Falsehood, Impossibility, or In∣credibility of things Incomprehen∣sible, since for ought we know or can know to the Contrary, there may be Truths which we cannot Comprehend.

20. But then I say further Third∣ly, that the Infinite Nature of Truth will Oblige us to acknowledge that there actually are and must be such. For if Truth be Infinite then 'tis plain that we cannot Comprehend it in its full and intire Extent, and so much the very Objection sup∣poses. But then I say that as the want of a perfect Comprehension of all Truth does very much shade and darken the perception of any one single Truth in particular, and that because of the mutual connexion and dependence of things one upon ano∣ther (as was before observ'd) so it must needs quite Eclipse and totally Abscond some Truths from our View. For there are some Truths so very Complex and Abstruse, and that lie so deep, and, as I may say, so far within the Bowels of the In∣tellectual

Systeme, that include such a Multitude of Relations, depend up∣on so many Suppositions, are the Conclusions of so many Premisses, presuppose and require the know∣ledge of so many things (of some of which it may be we have not so much as the simple Ideas) have such a Train of Principles Planted and Intrench'd as a Guard before 'em, and draw such an immense Retinue of Consequences after them, and are every way so mingled, involv'd and combined with other Truths that they cannot possibly be under∣stood without an intire and all-com∣prehensive view of the whole Ratio∣nal Systeme. Instances of such Truths abound in every Science. But there is nothing that may furnish us with so sensible and palpable an Illustration of this Matter as th•• Order and Measure of Divine Pro∣vidence. We are all fully assured from the very Notion and Idea of God as involving all possible Excellency and Perfection in it, that he is a Being infinitely Wise, Good, Just and Holy, and Consequently that his whole Conduct in the Go∣vernment

of the World must neces∣sarily carry the Character of all these Attributes, and that he cannot pos∣sibly do any thing contrary or repug∣nant to any of them any more than he can deny himself, or depart from the Essential Perfections of his In∣finite Nature. And upon this Con∣sideration is founded the best Argu∣ment we have for Submission and Resignation to the Will of God, and Acquiescence in his Providen∣tial Dispensations. Thus far then we are all satisfied and agreed. And yet it cannot be denied when we come to Particulars, but that there are Phenomena in the Moral as well as in the Natural World which are utterly insolvible, and that a great many of these Dispen∣sations of Providence are accompa∣nied with desperate and invincible Difficulties, such as have at once exercised and puzzled the thoughts of the most inquisitive in all Ages, and still remain Obstinate and Un∣moveable Objections not only to the Atheists and Libertines, but even to the most sober and intelligent of both Philosophers and Divines, Men

of the greatest Light and Piety, those who best understand, and do most reverence and adore the ways of God. And adore them after all they must, for so intricate and in∣tangling are the Difficulties, or (by the leave of some) I would say My∣steries of Providence, especially in those dark Scenes of it that relate to the Divine Concourse and Co∣operation with the Will of Man, the Ordination of his Final State, the Order and Distribution of Grace, the Permission, Direction and Nice Conduct of Sin, &c. that the Capacity of our Understanding will not serve us to give a clear and unobnoxious account of them. In∣deed the diligent and curious Wit of Man has gone a great way in this as well as in Other Matters, and several Systemes and Hypo∣theses have been invented about these things by Contemplative Spi∣rits, among whom the two very particular Authors of the Treatise of Nature and Grace, and of L'Oecono∣mie Divine have I think gone the furthest of any. But though some of these Accounts bid fairer for re∣ception

than others, by striking some glimmering Light into these Abstrusities, yet still they all agree in this, that they leave a great deal more in the Dark, and labour with Difficulties even where they do Ex∣plain: So that after all they discover nothing so much as their own Short∣ness and Deficiency. In the mean while we know and are most cer∣tain in the General, that all is right and as it should be in the Conduct of God towards his Creatures, and that he cannot make one false Step in the Government of the World. So much we understand without Systemes, and truly not much more with them. For as for the Particu∣lar Scenes of Providence we know not what to make of them; and when we have consider'd the Dis∣pensations of God as much as we can or dare, we find our selves after all obliged to confess, that though Righteousness and Iudgment are the Habitation of his Seat,* 1.6 yet Clouds and Darkness are round about him.

21. But now how comes it to be so Dark and Cloudy? How come we to be so little able to see the par∣ticular

Wisdom, Goodness, Justice and Holiness of those ways of God, which in the general we are con∣vinc'd to be so Wise, Good, Just and Holy? Why can we not enter into the Detail of Providence? Why even because we do not see it throughout, and have not a Com∣prehension of its Universal Systeme. For the Passages of Providence 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of such a Relative and Complicated Nature, there is such a kind of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or mutual in-being or in∣dwelling in them, (if I may transfer an Expression hither, commonly ap∣plyed to a higher Mystery) they are so interwoven with, and have so common a dependance upon one another, that without a Compre∣hensive View of the whole Drama, we can hardly make any thing of any one Particular Scene. Indeed if we could have such a View as that, a View that went round and through, and grasp'd the whole Area of that immense Circle, we should quickly see the Regularity of the most uneven and odd-figured Parts, and how wonderfully they conspired (like the Flats and Sharps

of Musick) to the Order and Har∣mony of that excellent and surpri∣zing Beauty that results from them. But being not able to reach this, we are not competent Judges of the rest, (which by the way should re∣press our forwardness to fit in Judg∣ment upon things so far above the Cognizance of our Court); and though we know the Measures of God to be all Wise, Good, Just and Holy, yet this is only an implicit Knowledge, founded upon an Ex∣ternal Evidence only (much after the same manner as it is in Faith) even the general Conception we have of the Divine Perfection, without any clear and immediate discernment of the Internal Connexion that is be∣tween the things themselves. We believe 'tis all well and right because the Infinitely Wise God sits at the Helm; but then again, because he is so Infinitely Wise we cannot found the Depths of his Wisdom, (as in∣deed it would be very strange if an Infinitely Wise Agent should not be able to do things Wisely, and yet beyond our Understanding) nor re∣concile all his particular proceedings

to the Laws of Reason and Equity; but the more we study about these things the more we are at a loss, the further we wade into this Sea the deeper we find it, till at last we find our selves obliged to cry out with the most inspired Apostle, O the Depth of the Riches both of the Wis∣dom and Knowledge of God,* 1.7 how un∣searchable are his Iudgments, and his Ways past finding out! And all for want of an Intire and Comprehen∣sive View of them. For if the Knowledge of some very Com∣pounded Truths be impossible with∣out the Clear Perception of the Sim∣ple Principles upon which they de∣pend; and a Man would to no pur∣pose beat his Brains about the Con∣sideration of Conical Sections, till he has first well possessed himself of Ordinary Geometry; how much less then (may we conclude) are the In∣tricate and very Complicated Events of Divine Providence to be unravel'd without a Collected and Simulta∣neous Idea of the Universal Systeme whereof they are parts, to which they relate, and from their Concen∣tricity with which they receive all

their Order and Beauty, but which is in a manner lost to us for want of Compass enough in our Prospect. By which single Instance it appears (among many others that might have been given) how the Incapacity of Comprehending Truth in its whole Extent may disable us from Com∣prehending many Particular Truths; and consequently, that the same In∣finity of Truth which hinders us from Comprehending it according to that Extent, must also hinder us as much from being able to compre∣hend every Particular Truth. So then there will be Particular Truths which are Incomprehensible by us, and consequently Human Reason is not Commensurate to all Truth, not only as Collectively, but even as Distributively Consider'd. And there∣fore not as Distributively, because not as Collectively.

22. But then to raise our Specu∣lation a little higher, I consider yet further, that the Infinity of Truth is not only an Infinity of Extent, but also an Infinity of Nature, that is, that the Compass of Truth is not only Boundless and illimited, and

that it has in it an inexhaustible Spring, which like the Source of Light, is never to be drawn dry by the most thirsty draught of the whole Intellectual World, but also that there are Particular Truths of a Na∣ture truely infinite, and by conse∣quence incomprehensible to any Understanding that is not so. For we are here to recollect, what has been already shewn, that Truth is Consubstantial and Coessential with God and with the Divine Ideas. Now though these Ideas are all equally of the Essence and Nature of God, and so far equally Divine (it being impossible that there should be any thing in God that is not God) yet there is this general and very remarkable Difference between them, that some of these Divine Ideas are Absolute, and some Relative. That is, some are of the Essence of God Simply and Absolutely as He is in Himself, without any Relation to any thing out of Himself. And o∣thers again are of the Essence of God consider'd purely in Relation to things without Him either in Act or in Possibility, and only so far forth

as the Divine Essence is representa∣tive of Creatures. Or if you will, thus: We may consider a twofold Being in Ideas, Esse Reale, and Esse Ideale or Repraesentativum. Some Ideas are Divine, not only accord∣ing to their Esse Reale (for so they are all) but also according to their Esse Repraesentativum, as representing God to the Mind that Contemplates them. Others again are Divine only according to their Esse Reale, being indeed of the Substance of God, but not representing him, but his Crea∣tures, and so are Divine in the same sense as the Idea of a Body is Spiri∣tual, viz. Essentially only, not Re∣presentatively. Which Diversity in∣deed resolves into the former, be∣cause they are of the Essence of God, not as it is absolutely in itself, but only as it is representative of Crea∣tures, according to such a certain Modality and Limitation of Perfe∣ction. And accordingly though they are truly Divine Ideas as well as the other, yet they are not said to be Ideas of God, as not representing him, but his Creatures. The short is, The Essence of God may be con∣sider'd

either as it is absolutely in it self according to its Infinite Simpli∣city, or as it is in relation to, and representative of things without, ei∣ther of an Actual, or of a Possible Existence. And so the Ideas or Es∣sential Perfections of God are of two sorts: Either such as are of the Es∣sence of God consider'd in the first sense, as it is in it self, or else such as are of the same Divine Essence only in the second sense, as far forth as that Essence is representative of things out of it self; upon which by the way, I suppose, must be grounded (if we will resolve things into their last Principle) the common distinction of the Attributes of God into Communicable and Incommunica∣ble. The Incommunicable Attributes of God being those Perfections that are of the Divine Essence Simply and Absolutely consider'd as it is in it self; and the Communicable those that belong to the Divine Essence Relatively consider'd, and as repre∣sentative of Creatures, to whom accordingly they are in their Mea∣sure truly applicable; whereas the former are not, but are peculiar to

God alone; which sufficiently shews the difference between this double order of Divine Ideas. But to make it yet more intelligible by an Instance. The Idea of the Divine Immensity, or that Perfection in God which we call his Immensity, is of the Essence of God according to the first sense, as it is simply and absolutely in it self; being no other than the Sub∣stance of God as it is universally dif∣fused, intirely present in, and filling all places without being circumscri∣bed by any, yet without any Local Extension. But now the Idea of Extension, or that Perfection in God which vertually, eminently, and modo intelligibili, answers to Exten∣sion (and is therefore frequently cal∣led by Mr. Malebranch, L' ètendue intelligibl••) is of the Substance of God, not as it is in it self simply and absolutely, but only as far forth as it is representative of Matter, or Body, and imitable or participable by it, according to those Limitations and Imperfections which belong to that kind of Being, and which are represented by this its Idea. I know not whether I express my self to

the Conception of every Reader, but I am sufficiently Clear and Intelligi∣ble to my self; and whoever is not much wanting either in Metaphysics, or in Attention, cannot I think well miss my Meaning.

23 Now the use that I make of this Speculation to the present pur∣pose is this: Those Ideas which are of the Essence of God only as that Divine Essence, according to some certain Limitations and inadequate Considerations of it, is representa∣tive of Creatures, must be consider'd by us as of a Finite Nature. Be∣cause however truly Divine and of the Essence of God, yet not as it is absolutely and simply in it self, but only as it is in relation to Creatures; that is, as partially and inadequately consider'd, according to certain Ab∣stractions and Limitations of Entity and Perfection, such as the things whereof they are Ideas do require. And accordingly such Ideas are or∣dinarily said, not to be the Ideas of God who is Infinite (for they do not represent him, though Essential to him) but to be the Ideas of Crea∣tures, who are Finite. They are

indeed Divine Ideas, because Essen∣tial to God; but they are not Ideas of God, because they are of the Di∣vine Essence only as it relates to Creatures, and is representative of them. Of Creatures therefore they are the Ideas, and God in seeing them is not properly said to see him∣self, (though they are of himself) but to see Creatures; because though they are of his Divine Essence, yet 'tis only according to such Precisions, Limitations and Inadequations of it as to be expressive and representa∣tive of their Finite Perfections. As therefore the Realities which these Ideas represent are Finite, so these Ideas must be conceiv'd by us as Fi∣nite too; it being impossible that Infinite consider'd as Infinite, should be representative of what is Finite. And as these Ideas are Finite, so are they also by Consequence so Pro∣portionate, and of a Measure so ad∣justed to Finite Understandings, as to be Intelligible by them, and with∣in the Possibility of their Compre∣hension; which must also in like manner be concluded of all those Truths which are Consubstantial to

them. And accordingly the Expe∣riment answers the Theory. We find that not only contingent Truths that regard only the Actualities and Existencies of Things, such as mat∣ters of Fact, Human Events, &c. but even a great many of those which are Ideal and Necessary, and concern only the Abstract Reasons and Essences of Things independent∣ly on their Actual Existence, are Comprehensible by us, as in Meta∣physics and Geometry, in the Con∣templation of which Sciences we meet with a great many things which we well understand, and whereof we have Clear Ideas and Conceptions.

24. But now it is not thus with the Ideas of the first Order, nor with their Truths, Though those Divine Ideas which appertain to the Essence of God only as representa∣tive of Creatures, be both Finite and Comprehensible by limited Un∣derstandings, (which indeed other∣wise would not be capable of any Science) yet these Absolute Ideas which I now speak of, are neither Finite nor Comprehensible. For

these Ideas are of the very Essence and Substance of God as it is in it self purely and separately consider'd according to its simple and absolute Nature, and not as it is in relation to Creatures, or as representative of any Reality out of it self. And accordingly God in contemplating these Ideas of his may be truly and strictly said to contemplate himself; and we also in the Contemplation of them do as really contemplate God, and that because they are of his Di∣vine Essence simply and absolutely consider'd as it is in it self, and not as it is in reference to any thing be∣sides, or out of it self. These Ideas therefore are strictly Infinite (be∣cause the Divine Essence, as it is in it self simply and absolutely consi∣der'd is so) and consequently Incom∣prehensible by any Finite, and con∣sequently by Human Understanding. God only can Comprehend these Ideas, and that because he only can Comprehend himself. Human Rea∣son indeed has Light enough to dis∣cover that there are such Ideas and Perfections in God, and is withal able to discern enough of them to

raise her greatest Wonder and Devo∣tion, and to make her despise all o∣ther Intelligible Objects in compari∣son of these Infinite Grandeurs; and the Angelic Spirits that wait about the Throne of his Majesty, and stand in a better Light, are able to see yet more of them; but neither the one nor the other can Compre∣hend them fully any more than they can God himself, and that because they are God. So that though the other Ideas are Finite and Compre∣hensible, these are truly Infinite and Incomprehensible. And of this we have sufficient Evidence in the In∣stances above proposed of each. The Idea of Extension is very Clear and Intelligible to our Minds, as Finite and as Narrowly bounded as they are. We have a very distinct View of it, we Perceive it, we Compre∣hend it. Among all Intelligible Ob∣jects there is none that is more clear, nor whereof we have a more ade∣quate and exact Notion. And upon this is founded all that peculiar Clearness, Evidence and Certainty that is in the Geometric Sciences, which alone have the happiness to

be free from Disputes, and without Contestation to find that Truth which the others seek after, and that for no other Reason but because we have so clear and distinct a Notion of its general Subject, Extension. But now as to the * 1.8 Divine Immensity, so far are we from ha∣ving a Clear Concep∣tion of that, that no sooner do we set our selves to contemplate this vast Idea, but we enter into Clouds and Darkness, or rather into such an over-shining and insupportable Light as dazzles and blinds our Eyes, yea hurts and pains them, till they can no longer indure to gaze, but are forc'd to refresh themselves either by letting down their wearied Lids (suspense of Thought) or by turn∣ing their view upon less glorious Ob∣jects. In the Meditation of the other Idea we are like Men that wade in a River where we both see and feel the Bottom, and go on for a pretty way together smoothly and without much difficulty, only now and then

meeting with an intangling Weed that lets and incumbers our pro∣gress. But in the Contemplation of the Infinite Idea of the Divine Im∣mensity we are like men that com∣mit themselves to the Main Sea, at the very first Plunge out of our depth, and ready to be overwhelm'd, swallow'd up and lost in an Abyss that knows no bottom.

25. I use a little Figure and Ima∣gery here the better to impress this upon the Imagination of those who are not so well habituated to the Conception of things by Pure In∣tellection, but the thing it self needs none of the advantages of the Me∣taphorical way, being strictly and severely true. And by these two Instances it may appear what a vast difference there is between these two sorts of the Divine Ideas, the Ab∣solute and the Relative, those that are of the Essence of God as in him∣self, and those that are of the same Divine Essence as it is in relation to Creatures. The First, Infinite and Incomprehensible, the Second, Fi∣nite and Comprehensible. For you see here the Idea of Extension is

clear and distinct, and such as we can fully and adequately Conceive, but the Idea of the Divine Immen∣sity, has nothing clear and distinct in it, but is all over Darkness and Obscurity, and such as quite asto∣nishes and confounds us with a Thousand difficulties upon the first application of our Thoughts to it, as indeed do all the Absolute Attri∣butes and Perfections of God, which are all equally Infinite, and equally incomprehensible to Finite Spirits, however they may be able to Com∣prehend that which in the Essence of God is representative of, and car∣ries a Relation to those Realities which either actually do, or possibly may exist out of it. And in this I say no more (setting aside only the Rationale of the thing) than those who tell us that the Incommunicable Attributes of God are Infinite and Incomprehensible. They are so. But what is it that makes them In∣finite and Incomprehensible? Even the same that makes them Incommu∣nicable, viz. their being of the Es∣sence of God as it is in it self ac∣cording to its Absolute Simplicity,

and not as it is in Relation to Crea∣tures. For 'tis most evident that the Essence of God as it is simply and Absolutely in it self is every way Infinite and Incomprehensible, and therefore all those Ideas and Perfections of his which are in this Absolute Sense Essential to him must be also of an alike Infinite and Incomprehensible Nature. Which by the way may serve to Silence the presumptuous Cavils of those who draw Objections against the Existence of God from the incom∣prehensibility of his Attributes, since if there be a God he must have in∣comprehensible Attributes, which unless we ascribe to him we do not think either rightly or worthily of him.

26. But to resume our Point, we see then here what a large Field is now open'd to our Prospect of In∣finite and Incomprehensible Truths, even of a Compass as large as the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of the Divine Essence. For though all Created things are of a Finite Na∣ture, and though even the Divine Ideas that represent them, as far as

representative of them, must fall under the same limited Considerati∣on, yet those Absolute Ideas and Perfections of God that have no such external Reference, but are of the Divine Essence as it is in its pure, simple, abstracted Self, must ne∣cessarily partake of the Divine In∣finity, and be as unbounded as God himself. And since Truth (as was before observ'd) is Coessential and Consubstantial with the Divine Ideas, I further Conclude, that though those Truths which regard the Ac∣tualities and Existencies of things, or if you please, things that do actu∣ally exist, be Finite, because the things themselves are so, and though even those that regard the Divine Ideas themselves are also Finite sup∣posing the Ideas to be of the inferi∣our Order, such as are of the Di∣vine Essence only as it is represen∣tative of, and in relation to Crea∣tures, yet those Truths which re∣spect those Divine Ideas of the Su∣periour Order, that are of the Ab∣solute Essence of God as it is in it self purely and simply Consider'd, and so are not only Essentially, but

even Representatively Divine, as tru∣ly representing God, and being in a strict and proper sense his Ideas, I say the Truths of this Order and Character must necessarily be of a Nature far exalted above all Crea∣tures, yea above all other Ideal Truths, even as far as what is of the Simple and Absolute Essence of God transcends that which in the same Es∣sence is only Relative to things with∣out, and can therefore be no less than Infinite. We have here then an Order of Infinite Truths, even allthose which regard the Absolute Ideas and Per∣fections of God. These Divine Ideas and Perfections are all Infinite, as that Glorious Essence whose Ideas they are and whom they represent, and so also are the Sublime Truths which result from them. They are of a Nature strictly Infinite, and if Infinite then by Consequence Incomprehensible, I mean to all understandings that are not so. For as Nothing Finite has Reality enough to represent Infi∣nite, so neither can any thing Finite have Capacity enough to Compre∣hend it. For as the actual know∣ledge of any intelligent Being can

never exceed its intellectual Power, so neither can its Power exceed the measure of its Essence. A Finite Being therefore must have a Finite Understanding, and a Finite Under∣standing must have a Finite Percep∣tion. Since then our Understand∣ings are Finite, 'tis plain that our Perception of Infinite must also be Finite. 'Tis true indeed that Objective Reality which we contemplate when we think upon Infinite has no Limits, and so we may be said in some respect to have an Infinite Thought, as far as the Operation of the Mind may be de∣nominated from the quality of the Object, but yet still we think ac∣cording to the Measure of our Na∣ture, and our Perception of Infinite can be no more at the most than Finite. But now a Finite Percep∣tion bears no proportion to an In∣finite Intelligible, besides that to per∣ceive such an Object after a Finite manner is not to perceive it as it is, but only Partially and inadequately. But now a Partial and inadequate Perception of a thing can never be said to be a Comprehension of that

thing, even though the thing be Finite, much less then when it is Infinite. Whereby it plainly ap∣pears that if there be an Order of Infinite Truths the same will also be Incomprehensible Ones, and since again as I have shewn there is an Order of such Truths, even all those that regard the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of the Divine Essence, it clearly follows that there is an Or∣der of Incomprehensible Truths, and Consequently that Human Rea∣son is not the Measure of Truth, even Distributively consider'd, since there are Particular Truths which it cannot Comprehend; which was the thing to be proved.

27. And of all this we may have a plain and visible illustration in the foremention'd Instance of the Di∣vine Immensity. This is an Idea or Perfection of God that is truely In∣sinite, as being of his Divine Essence as it is Absolutely in it self, and not as in Order to, or representative of Creatures; And as Infinite 'tis also Incomprehensible by any but God himself. Accordingly the Complex Truth that regards this Absolute

Idea of God is also Infinite, and as such Incomprehensible. As appears in this Proposition, God is Immense; which is an Infinite and Incompre∣hensible Truth. We find it is so a Posteriori by casting the view of our Understandings upon it. And we find it must be so a Priori by reason∣ing upon the Principles already laid down and establish'd. And to pre∣vent all vain cavilling in this matter I further add, that though we could suppose the Truths that result from Infinite Ideas not to be Infinite (which yet we cannot by reason of their real Identity and Coessentiali∣ty with those Ideas) yet however they must upon another account be incomprehensible, even upon the Incomprehensibility of those Ideas. For if the Ideas whereof a Truth consists be incomprehensible, as they must be if they are Infinite, that alone would be enough to hinder us from being able to Comprehend such a Truth, it being impossible we should thoroughly understand the Relations or Habitudes between those Ideas whose Simple Natures (the Foundation of those Habitudes)

we do not Comprehend. For if in Finite things the not having a clear and adequate Idea of a thing makes us unable to judge of the Truth or Falshood of many Propositions con∣cerning that thing (whereof there are a multitude of Instances in Mo∣rality, especially in Questions relating to the Soul of Man, which must for ever lie undetermin'd merely for want of our having a clear Idea of that Noble Essence) much more then in things Infinite will the not having a Comprehension of the Ideas incapacitate us from Comprehending the Truths that Result from them, which will therefore be as incompre∣hensible as if they were (what in∣deed they are) in themselves Infi∣nite.

28. I have hitherto shewn the In∣comprehensibility of Truth by Hu∣man Reason, and consequently that Human Reason, is not the Measure of Truth, from the joynt Conside∣ration of each. Only with this diffe∣rence. I have consider'd and re∣presented Truth Absolutely as it is in it self, according to its own Infi∣nite and unmeasurable Nature. But

as for Human Reason I have consi∣der'd that only as Finite, as suppo∣sing that sufficient to my present Purpose, and that there was no need of placing it in any other Light. For after it hath been shewn that Truth is Infinite, to prove that Hu∣man Reason cannot be the Measure of it, it is certainly enough to Consider it as a Bounded Power, without re∣presenting how very strait and nar∣row its Bounds are, since whatever is Finite can never measurer Infinite. But then it so, what if we add the other Consideration to it? If the bare Finiteness of Human Under∣standing (a defect common to it with all Created Intelligencies) ren∣ders it uncapable of Comprehend∣ing Truth, and Consequently of be∣ing the Measure of it, how much more then does the littleness and narrowness of its Bounds contribute to heighten that incapacity? If the having any limits does so unquali∣fie it for the adequate Comprehen∣sion of Truth, how then does the having so very short and strait ones? Strait indeed by Natural and Origi∣nal Constitution, but much more

yet retrench'd by Sin, and by all those Passions, Prejudices, deordi∣nate Affections and Evil Customs which are the Effects and Conse∣quences of Sin, and which have now so darken'd our Minds, and drawn such a gross Film over our Intel∣lectual Sight that we can hardly distinguish Day from Night, Clear∣ness from Obscurity, Truth from Falshood, and are able to see but so very little a way into the Works of God (much less into the Nature of God himself) that we need nothing else to depress and humble our Pride and Vanity than that very Know∣ledge of ours which puffs us up. So very narrow in its Compass and Extent, so very Shallow and Super∣ficial in its Depth, so very Confuse and Obscure in its Light, so very uncertain and conjectural in its Ground, and so every way defective and imprerfect is it. But how then can we found the Depth of Truth with so short a Line? A Bottomless Depth with (I will not say a Finite, but) so very scanty a Measuer? And what an extravagant Folly and Weakness, not to say Pride and

Vanity is it to fancy that we can? It would be a Vain Presumption in an Angel, but sure the very Mad∣ness and Distraction of Impudence in Man, who may with less defi∣ance to Sence and Reason think to grasp the Ocean within the hollow of his hand, than to Comprehend and Measure Truth, Infinite Bound∣less Truth, not only with Finite, but so very limited Capacities.

29. But suppose Truth were not (what we have shewn it to be) In∣finite, but had Bounds as well as our Reason, yet unless it had the Same, our Reason cannot be Com∣mensurate to it, or the Measure of it. But does the supposition of its having Limits infer that it has the same? No, For though Finite, its Bounds may possibly be extended further than those of our Under∣standings, and how can we be sure that they are not? We cannot then even upon this supposition be sure that our Reason is the Measure of Truth, and therefore it is all one as to us (as I said before) as if it were not so, forasmuch as we can∣not use it as a Measure by drawing

any Consequences from it concern∣ing the Falshood or impossibility of things upon the account of our ina∣bility to Comprehend them, since for ought we know the Limits of Truth though we should suppose it Finite, may yet exceed, and that very greatly too, those of our Ra∣tional Faculties. And Considering both the Natural and the Super∣accessory defects of them it is very reasonable to think that they do.

30. Some Essences perhaps there may be (though even this again is more than we know) that sit so high in the Intellectual Form as to be able to Comprehend all that is Finite, so that the only reason why they have not an adequate Compre∣hension of Truth at large is because it is indeed Infinite. But there is no Necessity, nor so much as Probabi∣lity that Human Reason should be of so rais'd an Order that nothing but Infinity should transcend its Comprehension. And it must be a strange Composition of Pride and Self-love that can make us fancy that it is; something like that, only much more extravagant, which

possesses the disturb'd Heads of some in Bedlam, and makes them Conceit themselves Kings and Emperours in the midst of their Irons, Rags, and Straw. What though Truth were Finite, and some Understandings too that are so were able to measure it, why must this needs be concluded of Human Understanding? If a Finite Being were able to Compre∣hend Truth, why must Man be that Being? The Scripture tells us he is made lower than the Angels, and how many Orders and Degrees there may be among them we know not, nor indeed how many Ranks of Spiritual Beings there may be in the Universe whose Understandings go beyond ours. For who can define the Out-flowings of the Divine Fe∣cundity, or Number the Rounds of the Intellectual Scale? In the mean while though man knows not how many Orders of Intelligent Crea∣tures there are above him, yet 'tis with great Reason and Consent pre∣sumed that there are none below him, so that he is placed even by his own Confession in the lowest Form of the Intellectual Order.

And why then may not his Under∣standing (as much as he values him∣self upon it) be of so Shallow a Depth, and so low a Size that e∣ven Finite Objects may be dispro∣portionate to him? Especially since we find him so often puzzl'd and gravell'd in Natural things, as also in those Ideal Truths that have re∣lation to the Natural and Ectypal World, such as Philosophical and Mathematical Problems. Or if the Reason of any Creature could be the Measure of Truth, why should he be that Creature, who is seated in the very Confines of the Mate∣rial and Immaterial World, and is as it were the Common-Point where Matter ends and Spirit begins, who brings up the rear of the Intellec∣tual kind, and is both the youngest and the least indow'd among the Sons of God.

31. These Considerations suffici∣ently shew that there is no Necessi∣ty, nor so much as Probability, that Human Reason should be the Mea∣sure of Truth even upon the Sup∣position of its being Finite. Which indeed is enough of it self to carry

the Point Contended for as far as the Design of the present Argument is Concern'd. For if it be not necessary that Human Reason should be the Measure of Truth, then it is Possible that it may not be, and if it is Pos∣sible that it may not, then we can be never Sure that it is, and if we cannot be Sure that it is, then we cannot Use it as a Measure, which (as I have remarqu'd already and for the Moment of it do here reincul∣cate) makes it the same to all intents and purposes as if it were not such at all. But yet to carry our Plea a little highter I further Contend that as the foregoing Considerations suf∣fice to shew that Human Reason may not, so there is One behind that very positively Demonstrates that it Cannot be the Measure of Truth, even tho' we should allow it to be of a Finite and bounded Nature as well as our own understandings.

32. As there are many things whereof our Ideas are very Confuse and Obscure, so 'tis most 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that there are some things 〈◊〉〈◊〉 we have no Ideas at all, it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not pleas'd the Eternal and 〈◊〉〈◊〉

Intelligence to Exhibit that in Him∣self which is Representative of those things to our Understandings. But now besides the Difficultys and disad∣vantages we shall always ly under in the Comprehension of things from the Confuseness and Obscurity of our Ideas, which of it Self will many times render those things, and also whatever nearly relates to those things incomprehensible by us, and besides that our not having any Ideas of Certain things, is an invincible Bar to all Knowledge and Compre∣hension of those things (unless we could be supposed to be able to see without Light) 'tis also further Considerable that possibly the Know∣ledge of that Truth which we set our Selves to Comprehend, and whereof we have the Ideas, may depend upon the truth of another thing whereof we have no Idea. If it should be so tho Truth in gene∣ral be never so Finite, or the Parti∣cular Truth we would Contemplate be never so Finite, 'tis plain we shall be no more able to Compre∣hend it than if it were Infinite. Now I say that 'tis not only Possible that

this may be the Case (which yet of it Self as I have again and again Noted is sufficient to debar us from using our Reason as the Measure of Truth) but there are also some In∣stances wherein it appears actually to be so. We know well enough what we mean by Liberty and Con∣tingency, and are withal well assured that we are Free Agents. We have also a Sufficient Notion of Prescience, and are also no less assured of the Reality of it, And because both these are true, and there can be no real re∣pugnance between one Truth and another we are also by Consequence assured that there is a good Harmony and Agreement between them, and that they are Consistent with each other. But now how to adjust their apparent Opposition, or re∣concile those Instances of seeming Contradiction and inconsistency wherewith they press us, this we nei∣ther Know nor are able with all our Meditation to Comprehend, and that because we have not an Idea of the Human Soul, without which there is no possibility of Compre∣hending how its Free Workings

may be the Objects of Prescience, tho our Ideas of Prescience and Li∣berty were never so Clear. Or if this Instance shall not be thought so proper because the Men with whom our present Concern lies are pleas'd to disown the Doctrine of Prescience, let me desire them to Consider whe∣ther there be not many other Difficul∣ties concerning Human Liberty, be∣sides that taken from, Prescience, which they are no more able to get over then they are that. And that for the very same Reason, even be∣cause they ahve not an Idea of the Soul, upon the Knowledge of which the Solution of those, as well as some other Difficulties in Morality, does Necessarily depend. Or if they please let them take an Instance of a Physical Nature. We know well enough what it is to be in a Place, and we know also as well what it is to be Coextended to a Place. But now how Being in a Place may be without Coextension to a Place, this is what we cannot Comprehend (tho as to the thing it Self, upon other Considerations constrain'd to grant it) and that because we are

ignorant of the general Nature of Spirit, upon the clear Conception of which the Comprehension of the other does so depend that it cannot be had without it. And indeed we may concluded in general that when ever we have clear Ideas of things, and yet are not able to Comprehend the Truth of them, 'tis because the Know∣ledge of those things depends upon the Truth of something else where∣of we have either no Idea, or not such as is sufficiently Clear. Which must be the true Reason of the hither∣to presumed impossibility of finding out the exact Proportion between a Circle and a Square. Why, Circle and Square are very Intelligible things, and how come we then not to be able to determin the precise and just Proportion that is between them: It cannot be from any Ob∣scurity in the things themselves, much less from our want of having Ideas of them, for we have as clear and exact Ideas of these Figures as we can have of any thing in the World. It must be therefore be∣cause the Knowledge of their Pro∣portion depends upon the Knowledge

of some other thing whereof the Idea fails us, which till we are pos∣ses'd of we shall in vain endeavour to discover the other. Whereby it plainly appears that we are not only uncapable of Comprehending those Truths that relate to things whereof we have no Ideas, but that even where we have Ideas, and those very Clear ones too we may be as far from Comprehending a Truth as if we had none merely upon the account of the Dependence which that Truth has upon some other thing whereof we have not, at least a just, Idea. Which single Consideration is e∣nough for ever to spoil Human Rea∣son for setting up for the Measure of Truth, even upon the Supposition of its being Finit. So very False is that arrogant Assertion of a Modern Philosopher,* 1.9. Quaecunque existunt hu∣manae Menti pervestigabilia, praeter∣quam In••initum. Whatever is may be thoroughly Comprehended by the Mind of Man, except Infinite. And again. Vnum duntaxat est quod om∣nem mentis nostrae vim longissime ex∣cedit, ipsâ{que} suâ Naturâ, ut in se est, ab eâ Cognosci nequit, In••initum puta.

There is but one only thing that far exceeds the Force and reach of our Mind, and that cannot of its own very Nature be known by it as it is in it self, namely Infinite. What but One thing excepted from the Verge, and placed beyond the reach of Human Knowledge? 'Tis well that One thing is a pretty large one, but sure the Authour was ignorant of something else, that is Himself, or else he could never have advanc'd such a Crude and ill-consider'd a Pro∣position.

33. And thus I have shewn at large in a rational way by arguing a Priori, and from the Nature of things, that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth, and that even upon the most Liberal Sup∣position of its being Finite; And if it be not so supposing Truth to be Finite, much less is it supposing it (what it has been prov'd to be) of an Infinite Nature. If upon the Former Supposition it exceeds the Proportion of our Reason, certainly upon the latter there will be no Proportion between them. But whether our Reason bears no Pro∣portion

to Truth, or whether it be only Disproportionate to it, either way it follows that it cannot be the Measure of it, which I cannot but now look upon as a Proposition sufficiently demonstrated. And in all this I contend for no more than what is implied in that Common and universally approv'd Maxim even among those of the Rational way, that we ought not to deny what is Evident for the sake of what is Obscure, or de∣part from a Truth which we see a Necessity to admit because of some Difficulties attending it which we cannot solve; which they say is an Argument only of our Igno∣rance, and not of the Falshood of the thing. This indeed is a true Rule, and such as must be allow'd to hold good in all our Reasonings, let the Matter of them be what it will. Only I wish that the Impli∣cation of the Rule were as much minded, as the Rule it self is gene∣rally receiv'd. For it plainly im∣plies that there are some things which though plain and certain as to their Existence, are yet incom∣prehensible

and inexplicable as to their Manner. But then as the In∣comprehensibility of the Manner should not make us reject the Truth of the thing when otherwise Evi∣dent, so neither should the Evidence we have of the Truth of the thing make us disown the Incomprehen∣sibility of the Manner, since it is so far from being against the Nature of Truth that it should be incom∣prehensible, that you see we have discover'd even from the Contem∣plation of its Nature that there are incomprehensible Truths. Of which I might now subjoyn some parti∣cular Examples, but that I should fall very deep into a Common Place, being herein prevented by many o∣ther Writers, particularly by the admirable one of L' Art de Penser, to the First Chapter of whose Fourth Book I refer my Reader; where he shews by several, and some of them uncommon Instances that there are things which the Mind of Man is not capable of Comprehending. Af∣ter which he Concludes with a very grave and useful Reflection, which for the great advantage and Perti∣nency

of it to the present Affair, though I refer my Reader to the rest of the Chapter, I shall here set down. The Pro••it (says he) that one may draw from these Speculations is not barely to acquire the knowledge of them, which of it self is barren enough, but it is to learn to know the Bounds of our understanding, and to force it to confess that there are things which it cannot Comprehend. And therefore it is good to fatigue the mind with these kind of Subtilties, the better to tame its Presumption, and abate its confi∣dence and daringness in opposing its Feeble Lights against the Mysteries of Religion, under the Pretence that it cannot comprehend them. For since all the Force of Human Vnderstand∣ing is constrain'd to yield to the least Atom of Matter, and to own that it sees Clearly that it is infinitely divi∣sible without being able to Comprehend how this may be. Is it not apparent∣ly to transgress against Reason to refuse to believe the wonderful effects of the Divine Onnipotence, Merely for this Reason, that our Vnderstanding can∣not Comprehend them? Yes without

doubt it is, as will better appear in the sequel of this Discourse. In the mean while before I take leave of the Subject of this Chapter, I have a double Remarque to make upon it.

34. The First is, that since Truth in its full extent is Incomprehensi∣ble, we should not vainly go about to Comprehend it, but be contented to be ignorant in many things. And since there are some special Truths in particular that are in∣comprehensible we should not ap∣ply our Thoughts to the Compre∣hension of all things at a Ven∣ture, as some who are for under∣standing every thing, but sit down first and Consider whether they are proportionate to our Ca∣pacities or No, and, as far as we can learn to distinguish what Truths may, and what may not be Comprehended by us, that so we may not lose that Time and Pains in the Contemplation of them, which might be profitably imploy'd in the Consideration of other things, better suted to our

Capacity. As a great many do, who busie themselves all their Lives long about such things which if they should study to E∣ternity they would not Compre∣hend, and that indeed because they require an Infinite Capacity to Comprehend them. Whereas the shortest Compendium of Study, and the best way to abridge the Sciences is to study only what we can Master, and what is within the Sphere of our Faculties, and never so much as to apply our selves to what we can never Com∣prehend.

35. The other Remarque is that the Conclusion prov'd in this Chapter does very much Fortifie and Confirm that which was un∣dertaken to be made out in the last Concerning the Distinction of Things Above, and Things Con∣trary to Reason. For if there are Truths which we cannot Compre∣hend, then it seems what is above our Comprehension may yet be True, and if True then to be sure not Contrary to Reason,

since whatever is Contrary to Rea∣son is no less Contrary to Truth, which though sometimes above Reason is yet never Contrary to it.

Notes

• * 1.1

  L' Art de Penser. p. 432.
• * 1.2

  Cogit. Rational. de Deo, p. 296.
• * 1.3

  Mr. Male∣branche.
• * 1.4

  Veritas immortalis est, veritas incommutabilis est, veritas illud verbum est de quo dicitur in principio erat verbum, & verbum erat ap∣ud Deum & Deus erat verbum. S. Austin in Psal. 123.
• * 1.5

  Iob 11. 7.
• * 1.6

  Psal. 97. 2.
• * 1.7

  Rom. 11. 33.
• * 1.8

  I the rather Instance in the Divine Immensity, be∣cause the D••vout Psalmist does herein parti••ularize his Igno∣rance, making it the Subject of his Astonishment rather than his Curiosity. Such Know∣ledge is too wonderful for me, it is high, I cannot at∣tain unto it, Psal. 139.
• * 1.9

  ••erardi de Vries Prasessor∣is V••tra∣•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉, exercita∣tiones rationales de Deo, Divinis{que} Perfecto∣inibus Pag. 248.