An account of reason & faith in relation to the mysteries of Christianity / by John Norris.

CHAP. III. The Distinction of things Contrary to Reason, and above Reason, Consider'd. (Book 3)

1. THere are some Distinctions in the World that are with∣out a Difference, though Difference be the Ground of all Distinction, and this by some is pretended to be of that Number, who will have the Parts of it to be Coincident, and that Contrary to Reason and above Reason signifie in reality alike, and are but different Expressions for one and the same thing. And though they may be reasonably suspected to do this to serve the interest of a Cause for whose advantage it would be to have this Distinction taken away, yet they have the Confidence to Charge the same upon those that hold it, pretending that it is only a dextrous Shift and Evasion invented

by Subtile Men as an Expedient to relieve the Distress of a desperate Argument, when there is nothing else to be said for it.

2. Which of these is the Evasion, either the denying or the allowing this Distinction, will best appear by the Examination of it, which, be∣sides its Serviceableness to our Clea∣rer proceeding in what we are now upon, I am the rather induced to undertake, because (as Mr. Boyle Observes in a little Treatise upon this Subject) there are divers that employ this Distinction, few that have attempted to explain it, and none that has taken care to justifie it. Indeed He himself is the only Person that I know of that has written pro∣fessedly about it (and I cannot but wonder that a thing of such Curi∣osity and Importance should be so little Consider'd) though I think he has not gone to the Bottom of the Subject, nor is sufficiently clear even as far as he goes. However because he has some Considerable Observations upon it (as indeed his Thoughts are generally very good) and there is no reason why we

should refuse any additional Light in so dark and untrodden a way, I shall for the further advantage and illustration of the Matter first draw up into a short view what that Ex∣cellent Person has Meditated con∣cerning it, with such Occasional Remarques as I shall think neces∣sary, and then proceed to state the thing according to my own Con∣ceptions, hoping that between us both it will be sufficiently clear'd, and that nothing of any Conse∣quence will be overlook'd that be∣longs to the Consideration of this so little consider'd, and almost Virgin Subject.

3. To give you then in the first place the Sum of Mr. Boyle's Ac∣count, He proposes in general two things. 1. To declare in what sense the Distinction is to be under∣stood. 2. To prove that it is not an Arbitrary or illusory Distinction, but grounded upon the Nature of things. As to the first he tells you that by things Above Reason he Conceives such Notions and Propo∣sitions as Mere Reason, that is, un∣assisted by Revelation would never

have discover'd to us, whether those things be to our Finite Capacities clearly comprehensible or not. And that by things Contrary to Reason he understands such Conceptions and Propositions as are not only undis∣coverable by mere Reason, but such as when we do understand them do evidently appear repugnant to some Principle, or to some Conclusion of right Reason.

4. Now before I go any further I would here by this great Man's leave, and with due deference to his high Character, remarque, that though things undiscoverable by mere Reason without Revelation may in a Certain sense be said to be above Reason, in as much as they surpass the Natural ability of the Understanding to make the first Discovery of them, yet this is not what Divines mean by Above Rea∣son as they use the Phrase in this Distinction, opposing it to Contrary to Reason. For this Distinction was intended against the Socinians, who generally reject the Mysteries of Faith as contrary to Sense and Rea∣son, to which we reply that they

are not Contrary to Reason but on∣ly Above it. They cry out that this is no Distinction, but a mere Shift and Evasion, pretending that the I arts of it fall in together, and that what is above Reason is also contrary to it, and therefore not to be believ'd. Now 'tis most plain that both they that use this Distin∣ction, and they against whom it is used do not. Mean by things Above Reason such as are beyond the first invention or Discovery of it. For besides that to mean that our My∣steries are only undiscoverable when we say they are above Reason, would be too little a thing to oppose to Contrary to Reason, it is also too lit∣tle a thing to intend by Mystery, since though the undiscoverableness of them by Reason might be a suf∣ficient ground of their being so call'd before their Revelation, it can be none now after they are reveal'd. And therefore if we say of these My∣steries now that they are above Reason, we cannot be presumed to intend it in respect of their undisco∣verableness. And 'tis as plain that that our Adversaries do not so un∣derstand

us. For they deny that things above Reason are to be be∣liev'd, and that because (according to them) above Reason and contra∣ry to Reason are all one. But now no Socinian that understands his own Principle would deny the Credibi∣lity of things above Reason, as that signifies only undiscoverable by Rea∣son alone, much less would he say that what is above Reason (in that Sense) is also contrary to it. No, without doubt they will in this sense both allow us the Distinction, and the Mysteries (if they may be so call'd) that are built upon it. But then this plainly shews that they do not understand it in this Sense, any more than we.

5. Instead therefore of saying un∣discoverable, he should have said in∣comprehensible by Reason. Into which he slips unawares in the account of the other part of the Distinction, things Contrary to Reason, by saying that they are such as when we do understand them do appear repug∣nant, &c. which plainly implies that the former things that were said to be above Reason are such as we do

not understand, even when disco∣ver'd, and not such as we are not able only to Discover, since other∣wise there will be no Antithesis in the Second part, in which there is nothing amiss except those words as are not only undiscoverable, which in my judgment ought to be ex∣pung'd as the Production of the first Mistake.

6. Mr. Boyle proceeds to illustrate his Explanation of this Distinction by a Comparison drawn from Sight. He supposes a Man to be askt by a Diver what he could see in a deep Sea. To which the Man is suppo∣sed to reply that he could see into a Sea-green Liquor to the depth of some yards and no further. So that if further ask't if he could see what lies at the Bottom of the Sea, his Answer no doubt would be in the Negative. But then if the Diver should let himself down to the Bot∣tom and bring up thence and shew him Oysters or Muscles with Pearls in them, he would easily acknow∣ledge both that they lay beyond the reach of his Sight, and that the Pearls were Genuin and Good. But

if the Diver should further pretend that each of these Pearls was bigger than the Shells they were contain'd in, this would be thought not only undiscernible by the Eyes, but con∣trary to their Informations, and to admit this would argue the Sight not only to be imperfect, but false and delusory, and accordingly 'tis presum'd that this he would not admit.

7. Now I not only allow this Com∣parison, but even admire it for the singular Aptness and Pertinency of it to illustrate, even to the Sense, the difference between things above and things contrary to Reason, only I think it seems to proceed upon the supposition that by things above Reason are meant such only as are incomprehensible by it, which cer∣tainly would make the Comparison much more Apposite and Exact. Whereof he himself appears sensible at the end of it, where offering to consider the Matter more distinctly, he tells you that the things above Reason are not all of one sort, but may be distinguish'd into two kinds sufficiently differing from each other.

which he makes to be these, that there are some things that Reason by its own Light cannot Discover. And others, that, when proposed it cannot Comprehend. This indeed is true, but then he should have said so sooner, and have told us withal that by things above Reason (as the Phrase is used in this Distincti∣on) he meant the Latter Sort only, the Former not being to the Pur∣pose.

8. However he proceeds upon that part First, that is, to shew that there are divers Truths in the Chri∣stian Religion that Reason left to it self would never have been able to find out. Of which he gives seve∣ral Instances, which as not being to the Point, I pass over, and come to his other Consideration of things a∣bove Reason, meaning such as when proposed do surpass our Compre∣hension, and that (as he well ob∣serves) upon one or other of these three Accounts, either as not clearly Conceivable by our understanding, such as the Infiniteness of the Di∣vine Nature, or as inexplicable by us, such as the Manner how God can

Create a Rational Soul, or how this being an Immaterial Substance can act upon a Human Body, or be act∣ed upon by it, &c. Or else lastly as Asymmetrical or unsociable, that is, such, as we see not how to recon∣cile with other things evidently and confessedly true, whereof he gives an instance in the Case of Prescience and Contingency.

9. He further observes (and I think rightly) that there may be difference of degree in things above Reason, as to their Abstruseness. That some things appear to surpass our understandings immediately, e∣ven before attentively lookt into. And other things only when a nar∣row inspection is made into them, being intelligible enough in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ and as imploy'd in common Discourse. Whereof he gives in∣stances in Place, Time, and Motion. And he makes use of this Observa∣tion to solve a Difficulty wherein it is pretended that we cannot profess to believe things which we acknow∣ledge to be above our Reason, with∣out discovering that we do not well consider what we say, and that we

then talk like Parrots. To which the substance of his Answer is, that we may talk of those things accord∣ing to that Notion of them which is more Obvious and Superficial, though not according to that which is Philosophical and Accurate.

10. After this Explanation of what is meant by Above Reason and contrary to Reason he comes in the Second place to justify the Distin∣ction by shewing that it is ground∣ed upon the Nature of things. And that he does by shewing that there is no Necessity that things above Reason should be also Contrary to Reason. This he shews first of things above Reason in the first Sense, viz. those that are undisco∣verable by Reason alone, but this being not the sense of Above Rea∣son as it is used in this Distinction, and since things according to this sense above Reason are not affirm'd by our Adversaries to be contrary to it, I pass over all that he says upon this part, and strike in with him again where he shews the same of things above Reason in the Se∣cond sense. I cannot meet with any

thing directly under that Head, but only a few Passages here and there scatter'd up and down. As when he says of Galileo, that when he first made his Discoveries with the Telescope and said that there were Planets that mov'd about Iupiter, He said something that other A∣stronomers could not discern to be true, but nothing that they could prove to be false. And again when he says that for a thing to be above Reason is Extrinsecal and Acciden∣tal to its being true or false. Be∣cause to be above our Reason is not an Absolute thing, but a Respec∣tive One, importing a Relation to the Measure of Knowledge that be∣longs to Human understanding. And therefore it may not be above Reason in reference to a more in∣lightned Intellect &c. which indeed is rightly and very judiciously re∣marqu'd in it self, and no less per∣tinently to the present business. And again when he says that there are some things true which yet are li∣able to Objections not directly an∣swerable, and so above Reason. He instances in the Controversie of the

Divisibility of Quantity, where each side of the Contradiction is press'd with unanswerable Objections, and yet as parts of a Contradiction, one of them must necessarily be true. And yet take which you will you run into invincible Difficulties. Which indeed well concludes that a thing that is above Reason may yet be true, and if true then not contrary to Reason, it being impos∣sible that what is so should be true. Which one Consideration is indeed enough to justifie the Distinction be∣yond all exception.

11. Mr. Boyle has yet a further Observation concerning this Distin∣ction too Considerable to be pass'd over, and that is, that he looks up∣on it to be of Importance not only to the defence of some Mysteries of the Christian Religion, but even of some important Articles of Natural Theology, in which (as he shews by several Instances) there are ma∣ny Doctrins which must be acknow∣ledg••d to be true, and yet whose Mo∣dus is not explainable.

12. After this he Considers an Objection wherein it is pretended that the granting this Distinction would be of bad Consequence, as affording shelter to any unintelligible stuff that a bold Enthusiast may ob∣trude under the venerable Title of a Mystery, that is above Reason. To which he answers very judiciously, that he does not deny but that the Distinction is liable to be ill imploy'd, but that this is no other than what is common to it with divers other Distinctions, which are without Scruple Admitted because useful, and not rejected because they have not the Priviledge that they can never be Misapplied. And that therefore both in reference to those other Di∣stinctions, and that he had been treating of, it becomes Men to stand upon their Guard, and strictly exa∣mine how far the Doctrine proposed as a Mystery, is intitled to the bene∣fit of this Distinction. Which if it should be employ'd to justifie any thing, that, though styl'd a My∣stery, is but a pretended one, the Errour (as he well observes in the Close of all) will lye, Not

in the Groundlesness of the Distin∣ction, but in the Erroneousness of the Application.

13. In this you have the Sum and Substance, as briefly and as clearly as I could represent it, of Mr. Boyle's Thoughts concerning things above Reason and contrary to Reason, which, like all his, are great and strong, and (allowing only for those inaccuracies taken Notice of) just and true. And now though what this Excellent Person has offer'd may serve to let in a great deal of Light into the Distinction, yet since a thing of such Consequence if true, and so much Contested whether true or no, can never be made too Clear, and sometimes a different, though not better, Representation of a thing may contribute to its further Illustra∣tion, every Reader having his parti∣cular Point of View, so as that the very ••ame Notion or Truth that does not Meet with him in one Posture, may shine full in his Face and strike him with success in ano∣ther, I shall therefore under the Shelter of Mr. Boyle's Authority, and by the advantage of his Light,

venture to set down my own Thoughts concerning this weighty Point, applying my self chiefly to that part of it, wherein I think the other Account Most defective.

14. And first though it should be true that to be above Reason is to be Incomprehensible, and to be Con∣trary to Reason is to appear repug∣nant to some Principle or Conclu∣sion of Right Reason, yet I do not think this of it self sufficient either to Clear or to Justifie the Distincti∣on, since it may be both again de∣manded what it is to be incompre∣hensible, and what repugnant, and again disputed whether incomprehen∣sible and repugnant be not the same, as well as whether that which is a∣bove Reason be not also Contrary to it. And then we are but where we were before. This Account of the Matter is then too Gross and Ge∣neral to be rested in, and we must be therefore more minute and par∣ticular in our Explanation of it, if we would be more Clear.

15. However since Generals are to go before, and do also prepare the way for Particulars, I shall first pro∣pose

the general Idea of things a∣bove Reason and contrary to Rea∣son, and then particularize upon that Idea, by opening and unfolding more distinctly and explicitly what is con∣tain'd in it, and by so comparing and collating together the two parts of the Notion as to shew the real Difference that is between them. So that I shall make but one work of the Explanatory and Iustificatory parts, supposing that there needs no more to the Justification of the Di∣stinction, than only to have the Members of it well explain'd. For if the Idea of Above Reason be di∣stinct from the Idea of Contrary to Reason (as the Explanation of them will shew that it is) then the Distin∣ction proceeds upon a real Difference, is grounded upon the Nature of things, and has all that is necessary to a true and good Distinction.

16. By things above Reason then (as the Expression is used in this Distinction) I conceive to be Meant, Not such as Reason of it self cannot Discover, but such as when proposed it cannot Comprehend. And by things Contrary to Reason I conceive

such as it can and does actually com∣prehend, and that to be absolutely Impossible. Or in other words, a thing is then above Reason when we do not comprehend how it can be, and then Contrary to Reason when we do positively comprehend that it cannot be. Thus in the General.

17. But to be a little more Par∣ticular, we are to Consider upon the first Part, that when we speak of things above Reason, the word Rea∣son here (as was shewn in the first Chapter) signifies the same as Vn∣derstanding, and there being but one only Operation of that, namely Per∣ception, by Comprehend here must be meant the same as by Perceive. So that when we say of things above Reason that they are such as Reason cannot Comprehend, 'tis the same as to say they are such as the Under∣standing cannot Perceive. But then when we say, Cannot Perceive, 'tis to be carefully noted that this is not to be understood of the literal and Grammatical Meaning of the Propo∣sition, as if the thing said to be A∣bove Reason were perfectly unintelli∣gible, but only of the Truth of it,

as was observ'd before concerning Faith. And then again when we say that Above Reason is when we do not Comprehend or Perceive the Truth of a thing, this must not be meant of not Comprehending the Truth in its whole Latitude and Ex∣tent, so that as many Truths should be said to be above Reason as we cannot thus thorougly comprehend and pursue throughout all their Conse∣quences and Relations to other Truths (for then almost every thing would be Above Reason) but only of not comprehending the Union or Con∣nexion of those immediate Ideas of which the Proposition supposed to be above Reason consists. And which is therefore said to be above Reason not because the simple and direct Meaning of its Terms is unintelligi∣ble, or because the Truth of it is not comprehensible in its remotest and utmost Extent, but purely because the Connexion of its Ideas, or the manner of it, is not discernible, and that partly for want of sufficient clearness of the Ideas themselves so as to be able to perceive their Uni∣on Intuitively, and partly for want

of a due and proper Medium where∣by to compare them, so as to dis∣cern their Union in the way of Sci∣ence and Demonstration.

18. 'Tis also to be Observ'd upon the Second part of the Explanation, that I chuse rather to say that things contrary to Reason are such as we Perceive to be Impossible, than such as appear contrary to some Principle, or some Conclusion of Right Reason. This being the more General and Absolute Idea, whereof the two o∣ther are but Instances and Specifica∣tions. For then is a thing said to be Impossible when its Ideas cannot stand together or be united. Which may be either because of the imme∣diate Opposition and Inconsistency of the Ideas themselves with them∣sel••••s so as Mutually to Exclude each other (as in a Contradiction) or be∣cause of their inconsistency with some other Truth, with which it cannot Comport. Or in other words, either because one of the Ideas can∣not consist with the other, by rea∣son of the immediate opposition that is between them, or because the U∣nion of both is inconsistent with some

Truth or other, which therefore will not suffer them to be United. Which Truth will be indeed either a Principle or a Conclusion of right Reason. And then we are said to Perceive a thing to be Impossible when we perceive that its Ideas can∣not stand together, and that either immediately by the very inconsisten∣cy of the Ideas themselves, or me∣diately by the Repugnance that they carry to some other Truth, whether Principle or Conclusion. Which Repugnance I take to consist in this, that the supposed Principle or Con∣clusion cannot stand with the Union of such Ideas, and that therefore if such a Principle or such a Conclusi∣on be true (as is supposed) then such Ideas are not United, and indeed are as uncapable of Union, that is as impossible, as if there were an imme∣diate inconsistency between the Ideas themselves. So that for a thing to be Contrary to Reason, is, in short, for the Understanding to perceive the Absolute impossibility of it, or that its Ideas cannot stand together, which it does either Immediately by perceiving the direct inconsistency of

those Ideas, or Mediately by per∣ceiving their inconsistency with some evident and incontestable Truth or other, whether Principle or Con∣clusion. For the way and method is the same in knowing a thing to be False or impossible as in knowing it to be True, and accordingly as the Process of the Understanding is either Immediate or Mediate in the latter, so is it also in the Former. But though there are these different ways of perceiving the impossiblity of a thing, 'tis in the General Percep∣tion of its Impossibility and not in the several ways of it that its con∣trariety to Reason must be made Formally to consist; Even as it was shewn before of Knowledge, which is made to consist in the Perception of the Relation of Ideas, and not in this or that determinate manner of perceiving it, which indeed serve afterwards to distinguish Knowledge into its kinds (as suppose Intuitive and Demonstrative) but do not en∣ter into its First and General Idea. For which Consideration I think the Perception of a things impossi∣bility does better express its Con∣trariety

to Reason than the Re∣pugnance it appears to have to some Principle or Conclusion of it, that being only (as I said before) an in∣stance and specification (and but one single one too) of its Impossibi∣lity.

19. So Now we are arrived to a Clear and Distinct Conception of things Above Reason and things Contrary to Reason. A thing is then above Reason when we do not Perceive or Comprehend how it can be. And then Contrary to Reason when we do Perceive that it Cannot be, or is Impossible. As to give a plain and sensible Instance of each of these. That the sides of an Hy∣perbola should be always approach∣ing to each other and yet never meet, though continued to infinity; is a Proposition of unquestion'd Cer∣tainty in Geometry, and yet such as passes the Reason of a Man to Com∣prehend how it can be, and there∣fore may properly be said to be one of those things that are above Rea∣son. But now that a Triangle should have Parallel Sides, is not only above Reason, but directly Contrary to it.

For here the Understanding is not only at a loss to Comprehend how it may be, but does positively and evi∣dently perceive that it cannot be, it being utterly impossible that a Fi∣gure of Three Lines should have its sides Parallel to each other.

20. Now though by this Expla∣nation of things above Reason and contrary to Reason the Difference between them is already obvious e∣ven to the eye, and stares a Man in the very Face, like things of great inequality whose Disproportion ap∣pears at View, without Measuring them, yet for further Satisfaction's sake, and to make the matter as plain as any thing in Nature to all but those who either have not, or will not use their Understandings, let us a little Compare these Ideas toge∣ther, thereby the better to illustrate their Difference.

21. It is most Evident that the Idea of things above Reason and the Idea of things contrary to Reason are two really distinct Ideas, and that One is Not the Other. This immediately appears from the very direct View of the Ideas themselves.

For what can be More plain than that Not to Comprehend how a thing may be, and to Comprehend that it cannot be, are two different things? And what better way have we to know the Distinction of things, but only that the Idea of one is not the Idea of another? But then be∣sides, the Ideas of these things are not only Formally different from each other, but have also different Properties and Characters belonging to them, and such too as are exclu∣sive of each other, and which there∣fore do manifestly shew the Ideas to which they belong to be distinct. For, for a thing to be above Reason implies only a Negation, the Not Comprehending how a thing can be, but for a thing to be Contrary to Reason implies the Position of an In∣tellectual act, the Comprehending that it cannot be. Again, in things above Reason the Proposition is sup∣posed not to be understood, whereas in things Contrary to Reason, it is supposed to be well understood, and that to be false and impossible. A∣gain, in things above Reason the Mind determines nothing concern∣ing

the Object proposed, whether it be true or whether it be false, whe∣ther it be Possible, or whether it be Impossible. All that she determines is concerning her own Act, that she does not Comprehend how it can be. But whether it be or not, that she does not affirm, but holds herself in a perfect Suspence. But now in things Contrary to Reason the Mind is every whit as positive and deci∣sive, and does determine as boldly and freely as in those things that are most according to it. Whereby it plainly appears that to be Contrary to Reason is something more than to be above it, and that the Mind proceeds a great deal further in the former than in the latter, the Lan∣guage of the Soul in things above Reason being only, How can these things be! But in things Contrary to Reason she is Positive and Dogma∣tical, roundly pronouncing, This cannot be. So that unless there be no difference between a Negation and a Positive Act, between the Igno∣rance or Non-Perception of a thing, and the knowing it to be False, be∣tween Suspension and a peremptory

Determination, between a greater and a less, 'tis most undeniably evi∣dent that the Parts of this Distinction are not only really but widely diffe∣rent, and that to be above Reason is one thing, and to be contrary to Reason is another.

22. If it be pretended (as some perhaps may be likely to Object) that to be Contrary to Reason im∣plies a Negation, as well as to be above Reason, because it is there supposed to be Comprehended that the thing is False and cannot be, and that therefore they agree in one of the Main instances of their Diffe∣rence, to this the Answer is Clear and Full. I grant there is a Nega∣tion in one as well as the other, but then I distinguish of Negation. There is a Negation of the Act, and a Negation of the Object. Contrary to Reason does indeed imply a Ne∣gation of the Object, that is, it im∣plies a Separation and dis-union of certain Ideas, as inconsistent and in∣compatible one with another. But it does not imply a Negation of the Act, but the quite Contrary, be∣cause the understanding is here

supposed positively to comprehend the thing, and withal the Impossi∣bility of it, which is not done in things Above Reason, wherein the Negation is that of the Act. So that this first and great difference between them stands firm and good.

23. And now having thus far justified the reality of this distincti∣on of things Above Reason and Contrary to Reason both by the Explanation and Collation of the Parts of it, which thereby appear to consist of Ideas as different as can well be conceiv'd, I might further proceed to do the same by producing some Instances of things confessed∣ly Above Reason that are also not∣withstanding as confessedly True. For if any one thing that is Above Reason be yet found to be true, this plainly demonstrates the thing in Question (if there can be yet any Question about it) most evidently shewing that what is Above Rea∣son is not as such Contrary to Rea∣son, it being impossible that what is Contrary to Reason should be true, whatever is Contrary to Rea∣son being also as Contrary to Truth.

I might also further alledge that to be Above Reason does equally ab∣stract from True and False (which Contrary to Reason does not) and that not only because, as I observed before, it determines nothing con∣cerning its Object, but also because 'tis a thing not of an Absolute, but of a Relative Importance, as being an extrinsecal Denomination taken not from the Nature of the Object as it is in it self, but only as it is to us, and in relation to our not only Finite, but very Limited Capacities. For to be Above Reason is not to be Above Reason in general or all Rea∣son, so as to be absolutely incom∣prehensible, but only Human Rea∣son. But then that which is Above the Reason of a Man may not be Above the Reason of an Angel (as indeed what is Above the Reason of one Man may not transcend that of another) and what is above the Rea∣son of an Angel may yet be perfect∣ly comprehended by God, the Su∣pream and Soveraign Reason. So that to be Above Reason here is of a respective signification, such as does not express the quality of the Object

as it is in its own Nature, but only as it is in reference to such a particu∣lar Faculty, whereas to be Contrary to Reason is not a Relative but an Absolute thing, and whatever is Con∣trary to Reason, is Contrary to all Reason, and so consequently to Truth. I say I might further insist on these and some other Considera∣tions, but being partly prevented here by Mr. Boyle (whose Account I would have used to supply the de∣fects of Mine, as Mine is intended to supply some of his) and having so abundantly clear'd the difference of these things already, I shall not so far distrust either the Strength of the Argument, or that of my Rea∣der's Understanding, as to prosecute this Matter any further than only to shape an Answer out of what has been laid down, to an Objection which I meet with in a Modern Writer against Monsieur Iurieu, and which, to do it the utmost Justice, I will set down in his own words.

24. I have Consider'd (says he) the Distinction which they use between be∣ing Contrary to Reason,* 1.1 and being a∣bove Reason. 'Tis agreed that 'tis not

possible to believe what is Contrary to Reason. But 'tis said that we can well believe what is above Reason. This Distinction seems to me of no use, or else I do not comprehend it. For if by being above Reason it be meant that we do not comprehend a Truth in its whole Extent, though what we con∣ceive of it be clear and certain, I own that in this sense one ought to believe what is above Reason. But if by being above Reason be meant a Doctrine, wherein we see nothing Clear, a Do∣ctrine which our Reason loses the sight of on all its sides, I mean that all the Propositions which may be extracted from it appear incomprehensible, such a one as this for example, that the three Divine Persons make but one God, &c. It seems that to be above Rea∣son in this sense, is the same as to be intirely inaccessible to Reason, which differs nothing, but in words, from be∣ing Contrary to Reason.

25. I suppose whoever has duely consider'd and well comprehended the Tenour of the foregoing Dis∣course, can neither be insensible of the Deficiency of this Allegation, nor be long at a loss what Answer

to return to it. But to spare my Reader this Trouble, My Reply is, that this Author's Argument pro∣ceeds upon a wrong Supposition. He supposes here that to be Above Reason must be either the Not Com∣prehending a thing in its whole La∣titude and extent, or the Compre∣hending Nothing at all of it. Where∣as I have shewn before that 'tis nei∣ther of them; That we do not mean by Above Reason what is all over unintelligible, even as to the very Meaning of the Proposition, nor what is not to be Comprehended in its utmost extent, but only what is in∣comprehensible to us as to the Truth of the thing, or the Manner of it. 'Tis true indeed if the Proposition were perfectly unintelligible, so that (as he says) we could see nothing clear in it, even as to the very Sense and Meaning of it, we could no more believe it than what is Contrary to Reason, though even then it would not (as this Author confusely e∣nough pretends) be the same with it, because what is Contrary to Reason is supposed to be well un∣derstood. But 'tis much otherwise

if it be incomprehensible only as to the Truth or Manner of the thing. This as I shall shew hereafter may very well be Beleiv'd, though what is Contrary to Reason cannot, and what is utterly unintelligible can∣not. And I have sufficiently shewn already that what is thus only in∣accessible to Reason differs, a little more than in words, from being contrary to it.

26. And now if Humane Nature were not a very unaccountable thing, I should stand greatly amazed at either the Natural or wilful Blind∣ness of those who are for confound∣ing things so vastly different as the parts of this Distinction, of things above Reason and contrary to it, most apparently are. There are in∣deed some things which we are or∣dinarily taught to distinguish, and yet when strictly examin'd and com∣pared, will be found to have no real ground of Distinction in them. And 'tis every whit as great (and almost as Common) a Fault to distinguish things that do not differ, as to con∣found those that do. And there are

also other things of such near Re∣semblance and Cognation to each other that there needs a great deal of Art, Subtlety and nice Inspe∣ction to discern their Difference. So Fine and Minute and almost im∣perceptible are the Lines that ter∣minate their Natures, and divide them from one another. But the Ideas of these things are as different as those of a Man and a Tree, a Triangle and a Square, so that a Man must wink hard not to per∣ceive it, or be very insincere not to acknowledge it. And I cannot ima∣gine why those especially who are known to serve themselves upon occasion of Distinctions which have no other Foundation than the mere Will and Pleasure (unless you will say Interest) of those that use them, should yet reject such a Solid and well-grounded, as well as well Au∣thorized, one as this, but only be∣cause it is not for their turn, and, if admitted, would like a Bomb thrown into their Garrison, blow up and lay wast their Main Strength, and force them to desert and give

up a Cause which they are (now especially) most Zealously Fond of, and seem resolv'd even against Reason to Maintain.

27. For I must further remarqu•• (and 'tis an Observation not lightly to be pass'd over) that if this One Distinction of things above Reason, and things contrary to Reason be once admitted, or shewn to be real, Solid and well-grounded, the main part of the Socinian Controversie is immediately, or at least in the very next Consequence, at an end. For the Reason why they will not be∣lieve things above Reason is because (as they pretend) Above Reason differs nothing in reality from Con∣trary to Reason, and so those things that are above Reason are also as much contrary to it as above it, and what is Contrary to Reason is on both sides acknowledg'd impossible to be believ'd. Well, but then if it be made appear (as I think by this time is sufficiently done) that these two are quite different things, and that to be above Reason is not the same as to be contrary to it,

then even by their own Confession there can be no pretence why what is above Reason may not be Be∣liev'd. Which I take to be the true inducement that makes these Men stand out so fiercely and obstinately against this Distinction (for they are aware what mischief it will do 'em) as it is also the reason why I have bestow'd so much care and pains to clear and justifie it.

28. And thus having given an Account of these great and Funda∣mental things, what Reason is, what Faith is, and what it is to be Above, and what Contrary to Rea∣son, we have now prepared the way to the more full and direct Consi∣deration of the Belief of things a∣bove Reason, the true state of which Question by what has been hitherto discours'd appears to be this, Whe∣ther we may not Assent upon the Authority of Divine Revelation to such things as our Understanding or Reason cannot perceive or Com∣prehend as to the Truth or Manner of them. Or, whether our not being able thus to Comprehend them, be a

sufficient Reason why we should not believe them. For the Resolution of which we have already laid the Grounds, and shall now proceed more directly to build upon them in the following Chapter.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Avis Stir le Table•••• du Socini∣anisme. Traité 1. pag. 14▪