An account of reason & faith in relation to the mysteries of Christianity / by John Norris.

CHAP. II. Of Faith. (Book 2)

1. FAith is a Term of great Am∣biguity as well as Reason, but not to insist upon the several Acceptations of it as it is used either in Divine or in Humane Writings, I shall only define in what sense I here take it, and then proceed to such Considerations upon it as may serve to lay open its Nature so far as is re∣quisite to the Present Design.

2. I do not take Faith here for the Object of Faith, but for the Act or Habit of Faith, and that not E∣thically consider'd, as it denotes the Moral Vertues of Veracity, Fidelity, Honesty and the like, but Logically, as it signifies a certain Assent, Judge∣ment or Perswasion of the Mind, particularly that which is founded upon Testimony or Authority. So that the Generical and Common Part of Faith is Assent, wherein it

agrees with some other Acts of the Mind, and the more special and pe∣culiar part that limits and Contracts the General, and whereby the whole is differenc'd and distinguish'd, is the Motive and ground of this Assent. 'Tis it seems an Assent grounded not upon the internal Reason and Evi∣dence of the thing, but upon the bare Testimony and Authority of the Speaker.

3. For I consider that there are two general grounds of Assent, Rea∣son and Authority. That is, we assent to a thing either because we have some Perception or Knowledge of it our selves, or because its Truth is declared to us by another upon whose Knowledge and Veracity we think we may safely depend. If the Reason or evidence of the thing be imperfect and incomplete, that is, if we perceive only in part, then we yeild a partial and imperfect Assent, mix'd with some Fear or Suspicion of the Contrary, which is what we call Opinion. But if the Evidence be full and perfect, then we yield a firm and most assured Assent, which is generally distinguish'd from the o∣ther

by the Name of Knowledge, which according to the common Notion and Definition of it is an Evident Assent. But it was shewn before that Knowledge does not For∣mally Consist in the Assent, but in the Perception which is the Ground of the Assent. And indeed how is it possible it should consist in any thing else? For (to give yet a further Con∣firmation to what has been already offer'd upon this Occasion) let Assent be never so evident, the evidence lies in the Perception, not in the Assent, which of it self is a blind dark Act of the Mind, and can be said no o∣therwise to be Evident, than as 'tis an Assent to an Evident thing, that is, to what we perceive. But now Perception and Assent are not only two things, but such as belong also to two different and distinct Faculties, and therefore can never joyn together to make up Knowledge, which is an Act only of one. And indeed to speak the truth, Evident Assent (as 'tis here applied) seems to me a mere jum∣ble of Words confusely uniting to∣gether in one Idea Operations that belong to distinct Faculties, one be∣longing

to the Will and the other to the Understanding. And how the result of this heterogeneous Compo∣sition should be Knowledge, I must confess to be indeed a Mystery above my Comprehension. And besides, after all, an Evident Assent when re∣solv'd into more words will amount to the same as an Assent to what we know, and would it not be a Nota∣ble Definition of Knowledge, to say, that it is an Assent to what we know?

4. If then Knowledge be not an Evident Assent, and indeed as to the Formality of it has nothing of Assent in it, as consisting purely and whole∣ly in Perception, 'tis plain that this Assent to an evident thing ought not to be call'd Knowledge. For 'tis necessa∣ry that the several Species of Assent should all have the general Nature of Assent in them, and consequently this being a certain Species of Assent must partake of the nature of Assent in ge∣neral, which it cannot do if it be Know∣ledge, for that were to pass over into another Kind, Knowledge not being Assent, but Perception. 'Tis there∣fore most clear and evident that our Common Systemes have here also

gone upon a wrong ground, and that Knowledge ought not to be put into the Number of the Three Assents (which are usually reckon'd to be Faith, Opinion and Science) since the Assent whose ground is full Evidence, and which is the only one that may pretend and is commonly presumed to be Knowledge, is most apparently not so, as differing from it no less than in the whole kind.

5. If then it be demanded by what Name I would distinguish this Se∣cond Assent to a thing when the E∣vidence is full and complete from the former wherein the Evidence is sup∣posed not to be so perfect, I answer that indeed (so little have these things been Consider'd as they ought) there is no proper Name, that I know of, for it. When we assent to a thing of incomplete Evidence we call it Opinion, and when we assent to a thing whose Evidence is com∣plete this has been usually call'd Knowledge, but certainly with the utmost impropriety, knowledge, as appears, being quite another thing. But by what name to call it, or how to distinguish it, I pro••ess I know

not. Not for want of real difference and distinction in the thing (for my Thought of it is very distinct) but merely because we want a word for it. As we do in like manner for Assent upon Reason in general to di∣stinguish it from Assent upon Autho∣rity in general. For as Assent upon Authority in general Abstracting from Humane or Divine is call'd Faith, so also Assent upon Reason in general abstracting from complete or incomplete should be call'd some∣what, if one could tell what, as eve∣ry generical Idea ought to be distin∣guish'd by a generical Name. But since our Language affords not any one word that will serve to either of these purposes we must be content with the De••initio instead of the De∣finitum, and express the things at large, by saying Assent upon Reason or Evidence, and Assent upon such Evidence as is full and complete, which is sufficient to distinguish it from Assent upon evidence incom∣plete, though we have no one proper word for this as we have for the o∣ther, which is fitly call'd Opinion, whereby we denote the imperfection

both of the Evidence and of the As∣sent.

6. But now if the Assent he not grounded upon any internal Reason or Evidence of the thing at all, but only upon Testimony or Authority, then we call it Faith. Which ap∣pears to be an Assent of a quite diffe∣rent Nature from the other two. For they both agree in the general Nature of Assent upon Evidence, and differ only as the Evidence dif∣fers, and that is gradually, as com∣plete differs from incomplet••. But Faith differs from them both in the whole Kind, as having no Evidence at all, but only Authority for its Ground. And thus we have here a Threefold Assent, (though not such as is taught us in the Schools) the Account of which in short proceeds thus. All Assent in general is either upon Reason or Authority. If the Reason be incomplete then 'tis Opi∣nion. If complete, then 'tis another kind of Assent for which as yet there wants a Name, as also there does for Assent upon Reason in General. But if the Assent be upon Authority only, then 'tis Faith.

7. Now this Authority may be either of God or of Man. If the Authority whereupon our Assent is grounded be of Man, then the As∣sent that is so grounded is Human Faith. If of God, then 'tis Divine Faith. Between which two there is this in Common, that they both proceed not upon the internal Light and Evidence of the thing but upon Authority, and so agree in the gene∣ral Nature of 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ only as the Au∣thority differ 〈…〉〈…〉 Faith also va∣ries, and Human Authority differing from Divine just as much as Fallible differs from Infallible▪ the same in proportion will also 〈…〉〈…〉 between Human and Divine ••aith. That is, the former will always be a Fallible, and the latter an Infallible Assent.

8. Human Faith (though some∣times as actually undeceiv'd as Di∣vine) is yet always liable to Error and Deception, and so doubtful, ha∣zardous and uncertain even when actually true, like a Conclusion drawn from uncertain Premisses; in which respect it resembles Opinion, and that so much that some have confounded

it with it, though I think illogically enough, since though there be a like uncertainty in both Assents, yet they differ extremely in their Formal Motives, one being grounded upon Reason, and the other upon Autho∣rity. And the Distinction of these Assents is not taken from the degree of Certainty wherein they agree, but from the Quality of the Motive wherein they differ. However tho' this makes a great difference in No∣tion, it makes None in the Affairs of Civil Life, and the Faith of him that believes the Testimony of a Man will as to all real intents and purposes go for no more than his O∣pinion. And that because though different Assents as to the Formality of their Motives, they are yet Much at one rate for Certainty, being both Fallible in their Grounds, and so subject to Error and Deception.

9. But the Case is quite other∣wise as to Divine Faith whose Foun∣dation stands too sure not only to be overturn'd, but even so much as shaken. This Faith is strictly and Absolutely infallible, not subject to the least Error, or Possibility of Er∣ring,

as having the very Ground and Pillar of Truth it self, the Omnisci∣ence and Veracity of God for its Se∣curity, than which there neither Needs, nor Can be Greater. 'Tis Most Certain that God is both Actively and Passively Infallible, his Omniscience will not suffer him to be deceiv'd himself, and his infi∣nite Veracity and Truth will not suffer him to deceive us. And there∣fore he that builds his Faith upon his Authority, goes upon the Most sure Grounds, and cannot possibly Err in his Assent. And as he is se∣cure from Error, so he is also from all just reason of Scruple or Fear, and leaning upon a firm and inde∣fectible Support, may stay and re∣pose himself upon it with full Ac∣quiescence. So that there is all the Certainty that can be in this Faith, both Objective and Subjective, that of the Thing, and that of the Per∣son. The thing assented to is most undoubtedly true in it self, and he that assents to it may be most firmly assured and perswaded of the Truth of it in his own Mind, and among all Temptations to Doubt and Di∣strust

may with great Triumph and Confidence say with the Apostle,* 1.1 I know whom I have believ'd.

10. It was observ'd a little before of Humane Faith that it resembles Opinion, in as much as they are both dubious and uncertain Assents, as proceeding upon grounds of like un∣certainty, though otherwise of diffe∣rent Natures. Now as this Faith resembles Opinion, so in like manner it may be observ'd of Divine Faith that it resembles Science, or rather that Second Assent (for so I am forc'd to call it for want of a better Name) which we lately discours'd of, and plac'd between Opinion and Faith. The Comparison here bears the same proportion as to Certainty, as it did in the other Case as to un∣certainty. Divine Faith has all the Certainty that is possible, and there∣fore to be sure as much as Science or that Second Assent can have. There is as much Certainty in the thing as∣sented to, and there may be as much Assurance and firmness of Perswasion in the Assent it self, or in other words what a man believes upon the Au∣thority of God is in it self as certain as

what he knows, and he may also be as Certain of it. For he that assents to a thing upon full evidence can but assent fully and perfectly without suspense or hesitation, and so also can he that assents to a thing upon Divine Au∣thority only. His Ground is every whit as Firm and Sure as the others, and why then should the Measure of his Assurance be less? It cannot possibly be if he Knows and Consi∣ders upon what Ground he stands. So that thus far, both in regard of the Certainty of the Object, and the Firmness of the Perswasion, Divine Faith may be justly placed upon a level with the Most Evident Assent whatever.

11. Nor I suppose will this be thought an undue Elevation of Di∣vine Faith. On the Contrary I ex∣pect to be Complain'd of for setting the Dignity of it at too low a Pitch by those who say that Divine Faith is Firmer than Science. But 'tis for want of the Latter that these Men so excessively ex••ol the Former. I call it excessively, because 'tis what strictly and exactly speaking cannot be. For what I Perceive or Know

is even by that very supposition un∣questionably true, (or else I cannot be said to Know it) and what I be∣lieve upon the highest Authority can be no more. To say therefore that Faith is Firmer than Science, is like saying that one streight Line is streighter than another. But per∣haps their Meaning only is, that 'tis safer relying upon the Aut••ority of God than upon our own Rational Faculties, which indeed is right, and I heartily wish all Men were convinc'd of it. For though what I do actually and really Know be to the full as true and certain as what I Believe, and I can no more be out in one than in the other, yet it is More Certain in the general that God cannot deceive me, than that my Reason cannot be deceiv'd. Not that what I assent to by Divine Faith can have a greater Objective Cer∣tainty than what I clearly and di∣stinctly Perceive or Know, but only that there is a Possibility, not to say Danger, of my taking that for a clear and distinct Perception which ••ndeed is Not so, and so though I

cannot be deceiv'd in what I do tru∣ly know, yet I may be deceiv'd in thinking that I know when I do not. So that Divine Faith though not more Certain than Knowledge it self, is yet of greater Certainty than our Knowing Faculties, and ge∣nerally speaking the Believer goes upon surer grounds than the Man of Reason and Demonstration. Because his Reason may possibly lead him into Error, whereas the Other's Au∣thority cannot. And when they are both in the right, yet still there will be this difference between them, that his Reason is only not Deceiv'd, whereas the Other's Faith is Infal∣lible.

12. And thus far we have taken a view of the more bright and per∣fect side of Divine Faith, I mean that of its Firmness and Certainty, in respect of which it stands upon a just level with Science. But it has also a more dark side, in which re∣spect it comes short of it, and must give it the Precedency. And I think it may be very properly call'd a Dark side, because it consists in Dark∣ness

and Obscurity, and which is still so much the darker, because 'tis so pe∣culiar to Faith, and makes so great a part of its Character, being the Main Difference that distinguishes it from Science, or that Second Assent before spoken of. For as to Firm∣ness and Certainty, therein they a∣gree. For Faith may be Firm, be∣cause he that believes in God may be supposed not in the least to hesitate or doubt of the truth of what he reveals. And 'tis also certain, be∣cause it relies upon the most certain Foundation, the Testimony of God, who is Infallible himself, and can∣not deceive. And hitherto they run parallel one to the other. But here begins both the difference and the disproportion, that there is Clearness and Evidence on the side of Science, and that Second Assent, whereas there is none on the side of Faith, which walks indeed upon firm Ground, but altogether in the dark. For he that Believes does not give his Assent because either by Sense or Reason he perceives the Object of his Faith to be thus or thus, but merely because he has the

Word and Authority of God for it. Which though it be sufficient to found a Firm and Certain, is yet however not enough to beget a Clear and Evident Assent. So that the great and distinguishing Character of Science and the Second Assent, is Light and Evidence, and that of Faith inevidence and Obscurity, which accordingly is commonly said to be an inevident Assent. But how and in what sense it is so seems not commonly to be so well understood, and for the Consequence of what depends upon the right stating of it, deserves to be explain'd with all pos∣sible exactness.

13. In order to which we are carefully to distinguish between the thing believ'd, and the Reason or Motive that induces us, to believe it; even as in Knowledge we distin∣guish between the thing Known, and the Argument or Medium by which it is Known, the Scitum and the Formalis ratio Sciendi. The thing Believ'd I would call the Mat∣ter or the Object of Faith, and the Motive that induces me to believe it I would call the Formal Reason

of Faith. Aquinas I know calls them both Objects,* 1.2 and then after distinguishes them by calling the Former the Material Object, and the latter the Formal Object of Faith. Accordingly he says that the For∣mal Object of Faith is the First Truth, meaning (as he afterward explains himself) that Faith relies upon the Truth of God as its Medium, or Argument. Which Medium I chuse rather to call (and I think more in∣telligibly) the formal Reason, than the formal Object of Faith. Since the Term (Object) seems more properly to design the Matter of Faith, or the thing Believ'd, and is hardly applicable to the Motive or Reason of Believing. However since we both mean one and the same thing, there need be no debate upon the different manner of expressing it, especially since if any one think his Term more intelligible and expres∣sive of the Notion intended by it, or has any reverence for it upon any other Consideration, he is at liberty to substitute it in the room of the other.

14. This necessary Distinction be∣ing premised, 'tis in the first place to be well heeded that when Faith is said to be an obscure and inevi∣dent Assent, this Obscurity or ine∣vidence is not to be applied to the formal Reason or Motive of Faith, but only to the Matter or Object of it. I say not to the formal Reason of it. For as there may be in gene∣ral a clear Reason why a Man should believe an Obscure thing, so 'tis most Certain that the formal Reason for which we assent to the things of Faith is very clear. For this for∣mal Reason is no other than the Authority of God, Or rather, since this includes the Truth of the Re∣vealer as well as the Revelation it self (for otherwise of what Autho∣rity would be the Revelation:) I would chuse to say that the Truth and Revelation of God do jointly make up the formal Reason of Di∣vine Faith, which accordingly pro∣ceeds upon this double Principle, 1. That whatever God reveals is true, 2. That this or that thing in particular is reveal'd by God. For Faith has its Reasons as well as

Science (though of another Nature) and its Reasons are these two, as will more distinctly, appear by dis∣posing the Process of Faith into a Syllogistical Form, which will be this.

Whatever is reveal'd by God is true, This is Reveal'd by God, Therefore this is true.

The Conclusion of this Syllogism contains both the Matter and the Act of Faith, as it is an Assent to such a thing upon such a ground, which is implied by the Illative Particle, Therefore. The two other Propositions contain the Ground it self or the formal Reason of Faith, which you see consists of the double Prin∣ciple before-mention'd. Now 'tis most apparent that these two Princi∣ples are both of them sufficiently clear, or at least may be so. 'Tis clear in the first place that whatever is reveal'd by God is true. This is either self-evident, or may be proved from the Idea of God, and so has either the Light of a Principle, or of a Conclusion, either an imme∣diate

or a Mediate Evidence. And it may be also clear (and to be sure is so whenever our Faith is well-grounded) that such a thing in Par∣ticular is reveal'd by God. And in both these respects it is true (what is commonly said) that Faith is the Highest Reason. For you see it is perfectly reasonable in its Fund and Principle, and does at last resolve, as much as any Mathematical Con∣clusion, into a rational ground of un∣questionable Light and Evidence. With this only difference that a Con∣clusion in Geometry is founded upon a Ground taken from within, from the intrinsic Nature of the thing, whereas our Conclusion of Faith proceeds upon a ground taken from without, viz. from the Authority of God, but such as however in Light and Evidence is no way inferiour to the other.

15. This by the way may serve to shew the vanity and impertinence of those who when they are to prove that there is nothing in Christianity above Reason, run out into a Popu∣lar Ve•••• of Harangue about the Rea∣sonables of the Christian Reli∣gion

and its great Accommodation to Human Nature, crying out with repeated importunity that Man is a Reasonable Creature, Christianity a reasonable Service, and Faith a Ra∣tional Act, nay even the Highest Reason, and the like. As if we were for a Blind and unaccountable Faith, and denied the use of Reason in Re∣ligion, or that Faith was founded upon Reason. Or as if because there is a Reason from without for Believ∣ing, therefore the thing Believ'd might not from within, and as to the inward Matter of it be above Rea∣son, so as not to be comprehended or accounted for by it. But this will cross my way again in another place,* 1.3 and therefore I shall not anticipate here what further Considerations I may have occasion to bestow upon it there.

16. To return therefore, I say that this Obscurity and inevidence that is in Faith, and upon whose account it is commonly said to be an inevident Assent, does not belong to its formal Reason (which you see may be clear enough, as clear as any Principle of Natural Science) but

only to the Matter or Object of it. That is, in other words the inevi∣dence does not lie in the Reason of Believing, but in the Nature of the thing Believ'd. Not that the mat∣ter of Faith again is wholy and all over without Evidence (for then there would be no reason to believe it) but only that it has no evidence from within, and from the Nature of the thing it self, as was remarqu'd before. Not that this again is so to be understood neither as if the Pro∣position to be believ'd were not so much as simply intelligible as to the very litteral sense and direct signifi∣cation of its Terms. No, we are no more to believe we Know not what, than to believe we Know not why, and whatever Darkness there may be in Faith, it is still so much a Luminous Assent, and an Act of Reason, as to require that we un∣derstand the simple Meaning of the Proposition we are to believe, as well as the Grounds of Credibility upon which it Challenges our Assent. For the general Object of Faith is Truth, and Truth is the relation of Con∣nexion between Ideas, I say Ideas,

for Truth does not lie in Sounds or Words but in Things. Therefore to believe such a Thing to be True is the same as to believe that there is a Connexion between such Ideas. But then a Man must know what those Ideas are, or else how can he believe they are connected. There∣fore he must understand something more than the Terms themselves, he must also have the Ideas of those Terms, which is the same as to under stand the Meaning and Signification of them. And indeed he that has no Idea or Conception of what he believes, believes he knows not what, and he that believes he knows not what cannot be properly said to be∣lieve any thing. In all Faith there∣fore the Proposition Must be simply intelligible, and though the Truth of it be to be Believ'd, yet the Meaning of it must be understood.

17. For we are again Carefully to distinguish between the Meaning of a Proposition, and the Truth of a Proposition. The meaning of a Proposition is only the Determina∣tion of the Ideas that are signified by such Terms; the Truth of it is the

Union or Connexion that is between those Ideas. Now though a Man does not see the Connexion that is between the Ideas of that Proposi∣tion he is said to Believe, yet he must in some measure perceive the Ideas themselves, because in believing the Proposition he is supposed to believe that such Ideas are so related and Connected together. When there∣fore 'tis said that the Matter of Faith is inevident as to the intrinsic Na∣ture of the thing, the inevidence must not be thought to lie in the Ideas whereof the Proposition to be Believ'd Consists, but in the Con∣nexion of those Ideas, that is, not in the Meaning of the Proposition, but in the Truth of it, which is pro∣perly the Object of Faith, as the I∣deas themselves are of Perception. Which again by the way may serve to discover another Instance of Im∣pertinency in the Reasoning of those, who when they are Maintaining that there can be no Article of Faith above Reason, divert into pompous Flourishes and Declamati∣ons about the Intelligibility of the Objects of Faith, and the utter im∣possibility

of Believing what is not intelligible. As if we denied the simple intelligibility of the Proposi∣tion, or would have Men believe they know not what (which cer∣tainly would be a strange degree of Implicit Faith, and more Non∣sensical than that of the Collier) or, as if that Proposition which is clear enough as to its simple Meaning might not be inevident, and so a∣bove Reason, as to its Truth, or in other words, as if Clearness of Ideas might not consist with Obscurity of their Connexion.

18. But then it must be observ'd again that when we say that the In∣evidence that is in the Matter of Faith respects the Truth of the Pro∣position not the Meaning of it, or the Connexion of the Ideas, and not the very Ideas themselves, this is not so to be understood neither as if the Matter of Faith even thus consider'd, were Absolutely, and in its self ne∣cessarily inevident, and such as could not possibly be known without alter∣ing its Nature, and ceasing to be any longer the Object of Faith. I know the contrary Supposition has

prevail'd in some Schools, where it passes almost for Principle and Maxim that Knowledge and Faith are mu∣tually Exclusive of each other, that the same thing cannot be at once the Object of both, and that therefore if a thing be believ'd it cannot be known, and if known that it cannot be believ'd. St. Austin was of this Opinion, and has in many places de∣clared his mind to this purpose, par∣ticularly in his XL Treatise of his Exposition upon St. Iohn's Gospel.* 1.4 And his Authority has recommend∣ed it (as it did most other things) to several of the Schoolmen, particu∣larly Aquinas, whence it has been transmitted down among many Mo∣dern Writers of the Systematical way, both Philosophers and Divines. But we must follow Reason before Authority, and whoever can be pre∣vail'd with to lay the latter quite a∣side, and to use the other as he ought, will I believe clearly perceive that nothing hinders but that the same Proposition may be at once the Ob∣ject of both Faith and Science, or that the Same thing may be at the same time both Known and Believ'd,

provided it be by different Mediums, according to the diversity of the re∣spective Acts.

19. For, not to enter into the wrangle and Dust of the Schools up∣on this Occasion, it may be sufficient to consider that there is no manner of Opposition between Faith and Knowledge, or the Most evident Assent as to the Essence of the Pro∣position (that being not supposed to be denied in the one which is Af∣firm'd in the other, or the contrary) but only as to the Medium of the Act. And that 'tis not the Absolute Nature of the thing Believ'd, but the Quality of the Motive that spe∣cifies Faith, and distinguishes it from other Assents. So that 'tis no matter what the Absolute Nature of the thing be in it self, whether it be evi∣dent or not evident, Knowable or not Knowable, provided it be assent∣ed to upon the proper Medium and Motive of Faith, that is upon Au∣thority, without any respect had to the Natural evidence of the thing, though otherwise never so evident in its own Absolute Nature, so as to be the Object of Science (though

upon a different Medium) at the same time. For as I said before, 'tis not the Nature of the thing, but the Quality of the Medium that speci∣fies Faith, and tho' the same thing cannot have two Natures, or be in it self at once evident and not evi∣dent, yet why may it not sustain two different Relations, or be consi∣der'd in two different Mediums, so as to be said to be known when per∣ceiv'd by its Evidence, and to be believ'd when assented to upon Au∣thority? Which certainly may be done as fully, and with as little re∣gard to its evidence, as if there were no evidence in the thing at all. So that the Evidence of the thing does not hinder the Belief of it, suppo∣sing the Belief not to proceed upon that Evidence, but upon its own pro∣per Medium, Authority.

20. But to use a way of Arguing less Abstract, though it may be with some more pressing and convincing. Suppose God should reveal to me a Geometrical Truth, as that two Tri∣angles having the same Base, and being within the same Parallels, are equal, and I who at first receiv'd

it upon his bare Authority should come afterwards to be able to de∣monstrate it my self upon the known Principles of Art, who that well considers the Natures of these things would say that my Science evac••••∣ted my Faith, and that I ceas'd to be a Believer assoon as I became a Mathematician? For though I am now supposed to Know what before I only Believ'd, yet why should this Knowledge destroy my Faith, since I may still have as much regard for the Authority of God, and as little to the Evidence of the thing as I had before the Demonstration, and would still be ready to assent to it though there were no evidence to be produced for it, only upon the Ground of Divine Authority. And, to use another Sensible though not so Artificial way of arguing, I would fain know whether any one of those who are of the Contrary Sentiment would refuse a Demonstrative Ac∣count of a Reveal'd Truth, suppose the Creation of the World, merely for fear of injuring or destroying his Faith, which yet he were bound in Conscience to do, if Knowledge and

Faith were so exclusive of each o∣ther, and inevidence and Obscurity were so absolutely of the Essence of Faith as some pretend. For then it would not be lawful to acquire the Natural Knowledge of any reveal'd Truth, because 'tis unlawful to de∣stroy one's Faith, and every Belie∣ver would have just reason to fear all further Light and Information about what he believes, which yet I think would be acknowledg'd by all an extravagant Scruple, such as can hardly enter, much less stay long in any Considering head; And is withal Contrary to a plain Exhorta∣tion of the Apostle, who bids us add to our Faith Knowledge* 1.5.

21. When therefore the Matter of Faith, as it is taken for the Truth of the Proposition Believ'd, is char∣ged with Obscurity, and Faith it self upon that account is said (as it commonly is) to be of inevident things, the Meaning ought not to be of an Absolute, but of a Relative inevidence. Not that what is Be∣liev'd is so all over dark and obscure that it cannot (while Believ'd) ab∣solutely be known, but only that it

cannot under that Formality, and so far as it is Believ'd, being neces∣sarily in that respect inevident, how bright or clear soever it may be in other respects. That is in other words, though the thing Believ'd absolutely consider'd may be Evi∣dent, yet it is not so as Believ'd, or in relation to Faith, because that has no regard to the Evidence how bright soever it may shine, but proceeds wholy upon another Argument, be∣tween which and the Evidence of the thing there is not the least Af∣finity or Communication. The short is, the Object of Faith simply and absolutely speaking may admit of Evidence, but then though it be never so evident and demonstrable in it self, yet as Believ'd it is always Obscure, Faith having no regard to the proper light and Evidence of the thing, but only to the Testimony of the Revealer, whose bare Autho∣rity is the only Motive that deter∣mines her Assent, and the only Ground upon which she lays the whole weight of it, though the Truth of the thing in it self abso∣lutely Consider'd, may also stand

upon other Foundations, be ratio∣nally accounted for by Arguments from within, and so be seen by its own Light. But let the Light shine never so bright upon the Object from other sides, Faith lets in none, nor has any regard to that which she finds there, but connives at it, and walks (as I may say) with her eyes shut, contenting her self with the certainty of Revelation, and leaving to Science (if there be any) the E∣vidence of the thing. So that the Object is always dark to her, how clear and bright soever it may be in it self, or appear, when absolutely consider'd, to a Philosophic Eye. In which respect it falls very short of the Perfection of Science, though in respect of Firmness and Certain∣ty it be equal to it, as was said be∣fore. All which is briefly couch'd in that excellent Account of Faith given by the Author to the Hebrews,* 1.6 when he says, that it is the Substance of things hoped for, and the Argument of things not seen. Where by Sub∣stance and Argument he equals it with Science in regard of the Firmness and Certainty of the Assent, but by

saying that 'tis of things not seen he makes it vail and stoop to it in point of Evidence, in which respect indeed Faith, as Firm and as Certain as it is, is as much inferiour to Science, as Darkness is to Light.

22. To gather up then what has been here discours'd at large con∣cerning the inevidence of Faith into one view. When we say that Faith is an inevident Assent we are not to understand this inevidence of the formal Reason of Faith, but of the Matter of it. And when we say that the Matter of it is inevident, we should not intend by it that it is wholy and all over without Evi∣dence, but only that it has none from within or from the intrinsic Nature of the thing. And when we say that the Matter of Faith is inevident from within, this again is not to be intended of the simple Meaning of the Proposition, but of the Truth of it. And when we say that the Truth of it is inevident, this again lastly is not to be understood, as if it were always and necessarily so in its own Absolute Nature, but only so far forth as it is Believ'd, or

as 'tis consider'd under the forma∣lity of an Object of Faith. Or in other words, the inevidence of the Matter of Faith in respect of the Truth of the Article is not an Ab∣solute but a Relative inevidence. Not that the Matter of Faith is Never Absolutely and in the Nature of the thing inevident (for it may be so too as will be seen afterwards) but only that it is not necessarily so, there being no reason from the Nature of Faith that requires it should, which may consist with Evidence, though it proceeds not upon it, and has no regard to it as a Motive. So then the formal Reason of Faith is always Clear, the Matter of it Absolutely consider'd may be clear or not clear, as it happens, according as the Na∣ture of the thing is, but as Believ'd, or as Consider'd under the formality of being the Object of Faith so it is always inevident and Obscure, as being not supposed to be assented to for the sake of its Evidence (even when it has any) but wholy upon another Account, already sufficiently represented.

23. And thus having struck some Light into the Darkness of Faith, by stating and explaining with what exactness I could in what Sense it is an inevident Assent, I cannot forbear Observing by the way (though a little of the soonest) of what Ser∣vice this Account may be towards the grand Question of Believing things above Reason. For if Faith be an inevident Assent so far at least as not to respect the Evidence of its Object, why may not a thing be believ'd though it be above Reason? For what though it be above Rea∣son, is it therefore above Faith? Has Faith any regard to Evidence? Or is it determin'd by any Rational Mo∣tive, I mean that is taken from the Nature of the Object? Even when a thing is evident, Faith is not sup∣posed to assent to it because of its Evidence, and why then may not a thing be believ'd though it be not evident? Some Contend that Faith and Evidence cannot possibly con∣sist together, and according to them Not only what is inevident may be believ'd, but whatever is believ'd must be inevident. But this I look

upon, and have already shewn to be a Mistake. And 'tis a Mistake in the Extremity too. For I take it to be every whit as much an Ex∣treme to say that the Object of Faith is always inevident, as to say that it is always evident. However, it is always inevident so far as Believ'd, which is the Middle Point between the two extremes. The Nature of Faith requires at least this Relative inevidence of the Object, whatever it be in its own Nature, and we need no More. For if the Object of Faith be alwayes inevident so far as Believ'd, then will it not follow that it May be believ'd though inevi∣dent? For my part I see nothing that should hinder this Consequence, if the Principle it proceeds upon be right. The Principle is (and a very moderate one sure, the generality of Writers straining the Matter a great deal higher) that the Object of Faith is inevident as far as Believ'd. The Consequence is, that therefore a thing may be believ'd, though inevident. 'Tis true indeed one of these is an Absolute, and the other only a Re∣lative inevidence. But this signifies

Nothing to the Argument. For why may not a thing really and in it self inevident be believ'd, when even that which is Evident is Consi∣der'd by Faith as inevident? Why, then 'tis all one (as to Faith) as if it were so indeed; For what does the Evidence signify, or what real alte∣ration does it make, if Faith has no regard to it, nor Consideration of it? And what should hinder then but that a thing really inevident may be believ'd, especially if reveal'd by God himself, and concerning him∣self. The short is, Faith as Faith has no regard to Evidence (I mean that of the thing) and Faith as Di∣vine has no need of it, and therefore why an inevident thing may not be believ'd is what I do not under∣stand, and would be glad to Learn.

24. But to return (for I look upon this as too much a digression from the present, and too much a Prevention of what is to follow to be further pur∣sued) after having thus discours'd of the Nature of Faith in General, and the double Distribution of it into Humane and Divine, with proper Considerations upon each of them,

it remains that it be now further consider'd that each of these may be either Explicit or Implicit. Then we are said to believe Explicitly, when we believe determinately such or such a thing in particular, di∣stinctly knowing what that Parti∣cular thing is. And then Implicitly, when we believe indeterminately and at large whatever is proposed to us by such an Authority, not know∣ing what in particular is proposed, or what it is we Believe. Which though it seems to carry the Ap∣pearance of an Assent too blind and hood-winkt to be the act of a Rea∣sonable Creature, may yet in its pro∣per place become him as much as the other, and indeed is every whit as rational an Assent in its Ground and Principle. For all Explicit Faith is founded upon Implicit, and has Implicit Faith in it.

25. To understand both this and the Nature of Implicit Faith the better we are to Consider (what has been already intimated) that Faith proceeds upon Premisses, as well as Science, and is the Conclusion of a Syllogism. And I further Note

(what perhaps may not be unwor∣thy the Observation of the Curious) that the Major Proposition in Faith Explicit is the Conclusion in Faith Implicit, as may be seen in the Syl∣logism before set down.

Whatever is reveal'd by God is true, This is Reveal'd by God, Therefore this is true.

The Major Proposition here (what∣ever is reveal'd by God is true) is the Conclusion of Implicit Faith, whose act is as much to believe to be true whatever God reveals, as the act of Explicit Faith is to believe that this or that in particular is so. So that Explicit Faith proceeds upon Implicit, borrows from it its Con∣clusion for its Principle, and begins where the other leaves off. Just as in the Subalternation of Sciences, that which is a Conclusion in one is a Principle in the other, so 'tis here in the Subalternation of these two Faiths, whereof that which is Expli∣cit may be said to be Subalternated to that which is Implicit. Let not any therefore vilify or disparage Im∣plicit

Faith as a blind and irrational Assent, since it lays a ground for Explicit, which serves it self of it, using its Conclusion as a Principle, even as what is a Conclusion in Geo∣metry is a Principle in Perspective. And as Geometry is therefore ac∣counted the Superiour Science, so ought implicit Faith to be reckon'd as the Superiour Faith, upon whose Conclusion the other proceeds, and which it self proceeds thus,

Whatever is reveal'd by him that is Infallible is true, God is Infallible, Therefore whatever is reveal'd by God is true.

Here besides that 'tis plain to be seen that the Conclusion of this last Syl∣logism is the Principle of the prece∣dent One, and that Explicit Faith supposes what is proved in Implicit, it may be further noted that Implicit Faith (as being the highest degree of Faith) is due only to the highest, that is, to an Infallible Authority, the reason why whatever is reveal'd

by God is here Concluded to be true, being, because he is infallible. In∣fallibility then is the proper ground of Implicit Faith, and accordingly the Church of Rome assuming to her self the Character of Infallible, does upon that Supposition rightly require it. I say upon that sup∣position, for she is right enough in her Consequence, supposing her Principle to be true. But the truth of it is, that is Most Ex∣travagant, and such as carries in it such matchless Arrogance and Pre∣sumption as befits only him who as God sitteth in the temple of God,* 1.7 shew∣ing himself that he is God. For God only is Infallible, and therefore he only has right to require Implicit Faith. And to him indeed it is due from every one of his Creatures in the highest Measure imaginable, as is also Implicit Obedience upon the same Ground. Of both which we have a signal Example in Abraham,* 1.8 who when he was call'd by God to go out into a place which he should after receive for an Inheritance, is said by Faith to have Obey'd, and to

have gone out, not knowing whither he went.

26. But now what can be more dark and inevident than this Im∣plicit Faith? Its Formal Reason in∣deed is sufficiently clear, and it re∣solves at last into a Ground highly Rational, and so may be said in that respect to be the highest Reason. For certainly nothing can be more Reasonable than to believe whatever God (who is Infallible) reveals. There is therefore no Darkness on this Side. Nay even the Light it self does not shine more Clear. But as for the Matter of it (if I may call it so where nothing distinctly is be∣liev'd) that is sure as dark and ob∣scure as can well be conceiv'd, so dark as even to be Invisible. For a Man to believe at large without any restriction or limitation what∣ever God shall propose to him, let it be what it will, not Knowing what that is (like Abraham's going, not knowing whither he went) is such a dark and obscure act of Faith as has nothing clear in it but the Hu∣mility and Devotion of him who

so believes. This is a Faith Wor∣thy of God, as well as peculiar to him, and 'tis the great inevidence and obscurity of it that makes it so. For so far is the Matter of it from having any Evidence in it, that it is not so much as Evident what the Matter of it is. Here then is the very Blackness of Darkness, and he that has this infolded Faith (as every true Believer has) and can thus trust God in the Dark, where he sees nothing but only the gene∣ral Reason of his so doing, is not likely in any of the more explicit instances of it to plead the inevi∣dence of the Article to excuse his Infidelity, or to deny his Faith to an otherwise sufficiently clear Re∣velation, merely because it is above his shallow Reason.

27. Upon what has been hither∣to discours'd it will not be difficult to give in few words a Satisfactory Resolution of a Celebrated Question which among the Schoolmen has made a great many, and that is, whether Faith belongs to the Vn∣derstanding or to the Will: It is

plain by the Measures already laid down that it belongs to the Latter. For Faith (as all acknowledge) is an Assent, and Assent is a Species of Judgement, and Judgement (as has been shewn already) is an act of the Will, not of the Understand∣ing, whose only Operation is Per∣ception, and consequently Faith is an act of the Will consenting to, imbracing, acquiescing and reposing it self in what the Understanding represents as proposed and reveal'd by God. And indeed unless Judg∣ment and consequently Faith did belong to the Will as their proper and immediate Principle, 'tis im∣possible to Conceive how a Man should be blame-worthy for any of his Opinions, or how he should stand accountable either for Er∣ror on the one hand, or for Infi∣delity and Heresy on the other. For if Faith be an act of the Un∣derstanding then since the only O∣peration of the Understanding is Perception, the greatest Fault of an Infidel or a Heretic will be Non-Perception, which indeed is not

Error but Ignorance, whereas Infi∣delity and Heresie are always sup∣posed to include Error, and to be also the worst of Errors. And this Non-perception is only a Ne∣gation, and such as resolves into want of Parts, which is not a Mo∣ral but a Natural defect, whereas Infidelity and Heresie (as indeed all that is Faulty) are understood to be Privations, and Defects of a Moral Nature. But then to make them so they must be voluntary (nothing being faulty but what is so) that is again they must be Wil∣ful, that is, they must be acts of the Will, and Consequently Faith which is the Habit whereof those Sins are Privations, must also be∣long to the same Principle, or else in short there would be neither Vertue in having it, nor Vice in being without it. And according∣ly our Saviour in upbraiding the Iews with Infidelity does all along not only by Confequence, but di∣rectly and expresly, Charge it up∣on their Wills:* 1.9 Ye will not come to me, that ye may have Life.

28. And thus I have gone tho∣rough what I intended, and what indeed is of greatest Considerati∣on, upon this Subject of Faith. In the account of which if I dif∣fer from any Authors of the bet∣ter Character that have either professedly or occasionally writ∣ten upon it, particularly Baronius and Dr. Pearson, 'tis not that I love to lay aside great Authori∣ties, or affect to be by my self, but because I follow the best Light of my Understanding, write with Freedom and Ingenuity what I think, and endeavour to repre∣sent things as they are, without having regard to Authority any further than I think it joyn'd with Truth and Reason. Which shall also be my Rule in what remains of this Treatise. In the Mean time what has been hither∣to discours'd concerning Reason and Faith may serve as a good Preparation in order to an Ac∣count of the Great Question Con∣cerning the Belief of things above Reason. But before we enter up∣on

any thing of that Nature, 'tis fit the Distinction of Above Rea∣son, and Contrary to Reason be Consider'd and rightly Stated, which is the task allotted for the next Chapter.

Notes

• * 1.1

  2 Tim. 1. 12.
• * 1.2

  22 ••. Q. 1. Art. 1.
• * 1.3

  Chap. 7. Artic. 9.
• * 1.4

  Tom. 9. p. 107.
• * 1.5

  2 Pet. 5.
• * 1.6

  Heb. 11. 1.
• * 1.7

  2 Thes. 2. 4.
• * 1.8

  Heb. 11. 8.
• * 1.9

  Joh. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 40.