An account of reason & faith in relation to the mysteries of Christianity / by John Norris.

CHAP. VI. That if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true, Human Reason would then be the Measure of Truth. (Book 6)

1. AS there is Nothing more Common than for people to hold Certain Principles that have an inseparable Connexion with ve∣ry bad Consequences, and yet not professedly to hold those Conse∣quences, because either they do not attend to them, or are not sensible that they do indeed follow from such Principles, whereof we have two very pregnant Instances in the Maintainers of the Predestinarian and Soli••idian Systemes, so on the other hand, and for the same Rea∣son there are those who take up, and with great Fixedness adhere to certain Consequences without Pro∣fessedly

holding those Principles from which they truly flow, and to which (if traced to the Head) they will infallibly lead them.

2. Of this we have a very par∣ticular Instance (where I confess one would not expect to find it) in those of the Socinian Perswasion. The Reason these Men of Reason give why they will not believe the Mysteries of the Christian Faith, is because they are above their Rea∣son, they cannot Comprehend them. Whereby they plainly imply, that they will believe Nothing but what they can Comprehend, or that No∣thing is to be believ'd that is In∣comprehensible, which is also a common Maxim among them, who accordingly make Above Reason and Contrary to Reason to be one and the same thing. And whereas 'tis only the untruth of a thing that can make it unfit to be the Object of Faith, in saying they will not believe what they cannot Compre∣hend, they do as good as say that what they cannot Comprehend is not True, and so that the Incom∣prehensibility of a thing is a just

warrant to conclude it False. And all this they own and expresly de∣clare, if not in these very terms, yet at least in such as are equiva∣lent to them as is too Notorious and well known to need any Ci∣tations for the proof of it. But now though they do thus profess••d∣ly own that the Incomprehensibi∣lity of a thing by Reason is an Ar∣gument of its not being true, yet that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth, or that all Truth is Com∣prehensible by it, are (as I take it) Propositions which they do not o∣penly and professedly avow. For as I noted in the Introduction 'tis such an Odious and Arrogant Asser∣tion that they cannot with any Face of Modesty or common Decency make a plain and direct Profession of it, though at the same time 'tis most Certain, that this is the true Principle of that Consequence which they do professedly hold, viz. that the Incomprehensibility of a thing ar∣gues it not to be true, and that this Consequence does as necessarily lead back to that Principle.

3. For as if Human Reason be the Measure of Truth it follows in the descendintg line as a direct Con∣sequence that the Incomprehensibi∣lity of a thing argues it not to be true, so it follows as well Back∣wards & per viam ascensûs, that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be True, then Hu∣man Reason is the Measure of Truth. Since if it were not, the Incom∣prehensibility of a thing (as is shewn in the Preceding Chapter) would then not argue it not to be True. If therefore it does, 'tis plain that Hu∣man Reason is the Measure of Truth. Which Principle whoever disowns ought also to renounce the other Proposition, viz. That the Incompre∣hensibility of a thing is an Argu∣ment of its untruth, which if yet he will imbrace notwithstanding, 'tis plain he holds the Consequence without its Principle, and has in∣deed no Reason for what he Af∣firms.

4. For as he who granting Human Reason to be the Measure of Truth, denies yet that the Incomprehensi∣bility of a thing is an Argument of

its not being true is therefore incon∣sistent with himself, because in so doing he supposes the Contradictory to what he had before granted, viz. that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth. So he that Af∣firms that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument of its not being True, and yet denies that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth, is also as inconsistent with himself, because in so doing the sup∣poses the Contradictory to his own Assertion, and does in effect say that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True, as most Certainly it would not be in case Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth, as the foregoing Chapter has sufficiently shewn. The short is, if the Not being of A proves that C is not, then the being of C proves that A is, since if it were not, according to the First Suppo∣sition C could not be. And so here if Reason's not being the Measure of Truth proves that the Incom∣prehensibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True,

then if the Incomprehensibility of a thing be an Argument of it's not being True 'tis plain that Reason is the Measure of Truth, since if it were not then according to the first Supposition the Incomprehensibility of a thing would not be an Argu∣ment of its not being True.

5. For how I pray comes the In∣comprehensibility of a thing to con∣clude the untruth of it? I cannot Comprehend such a thing, therefore it is not True, where's the Conse∣quence? By what Logic does this Latter Proposition follow from the Former? why we have here the Minor Proposition and the Conclusi∣on, and to make a Complete Argu∣ment of it we must add another, thus; If it were true I should Com∣prehend it, but I do not Comprehend it, therefore it is not true. Where∣by it appears to the eye that my not being able to Comprehend a thing is no otherwise an Argument of the ••••truth of it, than as it is first pre∣••••pposed that if it were true I should 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••ble to Comprehend it. Which again resolving into this Absolute ••••••••osition, that I am able to Com∣prehend

all Truth, it plainly follows that if my inability to Comprehend a thing be an Argument that it is not true, then I am able to Compre∣hend all Truth, and that my Reason is the Measure and Final Standard of it.

6. I Conclude therefore that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of it's not being true then Human Reason will be the Measure of Truth, and that they that hold the Former ought also if they will be Consistent with them∣selves to admit the Latter. But be∣cause this is a False Principle, that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth, therefore, I Conclude again that the Consequence that Resolves into this Principle is also False, since we may as well Conclude a Con∣sequence to be False because it leads back to a False Principle, as a Principle to be False because it is productive of a bad Con∣sequence. Which still further Con∣firms and Establishes the Conclusion of the last Chapter, viz. That the In∣comprehensibility of a thing is no Ar∣gument of its untruth, which you

see is now proved both Backwards and Forwards, and so made impreg∣nable on all sides. We have proved it Forwards by shewing the False∣ness of that Principle that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth, and by thence arguing the said Con∣clusion; and we have also proved it Backwards by shewing that the Contrary Supposition Resolves into that False and already Confused Principle. And I do not see how any Conclusion can be better prov∣ed.