The English academy, or, A brief introduction to the seven liberal arts grammar, arithmetick, geometrie, musick, astronomie, rhetorick & logic : to which is added the necessary arts and mysteries of navigation, dyaling, surveying, mensuration, gauging & fortification, practically laid down in all their material points and particulars, highly approved to be known by the ingenious, and as such are desirous to profit, or render themselves accomplished : chiefly intended for the instruction of young scholars, who are acquainted with no other than their native language, but may also be very useful to other persons that have made some progress in the studies of the said arts / by John Newton.

THE ENGLISH ACADEMY: The SIXTH PART. Of RHETORICK. (Book 6)

CHAP. I. Of the Definition and Parts of RHETORICK.

RHETORICK, is the Art or facul∣ty of Eloquent and delightful Spea∣king.

The Parts of Rhetorick are Five; Invention, Disposition, Elocution, Memory, and Pronounciation.

In Invention, we are to consider three things:

1. What we are to Invent. 2. By what Arguments we may confirm the Matter In∣vented. 3. From what Topicks or gene∣ral

Heads those Arguments may be raised.

And first, the thing or matter which we are to invent, is the scope and purpose of the intended Oration: That is, we must propound some certain Proposition to which we mean to direct our Speech; and of those several Propositions which may be raised from the subject propounded, we should still make choice of that which is most agreea∣ble to the Sentence given.

Secondly, When we have resolved upon a Proposition, we are to bethink our selves of some Arguments or probable Reasons, by which that Proposition may be confirmed.

Thirdly, We are to consider the several Topicks or common places from whence these probable Arguments may be invented and raised, and these are of two sorts; In∣trinsecal and Extrinsecal; those that are called Intrinsecal, which are comprised in the matter which is propounded, and the Topicks or Heads, from whence such Argu∣ments may be invented, are these following.

1. Definition. 2. Division. 3. Notation. 4. Conjugation. 5. Genus. 6. Species. 7. Semilitude. 8. Dissimilitude. 9. Contraries. 10. Opposites. 11. Comparison. 12. Causes. 13. Effects. 14. Adjuncts. 15. Antece∣dents. 16. Consequents. All other Topicks, from whence Intrinsecal or Artificial Argu∣ments may be raised, are contained in these, or may be derived from them.

1. Definition, is a Speech explaining or declaring what a thing is; The parts where∣of, according to Logicians are two; 1. The Genus, or general name agreeing with the thing defined, and with several other things besides. 2. The difference or particular name, which doth only agree with that which is defined:

For Example.

Man is a Living Creature, endued with Reason. In which the Genus is living Crea∣ture; and this agrees with other Creatures besides Man; the Difference, is endued with Reason, and this is proper to Man only. But such Definitions as these, are seldom used by Orators, but such rather as are cal∣led Descriptions, more properly than Defi∣nitions; as when a thing is described by its parts, or by its effects, or by the causes by which effects are produced, and such like.

2. Division, is the distribution of the mat∣ter propounded into its parts; Thus the Life of Man may be divided into Infancy, Child-hood, Youth, Middle-age, Old-age.

3. Notation, or Etymologie, is the Inter∣pretation of a Word, shewing as well the Original thereof, as the Signification; As a Senate is so called from the convention of the Seniors or Old Men.

4. Conjugation, is either when one word hath various endings; as knife, knives; or

when several words do come from one Pri∣mitive, thus; beautiful and beautifulness, are both derived from beauty.

5. A Genus, is that which comprehends se∣veral things under it; which are really dif∣ferent from one another.

6. A Species, is that which may with o∣ther things be referred to one common Ge∣nus: And thus this word Art, is a genus, in respect of the seven Liberal Sciences; as Grammar; Rhetorick, &c. and these Sciences Grammar, Rhetorick, &c. are the Forms and Species which are contained under this Genus or general term, Art.

7. Similitude, is the comparing of two or more things together, which are in themselves divers, but do agree in some particular.

For Example.

A shadow and glory, are in themselves ve∣ry different things; but yet they agree in this, that the shadow doth accompany the body, and glory, virtue.

8. Dissimilitude, is the disagreeing of two or more things in some particular.

9. Contraries, are such things which can∣not both at the same time, agree with one & the same thing: Thus no man can be said to be wise in that thing in which he is a Fool.

10. Opposites, are such things as can ne∣ver agree together, as wrath and friendship.

11. Comparison, is the comparing of one

thing with another; This is either equal or unequal.

Equal Comparison is, when two equal things are compared together; as thus, He hath deceived thee, therefore he will deceive me also.

Unequal Comparison, is two ways, first, when we argue from the greater to the less: As God spared not the Angels that sinned, how then shall He spare Man?

Secondly, when we argue from the less to the greater; As, He will not let one sin go un∣punished; much more will he therefore punish a multitude of sins.

12. Causes, are such things by which any thing is in any sort produced; there are Four sorts of Causes; Efficient, Material, Formal, and Final.

The Efficient cause, is that which maketh a thing: Thus the Sun causeth or maketh the day.

The Material cause, is that of which a thing is made, as Money, of Gold and Sil∣ver, &c.

The Formal cause, is that by which the thing is what it is, or that by which it is distinguished from other things; thus a Ship and a Timber-house do differ in the form, or divers disposing of the parts.

The Final cause, is that for which a thing is made.

13. Effects, are such things as are pro∣pounded by their causes.

14. Adjuncts, are such things which are joyned to the thing or person propounded, but not of necessity; and these are usually seven.

Quis? Quid? Vbi? Quibus Auxiliis? Cur? Quomodo? Quando?

In English thus,

First ask, Who? What? and Where? and Then, What aid? with Why? and How? and When?

Quis? Who? doth signifie the quality of the Person, in which there must be conside∣red his Nature, Sex, Age, Nation, Kindred, and Estate, in respect of his Body, Mind, and Fortune.

Quid? What? importeth an Inquiry af∣ter the nature of a thing, as whether it be of importance or not; whether great or small; noble or ignoble.

Vbi? Where? denotes the place.

Quibus Auxiliis? VVith what aid? notes an inquiry concerning the person that joyn∣ed with him in that action, or other In∣struments by which it is effected.

Cur? VVhy? denotes the final cause, with what intent, or to what end it was done.

Quomodo? How? shews the manner of do∣ing it; as namely, with ease, or how hardly.

Quando? When? notes the time in which it was done, and this head doth many times afford great plenty of matter.

15. Antecedents, are such things which go before the thing or matter; as you made

him tremble, therefore he is sensible.

16. Consequents, are such things which do necessary follow after the thing or matter as he that is thrust through the heart, must needs die; these are the Intrinsecal or Arti∣ficial Topicks, from whence Arguments may be raised on any Theme or matter propoun∣ded in this manner.

Every Theme or Proposition doth consist of three parts; a Subject, a Predicate, and a Copula.

That is called the Subject, of which we speak; The Predicate, is that which is spo∣ken of the Subject; and the Copula, is some Verb, which joyns the Subject with the Pre∣dicate, as in this Proposition; Claudius laid snares for Milo: Claudius is the Subject, be∣cause it is of him that we are to speak. Snares for Milo, is the Predicate; because that is the thing which is said of Claudius. And the Verb laid, is the Copula, which joyns the Subject with the Predicate. Now then if you will find out Arguments on this Proposition, take the Subject, and go through every Topick: First go to Definition, and ask what it is? what is the nature of it? and how it is distinguished from other things? then go to Division, and see into how many parts the Subject may be divided; and so forward from Topick to Topick. And still observe to yourself every Argument, which doth by this means arise from the Subject,

and apply it to the Predicate; so shall you easily see, whether it doth fully confirm your Proposition, and when you have done with the Subject, take the Predicate, and run through the several Topicks with that also; but if the matter require it, and that you judge it more convenient to take the whole Proposition, then the Subject and Pre∣dicate a part by themselves, you may in that manner run through all the heads of Inven∣tion; but stay not too long upon any one, for if matter offer not it self in one head, go to another, for every head perhaps may not afford matter, at least not such as is apt and fit. But if you would know whether your Arguments or matter be drawn from the Subject, or from the Predicate, put it into the form of a Syllogism, and if the major be most certain, you may conclude, that the Argument is drawn from the predicate; but if the minor be most certain, it is then drawn from the Subject.

VVhen you have found the Arguments which prove the Proposition, you must re∣duce them into the form of a Syllogism, which doth consist of three Propositions: the first whereof is called the Major, the se∣cond the Minor, and the third the Conclusion or Inference.

For Example.

In the former Proposition, Claudius laid snares for Milo; the matter or Subject of the

Discourse may be drawn from the Predicate the snares laid for Milo; which being a trea∣cherous thing, every one may naturally in∣fer, that it doth deserve punishment.

Now then joyn this Inference with the Pre∣dicate of your Proposition; saying, He that layeth snares deserveth punishment, and this is your Major; then take the Subject of your Proposition, and joyn that with the Predi∣cate, and say, Claudius layeth snares, and that is your Minor: From both which, this con∣clusion must needs follow, Therefore Claudi∣us deserveth punishment.

17. Hitherto we have spoken of Artificial Arguments, Inartificial are either Testimo∣nies or Examples.

Testimonies are either Divine or Human, a Divine Testimony, is that which hath God for its Author; such are the Oracles of God, and the predictions of his Prophets.

Humane Testimony, is either Common or Proper.

Common Testimony, is that which de∣pends either upon some Law, Custom, or Opinion and Sayings of wise Men.

Proper Testimony, is that which is pecu∣liar to some particular Causes.

Example, is an Inartificial Argument, by which the truth of a thing is confirmed and illustrated.

CHAP. II. Of Disposition.

DIsposition, is the orderly placing of those things which are invented: It is two-fold.

First, Natural, in which things are dis∣coursed in that order in which they were done, or in which according to Nature, they should be done; as if you were to commend a Person, you should begin with his Child∣hood, next his Youth, and so to the other degrees of his Age.

The second way is Artificial, which doth either for delight or profit diversly mingle and confound the matter, putting that in the end, which should be in the beginning, and the beginning in the end, that so he may both delight the Auditors, and hold them in suspense; which in an unexpected e∣vent doth not a little please and delight the Hearers.

The Orator then having resolved of his Proposition, must first consider of what na∣ture it is, whether single, or consisting of se∣veral parts; and which of the parts should be first handled, which next.

Secondly, he must choose some few of the best Arguments he hath invented, and place

some solid Argument in the beginning, those that are less forcible in the midst, re∣serving still the best and most convincing for the conclusion; because the Auditor at the first being greedy of knowing, must be prepos∣sessed and convinced; but in the end he must be strongly confirmed and forced.

And the most perswasive Arguments are those which proceed from the Definition, Distribution, Genus, Causes, and Effects of the thing discoursed of, for these explain the nature thereof; and less forcible Argu∣ments are such as are collected from some trivial Adjuncts and Conjectures.

Thirdly, he must Logically dispose of these Reasons and Arguments; First, into Syllogisms; and then consider how to enlarge them in an Oratorical manner.

Fourthly, he must consider into what parts his Oration should be divided, and the parts of an Oration are usually reckoned to be these five.

• 1. Exordium.
• 2. Proposition.
• 3. Narration.
• 4. Confirmation.
• 5. Peroration, or Conclusion.

As for Confutation, it is comprised in Confirmation: But all these parts are not always necessary; for the ingenious Orator, may as he shall see it convenient, sometimes omit the Narration, sometimes the Exordi∣um,

sometimes the Peroration or Conclusion, yea, and the Confirmation is many times scarce discernable; as when the things pro∣pounded are certain, there is more need of Ornament than Proof, as in Gratulatory O∣rations, and the like. As for the placing of these parts, their natural Order is that in which we have named them. 1. The Exordium. 2. The Proposition. 3. The Narration, if it be not thought fit to omit it. 4. The Confirmation; and Lastly, The Pe∣roration.

An Exordium, is as it were the door of the Oration, in which the Orator doth pre∣pare the minds of the Auditor for that which is to follow: And this is commonly done by one of these three ways; By bespeaking their favour; by making them Docible; or by begging their Attention. The Favour of the Auditors is bespoke either from the person of the Orator, from the persons of the Auditors, from the persons of the Ad∣versaries, or from the subject matter of the Discourse. The Orator may bespeak the Favour of the Auditors, in respect of him∣self, if his gesture and deportment be suita∣ble unto theirs that are his Auditors, and express himself modestly. And in respect of the Auditors, if he shew how well they have deserved of the Common-wealth, of him, and other men. And in respect of the Adversaries, if he modestly shew wherein

they are faulty, and render them to the Au∣ditors inexcusable. And lastly, in respect of the matter in hand, if he say, that it is some excellent, necessary, and profitable thing.

Secondly, the Orator may be said to make the Auditors Docible, if he clearly explain the thing of which he is to speak, and how he purposeth to enlarge upon it.

Thirdly, the Attention will be quickened, if he saith, that he intends to speak of some great and wonderful thing, and something that is delightful; necessary, and very much concerns his Auditors, &c.

The second part of an Oration is the Pro∣position; and the Proposition is that part of the Oration, in which the Orator doth briefly deliver the sum of the whole Matter, of which he intends to speak, and bespeaks the Hearers Attention, if need be. Some∣times it doth immediately follow the Exor∣dium; sometimes it follows the Narration; in what place soever it be put, it must be short and clear, and fit for Confirma∣tion.

The third part of an Oration is Narrati∣on, by which a relation is made of the mat∣ter or thing done. And this is either a di∣stinct part of the Oration, and then for the most part it doth immediately follow the Exordium, that the Proposition with the Con∣firmation, which is to be done in such Ora∣tions which assume the explaination of

the thing done to prove the matter in hand.

For Example.

If you were to prove that some Valiant Person had been a Souldier in some Warr; it is necessary that you should declare what the particular Actions were in which he shewed his Valour.

But now in that Narration, which is made a distinct part of the Oration, the thing done must be briefly and simply decla∣red without any exaggregation: And in such a Narration as makes way for Confir∣mation, the things done may be illustrated with great neatness of Language, with Sen∣tences and Figures, and some Discourses may be made concerning the worthiness of the action, with some amplification from Si∣militudes and Comparisons.

The fourth part of an Oration, is Confir∣mation: and Confirmation is as it were the ve∣ry Heart and Soul by which an Oration may be chiefly said to Live: Or it is the chief part of an Oration in which the Argu∣ments are produced, by which we would prove our Proposition, and refute or answer the contrary opinion of our Adversary, if need require. What is necessary in this be∣half, may be collected from what hath been already said. Seeing that Confirmation doth consist of the Arguments that are invented and the right disposition of them, both which have been fully enough declared be∣fore.

Confutation, is a part or kind of Confirma∣tion, in which we Answer all Objections; it doth either precede or follow Confirma∣tion, or may be here or there used in all the parts of the Oration.

And these objections may be either all Answered together, or those first which are first made, and then the latter; or those first which are most material, and the rest may fall of themselves; or the weakest first, that they being avoided, the strongest Arguments may be somewhat weak'ned. And the man∣ner of doing this, is by shewing, that the Adversaries Allegation is either false, impos∣sible, uncertain, or impertinent, and the like.

Peroration, or Conclusion, is the last part of an Oration, in which the Orator should very much endeavour to set an edge in the minds of his Auditors, and incline them to be of his side; and here he should therefore use such Figures, as are most proper to move the Affections: It doth chiefly consist of two parts, Enumeration, and Amplificati∣on.

Enumeration is required, that the chief Arguments more largely opened in the for∣mer discourse may be clearly repeated in a new form of words.

Amplification, desires that this repetition may be made, by some serious expressions, a∣dorned with Sentences and Figures.

CHAP, III Of Elocution.

ELocution, or the garnishing of Speech, is an Art by which the Speech is beautified with the Elegancy of Words and Sentences.

And this is performed two ways; by the fine manners of Words, called a Trope; or by the fine frame of Speech, called a Figure.

A Trope is such an Elocution or manner of Speech, as doth change the signification of a word into a different signification from the natural.

In a Trope two things are to be considered. 1. The Affections. 2. The Kinds.

The Affections of a Trope are four,

• ...Catachresis.
• ...Hyperbole.
• ...Matalepsis.
• ...Allegoria.

Catachresis, is a harsh and unpleasant change of a Word; as namely, when one word or name is put to another, not by any proper relation, but by a kind of force. He threatens me a good turn.

Hyperbole, is a very high relation of a thing, or a more bold excess of a Trope, which doth exceed belief, either by Augmen∣tation

or by Diminution. Note that though an Hyperbole doth vary from the truth, yet doth it not deceive us through-Fiction, or such variation.

An Hyperbole is two-fold; Auxesis or Meio∣sis.

An Auxesis is, when for Argumentation sake or Amplification, we interpose a more vehement expression, in his proper place; as when we say, magnificent for liberal.

A Meiosis, or a Tapinosis, is when for ex∣tenuation sake, we use a milder or more fa∣vourable expression, than the matter requi∣reth; as when we say a flatterer is a courteous and an affable person.

A Matalepsis, is that which containeth ma∣ny Tropes in one expression; as, when we by an improper Speech, signifie, first, that which is improper, and by that improper Speech perhaps another, and so forward, till we come to that which is proper, making way for Transition, by interposing a mean degree; as All the City was moved. Mat. 21.10. where the City is put for Jerusalem, by a Synechdoche Generis: and Jerusalem for its In∣habitants, by a Metonymy of the Subject.

An Allegory, is the continuation of a Trope as where many Tropes of the same kind are joyned together; as, Put on the whole Armor of God, Ephesians 6.11.

In an Allegory, observe to end with the same kind of Trope with which you begin, or

else the Consequence will be abused.

The several kinds of Tropes are these four:

• 1. A Metonomy.
• 2. An Irony.
• 3. A Metaphor: and
• 4. A Synechdoche.

A Metonomy, is a Trope of the Cause to the Effect, of the Subject to the Adjunct: and the contrary, of the Effect to the Cause, or of the Adjunct to the Subject.

There are four kinds of Causes.

• 1. The Efficient Cause, by which a thing is.
• 2. The Material Cause, of which a thing is made.
• 3. The Formal Cause, by which a thing is what it is.
• 4. The Final Cause, for which a thing is; of which the two first only belong to our pre∣sent purpose.

A Metonymy of the Cause, is of the Effici∣ent, or of the Matter.

A Metonymy of the Efficient Cause, is when the Author or Inventor of any thing is put for those things which he hath invented; as Virgil, for the Poem or Works composed by Virgil.

A Metonymy of the Material Cause, is when the name of the Matter is put for the Effect; as Brass, for Brass Money.

A Metonymy of the Effect, is when the Ef∣ficient Cause is signified by the Effect; as, Pale Death, which maketh Pale.

A Metonymy of the Subject, is when the proper name of any Subject is made to sig∣nifie the Adjunct; as, the Cup, for the Drink in the Cup.

A Metonymy of the Adjunct, is when the Adjunct is put for the Subject; as Gen. 31.53. Jacob swear by the fear of his Father Isaac, i. e. by God, whom Isaac feared.

An Irony, is a Trope from one opposite to another, or in which we speak by con∣traries.

Opposites; are either unlike or contrary; all things of different natures are said to be unlike, as a Man, a Stone; and all things of contrary natures are said to be contrary to one another; as light and darkness.

An Irony of a thing unlike, is when any thing is spoken of one person, and under∣stood of another.

An Irony from the contrary, is when one contrary is signified by another; as O thou hast done very well; meaning that he had done very ill.

Paralepsis, is a kind of Irony, by which we seem to pass by, or take no notice of such things which yet we strictly observe and re∣member.

Apophasis, is a kind of Irony, by which we deny to say or do what yet we speak with greatest earnestness, and do with all our might.

A Metaphor, is a Trope, by which we

express our selves by a word, which is of the like signification with that we mean; as, the King is the Head of the Common-wealth.

Synecdoche, is a Trope, by which a part is put for the whole, or the whole for a part.

A Part, is either a Member or Species.

A Synecdoche of a Member, when by a Member the whole is signified; as, the Roof for the House.

A Synecdoche of the Species, is when the Species is put for the Genus; as, Croesus, for a Rich man.

The whole is either an Integer or Genus.

A Synecdoche of an Integer, is when an In∣teger is put for a Member; as, His Army was so great, that it drank the Rivers dry; mean∣ing a great part of the Water in the River.

A Synecdoche of the Genus is, when the general is put for the special; as, Preach the Gospel to every Creature, meaning Mankind only, and not to every Creature.

Hitherto of Tropes, the first kind of elocu∣tion, the second kind of Elocution by Fi∣gure.

CHAP. IV. Of a Figure.

A Figure, is a kind of Elocution, by which the form of a Speech is changed from its right and plain use.

A Figure, is either of a Word, or of a Sentence.

A Figure of a Word, is that by which an Oration or Speech is composed of words aptly and sweetly suitable to one another, and this consists in the Dimension or Repe∣tition of Sounds or VVords.

A Figure, in the Dimension of Sounds, is the sweet number of Sounds in a Sentence.

Number, is either Poetical or Oratorical.

A Poetical Number, is that which is con∣fined to a perpetual observation of certain Spaces.

A Number Poetical, is either Rhyme or Meter.

Rhyme is a Poetical Number, containing a certain number of Feet, without any regard to the quantity of the Syllables; whether long or short, As,

Dare to be true; nothing can need a lye: A fault that needs it most, grows two thereby.

A Meter, is a Poetical Number, consisting

of certain Feet, of which the last Foot hath the last Syllable indifferent or common; that is, long or short.

Oratorical Number doth indeed consist of Feet, but not of any certain number of Feet, but of as many or as few as the Orator plea∣seth.

The Figure of a word in respect of the re∣petition thereof, is either of like or unlike Sounds.

A Figure of a word in the repitition of the like Sound, is either with, or without Inter∣mission.

Repetition of the like Sound without inter∣mission, is either an Epizeuxis, or an Ana∣diplosis.

An Epizeuxis, is when a like Sound is re∣peated in the same Sentence without Inter∣mission; as, a sword, a sword is sharpened.

An Anadiplosis, is when a like sound with∣out Intermission is repeated in divers senten∣ces, i. e. when it ends one and begins ano∣ther; as,

If then, why I take not my leave, she ask; Ask her again, why she did not unask?

Repetition of like sound with intermission in the same place, is either an Anaphora or Epistrophe.

An Anaphora, is when a like sound is re∣peated

in the beginning of Sentences; as,

By art of Sails and Oars, Seas are divided: By art the Chariot runs, by art Loves guided.

An Epistrophe, is when a like sound is re∣peated, in the close of sentences; as, Are they Hebrews? so am I: Are they, Israelites? so am I: Are they of the seed of Abraham? so am I.

Repetition of like sound with intermission in divers parts or places, is either an Epa∣nalepsis, or an Epanados.

An Epanalepsis, is when a like sound is re∣peated in the beginning and ending of the same Sentence; as, In sorrow was I born, and I must dye in sorrow.

An Epanados, is when the like sound is in the beginning and ending of divers senten∣ces, an Anadiplosis coming between; as Par∣thenia desired above all things to have Arga∣lus; Argalus feared nothing but to miss Par∣thenia.

A Figure of a Word made by the repeti∣tion of sounds somewhat unlike, is either Pa∣ronomafia, or Polyptoton.

Paronomafia, is when a Word being chan∣ged in a Letter or Syllable, it is also chan∣ged in sense and signification; as, Though you advise me to repent, I have not Grace to follow your advise.

A Polyptoton, is when words of the same

Original are reiterated, but with some variati∣on; as, Deceiving, and being Deceived.

A Figure in reference to a sentence, is a Figure which affecteth the whole sentence with some motion of the Mind, either in absolute reasoning, or in reasoning Dia∣logue-wise.

Logismus, or absolute Reasoning, is when a sentence is composed without any talk∣ing with other supposed; this is either Ec∣phonesis, a recalling of ones self, Apostrophe, or Prosopopeia.

Ecphonesis, is a Figure in reasoning, by way of Exclamation, by an Adverb expres∣sed, or understood; as, O wretched man that I am!

Recalling of ones self, is when something is called back; and it is as it were a Dimi∣nution of the over-hastiness or heat of speech; and this is either Epanorthosis, or Aposiopesis.

An Eparnorthosis, is when something pre∣cedeing is called back, by correcting it; as, I had one only Young Man to my son; ah! what have I said! I had! yea I had! It is now un∣certain whether I have or not.

An Aposiopesis, is when the close of a sen∣tence begun is stopped, by keeping in a part, which yet is understood; as, You Rogue if I Live!

An Apostrophe, is when a speech is dire∣cted to another, than was by the speech it

self at first intended; as, God knows I lye not.

A Prosopopoeia, is when in our Oration, we suppose another person to be speaking; as, Josh. 24.27. Behold this shall be a witness un∣to us; for it hath heard all the Words of the Lord, which he hath spoken unto us.

A Figure, in reasoning Dialogue-wise, is when a sentence is composed in form of a Conference; this consisteth in Question and Answer, in Consenting or dissenting Dialogism.

A Figure of consenting Dialogism, is when ones Answer doth admit of the Obje∣ction expressed or understood; yet so, as that from thence the inconsequence of the Objection may be shewed if need be.

Dissenting Dialogism, is when ones an∣swer doth impugn or cross the Objection.

And thus much concerning Elocution, as for Memory and Pronounciation, which are the other two parts of Rhetorick, I purpose∣ly omit them, as being natural Endowments, which may be better improved by constant practice, than by any Precepts which can be given.

FINIS.