An introduction to the art of logick composed for the use of English schools, and all such who having no opportunity of being instructed in the Latine tongue ... / by John Newton ...

The First Book OF THE ART of LOGICK. (Book 1)

CHAP. 1.

LOgick is an Art which conduct∣eth the mind in the knowledge of things.

In this Definition two things are to be explained.

• 1. The name of the thing defined.
• 2. The Parts of the definition.

For the first of these, Logick hath its name from this word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifieth

speech, and according to Aristotle, speech is twofold, internal, and external. Internal speech he calleth that which is conceived in the mind: And that he calleth external, which is expressed by words; now Logick hath its name from both these kinds of speech but chiefly from the internal, which is the reason or ratiocination of the mind, where∣as the external speech is but the interpreter of the internal.

This word Logick may be taken two waies.

• 1. For the Habit which is gotten by pre∣cept and practice.
• 2. For the Systeme of Logical precepts, by which that habit may be more easily acqui∣red.

And this definition of Logick doth bes¦sute with it in the first acceptation; though I shall here speak of it in the second; namely as it is taken for the Systeme of Logical pre∣cepts.

The parts of this definition are two, the Genus and the differentia; the Genus or ge∣neral name here given to Logick is Art not a manual art, or handy-craft trade but an internal and mental art; for the mind hath its artificial workings as well as the body, as is manifest even in Poetry.

The difference or particular name, by

which it is distinguished from other arts will be best conceived by considering three things; the End, the Offices and the Object thereof.

The last and principal end of Logick is, the knowledge of things, and its chief Offices by which this End may be attained, are these three.

• 1. To define things that are obscure.
• 2. To divide things that are general and u∣niversal.
• 3. To reason concerning things dubious.

And the matter or Object about which it ••reateth, is, all that we can possibly either con∣ceive in our minds, or utter with words; but the manner how this matter is to be considered, is not as things are in their own nature, but ••s the Instruments of Logick may be applied unto them.

The parts of Logick therefore are these two; Thematical and Organical.

The Thematical part is that, which treat∣eth of Theams with their various affections, and second notions, as of the matter of which Logical Instruments are composed.

The Organical part, is that, which treat∣eth of those Instruments, and their compo∣sition.

CHAP. II. Of Simple and Compounded Theams.

A Theam is any thing propounded to the understanding that it may be known.

• 1. To know is to form a conception or notion of the thing proposed: And a Notion is the re∣presentation of a thing in the understanding.
• 2. Notions are of two sorts Primary or Se∣cundary.
• 3. A Primary Notion is that which represents the thing as it is in it self.
• 4. A Secundary Notion is that which toge∣ther with the first Notions represents the manner how the mind doth either understand a thing, or explain its own understanding unto others.
• 5. Theams are either Simple or Com∣pound.
• 6. Simple Theams are such Theams as are apprehended without any composition of No∣tions; as a man, a house.
• 7. Compounded Theams are such, as are understood by two or more Notions, being joined together in the affirmation, or in the ne∣gation of a thing, as a man doth run.
• 8. A Simple Theam is either universal, or particular.
• ...

• 9. An universal Simple Theam is that which in its own nature may be spoken of many in one and the same respect, and that univo∣cally and without any ambiguity, as, a man, a horse, a plant.
• 10. A Particular or Singular Theam is that which in its own nature can be spoken of no more than one, as, Socrates Plato; for though the names of Socrates and Plato may be gi∣ven to many, yet that is by way of impositi∣on, not of their own nature; names as names are naturally spoken of no more than one.
• 11. Singular Theams are call'd individuals, because they cannot be divided into any more of the same name and nature.
• 12. And Individuals are of two sorts.

1. Such as are certain and determinate; the which may be expressed three waies.

• 1. By a proper name, as Alexander, Paul; which signifies some certain and deter∣minate particular.
• 2. By a Pronoun Demonstrative; as this man.
• 3. By Circumlocution or Paraphrase, as the Apostle of the Gentiles, that is, Paul.

2. Such as are uncertain and indetermi∣nate, which doth indeed express a particular

thing, but this or that indefinitely, as some man.

3. An Ʋniversal simple Theam, otherwise called a Predicable, may be spoken of two ways.

• 1. By declaring what a thing is, and then it is spoken of such things as do differ; ei∣ther
  • 1. In Species, and is called Genus, as a living creature, colour; or
  • 2. In number only, and is called Spe∣cies, as a man.
• 2. By declaring what kind of thing it is, of which it is spoken, and that either,
  • Essentially, and is called Difference: or
  • Accidentally, and that either
  • Of necessity, and then it is called a proper Accident: as the Risible faculty in man, or
  • Not of necesity, and then it is called a common or simple Accident, as white.

CHAP. III. Of Genus and Species.

A Genus or General may be taken two ways.

• 1. Civilly, and then amongst Grammari∣ans, it noteth the distinction of Sex; but amongst Orators it is taken for a Multitude which had their beginning from some one; thus the Romans are said to be the Genus or race of Romulus: or else it is taken for that one from whence that multitude had it's beginning; thus Romulus is the Genus or person from whence the Romans had their rise.
• 2. Logically, and then it is Ʋniversal, which is spoken of many that do differ in the Spe∣cies, by declaring what a thing is; and thus taken, it is either

Supream, and so a Genus as that it cannot be a Species; and of this sort there are ten Generals or Predicaments; or

Subaltern; and so a Genus, in respect of those things which are contained under it, and a Species in regard of that, under which it is it self contained, as a living creature.

2. A Species also may be taken two ways.

• 1. Civilly as it is used amongst Orators, and so it is taken for the external form, and beauty of the body.
• 2. Logically, and so it is an Ʋniversal, which may be spoken of many, that differ in number only, by declaring what a thing is. The Genus in this definition is this word Ʋniversall, the rest of the definition is put for the difference, in which by these words, spoken of many by declaring what a thing is, Difference and Accident, whether proper or common, are both excluded; and by these words differing in number only, Ge∣nus is excluded also.

3 A Species is either

• Subaltern, that is species of one and Genus of another; or
• Most Special, that is so a Species, as that it cannot be a Genus, as a Horse, a man.

4. The Canons or Rules of Genus and Spe∣cies are these following.

• 1. Every Genus must have two or more Species.
• 2. Nothing can be said of the Genus, which may not be also said of every Species; and the Species is conserved in every Indi∣vidual.
• ...

• 3. Every Genus and Species may be alike predicated of all that are under them.

CHAP. IV. Of Difference.

DIfference is threefold.

• 1 Common which is some seperable Acci∣dent that doth distinguish one thing from another, as white, to walk, and doth belong to the fifth predicable: It is called Difference as it makes to differ, and an Accident because it is inherent.
• 2. Proper, which is either an inseperable Accident, in the fifth predicable, or a proper Accident in the fourth predicable, as Quantity, Risibility.
• 3. Most proper, by which one thing doth differ from another essentially: and this is that Difference which belongs to this third predicable.

In which we are to consider three things.

First what this Difference is, and it may be defined three ways.

• 1. Difference is an universal, by which one Species is essentially distinguished from another:

• thus Rationality doth distinguish a man from a beast.
• 2. Difference is an Ʋniversal, according to which a Species doth excel its Genus: because a Species doth in it's essence contain such dif∣ferences as the Genus in its essence doth not contain. Thus man by reason of his Ratio∣nality doth excel a living creature in Gene∣ral, which is the Genus of man.
• 3. Difference is an universal, which may be spoken of many differing in Species or number, and declaring essentially what kind of thing it is of which it is spoken. And this is the de∣finition of difference, as it is a predicable.

Secondly, we are to consider how many fold this difference is, the which is either 1. Di∣visive, by which the Genus is divided into its se∣veral Species; as by rational, and irrational, a living creature is divided into a man or a beast.

2. Constitutive, which doth essentially con∣stitute some Species, and this is two fold.

• 1. Generical, which doth constitute some remote Species but not the next, for the next is the Genus; thus sensibility in respect of man is a Generical difference constituting first a living creature and remotely man. And this is always spoken of many differing in Spe∣cies or number.
• 2. Specifical, which doth constitute the

• ... nearest Species; as rationability doth constitute man.

3. We are to consider its properties which are six.

• 1. Every difference is, an Essential part of its Species, and of every individual of which it is spoken.
• 2. Every Difference is Divisive, in respect of its superior, and constitutive in respect of its inferiour.
• 3. Every difference is in nature before its Species, and is the internal cause thereof.
• 4. No difference is directly in the predica∣mental order, but indirectly only and collate∣rally.
• 5. Every difference is immediately spoken of one, viz. its Species, and mediately of ma∣ny.
• 6. No difference is spoken of that Species of which it is the difference, by way of more and less.

CHAP. V. Of Proper and Common Accidents.

AN Accident is taken two ways.

• 1. For all that which is not of the essence of the thing: and thus a man in re∣spect of an house may be called an Accident, because he is not of the essence of an house, but so it is not taken here.
• 2. For that only, which is inherent in some subject, and this is two fold, Proper and Com∣mon.

1. A proper Accident is that which is con∣vertible with his Species, perpetually inherent in every of them, and in no other; and this doth constitute and belong to the fourth predicable.

It may be other ways defined, thus

A proper Accident, is an universal, which may be spoken of many differing in Species or num∣ber accidentally, and of necessity declaring what kind of subject it is of which it is spoken: and thus risibility is spoken of man. And this is two fold.

• 1. Generical, which flows from the essence of the subal••ern Species or highest Genus, and this is always spoken of many Species.
• ...

• 2. Specifical, which floweth from the essence of the lowest Species, and this is spoken of one Species only, and many individuals.

2. A Common Accident, is that whith is not convertible with his Species; and this doth constitute and belong to the fifth predicable; and may be otherwise defined three ways.

• 1. A common Accident, is an universal, which may or may not inhere in the subject, with∣out the destruction of the subject, as man is the subject of whiteness, but the not being white doth not presently make him not to be a man.
• 2. A common Accident, is such an univer∣sal as is neither Genus, Species or Diffe∣rence, no nor proper to the subject, though it be always inherent in it.
• 3. A common Accident, and an universal, which may be spoken of many, differing in Species or number; accidentally declaring what kind of subject it is, of which it is spoken inconvertibly, and thus whiteness is a common accident be∣longing to man.

A common Accident is twofold.

• 1. Seperable, which may be actually sepe∣rated from the subject in which it is inhe∣rent; thus whiteness may be seperated from man.
• 2. Inseperable, which cannot be actually 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

• ... 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

• ...

• seperated from the subject in which it is inherent, but only in the mind or under∣standing; thus blackness is inseperable from an Aethiopian, though in speaking of one, I am not alwaies bound to consider his blackness.

The Canons or Rules are these,

• 1. Every Accident is in some Subject, and alwaies inherent in it.
• 2. Every Accident, if it be seperated from the Subject in which it once was, peri∣sheth.
• 3. No Accident can pass from one Subject to another.
• 4. Some accidents may be more or less in a subject, but not all.
• 5. Every accident is in nature after his sub∣ject.
• 6. Whatever is inherent in a subject is an Accident.

CHAP. VI. Of the Antepredicaments.

COncerning Simple Theams we are to consider two things.

• 1. The several ranks or orders to which all Simple Theams may be reduced, and in which they may be ranked and placed.
• 2. The way and means by which they are or may be interpreted.

The particular Orders to which all Simple Theams may be reduced, are otherwise cal∣led Predicaments, of which we are to consider three things.

• 1. The Antepredicaments, which are first to be learned, because the knowledge of them conduceth much to the understand∣ing of the Predicaments themselves.
• 2. The Predicaments, which are ten Or∣ders to which, as is said, all Theams must be reduced.
• 3. The Post-predicaments, which must be handled after the Predicaments, because the perfect knowledge of the Predicaments can∣not be attained without these.

I begin with the Antepredicaments, the which are three in general; and seven in

special, to wit, three Definitions, two Divisions and two Rules.

The Definitions are of Aequivocals, Ʋni∣vocals, and Denominatives.

Aequivocals are such things as have their name common to many. But the reasons for which it is applied to many are diverse; as that Domestick living creature is call'd a Dog, and a certain Star in the Heavens is call'd a Dog; now the name Dog is common to both, but the domestick creature is call'd a Dog for one reason, to wit from barking; the Star is call'd a Dog, for another reason viz. the Anology that it hath to a Dog. So a living man and a painted man agree in the common name of men, but the reasons for which they are so called are diverse.

The common names which for diverse reasons are given to the several things sig∣nified by them, are called Aequivocating Ae∣quivocals, and the things expressed by those names, are called Aequivocated Aequi∣vocals, thus a man is an Aequivocating Ae∣quivocal; a living man and a painted man are Aequivocated Aequivocals.

Aequivocals are either such as are.

• 1. By chance, of which no reason can be given for their being called by that com∣mon name, or
• ...

• 2. By counsel, of which some reason of de∣pendency or similitude may be given for their being called by that common name, as a living man and a painted man, and those are Synechdochically called Ae∣quivocals by Analogy.

Of both which these Canons are to be ob∣served.

• 1. Aequivocal words if they be not di∣stinguished, and taken in one sense, are of no use in any science.
• Every Ens or Entity in respect of the ten Predicaments, is a common Analogous thing.
• 3. Every Analogous thing put by it self is to be taken in the most common significa∣tion.

Ʋnivocals, are such things as have a common name, and the reason for which it is applied to many, is one and the same in them all; thus the name of a living creature is common both to man and beast.

The common names which are for the same reason attributed unto many are called Ʋnivocating Ʋnivocals. And the things ex∣pressed by these names are called Ʋnivocated Ʋnivocals; thus a living creature is an univo∣cating Ʋnivocal; and a man, a Bull, a Lyon are univocated Ʋnivocals.

Denominatives are such words, as being

of near affinity in sound and signification, d•• differ in termination; as Justice and Just.

In every Denomination there are three things.

• 1. The Form denominating; and that is some Accident in the Abstract, which is inherent in the subject; as Justice.
• 2. The Subject Denominated, and that is a substance in which the form is inherent, as Socrates.
• 3. The Denominative, and that is some Ac∣cident in the Concrete, which is predicated of the subject, and riseth from the form, as Just.

The Form Denominating, and the Denomi∣native, as Justice, and Just, in reference to

• The Word
  • Agree in the beginning.
  • Differ in the end.
• The signification
  • Agree in the thing, &
  • Differ in the manner.

The use of these Definitions, is, that the form of predication Aequivocally, Ʋnivocally and Denominatively may be the better known.

• 1. Aequivocal predication is in reference to the name, but not in reference to the defini∣nition, and thus every ens or entity is predica∣ted of in the ten predicaments.
• 2. Ʋnivocal predication is in reference to the name and definition both; thus superiours

• are predicated of the inferiours of the same ••••edicament.
• 3. Denominative predication, is to be pre∣dicated in the Concrete, as an Accident is pre∣dicated of its subject, thus the Accidents in ••he nine last predicaments are predicated of the ••ubstances in the first.

The Divisions belonging to the Antepre∣dicaments are two, one is of words and the other of things.

A Word is either Simple or Compound.

A Simple Voice or Word is threefold.

• 1. In respect of the sound only, when one word doth signifie many things, as a Dog, and every aequivocating aequivocal.
• 2. In substance and signification, when more words than one, are used to express one thing as a living creature, for an A∣nimal.
• 3. In sound and substance both, when one word doth express one only thing, as a man, an Animal.

A compounded voice or word is also threefold.

• 1. In respect of the sound only, as when more words than one are used to express one only thing, as a living body for an Animal.
• 2. In substance and signification, when one word expresseth diverse things, as a Dog is one word, but hath diverse significations, as

• every aequivocating aequivocal hath.
• 3. In sound and substance both, as when they are diverse words, and these diverse words do signifie more things, as these words a learned man, do signifie the substance and the quality.

Things are either Ʋniversal or Particular, and both of them are either substances or ac∣cidents.

• 1. Ʋniversal substances are spoken of the subject but are not in it, as a man is predica∣ted of Socrates and Plato, but inhereth not in any subject.
• 2. Particular substances are neither predi∣cated of the subject, nor inherent in it, be∣cause they are individual substances, as Socra∣tes.
• 3. Ʋniversal accidents are both predicated of, and inherent in their subjects, as White∣ness is spoken of this, or that Whiteness, and may be inherent in a man, or a wall, or a ship.
• 4. Particular accidents are not predicated of any subject, but are inherent in some, as this whiteness is in Socrates.

A Subject is either of inhesion or predica∣ti••n.

A Subject of inhesion is that in which some accident doth inhere; thus a wall in respect

of whiteness is a subject of inhesion, and accidents only are capable of such a subject.

A subject of predication, is that of which any thing is predicated essentially: and so every inferiour thing is the subject of his superi∣our; every universal substance as well as eve∣ry universal accident, is capable of such a subject.

A thing may be said to be inherent in a subject eight several ways.

• 1. Perfectively, as a part is in the whole, and thus a hand may be said to be in a man.
• 2. Comprehensively, as the whole is in its parts, and thus a man may be said to be in all his members.
• 3. Potestatively, as a Species in its Genus, thus man may be said to be in an Animal.
• 4. Actually, as a Genus in its Species, thus an Animal may be said to be in a man.
• 5. Authoritatively, as a King in his King∣dome.
• 6. Eminently, as a thing in the end there∣of, and thus vertue may be said to be in hap∣piness.
• 7.Circumscriptively, as a thing in its place, thus Socrates may be said to be in a house.
• 8. Inherently, as an Accident in its Subject,

• and thus heat may be said to be in fire.

Of these several ways we are here to un∣derstand the last only, to wit of Inhesion, as heat is in fire, or as an accident in its subject.

The first Antepredicamental rule is this: Whatever may be spoken of the predicate, may be spoken of the subject of that predicate also; as whatsoever may be spoken of an Animal, may be spoken of every sort of Animals, as of men, beasts, and such like.

The limitations of this rule are many, but the most considerable are these three.

• 1. That you proceed not from words t•• things, that is, from words of the first, to words of the second intention: whence it follows not: Animal is a Genus, A man is an Ani∣mal, therefore man is a Genus.
• 2. That you pass not from one side of the predicamental order, to the othr, and hence it doth not follow; Man is an Animal, an Animal is rational or irrational, therefore man is rational or irrational.
• 3. That you proceed not from the con∣creet to the abstract; and hence this doth not follow; A man is just, Justice is a quality there∣fore a man is a quality.

The second Antepredicamental rule hath two parts. The first is this; subaltern Ge∣neralls have the same Species and differences;

as a body and an Animal have the same diffe∣••ences.

The second part is this: Generals not Sub∣altern have not the same Species and differen∣ces; as substance and qualitie.

They are said to be subaltern Generals, whereof one is essentially contained by the other; as an Animal and a Body.

And they are said not to be Subaltern Generals, where the one is not essentially con∣tained of the other; as an Animal and a science.

The chief use of this Rule is, to prevent the confounding of the Predicaments, and to distinguish things between themselves, that do belong to diverse predicaments.

CHAP. VII. Of the Predicaments in General.

THe particular orders or predicaments, to which all simple Theams may be redu∣ced are ten, of which some are more princi∣pal some less.

2. The more principal predicaments are the first six; and these are of two sorts; one of substance and the other of accidents.

3. Predicamental ranks or Orders of Acci¦dents are of two sorts. 1. Absolute as the pre∣dicaments of Quantity, Quality, Action an•• Passion, 2. Relative as the Predicament of Re¦lation.

4. The less principle predicamental ranks o•• orders, are these four: When, where, situati∣on, and Habit. And in these ten predicament are all to be ranked, which can be predica¦ted or spoken of any thing, Directly, Collate¦rally, or by Reduction.

First then, Directly and primarily, ever supream Genus, or every thing of which th•• supream Genus may be predicated essentially may be placed in the predicamental scale and thus all Generals, Specials, and Individual are placed in them.

Secondly, Collaterally or sideways; and so some things are placed in the predicamenta•• order, which are not spoken or predicated o•• the supream Genus, but yet do divide the Ge∣nerals and constitute the specials, and thus es∣sential differences only are there placed.

Thirdly, indirectly or by Reduction: thu•• Matter and form are in the predicament o•• Substance; a point and unitie in quantity, and a proper accident is in the same predicament with its Species.

The Canons or Rules are four.

• ...

• 1. All words of Ambiguity or doubt, at least before they be distinguished and limited, with all feigned and impossible things, are ex∣cluded the predicamental order.
• 2. Every real finite, simple and Ʋnivocal thing is in some predicament, directly, collaterally or by Reduction.
• 3. Individuals are in some predicament, not for themselves, but by reason of their Species.
• 4. No one and the same numerical thing, can be in diverse predicaments, either in one respect or in diverse.

CHAP. VIII. Of Substance.

A Substance is a thing subsisting of itself, and it is either first or second.

2. The first substance is a singular substance, or a substance that cannot be predicated of its subject; as Alexander, Bucephalus.

3. The second substance is an universal sub∣stance, or a substance which may be predica∣ted of its subject, as a man, a horse.

4. The first substance is chiefly and properly a substance, and among the second substances, every one is by so much more a substance,

by how much it is nearer to the first.

The Rules or Properties are six.

• 1. A Substance is not in its subject. This agreeth to every substance, and to every sub∣stance only, but not only to those which are compleatly so, but to the differences and parts of substances also.
• 2. A Substance is univocally predicated of those things of which it is predicated. This a∣greeth to all second substances and their diffe∣rences, and no other, for the first substances are not predicated of any subject.
• 3. Every first substance, doth signifie some particular thing.
• 4. A substance, as it is a substance, is not contrary to another, but as it hath accidents or qualities: thus fire and water are contrary, not as they are substances, but in reference to their qualities of heat and cold. &c.
• 5. A Substance, as it is a substance, is not varied by degrees, or receiveth not more and less, but the variance or comparison is in respect of accidents; as a wise man and a fool, an old man and a child: one water hotter than another; these differ in qualities not in substance.
• 6. One and the same numerical substance, is capable of contrary Accidents. As water may be now seething hot, and anon as cold as Ice.

CHAP. IX. Of Quantity.

HItherto we have spoken of the predica∣ment of Substance, those of Accidents now follow; and first those that are absolute∣ly so; as Quantity, Quality, Action, and pas∣sion.

2. Quantity is an absolute Accident, by which a thing is said to be great, in bulk or number.

3. And hence quantity may be said to be twofold, continued or dissevered.

4. Continued Quantity is that, whose parts are joyned together by a common terme.

5. Dissevered Quantity is that, whose parts are not joyned together by a common term, and this is nothing else but number.

6. Continued Quantity, is either successive, whose parts consist in succession; and then it is time: or permanent, as magnitude, and place.

7. Every Magnitude is either, a line, a su∣perficies or a body.

8. A line is a Magnitude which can be di∣vided but one way; the limit whereof is a point, for every line is made, continued, and bounded with a point.

9. A Superficies is a Magnitude which may be divided two ways; the term or limit there∣of is a line.

10. A solid or body, is that, which may be divided three ways, namely by length, breadth, and thickness, whose term or limit is a super∣ficies.

11. Place is that which measureth something beside the subject in which it is, namely the thing which is placed; this seems to be refer'd to a superficies: for, Place (according to Ari∣stotle lib. 4 phys. cap. 14) is the superficies next to the body that is conteined in it.

The Canons or Rules are three.

• 1. Nothing is contrary unto Quantity in it self, but in reference to its Qualities only; thus winter is contrary unto summer, in respect of heat and cold.
• 2. Quantity cannot receive more or less. As one house is not more or less a house than another; though one be a greater house than another.
• 3. Things may be said to be equal or une∣qual, in respect of Magnitude or greatness.

CHAP. X. Of Quality.

QUality is an absolute accident, by which it is simply and determinately declared wh•••• kind of thing that subject is, of which it is the quality.

2. Quality is the most copious of all the predicaments; and it is of two sorts, Patible or Impatible.

3. An impatible quality, is such a quality, as doth not cause any passions in the senses, or any way affect them: and this is either in∣nate or acquired.

4. An acquired quality, is such a quality, as is begotten by labour; and this Aristotle ma∣keth the first species; and this is either hardly removed from the subject, and is called a habit, as vertue: or easily removed from the subject, and is called disposition, as a dispo∣sition unto vertue.

5. An innate, or inbred quality, is such a quality as is natural, and this Aristotle ma∣keth the second species; this maketh the sub∣ject apt and fit for action, and is some natu∣ral faculty or power, as risibility is a faculty naturally belonging unto man.

6. A Patible quality, is such a quality as doth affect the senses and causeth passion in them: and that either, by it self or by acci∣dent.

7. A Patible quality affecting the sense by it self, Aristotle maketh the third species, and is that which either affecteth the body or the mind.

8. A Patible quality which doth by it self affect the body, is either such a quality as can∣not be easily moved, as whiteness or such a quality as may be easily removed, and is some passion of the body, as blushing.

9. A Patible quality which doth of it self affect the mind, is also either hardly removed, as inveterate anger, or easily removed; as some sudden passion of love, or hatred.

10. A Patible quality which doth affect the senses, or causeth passion by accident, Ari∣stotle maketh the fourth species, and this is external proportion, either in things natural, and then it is the form of the thing, or in things artificial, and then it is the Fi∣gure.

11. To the first species of quality, do all the habits of the body belong; as health, sick∣ness, and all kind of diseases; and all infused habits, as faith, charity, and the gift of tongues; with all disciplines, whether of arts

or sciences both speculative and practical, as Logick, Geometry, Physicks, Metaphysicks, and Divinity, and all both vertues and vices.

12. To the second species of Quality be∣long all faculties proceeding from the essen∣tial forms of all substances; as the faculty of willing, speaking, laughing in man, of neigh∣ing and running in a horse; and the vertue of herbs, mettals and stones; all occult qualities, as sympathy, and Antipathy, and all influences of celestial bodies, the temperament of the body and disposition of the mind, and such like.

13. To the third species of quality belong all objects of sense, as of seeing, tasting, smelling, hearing and feeling.

14. To the fourth species of quality, be∣long all Mathematical figures, with all natural and artificial forms of bodies.

The Canons or rules of qualitie are three.

• 1. Qualities only admit of contrarieties; as heat and cold; the contrariety of qualites is most discernable in the third species, sometimes in the first, but not so frequently in the se∣cond and fourth.
• 2. Qualities do admit of degrees, asf more and less; but this doth not belong to all qualities.
• ...

• 3. Things in reference unto their qualities may be said to be like or unlike.

CHAP. XI. Of Action.

Action is an accident, by which a subject is said to be doing: and that by one of these three waies.

• 1. By some intrinsick quality; as fire by its beat acts in the water.
• 2. Instrumentally, as he that effects some thing with a sword or gun, or such like.
• 3. By the very formality of action, and so it is to be taken in this predicament.

2. Action, as it is taken in this predicament is twofold immanent or transient.

3. An immanent action is that, which doth not cause any real change in the thing that suffers, as understanding, s••ght.

4. A transient action is that, which doth oc∣casion a real change in the thing that suffers, as heat, cold &c.

The Canons or Rules of Action are three.

• 1. Action doth admit of contrariety.
• ...

• 2. Actions are capable of more and less. These two rules are not proper unto actions in respect of themselves, but by and for their qualities, by means of which the Agent act∣eth: nor are they agreeable to every action: and this is most proper unto action.
• 3. Every action doth of it self infer pas∣sion.

5. Passion is an accident by which the subject is called patient; or, it is the effect and a certain reception of action: for every passion is recei∣ved not so much by the condition of the a∣gent, as by the disposition of the patient.

6. Passion is either transmutative or in∣tentional.

7. A transmutative passion, is that which maketh some real alteration in the patient; and answereth unto a transient action.

8. An intentional passion, is that which terminateth the action without any real altera∣tion in the patient; and this answereth to an imminent action.

The Canons or Rules of Passion are three.

• 1. Passion doth admit of Contrariety:
• 2. Passion admitteth of more and less; both these are to be understood, as in the pre∣dicament of action hath been declared.
• 3. Passion is of it self and immediate infer∣red

• from action: and this is is most proper unto passion.

CHAP. XII. Of Relation.

HItherto we have spoken of such predi∣caments as are absolute accidents, come we now to that which is respective, namely relation.

2. Relation is a respective accident, by which one thing is predicated of another, or by some way may be referred unto another.

3. Relation is twofold, intentional or real.

4. Intentional Relation is that by which some second intention is referred to another; thus Genus and species, the cause and the caused, the subject and the accident, are things that are related.

5. Real relation is that by which the thing it self is referred unto another; and this two-fold.

• 1. Accidental, when one thing is re∣ferred not in respect of its essence or na∣ture,

• but only by Accident, as possessor and possession.
• 2. Essential, when one thing is referred unto another according to its nature and essence, as Father and Son, Master and ser∣vant.

6. In every Relation, two things are re∣quired, the subject and the term.

7. That is called the subject, which is re∣ferred unto another, and that the term, to which the subject is referred.

The subject is called the Relate, and the term is called the Correlate.

9. The relate and correlate are mutually referred to one another; and that by a double relation; in which reciprocation, that which is the subject of one relation is the term of the other, and the contrary.

10. In like manner that which is the re∣late in one relation, is the correlate in the other; and the contrary.

11. Every relate or respective is founded in some absolute predicament; as aequality in quantity, likeness in quality, Paternity in acti∣on.

12. Relates and Correlates, as they are such, are both together in nature and knowledge, and so do mutually put or take away one a∣nother, as well in being, as in knowing.

13. Relates are taken two ways.

• 1. Materially for those things with which the Relations do agree: as a father is taken for the man begetting, the Son for him that is begotten; and so they are not to∣gether in nature, for the father, as a man, must needs be before the son.
• 2. Formally, for that very relation which is in the subjects, by which the terms are mutually referred to one another; as the father to his son, and so they are in nature together.

14. Knowledge and knowable are taken three ways.

• 1. Both Actually, thus that is called knowledge, by which we actually know a thing; that knowable, which is actually known; and so they are in nature together.
• 2. Both potentially as that is called know∣able, which may be known; and that know∣ledge, which we may know: and so also, they are in nature together.
• 3. One Actually and the other potenti∣ally; and so knowledge is taken for that which we actually know, and knowable for that which may be known, and so they are not both together in nature.

The Canons or Rules of Relates are three.

• 1. Relates admit of contrariety. A Relate is

• not contrary to its Correlate; but one Relate is contrary to another: yet not in respect of themselves but in respect of their subjects. This rule therefore doth not hold in all, but in such relates only, which have contrary foun∣dations or subjects; thus a friend and an enemy are contrary, because the foundations of friend∣ship and enmity, to wit, wishing well and wish∣ing ill, are contrary.
• 2. Relates are capable of more and less: this rule also holds in respect of the subject or foun∣dation; and therefore in those relates only, which have a changable subject or foundati∣on. For when the subject or foundation is va∣ried, the Relation is intended or remitted. For example, unequal things are made more or less unequal, when Quantity, which is the sub∣ject of inequality, is in one of the two, more or less.
• 3. Relates are convertible; that is, every Re∣late is referred to its reciprocal Correlate; as a master is the master of a servant, and a servant is the servant of some master.

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CHAP. XIII. Of the four last Predicaments.

HItherto I have spoken of the principal predicaments; the less principal now fol∣low and they are four, When, Where, Situa∣tion, Habit.

2. The Predicament When, is an Acci∣dent, by which finite things are said to be in time, past, present, or to come. The words be∣longing to this predicament, make answer to such questions, as are made by this word, When, as to day, to morrow, yesterday, and the like. The properties thereof is, to ac∣commodate time, to persons, things or Acti∣ons.

3. The Predicament where, is an Accident, by which things finite are said to be in some place; where, is not the place it self, but notes the manner or circumstance of place, and ma∣keth answer to such questions as are made by this word where; as at home, within, without, in this or that Countrey, &c. The property thereof, is to accommodate place, to per∣sons, things, and actions.

4. The Predicament of Situation is a cer∣tain

Ordination of parts and generation, or, a placing of parts in Generation: to make up si∣tuation a threefold habitude is required.

• 1. Of the parts of some whole among themselves.
• 2. Of the parts of some whole unto that whole.
• 3. Of the parts and the whole in refe∣rence to place.

Yet every ordination of parts is not site or situation, but that only which they have in the whole by Generation. The propertie thereof is to be the nearest assistant unto substance of all the extrinsecal respective ac∣cidents.

All gestures and positions of body belong to this, as standing, sitting, walking, &c. Not as they signifie these actions, but as they signifie the position and order of the parts in the whole, or in some place.

5. The predicament of Habit, is an accident by which some garment, or something like a gar∣ment, is put about, hanged upon, or any other way joyned to a body. The body having it, is a substance; the thing habiting is always some artificial form belonging to the fourth Species of Qualitie. The Application of this to it, is that which maketh this predicament; The propertie thereof is always to be inherent in

many, in the habit, and in him that hath it, but in divers respects; for it is in the body that hath it, as in a subject, in the habit or thing framed, as in a cause.

To this belong all kind of garments, whe∣ther they be such as are used for necessity, as shoes for the feet, and cloaths for the rest of the body; or for distinction, as a Mitre, a Gown whether for Divines, Lawyers or Citizens; or for ornament, as rings, Jewells, Deckings, and the like.

CHAP. XIV. Of Opposition.

HAving done with the Antepredicaments, and the Predicaments themselves, the Postpredicaments now follow, and they are four.

• Opposition, Order, Motion and Manner of having.

2. Opposition is such a repugnancy of two simple terms, as neither the one can agree with the other, nor both of them with a third, after one and the same manner.

3. One of the opposites is either opposed to,

one or to many; those oppositions, where one is opposed to many, are called Disparates; as a man and a horse, of which Aristotle in his Lo∣gick makes no mention, nor are they to be reckoned amongst the kinds of opposition.

4. Those oppositions where one is opposed to one, are either of a thing and a thing, or of a ••hing and not a thing.

5. Opposition of a thing and a thing; is ei∣ther Relative or Contrary.

6. Relative opposition, is between the rela∣••ive terms, as the relate and his correlate: for though the relates do mutually depend upon one another, in reference to their simple being, yet are they opposed to one another in refe∣rence to their being in a subject: as father and son, but this is the least kind of opposition: The conditions belonging to these are set down in the Predicament of Relation.

7. Contrary opposition is between contrary ••erms: And these are called contraries, that being contained under the same Genus, are at the greatest distance between themselves, and mutually expell one another, from the same subject, that is capable of them; as heat and cold.

8. Contraries are of two sorts, mediate and immediate.

9. Immediate contraries are such as admit

of no medium between them, but the one of them is always in the subject, that is capable of them, as like and unlike, health and sick∣ness.

10. Mediate contraries are such as do admit of some medium; so that though one be ex∣pelled it is not necessary that the other should be in that subject, from which the first is ex∣pelled, as white and black.

The Canons or Rules of Contraries are these following.

• 1. True contrarietie by it self is not to be found but in qualities by themselves, and absolutely ta∣ken.
• 2. Contraries in the highest degrees, canno•• be in the same subject; so what is hot in the highest degree cannot be cold at all; but in remiss degrees they may both be in the same subject.
• 3. One of the contraries being remitted, the other is intended or heightened and the contrary: for every subject capable of two contrary qualities, must needs be filled up with the whole possible latitude of one of them.

11. Opposition of a thing and not a thing, is either privative or contradictory.

12. Privative opposition, is between Habit and privation. And Habit is the presence of a thing in a fit subject; but privation is the ab∣sence

thereof: as sight is a habit, blindness, pri∣vation.

The Canons or Rules are three.

• 1. Habit and privation are ab••ut the same subject. And hence privation cannot properly be, but in that subject which is capable of the Habit; a man therefore may be said to be blind, but a stone cannot.
• 2. Privative opposition requires determinati∣on of a certain time; neither can privation be spoken of a subject, but after the time that by its nature and fitness it might receive the habit; as none can be said to be bald, until the time that according to nature, they should have hair.
• 3. From privation to habit there is no regress naturally, the privation being perfect; that is, such as doth take away the act, and next be∣ginnings of habit, and leaveth nothing in the subject but the remote beginnings thereof; thus he that is once quite blind, cannot ordina∣rily and by natural means ever see again.

13. Contradictory opposition is between con∣tradictory terms. And those things are said to be contradictory, which are expresly con∣trary as affirmation and negation: as a thing and not a thing, a man and not a man.

The Canons or Rules are two.

• 1. Contradiction is the first of all oppositions,

• and so the measure of all the rest: for in every opposition there is virtually included a contra∣diction; and the opposition is to be thought so much the greater, by how much it cometh nearer to a contradiction.
• 2. Between contradictory things, there is no medium; neither of abnegation, or of the subject, (and therefore one of the contradictory things is affirmed of a thing, and not a thing) nor of participation, or of the form.

CHAP. XV. Of Order, and of that which is said to be together, before, or after.

ORder is that, according to which some thing is said to be before, or after another thing, or together with it.

2. A thing may be said to be before or af∣ter another five several waies. 1. In time. 2. In nature. 3. In disposition, or order. 4. In honour. 5. In Causality.

3. That is said to be first in time, that is the most ancient; thus Romulus was before Cato, and the City Pergamus before that of Rome.

4. That is said to be first in nature,

which cannot be reciprocally affirmed in con∣secution of existence; as, there is a man, there∣fore there is a living creature, but it doth not follow, there is a living creature, there∣fore there is a man; a living creature there∣fore is in nature before a man, and every Ge∣nus before its species.

5. That is said to be first in order or dis∣position, which is nearest the beginning: Thus the Exordium in an oration is said to be before the proposition, the proposition be∣fore the narration, the narration before the confirmation, the confirmation before the refu∣tation, the refutation before the conclusion; and in every science or discipline, that is first which is put in the first place, and thus letters are before syllables.

6. That is said to be first in honour or dignity, that is the most worthy; thus a King is before his Subjects, a Father before his Son, a Master before his Servant, Gold before Silver, and Vertue before Gold.

7. That is said to be first in Causality, which is any way the cause of another's exi∣stence; thus the Sun is before Light.

8. So many waies as a thing may be said to be before another, it may also be said to be after.

9. So many waies as a thing may be said to

be before another, it may be also said to be together with another; but two of the waies are more usual than the rest, together in time, and together in nature.

10. They are said to be together in time that are existent at the same time.

11. Things may be said to be together two waies primarily and secundarily.

12. They are said to be primarily together in time, which begin to be at the same time, and they are said to be secundarily together in time, when the one begins to be, before the other doth cease to be; thus Aristotle and Plato are said to be cotemporaneous, or toge∣ther in time; though Plato was born before Aristotle, and did also die before him.

13. Things may be said to be together in nature two ways; first simply and absolutely, and then in respect of some third.

14. Things are said to be together simply and absolutely, which are reciprocally together, according to the consecution of existence, but so that the one is not the cause of the others existence. Thus the relate and correlate are together in nature; and two effects depen∣ding upon the same next cause, as risibility and docibility in man.

15. Things are said to be together in re∣spect of some third thing, which under the

same Genus are in division opposed to one another; thus a man and a beast are said to be together in nature, not simply and absolute∣ly in respect of themselves, but in respect of a living creature, for a living creature is predicated of them both together, and not of one first, and another after. In this a Synonymous Genus is distinguished from a homonymous or aequivocal Genus; because this is not pre∣dicated of its several species together, but of one first, and another after.

CHAP. XVI. Of Motion.

COncerning Motion, four things are to be considered. 1. The Praecognita. 2. The Definition. 3. The several kinds. 4. The Rules belonging to it.

2. The Praecognita are either such as con∣cern the definition, or such as concern the division thereof.

3. The Praecognita concerning the defi∣nition of motion, are three. 1. The subject in which it is. 2. The two terms from which, and to what. 3. The measure, or instant time, and from these three every motion must be defined.

4. The Praecognita concerning the division of motion, or the several kinds of it, are al∣so three.

• 1. Motion is taken two waies, viz. either generally for any mutation, whether it be in time, or in an instant, and thus it compre∣hendeth Generation and Corruption; or special∣ly for some mutation which is made and mea∣sured by time, & thus it comprehendeth these four species, augmentation, diminution, alteration and location, and not Generation & Corruption.
• 2. Motion as it is divided here, is motion ge∣nerally taken, and as it comprehendeth all these mutations.
• 3. Motion, although it be put as a post-predicament, yet it is also in a predicament, but in a diverse manner; it is in the predi∣cament of position as it is in its own nature, but here as it is taken in reference to its terms, from which, and to what.

5. Motion, in the general is thus defined. Motion is a mutation made in the subject, (viz. either in the first matter, or in the body) from one term to another, either in time, or in an instant.

6. Motion is twofold instantaneous or successive.

7. Instantaneous motion is that, which is made in an instant, and this is Generation, or Corruption.

8. Generation is an instantaneous motion,

which causeth a mutation, either in the first or second matter, as in the subject, by the pri∣vation of form as the term from which, to ano∣ther form as the term to which, the motion is made.

9. Corruption is an instantaneous motion, which maketh a change in the same matter from a substantial form to the privation there∣of, or from a thing to not a thing.

10. Successive motion, or motion that is made in time, is either a motion to quantity, to quality, or to place.

11. Motion to quantity, is that, whose terms are in quantity, and this is either aug∣mentation or Diminution.

12. Augmentation is such a motion, as maketh a successive mutation in the body, from a less quantity to a greater.

13. Diminution is such a motion, as ma∣keth a successive mutation in the body, from a greater quantity to a less.

14. Motion to quality, otherwise called al∣teration, is a successive mutation from one con∣trary quality to another.

15. Motion to place, or local motion, is such a motion, as maketh a successive mutation in the body, by removing it from one place to another.

The Canons or Rules to be observed, are these five following.

• ...

• 1. Every motion is distinguished by its own term to which it is made, considered formally: for although that Augmentation and Dimi∣nution are to quantity, yet the motion of the one is to a less, and the other to a greater quantity.
• 2. Some motions are distinguished by their measure, as Generation and Corruption are distinguished from the rest, for that they are effected in an instant, whereas all other mo∣tions are performed in time.
• 3. Some motions are distinguished by the subject, as Generation and Corruption are in the first matter, other motions in the bo∣dy.
• 4. Rest is privatively contrary to all motions in the term from which it moves: for, rest is the privation of motion, viz. of subsequent motion, though it be the perfection of the prece∣dent.
• 5. Those motions are adversly contrary, whose terms are adversly contrary; for the motion from white to black, is contrary to the motion, from black to white.

CHAP. XVII. Of the manner of Having.

A Thing may be said to be had eight se∣ral waies.

• 1. In reference to habit and disposition; and so it is referred to the predicament of quality.
• 2. In reference unto quantity; and so it is referred to the predicament of quan∣tity.
• 3. In reference unto Garments and other things which are about the body, or whole; and so it is referr'd to the predicament of Habit.
• 4. In reference to the having of a thing, in or upon some part; as to have a ring up∣on a finger, and other things which are a∣bout the parts, and thus it is also referred to the predicament of habit.
• 5. In referrence to the part of a thing, as to have a hand, and this is referred to sub∣stance.
• 6. In reference to a vessel, as to have wheat, and this is referred to the predicament Where.
• 7. In reference to a possession; as to have

• a house, and so it is referred to the predica∣ment of Relation.
• 8. The last manner of having is the ha∣ving a wife; and this according unto Ari∣stotle, is the most improper manner of all. And this shall suffice to be spoken of simple Theams, whether singular or universal; and of the several predicamental ranks or orders, to which all simple Theams may be reduced, and in which they may be ranked and pla∣ced.

CHAP. XVIII. Of a Proposition.

I Come now to speak of compounded Thames And a compounded Theam is by some cal∣led an Enuntiation by others a Proposition.

An Enunciation, or a Proposition is an indicative, congruous and perfect oration signi∣fying true or false without any ambiguity.

Concerning which we are to consider the parts, the kinds and the affections.

The parts of a proposition are two, viz. ei∣ther the parts signing, or signed.

The parts signing are simple terms, and

those are called Simple Terms whose parts can signifie nothing, when they are sepa∣rated from the whole, or no such thing as they did signifie, when they were all joined together, and these are either Categorema∣tical or Syncategorimatcal.

1. Categorimatical or significative terms, are such simple Terms as do by themselves signifie something perfectly, and these are ei∣ther Nouns or Verbs.

A Noun is a simple term or word, which doth signifie some certain thing without distinction of time; as, a man, a horse.

A Verb is a simple term which doth sig∣nifie something with some distinction of time past, present, or to come, as, he runneth.

2. Syncategorimatical or consignificative terms are such simple terms, which of them∣selves do not signifie any certain thing, or constitute a proposition, but being joined with other words are significative, to express the manner of such a thing; and such are all words which serve to express the quantity of a proposition, as all, none, some &c. all Adverbs, Conjunctions, Prepositions and Inter∣jections.

The parts signed are Compounded Terms, or such as do signifie the same thing be∣ing separated from one another, as they did

signifie when they were joined together; and these terms are otherwise called Orations, and an Oration is either imperfect or perfect.

• 1. An Imperfect Oration is that which leaves an imperfect sense in the mind of the hearer; as, a rational creature, a learned man.
• 2. A perfect Oration is that which leaves a perfect sense in the mind of the hearer; and this is either not enunciative; that is, such an o∣ration as doth not express whether a thing be true or false, of which there is no use a∣mongst Logicians; or enuntiative, that is such an oration, as doth express whether a thing be true or false; and this may be either with ambiguity, when some word is am∣biguous; as there is a Dog in Heaven; or without ambiguity when there is no word am∣biguous; as in this proposition, a man is a living creature. The signed parts of a pro∣position are these three, the subject, the predi∣cate, and the Copula.

Place this between the 52 and 53 pa∣ges, and blot out the four first lines of the 53 page.

those are either categorematical, or syncate∣gorematical as was shewed before.

The parts signed are three, the subject, the predicate, and the Copula.

• 1. The subject is all that which preceeds the Copula in the proposition, as, man is a living creature; there this word man is the sub∣ject.
• 2. The Predicate is all that which is spo∣ken of the subject, as, man is a living creature; there these words living creature, is the pre∣dicate.
• 3. The Copula is the principal verb join∣ing the predicate to the subject: and every proposition is some person of this verb sub∣stantive [I am] or of a verb adjective as in this proposition, Socrates lived at Athens.

But here two things must be observed. First, That the subject doth not alwaies pre∣ceed, and the predicate follow the Copula in or∣der of the parts or terms, but in sense or construction; as in this proposition. Hard is the way to vertue. Where the way to vertue is the subject, and this word hard the predi∣cate.

Secondly it is to be observed that a propo∣sition may be either explicite or implicite.

1. Explicite, in which the three parts, the subject, the Predicate, and the Copula are

expressed, as in this proposition, a man is a living creature.

2. Implicite, in which all these three parts, the subject the predicate and the Copula are not expressed, but some of them implyed, as, I walk. And may be resolved by turning the verb into a participle and using some person of this verb [I am] and thus this im∣plicite proposition, I walk, is turned into this, I am walking; in which all the parts of a proposition are expressed.

As for the several sorts or kinds of proposi∣tions we must know, that a proposition is dis∣tinguished three ways, viz: 1. According to its Substance, Quantity, and Quality.

1. According to its substance or parts of which it doth consist; and so it is either, Ca∣tegorical or Hypothetical.

1. A Categorical proposition is that which doth consist of one subject, one predicate, and one Copula, and therefore the matter there∣of are simple terms; as, a man is a living crea∣ture. And this is either Pure or Modal.

A pure categorical proposition is, when the predicate is purely affirmed or denied of the sub∣ject, without expressing the manner of Affir∣ming or denying.

A modal Categorical proposition is that in which, besides the subject, predicate and copula,

we add some modification to shew how the predi∣cate is in the subject. (but of these afterwards.)

2. A Hypothetical which doth consist of two Categorical propositions joyned together by some conjunction; as, if a man be a liv∣ing creature, then a man is a body.

Secondly. A proposition may be distinguish∣ed in respect of its quality; and so first, it is affirmative or negative, and again it is in re∣spect of quality, true or false; but if it be askt of what quality a proposition is? it must be answered, that it is either affirmative or negative. An affirmative proposition is that in which the predicate is affirmed of the subject.

A Negative proposition is that in which the predicate is denied of the subject, as a man is not a stone, and this is the formal quality of a proposition.

The material quality is that by which it is sayd to be either true or false.

That is a true proposition which doth agree with the thing, as, a man is a living creature; a man is not a stone. And that is a false pro∣position, which doth not agree with the thing, as, a man is a stone, a man is not a living crea∣ture.

And because the matter of a proposition may be sometimes necessarily true, sometimes manifestly false, and sometimes neither plain∣ly

true nor altogether false, the quality of a proposition in respect of the matter about which it is made, is threefold.

• 1. Necessary, when the predicate doth so agree with the subject from the nature of the thing, as that it cannot possibly be other∣ways; as in this proposition, man is a living creature.
• 2. Imp••ssible, when the predicate is so re∣pugnant to the nature of the subject, as that it cannot be as it is affirmed; as in this pro∣position, a man is a stone.
• 3. Contingent, when the predicate hath such an indifferent relation to the subject that na∣turally it doth neither agree with it, nor yet is repugnant to it; as in this proposition, a man is learned.

In necessary matter, affirmative propositions are always true, negative false; as, a man is a living creature, is true; a man is not a liv∣ing creature, is false.

In impossible matter, affirmative propositions are always false, negative true, as, a man is a stone, is false; a man is not a stone, is true.

In contingent matter, propositions whether affirmative or negative, are neither always true nor always false; for either of them both may be true or false; as, a man is learned; a man is not learned.

Thirdly, a proposition may be divided in respect of its quantity, into an universal, par∣ticular, indefinite and singular.

An universal proposition is that, which hath a note of universality added to a common or an universal subject; as, every man is a living crea∣ture.

A particular proposition is that, in which a note of particularity is added to an universal sub∣ject; as, some man is a living creature.

An indefinite proposition is that, in which no note whether universal or particular is put before the universal subject; as, a man is lear∣ned.

A singular proposition is that in which the subject is singular, whether it be a proper name, as Socrates is a Philosopher; or, whether it be a common name with a note of singularity set before it, as, this man is learned.

For the better understanding of that which hath been said we must observe.

• 1. That a note is not a part of a proposi∣tion but the sign of quantity in some propo∣sition.
• 2. That some notes are universal; 1. Af∣firmative; as, every one, always, whensoever. 2. negative; as, none, no body, never. Some particular; 1. Affirmative; as, a certain man, some body, sometimes. 2. negative; as, not every 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

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• one. Some singular; as all pronouns Demonstra∣tives which design some certain; as, this, he, and this world all, when it is taken colle∣ctively not distributively, as, all the fingers are five.
• 3. That an indefinite proposition in necessary matter is equal to an universal; in contingent matter it is equal to a particular: And the matter of a proposition is then said to be ne∣cessary, when the subject cannot be without the predicate, and then it is sayd to be con∣tingent, when the subject may be without the predicate; as in this proposition, a man is lear∣ned; the matter is contingent; but in this, a man is living creature, the matter is necessa∣ry; for he cannot be a man except he be a living creature.

According to this threefold division there ariseth a threefold question concerning a pro∣position.

• What a prop••sition is it? To which it must be answered, Categorical or Hypothetical.
• 2. Of what quality is the proposition? To which it must be answered, Affirmative, or Negative.
• 3. Of what quantity is the proposition? To which it must be answered, Ʋniversal, Particu∣lar, Indefinite, or Singular.

CHAP. XIX. Of the Opposition of Categorical Propositions.

PƲre categorical propositions, as they have reference to one another, have these three affections.

• 1. Opposition.
• 2. Aequipollency.
• 3. Conver∣sion.

Opposition is the repugnancy of two Cate∣gorical propositions either in quantity alone, or in quality alone, or else in quantity and quality, in which there is the same subject, the same pre∣dicate, and the same copula; as in these, every man is just: no man is just.

Hence it is apparent that these five con∣ditions are required that any proposition may be said to be opposite.

• 1. That they be two different propositions; and therefore these are not opposite, a man is a living creature, a man is a living crea∣ture; for these are not two but one, not dif∣fering or repugnant, but the same.
• 2. That they be different either in quantity or in quality or in both these; therefore these are

• not opposite; some man is learned; not every man is learned; for they differ only in their words but not in quality nor in quantity.
• 3. That both propositions have the same sub∣ject and the same predicate; therefore these propo∣sitions are not opposite. A man is white; a man is black; for though these simple terms white and black, are in themselves opposite in sense and reality of the thing; yet they are not opposite in respect of the form of opposition, which is required in propositions, because they have not both the same predicate.
• 4. That both propositions be ad idem, or to the same thing; these propositions therefore are not opposite. A Blackmore is white, viz, in respect of his teeth. A Blackmore is not white, viz, in respect of his body.
• 5. That they be opposite in respect of the same time; otherways they are not opposite; as S. Paul was at Rome, and S. Paul was not at Rome. In reference to distinct times both pro∣positions may be true.

These conditions being observed there are four ways by which two propositions may be said to be opposite to one another, Contrarily, Subcontrarily, Contradictorily, Subalternally,

Two propositions that are Contrarily and Subcontrarily opposite are opposite only in qua∣lity; and such as are subalternately opposite,

are opposite only in quantity. And such as are contradictorily opposite, are opposite both in quan∣tity and quality.

Opposition by way of contrariety is the re∣pugnancy of two universal propositions in qua∣lity; as, every man doth run, no man doth run. And these in a contingent matter may be to∣gether both false, but cannot be both toge∣ther true.

Opposition subcontrarily is the repugnancy of two particular propositions in quality; as, some man doth run, some man doth not run; and these in a contingent matter may be both together true, but cannot be both together false.

Subalternate Opposition is the repugnancy of 2 affirmative or 2 negative propositions in their quantity; as, every man doth run; some man doth run; some man doth not run, no man doth run.

Contradictory opposition is the repugnancy of two propositions both in quality and in quan∣tity; so as that if one of them be affirmative the other shall be negative; if one be univer∣sal the other shall be particular; as, every man is learned, some man is not learned.

Hence it is apparent. 1. That every propo∣sition is opposite to some proposition or other. 2. That every proposition which is opposite to ano∣ther, is opposite, either by way of contrariety,

subcontrariety, subalternation, or contradi∣ction; all which may be easily apprehended from the following Scheam.

Every man is learned.	Contrariety	No man is learned.
Subalternation	Contra¦di¦ction Contra¦di¦ction	Subalternation.
Some man is learned.	Subcontrariety.	Some man is not learned.

And thus it hath been shewed what opposi∣tion is, and how many ways one proposition may be opposite to another; come we now to the rules to be observed in such propositions as are any way opposite.

1. Such propositions as are opposite by way of contradiction, have these four Rules or Ca∣nons.

• ...

• 1. Contradictory propositions are the greatest, ••ecause they are repugnant both to quantity ••nd quality.
• 2. Contradictory propositions can never be ••oth true, or both false, if but one be true the ••ther must be false; as, every man is just, ••••me man is not just.
• 3. Every proposition of what quantity or quality soever it be, it is opposite unto one, and but to one, by way of contradiction.
• 4. In every legitimate disputation, a con∣tradictory proposition is always concluded by the Thesis of the respondent.

And here observe that contradictory propo∣sitions are of two sorts, viz. 1. Either such as have a common subject; and such are those of which we have hitherto spoken; or, 2. such as have a singular subject, and which are two singular propositions, having the same subject and the same predicate, but one affirmative, and the other negative: as, Socrates is learned, Socrates is not learned,

2. The laws of such propositions as are oppo∣site by way of subalternation, are two.

• 1. If the universal or subalternating propo∣sition be true, then the particular or subalter∣nated proposition is also true, and the contra∣ry; as, if this be true, every man is learned, this is also true, some man is learned.
• ...

• 2. If the particular or subalternated propo∣sition be false, the universal or subalternating proposition is also false, but not the contrary; as if this be false, some man is learned; this shall be also false, every man is learned.
• 3. Propositions which are opposite by way of contrariety have this only rule, that they can never be both together true, but they may be both together false, viz; in a matter that is contingent; as these are both false, every man is learned, no man is learned.
• 4. Propositions that are opposite by way of subcontrariety have one rule, namely this, that they may be both together true, but cannot be both together false; as these be true, Some man is learned, Some man is not learned.

And thus much concerning opposition or the first affection of Categorical propositions.

CHAP. XX. Of the Aequipollency of Categorical Propositions.

AEQuipollency is the equivalency of two propositions in sence and signification, though they differ in words, by vertue of this word of negation, [not] being either set before the sign and subject, after the sign, and subject, or, both before and after, in which there is the same subject and the same predicate; as, some man is learned, not every man is learned; whence it is apparent that to a true aequipollency these conditions are required.

• 1. That they be two propositions.
• 2. That these two propositions have the same sence, so as that both of them be affir∣mative, or both negative, both true or both false, and both of the same quantity.
• 3. That they differ in words though not in sence.
• 4. That they be made equivalent by ver∣tue of this word of negation, [not] so that these propositions, a man is learned, a man is knowing, are materially equivalent, viz. equi∣valent in the sence, but not formally, and as

• we understand aequivalency in this place.
• 5. That this word of negation [not] be either set before the sign and the subject, or after the sign and the subject, or both before and after.
• 6. That both have the same subject and the same predicate.

Cateoorical proprositions are as many several waies made aequipollent as this word of ne∣gation [not] may be severally placed; and that is three; for this word of negation [not] may be set,

• 1. Only before the sign and subject, and then it makes two contradictory propositions to be aequivalent; as, not every man is learned, some man is learned
• 2. Only after the subject and sign of quan∣tity, and then it makes two contrary propo∣sitions to be aequivalent; as, no man is not learned, every man is learned; this holds if the first be negative.
• 3. Both before and after the sign and sub∣ject, and then it maketh two subalternate propositions to be equal; as, not every man is not learned, some man is learned; all which are fully expressed in these Distichs.

If after sign and subject this [not] be, Contraries then, make Aequipollenoie.

Only before make contradictories, But 'fore and aft' are subalternants guise.

CHAP. XXI. Of the Conversion of Propositions.

COnversion is an apt mutation of the whole subject, into the place of the whole predicate, and of the whole predicate into the place of the whole subject, keeping the same qua∣lity, but sometimes changing the quantities; as, every man is a living creature, some living creature is a man.

In conversion we are to consider the pro∣position to be converted, which is that, whose terms are to be transposed, and this is the first; as every man is a living creature.

Then we are to consider the proposition converting, into which the other is to be converted, and this is the latter; as some living creature is a man.

This conversion is three-fold.

• 1. Simple, in which the predicate is chan∣ged into the place of the whole subject, and the contrary, keeping the same both quality and quantity; as no man is a stone, therefore

• ... no stone is a man. In this conversion an uni∣versal negative, is turned into an universal ne∣gative, and a particular affirmative into a particular affirmative.
• 2. By accident, in which the whole predi∣cate is changed into the place of the whole subject, and the contrary, keeping the same quality but changing of the quantity; as, eve∣ry man is a living creature, therefore some living creature is a man.
• In this conversion an universal affirmative is turned into a particular affirmative, an univer∣sal negative into a particular negative.
• 3. By contraposition, in which the whole subject is changed into the place of the whole predicate, and the contrary, keeping both the same quality and quantity, but the finite terms are made infinite; as, every man is a living creature, therefore every thing that is not a living creature, is not a man. In this con∣version an universal affirmative is turned into an universal affirmative, and a particular nega∣tive into a particular negative; but this is the most useless, and indeed no conversion, be∣cause the terms are changed, which in a true conversion, is not to be admitted.

But that this concerning the terms may be made more clear; we must observe, that these terms are said to be. Finite, before which

this word of negation [not] is not set; as, a man, Infinite before which this word of negation [not] is set; as, not a man, not a stone, not learned.

The Rules for conversion are four.

• 1. If the proposition to be converted be tru••, in a legimate conversion, the proposition converting is also true, and the contrary; as if this be true, every man is a living creaure, this is also true, some living creature is a man; but not on the contrary: for this is not true, every man is learned, and yet this is true, some man is learned.
• 2. Every proposition cannot be converted e∣very way, but every proposition may be con∣verted some way; this proposition therefore can∣not be converted by simple conversion; every man is a living creature; for then the pro∣position converting should be false: that there∣fore it may be known, what propositions may be converted this, or that way, these verses are to be considered.

E. E. I. I. conversion simple make. A. I. E. O. of accident partake, A. A. O. O. for Contraposits sake.

In which the four letters A. E. I. O. are thus to be understood. A. signifies universal af∣firmative. E. universal negative. I. partiular af∣firmative;

and O. particular negative: accord∣ing to these Distichs.

A. affirms, E. denies, both universal are, I. affirms, O. denies, but both particu∣lar.

The first verses shew, that E. is to be converted into E. and I. into I. by simple con∣version; that an universal negative into an u∣niversal negative &c. so likewise A. into I. and E. into O. to be converted by accident and lastly A. into A. and O. into O. by contra∣position.

• 3. That the whole predicate be changed in∣to the place of the whole subject, and the con∣trary.
• 4. That we beware, that imperfect terms be not taken for such as are intire. This propo∣sition therefore; a certain tree is in the field, is not thus converted, therefore a certain field is in the tree; but thus, therefore a certain thing in the field is a tree. Some man doth see one that is blind, is not thus to be con∣verted, therefore some one that is blind doth see a man, but thus, therefore some thing see∣ing one that is blind is a man. Every old man was a boy, is not thus to be converted, therefore a certain boy was an old man, but

• thus, therefore a certain person which was a boy is an old man.

And thus much concerning the affections of pure Categorical propositions.

CHAP. XXII. Of Modal Propositions.

HItherto we have spoken of such Cate∣gorical propositions, as are pure, and with∣out modes; it remaineth now that we speak something of such categorical propo∣sitions as are called modal, the which are thus defined.

A modal proposition is (as we defined it above) that in which, besides the subject, predicate and Copula, we add some modification to shew how the predicate is in the subject; as in this pro∣position: it is impossible that a man should be without reason.

The division of modal propositions is taken from the diversity of the modes, which re∣spect either the matter or the form of the proposition.

Such modes which respect the matter, that is, the subject and the predicate without con∣nexion

are twofold,

• 1. Such in which the mode affects the subject only, as he which doth easily learn is ingenious; where facility is the qualification of the learner.
• 2. Such in which the mode affects the predicate only, which doth more frequently happen.

And this is twofold,

• 1. That which respects the time signified; as, Peter was here a long while.
• 2. That which respects the thing signified; as, a horse runneth swiftly, of which sort are these, it is a holy thing, it is eight, it is sweet, &c. which if they be resolved into nouns, do make the predicate it self; as, to worship God is a holy thing, that is, to worship God is piety; and in this manner the rest may be resolved.

Secondly, other modes respect the form or the connexion of the terms, to which especial∣ly the definition of a modal proposition doth agree, and is two-fold.

• 1. Principal, in which the moods are affect∣ed with some primary manner, such as are these four.
  • 1. Nec••ssary, and is defined to be that, which is and cannot be otherwise; as, a man must needs be a living creature; and hath the

• ...
  • force of an universal affirmative.
  • 2. Contingent, and is defined to be that which is and may be otherwise, or may not be, as, perchance it may rain to morrow; and hath the force of a particular affirmative.
  • 3. Impossible, which is defined to be that which neither is, nor can be, as it is impossible that a man should be a beast; and hath the force of an universal negative.
  • 4. Possible, which is defined to be that which is not, but may be; as it is possible that roses may flourish again, and hath the force of a particular negative.
• 2. Less principal, in which the modes are affected in a secundary manner, and may be reduced to the four first.
  • 1. Probable, and may be reduced unto Contingent.
  • 2. True, and is referred to necessary.
  • 3. Easie, and is contained under possible.
  • 4. Difficult, and is included in impossible.

That this may be the better conceived five things must be considered.

1. That the modification of a proposition doth consist in two things.

• 1. The saying, which is the whole Cate∣gorical proposition; which supplies the place of the subject only; as, it is possible that water may be warm.
• ...

• 2. The manner, which supplies the place of the praedicate, in what part of the propoposition soever it be set.

2. In every modal proposition the manner of the modification is the most principal, and doth the office of the copula.

3. No other modes or manners but the formal are in Logick to be regarded; that is, such as respect the connexion of the terms.

4. The four modes respect the four diffe∣rences that are in things.

Now things may be said,

• 1. Always to be; with which agreeth this, necessary to be.
• 2. Never to be; with which agreeth this, it is impossible to be; and this, never to be actu∣ally, as, an Infinite number; or, never to be either actually or potentially, as, an irrational man.
• 3. Sometimes not to be, but also may be; and with these agreeth this, it is possible to be.
• 4. Sometimes to be, but also may not be; and with these agreeth this, it is contingent.
• 5. That the four modes may be distin∣guished, two things are required.

• 1. That they respect the same time, other∣wise the same thing may be both possible and impossible; as, It is impossible for one that fit∣teth to run [that is while he sitteth]; but if it be referred unto another time, it is possible.
• ...

• 2. That they be referred to the same sub∣ject; as, whilst I see Socrates running, Socrates of necessity must run. But if it be referred to the liberty of Socrates, then it is contingent, for he may and he may not run.

The quantity of modal propositions as it hath reference unto the [dictum] or [saying] is altogether the same with pure Categorical, and is the material quantity; but as it hath reference to the mode, that is universal which hath an universal mode, as necessary or Impossi∣ble.

That is particular, which hath a particular mode, as possible or contingent, and this is the formal quantity; as, it is impossible that any man should be a stone; the which is particular in reference to the [dictum] or [saying,] and universal in respect of the mode.

In like manner the quality of modal propo∣sitions, as it hath reference to the saying, is the same with pure Categorical; and as it hath reference to the mode, that affirmeth which hath an affirmative mode, viz. necessa∣ry or contingent; and that denies, which hath a negative mode, viz. possible or impossible. But if respect be had to the whole modal proposi∣tion, that is negative in which the mode is for∣mally denyed, and that affirmative in which 'tis not denyed; as this, It is impossible that a

man should not be a living creature, is negative in respect of the saying, and negative in re∣spect of the mode, but in respect of the whole proposition it is affirmative.

Every true modal proposition is necessary, every false, impossible; and between these there is no mean.

In the necessary mode, that proposition is true, whose matter is necessary; false, whose matter is impossible, or contingent.

In the impossible mode that proposition is true, whose matter is impossible, and that is false, whose matter is necessary or contingent.

In the contingent mode, that proposition is true, whose matter is contingent, and that is false, whose matter is necessary or impossible.

In the possible mode that proposition is true, whose matter is necessary or contingent, and that is false, whose matter is impossible,

The Opposition and Aequipollency of modal propositions, Logicians have expressed by these fictitious words, Purpurea, Iliace, Amabi∣mus, Edentuli; The four syllables of every of these words do signifie the four modes, the first syllable in every word doth signifie the possible mode; the second syllable, the contingent mode; the third syllable the Imp••ssible mode, and the fourth syllable the necessary m••de.

As for the four vowels which are in these

words, A. notes that the dictum and the mode are both affirmative V. notes that they are both negative; E. notes that the mode is affirma∣tive and the dictum negative; I. noteth that the mode is negative, and the dictum or saying affir∣mative, according to these verses.

V, both denies. A, both affirms: but I,

Destroys the mode; E, dictum doth deny.

Which being premised the whole matter may be easily understood by the following Scheam.

• Pur not possible not.
• Pu not contingent not.
• re impossible not.
• a necessary.

• A possible.
• ma contingent.
• di not imp••ssible.
• mus not necessary not.

• not possible. I
• not contingent li
• impossible. a
• necessary not. ce

• possible not. E
• contingent not. den
• not impossible not. tu.
• not necessary. li

In which scheam those are aequip••llent, which are contained in any one word, but those at the bottom, top sides and opposite Angles, are in the same manner opp••sed, as hath been shewed concerning the opposition of pure Categorical propositions; therefore, Pur∣purea, and Iliace, are contraries; Amabimus, and Edentuli are subcontraries. Purpurea and Edentuli are contradictories; and so are Iliace

and Amabimus; Purpurea and Amabimus are subalterns, and so are Iliace and Edentuli.

As for the conversion of modal propositions I willingly pass them by, as being unwilling to give my Reader the trouble of that, which will not requite his pains.

To these modal propositions those may be re∣duced, which are called exclusive, exceptive, and reduplicative,

An exclusive proposition is that in which an exclusive particle is found, as, only, alone, and the like; as, man only is rational.

And it is exclusive either of the predicate or the subject. Exclusive of the predicate is that, which by a sign of exclusion put between the sub∣ject and the predicate doth exclude other predi∣ca••es from the same subject; as, the Eliments are only four; and this is called a proposition excluding the extream.

Exclusive of the subject is that, which with an exclusive particle set before it, excludes or shuts out other subjects from participation with the same predicate; as, only man is rational: and this is absolutely called an exclusive proposition.

A Proposition excluding the extream is ex∣pounded by taking away the sign and removing from the predicate any other number or thing, as the case shall require; as this, the elements are only four, is thus expounded, the elments are four and no more.

A proposition exclusive of the subject, though it may be otherwise expounded, yet is it more simply done by the universal affirmative of the transposed terms; as this, a man on∣ly is rational, is thus expounded, every thing that is rational is a man, and so of the rest; mutatis mutandis.

An Exceptive proposition is that in which there is an exceptive particle; as, except, besides, unless, and such like; as, every living creature besides a man is irrational.

In every legitimate exception, the term excepting must be of a larger comprehension than the term excepted, that it may be di∣stributed.

This is expounded by two exponents, the first of which ought to be of the same quanti∣ty and quality, with the exceptive in the subject of the excluded term; and the other of divers quan∣tity and quality, in which the subject is the excepted term, and the predicate the same with the exceptive; as, every living creature besides a man is irrational, is expounded by these, eve∣ry living creature, which is another from a man is irrational; And, some man is not irrational; and thus may any other be expounded.

A Reduplicative proposition is that, in which there is found some reduplicative particle; as, according to, in respect of, as far forth as, and

such like; as, man is rational, and this is called, a Restrictive or a limitative proposition.

Reduplication is twofold.

• 1. Ʋniform, which is also called simple or specifical, when the reduplication is by the same name; as, in this, man as man is ratio∣nal: and this reduplication is not used, but in an essential predication, where the predicate so agreeth with the subject, as if it were the very subject it self.
• 2. Not uniform, or compounded, when the reduplication is made by divers names, whe∣ther it be of the Genus, and so is called Ge∣nerical; as in this, a man, as he is a living creature, is sensible; or of the part, and is cal∣led partial or Synechdochical, as in this, a man in respect of his soul is immortal; or of the Accident, and is called Accidental; as, So∣crates, as he is a Philosopher, doth dispute.

A reduplicative proposition is expounded by four exponents; the first of which exponents, doth attribute the principal predicate to the subject. The Second doth attribute the re∣duplicative predicate to the subject. The third doth attribute the principal predicate to the subject, by way of universality. The fourth is a causal inferring the principal predicate from the reduplicative; as this, a man, as he is a living creature, is sensible, may be ex∣pounded

by these several exponents thus.

1. A man is sensible; and a man is a living creature, and, every living creature is sensible. And, because something is a living creature, that something is sensible. In like manner may all other reduplicative propositions be ex∣pounded, whether negative or aff••rmative.

But the whole matter may be more readily done, and no less commodiously, if it be ex∣pounded by a simple exposition by the help of one causal only; thus the former proposition, a man as he is a living creature, may be thus expounded; because a man is a living creature, therefore he is sensible.

CHAP. XXIII. Of Hypothetical propositions.

HItherto we have spoken of Categorical propositions, come we now to Hypotheti∣cal.

An Hypothetical proposition is that, which doth consist of two Categorical propositions joyned together by some conjunction; as, man is a liv∣ing creature; and, a man is learned.

Hypothetical propositions are of three sorts, con∣ditional

Copulative, and Disjunctive.

• 1. A conditional or Hypothetical proposition strictly taken, in which several categorical pro∣positions are joyned together by a conjuction conditional; as, if it be day, then the Sun doth shine; to this may that which is called a causal proposition, be reduced; such as is this, because the Sun doth shine it is day; and also this, the Sun doth shine, therefore it is day; and note that the first Categorical proposition is called the antecedent, and the second is called the consecuent, because it followeth from the former.
• 2. Copulative, in which several Categorical propositions are joyned together by a Conjuncti∣on copulative; as a man is rational, and, a beast is irrational. To these, those propositi∣ons are referred, which are called adversative; as, Socrates, though he is not an Orator, yet he is a Philosopher; and comparative; as, So∣crates is as learned as Plato; and significa∣tive of Place, as, where Socrates doth read, Plato doth dispute; and significative of time; as, while Socrates doth read, Plato doth dispute.
• 3. Disjunctive, in which several propositions Categorical are joyned together by a conjuncti∣on disjunctive; as, either it is day, or it is night.

A conditional proposition is,

• ...

• 1. True, when the Antecedent doth prove the consequent; as, if it be granted, that it is day; it followeth, that the sun doth shine; therefore the antecedent being granted, the consequent must of necessity be granted also.
• 2. False, when the antecedent doth not prove the consequent; but the antecedent be∣ing granted, the consequent doth not necessa∣rily follow; as, granting that a man is a liv∣••ng creature, it doth not follow, that he is learned: this conditional prop••sition is therefore false, if a man be a living creature, then he is learned.

A Copulative proposition is,

• 1. True, when both parts thereof are true: as this is true, a man is a living creature, and a man is rational, for both the parts thereof are true.
• 2. False, when either one or both the parts are false; as this is false, a man is a living creature, and irrational, for the latter part is false, namely this, a man is irrational.

A dis••unctive proposition is,

• 1. True, when one or both of the parts are true, as this is true, either it is day, or it is night; for one of the parts is true, though the other be false.
• 2. False, when both parts are false; as this is false, A man is either a tree or a stone, for nei∣ther of them is true.

Hypothetical propositions have not properly either quantity or quality, but what they have from their Categoricals; neither have they such oppositions and Aequipollencies which Cate∣gorical propositions have: they are capable but of one only kind of opposition, and that is Con∣tradictory; and this is made by putting the particle of negation, in the first part of the Hy∣pothetical proposition; and therefore this, if Socrates doth run, he is a living creature, is contradictory unto this, if Socrates doth not run, he is a living creature. And thus it is also both in Copulative, and in disjunctive propositions.