An account of reason & faith in relation to the mysteries of Christianity / by John Norris.

CHAP. VII. That therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no just Objection against the Belief of it. With an Account of the Cartesian Maxim, that we are to Assent only to what is Clear and Evident. (Book 7)

1. TIs a Wonderful thing to Consider the Caprice of Hu∣man Nature, by what unaccount∣able Springs it's Movements are ordered, and how odly and unsted∣dily Men act and manage themselves even in the same Circumstances, and in Relation to the same Objects. Sometimes the Obscurity and Myste∣riousness of a thing shall be a Mo∣tive of Credibility, and recommend it the rather to their Belief. Thus you shall have a great many reject that Philosophy as idle and Chime∣rical which undertakes to explain the Effects of Nature by insensible

Particles, their different Bigness, Figure, Contexture, Local Motion, Rest, &c. Merely because this is a plain Simple and Intelligible Account, such as they can easily and well Con∣ceive. The very easiness and clear∣ness wherewith they Conceive these Principles is Made an Ob∣jection against them (though indeed it be a good Presumption for them) and for that very Reason they will not believe them to be the true Prin∣ciples of Nature, whose Effects they fancy must be Resovled into Causes more hidden and Abstruse. And accordingly they find in themselves a greater inclination to lend attenti∣on to those that shall undertake the Solution of them by the real Chi∣meras of Substantial Forms, Quali∣ties, Sympathys, Antipathys, &c. or that shall go to account for them by the yet more Obscure Principles of the Chymists, striking and filling their Ears with those great but emp∣ty Sounds, Archeus, Seminal Spirit, A∣stral Beings, Gas, Blas, &c. which they receive with great satisfaction not for their Scientific Light (for they are dark as may be, mere Philosophic

Cant) but only because they are Mysterious and Abstruse, and there∣fore they fancy there must be some∣what more than Ordinary in them, tho they know not, nor, it may be, never Consider'd, what. And here∣in, as in some other Instances, Men love Darkness better than Light.

2. But then at another time you shall have them inquiring after Truth as Diogenes did after an Hon∣est Man, with a Candle in their hands, and not caring to go a step any further than they can see their way. Now upon a sudden they are all for Clear and distinct Ideas, Full and adequate Perceptions, Demon∣strative Proofs and Arguments, and nothing will serve or Content them but Light and Evidence, and they will believe nothing but what they can Comprehend. Strange diversi∣ty of Conduct! Who would think two such vastly distant extreams should meet together, I will not say in the same Man, but in the same Human Nature, and that the very same Creature (and such a One as Stiles it self Rational too) should proceed by such uncertain Measures,

and act so inconsistently with it Self; sometimes embracing a thing for the sake of it's Obscurity, and some∣times again in another Fit making that alone an Invincible Objection against the Belief of it.

3. But it is plain by the foregoing Measures that it is not. For since Truth is the general Object of Faith, 'tis evident that nothing can argue a thing to be absolutely incredible, or not reasonable to be beleiv'd, but that which at the same time argues it not to be True. For if true, then 'tis still within the Compass of the general Object of Faith. But now we have shewn already that the In∣comprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it's not being true, whence it clearly and closely follows that 'tis no Argument neither a∣gainst it's Credibility. And if so, then we may believe it Notwith∣standing it's Incomprehensibility, because we may believe whatever is not Absolutely incredible. So that there is no Necessity that we should discard every thing we cannot Conceive as unworthy of a Ratio∣nal Belief, or that what is Above

our Reason should be therefore a∣bove our Faith too.

4. It is true indeed that the In∣comprehensibility of a thing is in it Self no proper and direct Argument why it should be believ'd, and he would be thought to give but an or∣dinary account of his Faith, who be∣ing ask••d why he believ'd, such an Incomprehensible thing, should an∣swer because it is Incomprehensible. which at best could pass only for a Religious Flourish, much such another as, Credo quia impossibile. And that because the Incomprehen∣sibility of a thing is not directly and per se a Criterion of Truth (whe∣ther it may be per Accidens, may be Consider'd afterwards) whose Na∣tural and genuin Character is not Obsecurity, but Light and Evidence. Not that nothing is True but what has this Character (for we have al∣ready shewn the Contrary in prov∣ing Incomprehensible Truths) but that as whatever we clearly per∣ceive is True, so our Clear perceiving of a thing is the only sign from the Intrinsic Nature of the thing it Self of the Truth of it. Incomprehensi∣bility

therefore is none, but as such abstracts from true and not true, and is equally Common to both. But now that which may Consist with a thing supposing it false, can no more prove it True, than that which may Consist with a thing sup∣posing it True, can prove it false, according to the Tenour of the Fifth Chapter. The Incomprehen∣sibility therefore of a thing is no pro∣per Argument of the Truth of it, and Consequently no Reason of it Self, why it should be believ'd, and that because it abstracts as such from True and False, and is too Common to Both to prove either.

5. And because it is so, it is also further granted that the Incompre∣hensibility of a thing is not only in it Self no proper Reason why it should be believ'd, but has also so far the Nature of a Disswasive from believing, as to be a Caution against a too hasty Belief, till there appear some other Motive from without either from Reason or Authority that shall deter∣min the Assent. In the mean while it advises to Suspend. For the

Incomprehensibility of a thing being as such No Reason why a Man should believe it, 'tis plain that if he did believe it Consider'd only as in that State he would believe it. with∣out Reason. That therefore is a Reason why he should suspend, a Negation of Reason being enough to with-hold ones Assent, though to give it one had need have a posi∣tive Reason. When therefore a thing appears Incomprehensible, that indeed is sufficient Reason to suspend our Belief, till some prevailing Con∣sideration from without shall over∣rule that Suspension, by requiring our Assent. But when it does so, then the Incomprehensibility ought to be No Argument to the Contra∣ry, and it would be every whit as absurd to reject a thing now because of its Incomprehensibility, as to be∣lieve it before for that Reason. And that because as the Incomprehensi∣bility of a thing is no reason for Be∣lieving it, so it is no Absolute Reason against it.

6. If it were so it would be in Natural things, the objects of Hu∣man and Philosophic Science, such as

belong properly and immediately to the Province and Jurisdiction of Rea∣son. Here, if any where, the In∣comprehensibility of a thing would forbid all Assent to it. And so it is supposed to do by some who though far from denying the Belief of In∣comprehensible things in Religion, will yet tell you that in Physical Contemplations, Clearness and Evi∣dence is to lead the way, and we are to proceed with our Light be∣fore us, assenting to nothing but what we well Comprehend. In Matters of Faith indeed they will allow that Reason is to be submitted to Revelation, and that we are to believe many things which pass our Comprehension; but in Matters of pure Reason they will have us go no further than Reason can carry us. Which indeed is right enough it their Meaning be that we are to Assent to Nothing but what upon the whole Matter all things Consider'd from without as well as from within, we have reason to believe true, and that we are never to proceed to judge or determin without some Evidence or other, but then this will equally hold

in Matters of Faith too, which is too rational an Assent to be given at a Venture, and we know not why, and whose Formal Reason (as has been already discours'd) is always Clear. But if their Meaning be that in Matters of Reason we must As∣sent to nothing but what has an in∣ternal Evidence, and what in its self, and by its own Lights is Comprehen∣sible by us (as they seem to mean, or else their distinction of the Case of Reason and the Case of Revelation is here impertinent) then I conceive that they set too narrow limits to our Assent in Matters of Reason when they allow it to be given only to things which in this sense are Evi∣dent to us. For 'tis plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True, and must be True, and so not only may, but cannot help Assenting to them, though at the same time we are not able to Com∣prehend how they are, or can possi∣bly be.

7. Not that our Assent is then Blind and wholly without Evidence, (for then we might as well Assent to the contrary as to what we do, and

would do better not to Assent at all) but only that it has none from within, and from the intrinsic Nature of the Object, but only from some Exter∣nal Consideration, much after the same manner as it is in ••atch. In both which there may be a Clear Reason, why we should Assent to an Obscure thing. But then as the internal Obscurity does not destroy the External Evidence, so neither does the External Evidence strike a∣ny Light into the internal Obscurity; or in other words, as the Reason for Assenting is never the less Clear be∣cause the Matter assented to is Ob∣scure, so neither is the Matter as∣sented to ever the less Obscure be∣cause the Reason for assen••ing to it is Clear. And yet notwithstand∣ing this internal Obscurity of the Matter we assent to it because of the prevailing Light of the External E∣vidence. And this we do, not only in Matters of Faith (according to the Restriction of some) but in the things of Nature and Reason too, where we are oftentimes forced by the pressing urgency of certain Ex∣ternal and Collateral Considerations

to assent to things internally obscure and whose very possibility we can∣not Comprehend, as is plain in the great Question of the Divisibility of Quantity, and other Instances, whereof every Thinking Man's Ob∣se••••ation cannot but have already furnish'd him with variety. The Incomprehensibility then of a thing is non just Objection against our As∣sent to it even in Matters of a Ra∣tional Nature, much less then is it in Matters of Faith For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reason, and where she sits as Judge, then much less in things that are not of her proper Jurisdiction, and if notwithstanding the internal inevi∣dence of an Object we think fit to assent to it upon Rational Conside∣rations, much more may we, and ought we upon the Authority of the Infallible God.

8. Indeed if whatsoever is Above our Reason were also (as some pre∣tend) as Contrary to it, and there were nothing true but what was also Comprehensible, and so the In∣comprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true,

then I con••ess we could not as Ra∣tional Creatures assent to an incom∣prehensible Proposition upon any Consideration whatsoever, No not even that of Divine Authority. 'Tis true indeed there could then be no such Authority for Incomprehensible things. But if there were, 'tis im∣possible we should regard it, because we could not have greater assurance either of the Existence or of the Truth of it, than we have already (upon this Supposition) that the things reveal'd are not true. But now if this Supposition be no more than a Supposition, if to be above Reason does not involve any Con∣trariety to it, if there are incom∣prehensible Truths, and Consequent∣ly the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument o•• its not being true (all which has been already proved) then 'tis plain that what is an in∣comprehensible may yet be a Be∣lievable Object (because within the Possibility of Truth) and then to render it actually believ'd there needs only some External Evidence either from Reason or Authority. For what should hinder our Assent to an

Incomprehensible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it, and its own internal Obscu∣rity is no Argument against it! 'Tis plain therefore that we ought to give our Assent. And since we do so oftentimes upon a Ground of Rea∣son, much more ought we upon that more Firm and Immoveable ground of Revelation. The short is, whatever is no Objection against the Truth of a thing is none against the Credibility of it, since Truth is the General Object of Faith (un∣less you will say that a thing is un∣fit to be believ'd upon any other ac∣count besides want of Truth) and therefore since we have already shewn that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Truth of it, it visibly follows that it is no Argument against the Belief of it neither. Therefore an Incomprehensible thing may be be∣liev'd, and accordingly he that refuses to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reason for it than because it is Incomprehen∣sible.

9. If it be said that this is rea∣son enough, because Faith is a Ra∣tional Act, and therefore what is a∣bove the Comprehension of Reason is as much above a Rational Belief, to this, besides what I have already remarqu'd upon this Occasion in the Chapter of Faith,* 1.1 I here further reply, that it is true indeed and on both sides agreed that Faith is a Rational Act, but in what Sense is the Question. There are two very different Senses according to which it may be said to be so either in re∣gard of the Clearness of its Formal Reason, or in regard of the Clear∣ness of its Object. Either because it is founded upon an External Evi∣dence, or Argument for believing, or because it proceeds upon an In∣ternal Evidence, that appears in the very Nature of the thing Be∣liev'd. I•• Faith be said to be a Ra∣tional Act in the latter Sense, the Assertion is then False, for so (that ••s in respect of the Object) we have sh••wn it to be an inevident Assent. But i•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be said to be a Rational Act in the former Sense, then indeed it is true, but nothing to the purpose,

since nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well consist with an Internal Inevidence, or in other words, that the Clearness of the Reason for Believing may stand with the Obscurity of the Object Believ'd. And therefore though Faith be a Rational Act yet it does not hence ••ollow that what is Above Reason is also above Faith and can∣not rationally be believ'd, because the Act of Faith is said to be Rational, Not in respect of the Evidence of the Object, but only that of its For∣mal Reason or Motive. And there∣fore though there be no Evidence in the Object, yet it is not thereby ren∣der'd uncapable of being the Matter of Faith, because the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Act supposes, is wholly of another kind. There seems indeed a kind of opposition as to the Sound between Faith's be∣ing an Act of Reason, and the be∣lieving what is Above Reason. And this it may be is that which imposes upon the Minds, or the Ears shall I say, of them that urge it as an Objection. I cannot imagine what else should, for I'm sure there is no

Contradiction in the Sense. 'Tis true indeed Evidence in the Act and not Evidence in the Act are Contra∣dictories, because ad Idem, and so are Not Evidence in the Object and Evidence in the Object, for the same reason. But there is no Con∣tradiction between Evidence in the Act and No Evidence in the Object, and therefore these may stand toge∣ther, though the other cannot

10. But to lay open the Fallacy of this great and very popular Objection yet a little more to the Eye (though it must be a very blind one that does not see it already) I will put it into Form, and give it a Formal Answer.

If Faith be a Rational Act, then what is Above Reason cannot ra∣tionally be Believ'd. But Faith is a Rational Act, Ergo.

For Answer to this I distinguish. If by Rational Act be meant an Act founded upon Internal Evidence, or the Evidence of the Object, then I deny the Minor, Faith is not so a Rational Act. But if by Rational

Act be meant an Act founded upon External Evidence or the Evidence of its Formal Reason or Motive, then indeed I grant the Minor, but deny the Consequence, which is none at all, for it does not at all fol∣low because Faith is a Rational Act, meaning by it that it proceeds upon External Evidence, and that there is a clear Reason for Believing, that therefore the thing Believ••d may not from within and in its own Nature be altogether inevident and so above the Comprehension of Reason. For though Evidence be Contradictory to Not Evidence in the ••ame, yet Evidence in the Act is no way Con∣tradictory to inevidence in the Object, and Consequently does not at all exclude it. They may there∣fore both stand together, and Con∣sequently what is above Reason may be believ'd for any thing that this Celebrated Objection from Faith's being a Rational Act makes to the Contrary; which truly is so gross and palpable a Sophism, that I cannot but wonder how it could ever impose upon so many Learned Men as it has done, and some of

them very acute and nice Consider∣ers of things. But I hope the Falla∣ciousness of it is by this so plainly and fully detected, that I shall not think those Heads worth much inform∣ing that shall be further imposed on by it.

11. But what then shall we say to that Great and Fundamental Maxim so pressingly inculcated by Des Castes and his Followers, and not disal∣low'd of by others, that we are to assent to not••ing but what is Clear and Evident? If to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, how then to what is Obscure and Inevident? Or if to what is Obscure and Inevident, how then to nothing but what is Clear and Evident? Do not these seem flat Contradictions one to the other, and how then shall we adjust the Matter between them? It must be either by denying that Cartesian Maxim to be true, or by shewing that though it be true it does not Contradict the Assertion here main∣tain'd, but is Consistent with it. The First way I shall not take. I allow the Maxim to be true, and not only so, but to be withal of the

greatest importance of any that can be given for the direction of the Mind of Man in order to the avoid∣ing of Errour. The only Remedy and Caution against which is never to let our Judgments prevent our Conceptions, or to Assent to any thing that we have only a Confuse Notion of, and where we see only by halves and with an imperfect Light, or perhaps do not see at all, but to have a Clear Understanding of the Matter before we adventure to judge of it, and to Maintain an Evidence in all our Reasonings. Which accordingly is made by M. Malebranche the First of those Rules which in his Treatise of Method he lays down to be observ'd in the inquiry after Truth. And indeed to do otherwise is to make a wrong use of our Intellectual Powers, particu∣larly of that Liberty we have to sus∣pend Judgment till the fulness of E∣vidence requires it, and the want of Observing this Rule is also the Occasion of most of our Errours and Wrong Assents,* 1.2 as the same Excellent Person shews it to have

been in particular to the Authors of the Scholastic Philosophy.

12. I shall not therefore go about to salve my own Assertion by deny∣ing Des Cartes's Maxim, but rather by shewing that according to the true Sense and intendment of it, it does not Contradict it. But first we must see what the true Sense of it is, or rather in what Sense it is true, though this may be without much difficulty Collected by any attentive Reader from what has been already said in several places of this Chapter, wherein I have in great Measure prevented this Objection. But to Consider it more directly; To verifie this Maxim that we are to Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, the usual way has been to distinguish between Matters of Faith, and Matters of Reason. In Matters of Faith, say they, we are to believe many things which we cannot Comprehend. And here then it seems this Rule must be laid a∣side. But in Matters of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident. And here then it seems it holds. Accordingly when

'tis Objected against certain Articles of Faith that they are not to be com∣prehended by Reason, 'tis usual to reply that these things do not belong to Reason &c. implying that if they did, then indeed the Objection would be good, and the incomprehensibility of such things would be an Argu∣ment against assenting to them, which implies again that in Matters of Reason we must not Assent to any thing but what is Clear and E∣vident, though in Matters of Faith we may. But we have remarqu'd already that even in Matters of Pure Reason we are forc'd to Assent to many things which we cannot com∣prehend, and that even in Matters of Faith we do in a Certain Sense Assent upon Clear Evidence. This Distinction therefore will not do.

13. In stead therefore of distin∣guishing between Matters of Faith and Matters of Reason, I think it will be better to distinguish of Evi∣dence. We are to Assent to Nothing save what is Clear and Evident, says our Maxim. Very Good. Now if by Evidence here be meant inter∣nal Evidence, and the Sense be that

are to assent to nothing but what in its own Nature, and by a Light in∣trinsic to it, is Evident, then the Maxim is False; and that not only in Matters of Faith, but also in Mat∣ters of Reason too, wherein we find our selves often Constrain'd to assent to things that have not this inter∣nal Evidence, but are (as to what respects the Nature of the things themselves) altogether Obscure and Incomprehensible. But if by Evi∣dence here be Meant Evidence at large, abstracting from Internal or External, and the Sense be that we are to assent to nothing but what has some Evidence or other, either In∣ternal or External, or what is some way or other evident to us, and what we see plainly to be true by a Light shining from within or from without, in short, what we have one way or other sufficient ground or Reason to assent to, then the Maxim is undoubtedly true, and will hold Universally, not only in Matters of Reason, but also in Matters of Faith too, which (as was shewn in the Chapter of Faith) is the Conclusion of a Syllogism, and so a Rational

Act, and proceedt upon as Much, though not the Same kind of Evi∣dence, as any other Conclusion does, And that even in the Belief of In∣comprehensible things, which it would be absurd, nay impossible to believe, if there were no Reason to believe things above Reason. Ac∣cording to a saying, as I take it of St. Austin, in one of his Letters to this purpose, That we could not bring our selves to believe what is Above our Reason, if Reason it self did not per∣swade us that there are things which we should do well to believe, although we are not capable of Comprehending them. So then in ••hort, if this Maxim that we are to assent to nothing but what is Evident, be understood of Internal Evidence, then 'tis False, not only in Matters of Faith but also in Matters of Reason, wherein things intrinsecally inevident are assented to. But if it be understood of Evidence at large then ••tis true, not only in Matters of Reason, but also in Matters of Faith, which (as has been often noted) is reasonable in its Fund and Principle, and whose Evidence

must be Clear, though its Object may be Obscure.

14. In this large therefore and indefinite Sense of the Word Evi∣dence the Maxim is to be under∣stood. We are to assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, that is, we ought to make use of our liberty of Suspension so far as not to give our Assent to any thing but what all things Consider'd and upon the whole appears Evident to us, what by some Light or other we see and plainly perceive to be true, and what in one word we find sufficient Reason either from with∣in or from without to Assent to. According to that well known Sen∣tence wherewith Des Cartes Con∣cludes his wonderful System, Ni∣hil{que} ab ullo Credi velim, nisi quod ipsi Evidens & invicta ratio persua∣debit. I would have nothing be∣liev'd by any one but what by evi∣dent and irresistible reason he shall be Convinc'd of. And certainly he would be very unreasonable that should desire more. For to assent without Evidence of one sort or o∣ther that the thing assented to is

true, is to assent without a why or wherefore, and to assent so is to as∣sent without Reason, which again is to assent not as a Rational Crea∣ture; and as Man ought not, so to be sure God cannot require such an Assent. To assent therefore to no∣thing but what upon some Consi∣deration or other is Clear and Evi∣dent to us, and what we have good reason to imbrace, as true, is cer∣tainly a Maxim of unquestionable Truth, and of universal Extent, that holds in all Matters whatso∣ever, whether of Reason or of Faith, in the former of which an Assent without Evidence would be the Act, and in the latter the Sacri∣fice of a Fool.

15. And that this is the true Sense wherein Des Cartes intended his Maxim, as well as the true Sense of the Maxim it self, is plain from the Occasion of it which as all know who are not utter Strangers to, or very Negligent Readers of his Books, was the bringing in and obtruding so many things in the Vulgar Philo∣sophy whereof the Introducers of them had such Confuse Notions

and of whose reality and Existence they had no Firm and Solid Reasons to assure them, such as Substantial Forms, really inhering Accidents and Qualities and the like, which served rather to darken than clear up the Science of Nature, and were the Occasions of a thousand Errours in the Superstructures that were rais'd upon those Imaginary and Chimerical Principles. In Opposi∣tion to, and as a Remedy for which, he lays down this Fundamental Maxim, to be Carefully observ'd by all the Disciples of Truth in their whole Intellectual Progress, never to assent to any thing but what is Clear and Evident, that is, to no∣thing but of Whose Truth and Rea∣lity they are fully assured, and have sufficient Reason to assent to. This is the true Sense of the Maxim, this is the Sense of its Author, and in this Sense it is undeniably true. And that without any prejudice to our present Conclusion, with which (as thus explain'd) it is very Consistent. For 'tis now very easie to discern that we may believe an Incompre∣hensible thing, and yet at the same

time according to this Cartesian Maxim assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, because the Evidence of Faith is External, and that there may be an External Evi∣dence to assent to a thing Internally Inevident is no Contradiction.

16. Which by the way may serve to discover as well the Injustice as the Impertinence, 1. Of those who make use of this Maxim as an Ob∣jection against the Belief of things above Reason. 2. Of those who take occasion from hence to traduce the Cartesian Philosophy as favoura∣ble to, and looking with a very pro∣pitious Aspect upon Sociniani••••, and indeed as little better than an Intro∣duction to it, only because it talks so much of clear and distinct Ideas and Conceptions, and of assenting to nothing but what is Clear and Evi∣dent. But Most of all 3dly. Of those who proceed even to traduce the Author himself as a secret Friend to the Cause, and no better than a Socinian in Disguise. It would have been indeed a Considerable Glory and Advantage to that, (or any o∣ther Interest) to have had so great

a Master of Reason a Friend to it. But he Certainly was not, if with his Words he has transmitted to us his real Thoughts, which would be great uncharity to question, and, with a witness, to Assent to what is not Evident.

17. He was indeed a great Master in the Rational way, but no Mag∣nifier or Exalter of Human Rea∣son. So far from that, that he seems to have had the most inward and feeling Sense of its Infirmities and Defects, and the best to have under∣stood what a poor little thing 'tis to be a Man, of any one in the World. As may be abundantly Collected from several passages in his Writings (besides that the whole vein of them runs that way) particularly those two final Sentences wherewith he shuts up his Principles and his Meta∣physics, At Nihilominus memor meae∣tenuitatis, nihil affirmo &c. and, Naturae nostrae infirmitas est agnoscenda. Which plainly shew what a low de∣basing Sense he had both of Him∣self and of Human Nature in ge∣neral, as ••tis Natural for every man to have more and more, the wiser

he grows, and the further he ad∣vances in Knowledge, which when all's done (provided you take a good Dose of it) is the best Cure of Pride and Vanity.

18. And as he had thus slender an Opinion both of Human Reason and his Own, so he appears to have had also at the same such an high-raised and elevated Sense of the im∣mense Grandeur of God, and of the Magnificence of his Works, and how inscrutable the Profundities of both are to such Finite and Con∣tracted Minds as ours, as can scarce any where be parallel'd. Two Characters certainly of Spirit, that are none of the aptest to dispose a Man to Socinianism. But not to dwell any longer upon Rational Presumptions, there is a certain plain and deciding place in the Writings of this Great Man (which one would think had escaped the Eyes of some) that is enough for∣ever to silence the Calumny of his being even in the least Socinianiz'd, and to shame those that have so little Conscience or Judgment as to

stain his Memory with it. For who can suspect him in the least in∣fected with that Head-seizing Dis∣ease, which is now become so Po∣pular and Epidemic, when he shall hear him still Purging and Apolo∣gizing for himself in these Vindica∣tory words,* 1.3 Credenda esse Omnia quae a Deo revelata sunt, quamvis Captum Nostrum Excedant. And again, Ita si soriè nobis Deus de seipso, vel aliis aliquid revelet, quod Naturales inge∣nii Nostri vires excedat, qualia jam sunt Mysteria Incarnationis & Trini∣tatis, non recasabimus illa Credere, quamvis non Clare intelligamus. Nec ullo modo mirabimur multa esse, tum in immensâ ejus Naturâ, tum etiam in r•• bus ab ••o Creatis, quae Captum No∣strum excedant. Now how glad should I be to see all the Socinians in Christendom Subscribe to this Form of Words, and is it not strange then that he whose Originally they are should be suspected of Socinianism, and that his Philosophy too should be thought to lead to it. But the Truth is, the Cartesian Philosophy leads just as much to Socinianism, as

Philosophy in general does to A∣theism, and I will venture to say, and be bound to make it good, that as no good Philosopher can be an Atheis••, so no good Cartesian can be a Socinian.

Notes

• * 1.1

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.2

  Recherche de la Ve∣rité. Tom. 2. p. 165.
• * 1.3

  〈…〉〈…〉.