Discourses upon Cornelius Tacitus written in Italian by the learned Marquesse Virgilio Malvezzi ; dedicated to the Serenissimo Ferdinand the Second, Great Duke of Thuscany ; and translated into English by Sir Richard Baker, Knight.

Vrbem Romam a principio Reges habuere.

CHAP. I.

Of the divers formes of Government, that Rome had: and how it happens, that Cities for the most part, have their beginning under Kings rather then any other forme of government.The first Discourse.

THe Almighty God, understanding and comprehending himselfe in∣finitely; in as much as the under∣standing himselfe, proceeding from himselfe, returnes into him∣selfe: joyneth together by an ad∣mirable circulation, the begin∣ning with the end.

The Angelicall spirits as they have a twofold con∣templation, so they cause a twofold motion: For by contemplating of God, their owne knowledge retur∣ning in an acknowledgement of its originall: they move the Heavens circularly, in a like motion to that of the first mover, from East to West: and by contem∣plating of themselves, they cause another circular mo∣tion contrary to the former, from West to East. And

seeing all mortall things are influenced by the motions and light of the Heavens. It followes necessarily, that they all follow the heavenly influences with moving in a circle. What marvell then, if the government of the City of Rome, (as here in few words is delivered by Tacitus) have had its circular motion; passing from a regall government, begun by Romulus; to a popular or free estate under Brutus; and from that, to an Ari∣stocraticall government under Pompey, Crassus, and Cae∣sar; under Lepidus, Anthonie, and Augustus; and then at last, with a wonderfull circulation returning againe to a government Monarchicall, as it was at first. Where∣upon the Prophet Ezekiel, not without great mystery, shewing us in his first vision, four beasts, which in the opinion of many, are figures of the foure Empires of the World; he sets before every one of them a wheele; to intimate in what a circulation they are turned a∣bout. And this circulation or alteration, though I cannot say, it is inalterable; yet I may truely say, It is so naturall, that even Aristotle himselfe, discoursing upon the passages of Rule and Dominion; foresees and ob∣serves that as a Philosopher; which Tacitus as an Hi∣storian, relates here of Rome. Et ob hoc forsan Rex ab in∣itio repertus est; quod difficile erat viros plures excellenti virtute reperiri, praesertim cum tunc civitates parvae forent. So Tacitus here, Vrbem Romam a principio R•…•…ges habuere. Aristotle goes on, Sed cum postea contingeret, ut plures pari virtute reperirentur, non amplius tolerarunt Regem; sed com∣mune quiddam quaerentes, resp•…•…blicas constituere: So Tacitus here, Libertatem Lucius Brutus Instituit. Aristotle pro∣ceeds, Cum verò deteriores facti, lucrum sibi quaererent, ex gubernatione rerumpublicarum; Paucorum hine potentiam exortam fuisse, credendum est: Honorabant enim Divitias. So here we see, from whence the power came which Pompey, Crassus and Caesar had; and from whence also the Triumvirat of Augustus. Aristotle againe, Ex his verò

in Tyrannides transiere. So Tacitus here, Lepidi atque An∣tonii arma in Augustum cessere.

But for as much as Aristotle shews, that from the end of one circulation another begins; while pursuing this Argument, he saith, Ex Tyrannis rursus ad Plebem: he that will consider in Rome, those forms of government, which for their small continuance, I have omitted; shall find plainly, that even in those also, there hath been a manifest circulation: For after the Regall un∣der Romulus; it came to be a free estate under Brutus; from that, to be a government of a few under the decem∣viri: lastly, to be in the hand of a tyrant, under Appius Claudius; after whose death she recovered againe her liberty; and then passing under the Power of a few, setled at last in a Tyranny under Augustus: and if there hapned afterward no new circulation, the reasons thereof shall be shewed in another discourse.

But conceiving it to be the fittest course for exami∣ning of these revolutions, to proceed by shewing the causes of them; thereby to make men the better see that the events of former times have not been casuall, and hapned by chance; and also the better be able to prevent the like accidents that may hereafter happen; I will therefore make my beginning at the Power Re∣gall; with which, it ought not to seem strange, that Rome at first was governed; seeing it hath been the like in the foundings almost of all Cities: as both Salust wit∣nesseth, Igitur Initio Reges; nam in terris, Nomen Imperii id primum fuit: and Justin, Principio rerum, Gentium, Na∣tionumque Imperium penes Reges erat: and also Aristotle, Fuerat enim antiqua civitatum gubernatio paucorum & Regia: and besides these, there are many examples in the holy Scripture, that shew it, to have been so: Cain, before the flood, was founder of the first City that ever was in the World; and he, as S. Austin writes, was a King; as also his successours: likewise after the flood,

the great City Babylon was scarce built; when Nintrod, (as the Scripture saith) Coepit esse Potens in terra.

There being therefore no doubt of the case: having so many and great authorities to confirme it; the next thing is, to search out the causes; amongst which, the first may be taken from the first founding. For Cities are sometimes founded by one alone; and he a Private man; as Rome, by Romulus: sometimes by one alone, but he a Lord of other Cities, as Constantinople by Con∣stantine: oftentimes by many joyning together; and those many, either all of one Country; who for shun∣ning of danger, assemble themselves into one City: as the Athenians did at Athens: or else such as quite leave and forsake their ancient habitations; which may happen, either in time of peace; when men are forced by the great overswarming of people to seeke new dwellings; as the French did, when they built Milan: or else in time of warre; when men flying from a Coun∣try wasted; retire themselves into fresh places: and this may happen, under some one that is Head or Chieftaine; or without Head: without a Head, as Ve∣nice; under a Head, as Lavinium, Padoua, and Athens: the first, built by Aeneas: the second, by Antenor; the third, by Theseus.

Now a City which is built by one alone, whether he be a Private man, or a King; is no sooner founded, but it comes presently to be under a Power Regall: Those againe that are built by many joyning together: whe∣ther it be, that they fly, by reason of warre; or whether it be, that in peace, to enlarge themselves, they seeke new countries: These also fall presently under the power Regall; because these things cannot well be done, but where there is a superiour, that is Head; as Milan did under Bellovisus; Padua under Antenor; La∣vinium under Aenaeas; and Athens under Theseus.

But if a City happen to be built by many that are

equals and have no chiefe amongst them: in this case onely, it may be that Cities have not their beginning under Kings: of which, there may be many occasions. First, when the end was not first publique to build a City; but rather for private commodity; where men∣might place their persons and goods in safety: which in other places by reason of warres they could not do; and in case of such danger, many building houses, now one and then another, have thereby made as it were a Village, and at last a City. Which having beene built insensibly and by fits, is therefore not governed by Regall power; which it would have been, if it had been built at once by a number of people united to∣gether: a thing impossible to happen, where there is not a Head: as Plato in his Dialogue of Lawes hath learnedly taught. And therefore Venice having beene founded in the foresaid manner; hath beene able to begin; is and will be able to maintaine it selfe a free City; there concurring together with the wisedome of him that built it; the valour of him that governes it. Secondly, this may happen thorough the condition of those, who without a Head joyne toge∣ther to the founding of new Cities, for if they be pious and religious; of quiet dispositions, not greedy of command, and such as have had their education in a Common-wealth, where they have learned rather to content themselves with equality, then to aspire to soveraignty: there is no doubt but they will rather set up a free estate, then a Regall; as it was at the foun∣ding of Venice. Thirdly, it may happen by reason of their weakenesse who were the founders; amongst whom there being none fit or worthy to be a King, they are all Commanders. For this reason (though falsely) Tarquinius speaking to the Thoscans and Vei∣entanes, would have it, that the City of Rome was be∣come a Republique: Se Regem augente bello, Romanum

Imperium a Proximis scelerata Conjuratione pulsos eos inter se, quia nemo Vnus satis dignus Regno visus sit, partes Regni rapuisse.

These are the occasions by which it happens, that sometimes Cities in their beginnings are not governed by Kings: but because it is a thing that seldom hapens, we may well say; that the first reason, why the greatest part of Cities, in their beginnings, are governed by Kings, is their founding: which without a head, can ill be done. A second reason we may take from the Inha∣bitants; who in the beginning being but few; are apt to tolerate the Regall Power: an instruction that A∣ristotle gives, Propter paucitatem enim hominum, non crat magmis memerus mediocri•…•…; itaque pauci cum essent, multitudine & Institutione; magis ferebant ab aliis gubernari: and this certainely Livie meant when he said; that if Brutus had deposed any of the first Kings, while the multitude was yet unfit to beare any other govern∣ment then the Regall; the Common-wealth had thereby been Endangered. Dissipatae res nondum adultae Discordia forent, quas fovit tranquilla moderatio Imperii, eoque nutriendo perduxit, ut bonam frugem libertatis, maturis jane viribus ferre possit. A third reason and like unto this, may be taken from the difficulty to finde many in the first founding of a City, that are of ability and fit to governe: for which reason perhaps, Aristotle saith, Rex ab Initio repertus est, quia difficile erat, viros plures excellenti virtute reperiri. And so much the more, the City being then, (as Lucius Florus saith) in her child∣hood; and consequently, wanton and given to plea∣sures; and therefore had need of such a schoolmaster as a King is, to keep them in awe; whom liberty else would soone corrupt. And to this purpose it is that Livie speaks, and that of the liberty of Rome. Quid enim futu•…•…m fuit, si illa Pastori•…•…m convenarumque plebs transfuga ex suis populis, sub tutela Inviolati Templi, aut libertateni

aut certam impunitatem adepta, soluta Regio metu, agitare caepta esset Tribunitiis procellis. No man therefore ought to marvell, that our Lord God, in the time of the Mo∣saicall Law, never gave to the Hebrews a Common∣wealth, as long as either immediately by himselfe; or else by the meanes of Kings or Judges, he governed them in feare, under severe lawes; where of when men came to be more perfect, he abated the rigour; as Saint Austin excellently expresseth, saying, Deus He∣braeis diversa pro qualitate temporis, imposuit Praecepta; erant enim sub lege quast puert sub Pedguogo incluse: and therefore Saint Paul saith, Sub lege custodiebamur in Christo, nutriens nos tanquam parvulos sub rigore & Disei∣plina. The last reason is, because a City in its Begin∣ning hath need of Lawes, which may better be given by one alone, then by a multitude; where of Aristotle gives the reason, Quia Vnum nancisci & paucos facilius est quam •…•…ltos qui recfe sentiant, & possint leges condere, & jus constituere.

Now having shewed, that not without just cause, the City of Rome was in its beginning governed by Romu∣lus: it will not be amisse, to examine the scituation of the City, and therein to shew the Founders wisdome in the building it. First therefore the scite of a City, (according to Aristotle) ought neither to be too re∣mote from the sea; nor yet too neer it; to the end, that by too much remotenes, it be not deprived of many commodities, which the Sea is wont to bring in; and by too great neernesse, it be not exposed to the danger of suddaine assaults. Secondly, It ought to be in a good aire; as the thing, which of all other, can most annoy us; being continually, not onely about us, but taken into us. Thirdly, it ought to be in a place of plenty; without which, there can never accrew any greatnesse to a City. Fourthly, it ought to be in a place, easie for carriage and bringing in of commodities. Fiftly and

lastly, it ought to be in a place of advantage for assaul∣ting its neighbours: and difficult it selfe to be assaul∣ted. Now that Rome was scituated according to these rules of Aristotle, is related by Livie, where he saith: Non sine causa Dii hominesque hunc urbi condendae locum elegerant, saluberrimos colles; here he shewes the good∣nesse of the ayre: Flumen optimum quo ex Mediterraneis locis fruges advehantur. Here he shewes the facility of cariage, either by Land or Water. Mare vicinum ad commoditates; nec expositum, nimia propinquitate ad peri∣cula classium externarum Nationum: Here he shewes a neerenesse to the sea in respect of profit: and a re∣motenesse, in respect of danger. Italiae Medium ad In∣crementuan urbis natum unice: Here he shewes the diffi∣culty for being assaulted, by people farre off, being in the midst of Italy; and by people neere hand, by rea∣son of its own strength. We may therefore conclude: that a City built to grow great, cannot possibly have a more excellent scituation, (according to Aristotle) then Rome had.

Libertatem Lucius Brutus Instituit.

How the City of Rome came from being governed by Kings, to be a free State; and what the difference is betweene a beginning and a cause. The second Discourse:

HAving shewed the causes for which the City of Rome, was in her first beginning governed by Kings: I conceave it to be no lesse necessary, to make inquiry how it hapned, that leaving that kind of go∣vernment, it came under Brutus, to be a free State: and seeing, of the causes that may be alledged, (setting

them aside that are supernaturall) some are Philoso∣phicall, and some Politicall; these consisting in the things done; those in the order of number, and in∣fluences of the Heavens; I say first, speaking as a Poli∣tician; There are many of opinion, that this altera∣tion of government in Rome, was caused by the ravi∣shing of Lucretia, by Sextus Tarquinius: which opinion Aristotle seemes not much to decline; while speaking of the causes, by which Monarchies and States come to be changed, he omits not to name for one, the lust and lasciviousnesse of the Prince: which (as he shewes by many examples) have been the cause of change in all kinds of Commonwealths and Monarchies. Others may say, that this change of government in Rome, pro∣ceeded from this, that Tarquinius had taken away all authority from the Senators; and had by devises pro∣cured the utter abolishing of the Senate; which also was the cause, that the Monarchy of Rome, passed after∣wards from the house of the Caesars, into that of Galba. The cause likewise of the change in Syracusa, from a Monarchy to a popular State; when Hieronymus not following the steps of his grandfather Hieron; deve∣sted the Senate of all authority; and was therefore by conspiratours most miserably slaine. For as the sto∣macke, which is the seat of naturall heat; as long as it hath in it any little nourishment, leaves the body in peace and quiet; but if it be altogether without, it then drawes nourishment from the head, and thereby oftentimes destroyes the body: so if the Senate have but some little authority left it, it then rests satisfied and contented; but if it be wholly deprived of all au∣thority, it then turnes head upon their head, and fals upon the Prince; and oftentimes becomes the ruine of the City. And even this is one reason, that Octavius Augustus, after the death of Caesar, was able to continue in his Empire; because he left to the Senate, part of

that authority which Caesar had before abolished; at least had plotted to abolish.

By the examples hitherto brought, I conceave it may be gathered, that these were the true Politicall causes, why the City of Rome, changed its regall government, to a free State; but because to say but this, would be to confound beginnings with causes; it is necessary to expatiate a little; that so returning backe, I may leave no man uncapable of this truth.

We must therfore know, that between a beginning and a cause, there is great difference; not speaking of them either Philosophically, or Theologically; al∣though in each of them, it might easily be shewed. In Theologie; because the Father is the beginning of the Sonne; and the Father and the Sonne, the begin∣ning of the Holy Ghost; yet neither the Father is cause of the Sonne, nor the Father and Sonne cause of the Holy Ghost, as Thomas Aquinas doth learnedly de∣monstrate. In Philosophy; seeing Aristotle in his Phy∣sicks; and in his books of Generation and Corrupti∣on, shews manifest difference, between beginnings and causes. But because Aristotle in distinguishing thē, takes thē not alwaies in the sense that we take them; and of∣tentimes also confounds them; as in his Metaphysicks; where he shewes that a cause and a beginning, are as Ens and Vnum; which are convertible one with the other; and in another place affirmes, that all causes are beginnings: and in Divinity likewise the Greeke Fathers mingle oftentimes in the Persons of the Tri∣nity, the causes with the beginnings: as Saint Gregory Nazianzen and others: we therefore in this place, will forbeare to speak of them, either Philosophically, or Theologically; but will frame our Discourse, by way of actions; shewing into how great errors those men have runne, who confound causes with begin∣nings: a thing which Tacitus is not guilty of, who in

his History saying; Struebat jam fortuna in diversa parte terrarum initia causas Imperii; shewes plainly he knew that a cause and a beginning were not both one thing.

We may therefore take causes to be those that are in the understanding; beginnings, those by whose meanes, that which is in the understanding is put in execution. And so a cause comes to be, the first in the intention; and the last in execution; a beginning, the last in the intention; and the first, in execution.

This, Polybius well understood where he saith, Causae omnibus in rebus primae sunt; Principia verò ultima causa∣rum: equidem ita existimo, Principia dici Primas omnium actiones in rebus quae judicatae as deliberatae sunt; causas verò quae judicium deliberationemque praecedant. And thereupon excellently well he saith, That the cause of the second warre of the Carthaginians with the Ro∣mans, was the indignation of Amilcar Hannibals father: who, though he were not overcome by Land of his enemies the Romans, yet the Carthaginian Forces being put to the worse by them, he thought it his best course to make peace, and to lay downe Armes for the present, reserving in his mind a perpetuall indig∣nation; which cncreased afterward by their threatning of warre, at such time as the Carthaginians distracted with other discords, and thereby not able to with∣stand them, lost Sardinia. Whereupon, Amilear incen∣sed with a new indignation, had an intention to make warre upon them, many yeeres before Hannibal passed into Italy. These were the causes of the warre: but the beginnings of it were afterward the siege of Saguntum: and Hannibals passing over the River Hiber. So you see, the beginnings were not at the same time; but were long before preceded by the causes.

To roturne now to our purpose, concerning the alteration of States: it is seldome seen, that the cause and the beginning happen both at one time. The

cause that moved Caesar, to change the State in Rome; was an impatience of equality; which being borne and bred with him, was hastened in him, by the threat∣ning of his enemies, pressing him to give over his Con∣sulship, and to give an account of what he had done; a thing of great difficulty and danger in Common∣wealths, as was seen in the case of Scipio, of Furius Camillus, and others. But the beginning was his passing over the river Rubicon. So likewise the change which the Israelites made in the time of Samuel, from Judges to Kings; had a beginning diverse from the cause; there being in their hearts sometime before a desire of Kings, through an impatience of liberty, (as writers hold) which afterward tooke beginning from the in∣justice of the sons of Samuel.

The cause then that Rome came to be a free State, was Romulus, and the Citizens growing to perfection. Romulus, because he being sole King, made such lawes and ordinances in the State, that shewed he had more regard to prepare the Romans for liberty, then to establish the Monarchy to his successors: seeing he reserved to himselfe no other authority but to assem∣ble the Senat; nor other charge but to command the Army in time of warre. It may be said then, that ei∣ther Romulus shewed but small signe of wisdome, to make ordinances contrary to himselfe; whereof being afterward aware, he meant with a greater error, to take from the Senat that authority, which being now established, was soone after, the cause of his death. Or we may say, and better, that Romulus as having no children, had no desire to leave Rome under a Regall government; and the City having none in it, but im∣perfit men, he had no power to leave it a free State; untill by being governed first by one alone, they should learne to be able of themselves to hold that, which to come to know, they needed first, to be guided

by a King. Just as swimming masters use to doe; who beare a hand over them they teach, untill such time as they grow able to governe themselves; and then they leave them at their owne liberty. This made Ty∣berius (as Dion reports) praise Augustus so much: though not without flattcry: saying, he had imitated those Physitians, who barring their Patient, the orde∣ring of his own body; they first restore the Body to health, before they allow him the ordering of it. Inso∣much, that after the death of Romulus, the people not yet grown to perfection, there was not one man that once spake of liberty; but all agreed to desire a King. Regem tamen omnes volebant (saith Livy) libertatis dulce∣dine nondum experta. It was not thus at the time of the Tarquins; for the people being then growne to per∣fection, there was in the City good store of Common wealths men; fitter to governe, then to be governed. And so came up this government most agreeable to nature; which is (as the Philosopher saith) that he be commander of others who is wiser then others. And therefore Numa Pompilius needed no guard to safeguard his life; seeing governments that are natu∣rall, are a guard to themselves. From hence it was, that our Lord God, the first time he gave a King, (as the holy Scripture saith) Non erat similis ei in Israel; mea∣ning to shew, that he is not worthy to be ruler over others, who is not wiser then others. There being then in those times, such excellent men in the City of Rome, as ought rather to give then to take lawes from the Tarquines; they had in them, an ardent desire, to ob∣taine that liberty in possession, which they had now prevented with merit. And therefore it appeares, that Junius Brutus, even from his youth, had this intention: for going with the sonnes of Tarquin to the Oracle, to aske which of them should be Lord of Rome, and the Oracle answering; he that first should kisse his mother,

he presently kissed the Earth; and yet he knew not then, that Tarquin should ravish Lucretia. Now if this injury onely had beene the motive to Brutus, certainly then, as the injury came from a particular person; so the revenge should rather have been taken upon that particular person, then upon the power Regall; and yet we see the contrary happened: for Brutus in the oath which he caused his confederates to take, made this one part, not to suffer any to reigne; not onely not the Tarquines, but not any other per∣son whatsoever. Nec illos nec alium quemquam regnare Romae passurum. A manifest argument, that he had more desire, to abrogate the regall Power, then to vindi∣cate the adultery. So much more, as the conspirators addressed themselves against the dignity rather then against the life of the offender. The cause then of this alteration in the state of Rome, was the Citizens spirits being grown to such perfection, that they could no longer tolerate Kings: and this no sooner then they were arrived at such perfection. In signe whereof, I consider amongst so many Kings as Rome had; how onely Tully Ostillus, the predecessor of Tarquinius super∣bus, had the intention to make it a free state, which certainly had taken effect, if his death had not preven∣ted it. Ac tam moderatum Imperium, tamen quia Vnius esset, deponere eum in animo habuisse, ni scelus liberandae patriae consilia agitanti interemisset. Which because we cannot ascribe to the onely goodnesse of Tullus; seeing Numa Pompilius, a better man perhaps then he, never had any such thought: we must needs say, that Numa seeing the Citizens unfit for a republicke, set them in a way to that perfection, to which arrived under Tullus. It should be an easie matter, for such Citizens to conserve that liberty, which under a good Prince they had re∣ceived. And here experience shewes that, which Ari∣stotle speaking naturally, knew well in matters poli∣ticke;

for assigning the cause, why Power regall changeth oftentimes to a free State, he alledgeth no other reason, but the passing from imperfection to perfection: saying thus, Sed cum postea contingeret, ut plures pari virtute reperirentur, non amplius tolerarunt Regem; sed commune quiddam quaerentes, respublicas constituêre.

Moreover, that the ordinances of Romulus had not been sufficient, if with it there had not concurred a perfection in the Citizens; will be easily conceived, if we consider the case of Moses who was blamed by Je∣thro for ruling himselfe alone: I doe not beleeve it was, for that he did not judge well; or for that, he tooke too great paines: but rather, for that he shewed not to be more intentive to strengthen his owne po∣wer, then to prepare for others the goodway; of which this was the chiefe and first foundation; Vt non aliter ratio constet quam si uni reddatur. And therefore, he appointed them a Senate, which by their authority, might serve to set the people in a way to know their owne good; shewing them the way, with which being once acquainted, he might leave them afterward to walk in it of themselves: in such sort, that Moses no lesse then Romulus directed the Israelites the way to liber∣ty; but they, never attaining to know the way, as never comming (I speake not in matters of Religion) to that perfection, to which the Romans attained: as these could not endure Kings; so those had no will to live in liberty; for although they met with the same cause, extrinsecall; yet they had not the same cause, intrinsecall; which Moses well knew, when per∣ceiving his death to approach, he made his prayer to God, that he would provide them a leader, to the end, that as sheep not knowing the way, if it be not shewed them by a shepheard, they might be by him directed. Provideat Dominus Deus spirituum, omnis carnis, homi∣nem

qui sit super multitudinem hanc; ut possit exire & in∣trare ante •…•…os, vel introducere, ne sint sicut oves sine ductore. And he that will more plainly see their imperfection, let him confider, that in the long absence of Moyses, they never demanded any other leader; there being none amongst them sit to governe them; but onely desired, that Aaron would make some Gods, Facnobis Deos qui nos pracedant. Whereupon for all the many beginnings the Israelites had, from which they might have taken occasion, to erect a Commonwealth; yet they never did it: because as causes be not sufficient, if with them there concurre not beginnings; so begin∣nings a•…•…e of no force, if they come not accompanied with causes; and causes availenot neither, if they be not good. The death of Caesar was a beginning from which a Common wealth might have been erected; but because it was grounded upon a cause that was not politicall, proceeding rather from the hatred and spleene against the Prince, then upon any mature judgement, or judicious counsaile; it was not there∣fore sit, to bring them to a be free State. So when the Senatours killed Romulus; they had by that a begin∣ning of liberty: but it hapning upon the same occa∣sion, as that of Caesar, they hardly had so much braine to agree among themselves to choose a King. So as when there concurre not causes, beginnings oftentimes are left unpursued: that I cannot but say, if Lucretia had been •…•…avished by Romulus; yet Rome for all that had never gotten liberty. It behooves therefore to take great heed, when there be occasions first, not to give the least cause of a beginning: and therefore the Ifra•…•…, being moved to demand a King, upon a very great occasion, namely their unfitnesse to suffer liber∣ty; they tooke for a beginning a most weake cause, namely the old age of Samuel; and yet for all he could doe, in shewing them the burtheus of tyranny; telling

them as a Prophet, that instead of a King, they, should have a tyrant; he could never perswade them to leave demanding a King. And therefore David, after his great sinne, knowing he had given the people great cause to rebell, avoyded all occasions, from which they might take never so weake a beginning; and for this cause forbare to punish Joab, though provoked to it by just indignation; and left the revenge of it, to his successor. Whereupon we may beleeve, that Tarquinius Superbus, and his sonne shewed little discretion, seeing so many worthy men desirous of liberty; that they would give them occasion of beginning it: The one by taking away all authority from the Senat; and o∣ther, and that more hainously, by ravishing Lucretia: considering that the insolency of the sonnes, makes alwaies the Prince himselfe odious, as Guicciardine re∣lates of John Bentivoglio. And hereof we have a like example in the holy Scripture, of Hemor Hevaeus Prince of the Sichemites; who lost his Kingdome, thorough the ravishment his sonne Sichem committed upon Dyna the daughter of Jacob and Lea: whereof the holy text in Genesis saith; Egressa est autem Dyna filia Leae ut videret mulieres regionis illius; quam cum vi∣disset Sichem filius Hemor Hevaei, Princeps terrae illius, ada∣mavit eam, & rapuit, & dormivit cum illa; vi opprimens virginem: and in the end of the Chapter, Arreptis duo filii Jacob Simeon & Levi, patris Dynae gladiis; Ingressi sunt urbem considenter: Interfectisque omnibus masculis Emor & Sichem pariter necaverunt; & depopulati sunt urbem in ultionem stupri. Thus the cause which gave the Romans occasion of a beginning, if we consider it of the sonnes part, may be conceived to be this; that he was the first, that had ancestours in such height of greatnesse; a thing that commonly puffes up men, and makes them proud; as Galba said speaking of Nero, Si ante oculos Nero, quem longa C•…•…sarum serie tumeutem; and therefore

the first that arrive to any heighth of greatnesse; they alwaies endeavor to shunne contempt; but their suc∣cessours, while they give themselves to pleasures, in that very time, they make themselves contemptible; and give occasion to others to oppresse them. Which Aristotle expressely teacheth us, where he saith, Plerique eorum qui Dominationes adepti sunt, eas usque ad extremum conservaverunt; sed qui ab illis susceperunt, confestim ut ita dixerim, perierunt omnes; in voluptatibus enim viven∣tes efficiantur facile contemnendi; ac multas perhibent occa∣siones opprimendi sui. This was the very cause of al∣tering the Principality of the Acheans (as Polybius relates) for that Principality having had beginning in the vertues of Tisamenes, the sonne of Orestes; It had ending in the vices of the successours of Ligius, Postea vero moleste ferre Regnum coeperunt, quia filii ligii non jam legitime, sed per Tyramtidem Provinciam gubernarent.

And this is so true, as both Aristotle affirmes, and is confirmed by experience; that the first purchasers of a power, doe for the most part maintaine it; and that in their successours it commonly vanisheth; that I cannot choose but make a little digression, to shew the reasons of it: The first is, because they who acquire any thing with labour, account and love it as an issue of their owne: and therefore use as much diligence in keeping it, as they tooke paines in getting it; from whence it is, as Plato intimates, that those men are commonly the greatest lovers of riches, who by their owne industry have been the getters: and therefore our Lord God in Esay, promising infinite content∣ments and exaltations to his people, in giving the rea∣son of this so great happinesse; he saith, Dominabitur •…•…ui qui fecit te. A second reason, and perhaps a better is, because they who first acquire an estate, must needs doe it by way of some eminency; either of subtilty, or wit, or force, or such like; wherein excelling others,

they shew themselves in that kind, to be more vertu∣ous then others, as Aristotle in the first of his Politicks saith; that to overcome, is not without vertue; and seeing Empires are easily kept by those arts, by which they are acquired, Nam Imperi•…•… facile iis artibus reti∣netur, (saith Salust) quibus à principio partumest; it will be an easie matter, for him that hath acquired it, see∣ing he must necessarily acquire it by way of vertue, by the same way to maintaine it. Whereas his successors very seldome succeed him in vertue; and easily loose that, for the getting whereof, they have taken no paines. A third reason is, because he who riseth first to a power, contents himselfe with every little autho∣rity; as Aristotle saith, Contigit autem hoc maxime, post mutationes rerum publicarum: Non nine statim mutantur; sed contenti sunt ab initio homines, parva concessione poten∣tiae: Whereupon it ought not to seem strange; but ra∣ther it is ascribed to the Prince, for a great favour, that which oftentimes he grants for his owne security; and all that, wherein one hath more power then o∣thers, yet arrogates no more to himselfe then others; is received of subjects, as so much given them. Where the successours commonly have more pride and lesse vertue, then their predecessours: and think not themselves Princes, if they raise not their owne autho∣rity by depressing of others; as Hieronymus did in Sy∣racusa; and as feroboane when he said, Grossior est minimus digitus meus, dorso patris mei. And this is so much more distastfull to subjects, to see themselves more re∣strained by him, that hath lesse worthinesse; that it seemes to invite them to conspiracies; as to the one, and the other of those before mentioned, it happe∣ned. A fourth and last reason is, because those men who come newly to a power, are commonly suspitious of loosing it againe; and therefore doubting their owne children, they are contented to see them plun∣ged

in vices; and estranged from the love of the sub∣jects; whereupon, they comming afterward to the Principality, cannot choose but run a hazard.

But to returne from whence I digressed; the cause why Tarquinius used such cruelty to the Senate, which made them so much desire liberty; was in my opinion, because Ancus Martius was preferred before him; and therupon conceiving great indignation against the Se∣nators & people; & cōming afterward to the govern∣ment; he meant to be revenged upon thē with bridling them a little. And such men should never be made Em∣perours, as from whom there can be nothing expect∣ed, but effects of cruelty. An instruction which Corne∣lius Tacitus gives us; while discoursing of the causes, why the Romans speaking of a successor to Augustus by reason of his approaching death, would not have Agrippa Postbumus, mentions this as the chiefe, Trucem Agrippam & Ignominia accensum: For Tiberius being preferd before him in the lifetime of Augustus; and ha∣ving suffered banishment in the Iland of Pianosa; he was full of spleene and indignation; which no doubt he would have shewed, if he had ever come to be Em∣perour. For this very cause also Otho misliked the ele∣ction which Galba made, and was doubtfull of Piso; Ingenio trucem, & longo exilio efferatum.

The Beginning then of the change of government in Rome, to speake as a Politician, was the lascivious∣nesse of Lucius Tarquin; and the pride of his father: but the causes were, the ordinances of Romulus, and the perfection of the Cittizens.

But to speake of the causes as a Philosopher; we may assigne two; answerable to that which Aristotle relates to have been the opinion of Plato; one from the influence of the Heavens, the other from num∣bers. As for the first of these; by reason of the uncer∣tainty of the yeeres, and perhaps of the Art, I take not

upon me, with any probability to discourse; and therefore passing to the other, which is number: Plato saith, that the number of seven, hath great operation in the changes of Commonwealths, which may first be observed in the Commonwealth of our body; wherein from seven to seven there is a contiuall change; and there want not examples hereof in all kinds of government; as we may see in Esay, in feromy, in Damel, in Saint Matthew, in the Sabbatisme, in the Monarchy of Cain, & in so many other places; that we must needs beleeve this number to beare a great sway in changes generally, as by others before me hath been observed; yet considering it as to my purpose, it hath not perhaps by any been observed but now by my selfe, that to the foresaid causes of the change of go∣vernment in Rome, this of the number of seven may also be added, seeing after seven Kings, (as every one knowes) it came to be a free state; yet I meane not that numbers can enforce, but onely incline, as instru∣ments of that Almighty God, who Omnia posuit innu∣mero, pondere & Mensura.

A Parallell between the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus a∣gainst Caesar, and that of Lucius Brutus against Tar∣quin: whereby we may see why the one brought in liber∣tie; the other, tyranny. The third Discourse.

HAving shewed Rome at last came to be a free state, by meanes of the conspiracy of Lucius Brutus a∣gainst the Tarquines; I conceive it necessary to exa∣mine, why the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus against Caesar, having been moved with the same intention, yet wrought not the same effect; and no better

way to come to know it, then by comparing them together.

Many things are wont to concurre in favour of an action; whereof some are antecedents, and give it as it were birth; other are concomitant, and give it nou∣rishment; others againe are subsequent, and procure it strength.

The action of Brutus in killing Tarquin, was aided by the three foresaid things, to make Rome a free state; First the ordinances of Romulus, which tended rather to bring in liberty, then to preserve a Monarchy: then the aptnesse of the Cittizens, who now grown fit of themselves to governe, could no longer endure to be governed by others; and lastly the insolency and proud tyranny of Tarquin, so extreamely distastfull to all the Citizens. Thus Romulus set them in a way; the perfection of the Cittizens made them fit; and the insolency of the Tarquines made them de∣sirous. Now if we looke upon the action of Marcus Brutus in killing Caesar; we shall finde there were all the three causes too; but because they were contrary, they therefore brought forth a contrary effect. The first was the domination of Cinna, of Sylla, of Pompey and of Marcus Crassus: who set the City in a way, and made it plyant to tolerate Monarchy. The second was the imperfection of the Citizens, which was growne so great, that where Rome had sometimes been a City much honoured for vertue; it was now become through evill custome, most abhominable. Thirdly, there concurred the great clemency and goodnesse of Caesar; with which he had gotten and tied unto him the hearts of the people; so as, instead of the ordinances of Romulus, to set them in a way of liberty; there prae∣ceded here the waies of Marius and others, to lead them into servitude. In stead of perfection of the Ci∣tizens, which made them fit to live a free people; there

concurred here imperfection, which made them good for nothing but to live in bondage; and where in the one there concurred the cruelty and Pride of the Tar∣quines, to make them desire liberty; in the other, there concurred the affability and clemency of Caesar, to make them content with servitude.

Now againe if we come to speake of the causes con∣comitant, there were three things concurred in ayd of the conspiracy against the Tarquins. First, the ra∣vishing of Lucretia; sufficient of it selfe, as a publique injury, to cause a publique insurrection. And there∣fore Virginius speaking against Appius Claudius, who would have ravished his daughter, said to the people, with a purpose to set them in commotion; Illis enim quoque filias, sorores, conjuges esse; sed quo impunitior sit, eo effraenatiorem fore, aliena calamitate documentum datum illis cavendae similis injuriae. Secondly, the just indignation of Lucius Brutus against Tarquinius. Thirdly, his ac∣quainting the people with his intention: letting them know the causes that moved him; and so, they having a part in the conspiracy, could not choose but ap∣prove it; and having a part in the danger, not choose but maintaine it. Thus the adultery committed with Lucretia, gave a color to the conspiracy: the just indig∣nation of Lucius Brutus, set a glosse upon the Authour; the communicating it to the people, made them a party in the cause, and facilitated the action. Now in the fact of Marcus Brutus against Caesar, there concur∣red the many favours and graces which the Prince had alwaies shewed to all; the many benefits which Marcus Brutus had received, the murder committed in the Se∣nate, without the peoples knowledge; and where the ravishing of Lucretia; gave a colour to the banish∣ing of the Tarquins; the favours of Caesar discovered the ill intention of the conspirators; and where in the one, the offence done to Lucius Brutus, set a glosse of

praise upon the authour: in the other, the benefits bestowed by Caesar, set a blot of ignominy upon Mar∣cus Brutus, and made him hatefull to all the people: and where the Commons being made partakers of the conspiracy against the Tarquins, conceived it was done for the publicke good; here the Commons knowing nothing of the matter, conceaved it was done for private profit. Lastly, if we looke to the things subsequent; we shall also in them finde great contrariety. For after the death of the Tarquins, first, there followed an easing the people of taxations; and a maintaining them in plenty, to the end they might tast the benefit of liberty; secondly, they put to death those Noblemen, that had been adherents to the Tar∣quines; to the end they might be made sure for ma∣king innovation. Thirdly, they extinguished the whole race of the Tarquins, to the end they might be out of feare, of the States ever comming to any of them againe. And thus they secured themselves from the people, from the Nobility, and from the blood Royall. Now after the death of Caesar, all things were cleane contrary: First, where in that case, the benefit of liberty was made appeare to the people: Here An∣tonius with a most eloquent Oration, reading Caesars Will, wherein he had given a great Donative to the people; made them sensible, how much more it would be for their profit to have a Prince. Secondly, where in that case, the partakers were all put to death; here, they were all left living. Thirdly, where in that case, there were Armies levied against the line of the Tar∣quines; to the end, they might never be able to reco∣ver the government: here, Armies were levied in ayd of Augustus, to the end, he might more easily make himselfe Prince. Let no man therefore marvell, if where the intention was equall, yet the successe was not equall; by reason of the difference, and inequa

lity of the accidents. I have omitted in this discourse some other differences, that were between these two conspiracies; meaning to speake of them in another place.

Pompeii Crassique Potentia cito in Caesarem, Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere.

That the power of a few cannot consist in any number bet∣ter then in three. The fourth Discourse.

THe Common-wealth of Rome, leaving the go∣vernment of one, and passing by the number of two, where it stayed a while under Marius and Sylla; setled at last in the number of three: the first time under Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey; the second time, un∣der Anthony, Lepidus and Augustus. Which how much better it was, then to have stayed in two; every one may know, that will but consider, either Philosophi∣cally, or Theologically, or Politically, what great force there is in the number of three, for the conser∣vation and union of things. Indeed Aristotle had no better way to shew the necessity of the Materia Prima, then this; seeing there being a forme and a privation which are two; it was never possible they should be united together, but in a third: in which, and by which they might be conjoyned. Also the schoole of Theo∣phrastus, contented not it selfe, to deliver for Princi∣ples, Radicall moysture, and Naturall heate; know∣ing, that two alone are destructive; but he added a third; that is, salt and cold, and dry; to the end, that with cold he might associate Radicall moysture; and

with the dry, Naturall heate; and consequently make a perfect union of the three, that is Salt, Sulphur, and Mercury. It is therefore no marvell, if Divines also make a Trinity in the Deity, not only a Father and a Sonne, but also a Holy Ghost: who (as many of them say) unites the Father with the Sonne; and it is very convenient, that from that Essence which is one, there should come three, a child of unity. Againe, if we ex∣amine it Politically why three should be conservative; we shall finde it manifest of it selfe; because if one of the three should aspire to be sole Prince; presently the other two would joyne and oppose, and utterly frustrate his designe. And if two of the three should grow at variance, the third would either by interpo∣sing reconcile them; or standing neuter, as onely a looker on, they would grow friends of themselves; for feare least the other should reape the benefit of their victory. And therefore Aristotle found fault with Plato for making a Commonwealth to consist of only Prince and People, and consequently of only two formes: saying it had been much better, to have made it to consist of three; which yet to many seems a Paradox; because as multiplying of good, makes a more good; so multiplying of evill, makes alwaies a more evill. And why then would he rather have three corrupti∣ons then two? for no other cause as I conceave, but that he would plainly shew he knew the number of three to be conservative; and the number of two, de∣structive; there being nothing that more ruines Ci∣ties, then to be divided into two without a third; as Aristotle in many places shews: and praising that City for the best, which is full of middling sorts of men; for no other cause, but because there are in it the three; that is, rich, poore, and of a middling ranke; and shewes that where these are not, it is impossible a City should continue. To come then to a Monarchy, it was of ne∣cessity,

that the number of three should be destroyed; and to destroy three, It was of necessity, either by en∣creasing it to bring it to foure; or by abating it, to bring it to two; just as the apostate Lucifer, would have done to divide and destroy the heavenly Monar∣chy; when leaving the circumference founded upon the divine Center, he framed another higher Circle founded upon the center of himselfe, bringing the one to two; which because it could not continue, he was therefore cast into Hell: where seeking againe to destroy the Divine Monarchy, by bringing it to two; he perswaded Eve to eat the forbidden fruit. We may say then, that as long as the number of three stood firme in Crassus, Caesar, and Pompey, So long the government came not to be a Monarchy; but as soon as Crassus died, and that the number came from three to two, there presently grew dissention between Caesar and Pompey, till Caesar at last made himselfe sole Em∣perour. Likewise in the Triumvirate of Augustus, none of them was so hardy as once to stirre: but Lepidus be∣ing gone out of the three, there fell discord between Mark Anthony and Augustus; who by the death of the other, remained sole Emperour. It is therefore no marvell that the Jewes, seeing the government of Judges was to come to two, under the sonnes of Sa∣muel, demanded a King; considering that two and foure which proceeds from the same root, is no lesse a child of the divell; then three and one which is the root of it, is the child of God. And therefore God blessed not the second day; and in the creation, the Holy Ghost by the mouth of Moses, makes mention of three things; the Heaven, the Earth, and the waters. Which perhaps moved Plato in his Timaeus, to make three Elements, three and one being union; two and foure, dis-union.

Cuncta Discordiis civilibus fessa, nomine Principis subimperium accepit.

Of what kind of Discord the Authour intends to speake. The fifth Discourse:

BEing by occasion of this passage, of necessity to speake of discords; and oftentimes to com∣mend them, though with some distinction: I can∣not omit to explaine my meaning; which is, that where I affirme, discords fit to be fomented; I mean alwaies amongst the enemies of the Christian faith; amongst whom discords are of such benefit, that the Prophet Abacuck in expresse termes saith: Fluvios scindes terrae; which S. Hierome expounding saith, Reges terrae adversum populum tuum dimicantes divides & dis∣perges. For in holy Scripture, by Rivers oftentimes are meant Kings: because as rivers watering the fields in fit time and place, make them fruitfull; or other∣waies with unseasonable overflowing, destroy them: so Kings with the sweetnesse of justice, increase; or otherwise, with unmeasurable cruelty, overthrow the Kingdome. The Prophet therefore desires, that the Princes of the Earth may be divided, meaning such Princes, as make a God of earthly things; to the end, that by such division, they may more easily be over∣thrown: there being nothing more hurtfull, not only to the good, but even to the wicked themselves, then the concord of the wicked. As S. Austin declares it, where he saith, Sicut multum nocet discordia inter bonos; ita valde dolendum est, quando mali pacifice vivunt; quando vero discordant, tunc mundus aliqualiter tranquillatur: Nam sicut concordia malorum contraria est concordiae bono∣rum;

ita optandum est, quod boni pacem habeant, & mali discordes sint: nam per discordiam, mali aliquando op∣timi efficiuntur; cognoscentes quid sint, & quid erunt. From these words it may be clearely gathered, that it is as great a good to put discord between the wicked, as to preserve union between the good: and therefore A∣braham in his Sacrifice, divided the Goat and the Ram, but the Turtle-dove and the Pigeon he divided not: of which Saint Austin speaking saith; that by this, the Holy Ghost would intimate, that carnall men should be divided between themselves: but good and spiri∣tuall men should be kept in unity: of whom the Pro∣phet Esay speaking, after he had said, Et fluent ad eum omnes gentes he addes, Non exercebuntur ultra ad praelium: as if he would say, that between the good, there shall be alwaies peace. And therefore the Dove returning into the Arke, brought in her mouth an Olive branch; to shew, that the peace between good men ought to be perpetuall: as the leaves of the Olive which are never dry; or as the Oyle which gets by time, not lesse perfection, but more purity. Let peace therefore be kept amongst the good, and let discord be raised a∣mongst the wicked; imitating the discretion of Phy∣sitions, who divide and cut off corrupt members: but preserve and keep united, the sound. Whereupon our Lord God in S. Matthew, hath left written: Non veni mittere pacem, sed gladium: which place S. Chrysostome expounding, saith: Quia videlicet praecipua singularisque Pax tunc praestatur; quando quod tabo vel sanie corruptum est abscinditur, at que projicitur, quando factiosa & improba pars repellitur aut omnino destruitur: sic certe coelis terra conjungi potest. Nam & medicus hoc modo reliquum corpus conservat facile; si quod reduci ad sanitatem non potest, ce∣ciderit atque abjecerit, & militiae Dux ad solvendam mili∣tum conspirationem, alterum in alterum concitat So did God in the Tower of Babel: So did S. Paul in the con∣spiracy

plotted against him; and this may suffice for declaration of my meaning.

Now as to our purpose; seeing discords may be divi∣ded into internall, & externall: Internall, between Ci∣tizens of the same City: External, between one City & another: because it is a subject no lesse large then diffi∣cult; I will divide it into foure discourses: In the frist, I wil handle whether an external war with the enemies of the Christian faith, be the best meanes to hinder internall discords amongst Christians. In the second, in what manner, and at what time discords should be raised with the enemies of our faith, for our most ad∣vantage. The third shall shew, what discords they are, that serve to uphold the formes of states. In the last I will shew, that by reason of our imperfection, there is necessary a certain discord, which may be called a Concord.

Whether an externall warre with the enemies of the faith, be the best meanes to hinder internall discords among Christians. The sixth Discourse.

ARistotle in his Politicks seemes to thinke, that feare may be a great means to uphold Common∣wealths; where he saith, Conservantur autem Respublicae non solum ex eo, quia procul sunt a periculis, sed etiam inter∣dum, quia propinquae sunt; homines enim formidantes, vigi∣lantius intendunt ad reipublicae custodiam: Itaque oportet eos, qui rempublicam salvam esse volunt, formidines quasdam ut caveant neque dissolvant, quasi nocturnam quandam custo∣diam reipublicas observationem. Whereupon, many are perswaded, that a forraine warre is the onely meanes to maintaine peace at home. And Sallust having an eye to this, saith, Metus bostilis in bonis artibus civitatem re∣tinebat

And the Romanes as long as they had Carthage for an opposite, were free all that while from civill war; and therefore Scipio Nasica, accounted the wisest man of his time, and as such chosen by the City, to have the keeping of the Mother of the Gods in his house, as the Oracle had commanded; gave counsell that by no meanes Carthage should be destroyed, Timens inf•…•… animis (saith S. Austin) hostem securitatem: & tanquam pupillis civibus tutorem necessarium videns esse Terrorem: and in a manner with the same words hath Livy inti∣mated the same conceit, Disciplina erat custos infirmita∣tis, qua inter validiores optime Timor continet. And there∣fore the Athenians (as Plato relates) never attained to greater perfection, then when the Persians assailed Greece. But yet this Rule, as many other in the Poli∣ticks, though it be sometimes good; yet is not to be trusted alwaies and in generall: for a Politician in this case must doe as a Physician: apply to one com∣plexion one medicine; and to another, a divers; and oftentimes to the same Patient; in diversity of diseases, diversity of medicines: and more then this, to the same Patient in the same disease, apply diverse medicines ac∣cording to diversity of times. And therefore Vindicia∣nus the Physitian (as S. Austin relates) having given a medicine to a sicke friend of his, at that time it healed him; but after some yeeres the same man falling again into the same disease; and using, without farther coun∣sell of his Physician, the former medicine, it did him no good; whereat marvelling and asking Vindicianus the cause, he answered, Quod non intellexerat videlicet•…•… illi aetati jam non hoc se fuisse facturum: and the reason is, because we must not so much consider, that the person which useth the medicine is the same; as that the time is diverse; and if the diversity of time be of so great moment; of what moment is the diversity of indivi∣duals? We may therefore conclude with Aristotle in

many places of his Ethicks; that in things belonging to particulars, there cannot be given any Rule uni∣versall.

I will therefore distinguish men, and consequently Cities; seeing Cities are nothing else, but a commu∣nion of men assembled together to live well, as the Philosopher defines them: afterward, I will divide the times: and lastly, the formes of states.

Of men, some are quiet, some turbulent, some ad∣dicted to Merchandise, some to study: so of Cities, whether by any power of the Ayre, or of the influence of the starres, some one is full of sharpe wits, fit for merchandizing; others of stout spirits, fit for Armes: some have ordinances which lead them in a way of peace; others, of warre: sometimes they are both by nature and art of so strong a scituation, that in regard of their difficulty to be assaulted, they are altogether carelesse of Military profession.

In this last case, it will be an easie matter to maintain peace at home, to which they are either called by na∣ture, or ayded by art; and especially if the inhabitants shall give themselves to such exercises, which keepe men from dissentions. But if the Citizens be of stout natures and imperfect, (I meane not in essence; for I well know by divinity, that every creature, in its es∣sence is perfect,) it will then be necessary there should be feare: and this S. Austin meant when he said, Infir∣mis animis hostem securitatem: and there is good reason for it; for if they feare to be overcome of an Enemy, they will strive to overcome their own will; and take for a master, the feare of vertue. And therefore our Lord God, when he gave Joshua the Land of Promise; as he had promised to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: yet he destroyed not all enemies, but left a part of the Land in the power of the Philistines: and others, mentioned in the Booke of Joshua; and this he did, as

knowing that the Imperfection of that people, whom the Holy Ghost by the mouth of Moyses, cals Gens durae cervicis; could not better be upheld and kept, then by the feare of enemies. And this the Holy Ghost ex∣presseth likewise in the booke of Judges; where spea∣king of those Nations which remained in the Land of Promise, he saith, Hae sunt Gentes, quas dereliquit Dominus ut erudiret in eis Israelem. It is therefore no marvell, that our Lord God, knowing the weaknesse of Ada•…•…, as soon as he saw him fall into the imperfection of sin; to the end he should not commit the like errour a∣gaine, presently put him in the midst of discords and enmities: when he said to the serpent, Inimicitias ponam inter te & mulierem, & semen tuum & semen illius: and for this cause it is, that he hath left to the Catholique Church so great adversaries, as himselfe expresseth in S. Matthew; In signe whereof, he would not suffer the servants to pull up the Tares, but would have them to be let to grow with the Corne; least plucking up the one, they should withall root out the other. Now for those Cities, where the Citizens are given to merchan∣dise, they by all meanes ought to shun warre, as being things of very different nature, to stand in the shadow writing Bils of account; and to endure heat and cold, fighting in the field; as S. Thomas teacheth us where he saith, Est otiam Negotiationis usus contrarius quamplu∣rimum exercitio Militari; Negotiatores onim dum umbram colunt, a laboribus vacant; & dum fruuntur delitiis, mol∣leseunt aninto; & corpora redduntur debilia ad labores Mi∣litares inepta.

But if Cities be so formed with Lawes, that they have better meanes to make resistance in warre, then to conserve themselves in Peace; in this case, it will be necessary to have warre with forraine Nations, to maintaine peace in their own Nation; otherwise it will runne a manifest hazzard to be ruined, as it hap∣pened

to the Lacedemonians, of whom Aristotle saith, Ad partem enim virtutis tota ordinatio illarum legum con∣tendit, scilicet Bellicam; haec autem utilis ad victoriam con∣sequendam; Itaque salvi erant bellum gerentes; peribant vero, rerum potiti; quoniam nec oti•…•…n agere, nec quicquam aliud exercere sciebant praestabilius, quam rem Militarem. And therefore the City of Rome which was formed by Lawes and Ordinances, to enlarge it selfe, and grow greater by warre; no sooner laid down Armes with Enemies, but it tooke them up with friends; that ha∣ving none at last with whom to contend, it contended with it selfe; and became overthrown by its own for∣ces. And therefore Livy saith, Nulla magna civitas diu quiescere potest; si foris hostem non habet, domi invenit, ut praevalida corpora ab externis causis tuta videntur, sed suis ipsa viribus onerantur. But if they have Lawes and Or∣dinances to live in peace, their best course is to hold them to peace.

The second division we brought before, was of times; which may be divided into two: One, wherein warre hath been but of late: the other, wherein peace hath been long: if peace hath been long, why should we take any other course, and not continue peace still? but if our case be the former, it will then be ne cessary to maintaine at least some face of warre; be cause as all habits whether of body or mind, are hard to be left; so spirits once grown fierce with warre, when they want meanes to exercise their fiercenesse upon enemies with honour, will hardly be kept from using it upon friends though with shame. Thus it fell out (that I may keep me to Tacitus) amongst the Sue∣vians and the Cherusci, people of Germany; who after the departure of the Romans, being secure from for∣rain enemies, they then, out of the custome of waging warre, and desire of glory, turned their Armes upon their friends at home: and therefore Tacitus saith, Sed

Suevi praetendebantur auxilium adversus Cheruscos oran∣tes; nam discessis Romanorum, ac vacui externo metu, gentis adsuetudine, & tunc aemulatione Gloriae, arma in se verte∣rant. So the Romans most stout and warlike from the time of Scipio Nasica untill the birth of our Saviour, being in a manner quiet abroad, were in continuall warre at home; and the peace which they came to at last was under a Prince; where of Tacitus saith, Post haec Pax quidem, sed cruenta: because it was under Au∣gustus, who finding the City tyred with discords, made himselfe sole Lord: whereupon S. Austin speaking of those times saith, Eaque libido dominandi quae inter alia vitia generis humani immoderatior inerat Populo Romano postquam in paucis potentioribus vicit, obtritos fatigatosque caeteros etiam jugo servitutis oppressit. And this of may be rendered many causes: the first is, because in Cities used long to warre, the people, at least great part having no other occupation, give themselves to be souldiers; and if they faile of that imployment, they must neces∣sarily either sterve for want of victuals, or else stirre up discords and seditions; that so under one side or o∣ther, they may get a living. Et ex civili praelio (saith Tacitus) Spem majorum praemiorum. Not being possible, that souldiers accustomed to gaine by warre, should be content with peace, as Dion excellently observed in Caesar; and therefore Livy saith, Mercenarii milites pretia militiae casura in Pace, aegrè ferebant. Whereupon Salomon, seeing that the greater part of his people ha∣ving in Davids time been accustomed to continuall warre, and had not any other trade of living, would of necessity be forced to die for hunger, he therefore, though now in peace, would not disband them, but kept them still in Armes; as it is written in the Booke of the Kings; knowing there is nothing, that sooner makes men Rebell, then to have their Trade taken from them, by which they gaine their living: and

therefore when S. Paul spake of destroying the Tem∣ple of Diana in Ephesus; those Silver-smithes who lived by making such Images, presently rose up in Armes, and were ready to have killed him. So also it was, when S. Paul healed the woman possessed; because Magnum quaestum faciebat Domino suo: from hence it is, that it will alwaies be impossible to breake the Uscoc∣chi, from using pyracy; seeing they have no other trade, by which to live. The second cause may be ta∣ken from the Nobility; who will easily be moved to raise discords in time of peace; by reason of a habit, which as it is produced by many Acts iterated, so it ne∣cessarily produceth iterated acts, and also by reason of that desire of greatnesse, which alwaies accompa∣nies the Nobility; and againe, by reason of the skorn it takes at equality, and much more at servitude: which is so much harder to be endured, as superiours, in peace are harder to be dealt with. Revocante Nobilitate (saith Tacitus) cur in pace durius servitium?

Having now divided Cities and Times; It remaines, that we divide the formes of States: which as to our purpose are of three sorts; Monarchy, Optimacy, and Popular. The Common-wealth of the Optimates, either hath under it many Cities and Kingdomes, as Rome and Carthage had; and at this day, Venice hath; or they have but some few Cities, as the Athenians, the Spartans and others: or lastly, they have but only one City; as Pisa in times past: and Lucca, and many free Cities at this present. The first forme of Common∣wealth, which is that which hath Kingdomes under it; either it useth to wage warre with its own Armes, as the Romans; or with forraine Armes, as the Cartha∣ginians: if it use and be able to wage warre with its own Forces, then either we speake of warre farre off, as of the Romans with the Carthaginians; or of warre in their own state, as of the Romans with the Thus∣cans.

If the case be of warre farre off, waged with their own Forces, this will be the Treacle of civill discords. First, because those who are likely to move them, may under colour of honours, be sent to the warres abroad, and spirits that are warlike, are willing enough of themselves to goe where there is fighting, though without any such colour. Thus it was with the Ro∣mans, (as Livy relates) who sending forth the hottest spirits of their youth to the warres abroad, they in the meane time remained quiet in Rome. Consules educta ex urbe Juventute, tranquilliorem caeteram turbam fecerunt. And even by this way, not onely all feare of civill dis∣cord will be taken away; which onely proceeds from unquiet spirits; but also all suspition of any rebellion in the subject Cities: as well because they will be weakned both in men and money, by levying Auxili∣ary souldiers: as also because they will be kept in aw by an Army in the field. But it must be here observed, that they make not then too dangerous a warre, where their whole Forces must be imployed, for then the subject people will be apt to rebell; as the Thuscanes, who seeing the Romans busied in a warre with their whole Forces, they then fell to rebell.

Now if we speake of a warre neere home, either it is some slight warre, or else some warre of moment. If but a slight warre, it ought to be nourished with all endeavour; as the Romans did with the Genouese, making use of that warre, as of a Military schoole; but if it be a warre of moment, and neere the State, it ought to be avoyded by all meanes possible. The rea∣son is, because the Cities that are subject to a Com∣mon-wealth, doe all with an ill will beare their yoak: in confirmation whereof, Tacitus saith, Neque Provinciae illum rerum statum abnuebant. As long as Hanniball made his warre farre off from Rome, although he obtained many victories, yet not so much as any one Castle, (as

Polybius relates) rebelled against Rome: but when he got his victory at Trasimene, and by consequence not farre from Rome, all at once rebelled: and yet for all the overthrows they had had in Sicily, in the firme Land, and at Sea, they never made the least signe of revolt. The like happened to the Venetians, after the overthrow they received at Geradada. It is there∣fore no marvell, that Agathocles being besieged in Sy∣racusa, and not able to endure the siege; when by rea∣son of his tyranny every one rebelled against him: No marvell I say, that not able to endure the warre in his own state, he removed it to the Carthaginians in Af∣fricke; as knowing, that Cities subject to Common∣wealths, doe with an evill will endure their yoke: and his enterprise tooke effect as he desired. These Com∣monwealths therefore, by all means possible ought to shun a warre neere home.

But where the custome is to wage warre with for∣raine Armes; there all kind of warre, whether neere home, or farre off, is to be shunned. Because mercenary Armes are insatiable, licentious, and for the most part, either they never finish a warre; or once finished, they cannot be gotten away againe, without destroying and making spoile in the Countrey. Or else with mu∣tinies put the Cities in danger. It was a good inven∣tion, which Glisco Generall of the Carthaginian Army in Africk used; after the warre was ended with the Romans; for knowing the ill condition of a merce∣nary Army, he thought to send the souldiers home to Carthage, by little and little: in such sort, that the first might be gotten home to their own houses, before the others should recover the City; a judicious conceit, but which seldom takes effect: because oftentimes the souldiers perceive it, and will not be divided; as it happened with the Switzers in times past: and some∣time, though they be divided, yet it hath no good

issue: as it happened to the Carthagenians, whose Cities all at once rebelled; and Carthage it selfe was not farre from loosing. And in truth, they then per∣ceived, how dangerous a thing it is, to wage warre with mercenary forces; whereupon for this cause, when Scipio afterward came into Africk; they know∣ing themselves to be no matches for the Romans, to be able to wage warre at their owne home, Suant ple∣bem imbellem in urbe (saith Livy) Imbellem in agris esse, mercede parari auxilia. These Commonwealths there∣fore ought rather to keep themselves from discord, by imploying their Cittizens in merchandising, in go∣vernments and Offices, and by not suffering the quiet spirits to grow turbulent, northe turbulent to stay in Cities, where the people ought to be kept without Armes: Imitating herein, the Carthagenians rather then the Romans.

Now if we come to speake of those Common wealths, that have but few, or but one City under them; in this case they ought by all possible meanes to seek to preserve peace, as the Switzers, the Lucchesi, and such others do, being very obnoxious for such, to become a prey to the more potent, as it hath alwaies happened to the Athenians, to the Lacedemonians, and the Genouesi. From hence it is, that the King of France, to preserve the Commonwealth of the Swiz∣zers, hath alwaies procured to quench that fire, which some have endeavoured to kindle for their ruine. And if any object, that the Commonwealth of Rome, when it was yet but little, not only maintained it selfe, but grew greater by the means of warre; I answer, that in that time the States in Italy were not great, as now they are; and from hence may be drawn a reason, why the Athenians, and the Lacedemonians were never able to get further then their first bounds, without endangering their state; and Rome was able to make

it selfe Lord of a great part of the World; and it is, be∣cause the one were environed with two mighty adver∣saries; the other, with many, but weake ones.

Lastly, to give a generall rule; all those Common∣wealths whose ordinances tend rather to conservati∣on then augmentation; ought to use any other means to keep themselves from discords at home, rather then warre.

It remaines to speak of a Kingdome, which is either setled and naturall; or else dangerous and new: if we speake of that which is naturall, I account that to live in peace as well abroad as at home, is both necessary and easie, especially in our times, wherein Cities and Kingdomes are without the least blemish of tyranny, all governed by Princes just and pious: and this the rather ought to be done, because in peace, the wits of men are cultivated; their manners refined, good Arts flourish, merchandising is lesse dangerous, and plenty of all things easily maintained. And therefore in Esay it is said, Conflabunt glaclios suos in vomeres; which means nothing else, but that peace causeth the earth to be manured, and riches easily to be encreased. Where∣upon the Ancients feyned, that the God of riches was nursed by peace.

Now to Kingdomes that are new, and not well set∣led, every thing is dangerous, whether it be of peace or warre; but warre, perhaps lesse; as bringing with it but one danger: which is, that the Army being in the hand of a Generall, the Empire seemes to be in his power. As Tiberius doubted, that Germanicus potius vellet accipere quam expectare Imperium. But then it brings with it many benefits, not only in favour of the Prince, but of the subjects also. On the Princes behalfe, because he by sending forth to the warres, the most potent and stout spirits, may himselfe in the meane time remaine secure at home. And therefore King

Ferdinand kept alwaies some little warre abroad, to the end the Nobility should not mutiny in Spaine. And Henry the second had counsell given him to keep the French busied in some warre, to the end they might not mutiny in France. And this rule ought alwaies to be observed, where the people have not lost their stoutnesse of courage. On the Subjects behalfe, be∣cause while such stout spirits live in peace; they are apt to seeke, as having no other meanes, their owne security, by the death of the Citizens. And this Taci∣tus meanes, where in the first of his Histories he saith, Sub Tyberio & Caio & Claudio tantum pauci adversa per∣timuere. Againe, it is well that cruell men, such as ty∣rants use to be, to the end they may leave the Citizens in peace, should have warre with strangers abroad, upon whom to wreke their cruelty. From whence it comes, that this race of men is more cruell in their age, then in their youth: and therefore oftentimes in the holy Scripture are likened to Lyons; which, as A∣ristotle relates, in their old age enter into Cities and make spoile of people: and this proceeds (saith he) because thorough weaknesse of body, and defect of teeth, not being able in the fields to follow the chase after beasts; they enter into Cities, and prey upon men: so tyrants, when weakened with age, they can no longer quench their thirst of blood upon enemies in warre; they then for exercise of their cruelty fall upon their friends in peace. So did Herod the great, and many others, of whom Histories are full.

But to returne to our purpose: peace after warre is much more dangerous; because leisure gives time to thinke, thinking takes notice of subjection; and stout∣nesse gotten in warre, breeds a desire to free them∣selves by any bad way whatsoever. In regard of this, Salomon comming to be in Peace, after a long warre w^ch his father had, made many warlike expeditions, as

appeares in the Booke of Kings: and to this it seemes David exhorts, where in the Epithalamium he made, he saith, A•…•…cingere gladio tuo super f•…•…ntur tuum potentissi∣me. Where it is to be noted, that Faemur oftentimes is taken for pleasures: as though he would say, Couple Armes with pleasures; stand not slumbering in idle∣nesse; so many writers interpret it: and perhaps in re∣gard of this, Augustus would never be without some little warre in Germany; rather for these reasons, quam cupidine proferendi Imperium vel istud ob praemium. And Tyberius upon the same ground, was well pleased that troubles should rise in the Easterne parts; Caeterum, saith Tacitus, Tyberio haud ingratunt accidit; turbari res orien∣tis, ut ea specie Germanioum suetis legionibus abstraheret; novisque Provinciis impositum, dolo simul & casibus objectaret.

Lastly; a Popular state ought alwaies to procure peace; for if there be warre, either the people goe forth to fight; and then the Nobles in the mean time, will have meanes to change the state; or else the No∣ble men goe, and then having an Army in their hand, they are able to make alterations at their pleasure. Whereupon Isocrates in his oration of peace saith, that a popular state is strengthned by peace, and by warre, ruined.

But having shewed in this my discourse, that to ma∣ny Common-wealths it is not good to have warre: to the end I may not dissent from that place in Aristotle alledged in the beginning, I now say, that Aristotle commends not feare as a thing fit alwaies, but some∣times; and doth not specifie what kind of feare it is •…•…meanes. For understanding whereof, we must know, that Commonwealths oftentimes are endangered by too much security: as the City of Rome ranne headlong into hazzard, for want of fearing. Which useth to happen from two occasions: one from the inveterate∣nesse

of the danger: the other, from the greatnesse and power of them that are offended. Rome at the time when it was freed from the tyranny of Tarquinius was not great; and being neere to danger, it stood in feare: being grown suspicious, partly for the fathers name called Superbus; and partly for the sonnes house built higher then ordinary (weak causes God knows.) But when the City was growne into greatnesse; and forgot the danger by reason of inveteratenesse; it then left fearing, and afforded such beginnings; that gave Caesar advantage to bring it in subjection. So the Flo∣rentines extinguished the name of liberty in Pisa; and used great diligence at the beginning to prevent re∣bellion; as standing in feare, as well for the freslmesse of the offence, as for the smalnesse of their Forces: but after some yeeres, Florence being grown greater, and the offence through time forgotten, they began to leave fearing; and as not fearing, rebelled under Charles the eighth, which was in a manner the ruine of Florence. Seeing then when Cities are without feare, they live without fore-sight; it is profitable for Common∣wealths (as Aristotle in that text saith) that some such accident should happen, as may teach them the danger of security: and therefore the Rachiensi (as Polybius relates) while they lived inconsiderately, suspecting nothing; they were upon the point of losing their City to the Slavonians; but having repelled them; it was afterward a great good unto them, as that which made them stand in feare; Vt per negligent•…•…m in peri∣culo fuerant & urbem & Patrios lares amitendi; per for∣titudinem nihil mali perpessi, in posterum p•…•…ius suis rebus consul•…•…t. And in truth, if we consider the ac∣cident which of late yeares happened in Venice; the prudence with which those Senatours managed that disorder, and the good ordinances made for preven∣ting the like hereafter: we cannot but say with Ari∣stotle,

that the accident proved to the City of Venice, of great benefit. Lastly, I conclude, that they who will not be in warre actually; at least let them make a shew to be in it potentially; Ostendite modo bellum & pacem habebitis; videant vos paratos ad vim, jus ipsi remittent: and therefore Augustus was never without an Army, upon the frontiers of enemy Nations; and Salomon also did the like.

Thus it stands sufficiently proved, when externall discords, or to say better, forraine warres are profita∣ble: that is, speaking of men and Cities, if they be tur∣bulent and imperfect, and have laws tending to warre; to such, they are profitable, or rather necessary. But if their lawes be tending to peace; or if the people be∣mild and gentle, and by reason of their strong scitua∣tion, accustomed to peace, or merchandising: in this case, there is no inconvenience, but they may live qui∣ctly and without warre. Then as concerning times, we have shewed, that in times when warre hath been lately, it will doe well; but not so, when there hath been long peace. Then as concerning states we have proved that Common-wealths that are potent, and able to wage warre with their own Forces, shall doe well to maintaine a warre farre off, but not neere home. But if they be not able to wage warre without forraine Force•…•…, they shall then do well to embroyle themselves with no warre at all, either neere or farre off. And as for Commonwealths, that are but petty ones and of small power; it is best for them, to looke to their own safety. Then for Kingdomes that are well setled, we have liked well of peace: for them that are dangerous, of warre. Lastly, that a popular state take care how to live.

What is the fittest time to proceed in the discords with ene∣mies of the faith. The seventh Discourse:

THis sentence of Tacitus standing good, Cuncta dis∣cordiis civilibus fessa, nomine Principis sub Imperium accepit: many grow to beleeve, that because discords made the way easie for Augustus to make himselfe Em∣perour of Rome, therefore every one may easily make advantage of the dissentions of others. But because they neither consider the diversity of persons, nor di∣stinguish the times, nor are acquainted with the causes; they therefore oftentimes deceive themselves, deter∣mining these things absolutely and in grosse, which are not to be admitted but with distinction. To find out therefore the truth in this matter, indeed weighty and worthy of consideration, I say, that discords may be either internall between Citizens, or externall be∣tween Cities of one Province: if between Citizens, then sometimes they are between Nobles and Nobles, oftentimes between Nobles and Plebeians, and many times between Plebeians and Plebeians. If they be be∣tween Cities, it happens that sometimes they be e∣quall, sometimes unequall; likewise he that aspires to be a Lord, either is a stranger, or Citizen: if a stranger, either he is stronger then the others, or weaker; and either he hath intelligence, or hath none: if a Citizen, either he is chiefe of a faction, or not.

These heads I shall endeavour to examine; begin∣ning with the stranger; who by civill discords aspires to make himselfe Lord; understanding by civill dis∣cords, not those only which are between Citizens of the same City, but between divers Cities of the same

Province, as Plato understands them, where he saith, that if Graecians contended with Graecians, it was a sedition, and not a warre; shewing plainly, that such a one ought to be called a civill discord.

I say then, (to returne to my purpose) that such stranger, either hath intelligence with one part of the Citizens, or he hath not; if he have intelligence, then is the time: so did Germanicus, when he assaulted the Catti, a people in Germany; Nam spes incesserat dissidere hostem in Segestem, & Arminium: whereupon, having Segestes on his side, it was an easie matter to prosper in his enterprise; and of such cases Histories are full.

But if this stranger have no intelligence, either it is in the beginning of the discords; or when they are inveterate: and thereby one or other of the sides, wa∣sted and spent; if it be the beginning, it will do no hurt, but good: so it happened to the Thuscans, and the Veientanes; so to the Athenians, while Agis approached their walls; so to the Sabines, and the Prenestines against the Romans. Of whom Livy saith, Nam in spe ventum erat, discordia intestina Rem Romanam dissolvi posse. But in truth it was but ill advised of them; and in such a manner, as while they sought the death of the sick Roman state; they applied a medicine that restored it to health. Whereupon Livy inferres, Sed externus Timor maximum concordiae vinculum, quamvis infestos suspectosque jungobat inter se animos. And there∣fore Aristotle saith, Cogit enim in unum communis metus; etiam eos qui p rius erant inimicissimi. And this will the rather happen, if they be enemies naturally; either through long warres between them; or else through diversity of Ay re; which consequently produceth di∣versity of tempe ratures: from whence ariseth diversity of customes, and these would rather die a thousand deaths, then come to be in subjection to their enemies. Whereupon it was seen in the beginning of Charles the

fifth; that while the Kingdome of Spaine rose up in Armes, and strongly mutinied against their own King; France seeing it, and having recovered Navarre, brought their Army upon Spaine, and presently they came to concord. The best way therefore will be, to take another course, (I mean alwaies against infidels) which is, to let them wast themselves; imitating the worme which gnawes in wood in such sort, that after∣wards it is easily broken; so discords should be fomen∣ted in enemies countries, that afterward more easily they may be overcome; but yet staying time, that the wood be first consumed, that so at one blow it may be broken. In regard whereof, David saith, Quasi toner∣rimus ligni vermiculus qui octingentos interfecit, impetu uno: in as much, as having by little and little, and by secret waies weakned his enemies, he afterwards easily as wormeaten wood broke them at one blow. Where∣upon I conceive, that the Romans are therefore by the Holy Ghost, called a Worme in Jonas; where he saith, Et paravit Deus Vermem, ascensu diluculi in Crasti∣num; & perc•…•…ssit haederam, & exaruit: this place being meant, (as Robert Abbot with many other writers inter∣prets it) of the destruction of Jerusalem, by the Ro∣mans under the Empire of Vespasian, who having pre∣pared a siege against Hierusalem, and understanding there were discords risen amongst them, he delayed the enterprise, Obsidionem Hierusalem distulit, ratus ejus∣modi civilibus discordiis facilius Judaeos consumptos deleri, quam armis Romanorum: and after a while, assaulting the City, he destroyed it. I observe moreover in that Chapter of Jonas, that the sunne came not first upon the Prophets head; but the worm that dried up the gourd, so also we must dry up our adversaries with discords, and then set upon them with our Armies. This Coriolanus meant, when he appointed his souldi∣ers to spoile the fields of the Plebeians; but to leave

the fields of the Senatours untouched; which he did not do for any hatred to the people, but out of a fur∣ther reach, by this means to foment their discords. The importance of this, the ancient Romans knew well; who after the first warre in Sicily, seeing the Carthagenians, I may say their naturall enemies, in a great streight, through the revolt of the Cities of A∣fricke, and the rebellion of their own Army, yet never for this made warre upon them; which would rather have brought concord to their enemies, then victory to themselves: but letting them tire and weary them∣selves with their own discords, they then set upon them so wearied, and without shedding of blood, made themselves Lords of all Sardinia with encrease of Tribute.

But in case they would not stay so long, till the ene∣my might trie out himselfe: they should then do wel to bring with them in their Army, some person of the blood; and that hath pretension in the state; but yet so, as to do it without forcing. When Charles the eighth had intention to make warre upon Bajaset the great Turke, because he knew how vain a thing it were to beleeve that a Kingdome, in Religion, in cu∣stomes and in language different, should receive him; he therefore tooke with him the brother of Bajaset: and the like did Situlces King of the Thracians; and Osman Basha by the commandement of Amurath, going to destroy the King of the Tartars, took with him Islan brother of that King; and it succeeded well; where∣upon (as Argentone relates) Lewis the eleventh stood in feare of the league, only because they brought his bro∣ther along with them. But if the discords be inveterate, and the Citizens through them grown weak, it is then alwaies time to assaile them; and there can be no doubt of victory. Thus Greece was easily overcome by any stranger that tooke this opportunity.

And thus much concerning discords, of Citizens between themselves; or of Cities that are under one Lord; in which it is sufficiently shewed, how a stranger ought to carry himselfe: Now we will shew, what course he ought to take, with other Provinces or Cities that are in discord between themselves. These Cities then are either of equall force, or of unequall; if of equall, then ought he to foment both sides: and there∣by they comming at last to be unequall, he shall then take part with the weaker side; but yet so, as not to weaken himselfe: as Croesus in Justin teacheth us, who ayding the Babylonians against Cyrus, he so much weakned his own Army, that after the taking of Ba∣bylon, he also himselfe was easily overcome. And there∣fore he saith, Ibi fortuna prioris praelii (that is of Baby∣lon) percussum jam Croesi exercitum nullo negotio fudit. The matter therefore must be so carried, that if the contra∣ry side happen to be Conquerour, yet you may be able to maintaine the warre your selfe: if conquered, it will then be easie for you to make your selfe Lord both of the one and the other. For it is not fit when a man may have need of his money and his Forces in de∣fence of himselfe, that he should rashly wast them in the service of another. Such was the counsell (as Thu∣cidides relates) that Nicias gave the Athenians, while he disswaded them from the warre in Sicily; there be∣ing no discretion, to uncloath 〈◊〉〈◊〉 selfe, to cloath another. Which is so true, that it is written by the Holy Ghost in Ezechiel, while speaking of the foure beasts, he saith, Sub 〈◊〉〈◊〉 autem pennae eorum rectae alterius ad alterum: and this as S. Gregory interprets it, intends to expresse the ayd that is due from a man to his neighbour. It follows after, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 duabus alis velabat corpus suum; to shew, that for ayding of others, it is not fit to dismantle our selves.

To return to our purpose, in that we spake of be∣fore:

that is, what way is to be held in ayding the wea∣ker side: a better example cannot be given then that of Phillip King of Macedon, who seeing the Cities of Greece at variance between themselves, he fomented the weaker side: and after he had wearied the one and the other, he brought them both under his Do∣minion. Philippus Rex Macedonum (saith Justin) liber∣tati omnium insidiatus, dum contentiones civitatum alit, aux∣ilium inferioribus ferendo, victos pariter victoresque sub∣i•…•… Regiam servitutem coegit. According to this advice, Ferdinand King of Spaine fomented so well the discord between Francis King of France and him of Aragon; that weakning the one, and oppressing the other, he made himselfe Lord of the Kingdom of Naples; with∣out wasting of either souldiers or money; a Kingdom gotten before by the King of France with so much blood. This also many Writers attribute to the Ve∣netians, vvho calling Lewis the tvvelfth into Italy, ho∣ped by this means to make themselves Lords of many Cities in Lombardy and Romagna; with this conceit, Lewis il Moro, called in Charles the eighth King of France; but this man endangered himselfe unhappily; and the other were not far from absolute ruine. Upon occasion whereof, I cannot omit to shew their errour, who make doubt, that a third man should enjoy the benefit of their victory, and what remedy there is for it. Secondly, how it happened that Ludovico Sforza by raising discord between the King of France, and them of Aragon, lost his state; when Philip by raising discord between the Graecians, and also Ferdinand King of Spaine, got so much by it. Concerning the first, there can no better counsell be given, to two, who striving together, have a third looking on, to set upon the winner, then to perswade them to peace; or else juri∣dically to heare their differences: but because, this seldome or never hath place amongst Princes; and

warre oftentimes for many occasions either cannot or will not be avoyded: therefore I cannot better deli∣ver my opinion, then by shewing the example of Me∣tius, who being upon the point of striking battell with Tullus Hostilius, and knowing that which side soever was victor, must needs (not having to fight with sheep) exceedingly weaken it selfe with losse of souldiers; whereby the Thuscans who were equall in Forces to the one and the other, and by this losse of men should remain the stronger, might take occasion to draw the victory of the conquering side to themselves; he invited Tullus Hostilius to a parlee: and with these rea∣sons perswaded him to put the fortune of the victory upon a few, that not only the Victor might be out of danger, but might also have it in his power, to op∣presse the Thuscanes; which proposition Tullus accep∣ted; and though there be many that blame him for it, yet I thinke, they meane it in some other case; because it is not likely, that a warlike spirit as Tullus was, if he had not certainly known the manifest danger of fal∣ling to be a prey to the other, would ever have con∣sented to such a duell; which in the case of another, is never without blame, being a thing unworthy of a valorous Captaine, to lay the fortune of many upon a few; but as this case was, I find no other errour in Tul∣lus Hostilius, but that he would hazzard the whole Army upon three men; but if the condition had been, to fight with one squadron of Foot, and another of Horse, I could not then but have commended it: and the reason is, because by such a fight it would plainly have appeared, which of them in a set battell would have had the victory, there concurring in it, the skill of the Captaine, and part of all parts of the Army; which have the same proportion with one another, as the whole hath with the whole; according to the vul∣gar rule, Eadem est ratio totius ad totum, quae est partis ad

partem: But in the case of Tullus, one of the Armies might be inferiour to the other, in Horse and Foot and Captaine; and yet have three braver men in any of these kinds in it, then the other.

Concerning the second Point, Ludovico Sforza did well, for securing himselfe in the State of Milan, to move the King of France; but he did not well after∣ward, to move him against the Aragonesi; for he ought (at least if he could; and if he could not, he should not then have medled in it at all) to have made use of the King, as an ayd in peace, but not as a Captaine in warre: and so was the counsell which Phaneas the Eto∣lian gave: that they should call in Antiochus and make use of him as an Umpire, but not as a Captaine: Pha∣neas (saith Livy) Reconciliatore pacis, & disceptatore de iis quae in controversia cum populo Romano essent, uten∣dum potius Antiocho censebat quam duce belli. And there∣fore Ludovico Sforza had not done ill to call in the King of France, as for his purpose to make himselfe free Lord of Milan, if it had been in his power to make him returne againe: but seeing the case required to make use of him in warre, now it was his ruine: because to seeke to rise by the discords of others, is not a work for an inferiour, but either for an equall, or a greater. Whereupon to Philip King of Macedon, and to Ferdi∣nand King of Spaine, it proved well; but to Lodowick Sforza, it brought utter ruine; and to the Venetians exceeding danger; although he with indiscretion set forward his own destruction; these with judgement, freed themselves from the danger. And therefore in the foresaid case, he that is inferiour in Forces ought to seeke alwaies rather to extinguish, then to kindle fire. Amurath the great Turke was minded to make warre upon the King of Polonia; between whom lay the state of Petrasco Prince of Pogdania; and he, as a wise man, knowing the damage he might sustaine, ei∣ther

by having his Countrey wasted with the Great Turkes Army; or after the warre ended, by wholly loosing it, as lying in the mouth of the Polack; he so treated with them, that he made them friends. But many Cities in Italy, not observing this rule, whilst they fomented discords between Pyrrhus and the Ro∣mans; remained, after the warre ended, a prey to the Romans. So the French, when Hanniball came into Italy, perceived though too late, they had exposed their Countrey as a Prey to his Army. So the Etolians calling in Antiochus to make warre upon the Romans; were themselves the first a prey to the Romans, as it had been foretold them. But although we have shewed by the example of Craesus, that it is not good in dis∣cords, so to ayd one side; as to weaken ones selfe: yet is not this rule to be observed, where one is so much too strong, that the other without great ayd is not able to withstand: because in this case to abandon a friend, would be a strengthning of the enemy; as the Corfuans in Thucydides excellently shewed, in the Ora∣tion they made to the Athenians, whereupon the Rhegini fearing the Army of Pyrrhus King of the Epi∣rots; the Romans came with great Forces to their ayd; but the end was, they became Lords over them. Which they of Corfu, not observing in the discords of Durazzo, and denying them ayd, were cause that they yeelded themselves to the Corinthians, and conse∣quently encreased the Forces of their enemies. But Germanicus carried himselfe with great judgement in ayding Segestes; knowing, if Segestes were overthrown, his faction would joyne it self with Arminius; and con∣sequently the Forces of his enemy be encreased. This the Campans declared, demanding ayd of Rome; Si defenditis, vestri; si deseritis, Samnitum erimus. Capuam ergo & Campaniam omnem vestris, an Samnitum viribus accedere malitis, deliberate. So as this is a lesson which men should

learne, to give present assistance to their friends that need it; otherwise they cannot avoyd being a prey to others: and this is delivered by S. Matthew in a Para∣ble; where they not comming that were invited to the marriage, others were called that stood in the streets.

It is therefore to be observed, when we make other mens case our owne, that our power be more then theirs: because else, either they will be hindred from getting victory; or getting victory be kept from be∣ing masters of the victory; it is not therefore for Prin∣ces or Cities that are weake, to make warre; which are to call in one more powerfull then themselves to their ayd: for by this, they doe but procure a stronger enemy: The Campani oppressed by the samnites, put themselves into the hands of the Romans, and so en∣creased their Forces: and for this cause perhaps it is, that Lucca continues a Commonwealth.

Having shewed, that we ought with all our Forces, to ayd the weaker side; when of it selfe it is not able to subsist: it is to be observed, that in doing it, we make not shew of such preparation, as may make our friends suspitious of us: which Phillip King of Spaine not observing; whilst under pretence of ayding the King of Scots against the Queen of England; he pre∣pared so great a Fleet, that the Scots might easily per∣ceive, that Fleet was not meant for resisting of Eng∣land; but for making himselfe Lord of Scotland. Into this errour also the Athenians ranne; who under co∣lour of ayding the Catanesi against the Syracusans, meant to make themselves Lords of Sicily, and there∣fore came with so great an Army (as Justin saith) Vt iis terrori essent in quorum auxilia mittebantur: whereupon they failed of their purpose, by reason it was easie for the Lacedemonians, to put a suspition of this into the Sicilians heads. And therefore Vitiges being within Ra∣venna,

besieged by Delisarius; and hearing by the Em∣bassadours of the King of Austrasia, that he offered to ayd him with fifty thousand French; astonished at so great a succour, put himselfe into the hands of Justi∣nian. Therefore weake Cities ought not to go in quest after warre; because they are like, either to be over∣come of their enemies, or to be in servitude to their friends; seeing they who call to their ayd a greater power then their owne, may be said to leane upon the point of a Speare, or upon a broken Reed; upon which, he that leanes, is like to find rather death then ayd. And therefore our Lord God, speaking in Esay to his people, who had called the Aegyptians to their ayd, Ecce confidis super baculum arundineum, confractum istum, super Aegyptum: cui si innixus fuerit homo, intrabit in manum ejus; & perforabit eam; sic Pharao Rex Aegypti omnibus qui confidunt in co. Which Aratus Head of the Achaeans knowing, refused to receive the ayd of Anti∣gonus. Verebatur enim si forte Rex victoria potitus, Cleomene ac Lacedaemoniis superatis ad extremum aliquid novi contra Rempublicam Achaeorum tentare. And if these Cities find a necessity to make warre for their owne defence, or otherwise, and that not able of themselves, it behoves them to call in, others to their ayd: they shall then doe well, to call in more then one; so the Pisans did a∣gainst the Florentines, who ayded by the Venetians, by Lodovico Sforza, by the Genouesi, and by the Senesi, went a long time dallying, and kept them all off from getting to be Lords over them.

I cannot omit to advertise, when one gives ayd to another, and the case stands so, that their Forces being joyned, they are able to resist, or else not: that in this case, he ought to come with all his Forces; that if one resist not, the other may: and in this was the errour of the Campani, in ayding the Sedicini, who therefore were both of them ruined. Campani magis nomen ad praesidiunt

sociorum quam vires cum attulissent: fluentes luxu obdura∣tis usu armorum in Sidicino pulsi agro, in se deinde molem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 belli verter•…•…nt: and if the Romans had not ay∣ded them, they had been in manifest hazzard of de∣struction. And therefore I cannot commend the course which the Athenians tooke in a battell of the Corfuani with the Corinthians; in which having brought a squadron of Galleys in ayd of the Corfuans, they gave order, not to come into the fight, untill they should see them routed; there is no doubt, but that if the Athenians had come in to fight in the be∣ginning of the battell, the Corfuans had got the vi∣ctory: but staying, as their commission was, and not giving ayd to their friends in time; they added repu∣tation to their enemies, and lessened their own For∣ces; so as either they should not have offered their ayd at all; or they should have given it in the beginning.

Let us now come to a Citizen that aspires to make himselfe Lord of his own Countrey, being held by infidels; in which, if the discord be between the No∣bles and the Plebeians, it is a hard matter to compasse: yet in this case, it is better he should make himselfe head of the people; who have both more will and power then the Nobles, as being a greater number; and though they be of inferiour ranke to the great ones: yet it is with them as with Buls; who suffer them∣selves to be mastered, because they know not their owne strength. Which Manlius well knowing, spea∣king to the people said, Quous{que} tandem ignorabitis vires vestras? It happens also for want of judgement, and scarcity of money; but all these things are helpt by making some great man Head, that is wise and rich; the people being like sheep where one leaps, the other follows. And this Moyses knew, when being told by God, of his own death, he prayed him to provide his people a Leader, that they might not be as sheepe

without a shepheard, Ne sint sicut oves sine ductore; the people therfore are more able; and the more able, if they have a Head.

It remaines to shew, that the people are more wil∣ling; and more easily perswaded to raise a Plebeian to the Principality, then one of the Nobility: First, by reason of the hope, which every one naturally hath of new things, specially the common people; there∣fore Sallust saith, Sed omnino cuncta plebs novarum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 studio, Catilinae incoepta probabat. Secondly, because the people envies not the inequality of Honours; but the inequality of Riches; and this is the reason why it was never seen, at least very seldome, that one Noble man helps to raise another Noble man to the Principality: and this Aristotle knew when he said, Nam multitudo quidem graviter fert inequalitatem patrimoniorum; praestan∣tes viri honorum oequalitatem. Whence it is no marvell, if after the death of Romulus; the Nobles found no way to make a King: and if it had not been for the people, it had scarce been ever done. And Livy speaking of this saith, Et esse igitur aliquod caput placebat, & nemo alteri concedere in animum inducebat. It is therefore best, the discord being between the Plebeians and the No∣bles; (I meane alwaies as I said before, as farre as may be done with a good conscience) to make himselfe Head of the people; which yet is not without great danger, and very fallacious, as I shall shew in another discourse upon those words, Et ad tuendam Plebem Tri∣bunitio jure contentum. If the discord be between Nobles and Nobles; then he that would make himselfe Prince, either is head of one part, or not; if not, he ought then to procure the concord of them that are 〈◊〉〈◊〉; because their discord will be a cause, he can have but one side in his ayd; and that but weakely 〈◊〉〈◊〉 where, if they be made friends, by this 〈◊〉〈◊〉; they will both of them remaine, as it were obliged to him;

and perhaps will doe it the more, because they cannot but thinke it a great matter, for one man to hinder the proceeding of their enemies, who will therefore after∣wards without any other regard, runne headlong to ayd him, not caring what he be. This my opinion will be sufficiently proved by the example of Caesar; who seeing Pompey and Crassus at variance, wrought so with them, that he made them friends; as knowing, that to his purpose, for making himselfe Prince, this discord of theirs would be a great impediment. But if he be head of a Faction, then is the time to make himselfe Lord securely; because having halfe the Nobility of his side, if he can withall get the favour of the people, he will undoubtedly be able to get the Empire. And so is this place of Tacitus of which we speak, to be understood; that Augustus in the dissentions of the Pompeians and the Caesareans, of whom he was Head, made himselfe protectour of the people: that there were dissentions between them, is seen by that he saith, Cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa; neque Caesareanis partibus nisi Caesar Dux reliquus: and that he had made the people his friend; is knowne by those words, Et ad tuendam Plebem, Tribu∣nitio jure contentum.

The summe of all I have said, is this: If a stranger in a civill discord, seeke to make himselfe Lord: (I meane by civill, that which is between Cities and Per∣sons that are under the same Dominion) if he have in∣telligence with them; either it is in the beginning, and then he shall not stirre, but rather be a meanes of con∣cord; especially betweene those that are naturally e∣nemies; betweene whom it behoves him to foment discords: to the end, that being weakned, his way may be eafie; or else assaulting them with Armes, be sure to have in his Army one of the blood, but yet without power; although in another discourse I shall shew that this is a weaknesse: or else it is, when discords

are inveterate; and consequently the Citizens wasted: & then every thing is like well enough to succeed. We have also shewed, that a stranger who seekes to get the Dominion of Cities, which are at warre under divers Lords; ought to foment the discords, if they be of e∣quall power, so farre as that they may come to be un∣equall, and then to take part with the weaker; yet no further, then only that they may be able to resist their enemies; alwaies being carefull, that the ayd be not so great, as to weaken him that gives it; unlesse, when without excessive ayd, they cannot prosecute the warre; and that there be danger, least they fall into their enemies hands; for then it behooves to make it his owne cause: but all in such sort, that he give no cause of suspition to his friends. I have said also, that it is no small skill, to foment discords, and that no man ought to make use of a great power, for his interest in war but only in peace; when he is not offorce sufficient to be able to send it away againe. And as for those, that lie between greater Princes that are at variance; let them, as Laurence de Medici did, use meanes to make them friends. Weake Cities, in my opinion, should never intricate themselves in any warre; and where there are two, that stand in feare of a third; if they will follow my counsell, they shall never lead forth all their Forces. Now if he be a Citizen, who in the dis∣cords of the City, seekes to make himselfe Lord of it; let him know it will be hard to compasse, when the discord is between the Nobility and the people; but in this case, the best way is, if he can, to make himselfe Head of the Commons. If againe the discord be be∣tween the people amongstthemselves, it is then almost impossible: but easie, when it is between Nobles and Nobles; especially if he be Head of a Faction; and if not, then to stand neutrall.

What Discords conserve States, and what corrupt them. The eighth Discourse:

THus then we see, that of those three distinctions, there is one proper for conserving the Prince; that is, the discord betweene the Nobility and the Commons; as sufficiently hath been shewed.

Now the state of the Optimates (to returne to our purpose) is easily preserved, so long as there growes no discord between Nobles and Nobles: because, as we have said before, the dissentions of the Nobility rest upon two Heads; whereof the one soone prevai∣ling over the other, brings it within his power to make himselfe sole Lord; so much the rather, because in a State of Optimates there is alwaies discord be∣tween the Nobility and the Commons; and so much, that the people ill brooking the Senat, will rather be willing to have a King. We must therefore know, that in a State of Optimates, as the dissension betweene Nobles and Nobles, is very hurtfull; so that betweene the Nobility and the people is very profitable, and greatly fortifies and upholds it, so long as there con∣curre not with it, discord between the Nobles. The reason is, because the people being at variance with the Nobles, it will be a cause, that they standing uni∣ted, will not incurre the danger before spoken of. Thus we see, the Romans after the expulsion of the Tarquins, continued easily in their government; be∣cause in that time there was perpetuall discord be∣tween the Nobility and the People. In which discords when the people came to be oppressed, the Nobles fell into Factions, and then the City in a few yeeres came to be a Monarchy.

Of concordant discord; and how it ought to be mannaged, for the good of Cities. The ninth Discourse.

THere is nothing more profitable for the con∣cord and good government of a City, then a discord between the parts: a City being a body com∣posed of many parts, as our body is of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 foure Ele∣ments. And as in this, if it be well Organized; in such sort, that all the foure Elements be in a due propor∣tion, there will then need no discord to maintaine it, there being none that seekes its own destruction: and therefore it sweetly enjoyes a quiet rest: so in a City, there will be no unquietnesse, if all the parts be equall; I meane not equall, simply; for it were not fit, that all in a City should be equall in dignity and riches; being necessary, some should be rich and some poore: but equall in such manner as it is in the body, whose good consists in this, that all the members be equall: for there are two kinds of good, (as saith S. Thomas) one, the good of the whole; and the other, of the parts: and likewise two natures; one universall, the other particular: the good of the whole consists in the en∣tirity, and in the distinction of the parts: and there∣fore it is better for a man, to have a Head, Feet, Hands, and the other members, then that all should be Head: but the good of the part, should be more good and perfect, if it could attaine to the degree and perfecti∣on of the superiour part; and therefore the Foot should be more Noble, if it were a Head; but the body should not be more perfect, if it wanted a Foot: so in a City it is sit, there should be Plebeians; and the e∣quality that is required, ought to be Geometricall

and not Arithmeticall; and where this is, a City shall not need dissension, to make it be well governed; but because as Galen in his Method, speaking of bodies that are in health, simpliciter, and absolutely, saith, This symmetry of humours consisting In Puncto is very hard∣ly found; and found impossible to be kept: as also Hippocrates speaketh of those bodies, that are in the height of healthfulnesse, Neque enim in melius verti, neque diu sistere valent; reliquum est ut in deterius dilaban∣tur: so also a City, is either never found in such a sym∣metry of parts; or if at any time found, never long continues. And therefore Tacitus speaking of such a composition saith, Laudari facilius quam evenire: vel si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest.

It is of necessity, that in the body, there be predo∣minant either cold or heat; or dry or moyst: if cold be predominant, there is heat to oppose it; if dry, the moyst: so in a Commonwealth, all things must be re∣duced to equality; for not onely they which overtop others, but they also that are in misery, are dangerous: in like manner, as it happens in buildings, which come to decay, as well by stones that stand too farre out; as by those, that stand too farre in: and therefore the Mason alwaies measures the walls and fits the stones; not by cutting them away, but by setting them in the right place: and thus our Lord God would have it be done in his holy Church; and therefore when Ezechiel saw it in the top of a mountaine, he stayed not long, but there came a man of mettall like brasse. Et F•…•…ni∣culus lineus in manu ejus: the Septuagints read it, Funicu∣lus cimariorum in manu ejus: where S. Gregory interprets it, after my meaning; and Aristotle also knowing this, gives counsell, when one part in a City is oppressed, and another oppresseth; that then the Magistrates should relieve the part oppressed, and reduce them to equality.

There are three things that may beare sway in a City; either the power Regall, or that of the Nobles, or the Authority of the People: if the Regall Power be predominant, then the people who are many, must oppose it; because one and many are contraries: and and perhaps for this it is that Plato saith, that a Com∣monwealth should be framed of two ingredients; a people, and a King; because the people alone being many, may be a bridle to the King; and the King a∣lone to the people. If the Nobility be predominant, then the people, as being directly contrary to the Nobility, must be opposed against it: whereupon, as we said before, as long as the City of Rome used this opposition, it could never be destroyed by the Nobi∣lity: In this regard, Sulpitius called a squadron of the youth, the Senatours Treacle, as opposed against them.

If the people be predominant, then the Nobility must be set against them; and as when cold is predomi∣nant in a body, if another cold should be set to strive with it, it would instantly, Ipso facto, destroy the body: So when the people is predominant, if the people should be set against them; or when the Nobility is predominant, the Nobility should oppose it; the Commonwealth presently would goe to wracke; as it fell out in Rome. But not onely, when the like is op∣posed against the like, both a body and a Common∣wealth may be ruined; but as well also if a contrary be opposed, and not in a due manner: and therefore Galen saith, that contraries may be of three sorts: that is, Greater, lesser, and equall. It is a greater contrary, when to a distemper hot in two degrees, a remedy is applied cold in three degrees: a lesser contrary is, when to a distemper hot in two degrees, a remedy is applied cold in one degree; the equall is, when to e∣quall heat, equall cold is opposed; which being so, saith Galen, the cure of a distemper must not be by a

greater contrary; because this not onely takes away the distemper, but introduceth the contrary: as if to a distemper, hot as two; a remedy be applied, cold as three: this indeed will take away the heate, but then in place of it, bring in a distemper cold in one de∣gree. Neither also is a cure to be made with a lesser contrary, because this would not reach to take away the distemper: but the cure must be made by an equal, which cannot introduce a contrary, but onely reduce the distemper to a due proportion. And thus is it to be done in Cities: for if the people grown two degrees above their ranke, should have the Nobility opposed in three degrees: this would not onely take away the predominancy of the people, but would bring the Nobility one degree out of just proportion: and the contrary will happen, if it should be lesse: and there∣fore in the Common-wealth of Rome, as long as the people were able to counterpease the power of the Nobles; although it were in discord, yet it continued and kept it selfe free: but after the death of Tib•…•…nius and Caius Gracchus, when this contrary became unable to withstand the Nobility, the Commonwealth pre∣sently was endangered; as well for the inability of the peoples opposition, as for that it gave occasion to raise discord amongst the Nobles. That the contrary in this case was not fit and able, Salust sheweth where he saith, Caeterum Nobilitas factione magis pollebat; Plebis vis soluta atque in multitudinem dispersa, minus poterat. Besides the Nobles themselves opposed not well, in opposing Sylla to Crassus; and worse, in opposing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to Anthonie: because as the opposition the people made was too weake,: so the opposition of the Nobi∣lity was too strong; and was therefore the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Commonwealth. That contrary therefore which with discord shalbe opposed to him, that exceeds proporti∣on, ought to be such, as to have no greater power, nor

other end, but only to reduce the other to his due place; but yet with waies befitting a Christian: for I like not that course of Tarquinius Superbus, which he intimated by cutting off the heads of the Poppies (an invention used by many, and related also by Aristotle) For in the commonwealth of the body, what worse evill, then the gout in the feet or hands? yet to heale it, I never saw the foot or the hand cut off; but pur∣gations applied to bring them to their naturall tem∣per. Being in all evils better to oppose the beginning, then be forced to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 off the part, by letting it runne to a Gangrene or Convulsion. For as this oftentimes brings death to the whole body; so in a Common∣wealth, the dismembring of a Citizen that is growne out of order, is occasion oftentimes of the ruine of the State; as it fell out in Caesar.

I am to advertise, that I intend not to put division between men and men, but between men and the actions of men; for as the first is extreamly ill, so the second is as good. And therefore the Prophet saith, Nonne qui oderunt te Domine Oderam; & super inimicos tuos tabescebam; and of this kind of hate, Christ spake when he said, Non veni mittere pacem, sed gladium in terra. Whereupon it being an evill action, for one to exceed his degree and thereby seeke to oppresse the City; it ought to be hated, and to seeke to bring him to pro∣portion; but that done, the hate then must be laid aside; and therefore all the holy Fathers agree, that to know what 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is good, and what bad, there is no better way then this, to looke if the action ceasing for which they hate, they also cease to hate; otherwise it appeares, they hated the person, and not the action. Secondly, it must be observed, when I shew, that for Cities to be well governed, it is necessary there should be discord: I meane not that kind of discord which is destructive, a discord in the whole; but that which is

a discord in a part; and in the whole, a concord: in like manner, as the Heavens turning with one motion from East to West; and with another from West to East, they are discordant in the parts; but in conser∣vation of the whole concordant. So not without a great mystery of nature, that is of God; the Planets by whose influence he governs earthly things, are by their Maker so placed in the heavenly Orbes; that one contrary stands neighbour to another: to the end, that with an harmonious discord, they may have a concordant influence, for the good of the Universe. From hence it is, that Jupiter is next to Saturne; be∣cause Saturne being old and dry, an unfortunate Pla∣net, it was necessary he should be allayed with the goodnesse of Jupiter, who with heat and moysture, in an admirable manner opposeth him. So unfortunate Mars is tempered with fortunate Venus, (to speake in the termes of Astrologers) who allaies the malignity of Mars, in such manner, as we see oftentimes, the cho∣ler of a man, to be mitigated with the sweetnesse of a woman. In like sort (to descend lower) if the Ele∣ments were not discordant, there would arise no al∣teration, and consequently no generation: so if the parts in Musicke were not discordant, there would be no harmony. The parts therefore are discordant; the Heavens, discordant; the Planets, discordant; and all for conservation of the Universe. Whereupon, and it is the doctrine of Aristotle; as from the contrariety and discord of the Elements, ariseth the peace of the Universe: so from the opposition in the parts of a City, (I speake in the sense I said before) there ariseth the conservation of the whole. Which perhaps Plato meant, when by the mouth of Socrates he said, that the profit of a City consists not in concord.

Sed veteris Reipublicae Prospera vel Adversa claris Scriptoribus memorata sunt: tempo∣ribusque Augusti non defuere decora ingenia; donec gliscente adulatione deterrerentur. Tiberii Caiique & Claudii ac Neronis res, florentibus ipsis, ob metum falsae: post∣quam occiderant, recentibus compositae sunt.

How hard and dangerous a matter it is to write Histories: when the easiest time is to finde writers and which of them deserve most credit. The tenth Discourse.

THe words of Tacitus above-cited, give me occa∣sion of two discourses; one, concerning the wri∣ting of Histories: the other, concerning flattery. Con∣cerning the first, I intend to shew the difficulty it brings with it, what danger Historians undergo: of whom it is easiest to write, and in what time. As for the difficulty, it may grow either in regard of him that reads, and is not interessed; or from him that reads, being interessed: or lastly from the times, in which one writes. Beginning then with the generall, that is, of him who reads, and is not interessed; there is no doubt, but the Historian with such a one, will finde some difficulty, to be thought a true writer. Seeing he must necessarily relate actions; either worthy of praise, or worthy of blame: if of blame, it is attribu∣ted to malice; if of praise, it is received with envy: be∣cause as Thucydides saith in the person of Pericles, in the oration he made to the people of Athens, at the fune∣rall pompe of those that were slaine in warre; The praises of the dead if they be heard by friends, never seeme enough; if by strangers, so long as they goe no further then possibility, they are received with pati∣ence,

but if they passe that bound, they are then as fabulous, either scoffed at, or else envied. This case, Salust translated out of Thucydides, where he saith, Ar∣duum videtur Res gestas scribere; primo quia facta dicris exaequanda sunt; Dein quia plerique quae delicta reprehen∣deris, malevolentiae & invidia dicta putant; ubi de magna virtute atque gloria bonorum memores, quae sibi quisque fa∣cile factu putet, aequo animo accipit; supra, vel•…•…ti ficta pro falsis duoit. It is therefore true, that between these two extreames, that writer shall alwaies be more beleeved, and be held in better account, who in blaming shall discover the vices and defects of others; then they who in praising, shall make their virtues too resplendent; because a reader, takes blame, in it selfe for a praise; if at least he have not himselfe those vices for which one is blamed; and praise he takes for blame, if he find not those vertues, for which the Historian extols him. Besides, to blame being alwaies with danger; and to praise, rather with benefit; he who blameth, will be alwaies taken for a man free and sincere; and he that praiseth for a flatterer. To this perhaps Tacitus had an eye, when he said, Obtrectatio & livor pronis au∣ribus accipiuntur; quippe Adulationi foedum crimen servi∣tutis; malignitati falsa species libertatis inest.

The second difficulty is caused by persons interes∣sed; which are either Princes, or Common-wealths: if Princes, either they are vertuous, or vitious: if viti∣ous, let the History be written either of his life, or of any others that is like his, it will be taken, as if by rela∣ting the faults of others openly, his own faults secret∣ly be cast in his face. This by Tacitus is learnedly ex∣pressed, where he saith, Reperies qui ob similitudinem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, aliena malefacta sibi objectari putant. So likewise if the vertues of some other Prince; or of his owne an∣cestours shall be praised; he will take it, as an upbray∣ding to him his owne vices, and thereupon be moved

to indignation and envy; and for default of vertue in himselfe, will with an ill will heare the praises of a∣nother. Etiant gloria (saith Tacitus) ac virtus infensos habet; ut animus ea propinquo diversa arguens. Which our Lord God meaning to shew by the mouth of Ezechiel saith, Fili hominis, ostende domui Israel Templum, ut confun∣dantur ab iniquitatibus suis, & metiantur fabricam, & eru∣bescant ab omnibus quae fecerunt. And S. Gregory expoun∣ding this place, saith that the Temple of God is then shewed in confusion, when the actions of a just man are shewed to a wicked; and our Lord God, to shew that wicked men cannot abide to heare the life of good men spoken of, saith, Vt ostendat Templum, he saith not, Vt videant Templum, meaning to shew, as S. Gregory expounds it, Sponte sua considerare nolentibus, rectorum opera narrare; These therefore with an evill will, heare the praises of others; which Tacitus know∣ing, forbore to write the life of Agricola, a good man, in the time of wicked Emperours, but stayed till Trajans time, as having seen manifest examples, of ma∣ny writers, that lost their owne lives, without any be∣nefit to those of whom they writ, by being them∣selves slaine, and their bookes burnt, while under wic∣ked Princes, they would publish their Histories of such persons: and therefore he saith, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cum Aruleno Rustico, Paetus Thrasea Herennio Senecioni, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Helvi∣dius laudati 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Capitale fuisse; no que in ipsos 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Autho∣res, sed in libros quoque saevitum.

But greater danger an Historian in curres, if under a wicked Prince, he dare write his history, because, ei∣ther 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his vices, he shewes himselfe a manifest slatterer, and no wise Historian, who without truth, (as Polybius saith) is as unprofitable, as a man without eyes; or else writing the truth, he shal in so doing, make his owne grave.

But say, he writes under a good Prince, either he

must relate the actions of the Prince himselfe, or of his house; if of himselfe living, the Historian can never avoyd suspition: and it is not enough to say, that under such praise-worthy Princes, there will be no need, to part from truth, because there are few men that doe not conceive their owne actions to be greater then they are, or at least that desire not, others should thinke them so: whereupon, when they find, that an Historian relates them not, in such a height as they conceive, or desire that others should; no doubt, they will thinke he blames them, as not sufficiently praising them.

Now if under a vertuous Prince, they write the History of his family, there growes another difficulty of great moment; which is, that a great part of the Cities and Provinces having beene sometime Com∣monwealths, & from Commonwealths become King∣domes; seldome without shedding the blood of the Citizens, and oftentimes of the Princes: the relating these things under a Prince, now Lord of the City, whether he be good or bad, is dangerous: first, on the part of the Citizens, who reading the death of their ancestours; or their greatnesse in the time when it was a Commonwealth: by the one, they are stirred up to hate, by the other to desire: and taking into their consideration, that greatnesse in which they were, and those injuries which they suffered; because they cannot revenge these, nor regaine those, but by the death of the Prince, they are oftentimes drawne to make cruell conspiracies. Secondly, on the part of the Prince, who in reading such Histories, seeing con∣tinually before his eyes, those Citizens, whose fathers either killed or at least conspired against his ance∣stours; seeing he cannot beleeve they should love him; he will hardly be induced to love them, knowing wel, that things which are tolerated, by force, when oc∣casion

happens to remove that force, will never be to∣lerated.

To this may be added another difficulty, on the part of the Citizens: who love not to heare the disgraces of their ancestours related in Histories; and are thereby moved to indignation: this Tacitus meant, where he saith, At multorum qui Tiberio regnante, poenam vel infamiam subiere, Posteri manent. And oftentimes Tacitus himselfe forbeares to speake of such; as he did of those who suffered disgraces under Nero, of whom he saith, Quos fato perfunctos, ne nominatim tradam, Majoribus eorum tribuendum puto.

Againe to relate the warres, which these Princes or their Ancestours had with others; how dangerous it is, Crescentius Cordus may be an example; who for praising Brutus and Cassius, was forced miserably to end his life, as the said Tacitus relates. It is true, this useth not to happen, but under wicked Princes, as Ti∣berius was. For Augustus, as the said Tacitus relates; made rather a jest, then tooke indignation at any such things: and thus much concerning a Prince.

Now in writing Histories under a Commonwealth; there appeare againe a thousand difficulties: First, if he make relation of their beginnings, he shall make himselfe odious to all in generall, and to every one in particular. To all in generall, because all things having but weake beginnings, men like rather to heare the History of the Common-wealth, in its virility, then in the weaknesse of its infancy. To particulars, because hearing relation made of the beginnings of their Hou∣ses, which commonly are but meane, they cannot read such Histories with any patience; at least, not with liking: and therefore in some Cities, such writings have not been admitted. This conceit Titus Livin•…•… expresseth to the life; where he saith, Et legentium ple∣rosque (speaking of himselfe, who writ the beginning

of Rome) haud dubito, quin primae Origines proximaque Originibus, minus praebitura voluptatis sint, festinantibus ad haec nova, quibus jampridem praevalentis populi vires seip∣sas conficiunt.

Moreover, if they write of warres; not onely they incurre the same danger we spake of before, under a Prince; in too much praising those, with whom the warre hath been held: but besides, in this kind, it is easier to offend in a Commonwealth, which consists of many; then in a Kingdome, which consisteth but of one. Whereupon, it seemes to be more easie to write the truth of one alone, then of many; but withall more dangerous, because the hatred of private Citi∣zens may be shunned; but the hatred which comes from the publik person of the Prince, and reacheth to life and goods, are impossible to be shunned.

It is therefore dangerous to write under a Prince, whether he be good or bad; and whether the History be of the Princes own actions, or of his ancestours; and whether in forraine warre, or in warre at home. And it is dangerous likewise to write under Common∣wealths; not onely to write of their beginnings, but in other times also.

It remaines to shew, whether it be more easie, to find Historians under a Kingdome, or under a Com∣mon-wealth.

The Prince may be a tyrant, and living; the Com∣mon-wealth may be corrupt, and continue: and while it continues, hardly will any Citizen, out of love of his Countrey, be drawne to disclose those things, which ought to be kept secret; and as little whilst a Tyrant lives, will any man register his disorders for feare: Whereupon not without cause, the most wise Salomon in his Proverbs saith, Nomen impiorum putrescet, not Putrescit; because in the time present, his stinch is not smelt; or to say better, none will be so bold, as to dis∣cover

it; and if in the one, or the other, an Historian be found so hardy, as to write, he will certainly flatter. And therefore Tacitus saith, Tiberii Caiique ac Neronis res florentibus ipsis ob metum falsae.

Also Historians take no care of those that come after, but consider onely their owne interest: and knowing how much trouble they endure, that in such times can but live, when they hold their peace; they are out of heart for writing of Histories, and though they should have a will to doe it, yet they could have no meanes, as not being informed of publike affaires, which being done onely by the Prince, and out of his Element, he neither understands them, nor meddles in them, nor regards them: all which, Tacitus tooke into consideration, when he said, Postquam bellatum apud Actium, at{que} 〈◊〉〈◊〉 potestatem ad unum conferri pacis inter∣fuit; magna illa ingenia cessere; simul veritas pluribus modis fracta; primum inscitia reipublicae ut alienae; mox libidine assentandi, aut rursus Odio adversus Dominantes; ita neutris cura posteritatis, inter infensos & obnoxios.

But if this tyrant Prince be dead, and the tyranny altered: also if a corrupt Commonwealth shall be a∣bolished, and in place of it, shall come a Prince; in this case, there will not want Historians, but yet not with∣out some doubt of truth. On the part of the Com∣monwealth now abolished, by reason of flattering the new Prince; on the part of the Prince now dead, by reason of the hatred that is borne to a tyrant: and to this Tacitus had an eye, when he said, Postquam occide∣runt, recentibus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 compositae sunt: saying in another place, that Historians who write of tyrants, write many things through hatred, which are not true.

If lastly we speake of writing Histories under a wel∣governed Common-wealth, or under a Prince that is a Monarch; in this case, it will be easie to find writers good store: and therefore Tacitus saith, Sed veteris

Reipublicae prospera vel adversa, claris Scriptoribus me∣morata sunt; where we must observe, he saith, veteris: to signifie that he meanes the Common-wealth, in those first times, when it was not corrupt. And as to the purpose, concerning a good Prince, he addes, Tem∣poribus Augusti non defuere decora ingenia. Where also we see, he speakes of the first yeeres of Augustus, which were indeed his best: and therefore our Tacitus writ onely the latter time of Augustus, which was his worst, and consequently more hard to find Writers that had written truly. So also did Acchias, who writing the History of Salomon, omitted the beginning of his raign, as being the best; and began at his declining. Accor∣ding then to Tacitus, there will be writers good store, both under a Commonwealth, that is well governed; and under a Prince, that is well disposed: but in my opinion, more under the good Prince.

First, because of the greater profit; for a Prince will take more notice of a Writer that relates particular actions; then a Commonwealth will doe, for relating universall: and here is to be noted, a difference be∣tweene the Records of a Prince, and of a Common∣wealth. The Records of a Common-wealth, Intensive (give me leave to use this word) being in my opinion lesse then of a Prince: the reason is, because as it is in the Proverbe, He that serves the publike, serves no body: for the benefit being received of none as pro∣per, is little regarded, and therefore little recompen∣sed of the publike; whereupon we see Joseph received a greater reeompence for the benefit he did to Pharao, then ever we read given by any Common-wealth. But Extensive, I hold it more profitable to serve un∣der a Common-wealth; because the memory of a benefit done to a Prince, as being a particular person, dies with him: but the memory of a benefit done to a City, continues as long as the City continues; and

not onely towards him that did it, but to his posterity also: where of we have a cleare example in the fore∣said Joseph; who Intensively was rewarded by King Pharao, beyond measure, being more King then Pharao himselfe. But Extensively, it proved more hurt then benefit, his successours being put to slavery by him, whose grandfather with all his people, Joseph had pre∣served before from famine. This reason by me alled∣ged, is written by the Holy Ghost in Exodus, where he saith, Surrexit in terra Rex novus, super Aegyptum, qui ignorahat Joseph, & ait ad populum suum; Ecce populus Israel multus & fortior nobis est; Venite, sapienter opprima∣mus eum. And therefore, (as I shall shew in another place) men more esteeming a present profit, then a future, will be moved rather to write of a Prince, then of a Commonwealth.

Secondly, by reason of lesse danger, because an Hi∣storian in praysing a Prince, hath nothing else to think of; and being indeed a good Prince, he may praise him truely; and therefore Tacitus discoursing of such Princes, breakes out into these words, Rara temporum faelicitate, ubi sentire quae velis, & quae sentias dicere licet. But in a Common-wealth (as I said before) it is impos∣sible to write so, but that amongst so many, some or other will be blamed; and oftentimes the Hate that growes from one, proves more hurtfull, then the love of all the rest proves beneficiall; because these hold themselves not much obliged, as counting it but their due; the other conceave an irreconcileable hate, as counting it a wrong.

Thirdly, Historians will more willingly write the deedes of a Prince, then of a City; because men take more pleasure to praise such as are above their owne ranke; envy, as every one knowes, being properly amongst equals: and therefore in Common-wealths, every one lookes rather to be praised himselfe, then to

praise others: whereupon Sallust, not without cause lamenting the scarcity of Writers that Rome had, saith, At populo Romano nunquam ea copia fuit, (that is of Wri∣ters) quia prudentissimus Negotiosus maxime erat; Ingenium nemo sine corpore exercebat; Optimus quisque facere quam dicere, sua ab alis benefacta laudari, quam ipse aliorum nar∣rare malebat. And thus much concerning the persons under whom, and of whom an Historian writes.

Now concerning the time, there may be given three kinds of Historians: some, who relate things hapned in their owne time; some, things done time past; and others, things to be done in time to come. They who relate the Accidents of time past, without having had any former relation, are called Prophets: as Moyses writing of the Creation of the World; so many who have written of things to come, are called Historians; as Esay, who hath written as well of our Church; as if he had written of things past; Ita enim Vniversa Christi (saith S. Hierom) Ecclesiaeque mysteria prosequutus est, ut non putes eum de futuro vaticinari, sed de praeterito Histo∣riam texere.

But leaving those who write with such Authority, that of their truth there can be no doubt, our dis∣course shall be of the other; and because (as we have said) many write of the times past; others, of their owne times: and of these, some are such as have beene present at the things they relate; and others have them onely by relation: there being great difficulty in all the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, it is requisite, that together with the difficul∣ty, we should also examine, which of them is most wor∣thy to be credited.

They then who relate things which themselves have seene done, may easily be drawne to vary from the truth; as moved with passions, sometimes of hate, sometimes of envy, and sometimes againe of love; and therefore Plutarch counts it a businesse of great diffi∣culty

and this perhaps Livy meanes, when speaking of such Writers, he saith, Etsi non flectere à vero; solici∣tum tamen efficere possunt. And Polybius to give the grea∣ter authority to his History, labours to shew that the story of the first warre of the Romans with the Car∣thagenians, written by Fabius Pictor a Roman, and by Philo a Carthagenian, was by those Authours, each of them in favour of his owne Country, stuffed with lies. And indeed it is not unlike, but they might vary from the truth, and yet out of no corrupt affection; but that each of them writ as he believed, though not as it was; seeing things to which men are affected, seem alwaies, in the good, greater; and lesse, in the evill; according to that rule of Aristotle, Intus existens prohibet Extraneum: and therefore to an eye, looking through a greene Glasse, every thing seemes greene. So to the palate offended with choler, every thing tasts bitter: and therefore David made his prayer to God, to keep him as the Apple of his eye, Custodi me Domine ut pupil∣lam oculi: which as it hath in it no colour, and there∣fore sees things as they are; so he desired to be without affections, that he might know the truth of things. Whereuppon it appeares, we may conclude, that they who write of their owne times, and have not the ver∣tue of the apple of the eye; may easily vary from the truth; not onely by malice, but sometimes also by ig∣norance; it being impossible, that a man should be an eye-witnesse of all he writes; and should be present at all Actions and Counsels in such manner, as not to need the information of others; and even those who are present at any action, do seldome all of them agree in the relation.

On the other side, it appeares there is more cre∣dit to be given to an Historian that writes of his owne time, and of those things at which he hath himselfe been present, then to others; seeing they are forced to

stand to that which is left them by the ancients, either written in History, or preserved in memory, as Plutarch well observes. And because it is seldome, but there is more then one Writer of the same History: and for him that will relate them, he must necessarily make use of those, who have formerly given the informa∣tion: it is an easie matter, in such a number of wri∣tings, for an Historian to be confounded; and be able but as a blind man, to give advertisement of things, whereof he is himselfe to be advertised. Besides, those first writings or memories of which this Historian makes use: they also, may have been written, out of affection.

Lastly, there are not wanting reasons to prove, that he who writes a History of his own time; though he have them but by relation, is the more worthy of credit; because in such, the difficulties that are found in the others, are abated; seeing, by not having been present, and had no part in the actions they relate; they are also voyd of those affections, which make Historians speake lesse truth: and by writing of their owne time, they are not tied to stand to the bookes of others, who never agree with one another. And there∣fore the holy fathers, from this difficulty have drawne an Argument to prove the truth of the Gospell; be∣cause four Writers agree in all points. Neither by this example is my opinion abated, but rather strength∣ned; it being necessary, that to make foure men write agreeingly in all things, there must be one onely to instruct them all, which is the Holy Ghost.

But neither is this kind of Historians without dif∣ficulty; rather as I conceive, in greater then any other: as partaking himselfe alone of all those difficulties, which we in the two first observed; because although he be not present at the things, yet he is present at the time; and this hath force to stirre affection even in

those that are not neere the time, as every one finds by experience in himselfe. Secondly, he who gives the information, may be moved by some passion himselfe; and then he will the lesse care for writing a lie, when he hath his intent, and the blame anothers. Thirdly, if he take more then one to give him information; he will fall into the same difficulties, as he that writes Histories of the times past: seeing it is seldome seene, that two agree in their relation; and oftentimes, one alone is contrary to himselfe.

And thus there is difficulty we see in all manner of times, and of Writers; whether they write of the time past, or of their own times; and whether they write by relation from others, or as eye-witnesses themselves.

For resolution, we may conclude, that more credit is to be given to those things, which are related by Historians that have beene eye-witnesses of things done in their own time, so long as the Writers be ho∣nest men. Whereupon we give more credit to the Histories of Argentone, relating accidents, at which he was himselfe present, then we doe to Jovius, who writ by relation from others, when himselfe perhaps was all the while at his Bishopricke. Yet I say not, that Jo∣vius is not worthy of credit, seeing it is not my pro∣fession to lay blame upon any. This Argentone hath made us know this difference, while enterlacing the Histories of Lewis the eleventh with those of England; he useth much cunning to make us beleeve him; as one that was not present at the things done: and there∣fore for the most part, names the persons who gave him information: that from the greatnesse and credit of his informers, he might winne credit to his owne writings. And this was the very case of S. Luke, who writing in his Gospell the life of our Saviour; because he had not himselfe been present, therefore to pro∣cure himselfe credit, at his very beginning he saith, he

had it by relation from persons that were present. Si∣cut tradiderunt nobis, qui ab initio ipsi viderunt, & mini∣stri fuerunt sermonis: but when he was to write the Acts of the Apostles, at which he had been present; then without making any Promise or Proaeme: he begins with saying, Primum quidem sermonem feci de omnibus, O Theophile: and this for no other cause, but because he knew, how much a History hath more credit, when things are written by one that hath seen them. It is no marvell then, that S. John, for gayning himselfe credit saith, Ego vidi, & testimonium perhibui, quia hic est filius Dei. And therefore it was Gods will, that the Apo∣stles should beare witnesse of him, Et vos testificamini de me, quoniam ab initio mecum estis. And S. Peter in the Acts, when he would perswade the resurrection of Christ to be believed, saith, Qui simul edimus & bibimus cum illo. Whereupon S. Chrysostome, considering why S. John names himselfe, where he saith, Sequebatur autem Petrus, & alius Discipulus, gives the reason in these words, Et sui meminisse coactus est, ut intelligas ea, caeteris diligentius, quae in Principis aula facta sunt enarrare, utpote quia aderat.

As for the objection made before, it is plainly clee∣red, if the Writer be an honest man. For in a good Historian, there are two things required; an ability, and a will: and one of these parts he that writes of things himselfe hath seen, hath certaine in him more then others; which is, that he is more able to write the truth, then any other; and as for the will to doe it, it cannot be wanting in him, if he be honest: and if he be not honest, then no doubt another that writes of times past may be worthy of more credit then he.

Donec gliscente Adulatione deterrerentur.

From whence flattery proceeds: how many kinds there are of it, and which of them is hurtfull to a City. The eleventh Discourse.

COncerning flattery, there have been discourses morally written, by infinite writers; and in such manner, that they have given cause rather to admire them, then left any place to adde any thing unto them. I therefore, as I use to do, will handle it as a Po∣litician, briefly, and yet perhaps in such a way, as hath not beene done by any. Shewing first, that Princes themselves are the cause of flatterers. Secondly, how many kinds of flatterers there are. Thirdly, in what the essence of flattery consists. And lastly, which of them are hurtfull to Cities.

Concerning the first, it is in common experience, that flatterers are the ruine of Princes; and yet it is easie to shew that Princes are themselves the forgers of this their ruine; because if they were furnished with vertue and goodnesse; flatterers could find no matter in them to worke upon: and so, either there would be no flattery at all, or at least not hurtfull. And therefore those wise virgins who stood waiting for the Bridegroome by night, having Oyle for them∣selves; which in the Scripture, is often taken for praise, Oleum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nomen tuum: as Lyranus interprets it, they needed not procure from others the Oyle of flattery. Et Oleum peccatoris non impinguet caput meum: so as Prin∣ces themselves being the cause of flattery, and not the Subjects; all the fault of it, ought to be laid upon

them. Whereupon it is no marvell, that in the Acts, while Herod making an oration to the people, was flattered of them, calling his voyce the voyce of a God; suddenly an Angell stroke him, and he was eaten up of wormes. Statuto autem die, Herodes indutus vestitu Regio & sedens super Tribunal, concionabatur ad Illos: populus autem clamabat, vox Dei: statim autem illum per∣cussit Angelus Domini: what fault was it in Herod, that the people applauded him, calling his voyce, the voyce of God? and yet he was stroken, and not the People. We may say then, that our Lord God by this example would shew, that Princes themselves are more cause of the peoples flattery, then the subjects are; which, as a Penne, writes such things, as he that moves it drawes; of which, it is but the instrument, and no efficient cause.

Before I come to the other two heads; that is, how many kinds of flattery there are; and which of them be hurtfull to a City: I am forced to premise a little doctrine, of which I shall have use, in the explication of the one and the other.

We must therefore know, that flattery is a morall action: one of its contraries being friendship, which is a morall vertue; and because contraries, (as witnesseth the Philosopher) are all under the same genus; as white and blacke under colour; therefore flattery also must be under the genus of morall actions: of which there are many so bad, that nothing can make them good, as adultery, and such like. This opinion was held by the master of the sentences; by the authority of S. Austin, where he saith, Bonum est continentia, malum est lux∣uria, inter utrumque indifferens, ambulare; capitis naribus∣que purgamenta projicere, sputis rheumata jacere, hoc nec bonum, nec malum est; sive enim feceris, sive non feceris, nec justitiam habebis, nec injustitiam. Thirdly, an action may in his owne nature be good; yet so as by meanes, it

may become bad: as to fast, to pray, to sacrifice, and the like. Qui enim de rapina Deo sacrificium offerunt (saith S. Austin) idem facit, ac si filium in conspectu patris victi∣met. Lastly, an action may be given, which of its owne nature is bad; and yet by some other cause, may be∣come good. Murther is a wicked thing, yet Elias in kil∣ling the false Prophets did a good worke, and shewed himselfe zealous of the honour of God.

Those actions then which are subject to alteration, may receive it from three things: first, from the object; a carnall act performed with a wife, is good; but if with another mans wife, is wicked. Secondly, from the circumstance: the Sacrifice which Saul made, because it wanted the due circumstances, was not accepted of God. Thirdly, it may receive this alteration from the end; that is, from the intention: but because the end may comprehend under it, both the object and the circumstances; therefore we must know, that it may be considered three waies: First, as it is an object, that terminates the act; and then it is called an intrinsecall end. Secondly, as it happens to some act, as a circum∣stance. Thirdly, as it is in nature of a cause, and then it is called, Cujus gratia: when therefore we say, that an action may receive goodnesse or badnesse, from the end; we meane it the third way.

The action in which flattery consists, is such as may receive alteration, from the intention, or from the object; or from the circumstances. What action of its owne nature more adulatory, then to feigne ones selfe crook-backt, with one that is crook-backt; as Platos schollers did? or to stammer with one that is stamme∣ring, as Aristotles did; or to fiegne himselfe wry-neckt, with one that is so, as the Courtiers of Alexander the great did? or to feigne ones selfe poore blind, with one that is poore blind, as the flatterers of Dionysius did? It is indeed the greatest kind of flattery (as Plutarch ac∣counts

it) that can be; and yet these and the like actions, Saint Paul did, as he writes himselfe; with the Jewes, he feigned himselfe a Jew; with those that are weake, to be weake: and in short, with all, he feigned himselfe all. Et factus sum Judaeis tan∣quam Judaeus; ut Judaeos lucrare iis qui sub lege sunt, quasi sub lege essem; cum ipse non essem sub lege; ut eos qui sub lege erant lucrifacerem; iis qui sine lege erant, tan∣quam sine lege essem; cum sine lege Dei non essem; sed in lege essem Christi, ut lucrifacerem eos qui sine lege erant: factus sum infirmus infirmis; ut infirmos lucrifacerem: omnibus omnis factus sum, ut omnes facerem salvos. See here, that act, which of its owne nature, was most adulatory, be∣ing used by S. Paul, became vertuous and beneficiall; and the reason of this can proceed from nothing, but from the intention; because as those other were mo∣ved, with their proper interest; So S. Paul was moved with the zeale of God. Vt Judaeos lucrarer, ut eos qui sub lege erant lucrifacerem, ut omnes facerem salvos. For there cannot a better way be found, to reduce men to the right way, then to counterfeit to be such as they are: And even so, doe many Physitians use to doe; who oftentimes having a patient troubled with a melan∣cholicke humour in the braine; in such sort, as that they thinke themselves to be earthen Pots: they also feine themselves to be such, to the end, that they ta∣king meat, their patient also by their example may take meat, and not die with hunger, out of a conceit that earthen pots could not eate. And in this manner oftentimes they heale their patients; and feigning themselves to be fooles, have cured them of folly. Thus also did S. Paul, who circumcised Timothy, with a purpose to take away circumcision; whereof Saint Chrysostome speaking, saith, Vide opus, circumcidit, ut circumcisionem tolleret. Not without cause there∣fore did Marcus Tullius blame Cato, that would not

flatter the people with counterfeiting their fashions, thereby to get the Consulship; and have freed his Country from the imminent tyranny of Julius Caesar. And the rather, it being a thing commended of God himselfe, Cum perverso perverteris: that is, with wicked men, one must feigne himselfe wicked, to reduce them to goodnesse.

This Act, which in S. Paul received alteration from the end, may also in the contrary receive alteration from the circumstance; and was used therefore by S. Peter, who when he went to Antiochia, was hindred by S. Paul himselfe, Et in faciem restiti quia reprehensibilis erat: although the Act of S. Peter was the same, and done with the same intention that S. Pauls was; yet by reason of one circumstance, which was, that by his ex∣ample, the Gentiles were drawne to Judaise, he deser∣ved reprehension.

To come then to the second head, which is, how many kinds of flattery there are: I say first, there may be an Act of its owne nature exceeding good, and yet be apt to become a flattering act: as, to praise a man for something he hath done, to the end he may with more boldnesse reprove him afterward, is a good act: and therefore S. Paul knowing that the Corinthians, for the love they bore to certaine persons, were fallen into schisme, at first, he praiseth them, where he saith, Gratias ago Deo meo, semper pro vobis in gratia Dei, quae data est vobis in Christo Jesu; quia in omnibus divites facti estis in illo, in omni verbo & in omni scientia, sicut testimo∣nium Christi confirmatum est in vobis, ita ut nihil desit vobis impulsus gratiae: certainly a greater praise then this, he could not possibly give; but he addes afterward, Obse∣cro vos fratres per nomen Domini nostri Jesu Christi ut id ipsum dicatis omnes, & non sint in vobis schismata; see here, after his praising them, how sharply he repre∣hends them. The contrary happens when one praising

a man, speakes the truth, but with an ill intention; for it is then true flattery: and such, a Prince should never endure to heare. And therefore S. Paul, passing with many others by a place, where stood a maid possessed with a devill; and hearing himselfe praised by that de∣vill for a servant of God, he made him hold his peace, driving him out of the mayds body. Factum est autem euntibus nobis ad orationem, puellam quandam habentem spiritum Pythonem obviare nobis, quae quaestum magnum praestabat Dominis suis; Divinando, haec subsecuta Paulum & nos, clamabat dicens: isti homines servi Dei excelsi sunt, qui annuntiant vobis viam salutis: hoc autem faciebat mul∣tis diebus: dolens autem Paulus, & conversus spiritui, dixit; praecipio tibi in nomine Jesu Christi, exire ab ea, & exiit eadem hora. There is no doubt, but the devill in prai∣sing Saint Paul and his companions said the truth; but because he did it not with a good intent, but to the end, that another time he might tell a lie, and be be∣lieved; therefore S. Paul made him goe forth of the maids body. And so ought it to be done to those, who sometimes speake the truth; but to the end, that ano∣ther time they may more securely flatter. That such kind of praising is flattery, may easily be proved. For either it must proceed from friendship, or from mild∣nesse, or else from flattery. But it proceeds not from friendship, because a friend never praiseth out of inte∣rest; nor it proceeds not from mildnesse, because he by Aristotle is defined to be mild, who exceeds in his praises to give contentment; and differenceth him by this from a flatterer, who praiseth for his owne inte∣rest. So as we truely and upon good ground take this to be flattery; the rather being defined by S. Chry∣sostome, Adulatio est quando quosdam colit quispiam, non propter quae colere oportet, sed ad captandun terrena; where this word Colit stands in place of the Genus; as being common both to a friend, and to him that is mild: and

these words Ad captandum terrena, stand in place of the difference; in which the essence of flattery consists.

Secondly, there may be an action, which of its own nature, is neither good nor bad, but from divers causes may receive a diverse forme. And it is where vertue is indeed and truly in a Prince, but is increased and made greater in the praising it. The liberality that was in Tiberius being celebrated by the Senatours more then was cause; not to the end, he should encrease it for the publike good; but to the end, to make him privately the more their friend, was flattery, which could not be so called, if it had been done for the publike good. And therefore when Metellus was extolled for the great valour and prowesse he had shewed in mana∣ging the warre; because it was done to the end, he should continue, and hold on his course, as he did, was no flattery, but a good act, and so recorded by Historians.

Thirdly, there may be an act, of its owne nature bad and flattering; yet capable to become good from the intention: and it is when a Prince is praised for those vertues and conditions which are not in him, but which should be in him, so long as he is not guilty of the con∣trary vices.

Fourthly and lastly, there may be an act, I will not say, essentially flattering; but which seldome and very hardly can change its nature; and it is, when a Prince is praised for a vertue, being stayned with the contrary vice; as to call one mercifull, that is cruell.

It remaines to shew, which of these kinds is hurtfull to a Prince, and consequently to the subjects. Concer∣ning the first, seeing flattery consists of two things; an action, and an intention: as being an action, it is tran∣sient; as being an intention, it is imminent; as being an action it is good, as an intention bad: lastly, as an action it is founded in the merit of the Prince, in

which it passeth away; as an intention, it is founded in the ill quality of the actor, in whom it remaines; so as it cannot be hurtfull to the Prince but by acci∣dent; when it is done, as to make an introduction, but hurtfull to him that useth it: who thereby shewes him∣selfe a wicked man, and an interessed flatterer. For there is this difference betweene morall acts and works artificiall, as Aristotle saith, that workes of art passe away in the matter; and remaine not in the work∣man; but acts of vertue remaining in our selves, re∣quire a goodnesse in the actor; which is of smal impor∣tance in works artificiall. But although in this, there appeare no great hurt, yet it will be alwaies good to imitate S. Paul, in discarding such persons: or rather to imitate our Lord Christ, who being flattered of the devill, (as Theophilact interprets it) when in Saint Luke, he said, Scio te qui sis, sanctus ille Dei: he instant∣ly rebuked him, Et increpavit illum dicens; obmutesce & exi ab eo.

The second way that may either hurt, or profit a Prince, is taken from the object; for this praise is a∣bout an object, either good or bad: I meane, he whose vertues are extolled, is either vertuous and just as Me∣tellus was, or vitious and wicked as Tiberius was. In the first case, it doth well, and was therefore very profita∣ble to the Commonwealth: but in the second case, I like it not; in regard whereof, S. Gregory saith, Injustus audita lande sua polluitur, justus purgatur: pavet enim si talis non ostenditur, qualis ab hominibus putatur.

The third way is a little more difficult; yet as it is easie to be knowne, and hard to be done; so it can do but small hurt, to a City or a Prince. For if he shall beleeve there is such an opinion had of him; he will endeavour so to carry himselfe, that his actions may answer that opinion, if not to attaine to that for which he is praised, at least to hide the contrary. And

for this perhaps Varro (as S. Austin relates) said, that it is profitable for a City, to flatter Princes, with making them beleeve, they are Sonnes of the Gods; because fin∣ding such an opinion had of them, either they will be∣leeve themselves to be such indeed; or at least belie∣ving themselves to be accounted such, they will endea∣vour to do nothing, that may be unworthy of Sons of the Gods. Neverthelesse, (to returne to our purpose) this way also receives goodnesse frō the object; seeing, if we deale with bad Princes, it is no good course, to make them thinke, those vertues to be in them, where∣of they have not any sparke; because, either they will beleeve that they are such; and then will never endea∣vour to be such; or at least, finding there is such an opinion had of them, they will content themselves with having the name. But on the other side, if we have to doe with a good Prince, it cannot be but very profitable; seeing although he should not beleeve himselfe to be such, nor had in such account; yet fin∣ding such vertue to be universally praised, he would for meriting the praise, apply himselfe to it: and much more, if he beleeve such an opinion to be had of him, for fearing of going lesse. Therefore S. Austin saith, Gratias 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tibi uberes, quod nos laudas tanquam tales simus: magnopere enim hortaris ut tales esse cupiamus. With this intention he conceives in another Epistle, that Cicero praised Caesar for clemency, Talem esse ostendebat Principem qualem illum fallaciter predicabat. So as from this kind of flattery, there will grow no hurt, but ra∣ther good: and the more, if the flatterer meaning to praise a Prince for something that is not in him, he praise him not for some vice; for this would rather provoke him to anger, to heare those vices attributed to him of which he is not guilty: and which are so much better known, as they are lesse like.

The last way also may be either good or bad. The

Senate of Rome understanding that Macrinus the most cruell man in the World, was chosen Emperour, pre∣sently determined to give him the name of Pius; which was not done without great judgment and mystery: & it did some good (though he accepted not the name) to mitigate in some part his cruelty. But contrariwise, when Nero afterward having killed his mother, and an infinite number of Senatours, found himselfe applau∣ded, and the name of a valiant man given him; it drow∣ned him altogether in a flood of vices. Seque in omnes libidines effudit: and a little after, Postquam cuncta scele∣rum pro egregiis accipi videt, exturbat Octaviam, and so following. From these two contrary, at least unlike effects; I am moved to search out the reason, why the one of them, should be profitable rather then hurt∣full; and the other be the ruine of so many Citizens? To which I say, that this Act may receive alteration, either from the circumstance, or from the object. From the circumstance, seeing this praise may either be gi∣ven for a vertue, farre different and contrary to a vice with which the Prince is tainted: or it may be given for a vertue, which is neere to that vice. If in the first case, we call one that is cruell, mercifull; as it is easie to be knowne, so it will doe more good then hurt; because this is rather a modest admonishing the Prince, then an impudent praising of his vices; but in the se∣cond case, to call one that is cruell, and a murtherer of his Senatours and Citizens, by the name of a valiant man, and a freer of his Countrey; as it is a flattery hard to be knowne, so it is both to Prince and City most pernicious. Of the first sort, was the case of Macrinus: of the second, that of Nero. As concerning the object, he whom we praise for a vertue, either is stained be∣fore, being Prince, with the contrary vice, as Nero was: or else he comes but newly to be Prince, as Macrinus did; if he were stayned before, it can doe no good, al∣though

the praise be for a vertue most remote from the vice; but if he come but newly to be Prince, it may then doe some good.

I will not omit (though this be not the proper place for it) to advertise, that a flatterer is a person, of whom a Prince ought to stand in feare; seeing two sorts of men may be his ruine: either, they that are too free; who using their freenesse in dispraising their Lord, must needs give him cause to be afraid; or else they, that are too wary, who concealing their thoughts, are apt to make conspiracies; and the flat∣terer being of this sort, a concealour of his thoughts, gives the Prince just cause to feare him. And therefore Tiberius an understanding man, neither liked those that flattered too much, nor those that spake too free∣ly; unde Augusta & lubrica Oratio, (saith Tacitus) sub Principe qui libertatem metuebat, adulationem oderat. And in another place, speaking of flattery, he saith, Quae, moribus corruptis perinde auceps si nulla, & ubi Nimia est.

Postquam Bruto & Cassio coesis, nulla jam publica arma Pompeius apud siciliam oppressus, exu∣toque Lepido, interfecto Antonio, ne Julianis quidem partibus nisi Caesar Dux reliquus; posito triumviri nomine, consulem se ferens & ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio Jure contentum, ubi Militem donis; Populum, annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit.

What things holpe Augustus to the Empire, and what meanes he used to maintaine it. The twelfth Discourse.

COrnelius Tacitus not onely in these words, but also in a good part of the first Book, entreating of Au∣gustus, labours to shew what meanes he used to attaine

the Empire; and what to uphold him, having attai∣ned it. And my meaning is to follow his course, and punctually to examine all things: dividing my Dis∣course into two parts: the first, to shew the waies which Augustus used to attaine the Empire; the second, the waies by which he maintained it.

The ordinary waies, as experience and men teach us, to come to a Principality, are either by fortune, or by vertue, or by wickednesse, or by craft, or by electi∣on; or lastly by succession.

Augustus then came to the Empire by fortune; which holpe him three waies: the first, that when Brutus and Cassius who were his enemies were dead; and that Lepidus and Antonius his partners in greatnesse were extinguisht; he only remained of the Caesarian faction: and therfore Tacitus speaking in what manner fortune ayded him, saith, Postquam Bruto & Cassio caesis; nulla jam publica arma, Pompeius apud siciliam oppressus; exuto Lepido, Interfecto Antonio, ne Julianis quidem partibus nisi Caesar Dux reliqu•…•…s: and so following.

This onely ayd of fortune, is the ablest way to raise one to a Principality: and therefore Pericles, (as Plu∣tarch in his life relates) by this onely meanes became Prince of Athens, Postquam Aristides vita decessit, Themi∣stocles exulatum abiit, Cimonem bella, plerique citra Graeciam detinuere, ibi demum Pericles populo se dedit.

But thisalone did not serve Augustus, but fortune in another manner gave him assistance: for the stoutest Citizens, being part banished, and part slaine in bat∣tailes, it was an easie matter to attaine the Empire without any let. This second ayd of fortune, Tacitus expresseth, where he saith, Insurgere paulatim, munia Senatus, Magistratum legumque in se trahere; nullo adver∣sante, cum ferocissimi peracies, aut proscriptione cecidissent.

Not lesse apt then the first, is this ayd, to make a change in States; seeing the people of Tarantum, onely

because the greater part of the Nobility were dead in warre, was easily able to change the state: whereupon Aristotle saith, Contingit vero quandoquidem id, (the change of the State) per fortunam, veluti apud 〈◊〉〈◊〉; cum superati praetio a Lampigensibus Nobilitatis magnam partem amississent.

But fortune not content with this neither gave Au∣gustus another ayd also, to make himselfe Emperour: which was, that he found the Common-wealth wea∣ried with discords, and the Provinces oppressed by Magistrates; which Tacitus describing saith, Cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa, nomine Principis sub Imperium accepit: and of the Provinces he addes, Neque Provinciae illum rerum statum abnuebant, suspecto Senatus populique Imperio, and that which followeth.

This way was the onely cause that brought Visconte to be Lord of Milan; and Bentivoli to be Lord of Bologna.

Yet fortune by all these waies had not power her selfe alone, to bring Augustus to the Empire; though (as we have shewed) each of them of it selfe were apt to doe it: but secondarily there concurred with them his own valour, which he shewed in so many battels: and lastly, in that Navall fight; by meanes whereof he came to be Emperour. And although this alone had beene sufficient to bring him to the Empire, as was seen in Vitellius, who by getting the victory onely in one battaile against Otho, made himselfe Lord of Rome; yet Augustus, besides fortune and his owne vertue, brought himselfe forward by desert, as having enlar∣ged the Roman Empire, Mari Oceano, haud amnitibus longinquis septum Imperium: by this way have many come to be Princes, as Saturnius, and others. And Aristotle himselfe approves it, where he saith, Praeterea ob bene∣ficia accepta Reges Creavere. Which Saint Thomas ex∣pounding, saith, Vel quia pugnavit contra 〈◊〉〈◊〉

pro illis, vel invenit artem aliquam iis necessariam.

But besides fortune, vertue, and merit, Augustus brought himselfe forward by wickednesse and perfidi∣ousnesse also, which ayded him two waies: First, by making use of those armes to oppresse his Countrey, which he had received to defend it, Arma quae in Anto∣nium caeperat contra Rempublicam versa: and indeed, there cannot be a greater wickednesse, then when be∣nefits are turned against him of whom they are recei∣ved: and therefore our Lord God meaning by the mouth of Esay, to shew the ungratefulnesse & wicked∣nesse of the Hebrew people, saith, Filios enutrivi, & exaltavi, ipsi autent spreverunt me, Where the Chaldee paraphrase saith, Tulisti de auro meo, atque de Argento meo, quae dedi tibi, & fecisti tibi Imagines Masculinas. This way was also followed by Hiero the Syracusan, who im∣ployed that Army to oppose the Common-wealth, which he had received to defend it.

But neither did this wickednesse of Augustus serve his turne, in committing so many murthers, as Tacitus describes where he saith, Pietatemerga parentem & tem∣pora Reipublicae obtentui sumpta. And againe, Cassii & Brutorum exitus paternis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 datos: deceptos post Antonium Tarentino Brundusinoque faedere: & nuptiis so∣roris illeptum, subdole affinitatis poenas mortis exolvisse. But not onely this wickednesse, with so many other causes spoken of before, concurred; though this alone were enough to bring a man to a Kingdome; as it did Aga∣thocles the Sicilian, and Cleomenes the Spartan and ma∣ny others; a way unworthy to be imitated not onely of Christians, but even of Barbarians: But besides all these, that which ayded Augustus was craft and policy: for being called in by his owne Citizens, and they di∣vided into Commons and Nobility; The Commons by reason of oppression by the great ones: the Nobles by reason of common diffension, desired rather to

have a King and be safe, then to have liberty, and be in danger: So as Augustus, Ad tuendam plebem, tooke upon him the dignity of a tribune; and to be ayded by the Nobility, advanced them in honours and riches, who Novis ex rebus aucti, tuta & praesentia, quam veter a & periculosa mallent. For safety is so sweet a thing, that the people liked better of servitude with safety, than of liberty with danger. And therefore the Israelites finding that the Canaanites were a valiant Nation, were ready rather to turne backe into Aegypt and be slaves; then to stay in Canaan and be in danger. As it happened also in Exodus, when they saw Pharao com∣ming, Nunquid non erant Sepulchra in Aegypto, quando se∣debamus super ollas 〈◊〉〈◊〉? And therefore the Ro∣mans having driven out the Kings, doubted lest the the people, if the Tarquins should make warre upon Rome, would not to resolve, rather to receive the ty∣rant againe, and live in peace; then continue in liberty, and be still in danger. Nec hostes modo timebant (saith Livy) sed suos met ipsos cives, ne Romana plebs, metu per∣culsa, receptis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 urbem regibus, vel cum servitute pacem ac∣ciperet. And here is to be noted, that men will alwaies be more moved with private interest, then with pub∣like profit; and that every one had rather be a slave and rich, then to be free and poore. Whereof I will bring one example out of Dio: Caesar having before him the Army of Scipio, caused Letters to be carried into the enemies Tents, wherein he friendly promised the Souldiers honours and riches, and to the Coun∣treymen, to save their goods untouched; and by this meanes, he drew them all to come to his side: on the cōtrary, Scipio also being forced to use the same device of sending Letters into Caesars Camp, perswaded them to be of his side, in defence and for the good of the Commonwealth; putting them in mind, of the great benefit of liberty: for all which perswasions, there was

not a man that would offer to go from Caesar; whereby we may plainly see, that ordinarily men preferre pro∣fit before honesty. And where it may be objected, that people infinite times make insurrections onely for their liberty: it is easily answered, if we consider that under that name of liberty, they alwaies thinke, or are made beleeve, there is great profit to be had: and therefore they desire liberty, not as an end, but as a means to another end.

But to returne to our purpose; besides so many causes alleged, concurring in favour of Augustus; this of election also is to be added: that he was chosen by the Senate, by the people, and by the Souldiers; by which meanes infinite others have obtained the Ro∣man Empire: and so it happened amongst the Graeci∣ans, so the Pope, so the Kings of Polan, so the Emperour in our times, by this meanes onely of being elected, attaine their Principalities.

Lastly, it may be also said, that he came to be Em∣perour by succession, as being the next of kin to Caesar, to whom by right of succession, besides his being made his heire by his Will, the Empire belonged.

We may then say, that Augustus came to be Empe∣rour, neither by fortune, nor by wickednesse, nor by policy, nor by merit, nor by election, nor by succession, but by all of them together; seeing each of these, (as I have before shewed) being apt of it selfe to raise a man to the Empire, certainely all of them concurring in Augustus could not choose but effect it.

And thus much for his attaining the Empire; now for holding it, thus gotten: we say, that an Empire may be held, either from the Nobility, or from the people, or from the Souldiers; and that either by love or by force. With the people it is held by procuring of plenty, and that the poore be not wronged by the rich; there being nothing that makes a Prince more

beloved of the people, than to keep them safe from the insolencie of great men. And therefore the Holy Ghost meaning to shew the cause, why all Nations should serve that King, saith, Omnes Gentes servient ei, quia liberavit pauperem à potente: and a little after, Et honorabile Nomen eorum coram illo. S. Hierome reads it, Et pretiosus crit sanguis eorum coram illo, That is, they shall hold the honour of the King in great account, and shall not leave unpunished whosoever shall imbrue their hands in his blood; as was seene in the conspiracy against Caesar. This therefore Augustus knowing, tooke upon him the power of a Tribune, Et ad tuendam ple∣bem Tribunitio jure contentunt: and suffered them not to be in want, knowing that safety without plenty is little esteemed: and therefore he saith, Populum annona.

Now for Noble men, they are of two sorts; stout, and timerous. In the stout, there is no trusting, being men that extreamely skorne a servile condition; and consequently extreamly hate a tyrant. And therefore it was necessary, Augustus should send such into banish∣ment or to the warres; and they once dead, he then remained secure and without feare of any new hatred. To the timerous and quiet are to be given honours; for a Gentleman hath no other end, but honour: and of these, the Prince ought to make use in peace; and as for warre he need not feare them: therefore Tacitus saith, Caeteri Nobilium quanto quis servitio promptior opibus & honoribus extolluntur: ac Novis ex rebus aucti, tuta & praesentia quam vetera & periculosa mallent. Where it is to be observed, that by caeteri he meanes, those onely that were not stout: there following, without any words between, Cum ferocissimi per acies ant proscriptione cecidissent.

Augustus then did well, to advance many of the Noble men, above the others; & especially those, that

shewed themselves most ready to do him service. First, to the end, that such example might draw others to the like servitude, thereby to gaine the like honour. Secondly, to the end that seeing honours attained to under a Prince, which could never have beene attai∣ned in a Common-wealth, they might the better be contented with such a State; and therefore Aristotle amongst the meanes for conserving a Kingdome, for∣gets not to speake of this, where he saith, Atque eos vi∣ros qui aliqua in re honorabiliter se gesserint honorare; ita ut non existiment unquam se magis honorari in civitate degenti∣bus potuisse. Thirdly, Augustus did well, to advance many great ones above others, because as where equa∣lity is, a Kingdome there is hardly raised, and liberty easily maintained: so where there is inequality, a King∣dome there is easily preserved: and therefore a Prince is to be commended, that removeth many from equa∣lity; to the end there may be seen a certaine propor∣tion, and not one to be unequall, and all the rest equall. The reason of this, in my opinion, is, because when onely one is seen unequall, all the rest will have a desire to reduce him to equality, and by some means or other to rid him away; but when there are many unequals, the inferiours not only will never be moved to conspire against the Prince, because they should never by this meanes come to equality: but also they will not suffer any other to doe it, resting satisfied in this, that as themselves have many unequals, their su∣periours; so those have the Prince unequall, and their superiour: and in this at least they shall be equall, that they are all of them inferiour to one.

But because obedience is hardly found, especially in new states, if there be not force concurring; where∣upon the Throne of Salomon, which by Writers is ta∣ken for obedience, was compassed about with twelve Lyons; seeing they who desire to be obeyed, ought

together with generosity, have force also to make them be obeyed; and therefore the holy Ghost in the mouth of Salomon saith, Sicut Turris David, collum tuum; quae aedisicate est cum propagnaculis; mille clypei pendent ex ea; omnis armatura fortium. This Towre hath so many de∣fences, because it is put for a figure of obedience; mea∣ning to shew, that they who desire to preserve obedi∣ence, have need of all sorts of Armes to defend it: for these causes, Augustus knowing this, and having an Army in his hand, able to make him be obeyed by force, if need should be, he made the Souldiers sure to him, by donatives of which they are most greedy: whereupon it may be said, that Augustus maintained his Empire, neither by the Nobility, nor by the peo∣ple, nor by the souldiers; neither by love, nor yet by force, but by all of them together.

Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio Iure contentum, ubi Militem donis, Populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit.

How Princes may get the peoples love: how a private man ought to make use of the peoples favour; and what part it hath in bestowing the Empire. The thirteenth Discourse.

AS safety is not enough to give the people satis∣faction, if it be not accompanied with plenty: and therefore the Israelites, though they lived safe under their leader Moyses, yet when plenty failed, they desired againe the servitude of Pharao: so neither doth plenty give satisfaction, if it be not accompanied with peace, as was plainly seene in that people; for when those men returned whom Joshua had sent into

the Land of Promise, to make known the fruitfulnesse of the Countrey, yet when they heard there were in it great store of Gyants, onely for this, they liked bet∣ter to stay in the Wildernesse in peace, then to goe to a Land flowing with Milke and Honey with warre: the desire of living quietly prevailing more with them, than the enjoying of plenty.

Three things then are required in a people, to make them absolutely happy: safety from being oppressed by those at home; peace with those abroad; and plen∣ty. Whereupon our Lord God meaning to shew the happinesse in which his people should live, expresseth these three things by the mouth of his Prophet Esay, where he saith, Sedebit populus meus in plenitudine pacis, here is peace: In Tabernaculis fiduciae, here is safety: In requie opulenti, here is plenty. Such a like happinesse Tacitus shewes that Rome had; or to say better, the people of Rome under the Dominion of Augustus; where he saith, Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio jure con∣tentum: see here, by making himselfe protectour of the people, he made them safe from oppressours at home: Vbi populum Annona, see here, plenty: Cunctos dulce∣dine otii pellexit, see here the safety from forraine ene∣mies, which is peace; for by the word Otium in this place (as I shall shew in another discourse) he meanes nothing else but peace.

But because many gather from this place, seeing Au∣gustus obtained and maintained his Empire by the love of the people; that therefore this is the true way, for all others to rise from a private man to be a Prince; and the rather because a place in Aristotle confirmed by many examples seemes to concurre in this opinion, where he saith, Et profecto antiquorum Tyrannorum plu∣rimi ex popularibus hominibus facti sunt; I shall be forced in discoursing of this matter, to proceed with distin∣ction, as finding many places directly contrary to this;

and particularly in the foresaid Tacitus, who in ano∣ther place shewes, that the peoples favour is rather a ruine than a fortune to great men; where in the third of his Annals he saith, Breves & Infaustos Rontani populi amores.

I say then, that he who is in the peoples favour, ei∣ther he hath a mind to make himselfe Prince, or he hath not: if he have no such mind, he shall doe better to avoyd those demonstrations with safety, which without any benefit makes him runne into danger; seeing a good intention is not sufficient, where it is e∣qually dangerous, to have such imputation, whether wrongfully or justly, as Tacitus well saith, Si objiciantur etiam insontibus, periculosa: because Princes, as soone as they see the peoples favour enclining to another, pre∣sently have him in suspition; and therefore David be∣gan to be hated of Saul, as soone as he knew the peo∣ple loved him: whereupon in the booke of the Kings, the holy Spirit saith, Posuitque eum Saul, supra viros belli, & acceptus erat in occulis Vniversi populi, maxime{que} in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 famulorum Saul: and a little after, Non rectis ergo oculis, Saul respiciebat David, a die illa & deinceps.

Likewise when the mysticall David, Christ, was seene to the Jewes, to enter triumphantly into Hieru∣salem on Palme-sunday, with great applause of the people, they presently began to conspire against him: The like hapned to Germanicus, whose case was much like that of Aristobulus; both of them being gracious with the people; young men of goodly presence, both; both of them next to the Crowne; under most cruell tyrants, Herod the great, and Tiberius Nero; both of them for the same causes put to death by fraud: one bewalled counterfetly of Herod; the other, feignedly of Nero; by whom in truth they came to their deaths. Of these then, it may be said, Breves & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 populi amores.

But if he that is in the peoples favour, have an in∣tention to make himselfe Prince, we must then distin∣guish: for either the peoples favour towards him growes out of a discontentment towards the Prince; or it comes out of anger arising from some suddaine accident: if in the first case; he that will make use of their favour, if he be able to hide it, which is a difficult thing, shall doe well to wait for some good occasion: seeing he may assure himselfe, that as discontentment encreaseth by little and little, and is nourished in minds once discontented; so it is hard, or rather im∣possible, it should vanish on a sudden: and therefore if he stay for a good beginning, where there hath prece∣ded a good occasion, as I have shewed in another dis∣course, there can be no doubt of having good successe. Princes therefore must take heed, they give the peo∣ple no such occasions; which are so much more dan∣gerous, as they are lesse violent: because in such cases, men are not moved with every light wind; but way∣ting for a fit opportunity, they then shew their minds when they see they have power to doe it, with the ruine of the Prince. And there needs no other proofe of this, than the examples of the Aragonesi, and of Ludovico Moro. But if the people be moved to ayd him, out of choler, this, as it is lesse dangerous for the Prince; so to him that would make use of it, it is more difficult: First, because when the beginnings are not preceded by fit occasions, as hath been shewed in the like cases, it seldome takes any good effect: And there∣fore when the people would have risen against Tibe∣rius, onely out of choler, because he had taken from them that small authority they had; this insurrection not being preceded by mature judgement, there was none would take upon him to be Head; and so the enterprise came to nothing Secondly, because the occasion which is founded upon choler, will soone

cease, and is never able to continue; and as it growes coole, makes men repent them of what they had done. And you cannot say, that having provoked the Prince with choler, there is now a necessity to follow that Head for feare; with whom, partaking in fault, they partake also in fortune; for this is directly the over∣throw of the businesse, because having provoked the Princes mind with their insurrection, and knowing they may please him againe with killing their Head, they will easily be drawne to murder him. Neverthe∣lesse, he that will make use of the peoples favour, for rising to any honour, which he thinks is his due, let him give them no time to thinke of the matter, but once perswaded, let him suddenly venture. Don Antonio of Portugall, finding he had the peoples favour, instantly without delaying any time, made use of it, and it took effect. So Bardanus called in by the Parthians, that would drive out Gotarze, went about it with all sud∣dennesse; and having gotten possession, knowing the inconstancy of that people, he suddenly fortified all the principall places of the Countrey. It is therefore no marvell, that Caius Cassius gave counsell to seize upon the Kingdome suddenly, knowing the Parthians to be fickle and inconstant; and this suddennesse ought the rather to be used, because for the most part, a people in insurrections is drawn to do things, which though good, yet are repugnant to their Genius: and therefore if time be given them, they soone perceive their errour, and thereupon repent, and put presently their repentance in execution. The Souldiers of Neroes guard, were with great cunning perswaded to give their consent to his death; but when they had time given them to perceive their errour, they suddenly turned to take revenge, and it tooke effect. Miles Vr∣banus longo Caesarum Sacramento 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & ad destituen∣dum Neronem arte magis & impulsu, quam suo ingenio tra∣ductus:

and that which followeth. Another example we have in the second of Tacitus his Annals; where speaking of Vonone, whom Tiberius at their desire had sent to the Parthians, he saith, that at first they received him with great applause, Et accepere barbari Laetantes prout ferme ad nova imperia; but those people thinking afterward of the matter, though he were a King of good conditions, and profitable for them, yet, because he came from the Emperour of Rome, and consequent∣ly contrary to the Genius of that Nation, they first repented them, and afterward expelled him. Mox subiit pudor degeneravisse Parthos petitum alio ex orbe Regem; and that which followeth. This then may passe for a ge∣nerall rule, alwaies when either through eloquence, or threatning, or reward, or any other cunning, a man is induced to doe a thing against his genius, seeing it de∣pends upon his will, it is like to last no longer then he hath time to thinke upon it: and therefore the best course in such cases, is so to mannage the businesse, that having once perswaded him, it be not left in his power to repent, as Bardanus did, by fortifying him∣selfe presently. So Jehu who in the life of Joram, was accepted King by Gods appointment, seeing the good inclination of the people towards him, and knowing that if he gave them time he should never perswade them to set upon their naturall Lord, he went in∣stantly to find out Joram, and slew him. This reason is taken into consideration by Abulensis, where he saith, Quia totus vigor Jehu erat in hoc, quod populus concorditer adjuvare illum volebat: si tamen differret opus ad aliquan∣tulum tempus, forte animi virorum tepescerent, & nollent insurgere contra Dominum suum antiquum. But the con∣trary of this being done by Julius Campitolinus, and Spurius Aemilius in Livy, both the one and the other were forsaken of the people, and they runne them∣selves into no small danger. For the people indeed are

never able to continue long in dissentions, having trades which they must necessarily follow to get their living; which Aristotle considering, is of the mind, that there cannot be a better kind of people in a City, then that which consists of Husbandmen; because being forced to attend their occupation, they are not able to stay long in seditions. He therefore that will make use of the people, for the purpose aforesaid, let him dispatch it, and doe it so speedily, that they may have no time given to repent them.

I cannot omit here to examine the reason, why the people oftentimes doe good actions upon the sudden, and such as upon mature deliberation they would not doe; and forbearing for brevities sake, certaine reasons which every one of himselfe may easily conceive, I only say, that this proceeds from the weaknesse of their understanding; It being their custome, either to doe nothing that is good, or else to doe it upon the sudden; because as Aristotle saith, All weake things come soon to their accomplishment and height: see∣ing nature, which is moved by the intelligences, and by God, bestowes little time upon the growth of base things, as is seen in Pompions, and other Herbs of smal moment. Another reason may be taken from the said Aristotle, who speaking of the Ancients who made the first principles contraries, saith, Quasi a veritate ipsa coacti; whereas S. Thomas learnedly shewes, that as a stone of its owne nature descends downward, and fire ascends upward; so the understanding naturally fol∣lows the better apparence: and therefore weake un∣derstandings, if they doe at any time any good thing, they must do it naturally, and consequently upon the sudden; for if they have time to thinke upon it, then the counsell which they give, or the action, which they doe, will be no longer naturall but Artificiall; and therefore weake understandings are not perfected by

deliberation, but rather confounded, and by this meanes would oftentimes goe astray. This then is the Philosophicall and Reall reason, why many having done something that is good, doe afterward by thinking upon it, and deliberating, spoyle and over∣throw it.

For resolution therefore, and to make the fore∣alleged passages to agree, I say, that the people are not the whole cause of raising one to a Royalty, but only concurre as a cause in part; neither yet the peo∣ple together with the Nobility, sufficient to make an alteration, where there are Souldiers; and therefore not without cause Tacitus saith, Breves & infaustos populi Romani amores: because the City of Rome was never without Praetorian souldiers. Of this there is a plaine example, in the whole siege of Nola, in Livy; and to speake of our owne times, in Verona, where the people having a mind to rise in favour of the Veneti∣ans, yet because the souldiers of the King of France and of the Emperour were within it, they were not able to doe any thing of moment. We may therefore conclude, that the people alone can never be an ab∣solute meanes to raise a man to a Principality, if it be not upon a suddaine, and that there be no Souldiers in the place; for against them there is no good to be done, although they should have the Nobility to assist them: but the people together with the souldiers, may easily raise one to the Empire, and when Tacitus saith, Breves & infaustos populi Romani amores, he means it of the people alone; but in this present place, he speakes of the people and souldiers together; which plainly appeares, because having said, Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio jure contentum, he addes, Vbi militem donis: shewing he well knew, that together with the people, the souldiers must concurre. And Aristotle dif∣fers not from Tacitus, nor yet from my opinion, but

rather confirmes both the one and the other: seeing, where he gives a reason, how it happened, that in an∣cient times the favourites of the people came to be Lords, he saith, that the same man who was powerfull with the people, was also Leader of the Army; and so, had both people and souldiers of his side. And addes withall, that whosoever of late time hath at∣tempted any thing, relying only upon the people, hath never brought his purpose to any good passe: A manifest argument, that the people concurre as a cause in part, if the souldiers joyne with them: Vetustis quident temporibus (saith he) quando idem erat potens in populo ac Bello, Dux, Popularis Respublica in Tyrannidem mutabatur, & profecto antiquorum Tyrannorum plurimi ex popularibus hominibus facti sunt: causa autem cur tunc fierent, non autem nunc, illa est, quod qui tunc in populo maxime poterat, ex iis erat qui bello 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

Ubi Militem donis.

How the Donatives which are given to souldiers are profi∣table to raise a man, and to maintine him in the Empire•…•… and when it is that Military discipino is corrupted by them. The fourteenth Discourse.

THere are two things chiefly that move men to follow the warres; Acquiring of honour, and encrease of riches; and both these are in Donatives: for Donatives, as to the thing it selfe, is an encrease of wealth; and comming from the Princes hand, as a te∣stimony of the souldiers valour, they are an encrease of Honour. It is therefore no marvell that Augustus, not only at his entrance into the Empire, but even from his childhood, used with Donatives to winne the soul∣diers

love, seeing they are able to corrupt the wisest and best men; as our Lord God in Exodus hath left written, Nec accipies munera quae etiam excaecant prudentes & subvertunt verba justorum. Whereupon not without cause, S. John in the Apocalyps, cals them by the name of Witchcraft, where speaking of Rome under the fi∣gure of Babylon he saith, Quia mercatores tui erant Prin∣cipes terrae, quia in venesiciis tuis erraverunt omnes Gentes. Where S. John intends to shew, according to the opi∣nion of some, that Rome by meanes of guifts, as it were with sorcery, had drawne the greatest part of the world, to the adoration of Idols. Tiberius therefore knowing what power there is in them, when Junius Gallus had moved in the Senat, that Gifts and Honours should be bestowed upon the souldiers of his Guard, he sharply reproved him (saith Tacitus) veluti coram rogitans, quid illi cum militibus esset, quos neque ditu Impe∣ratoris, neque Praemia nisi ab Imperatore accipere par esset.

Yet the introduction of Donatives was to the Com∣monwealth of Rome of exceeding great damage. First, they have been, (as I shall shew in fit place) in great part the cause, why the City of Rome, freed once from tyranny by Lucius Brutus, was never afterward able, being oppressed by the House of the Caesars, to recover its liberty; the Donatives having put the election into the souldiers hands, and they, not to lose so great a gaine, would alwaies rather have an Emperour for their private profit, than a Commonwealth for the publike benefit. Secondly, because having an Army in their hand, on which the election and safety of the Emperours depended, as men greedy of money, they were moved to stand for him who offered most, in such sort, that at last they came to set it, at who gives more: and because as Aristotle in his Politicks well observes, when Honours are bestowed in a City, in regard of riches, it is an easie matter for every Plebeian to be∣come

Honourable; and therefore no marvell that Elius Pertinax an Hostlers sonne, came to be chosen Emperour.

It is therefore a cleere case, that these Donatives were the ruine of the City of Rome; from whence also may be inferred, that they were hurtfull to the Prince, whose profit depended upon the welfare of the City. But because the contrary happens where tyrants go∣verne, I shall be forced to examine, whether the intro∣duction of Donatives were for the Emperours benefit, or no. Many approve the affirmative part, as moved not onely by the said place of Tacitus, where he shew∣eth, they were to Augustus a speciall helpe; but by the example also of Caesar, who by this meanes, both ob∣tained and maintained the Empire. And it availes not to say, that he was there slaine, because seeing one mans indignation was enough to make a Prince be murthered; the difference that may be taken from the ones well, and the others ill governing, for conserving the Empire, ought not to be taken from a violent death, but rather that death being revenged, and the antient successours replaced in their states: I see not, how there can be a greater signe, of proceeding with judgement for his owne security, being able even after his death, with his only name, to procure his revenge, and to settle the Empire in his owne family; a hard matter oftentimes for the best Princes to obtaine, who yet have the favour of God, to die a naturall death. This example therefore, (to omit many others, of which Histories are full) is an evident proofe, that Donatives to the Souldiers, were profitable to the Roman Emperours, not only to attaine the Empire, but also to maintaine them in it. Neverthelesse, for the Negative part, there want not examples to the con∣trary, not only of Otho, but of infinite other Emperors, who by giving excessive Donatives, lost the Empire.

For resolution, we must proceed with distinction; either he that comes to the Empire, is the first that brought in Donatives, as Caesar the Dictatour, and Octavius Augustus were; and then not onely they help to attaine, but also to maintain the Empire: and there∣fore Tacitus intimates it as a praise to Augustus, where he saith, Vbi Militem Donis; or else he is not the first, but finds it a custome brought in before, and then as it may be a good meanes to attaine the Empire; so it is a certaine ruine for maintaining it. The reason of this difference is, because the souldiers not being accusto∣med to receive Donatives; the first time it is given thē, they acknowledge it as a gift of the Princes bounty, and account themselves obliged for it; and more than so, not knowing whither they should receive the like from others, they endeavour to uphold him in the Empire, hoping hereafter to have those things by merit, which the Prince at this time hath given them of courtesie. But if they have been accustomed to have Donatives, and it hath been a use amongst them, then, where in the first, they acknowledged them the only bounty of the Prince, and received them as gifts of grace; now accounting them as debt, they take them as rewards of due, which if it be denyed them, it then causeth an implacable hatred against the Prince, and at last, his ruine; and if it be granted them, yet this en∣creaseth not the souldiers love, who count not them∣selves beholding to the Prince for them, but as fellows accustomed to have money without paines, they spend it frolickly, and that spent, they expect new Dona∣tives; which if a Prince may satisfie a while, yet he cannot hold out to doe so long, but that at last he must be faine to deny them; and when this happens they presently fall to choose a new Emperour of whom they may receive it; and this hath been in Rome, the ruine and death of many, as every one may read

and see. We may therefore conclude, that Donatives to the souldiers are very profitable to all for attaining the Empire, but that the introduction of Donatives for them that were not the first, is very pernitious for maintaining them in it. And Galba having al∣ready attained the Empire, and knowing this, open∣ly made it knowne, that he meant to give no more Donatives to the souldiers, as resolved to take away so great an abuse, Accessit Galbae vox, pro Republica, ho∣nesta, ipst anceps; legi a se Militem, non emi, but it had an unhappy issue: First, because (as I have shewed in a∣nother Discourse) the Souldiers were against their genius induced to abandon Nero; and therefore it had been fit, with the same cunning to have held them in, and not have suffered them to be conscious of their errour, Miles Vrbanus longo Caesarum Sacramento imbu∣tus, & ad destituendum Neronem, arte magis & impulsu, quam suo ingenio traductus, postquam neque dari Donati∣vum sub nomine Galbae, and that which followes. Se∣condly, having gotten no reputation amongst the souldiers, and by reason of his age, being apt to be contemned, he should rather with liberality have got∣ten their love, than through covetousnesse have pro∣cured their hate. Non enim ad hanc formam (saith Taci∣tus, to not giving donatives to Souldiers) Caetera erant; invalidum senem; and that which followes. Thirdly, if he would not give donatives himselfe; yet at least, he should have taken order, that no other in his preju∣dice, should have given them; which because he did not doe, he therefore with his avarice was by Otho's liberality easily oppressed. Quoties Galba apud Othonem epularetur, cohorti excubias agenti, viritim centenos 〈◊〉〈◊〉 divideret, quā veluti publicam largitionem Otho securioribus apud singulos praemiis, intendebat, adeo animosus corruptor ut Cocceio Proculo speculatori de parte finium cum vicino am∣bigenti, universum vicint agrum sua pecunia emptum, dono

〈◊〉〈◊〉 per: focordium 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Fourthly, to take away a custome so 〈◊〉〈◊〉, he should have contented himselfe in the beginning, with onely moderating it, especially, seeing he might have obtained his purpose, with any small donative, Constat potuisse conciliari ani∣mos (faith 〈◊〉〈◊〉) quantulacunque parci senis liberalitate; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 antiquus vigor, & nimia severitas, cui jam pares non 〈◊〉〈◊〉. By which words we may plainly see, that Tacitus blames not his severity, but the excessivenesse of it: whereupon Vespasian who knew as much as Galba knew, tooke a better course, and had his intent. For moderating only the donatives of the souldiers, he left them not altogether without hope of having some; & by this means, he preserved himselfe in the Empire, and yet corrupted not the souldiers: Ne Vespasianus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 plus civili bello 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quam alii in pace, egregie 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad∣versus militarem largitionem, eoque exercitu meliore.

If any should now enquire, whether donatives to the souldiers corrupt Military Discipline, or no? I would briefly answer, That rewards uphold it, but that donatives corrupt it: and the reason is, because donatives being such as are given without cause, the souldier may alwaies by the same right demand them; and whilest he stands waiting for this ayd from the Prince, he becomes idle and good for nothing. But rewards given for some notable service, cannot but for such service he demanded, and that souldiers should endeavour to do such services, is a matter of great pro∣fit to Military difcipline. And therefore Caesar, with Reward, made his Souldiers more valorous, and Otho, with donatives corrupted them.

Populum Annona.

How much it imports a Prince for getting the peoples love, to maintaine plenty, by what meanes scarcity happens, and how it may be helpt, and how a Prince may make good use of it. The fifteenth Discourse.

ABove all things for winning the peoples love, a Prince must take care there may be plenty; in regard whereof, Caesar ordained two Aediles, whose imployment was onely to this purpose. Also Augustus knowing of how great importance this is, (as Tacitus relates) amongst other secrets of his government, had alwaies a great jealousie of Aegypt, from whence all the Corne for maintenance of plenty in Rome, came; and indeed both the one and the other understood it rightly, because, as the want thereof is apt to cause insurrections amongst the people, as was often seen amongst the Israelites against Moyses, who if God had not mightily protected him, had oftentimes for this onely been in manifest danger: so on the contrary, the onely plenty of things is enough of it selfe to raise a man to the Empire; As was seen at Rome, when the City was so opprest with a dearth, that the Citizens chose rather to die in the water of Tiber, than to stay upon the Land, and be starved with hunger. And he that will see an example of this, may consider how our Lord Jesus Christ, having fed a multitude that fol∣lowed him in the Wildernesse, he had presently the acclamations to be a King, or a Prophet, Illi ergo ho∣mines (saith S. John) cum vidissent quod Jesus fecerat sig∣num, (that is of the bread and fish he gave them) dice∣bant quia hic est vere Propheta qui venturus est in mun∣dum,

Jesus ergo cum cognovisset, quia venturi essent ut rape∣rent eum, & facerent eum Regem, fugit interim in montem; but they another time, desiting to eate, asked him bread, Domine semper da nobis panem bune; and he at that time denying to give them temporall bread, the multitude, which before when he gave them meat, had called him a Prophet, and would have had him for their King, now they call him a Carpenters sonne, for no other cause, but because he denied them corpo∣rall bread, when he meant to set them at Gods owne Table: Murmurabant ergo Judaei die illo, quia dixisset ego 〈◊〉〈◊〉 panis 〈◊〉〈◊〉, qui de Caelo descendi, & dicebant nonne 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Joseph cujus nos novimus patrem & matrem? For there is no such happinesse to the people, as to have wherewith to fill their bellies. Whereupon as S. Chrysostome observes, in making mention of the mi∣racles and stupendious Acts of Moyses, they omitted all other, though farre more marvellous, and mentio∣ned onely that of Manna, Patres nostri 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Manna in deserto.

A Prince therefore must of necessity, either main∣taine plenty, or else leave his Principality, and speci∣ally one that comes newly to the Empire, as Augustus did. And therefore Esay, Prophesying of one whom the Israelites should require to accept the Kingdome, shewes that if they knew him not able to maintaine plenty, they should not accept him, In domo mea non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 panis nolite constituere me Regem super vos. Being assured, he could never hold his Principality with dearth, as it hapned to Prometheus King of the Scythians, who not being able to maintaine his people in plenty, by rea∣son the Land was overflowed with the River 〈◊〉〈◊〉, he was cast into Prison; and because Hercules turned that River into the Sea, and made the Country fruitfull, the fable came up, that an Eagle devoured the liver of Prometheus, and that Hercules freed him.

Having shewed, that Augustus in the beginning of his raigne, wonne the people to him by procuring of plenty, it will be necessary to shew, how dearths hap∣pen, and by what means they may be helpt, and how farre the Prince is faulty in them.

A dearth may happen first, from the barrennesse of the soile, as it happened to the Israelites in the Wil∣dernesse.

Secondly, It may happen, for want of Husband∣men to till the ground, which if it were tilled, would be very sufficient and have to spare, as in times past, it happened in Mesopotamia, and in our time would often happen in the Sea coasts of Siena, if the care of the Se∣renissimo the great Duke did not supply the want of Husbandmen.

Thirdly, it may happen through abundance of peo∣ple, and smalnesse of Territory, as in ancient time it would have happened at Rome, and would in our time at Florence, if the one had not then had the Countries of Aegypt and Sicilie for a Granary, and the other had not now a gracious and provident Prince for a purveyour.

Fourthly, it may happen through the sterility of the season, and of the yeere, as particularly this yeere 1621.

Fifthly, many times there are Husbandmen and land enough to till, but is not tilled, either by reason of warre, or for some other cause, as it happened at Rome not long after the banishment of the Tarquins; the people (as Livy relates) by reason of dissentions with the Senate, refusing to till their grounds, in such sort that they wanted not much of dying for hunger.

Lastly, it happens oftentimes, either by reason of a siege, as in Hierusalem, where mothers did eate their owne children; or through incursions of enemies, as in Athens all the time of the civill warre.

And although in none of these cases, any just blame can be laid upon the Prince, yet it is his part to use all meanes, with money, diligence and power, to make resistance against fortune, nature, and all accidents whatsoever.

In the first case, I shall not need to trouble my selfe to shew, how a dearth may be helpt in desart places; seeing he might well be accounted a man without braine, that would build a City, in a Countrey alto∣gether barren: and though it were so with the Israe∣lites, yet their Tabernacles were for passage and not for habitation.

If it should happen in the second case, that is for want of men, where there is Land sufficient; here the Prince must induce men to marry, and draw in stran∣gers to dwell in the Countrey; the first will take effect, if the course of Lycurgus be observed, who seeking to make the City of Sparta populous, allowed great ex∣emptions to them that begot children, or else if dis∣burthening them of taxes, (as the Duke of Parma at this day doth in his State of Castro) he shall give occasi∣on, that gathering wealth, they may endeavour to have children to whom to leave it; and by this course, he shal be able to draw strangers also to come and live there. For men run willingly even with danger of their lives, where they see there is certaine & present profit to be had, never having a thought of a future and uncertaine death. Wherof we have example in the State of Milan, where in some places the ayre is so unwholsome, that few of the inhabitants ever come to be forty yeeres old; yet in these places, men growing rich, although they see this example daily before their eyes, yet they choose rather to dwell there, than in other places of wholsome ayre. Another course also may be taken, for this inconvenience, by drawing thither, a forraigne Nation, as Antiochus did, who causing two

thousand families of Jewes to come and dwell in the Countries of Mesopotamia and Babylon, (as Josephus re∣lates) assighed them Land to till, and places where to build, and then exempting them for ten yeeres from tribute, he lastly gave order, they should have so much Corne given them, as might serve them to live, till their own should be reaped.

And lastly, those who dwell in such ayre, and in such Countries, should indeed, have no other burthens laid upon them, but only the burthen of bringing up their children, Pauperes satis stipendit pendere (saith Livy) si liberos educent. But notlling prevailes so much to make a place populous, as the Princes living there: and so 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Hostilius did; and we have experience of it at Petiglidho, where whilst the Orsini that were Lords of it, kept their residence, it was infinitely fuller of people than it is at this day, under the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the great Duke of Thuscany, though governed by him, with admirable justice and clemency; of so great im∣portance is the presence of their naturall Lord, that many times men had rather have a tyrant, that should live amongst them, than a good Prince, that should be farre of.

Another way is no wadaies used by Princes for peo∣pling such places, and it is, by confining some petty delinquents thither; because, if they live, they encrease the number of the inhabitants; and if they die, the Prince receives no losse by it. This invention whether good or bad, is yet most ancient; and we have an ex∣ample of it in Tacitus himselfe, Actum & de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Ae∣gyptiis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pellendis, factunque 〈◊〉〈◊〉 consultum, ut quatuor millia libertini generis, & superstitione infecti, queis Idonea aetas, in insulam Sardiniam 〈◊〉〈◊〉, coercen∣dis illic latrociniis, & si ob gravitatem 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 vile damnum.

If the defect grow in the third case, that is, from smal∣nes

of Territory, where the people are many, the reme∣dy here used, hath been to send forth Colonies; so Peri∣cles did, to help a dearth that was at Athens. In this case Plutarch in the life of Numa, gives a counsell, which is, that in such a City, care must be taken that Trades be in account, and that idle persons be punished; but the best course of all will be, that the Prince spare no cost to fetch Corne, where it may be best had; so a thou∣sand times did Tiberius, and so Nero, who not regar∣ding the great charge he had been at by Sea, nor the great losse he had in Tyber, with infinite expenses, provided that the price of Corne might not be raysed. This course was notably followed, by the Serenissimo Cosmo, second great Duke of Thuscany, who by the way of Livorno, and other places, procured at his infi∣nite charges, a perfect plenty; and sometimes out of his owne purse, hath kept of Almes six thousand per∣sons. I forbeare to say, that many yeeres together, he spent of his owne, to keepe down the price of Corne, above a hundred thousand Crownes: An act that ex∣ceeds any act whatsoever of the Ancients, seeing that which moved them, was their owne interest, and mat∣ter of state; but that which moved him, was only the office of a Prince, and the zeale of a Christian.

In the fourth case, provision will be made from o∣ther Countries, by such waies as have been shewed.

In the other two cases, where dearth may happen by reason of warres, caused by sieges, and by incursion of enemies, the Commonwealths of the Swizzers, have found out an excellent way, who in places under ground, have in store for many yeeres, all things be∣longing to victuals, and also to Trades; which course, with great prudence, the Commonwealth of Lucca hath taken to imitate.

But above all, the Prince must take heed, that he be not himselfe a cause of the dearth, by making mer∣chandise,

and by engrossing, nor yet by suffering o∣thers to doe it, for then the fault will be laid upon the Prince, and the Subjects will have just cause to complaine. Likewise, that when the people are in want, he continue not feasting, and feed upon dain∣ties, as shewing to take little care of his Subjects mi∣sery; a thing most pernitious to Princes, who should alwaies take such part as the people doe, thereby to encourage them the more contentedly to beare their labours. This in the old Testament our Lord God teacheth us; who when the Israelites were in the Wil∣dernesse, and like Shepheards dwelt in Tabernacles, he also would dwell in Tabernacles himselfe; after∣ward when changing their course, they entred into warre under their Judges and Kings, and their Army used Tents, he also would then dwell in Tents too; and when David desired to build him a Temple, he would not suffer him, untill such time, as there being peace under Salomon, every one might dwell in his own house, and then he was contented to have a house also built for him. All this is expressed in the Booke of Kings, where he saith, Neque enim habitavi in domo ex die illa qua eduxi filios Israel de terra Aegypti, usque in diem hanc, sed ambulabam in Tabernaculo & in Tentorio per cuncta loca, quae transivi cum omnibus filiis Israel. But be∣cause this course was not imitated by Augustus, who when the people died in the streets for hunger, him∣selfe made a sumptuous banquet, where (as Suetonius relates) the guests sate in form of Gods and Goddesses, and he in shape of Apollo, the people infinitely distast∣ed it, and was moved to great indignation. Auxit caenae rumorem, summa tunc in civitate penuria, ac fames, accla∣matumque postridie est, frumentum omne Deos coniedisse.

But if he shall be no occasion of the dearth, and much lesse shew himselfe to rejoyce at it, he may then convert it to his owne profit, either by getting of

money, or encreasing his authority, or otherwise by winning the love of his people. Pharao King of Aegypt, by meanes of a dearth and Josephs counsell became Lord of all Aegypt, Emit igitur Joseph omnem terram Ae∣gypti, vendentibus singulis possessiones suas, prae magni∣tudine fantis, subjecitque eam Pharaoni, & cunctos populos suos, a novissimis terminis Aegypti, usque ad extremos fines ejus; which purchase was not distastfull to the people, for the cause aforesaid; but rather they accounted themselves obliged to the King for it, saying, Salus nostra in manu tua est, respiciat tantum nos Dominus noster, & laeti serviemus Regi. Whereupon I conclude, that when a great famine was in Rome, and the Senatours had fetched Corne from Sicilie, then had been a fit time to take the authority from the people, which they had usurped. This, Coriolanus in Livy well knew, whose conceit yet was not approved of others; not because it was not sufficient being used with lesse vio∣lence, to take away that authority, but because it was not sufficient to maintaine it, seeing the Senatours having a purpose to augment the Common-wealth, and consequently to make use of the peoples Armes, they might conceive, that those Magistrates who had left their authority in time of dearth, would after∣ward, the dearth ceasing, resume it againe by force.

A dearth then thus managed, will be a means to get the Prince, both authority and riches, and the love also of his Subjects. As we see in Herod the great, who being a Prince the most hated of his people that ever any was; yet onely by relieving them with Corne, in a time of dearth, he made himselfe beloved, obliged, and freed from a thousand dangers.

Cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit.

What kind of ease it is that Tacitus speaks of, and how it may be reconciled with some places in other Authours. The sixteenth Discourse:

IN these words Cornelius Tacitus shews us, that Augu∣stus by meanes of procuring ease, got himselfe the love of all men. And because, he as a new Prince, ought rather to have sought how to maintaine himselfe in his Empire; then how with his own danger to procure delights to his Subjects; it seemes, he might for this be reproved, there being a precept of Aristotle in his Poli∣ticks, where teaching the true way that a Prince ought to take, for maintaining him in his State, he perswades this specially, not to keep the people in ease, and gives us for example the Kings of Aegypt, who to the end their people should not stand idle, caused so many Pyramides, and Mausoleums to be built, as Pisistratus the tyrant built the Olympus, and Polycrates a thou∣sand Fabricks about Samos, Haec enim omnia (saith Ari∣stotle) fuerunt instituta ad otium & quietem populorum tol∣lendam, ut illi quotidianis molostiis occupati, vacare non pos∣sent ad consilia contra tyrannos ineunda. And there is rea∣son for it, as is said in Ecclesiasticus, Cibaria & Virga & Onus Asino, Panis & Disciplina & opus servo, operatur in disciplina & quaerit libertatem, jugum illorum curvat collum, & servum inclinant operationes assiduae servo ma∣levolo tortura, & compedes, mitte illum in operationem ne vacet; multam enim malitiam docuit otiositas. And so much more might Augustus be blamed for it, seeing (as we have shewed before) he maintained the people in plenty; and now if to plenty be added case, it cannot

choose but be the ruine of any City whatsoever. Haec fuit iniquitas Sodomae, (saith Ezechiel) Abundantia panis & otii.

And againe, because this ease assigned by Tacitus came presently after a warre, his fault may be the more, there being a passage of Aristotle in his Politicks, where he saith, That the Lacedemonians passing from warre to ease, incurred great danger.

Thirdly, there is a place in Livy also, that crosseth this of Tacitus, where he saith, that Tarquinius Priscus, after his fight with the Latines returning to Rome in peace, kept the people in continuall and laborious exercises, of which Livy saith, Majore inde animo Pacis opera inchoata 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quanta mole gesserat bell a, ut non quie∣tior populus domi esset, quam militiae fuisset.

To reconcile then these foure Texts, it must be shewed, that neither of them is repugnant to another, but that all of them agree together. First, I distinguish of ease, which, as to our purpose, is of two kinds; ease, which is a desisting from any action at all; and ease, which is contrary to warre; because warre being a violent action, those souldiers which are in peace, al∣though they have other exercises, yet are said to be at ease; seeing desisting from warre, they desist from that violent action, which is proper to them. In this sense Aristotle once tooke ease, where speaking of the Lace∣daemonians, he saith, Splendorem enim veluti ferrum, per pacem amittunt; causa hujus est legis positor, qui non ita in∣stituit, ut in otio stare possint.

By meanes of this distinction, this place of Tacitus is reconoiled with the first place out of Aristotle; seeing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by ease here, meanes not an ease contrary to all action; for Augustus both with sports and playes, and buildings, held the people in continuall worke, in∣somuch that he could boast, he had made Rome a City of Marble, which he found but of Bricke; but he means

it of that ease which is contrary to warre. And this is plainely seene, because having said before, Cuncta dis∣cordiis civilibus sessa, he presently comes in with this very word, Cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit. Thus Aristotle agrees with him exceeding well, in that Text, where he likes the people should be held in action but not in warre: and indeed in such actions, as debase men, and are worse then ease. So dealt Pharao with the Is∣raelites, putting them to make Bricke, and other most base workes. Whereupon it is said in Exodus, Praepo∣suit i•…•…aque eis Magistros operum, ut affligerent eos operibus; and a little after, Oderant filios Israel Aegyptii, & asslige∣bant cos, & invidentes eis, atque ad amaritudinem perduce∣bant vitam eorum, operibus duris luti & lateris, omnique fa∣mulatu.

But to this resolution, that place of Livy before cited is most contrary, wherespeaking of Tarquinius Priscus, he shews, that returning from the wars, he held the people in hard and cruell labours. For answer whereunto we must distinguish, that the Princes are either in termes of getting more, or else but of kee∣ping that they have already gotten; if to get more, then it is necessary to hold the people in hard labours, to the end they may not lose courage, and be imba∣sed in their spirits. And therefore no marvell that Tarquinius Priscus teacheth us to hold the people in hard labours, seeing the Romans at that time had no other end, but to enlarge their Empire. But if the Prince have no ayme at augmentation by new acquests and stands not so much in feare of externall enemies, as of friends at home, he then ought to let the people enjoy a negotious ease, of buildings, and playes, and such like things. And this made Augustus take this course, because he aymed not at all, at any amplifying of his Empire, as from many places in Tacitus may be gathered, and particularly from that place where in

the first of his Annals he saith, Bellum ea tempestate nul∣num, nist adversus Germanos, abolendae potius injuriae, ob 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cum Prisco Varo exercitum, quam cupidine profe∣rendi Imperii. And in another place where he saith, Con∣silium coercendi intra terminos Imperium, whereby we see, he was minded rather to restraine, then to enlarge the Empire.

Lastly, it remaines to reconcile that other place of Aristotle in the second of his Politicks, where by the ex∣ample of the Lacedemonians, he shewes, that after warre, to be left to live at ease, is a dangerous thing.

For Resolution whereof, I say, that the passing from warre to ease, is then dangerous, when men returne from a short warre, and in which they have had the better; because they that get victories, by reason of the pride which victory brings with it, are apt in Cities, to raise commotions. So it fell out amongst the Lacedemonians, and so a thousand times it hath been like to fall out amongst the Romans, whereof, in the whole first decad of Livy we may see examples. But when men come from a warre bloody and long; then they love and are glad of peace. Whereupon in our case the Romans comming from an infinity of civill warres, in which to winne was no better than to lose; and being now weary, as is gathered by the words, Cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa, they became not onely desirous, but apt also to tollerate ease.

It is now sufficiently proved, that Tacitus, or to say better, Augustus is no way discordant either from the precepts of Aristotle, or from the examples of Livy, but that with great judgment, he undeavoured to win every one with ease.

Lastly, it is necessary to reconcile Tacitus with him∣selfe, who in this place praiseth ease, and yet afterward examining the causes of the tumults in Germany, he saith, Habebantur per otium; as though ease were the

cause of those rebellions. To which I briefly say, there is great difference betweene the ease that is in a City, and the ease that is of souldiers in warre; because the end of a City, is to live in peace, whereof the ease spo∣ken of before is a companion; but the chiefe end of souldiers at the warres, is to fight, to which ease is con∣trary and an enemy: and so the souldier with ease, and the Citizen by warre, are deprived of their ends, and consequently in short time runne into danger.

Neque Provinciae illum rerum statum abnuebant, suspecto Senatus Populique Imperio ob certamina Potentium, & avaritiam Magistratuum: invalido legum auxilio, quae vi, ambitu, postremo pecunia turbabantur.

That Cities subject to another City, better like the govern∣ment of a King, than of a Commonwealth, and that every City would gladly have their Lord to live amongst them. The seventeenth Discourse.

COrnelius Tacitus in these words makes us know, that the Provinces subject to the people of Rome, liked better the government of a King, than of a Com∣monwealth, as it happens generally to all Cities that are subject to another: So Guicciardine relates of Cre∣mona, that it liked better to be under the King of France, than to be governed by the Common-wealth of Venice. And hereof we have a manifest example in Pisa, which being sold by Gabriel Maria Visconte, to the Common-wealth of Florence, there was scarce one Ci∣tizen that would tarry in it. But more than in any o∣ther, we may see the truth of this, in the Lycians, who having tried what it was to live under a King, and un∣der

a Common-wealth, they called the servitude of that, in comparison of this, liberty. Neque miserabilis legatio Lyctorum, qui crudelitatem Rhodiorum quibus ab Lu∣cio Cornelio attributi erant, quaerebantur fuisse sub ditione 〈◊〉〈◊〉 eam Regiam servitutem, collatam cum praesenti statu pnaeelaram libertatem visam: Non publico tantum se 〈◊〉〈◊〉 imperio, sed singulos injustum pati servitium.

Of these points we will speake, first in particular of Rome, then in generall give the reasons; Lastly, we will shew, that every City would we glad to be under a particular Prince, and one that should dwell amongst them.

Concerning the first; all those changes of State, which come from a worse, must needs be welcome; from whence it is, that after the expulsion of the Tar∣quins, liberty was so pleasing, Et ut laetior esset (saith Livy) proximi Regis superbia fecit. That in our case, the Commonwealth was corrupted even to the worst degree, is sufficiently expressed by Tacitus in the fore∣said words. First, by reason of the discord of the great ones; one of which factions there was a necessity to follow, and that overcome, all then remained at the discretion of the other. Secondly, by occasion of the Magistrates, who sought rather to satisfie their avarice with money, than to take care for the executing of ju∣stice. Thirdly, because the laws had now no more place, as being easily corrupted by force and mony. Just cause therefore had the Provinces, to be glad of the govern∣ment of Augustus.

But because this liking of a subject City, to be ra∣ther under a Prince than under a Commonwealth, (as we have said before) is a common liking of all Provin∣ces and Cities that are under another, It will be neces∣sary to search out the reason, why it is so. And for a first reason, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 certaine politioian brings this, because Commonwealths are more durable than Kingdomes;

and being more durable, there is lesse hope to shake off their servitude, and are therefore the more hated. Secondly, because Common-wealths having no other care, but to make themselves greater, and others lesse; they endeavour only to weaken the subject Cities, and to strengthen their own body; a thing which Princes care not to doe: and for this, he brings the example of the Samnites, who as long as they were of them∣selves, maintained warre with the Romans a hundred yeeres; a manifest signe, they were then a strong peo∣ple; but afterwards falling in subjection to Rome, they became most weake, and of no force.

But because the first of these reasons is false, and the second followes no lesse in Kingdomes than in Common-wealths, (with leave of so great a man) I have conceived perhaps a better reason, and it is, be∣cause the Provinces and Cities having been at warre, and by reason of the warre, grown to hate one ano∣ther, and that hatred in processe of time become na∣turall, as it was between the Romans and the Cartha∣ginians, between the Pisanes and the Florentines, and others; it happens, that being overcome, they are held in subjection by their naturall enemies; which subjection is so much the more distastfull, as being be∣tween persons that are equall: and from hence it is, that so gladly men seek to shake of the yoak. So, many times did Pisa, so Spaine with the Romans, who doub∣ting the like of Greece; as knowing by their continuall rebellions, that they il brooked their subjection to the Commonwealth of Rome, they destroyed many Cities, and at last Corinth.

But if it happen that this Common-wealth fall into the hand of a Prince, there is no doubt but the other Cities and Provinces will be glad: a principall reason is, because where these served, and those ruled before with inequality, now under a Prince, they both serve

equally; and comming to be commanded, by persons much their superiours, the Dominion is so much lesse hated, as the person is greater that commands; and therefore we see, that Pisa which under a Common∣wealth was alwaies in rebellion, now that it is under a Prince, hath lived, and doth live, and is like to live, in most quiet peace; it is true indeed, there concurres the graciousnesse of the Prince that sweetens all things. Another manifest example we have in the Ro∣man Histories; and it is, that Spaine, as long as the City of Rome was a Commonwealth, was continually in rebellion; nor could ever be quieted, till the said City came into the hand of a Prince under Augustus. I omit the example of the Philistines, who never left warring with the Israelites, from the first day (I may say) they entered into the Land of Promise, untill they were setled in a Regall government un∣der David.

To come to the third head: not onely Cities and Provinces cannot abide to be under the rule of a Com∣monwealth; but neither doe they like to be under a Prince that is a stranger, and that dwels not amongst them; which Prince may either be of different cu∣stomes and language, as the King of Spaine to Naples and Milan; or of the same customes and language, but of divers Provinces, as the King of France to Bur∣gundy and Britaine; or else of the same Province, the same tongue, and the same customes, as many Princes of Italy, to many Cities.

In the first case, they are not well brooked, but to∣lerated with an ill will: First, by reason of the diffe∣rence of customes, which is able to make a Prince odious, though he be not a stranger: whereupon Ta∣citus speaking of Ven•…•…ne given to the Parthians to be their King, shewes, that because he was of different customes from the Parthians, though of better than

theirs, he was with ignominy expelled the Kingdome. Accendebat dedignantes & ipse diversus â Majorum insti∣tutis, raro venatu, segni equorum cura, quoties per urbem incederet, lecticae stamine, fastusque erga patrias epulas, ir∣ridebantur & Graeci Comites, ac vilissima utensilium annulo clausa, sed prompti aditus, obvia comitas, ignotae Parthis virtutes, nova vitia, & quia ipse majoribus aliena perinde odium pravis atque honestis. For the very same reason, the Gothes tooke it ill, that Amalasunta caused Atta∣laricus to be brought up in the Roman customes, al∣though they were better than their own. And there∣fore Isabel Queene of Spaine, by her last Will, left Fer∣dinand her Husband to be Governour of Castile, for so long time, untill Philip who was to succeed, being a stranger, might learne the customes of the Spaniards. And for this cause, the Jewes at the comming of the Messias, were troubled together with Herod, and liked better to be in subjection to one of their owne cu∣stomes, though a stranger as Herod was, than to the Messias that was of different, though better customes; although they knew by the words of Moyses, Prophe∣tam suscitabit Dominus de medio fratrum tuorum, that he should be their owne Countreyman, of which S. Chry∣sostome gives the reason, Fuerunt isti turbati, quia injusti non possunt gaudere de adventu justi.

Secondly, because difference of Language is a most odious thing; and this out of his singular providence God foreseeing, and meaning to hinder 〈◊〉〈◊〉 en∣terprise, to make himselfe a Monarch, he confounded the Tongues, and thereby easily gave a stop to their proceeding. On the contrary, when our Lord meant that his Apostles should make some fruit of their la∣bours, he would not have them preach in a strange Tongue, and therefore gave to every one of them, all Tongues, that so more easily they might draw men to receive the Faith. And the Romans knowing, what

advantage there is in this, compelled all their subjects, when they spake in the Senate, to speak in the Roman tongue. And Rabsaces, knowing of how great impor∣tance, the likenesse of Language is, to win the love of the people, to the end the Israelites might the wil∣linger receive the government of Senacherib, though Sohna the Jew, out of a contrary end, prayed him to speak in the Syriack tongue, Loquere lingua Syriaca ad servos tuos; yet he an understanding man (as is written in Esay) Clamavit Lingua Judaica; whereupon Esay, in another place, shewing the hate and feare, which the City of Hierusalem had of the King of the Assyrians; amongst other causes, names their differing in lan∣guage, Populum impudentem non videbis, populum alti ser∣monis, ita ut non possis intelligere disertitudinem linguae ejus.

Thirdly, when to difference of customes and lan∣guage, there is added remotenesse, it will adde no doubt a great degree of distastfulnesse. First, because they will be more obnoxious to the dangers of warre. And therefore the Tribe of Dan, seeing Lais to be farre off from Sydon, which had then the government, attempted to bring it in subjection, and it tooke ef∣fect. And that this was the cause that moved them, may be gathered from words in the Booke of Judges; Euntes igitur quinque viri venerunt Lais, videruntque po∣pulum habitantem in ea absque ullo timore, juxta consuetu∣dinem Sydoniorum securum & quietum, nullo eis penitus re∣sistente, magnarumque opum & procul a Sydone, atque a cunctis hominibus seperatum. And that by this meanes, they easily made themselves Masters of it, is written also a little after, where he saith, Sexcenti autem viri tulerunt sacerdotem, & quae supra diximus, veneruntque ad Lais ad populum quiescentem & securum, & percusse∣runt eos in ore gladii, urbemque incendio tradiderunt; nullo penitus ferente praesidium, Eo quod procul habitarent a Sy∣done. So it happened to the Saguntines, who being

farre remote from the Romans their confederats, were destroyed before they could be ayded. And therefore the Armenians standing in doubt of this, put them∣selves into the hands of Mithridates, and revolted from the Romans. So the people of Syria desired to live under the government of the Parthians, as being neere unto them, and neighbouring upon them. Secondly, because people that are farre off, must of necessity be governed by a Deputy, who by reason of the Princes remotenesse must have great authority given him, and consequently may at his pleasure, contrary to the Princes meaning, play the tyrant over them. For all those things that have motion from another, and a motion of their own besides, how much they are lesse neere to the first mover, so much they are more able to move their owne way. From hence it is, that the Moone, being of all the Planets the farthest off from the Primum mobile, is moved faster in her own motion, and slower in the diurnall motion, than any of the other. The contrary whereof is seen in Saturne, which being neere to the Primum mobile, hath the slowest mo∣tion, and makes the least resistance.

Yet in the second and third case, they will more easily be tolerated; although as well in this as in that, there is a generall rule that seems to crosse it; which is, that every City would gladly have a Prince that should be resident amongst them, and also be a native of their City. That one of the same Nation and City is most acceptable, is plainly seen, because the people for the most part waves justice, and regards not so much the generall good, to choose the worthiest; as their private benefit, to choose the neerest. And therfore the Prophet Esay saith, Apprehendet enim vir fratrem suum Domesticum patris sui, & dicet; vestimentum tibi est, Princeps noster esto. Where S. Thomas observes well, that every one seeks to make him King, that is neerest, and

not him that is best. Indeed this respect of neernesse is of speciall force; as we may see in David, who being chosen King, was followed only by the Tribe of Juda, Sola autem domus Juda sequebatur David. So Abimelech was more willingly received of the Sichemites, then the sonnes of Jerobeam, when he said unto them, Simul considerate quod Os vestrum & Caro vestra sum, They were all presently moved to say to him, Frater noster es. The Milanesi exposed themselves to a thousand dan∣gers, out of a desire they had, to be governed rather by one of the Sforzi, then by the King of Spaine or France. And the Faentines chose rather a bastard of Manfredi, then to be under the Church. So the Arme∣nians (as is said before) subjected themselves to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and revolted from the Romans. Finally, we have a notable example of this, in the life of Aratus, to whom it was imputed. as a great fault, that he would rather call to his ayd, Philip King of Macedon, then put his Cities into the hands of Cleomenes a Spartan. Quod si omnino (saith Plutarch) Cleomenes injustus fuerit, atque Tyrannicus, tamen Heraclidarum genere, patria 〈◊〉〈◊〉 suisse, & quidem iis qui rationem aliquam Graeciae Nobilita∣tis 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Spartanorum obscurissimum potius, quam pri∣mum inter Macedonas Ducem deligendum fuisse. Where∣upon our Lord God, meaning to give the man Regall power over the woman, to the end it might be tole∣rated with more contentment, made her of a ribbe of Adam. And to conclude, in Deuteronomy, he comman∣ded his people, they should not choose a stranger to be their King.

But because this my opinion is full of difficulty, see∣ing oftentimes a City desires to be governed rather by a stranger then by one of their owne Citizens, it will be necessary to use distinction; either it is the first time a Kingdome is erected, or else they have been used to Regall power before: if it be the first time, they will

then rather choose to serve a stranger, then one of their own Citizens: First, because knowing the Citi∣zens beginning they are apt to scorne him. So it fell out with the Israelites, the first time they had a King, for being most desirous to see who it should be, when they saw it was Saul, they scorned him. Num salvare nos poterit iste? & despexerunt eum. Secondly, it happens often by reason of factions that are in the City; for such desire rather to be governed by a stranger, as a man indifferent, then by a Cittizen that is an enemy. Seeing such a one comming to the government, would certainly sill the City with blood and slaughter. Whereupon Livy saith, Cum pars quae domestico certa∣mine inferior sit, externo potius se applicet quam civi cedat. A third reason is drawne from envy; for an envious man endeavours alwaies to obscure the worthinesse of his Countreymen, as lying more in envies way then a stranger, whereof S. Hierome saith, Propemodum natu∣rale est semper, cives civibus invidere; invidia autem est, tristitia de aliena excellentia, ut est proprii boni diminutiva. Bonum autem absentium non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nostra, quia non con∣fert eis, Ideo non invidemus, bona autem praesentium confe∣runt bonis nostris, & comparatione excellentiae eorum, osten∣ditur parvum esse bonum nostrum, & hoc est illud Diminui. And of this we have the example of our Lord Christ, who being persecuted by his Countreymen, was invi∣ted by Abagarus a forraine Prince, that would have made him in part King with him in his City. A third reason may be this, that Countreymen know a man from his infancy, when there is yet no vertue in him, and thereupon consider him but as such a one still; where strangers that come not to know a man but in his perfection, cannot, nor know not how to consider him other then as such. So the said S. Hierome saith, Quia cives non considerant, praesentia viri opera, sed fragilis •…•…ecor∣dantur Infantiae. It is therefore no marvell, that the

Florentines chose rather, to be governed by a French man, then by one of their owne Citizens. Our Lord God, knowing how difficult a thing it is, to choose at the first time, ones own Countreyman to be Prince; In the old law, to the end the Israelites having a de∣sire to have a King, and not yeelding one to another, might not subject themselves to a stranger, he made a law, they should choose none to be their King, but only an Israelite, Non poteris alterius generis hominem in Regem facere, quod non sit frater tuus; But because he knew, it would be a hard matter for them to agree upon the choyce at the first time, he therefore made that election himselfe, Eum constitues quem Dominus Deus tuus elegerit de medio fratrum tuorum. And when lastly he came to choose him, to the end he might be lesse envied, he tooke a course, that causeth least envy, and that was by Lot. But if the people have been ac∣customed before to a Regall subjection, in this case they will rather like to be governed by one of their own Countrey then a stranger; and so much the more, if some of his family have beene Governour be∣fore; there being then no place for either envy, feare, or for equality. It is therefore no marvell, that Caesar was but ill beloved, and was slaine, and that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 lived quietly, and had the love of all men, seeing Caesar raised his House from equality; and Augustus found it in superiority, in which the Dictatour had left it: whereupon when I consider how it happened, that our Lord God would at the first time make a King by election, and afterward would have it to goe by suc∣cession in David; I cannot conceive a better reason than this, that he knew after the first time, the election of a King would be without difficulty.

In this particular, let every one be of what opinion he please; but for this other point, I doe not thinke it will be denied me, that all Cities and Provinces like

better to be governed by a particular Prince, that dwels amongst them, then by any other how great soever he be. For this cause it was, that the Spaniards were not well pleased when Charles the fifth was made Emperour; and were ready to rise, because they fea∣red he would leave dwelling in Spaine, and make his residence in Germany. This desire was the cause, that the Persians, to have a King in their owne Province, set up Cyrus against Astyages, who resided in Media; and out of this desire the Brittaines covenanted with the King of France, that his eldest sonne comming to the Crown, his second sonne should be Duke of Brittaine; whereof there can be no other reason, but the desire to have a particular Prince, that should dwell amongst them, as being indeed of speciall benefit to the peo∣ple. First, because living amongst them, he spends those Revenues in the Country which he drawes from the Countrey. Secondly, because of the greater care the Prince hath of them; and because of the peoples neernesse to their Lords eare, to whom they can pre∣sent their suites in their own persons; without wasting themselves in journeys, and lying at Innes. Lastly, be∣cause if the Prince being Lord of many Provinces, re∣side in one of them; the other must be faine to be go∣verned by Deputies of that Province. The Emperours of Rome residing in Italy, governed all the Provinces by Italians, a thing most distastfull to all the people; because to one that is not grieved to be subject to a Prince that is a stranger, yet it grieves him to be go∣verned by men of a Province that is a stranger: as many people that are content to be subject to the King of Bohemia, yet refuse to be subject to the King∣dome of Bohemia. And the King of France, after many times losing Genoua by this meanes, at last he resolved to govern it by Genuesi. So in Milan he made Trivultio Governour, wherein though he erred, yet the errour

was in the Individuall, and not in the Species; as put∣ting the government into his hand, that was Head of a Faction. But if the Prince be resident in the Pro∣vince, though he be a stranger, yet with better liking he will be tolerated; because such commonly not only govern the places where they reside, but all other pla∣ces subject to them, by Citizens of that Country where they reside. The King of Spaine, residing in Spaine, governes all his subject Kingdomes by Spaniards, a thing which not onely winnes love to the Prince, but profit also to the Province. To this may be added, that those people shall alwaies receive more favours, who are neere to the Fountaine from whence those favours come, then they shall doe that are further off; seeing, (as S. Thomas learnedly observes) how much a thing is neerer to its beginning, so much it partakes more of the effects of that beginning. And for this cause Dionysius Areopagita saith, that the Angels as be∣ing neerer to God than men are, do therefore partake more of the divine goodnesse then men do.

I cannot omit to advertise, that all the difficulties before spoken of, are easily allayed, after the first heats are once passed, as oft as there is found a pru∣dence and graciousnesse in the Prince, which is indeed of marvellous great moment, as was seen in the Ro∣mans, who though they hated strangers, and were re∣solved to have no stranger be their King; yet when 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (a stranger) was propounded to them; in regard of his eminent vertue, they accepted of him. Where∣of Livy saith, Romani veteres peregrinum Regem asper∣nabantur, and a little after, Audito nomine 〈◊〉〈◊〉, patres Romani, quanquam inclinari opes ad Sabinos, Rege inde sumpto, videbantur, tamen neque se quisquam, nec factionis suae alium, nec denique Patrum aut civium quenquam prae∣ferre, illi vero ausi ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 omnes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Pompilio Regnum deferendum decernunt. Whereupon it is no marvell, if

at this day many Provinces and Cities, whereof some have a Prince that lives farre off; and some, a Prince that is a stranger, of customes and language different; yet they all live in great contentment, only thorough the just government of him that rules them. I desire therfore that this discourse of mine may be received, as of the times past, my purpose being to search out the reasons of things have formerly happened; and not expressely or tacitely to taxe any Prince, Common∣wealth or City, nor so much as any particular per∣son: For above all things, I abhorre slandering, and specially of those to whom as superiours I owe Re∣verence.

Caeterum Augustus subsidia dominationi Claudium Marcellum sororis filium admodum adoles∣centem: Pontificatu & curuli Aedilitate Marcum Agrippam ignobilem loco, bonum Militia, & victoriae socium geminatis consulatibus extulit, mox defuncto Marcello generum sumpsit, Tiberium Neronem & Claudium Drusum privignos Imperatoriis nominibus auxit.

What meanes Princes may use with safety to set them in a way, that are to succeed them in the government. The eighteenth Discourse.

IT is plainly seen, that Augustus to the end the Se∣natours nor any other, should ever hope to reduce Rome to its ancient forme of government, held this for a speciall Maxime of State, to advance his neerest kin∣red; and to set some one of them in the way for man∣aging the Empire, that so making him privy to all affaires, making him known to the fouldiers, making him beloved of the people; and lastly, making him

favoured of the Senatours: both he after his death might have his way made to come to the Empire; and on the contrary no hope might be left for any to at∣tempt any thing against the life of the Prince, being propped up with so many Pillars. And therefore, Vt 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 insisteret, he raysed Marcellus, he ad∣vanced Marcus Agrippa; and after them, Tiberius Nero, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Drusus, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Lucius sonnes of Agrippa; and lastly, would have Tiberius to adopt Germanicus and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to be his successours. And accordingly, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 advanced to the Consulship, and other honours, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and after them Caius Caesar. Whereupon by the example of such great men, this course perhaps may be thought worthy of imitation, as well for securing ones selfe from danger, as also for lessening in part the burthen of those great labours, which so great a dignity brings with it: so much the more as we have in Cornelius Tacitus, a manifest exam∣ple of Sejanus, who by no other meanes was stopped in his course, but onely by the number of successours Tiberius had ordained; and this stopping, as in con∣spiracies it useth, was cause at last, that the Prince dis∣covered all his practices. But because of the other side, the desire of rule blinds the minds of the most inward and domesticke friends; It seemes to be no safe course for a Prince, whilst he lives himselfe, to give any great authority to successours. For Invidia Regni (as Livy saith) etiant inter Domesticos infida omnia atque infesta 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 caused his sonne to be elected King, but this served not his sonnes turne, who thereupon would have killed his father. So Absolon meant to do, and when with safety he might have expected the Kingdome, after the death of his old father David, he would rather with wickednesse prevent it, and run 〈◊〉〈◊〉 allong into 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 etiam 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉, (saith 〈◊〉〈◊〉 upon another occasion) 〈1 line〉〈1 line〉

tarda cum securitate praeniatura, vel cum exitio properant. And therefore Selim being assumed into part of the Empire, by his father Bajaset, could not stay to expect it with peace, but sought by the death of his father, to make himselfe sole Lord. And the like intention had Mustapha towards Sultan Solyman, and thereby lost his life. Finally, this advancing of his successours, had but ill lucke with Augustus; for Tiberius (as is com∣monly conceived) caused him to be poysoned: and with Tiberius it proved not much better, who also to∣wards the end of his life, had the kindnesse of Caius Caesar, to helpe him to his death. For resolution, it may be said, that where a State is quiet, accustomed to passe by succession, in children legitimate; there it is in no wise sit, to take them into part of the Empire, there being no cause, with ones owne danger, to take away hopes where there are none, or to seeke for props where no part threatens ruine. But on the other side, when the State is in danger, not accustomed to live under a Prince, and is apt to rebellions; in such case, it may doe well, to call him that is to succeed, to be a cosort in the Empire. To this purpose it seems the example tends, which Tacitus relates of Augustus: he caused Tiberius to be called Filius, to shew he was his successor; Collega Imperii, to enter him in managing affaires; Consors Tribunitiae Potestatis, to make him gra∣cious with the people; Omnique per exercitus ostentatur, to make him beloved, and knowne to the souldiers.

Neverthelesse having considered a little better of this matter, I have altered my opinion, concerning the last; and as to the example of Augustus, though it proved well for his successour; to bring him to the Empire, yet it proved but ill for his owne person: for by this meanes, he became as it were a servant to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who finally caused him by his owne wife to be poysoned.

I therefore conceived, the better course would be, to advance the managing of the Empire; not one a∣lone, but many; because, by this meanes, not onely he shall make himselfe secure from those of the City; but from those also of his own Family. This lesson I learn from Aristotle in his Politicks, where he saith, Communis vero custodia omnis Dominationis unius est, neminem unum prae caeteris magnum facere, sed plures, nam se invicem cu∣stodiunt: being an excellent remedy against the insa∣tiablenesse of men, to afford them some one, upon whom they may vent their ambition, without turning it against the Prince. For this cause perhaps, the an∣cients invented the name of fortune; to the end, that men falling into any great disaster, should not turne their anger against God, but lay the fault upon the false Deity of fortune. And in truth there is none hath more need to make use of this invention then Princes; because naturally, men seeking to rise above their degree; when they have another like to them∣selves, they may turne their practises against him, and not attempt any thing against the Prince, as they would doe, if they had not some upon whom to work, and vent their ambition. This good fortune happened to Tiberius, for when Sejanus would rise above his de∣gree, first he had Drusus against whom to turne him; and afterward the sonnes of Germanicus, in oppressing of whom, he lost so much time, that all his practises came to be discovered. To this opinion of mine, the course of Augustus was not contrary, but it seemes he followed it as long as he was able; seeing Tacitus re∣lates, that he advanced not Marcellus alone, but toge∣ther with him Marcus Agrippa; and when Marcellus died, he left not Agrippa alone, but joyned with him Tiberius Nero, and Claudius Drusus; and when Drusus died, he yet left not Tiberius alone, but brought for∣ward Caius and Lucius: and although when both these

died, he left Tiberius alone; yet it cannot be said, he did well in doing so: and therefore Tacitus maketh an excuse for him, that he did it by reason of age, Nan•…•… senem Augustum adeo devinxerat, ut nepotem unicum Agrip∣pae 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in insulam Planasiam projiceret: in which if he had done well, Tacitus had not needed to make his excuse: and even Augustus himselfe perceived at last his errour, as he that alwaies held it for a maxime of State, not to have onely one, but many upon whom to leane, Vt pluribus munimentis insisteret: whereupon at last, the poore old man opening his eyes, and seek∣ing to provide for it in a time, when he had done bet∣ter to dissemble it, having overslipt his time so long, he made shew to call Agrippa Posthumus home, Et inde spem fore (saith Tacitus) ut penatibus avi redderetur. And the making that shew, was a hastener of his death. Also Philip after he had put Demetrius to death, he percei∣ved his errour to let Perseus stay alone; whereupon he meant to bring in his familiar friend Antigonus, for a counterpoise, giving out, he should succeed him in the Kingdome, but was prevented by death. There∣fore Tiberius also considering this, advanced not Ger∣manicus alone, but Drusus with him, Seque tutiorem re∣batur, utroque filio legiones obtinente: knowing well, it would be impossible they should ever joyne together in any attempt against him. Quia arduum & difficile est, eodem loci concordiam & potentiam esse: whereupon he was secure he should alwaies have them of his side. And when Germanicus died, he left not Drusus alone, but brought in Sejanus, whereof Drusus infinite times com∣plained, Crebro quaerens Incolumi filio adjutore Imperii, alium vocari. And when Drusus was dead, and Sejanus left alone, Tiberius was then in no small danger; which he perceiving, had determined to bring in Nero sonne of Germanicus; but afterward being secured of the fall of Sejanus, he put him to death; and then Caius Caesar

remained alone. Whereupon Tiberius finding himselfe in the same straight, in which Augustus was when Tibe∣rius was left alone; although he knew the danger, and that it was no safety for him, that all favour should be cast upon one; yet being old, and ill-beloved of all, having thoroughly considered, what course he might best take to secure himselfe from Caius Caesar; he could finde none, as I conceive, but such as would ra∣ther be a course to hasten his death; and therefore in that case he shewed himselfe much wiser then Augu∣stus: and although Cornelius Tacitus attribute it to a∣nother matter, where he saith, Consilium cui impar er at sato permisit: which was to make choice of another successour; yet I, without taxing his opinion, would thinke that he forbore this new election, lest com∣ming to the eares of Caius Caesar, it might put him upon some practise to procure his death, as he himselfe had done before to Augustus; and the rather as knowing himselfe to be exceeding weake, Reputante Tiberio pub∣licum sibi odium, extremam aetatem, magisque fama quam vi stare res suas.

But because Augustus and Tiberius knew well, how much it imported, to have more successours then one: yet each of them was brought at last to have but one, and could not helpe it: it will be fit to thinke upon some way, how a Prince that is brought to such a straight, may both enter such a successour in affaires of State, and yet secure himselfe from domestick dangers. As for the entering him, and setting him in a way; it will be easily done, by putting him into those steps, which himselfe passed to attaine the Empire: and by this way, the House of Austria at this day maintaines it selfe in the Empire. An instruction of Augustus, and afterward followed by Tiberius, who comming to the Empire by meanes of the Tribuneship, they also used to make their successours Tribunes. Id summi fastigii vo∣cabulum

Augustus reperit, ne Regis aut dictatoris nomen ad∣sumeret, ac tamen appellatione aliqua caetera imperia prae∣mineret: Marcum deinde Agrippam socium ejus potestatis, quo defuncto 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Neronem delegit, ne successor in incerto foret: sic cohiberi pravas aliorum spes rebatur, simul mo∣destiae Neronis & suae magnitudini fiebat, quo tunc exemplo Tiberius Drusum summae rei admovet. The difficulty then consists onely in securing himselfe against his succes∣sour, being too potent; and the best way, that I can learne out of Histories is this; not to suffer him toge∣ther with the dignity, to get the love and affection of the Subjects. This Augustus put in execution, untill he was blinded by his wives intreaties. For when he de∣manded the Tribuneship for Tiberius, under colour of excusing him, he laid open all his ill conditions, there∣by to make him odious. Etenim Augustus paucis ante an∣nis, cum Tiberio Tribunitiam potestatem a Patribus rursus postularet, quanquam honora oratione quaedam de habitu cul∣tuque & institutis ejus jecerat, quae velut excusando expro∣braret. To what end should Augustus demand honours for Tiberius, and himselfe dishonour him? but onely to this, that as by meanes of the dignity which could not be denyed him, he meant to settle in him the suc∣cession, so by meanes of making knowne his vices, he meant to make him odiou•…•… and thereby secure him∣selfe, that he might never be able through the peoples favour, to contrive any plot against him. Tiberius also made use of this course, and therefore caused Dru∣sus to be present alwaies at the sports of the Gladia∣tours; to the end, that by shewing himselfe delighted with the sight of blood, he might be knowne to be of a cruell and bloody disposition, and consequently be of all men hated. Whereupon Tacitus discoursing upon the reasons, why Tiberius himselfe would not be present at them; amongst other, he mentions this, where he saith, Non crediderim ad ostentandam saevitiam

movendasque offensiones concessam filio materiem, quamquam id quoque dictum est. Another time, when Tiberius saw Germanicus and Drusus contesting with the Senate, he wonderfully joyed at it; as well because their conten∣tion was about disparaging a Law, as because of the hate they incurred by it, Laetabatur Tiberius, cum inter filios ejus & leges Senatus disceptaret.

Having commended the course, for a Prince to de∣signe more then one successour, by whom to be sup∣ported, there must care be taken to hold the ballance even betweene them, otherwise he shall expose him∣selfe to manifest danger; in regard whereof, Augustus never brought Tiberius openly forward untill such time as he was left alone, Drusoque pridem extincto, Nero 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex privignis erat, illuc cuncta vergere, and that which followeth. So Tiberius as long as Germanicus lived, used them with great equality: but after Germanicus death, he then discovered his love to Drusus. Tiberius Drusum summae rei admovet; incolumi Germanico, integrum inter Duos Iudicium.

But because it is a most difficult thing, to observe this equality, and to carry an even hand, as that which was in Christ accounted a matter of admiration, that he so carried himselfe toward his Apostles, that they could never know which of them he favoured most, every one thinking himselfe to be the man, where∣upon they often contended which of them should be the greatest; it is fit to consider, to which side the Prince ought rather to incline.

For resolution whereof, I conceive, that a Prince (as indeed he can doe no lesse) shall doe well to favour the weaker party, for by meanes of his favour he shall make him stronger then the other; and yet shall not need to doubt him, as being of himselfe the weaker. So did Tiberius, who if ever he shewed any sparke of par∣tiality, it was to Drusus.

Nam senem Augustum devinxerat adeo, ut nepotem unicum Agrippam Posthumum in Insulam Planasiam projiceret. And a little after, Nulla in prae∣sens formidine, dum Augustus aetate validus, seque & Domum & pacem sustentavit: postquam provecta jam 〈◊〉〈◊〉, aegro & corpore fatigabatur.

That old men are apt to be carried, away by women, and of what age a Prince should be. The nineteenth Discourse.

THe old age of Augustus (as we may conjecture by these two Texts, which for more conveniency I have joyned together) brought forth in the City of Rome, many evill effects: First, by suffering himselfe to be ruled by his wife Livia, who with no small subtilty perswaded him to discard Agrippa Posthumus, and to leave Tiberius Nero his successour in the Empire. Se∣condly, because thorough old age, he was no longer able to governe the City, his family, or himselfe.

By occasion then of the first, we will examine, whe∣ther it be true, that old men are apt and easie to be led away by women; and finding it to be so, we will shew the reason: and by occasion of the second, it will be fit to examine, at what age a Prince is fittest to governe.

Concerning the first, there will need no great la∣bour to shew by examples and by reason, that the wives of old men may obtaine of them whatsoever they desire. Adonia the sonne of David had made him∣selfe King in his fathers life; and by reason of age, as being the eldest, it was his due, as Salomon himselfe confessed, whilst denying a favour, which his mother

in behalfe of Adonia requested of him, he said, Ipse enim est frater meus major me; yet how easily did Bersabee perswade her old husband David to put by Adoniah, and to make her sonne Salomon his successour? where∣of the holy Scripture in the Booke of Kings saith, In∣gressa est itaque Bersabee ad regem in cubiculo, Rex autem se∣nuerat nimis. And seeing the holy Scriptures have never a word that hath not some mystery in it, we may well gather by these words Rex autem senuerat nintis, were written to intimate, that the suite of Bersabee was much facilitated by the old age of David. Another ex∣ample in the booke of Kings we have of Salomon, who in his old age was so led away by his Concubines, that most perfidiously leaving the true worship of God, he set up Images, built Altars and Temples unto Idols, whereof the holy Spirit in the said Booke gives the reason saying, that Salomon being now growne old, was easily drawne away by women, Cumque jam esset se∣nex, depravatum est cor ejus per mulieres, ut sequeretur Deo•…•… alienos.

The effect then is manifest: it remaines that we shew the cause why this should happen in old men, and not in yong. And first, it may be attibuted to length of time: for as a stone, though never so hard, is mollified and broken by often falling of water, so the long suits of women accompanied with their dalliances and al∣lurements, are able to penetrate the hardest heart: and therefore Job saith, Lapides excavant aquae, & allu∣vione paulatim terra consumitur; whereof Saint Gregory makes the like interpretation, as I doe here of the ex∣ample of Salomon, Videamus qualiter lapides excavant aquae: & alluvione paulatim terra consumitur. Salomon quippe immoderato 〈◊〉〈◊〉, atque assiduitate mulierum ad hoc perductus est, ut qui prius Templum Deo construeret 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 etiam perfidiae substratus, Idolis construere Templu non 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Sicque factum est, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ab assidua carni•…•…

petulantia, usque ad mentis persidiam perveniret. Quid it aque aliud quam aquae excavarunt lapidem? & alluvione pau∣latim terra consumpta est; quia surrepente paulatim infu∣sione peccati, terra cordis illius ad consumptionem defluxit.

A second cause is, because in old age by reason of weaknesse, the vertue of resisting feminine allure∣ments failes, which in youth by reason of vigour are easily resisted. This cause Cajetan meanes, when spea∣king of Salomon he saith, Quamvis mulieres junctae fue∣rint Salomoni Iuveni, non tamen diverterunt a Iuventute ad cultum Deorum, sed in Senectute paulatim emollitus est animus ejus, crescente amore, & deficiente virtute.

A third cause I would alledge my selfe, and it is, That all love is founded upon some interest, either good or bad: and seeing that of women can never be founded upon vertue, by reason of the incapacity of that sex; it happens oftentimes to be founded either upon beauty or upon profit: For in women common∣ly there are two desires; or to say better, two affecti∣ons: one of rule, the other of lust; and when these faile, then also their love ceaseth. From hence it is, that seeing an old man, can never beleeve (unlesse age hath taken away his braines) that women can love him for beauty; it follows necessarily, he must beleeve they love him for profit; of which if there be no hope, neither can he hope, they will ever love him. And therefore when he knows he cannot satisfie their affe∣ction one way, by reason of the weaknesse of his age, he must of necessity seeke to satisfie it the other way, and consequently agree to all their desires. And there∣fore no marvell if Tacitus say, that Augustus grown old, was led away by women.

Concerning the second point, before we come to examine which is the best age in a Prince, for govern∣ing his people, we must take notice, that in men there are foure ages: old age, childhood, youth, and con∣sistence,

or middle age. Thus Hippocrates distinguisheth them, which for the present shall passe, without que∣stioning the truth of the distinction. Secondly, it must be noted, that I speake not of Princes that are by suc∣cession; for they have their officers and Deputies, by whom they may alwaies governe well; but I speake of Princes that are by election, and particularly in King∣domes that stand in danger; into which, many by rea∣son of age have fallen.

In this case, it is not well, that a Prince should be in his childhood; whereupon our Lord God, by the mouth of the Prophet Esay, threatning the destructi∣on of Hierusalem, after saying, Ecce enim Dominator Do∣minus exercituum, auferet a Hierusalem, & a Juda, vali∣dum & fortem, & virum bellatorem, omne robur panis & omne robur aquae, Judiceni & Prophetam, Ariolum & senem: he saith, & dabo pueros Principes eorum, by whose go∣vernment, how great disorders were to grow, is shewed in the processe of that Chapter, and therefore Salo∣mon in Ecclesiasticus cries out, Vae tibi terra, cujus Rex est puer.

The reason of this is, because in a Governour, there are foure things required: the first is knowledge and prudence, whereupon Salomon considering himselfe to be but a child, prayed not to God for Riches or Ho∣nour, nor yet for long life, but for Wisdome to be able to judge rightly, saying, Ego autem sum puer parvulus, & ignorans egressum & introitum meum. Et servus tuus est in medio populi quem elegisti, populi infiniti qui numerari & supputari non potest, prae multitudine. Dabis ergo servo tuo cor docile, ut populum tuum judicare possit, & discernere inter bonum & malum. Whereupon S. Gregory makes a good observation; that in holy Scripture, Princes and Prophets are called Videntes, Seers, as those that have need of Prudence and Knowledge, that being to lead the blind, they be not blind themselves; for then will

Cities go to wrecke; and easily be destroyed; as Esay saith, Omnes bestiae agri venite ad devorandum, Vniversae bestiae 〈◊〉〈◊〉, speculatores ejus caeci omnes.

The second thing required in a Prince is fortitude, to be able to bridle the people, and to beare the weight of the Scepter. And therefore Salomon in Ecclesiasticus saith, Noli 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fieri Judex, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 valeas virtute irrumpere iniquitates; ne fortè extimescas faciē Potentis, & ponas scan∣dalum in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tua. And Job speaking of the burthen that lies upon Princes shoulders, saith, Sub quo curvan∣tur qui portant orbem, which S. Gregory upon that other place of Job, Ecce Gigantes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sub aquis, expounds saying, Gemero sub aquis meanes nothing else, but to be oppressed with the weight of Subjects, taking waters for people, as the Angel in the Apocalyps delivers, Aquae multae, populi multi: Whereupon not without great mystery our Lord God, meaning to make Peter Prince of the people, he called him first to walke upon the water.

Thirdly, Princes ought more to regard the com∣mon good of their subjects, then their owne private profit; that they may not be like those, of whom the Prophet Sophony speaketh, Judices ejus lupi 〈◊〉〈◊〉, non relinquebant in Mane: but like to the Apostle Paul, who saith, Non quaero quae vestra sunt, sed vos.

Fourthly, there is required Experience, Qui non est tentatus quid scit? saith Salomon in Ecclesiasticus, Et qui non est expertus parva recognoscit. And therefore the Ancients have a fable, that Phaeton having taken upon him to guide the Horses of the Sunne, was throwne downe headlong. In asmuch then, as a child through defect of age, can neither have knowledge, nor expe∣rience; and thorough weaknesse of body, can neither be strong nor constant: and finally, thorough time spent in pleasures, will more regard his owne interest, then the people; there can be no doubt of his unfit∣nesse

to govern others, who without doubt is not well able to governe himselfe.

The other age contrary to this, is old age; in which as a thing most odious, men commonly are subject to contempt: Ipsa aetas Galbae (saith Tacitus) & Irrisui & fastidio erat. And a little after, Precarium sibi Impe∣rium, & brevi transiturum. But besides their being con∣temned, oftentimes they governe ill, because (as Ari∣stotle writes in his Politicks) Habet etiam intellectus suam 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that the understanding also hath its old age; seeing by weaknesse of naturall heate, and want of radicall moysture, they generate naughty blood, from which consequently arise naughty spirits, which passing to the Heart, and from the Heart distributed to the senses, makes them they can but ill 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their office. And therefore in old men, we see the sen∣ses are alwaies weakned, as the Philosopher saith, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nostra intellectio ortum habet à sensu; the understanding making use of the senses to understand by: insomuch, that they being grown old, it may reasonably be said, the understanding is growne old: whereupon 〈◊〉〈◊〉 meaning to shew, that Camillus though growne old, was yet able to governe, saith, He had all his senses per∣fect, Sed vegetum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in vivido pectore vigebat vire∣batque integris sensibus.

A Prince therefore should not be old, as well be∣cause such are apt to be contemned; as because, be∣comming a child againe, he will governe ill: where∣upon not without cause, Tacitus speaking of Augustus, saith, Postquam provecta jam senectus, aegro & corpore fatigabatur; and that which followeth. And Galba knowing this, and meaning to helpe these inconveni∣ences of old age, he adopted Piso, saying, Et audita adoption desinam videri senex, quod mihi unum objicitur. And our Lord God meaning to furnish his Captaine Moyses, with all the parts required in a Prince; to the

end, that through old age, he might not be contem∣ned, nor through want of understanding come to governe ill; suffered not his senses, nor yet his flesh to grow old with yeeres, but preserved them in a flouri∣shing state, Non caligaverunt oculi ejus, saith the Scrip∣ture, and this opinion all Writers follow.

It remaines, to shew, which is the fitter age, of youth, or the consistent age: for Resolution whereof, I say briefly, that if a Prince be to attend the warres, it is then better he should be yong; as well for the la∣bours of the body, as for the vigour of blood, which growne cold in old men, were never able to performe those things, which are required in a warriour. Where∣upon we see, that many great Captaines, who in their youth have done admirable acts; in their old age, have lost many advantages, through weaknesse of spirit; as it happened to Metellus, in the warre against Sertorius in Spaino, (as Plutarch relates.) And therefore Moyses shewed great judgement, who amongst the Elders he had chosen, having two yong men, Eldad and Medad, he caused them to stay in the Army; shewing thereby, that in matters of warre they should be yong men. And our Lord God meaning to ayd the Maccabees in a battaile against their enemies appeared in the forme of a yong man upon a white Horse.

But if we speake of Princes, that are to judge the people in peace; in this case, the age that inclines to old age, is certainly fittest; in signe whereof our Lord God who in the Canticles, as being a Bridegroome appeared in forme of a yong man, Comae ejus sicut elatae palmorum, nigrae quasi Corvus, when afterwards he ap∣peares as a King and Judge of Daniel, and in the Apoca∣lyps, he comes described with gray haires, Caput autem ejus & Capilli erant candidi, tanquam lana alba, & tan∣quam Nix; and this is for as much, as for the most part is wont to happen.

But because the contrary of this is often seene, that some man in his youth governes much better then in his age; I cannot omit in this place to advertise, that canities or whitenesse by age, consists not so much in haires or in yeers, as in the whitenesse of the thoughts: whereupon, in the Canticles, the Bridegroome saith to the Bride, Vulnerasti cor meum, in uno oculorum tuorum, & in uno crine colli tui, and S. Luke, Sed & capilli vestri nu∣merati sunt; and S. Gregory upon Job, expounding that place of Deuteronomy, Levitae tenentur radere pilos carnis suae: expounds it, id est, cogitationes superfluas.

He then shall be accounted old, and to have gray haires, that is full of white thoughts; whereupon Sa∣lomon saith, Senectus venerabilis est, non diuturna, neque annorum numero computata, cani autem sunt sensus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & aetas Senectutis, vita Immaculata. When our Lord God would have Moyses to choose persons that should assist him in judging the people, he said not, Choose out seventy old men; but, seventy whom thou know∣est to be old: where it plainely appeares, that he speakes not of the old age of the body, for that every one is able to know; but of the old age of the mind, and so S. Gregory expounds it in those words, Congrega mihi septuaginta viros Israel quos tu nosti quòd Senes populi sunt. While he saith, In quibus senioribus, quid aliud, quam senectus cordis requiritur, cum tales jubentur eligi, quod senes esse sciuntur? si enim senectus in eis corporis quaereretur, a tantis sciri poterant, a quantis videri •…•…dum vero dicitur, quos tu nosti, quod senes populi sint, profectò liquet, quia senectus 〈◊〉〈◊〉, non corporis eligenda mintiatur. For an old man that is gray by reason of yeeres may be a child in regard of conditions; and therefore Esay saith, Puer centum annorum moriatur; whereupon it followes not, to say, a Prince is yong, therefore he will governe ill; a Prince is old, therefore he will governe well; because it oftentimes happens, that the same man, is in youth,

old; and in age, yong; as Salomon who in his youth governed divinely well, both himselfe and his state, but afterwards in his old age, he overthrowes himselfe, and consequently his subjects. So Nero in the beginning of his youth, governed with so great prudence, that he is rather to be imitated, then that he can be surpassed: but in processe of time, he so perfidiously carried him∣selfe, that sparing neither his schoolmasters, nor his mother, nor finally himselfe, he cast himselfe, and (as much as he could) the state into absolute ruine.

It will not then be from our purpose, to search out the reason, how it happens that many in their youth governe well; and in their old age, become cruell; and throw themselves headlong into vices. First then, I say, it happens by reason of age, which (as we have shewed before) of its owne nature, causeth contempt; and the Prince doubting this, and thinking to remedy it with cruelty, plungeth himselfe in it, to shew there is valour in him: so did Tiberius who in his youth en∣deavoured by all meanes to hide his acts of cruelty; but in his old age, changing opinion, he was never well, but when he was talking of them, and when he could say something to make it appeare, that he was cruell; for no other cause, but that he thought this the onely way to keep him from contempt. Wherupon, if the Se∣natours had known this reason, they would never have marvelled to heare him recite his acts, & the death of his nephew Drusus: and although Tacitus ascribe this to his great confidence, where he saith, Penetrabat pavor, & admiratio callidum olim & tegendis sceleribus obscurum, eo confidentiae venisse, ut tanquam dimotis parietibus, often∣deret nepotem sub verberibus Centurionis, inter servonum ictus extrema vitae alimenta frustra orantem; yet I hold, he did it rather in the sense aforesaid, and I conceive that Tacitus in substance understood as much him∣selfe.

Secondly, this is wont to happen, because in the beginning men are not secure in their states, and there∣fore seeke by good meanes to make themselves secure; but once secured, they then yeeld themselves wholy to be governed by sense: and therefore David when he had vanquisht his enemies, and made himselfe se∣cure in his Kingdome, he then committed the adultery with Bersabee, and the slaughter of Vrias, whereof S. Bernard speaking saith, Sapiens David, sapiens Salomon fuit, sed blandientibus nimis secundis rebus, alter ex parte, alter ex toto desipuit.

Thirdly, because a Prince in old age, hath either gotten him a good name or a bad: if a good, then conceiving that whatsoever he doth, can never take away the good name already gotten, he easily runneth into vices; if bad, then despairing in so short a time, as being now old, to remove that bad name, he thinkes it all one what he doth; and thereupon contemning fame, would be content the World might end with himselfe. So did Herod the great, who gave order that as soone as himselfe should be dead, a great number of Noblemen, that were then prisoners should be slaine. And Nero was contented it should be thought, that he grieved for nothing so much, as that he had not the whole World in his hand, inclosed in a glasse, that he might cast it to the ground whensoever he should die. But if a Prince be yong, although he have gotten the name of a cruell man, yet hoping in time he may redeeme it and get a better, he will not easily plunge himselfe in vices.

Fourthly, this is wont to happen, when Princes are but of little judgment; because as when of themselves they are prudent, they alwaies governe better in the third age; so when of themselves they want discretion, they governe better in their youth, then afterward; seeing in that age, it is no disgrace to suffer themselves

to be guided by men of ability; as was seene in Nero, who in his youth was contented to be advised, and to follow the counsell of Seneca, Burrhus and Corbulo, but comming to a riper age, either they take a liberty no longer to regard the advice of good Counsellours, or else they count it a shame to be a Prince upon props: or lastly they are instigated by others, thorough hate they beare to the greatnesse of those able Coun∣sellours. All these things concurred in Nero: for first he rejected the reverence of his schoolmasters, seque in omnes libidines effudit: and then there wanted not instigatours, who told him it was a shame, Certe finitam Neronis pueritiam, & robur juventae adesse, exueret Magi∣strum, satis amplis Doctoribus instructus Majoribus suis. So as, having no braine himselfe, nor hearkning to them that had, he came in a short time to utter ruine. So the Emperour Constantinus Sestus, was contented at first to be ruled by his mother Irenea, but growing elder, he cast her off, and came to be starke naught. And Rabbi Salomon saith, that as long as Nathan the Prophet, who was Salomons schoolmaster lived, Salomon tooke no strange woman to be his wife: and this opi∣nion is followed by Abulensis.

Domi Res tranquillae: eadem Magistratuum vocabula.

That to maintain and suffer Magistrates to continue, although without authority, is a matter of great moment. The twentieth Discourse.

I Have alwaies heard it resolved, that when a City changeth from being a Common-wealth, to be a Kingdome, it should doe well, to leave if not the same

authority, yet at least the same Magistrates. And the same I have found written in all Politician Authours; and for authority, they alledge this place of Tacitus, Eadem Magistratuum vocabula: where he shewes; that Augustus changed all things in Rome, but onely the name of Magistrates: and they give this reason, that seeing it is onely a bare name, much in shew, and little in substance, the Prince can lose nothing of his owne Right by it; and yet by this meanes he shall be sure to get the love of his people, who are fedde with such vanity.

This opinion, held, written and observed of every one, containes in it two things: one, that as to the Prince, the leaving of Magistrates is of great profit: the other, that as to the subject it is a meere vanity, and serves onely to puffe up the people.

Although this opinion be generall and entred in such sort into mens conceits, that there seemes to be no contending against it; yet it may be lawfull for me to deliver what I thinke of it; seeing I seeke not to be believed, by any other strength, then by that of rea∣son. I say then, I could never come to know, that this leaving the name of Magistrates, is any weaknesse, but have alwaies accounted it a matter of great moment; for proofe whereof, we must know, that as all other kinds of state, so a Commonwealth also consists of two things; that is, of matter, and of forme. In a Monar∣chy, the forme is the Prince; and the City is the mat∣ter. In a Commonwealth, the forme is the Magistrate that rules; and the thing that is ruled is the matter. From hence it is, that when these two things doe not meet and joyne together, a City cannot be said to be free: whereupon, if it should be without any Prince, and should withall be without any Magistrates, it could not be called a Commonwealth. The Armenians after the death of Ariobarzanes, being unwilling to

serve his successours, remained without any Lord; but having no forme of a Commonwealth, they were ne∣ver the more free. Whereof Tacitus speaking, shewes he knew that well, which I said before, where he saith, Ariobarzano morte fortuita absumpto, stirpem ejus hand toleravere, tentatoque foeminae imperio, cui nomen Erato; eaque brevi pulsa, incerti solutique & magis sine Domino quam in libertate, profugum Vononem in Regnum accipiunt. If then the Prince taking away the matter, which is the City, shall leave the forme, which are the Magistrates, he shall give not onely a vaine content∣ment, as those men say, but also a great hope to reco∣ver liberty: of which they should be out of hope if the Prince, together with the authority, should also take away the Magistrates; seeing although they should be without a Prince, yet they should be nere the neerer for being in liberty, but rather would never be quiet, untill they had a King againe, as it fell out with the Armenians: and if they should agree to have a Commonwealth, it would never be durable; as was seene in Florence after a driving out of Petrus de Medici: and therefore the Romans had great fortune to find a forme made to their hands; for the Kings being ex∣pulsed, they had then nothing else to do, but onely in their stead, to make two Consuls. This thing both Romulus and Tarquinius, Caesar and Nero knew to be of great moment, who endeavoured all they could to ex∣tinguish the Senate. And indeed, those Provinces that have been without Magistrates, have never been able to come to liberty, as was seen in the Assyrians, and is at this day seen in the Persians, and in the Turks, and others. For it is an easie matter for an image of waxe, if it be broken, to be renued againe, so long as the forme by which it was framed remaines entire; seeing with one onely action, the new forme will be taken away, and the old will be introduced: but if together

with the Image, the mould also should be taken away; it would then be very hard to returne it to the old forme; as requiring two actions, one to breake the forme that is of new; and the other, to renew the form that was before.

Moreover, this onely apparence of Magistrates, be∣sides that it facilitates the recovery of liberty, causeth also a desire of liberty, which if it doe no other hurt, at least it puts them in mind of a Commonwealth, a thing to Princes most pernitious: and lastly, it gives occasion to the principall men to assemble together without suspition; and therefore, if I be not deceived, Julius Agricola told Tacitus oftentimes, that the taking away these apparences of liberty, had been very usefull for hindring the rebellions of the Irish. Saepe ex eo audi∣vi, legione una & modicis auxiliis debellari obtinerique Hi∣berniam posse. Idque etiam adversus Britanniam profuturū, si Romana ubique arma, & velut è conspeetu libertas toleretur.

Thus in my opinion it is sufficiently proved, that to leave the names of Magistrates, although without au∣thority, is not a puffing up, or a vanity that blinds the people; but indeed a matter of great moment, for re∣gayning of liberty. Yet I blame not Princes that take this course, and especially those that are at this day, who having no doubt of their people, ought to allow them, not onely the names of Magistrates, but also Magistrates with some authority: and as little doe I like, that a man comming new to a Kingdome, should take this course; only I put them in mind, that all they who have gone about to extinguish Magistrates, have either been 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or banished, except onely Cleomenes.

Tiberium Neronem maturum annis, spe∣ctatum bello, sed vetere atque insita Claudiae Familiae superbia, multaque indicia saevitiae, quanquam preman∣tur erumpere: Hunc & prima ab infantia educatum in domo 〈◊〉〈◊〉, congestos Juveni Consulatus, Trium∣phos ne iis quidem annis, quibus Rhodi specie secessus exulem egerit, aliquid quam Iram & simulationem & secretas libidines meditatum.

That Tiberius was part good, and part bad. How it happened that he fell not into dangers as Nero did. Whether it be good to be brought up in the Princes House: and finally, how their secret vices may be knowne. The one and twentieth Discourse.

TAcitus discoursing of the successours of Augustus, whilst he laies open the vertues and vices of Ti∣berius shewes us also, the capacity and incapacity that was in him for succession in the Empire: his capacity was first, by reason of his ripenesse in age, being such as in our former discourse we required in a Prince, then his ability in Military affaires; and the long experi∣ence he had, being brought up in Augustus his house, and imployed continually in State businesses; and seeing Princes ought to be able both to governe the people in peace, and to rule them in warre, I know not any man could be fitter for the Empire then Tiberius.

On the other side, Tiberius was proud, cruell, and lascivious; and seeing a Prince ought to governe with mildnesse, to have care of the subjects lives; and above all, rather to defend their honour, then oppresse it: there is no doubt, but Tiberius was more uncapable of such a dignity then any other; because as being proud,

he could never be pleasing in his government: and as being cruell, he was readier to destroy his subjects then to preserve them: and lastly, as being lascivious, he was likelier to dishonour his Citizens, then to do them honour and thus, as there were in him all those ver∣tues that make a Prince admirable; so there were in him all those vices that make a state miserable. And because for the most part, the good is overborne and suppressed by the bad; we may justly say, that Tiberius was altogether uncapable of the Empire, his Experience being obscured by his pride; his valour in warre, by his cruelty in Peace; and lastly his ripenesse in yeers, by his greennesse in lustfulnesse.

Tiberius yet together with his many vices, had also some vertues, and therefore was not wholly good, but part good; nor wholly wicked, but part wicked: and this is the cause why he continued peaceably in his Empire, which Nero did not, because Nero had many vices, and never a vertue; Tiberius though he had many vices, yet withall he had some vertues; and a vice can never hold out long, if it be not founded upon some vertue. A lascivious man, if he have not some temperance, will never live ten daies to an end: a Thiefe, if he use not some meane in his robbing, but will be stealing day and night, secretly and openly, he will quickly make his own Gallowes. Therefore Saint Chrysostome saith, Talis est natura mali, ut non consistat nisi virtuti cuipiam 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Nam mala non habent natu∣ram, ut ex se possint subsistere; nisi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aliquid a vir∣tutibus ceperint. And Aristotle having an eye to this, where teaching the way how to maintaine a tyranny, saith, that a tyrant ought at least to be part good, and part bad, Insuper moribus talis esse, ut recte se habeat ad virtutem, vel semibonus quidem sit, & non malus, sed semi∣malus. This was one of the causes why Nero being cruel, ruined himselfe, and Tiberius being cruell, kept him∣selfe

safe; because Nero was a cruell beast, and Tiberius a cruell man. He killed men, out of greedinesse of the blood of others; and this onely for security of him∣selfe: the one used his cruelty foolishly, and the other politickly; or rather we may say, wisely; Est enim quae∣dam Prudentia falsa (saith S. Thomas) vel per similitudi∣nem dicta, cum enim Prudens sit, qui bene disponit ea quae sunt agenda propter 〈◊〉〈◊〉 bonum finem, ille qui propter malum finem aliqua 〈◊〉〈◊〉 congruentia illi fini, habet falsam prudentiam, in quantum illud quod accepit pro fine, non est vere bonum, sed secundum similitudinem sic dicitur aliquis bonus latro; and that which followes.

But having said, that in Tiberius there was vertue as well as vice; but that Nero was all vice: for which some man with no small colour of truth may reprehend me, seeing in all Histories we find, that Nero was perhaps more vertuous then any other of the Caesarean family: I therefore thinke it necessary to advertise, that all vertues are not vertues in a Prince; But rather many a one, no better then a vice. Poesie, Musicke, Payn∣ting, and all those Sciences and Arts which depend upon sharpnesse of wit, a Prince having need to pro∣cure himselfe a soundnesse of judgement, and not a subtilty of braine, for contemplating of those things which consist onely in Idaea; therefore in these and such like, a Prince ought to content himselfe with a mediocrity of knowledge; not for his owne practice, but onely to enable him to taste the pleasure from them that doe practise them. Sunt enim quaedam e libe∣ralibus scientiis, (saith Aristotle) quas usque ad aliquid discere honestum sit, penitus vero sese illis tradere, atque usque ad extremum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 velle, valde noxium est. Philip King of Macedon, hearing his sonne Alexander play excellent well on an instrument, reproved him, saying, It is a shame for a Prince to play so well; it is onely fit for him, to be able to take delight, when he heares

them doe it, that make it their profession. And seeing this delight cannot be taken without being intelli∣gent of the Art, therefore this censure of Phillip seems not much different from my opinion; that a Prince, if it be possible, should know all Arts and Sciences, but not practise them. Nerva composed verses, and finding it a profession not fit for a Prince, he gave it over, Sed cohibet vires (saith Martial speaking of him) ingeniumque pudor. Seeing then Nero was vertuous and excellent in these kinds of Arts and Sciences, in which it is not for a Prince to be too conversant; we may justly say, that he was vitious in vertues; a thing which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 happens to those that are too greedy of getting knowledge. Whereupon Tacitus commended Agricola, that he could bridle this greedinesse, Retinuitque quod est 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ex sapientia modum. For this desire to know more then is fit, is neither Politically, nor Morally, nor Theologically good, Quemadmodum omnium 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (saith Seneca) sic literarum etiam intemperantia laboramus. And S. Paul, Noli sapere plusquam sapere oportet, sed sa∣pere ad sobrietatem. That which Tacitus cals, To hold a meane in studies, Seneca cals, to be temperate; and S. Paul, to be sober.

It comes into my mind, now that we are in this di gression, to give another reason, why Tiberius main∣tained himselfe in the Empire, and Nero perished in it: and it is, that Nero scorned fame, and Tiberius much esteemed it. And if a Divine should object, that the contemning of fame in this world, is a necessary vertue in all good men; I would answor, as it is true, that to contemne worldly fame, is one of the best things a Christian can doe; so it is one of the worst things a Heathen or a wicked man can doe; because there will be no vice or villany, which he will not dare to doe, if he regard not fame; as was seene in Nero, who not re∣garding fame, left no wickednesse unattempted.

But to returne to our purpose and principall in∣tent, which is, to shew the meaning of that place in Tacitus, upon which we have undertaken to discourse; I say, that many from that text, make it a rule, that one who hath been brought up in the Princes house, should not be made Prince, because of Tacitus his saying, Hunc & primum ab infantia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in domo Regnatrice: and their reason is, because in such places he learnes to be proud and insolent.

First, I doe not thinke, that Tacitus mislikes a successour should be brought up in the Princes House, neither that he makes it a cause of pride absolutely; because not onely it is commendable, but in a manner necessary, that Princes should be brought in their Houses to whom they are to succeed; seeing, that though a Prince be of the same state, and of the same blood Royall which ought to succeed in the Crowne; yet if he should be brought up any where but in his owne house, it would be cause enough to make him odious to all his subjects. And therefore Tacitus saith of Vonone, that although he were of the blood Royall of the Parthians, yet because he had beene brought up in Rome, his subjects would not endure him, Quamvis Gentis Arsacidarunt ut externum aspernabantur.

They therefore deceive themselves, who favouring either brothers or sons of the great Turk, have a hope to settle them in the Ottomane Empire: for though they be of the blood Royall, yet they will alwaies be ac∣counted strangers, and thereupon rejected. Where∣of continually we have heard and seene examples, no other good having ever come of it, but that it hath shewed the Christian piety of those Princes, who in zeale to God, have given shelter to such persons.

Secondly, he being commonly of an intolerable carriage, who from a servant comes to be a master, as

well because he passeth from one extreme to another; as because, to be a servant abaseth the spirit; as was seen in Tigranes, of whom Tacitus saith, that he there∣fore lost his Kingdome, Cum advenit Tigranes a Nerone ad capessendum Imperium dilectus, Cappadocum ex Nobili∣tate, Regis Archelai nepos, sed quod diu obses apud urbem fuerat usque ad servilem patientiam dimissus, neque consensu acceptus. And therefore our Lord God, would not that his Captaine and Leader of the Israelites, Moyses, should be as others were, a servant to Pharao, but would have him bred and brought up in the Kings house; and for this it was, that the Parthians expelled Vonone, Si mancipium Caesaris, tot per annos servitutem per∣pessum, Parthis Imperitet.

Thirdly, because being in some part raised above equality, as they are, who live in Princes houses, they are with lesse envy of the subjects, taken to be their Prince. Whereupon Servius, although (as some thinke) he was the sonne of a bondwoman; yet because he had been brought up in the Princes house, he was accepted for King. The Lacedemonians also, when they wanted a King, they tooke Laconicus, onely be∣cause he had been brought up in the Kings house.

Fourthly, because in such places, there is no doubt but they may better learne how to governe, and be set in a way of managing affaires: and therefore Dion in the life of Adrian, would have a speciall regard to be had of this, in choosing a Prince: and our Lord God, meaning to fit David, for being a King, made him in Sauls life time, to goe to live in the Kings Pal∣lace; to the end, he might learne the customes of a King, and be made to know the degree, before he tooke it; where if suddenly upon Sauls sinne, he had been made King, he should have come unknown to all the people.

It is not therefore to be found fault withall, that

he who is to rule others, should be brought up in his house that rules; neither in my opinion had Tacitus any such meaning; or to say better, he whose words Tacitus reports.

For they doe not simply and absolutely finde fault with Tiberius his education in Augustus his house, nei∣ther yet, that he had so great dignities and honours conferd upon him; for these did rather prepare him to governe well, then to make him proud; but the fault they find is this, that in his youth, and whilst he lived in the Princes house, he was raised to so many and to such a number of Offices. The fault therefore was not, that he was brought up in the Princes house, but that he had so many offices and honours bestowed upon him; and this neither not so much, as the un∣seasonablenes of them. And therefore Tacitus saith not simply, Congestos consulatus & honores, but Congestos Juveni consulatus. Which is very manifest, for seeing Tiberius had also in his mature age, great offices and honours, Tacitus must needs be understood to speake of those which he received in his youth, apt to make men grow proud, as in another place he excellently shewes, in the person of Tiberius; for the sonnes of Germanieus being much honoured by the Pontifex, who in his prayers to their Gods, made mention of them together with Tiberius, he forbad him saying; that yong men grow proud by receiving honours be∣fore their time. Movit ne quis in post•…•…runt mobiles adoles∣centium animos, praematuris honoribus ad superbiam extolle∣ret. And thus much concerning his pride.

Secondly, Tacitus taxeth Tiberius with cruelty, which though he endevoured all he could to hide, yet he could not keepe it from appearing. From whence we may know, there cannot be a worse nature, nor a worse Prince, then he who having in him the vice of cruelty, strives for some ends to hide it, seeing having

once gotten his intent, with heaping upon himselfe much hatred, he after makes his greedinesse of blood appeare the more, by flushing it out all at once, (at lest if he doe not as Cleomenes did) and where if he had not hidde his vice, every one might have knowne, upon what to worke and consequently few should have needed to feare. Now that he hides it, and men cannot penetrate into the Princes mind, it gives occasiō for all in generall to feare. The Senatours therefore of Rome, seeing Otho dissemble his vices, were much displeased at it: Otho interim (saith Tacitus) contra spem omnium, non deliciis, neque desidia torpescere; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 voluptates, dissi∣mulata luxuria, & cuncta ad decor•…•…nt Imperii composita; coque plus formidinis afferebant, falsae virtutes, & vitia reditura. Yet it is to be understood of those who dis∣semble; but for a certaine time, as Otho would have done, and as Nero did; but if we aske, which is the bet∣ter Prince, of him that being cruell desires to use his cruelty couertly, or he, that is openly cruell, I hold di∣rectly, that this is the worse; for, using his cruelty o∣penly, either he knowes not his vice, or he cares not what men say of him: if he regard not what men say of him, there cannot a worse thing be; if he know not his vice, he comes to be a cruell foole; where he that hides it, shews that both he knowes his vice, and also desires a good report: whereupon it followes he can∣not so often put his cruelty in execution; for then he should be a more foole then the other, to thinke that an act often repeated, should never be perceived; and if any one object that this must needs be the worse, as joyning to the vice of cruelty, the vice of craft: I an∣swer, that this mans government will be so much bet∣ter, as it is lesse distastfull, to be governed by one that is crafty, then by one that is a foole: whereupon the Senatours of Ronie never feared Tiberius so much, as when they saw him give over his dissembling: and

therefore Tacitus in another place saith, Penetrabat pa∣vor, & 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 & tegendis sceleribus ob∣scurum, eo confidentiae venisse, ut tanquam dimotis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ostenderet nepotem, sub verberibus Centurionis inter servo∣rum ictus, extrema vitae alimenta frustra orantem. But it is so hard a matter to hide a vice that is naturall; and to hide it so, as that no signe of it may appeare; that al∣most all they, who have had a purpose to dissemble; in short time have been discovered. So it happened to Philip, so to the Emperour Domitian, so to Sylla, to Tiberius and to Nero; and finally, to Theodotus King of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉: being a thing impossible, though there be a habit gotten of dissembling, to cover a vice that is naturall. In regard whereof, Plutarch saith of Philip, Insita a natura vitia adscititium habitum vicerunt, paula∣tim foris superhibuerunt, & ingenium Regis deterere. Whereupon our Lord God in S. Matthew, meaning to teach us to know such kind of men, saith, we must ob∣serve well their deeds, Attendite a falsis Prophetis qui veniunt ad vos in vestimentis Ovium: and to shew us the way how to know them, it followes, A fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos, where Theophylact adds, Nam licet ad tempus simulent, successu tamen temporis producuntur. I will not forbeare to bring another pregnant way, which Galen teacheth us, to come to the knowledge of these dissimulations, who saith, that if a vertue be naturall, as (for example) mildnesse, whether the provocations be great or little, yet they will not move a man to choller; but in all occasions, he will shew himselfe constant; but if it be feined, then perhaps in light oc∣casions he may hide it; but in great, it will violently break out and shew it selfe: and therefore Tacitus mea∣ning to shew the dissimulation of Tibernes useth these words, Multa indicia saevitiae, quanquam premantur erum∣pere: where this word 〈◊〉〈◊〉 shews, that not upon light, but upon great occasions, it discovered it selfe

with violence. Thirdly Tacitus blames Tiberius for luxury; of which head, I intend to speake in the fol∣lowing discourse.

Ne iis quidem annis, quibus Rhodi specie Secessus exulem egerit, aliquid quam Iram & simulationem, & secretas libidines meditatum.

How much it imports a Prince to be chast. The two and twentieth Discourse.

LUxury is a much greater vice, then cruelty; this taking away the life onely of the subjects, that the honour: and chastity on the contrary, is so pro∣fitable both to the acquiring, and to the conserving a Dominion, that every one (though of an ill nature, and a worse intention) that aspires to a Principality, will yet take care, if not to be chast, yet at least to seem so, and to hide his vice of lust untill he have at∣tained and be setled in the Empire. Whereupon Da∣niel speaking of Antichrist, saith, Deum patrum suorum non reputabit, & erit in concupiscentiis foeminarum: which place is translated in these words, Et concupiscentiis mu∣lierum non subjacebit. Writers therefore interpret, that Antichrist knowing of what importance chastity is for getting a Kingdome, will counterfeit himselfe to be so, thereby to get himselfe love, and to bring him forward, and finally to make him Emperour. But after he hath once gotten the Empire, he will then no longer hide his filthy concupiscence, but making him∣selfe a prey to vices, will shew himselfe to be truely their child.

This profit Tiberius Nero knew, and therefore strove all he could to hide his lust, Et secretas libidines medi∣tatum;

but when he had once gotten whither he as∣pired, and had set sure footing in the Empire, he then suffered himselfe to fall headlong into all kinds of vices. It is not therefore enough, to counterfeit to be such, before a man comes to his greatnesse, as that wicked one did, and as this impious one will doe; but a Prince must truely, both in the beginning, in the middle, and in the end not onely shew to be, but be in truth and sincerely free from lust: first, for zeale to God, and then for his owne good and the States: on his owne behalfe, because there is nothing that more ruines a Prince, then to be abject, base, and despised: Nothing that more upholds him, then Majesty, Gra∣vity and Reverence; and because Princes that are gi∣ven to Iust can never have any of these respects, It is therefore necessary they should keep themselves chast. In consideration of this, David after his adultery committed with Bersabee, taking notice of his errour, prayed to God and said, Redde mihi laetitiant salutaris tui, & spiritu Principali confirma me. As though he should say, O Lord God, I forgot that I was a King and a Prince, through the concupiscence of the flesh, into which most miserably I am fallen; I humbly pray thee, that from henceforward, thou wouldst confirme in me the spirit of chastity, that so I may returne to be a King & a Prince: and this is so true, that by the figure Antonomasia, chastity is called Gravity, and Majesty; and therefore S. Paul writing to Titus saith, In omnibus teipsum praebe exemplum bonorum operum; In doctrinà, in integritate, in gravitate. S. Hierome in his Comment upon that place, instead of gravitate, reads castitate; for the same word, which in Greeke signifies Gravity and Ma∣jesty, signifies also Chastity: and therefore, as Gravity and Majesty are necessary for a Prince, without which he should not be a Prince; so Chastity also is no lesse necessary: and as it is impossible that Majesty and lust

should be in company together, Non bene conveniunt, nec in una sede morantur, Majestas & Amor; so it is im∣possible that Majesty and chastity should not be toge∣ther, which onely of it selfe is able to make Princes be reverend. Which S. Paul in the foresaid Epistle shews where he saith, Vt qui ex adverso est Revereatur, nihil ha∣bens malum dicere nobis. Seeing chastity is reverenced even of her enemies.

On the part of the Subjects, there is no doubt but the chastity of the Prince, is of great consequence for their good: First, in regard of his example, seeing Cities, and consequently the Citizens, alter as they see the Prince alter: and therefore when Dionysius the Tyrant, sent for Plato to teach him Geometry, all the City and Pallace was presently full of dust, every one seeking with all diligence to be a Geo∣metrician. And Saint John in the Apocalyps, mea∣ning to expresse the changes, which are made in Cities, through the change that is in Princes, de∣scribes one and the same horse, to be sometime red, sometimes white, and sometimes blacke, which happened by the diversity of their riders, according to whom it changed colour. By the horse, (as the greater part of Writers say) is signified the Empire of Rome; and by those that rode upon it, the Emperours; accor∣ding to whose vices the Empire changed, and in no∣thing more then through chastity; seeing the Prince may by violence violate the honour of his Subjects, if he be not chast. In which regard S. Paul saith, Obsecro orationes fieri, pro Regibus, & pro omnibus qui in sublimi∣tate sunt constituti, ut tranquillam vitam agamus in omni pietate & castitate. Where he plainly shewes, that the chastity of the Subjects depends upon the chastity of the Prince, while he saith, let us Pray for Kings, to the end we may live chastly.

Chastity therefore is profitable for the Subjects,

and necessary for him that will rise to honour; in signe perhaps whereof, S. John in the Apocalyps, makes the Virgins appeare on the top of the Mount: as though he would say, that chast persons can easiliest rise to great degrees, who in the Scripture oftentimes are figured by Mountaines. Let Princes therefore be farre from lust, and as (according to the opinion of Hugo the Cardinall) they have the Name of God in com∣mon to them with Virgins: so also let them have cha∣stity in common to them with Virgins, but yet in such a manner as Princes are able to have it; for so they shall the better discharge their Office, to the honour and glory of God; which is the thing above all they ought to have before their eyes.

Accedere Matrem muliebri Impotentia, serviendum Foeminae.

How and when the government of women is odious. The three and twentieth Discourse.

FOr declaration of this place of Tacitus, where he seems to make it an odious thing to be governed by women: we will first shew, in what things it is, that womens Dominion over men is odious; and then, what Authority Princes should allow women in the government.

To begin with the first: I say, that women may beare rule three waies; the first, themselves alone di∣rectly. Secondly, themselves alone indirectly. Thirdly, themselves together with their sonnes, husbands, or o∣ther men.

The first way of bearing rule; that is, directly and properly consists in the acts of jurisdiction, as in judg∣ing;

to which there being required great knowledge, great prudence, and inflexibility: it is not possible, that women, by reason of the weaknesse of their un∣derstanding, can in any degree be fit: and therefore in the law, there is a prohibition against that Sex. And indeed there is no example found to the contrary, but only that of Debora, who in the old Testament is num∣bred among the Judges; and judged the people of Israel, with so great prudence, that she hath left of her selfe an eternall memory. But yet this case can be no barre to our assertion; seeing it may easily be an∣swered, that Debora gave not judgement of her owne braine, but gave answers to questions in manner of a Prophetesse, saying onely that which was revealed to her by God.

The second way of bearing rule, lesse proper and in∣direct, is nothing else, but to have a power to cōmand; which by accident also may happen to women, who being daughters of Princes, may succeed their father in the State. Although the power of commanding may seem proper to the man, and no way common with women; yet seeing the possessing of riches, is equally common to the man, and to the woman; and that it oftentimes happens that the jurisdiction followes the riches, and the thing possessed; it may also happen, that as the woeman is partaker of the riches, so she may be also of the jurisdiction to them annexed.

A third way, is to command in company with men; and themselves, not have the command alone; as many times, Wives with their Husbands, Mothers with their Sonnes, and Grandmothers with their Nephews; which oftentimes may be, and oftentimes is, but whe∣ther well or ill, shall be shewed hereafter.

It is therefore cleare, that a woman cannot beare rule directly and properly; that is, in that kind of ru∣ling which is called judging: but yet may in that which

is said to be commanding; and especially in the third way, with sonnes and other men.

As to the second point, whether the Dominion of women be odious, or no; we may distinguish it thus: either we speake of women alone, and by themselves: or else of women accompanied with men. If we take it the first way, there is nothing more odious, nothing more abhorred of men, then to be commanded by a woman, as being a thing repugnant to reason; con∣trary to Gods commandement, and most contrary to the law of nature. Our Lord God said to the woman; Sub viri potestate eris. Aristotle saith, that naturally the more perfect beares rule over the more imperfect; and the better over the worse: whereupon the wo∣man (as Aristotle in a thousand places witnesseth) being more imperfect then the man, and being by Pythagoras placed in the number of evils, and man of good, it would certainely be a monster in nature, that the per∣fect should be servant to the imperfect, the good to the evill; and especially that sex being (I say not al∣waies, but for the most part) voyd of prudence and of valour; full of pride; and fuller of lust; and conse∣quently most unsit to governe: of whom Tacitus saith; Non solum imparem laboribus sexum, sed si licentia adsit, saevum, ambitiosum, potestatis avidum. The government therefore of women; when they rule alone, not onely is odious, but is also most miserably administred: nei∣ther can the example of Debora (whereof I spake be∣fore) be justly objected; but rather I may my selfe make use of that example, in confirmation of my own assertion; for if she governed well, it was because she was a Prophetesse; and if her government were not odious; it was because a man commanded: for our Lord God, being willing the Israelites should be ru∣led by a woman; and knowing that by reason of their naturall imbecillities, they are not fit to rule, he infu∣sed

into Debora a Propheticall spirit, and meaning she should be received without distast, knowing how di∣stastfull a thing it is to men to be governed by wo∣men, he appointed her Barak for a companion in the government; to the end, that commanding by his assi∣stance, it might not be thought, as of her self alone, the command of a woman.

I will here forbeare to speake of infinite Kingdoms and States, that by the government of women have been utterly overthrowne, of which all ancient and moderne Histories are full; as well, for that it is a thing so well knowne, as for that it is not much to our pur∣pose. For when Tacitus saith, Serviendum foeminae, he meanes not, that a woman should command alone, either as Judge or as Princesse; but he meanes the third way, together with men, seeing he speakes of Livia, who having been the cause of Tiberius his com∣ming to the Crowne: it might be doubted, whether she also were not to governe, as well as he. That which we are to examine is this, what authority ought to be given in such cases, by men to women; and whether their government in this sort be odious or no? For answer whereto, we must proceed with distinguishing, either we speake of States not well setled, where the men are stout and warlike; or else of States, that live quietly and in peace, and are governed by a Prince se∣cure. If we be in the first case, I am absolutely of opi∣nion, that the Dominion of women is most odious; and therefore Semiramis, as knowing this, durst not venture to take upon her the Empire, openly; Haec (saith Justin) nec immaturo puero ausa tradere Imperium, necipsa Imperium palam tractare, tot ac tantis gentibus vir patienter uni viro, nedum foeminae parituris. And the rea∣son of this is nothing else, but that those Subjects be∣ing stout and warlike, would never have consented to be governed by her, if they had knowne her at first to

be a woman. Which we may well thinke, seeing with these very subjects, it was enough for Sardanapalus that he had but the likenesse of a woman, to make him de∣spised, and afterward be slaine. Indignatus tali foeminae (saith Justin of him in the person of Artabanus) tantum virorum subjectum, tractantique lanam ferrum & arma portantes parere. And this is the case, which Tacitus meanes when he saith Serviendum foeminae; shewing, it would be odious in a warlike people, as the Romans were, and dangerous in a new Prince as Tiberius was, to governe in company of a woman.

Now if we aske, what authority should be given to women in such cases, I say, they should not be suffered to entermeddle in matters of judgement, nor of the state, themselves alone; not so much for their incapa∣city, as for the contempt they are apt to fall into, though they should governe never so well. And there∣fore the Roman Emperour Alexander, a man most just, and furnisht with all the qualites of a good Prince; yet because he suffered his mother to meddle in mat∣ters of State, though she did it with great prudence and justice, he fell in short time into contempt, and finally of the Souldiers was miserably slaine. In truth a singular example to shew, that warlike minds can never endure the government of women, and that their honour is the Princes disparagement; which Ti∣berius (a wise man) knew, and could say, Moderandos foeminarum honores: and Tacitus, no lesse wise then he, gives the reason of it saying, Muliebre fastigium in sui di∣minutionem accipiens.

Yet they must not altogether be left without ho∣nour, but some authority it is fit they should have, es∣pecially such as are the cause of the Princes comming to the Empire. And therefore the wise Salomon, who through the good meanes of his mother Bersabee with old David, was assumed to the Royall dignity, not

onely honoured her exceedingly, but would have her sit with him upon his Throne; as is written in the Booke of Kings, Venit ergo Bersabee ad Regem Salomo∣nem, ut loqueretur ei pro Adonia, & surrexit Rex in occur∣sum ejus, adoravitque 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & sedit super Thronum suum, positusque est Thronus matri Regis, quae sedit ad dexteram ejus. But yet I cannot finde, in holy Scripture, that ever she gave judgement, or spake in counsell, or gave audience in affaires at any time. The authority and honour therefore that is to be allowed to women, in States that are not secure, ought not to be immedi∣ately in themselves, but by assistance of their husbands. And this counsell David gave to Salomon, in the Psalm Eructavit, speaking to his Bride, where he saith, Filia Tyri in numeribus, vultum tuum deprecabuntur: Where he saith not te, but vultum tuum, that is, thy husband; meant by the word countenance, as Theodoret and S. Basil interpret it. He then that is to be resorted to, and to be sued unto, must be the man, and not the wo∣man; and the honours that are done to the women, ought to passe by the way of their husbands: and there∣fore it is said in Esay, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 invocetur nomen tuum super nos. This course Tiberius tooke most notably, who when his mother made any suite in his name, he presently granted it; and more then so, he many times at the suit of Livia required those things of the Senat, which without blushing he could not have asked; but when it was moved to give her honours immediately without passing by the meanes of Tiberius, he then presently opposed it, saying, Moderandos foeminarum honores.

But if we speake of those Princes that live securely in peace, and are well setled in their states, as at this day many are in Italy; then, either those women that should governe together with the men, are in judge∣ment and understanding fit for it, or else they are al∣together

unfit: if unfit, it may then be enough for them to looke to matters at home, and Domesticall affaires; but if fit, I cannot then thinke any thing more just, or more convenient, or more profitable to a Prince, then to call such women of his blood, to beare a part of the burthens of government; both because by their experience and prudence they may assist the Prince as much as any other; and also because by reason of their owne interest, and the singular af∣fection they beare to their husbands, their sonnes or nephewes; there can be none found, that with more sincerity and faithfulnesse, and without any by-re∣spects, will helpe them to beare so great a burthen, as a Kingdome is; and so much more, as they are alwaies like to be partakers as well of the dangers, as of the profits of the Prince. A thing which is not found in strangers, and such as are mercenary, whose profit of∣tentimes lookes another way, and is divided from the Princes profit. Whereupon S. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 upon that place of Esay, Pater filiis notam faciet veritamet: saith, Non re∣velatur servo veritas, quia servus nescit quid faciat Do∣minus ejus, sed nec Mercenarius rapitur ad contemplandam veritatem, quia propriam quaerit utilitatem. And there∣fore Augustus a most wise Prince, had often conference with Livia, Numa Pompilius with Aegeria, Cyrus with Aspas•…•…a Tarquinius with Tanaquill, and Justinian with his wife Theodosia. Princes therefore ought not to de∣spise the counsels of women of their blood, but to hold them in great account; whereof, in my opinion there is in Genesis a Golden Text: Sara having spoken to Abraham to send away Agar and Ismael, it seemes he was not very willing to give credit to the words of a woman; which God knowing, said unto him, Omnia quae dixerit tibi Sara, audi vooem ejus. Moreover, when our Lord God made the woman, he said, Faciamus ei Adjutorium simile sibi: and why then should we seeke

after other helpers, and not take those who are made of purpose for our ayd? According to this my opinion was decided the controversie in Tacitus, betweene Va∣lorius Messalina and Caecina, where it was concluded, that in governments which stand in danger, it is not fit to bring in women; but very fit, in governments that are peaceable and secure. In which I say more, that a Prince who is yong, cannot doe better, then not onely to be counselled (a thing in part also fit, where States are dangerous) but to suffer himselfe also to be governed by women. Theodatus King of the Ostrogothes, in the beginning of his Raigne carried himselfe, with great moderation, as long as he agreed with his wife, but when he left to follow her advice, he filled with injustice all his Kingdome. The Emperour Constantinus Sestus, never governed well, but when he suffered his mother Irene to direct him. And Salomon never runne into disorderly courses, as long as his mo∣ther Bersabe•…•… lived; of whom he scorned not to be taught, as himselfe in the Proverbs saith, Filius fui patris mei, tenellus & Vnigenitus coram matre mea, & do∣cebat me atque dicebat, suscipiat verba mea cor tuum, custodi praecepta mea, & vives. And therefore S. Chrysostome upon S. John saith, Nihil potentius muliere bona ad insti∣tuendum, & informandum virum, quodcunque voluerit, neque tam leniter anticos, nec magistros patietur, ut conjugem admonentem atque consulentem, habet enim voluptatem quan∣dam admonitio uxoria; cum plurimum amet cui consulit, multos possum afferre viros asperos & immites, per uxorem mites redditos & mansuetos. Who knowes not, that Tiberius never plunged himselfe so much into all kinds of wickednesse, as after his mothers death? And the reason which all men alledge to prove women unfit for government, is of no force; of force I know in generall; but that in particular, women should not be as fit as men, I hold it a great folly to thinke; having

my selfe, although but yong, not onely found written in Histories, but seene in experience, many women able to have governed the whole World: and to these the frailty of their sexe, is so farre from being a hinde∣rance, that rather they are worthy of the more praise, for overcomming naturall defects, with supply of vertue.

Vix dum ingressus Illyricum Tiberius, properis matris literis excitur, neque satis compertum est, spirantem adhuc Augustum apud urbem Nolam, an exanimem repererit, acribus namque custodiis domum & vias sepserat Livia, laetique interdum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vulgabantur, donec 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quae tempus monebat, simul excessisse Augustum, & rerum potiri Neronem, eadem fama detulit.

That at one and the same time, to make knowne the death of the Prince, and the assumption of the successour, is a thing very profitable for States that stand in danger. The foure and twentieth Discourse.

THere is nothing makes me more beleeve, that Tiberius had given order to his mother to poison Augustus, then his very being far off from Rome, at the time of his death; an invention followed by all those, who by such meanes have taken away the life of great personages. So did Piso, after he had (as is said) poy∣soned Germanicus: so did Lodowick Sforza, who know∣ing that his Nephew had taken poyson, and could not long be living, he would not stay in Milan, but went to Piacenza to the King of France. The cause, as I thinke, why they do so, is to the end the World may not suspect they had any hand in their deaths; and al∣though, they cannot but thinke, that men of under∣standing

will suspect them the more, yet this is no∣thing to the Prince, who seeks but to a voyd the heat of the people, who without any judgment, are carried through love or hatred, to doe such things, as men of judgement would never doe.

Tiberius was then in Slavonia, when his mother sent him word of Augustus his sicknesse; who (as may be thought) was dead before Tiberius came to Nola; yet he oftentimes gave forth, he had good hope of his speedy recovery; and this he continued so long, till he might be provided of things needfull for accompli∣shing his purpose; and that done, he at one and the same time, with one and the same voyce, made known the death of Augustus, and his owne assumption to the Empire.

We have in Tacitus another example very like to this, of Agrippina the mother of Nero, who upon cer∣taine words she heard Claudius utter in his Wine, that he meant to give the Empire to Britannicus, she poy∣soned him; and being dead, she gave out there was good hope of his amendment, untill she had made ready all things needfull for making Nero Emperour. The words of Tacitus are these, Vocabatur interim Sena∣tus; votaque pro incolumitate Principis Consules & Sacer∣dotes nuncupabant, cum jam exanimis vestibus & fomentis obtegeretur, dum res firmando Neronis Imperio componuntur. Jam Agrippina velut dolore victa, & solatia conquirens, tenere amplexu Britannicum, veram Paterni oris effigiem appellare, ac variis artibus demorari, ne cubiculo egredere∣tur. Antoniam quoque & Octaviam sorores ejus attinuit, & ounctos aditus custodiis clauserat, erebroque vulgabat, ire in melius valetudinem Principis, quo miles bona in spe age∣ret, tempusque prosperum ex monitis Chaldaeorum attentaret. Tunc medio diei, tertio ante Idus Octobris, foribus Palatii repente deductis, Comitante Burrho Nero egreditur. I have related these words of Tacitus at large (as not able at

this time to discourse upon them:) to the end, that every one may see, what devices Agrippina used at the death of Claudius to bring Nero to the Empire. The very like course to this, was taken by Servius Tullus, in company of Tanaquill the wife of Tarquinius Priscus, who seeing her husband wounded so dangerously, that he was upon the point to die, she shut the Court gates, and gave out that the wound was but light; and that in a few daies they should see the Prince abroad, but that in the meane time, he had commanded Servius Tullus to take his charge, and to be obeyed as himselfe in person: by this device, Servius getting possession of the Royall authority, was able in few daies so to setle himselfe in the Empire, that it was an easie matter, at one and the same time, to make knowne that Tarqui∣nius was dead, and that himselfe was Emperour. Which fact Livy relating, saith, Servius cum trabea & lictori∣bus prodit, ac sede Regia sedens, alia decernit, de aliis con∣sulturum se esse Regem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, itaque per aliquos dies, cum jam expirasset Tarquinius celata morte, per speciem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fungend•…•… vicis, suas opes sirmavit, tum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 palam facta, ex comploratione in Regia orta, Servius praesidio firmo mu∣nitus, primum injussu populi, voluntate Patrum Regnavit. Also Arius Aper, after he had secretly in a litter slaine Numerianus the sonne of the Emperour 〈◊〉〈◊〉, gave out in the Army enquiring where he was, that for an in∣firmity in his eyes, he kept him out of the wind, inten∣ding first to accomodate his owne designes, and then to publish Numerianus his death; and if his plot suc∣ceeded not, that was long of other occasions. It is therefore no marvell that Tiberius following the course of Servius, was able to attaine his end, as well as Servius, especially having many things to help him, which to the other were wanting.

This therefore is an excellent way, secure and wor∣thy of imitation, in Kingdomes that are not well

setled, and where the people are desirous of change; for to suffer no Interregnum, but in one and the same time, to make knowne the death of the one, and the assumption of the other, is the onely meanes to hin∣der innovations. The reason of this, in my opinion is, because as Waxe is more apt to take a forme, when it is without any, then when it hath a forme before, see∣ing in the first case there needs but one action, which is to imprint a new forme; where in the second case, there need two: first to take away the old forme, and then to bring in a new, which certainly is double as difficult: and therefore a certaine Philosopher, would be doubly payed, when he tooke one to teach, that had been taught before, because he must take double paines: first, to remove the false Images imprinted in the fantasie; and then to bring in the true: so a City (to returne to our purpose) being a matter that can∣not consist without a forme, it will be more easie to bring in it a new forme, if it have none before, then if it have; and therefore if Tiberius had made knowne the death of Augustus, before his owne assumption to the Empire, the City had remained without a form, & consequently with small difficulty, either the Senate or the people, or the souldiers might have brought in another: but comming at one and the same time, to know both the one and the other, the Empire seemed rather to change Prince, then forme. Our Lord God knew the Israelites to be a people, Durae cervicis, apt to rebell, and desirous of innovations; and therefore he called Moyses up to the Mount, to the end they might not know of his death, before they knew Josua the sonne of Nun to be his successour. We may there∣fore conclude, that this course of Tiberius is not to be blamed, especially taken to a pious end.

Primum facinus Novi Principatus fuit Posthumi Agrippae caedes; quem ignarum Inermem{que} quamvis firmatus animo Centurio aegre confecit. Nihil de ea Re Tiberius apud Senatum disseruit: Patris Jussa dissimulabat, quibus praescripsisse Tribuno custodiae ad∣posito, ne contaretur Agrippam morte adsicere quando•…•…ue ipse supremum diem explevisset.

That those men who possesse the state of another, are but in a dangerous condition, as long as any of the former Lords line remaine alive: and what course is to be taken to free themselves from such danger. The five and twentieth Discourse.

TIberius apprehended, he could never live securely in the Empire, if he made not away Agrippa. For he being of the line of Augustus, and neerer to the Crowne then himselfe, a sierce man and of beastly conditions, would alwaies be a refuge to the souldiers and people of Rome, whenfoever they should fall into distast of their Prince: and the rather for that he be∣ing a violent man, and without judgement, would never have stood upon danger, but not fearing death it selfe, would have ventured upon any occasion. And these are the men, who though but private men, are to be feared of all: and therefore Pomponius stood in feare of Titus Manlius, Et quod haud minus timendum erat (saith Livy) stolide ferocem viribus suis cerneret.

This course of Tiberius hath for the most part beene followed by all Princes and Commonwealths in the changes of State, when from one line it passeth to another, the new alwaies extinguishing the old, as though without this course, they were never able to

live in peace. So the Romans, as long as the race of the Tarquins continued, were never without warre. And this is one of the causes I alledged, why the con∣spiracy of Marcus Brutus against Caesar, had not so good successe, as the conspiracy of Lucius Brutus a∣gainst the Tarquins; because in this, they destroyed not onely the line of the Tarquins, but all those that were of the name: where in that of Caesar, they onely cut downe the tree, but left the roote behind; from which sprung up Augustus, who receiving nourishment and ayd from those very men that had killed his unkle, in a short time he grew to be so great a Tree, that he crushed them to pieces, that went about to cut him downe. For this very cause, in Aegypt, in Cappado∣cia, in Soria, in Macedonia, and in Bythinia, they often changed their Kings, because they tooke no care to extinguish the line of the former Lords, but onely to get their places. And therefore Bardanus in Tacitus is justly blamed, who instead of extinguishing Gotarze the former Lord, stood loosing his time, in besieging the City.

But these and a thousand other examples, (which for brevity I omit) it may be held for a maxime of State, that whosoever gets a Kingdome from another, he ought to root out the whole line of him that was Lord before.

But this rule cannot be thus left, without some asper∣sion of impiety: and therefore, for resolution, I think best to distinguish; because if we speake of a Christian Prince, that hath gotten the state of another, who is enemy of the faith, he may justly do•…•… as best pleaseth him, by any way whatsoever to take them away, that can pretend to the State; yet not so neither, unlesse he find them so obstinate in their •…•…ect, that there is no possible meanes to remove them from their errour; and so much our Lord God himselfe, by the mouth of

the Prophet Samuel, appointed Saul to do to Amalech, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ergo vade & percute Amalech, & demolire Vni∣versa ejus, non parcas ei, & non concupiscas ex rebus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aliquid, sed interfice a viro usque ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 atque Lactantem.

But if we speake of a Christian Prince, that by force gets possession of a State, from one of the same faith let him never goe about to destroy the line of him that possessed it before; for, besides that it is a thing un∣worthy of a Christian, it seemes to me, to be rather their invention, who meaning to live wickedly, would be glad to have no bridle, for if a Prince shall carry himselfe lovingly towards his Subjects, using them as children, and not as servants, he need not be afraid of any whomsoever. For this cause, the Senatours of Rome, having driven out the Tarquins, had more 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to governe the City, as fathers, then to extinguish the line of him that had been Lord, which was indeed in∣comparably more for their good: as in the second booke of the first Decad of Livy, every one may see.

Rather, many times it is better to bestow honours upon them, from whom a state is taken, and to leave them a part, thereby to reteine the rest more securely. So did Cyrus, who having taken Lydia, and dispossessed Craesus, who was Lord of it before, he left him at least a part of his patrimony, and gave him a City to be his owne. And indeed if he had done otherwise, he might easily have lost all: therefore Justin saith, Craeso & vita, & patrimonii partes & urbs Barce concessa sunt, in qua 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non Regiam vitam, tamen proximam Majestati Regiae degeret. And then shewes the benefit that comes by it, where he saith, Haec Clementia non minus Victori, quam victo utilis fuit: quippe ex Vniversa Gracia, cognito quod illatum Craeso bellum esset, auxilia veli•…•…t ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 extinguendum incendium 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 Craesi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 apud omnes urbes erat, ut passurus 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 bellū Gracia

fuerit, si quid crudelius in Craesum consuluisset. If the King of France had done thus, when Ferdinand of Aragon would have yeelded up the Kingdome of Naples to him, if he would have left him but Lord of Calabria, perhaps he had not lost both the one and the other: and in truth, it had been his best way to have done so, at least for so long time, till he might have made himselfe sure and firme in the Kingdome of Naples: and then for the o∣ther, he might have taken it from him againe at any time. So did David, who tooke away halfe of the substance which Saul had given to Mephibosheth; and gave it to his servant Siba, for a doubt he had, lest he should desire his fathers Kingdome. This interpreta∣tion Procopius made of it, when he said, Vt substantiam 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ipsius dejiceret, ne Regnum affectaret, alias enim illum qui adversus Dominum suum mendacium dixerat, quem punire potius debebat, nequaquam participem cumeo fecisset.

Alexander the Great, when he waged warre with Kings farre off from Macedonia, he not onely when he had overcome them, never sought to extinguish their line; but which is more strange, to them from whom he had taken a Kingdome, he restored the same King∣dome againe. A great act of Magnanimity, and which may and ought to be used, in the like case to that of Alexander Magnus; that is, when Countries farre re∣mote from the Seate of the Kingdom, and in customes, Iawes, habit and language very different, are easily o∣vercome; and so much the rather, when the warre is waged, more for desire of glory, then for getting of ground; seeing it is alwaies better, to seeke to hold that by a way of clemency, which by a way of force can never be held.

But in case it be feared, least leaving the former Prince, in the Countries taken from him, he should practise to make a revolution; he may then have states

given him to governe in other places: So Cirus did, who having overcome the Medes, and deprived Asty∣ages of his Kingdome, he would not leave him in Media, and yet would not deale hardly with him nei∣ther, but he made him Governour of Hyrcania, and although Justin say, it was done, because Astyages him∣selfe had no mind to returne to the Medes; yet to my understanding, it is more likely, that Cyrus did it as fearing, least he who had procured his nephews death, to bring himselfe to the Kingdome, being now depri∣ved of it, would never be quiet, when any fit occasion should be offerd to him.

Another way there is, which others have used, and it is, to keepe such about themselves, and to hold them in esteeme of Kings: so Herod the great had begun to doe with Aristobulus, and with Hyrcanes, but the cru∣elty of his nature made him fall at last, to take the same course that others doe. This counsell therefore, was much better followed by David, who leaving Sauls patrimony to Mephibosheth the sonne of Jonathan, he held him alwaies about himselfe in great honour, and all succeeded exceeding well.

And in case all these courses seeme to be difficult; either, thorough the undanted spirit of him that was Lord before, or by reason of the extraordinary affe∣ction the people beare him; in this case, the best course is, to send them into banishment for some long time, as the Pope did in Bolognia.

But to returne to our purpose: Tiberius not with∣out cause stood in feare of Agrippa, which is plainely to be seen by this, that not onely Agrippa, but one onely servant forging and taken upon him his name, was like to have raised no small insurrection in the people and Senatours of Rome; and because Tiberius could not put this Agrippa to death, without incurring an exceeding blot of cruelty, he therefore had re∣course,

to that remedy so much used by Princes; which was to feigne that Augustus had commanded it. So also did the Emperour Adrian, who would have it belee∣ved, that all the murthers he committed were done by his predecessours command; which not onely a∣bates the hatred and name of being cruell, but con∣verts it also into piety, as done for executing the will of the dead. And yet in this there would be no blame, if such murthers were committed out of zeale of ju∣stice, out of which zeale, David being willing that Joab should be punished for two murthers, and Semei for the injury he had done him; to take away the ha∣tred, that for this might fall upon Salomon, he com∣manded him at the time of his death to doe it; to the end, that he afterward putting it in execution, might seem rather (as in this indeed he was) a just King, and a pious executour of the will of his deceased father, then a cruell Prince.

But because Ludovico Moro, taking to him that state, which belonged not to him, by meanes of his Nephews death, hath much resemblance to Tiberius; I am wil∣ling to shew it a little more cleerely, by a Parallell. Augustus being dead, Tiberius succeeded in the Empire, and caused Agrippa Posthumus to be put to death, to whom the succession of right belonged. Ludovico Moro succeeded in the Dutchy of Milan, and caused (as it is beleeved) John Galeozzo, the true heire, to whom that Dutchy of right belonged, to be put to death. Tiberius doubted, that because Augustus was gone to visit A∣grippa, he would appoint him to be Emperour. Ludo∣vico Moro feared, that because Charles the eighth was gone to visit John Galeozzo, he would make him Duke of Milan Tiberius would have it beleeved, that he was elected by the Senate, and not through the wicked∣nesse and plots of his mother Livia. Ludovico Moro would have it beleeved, that he was made Duke of

Milan by the people, for the good of the state, and not through his owne villanies. Tiberius made a shew, as though he were unwilling to take upon him the Em∣pire, Moro also dissembled the like. In one onely thing they differed, that to the one it proved safety; to the other, ruine; and it is, that where Tiberius as soone as he came to the Empire, he presently put Agrippa to death; Ludovico stayed so long from putting his ne∣phew to death, that he was forced, for putting it in execution to call in the King of France, to his manifest and utter ruine.

A Parallell betweene Tiberius and Salomon. The six and twentieth Discourse.

SEeing in these Discourses, and particularly in the next before, we have spoken of Tiberius, and brought also many examples of Salomon, I have thought it no unfit curiosity, to compare them toge∣ther. Tiberius was borne of Livia, who was taken by Augustus from Nero. Salomon was borne of Bersabee, who was taken by David from Vrias. Bersabee was with child, (although by David) when he tooke her to wife; Livia also was with child, when she went to be married to Augustus. Augustus had many neere of kinne to whom to leave the Empire, as Agrippa for one. Da∣vid had his sonne Adoniah, to whom by right of age, as being the elder, the Kingdome belonged. Finally, Augustus growne old, at the suit of Livia, appointed Tiberius to be his heire: and David growne old, at the perswasions of Bersabee, ordained Salomon to succeed him. Salomon being come to the Crown, killed Adoniah, to whom the right of it belonged: Tiberius being come to the Empire, caused Agrippa to be put to death, who

was rightfull heire of the Empire: Both the one and the other governed with great judgement in the be∣ginning; but at last, Salomon loosing Bersabee, and Ti∣berius, Livia; both the one and the other plunged themselves into all kinds of lustfulnesse. Whereupon there rebelled against Tiberius, Sejanus the deerest ser∣vant he had: and against Salomon, Jeroboam the most inward friend he had. Tiberius used to speake darkly: Salomon also used the like speaking, as may be seen by his Parables and Proverbs.

Nuntianti Centurioni ut mos Militiae: factum esse quod imperasset, neque imperasse sese, & rationem facti reddendam apud Senatum, respondit. Quod postquam Sallustius Crispus particeps Secre∣torum (is ad Tribunum miserat codicillos) comperit; metuens ne reus subderetur, juxta periculoso, ficta seu∣vera promeret, monuit Liviam, ne arcana domus, &c.

That it is a dangerous thing to obey Princes in services of cruelty and tyranny. The seven and twentieth Discourse.

SAllust had taken order, and provided all due means for putting Agrippa Posthumus to death, by the commandement of Tiberius; but he desirous to shew he had no hand in the fact, denied to the Centurion who was the executioner of it, that it was done by any command of his; saying, that for what he had done, he must give account, not to him, but to the Senat. Which Sallust seeing, and doubting least the mischiefe might fall upon his head; Veritus (as Justin saith, spea∣king in the person of Arpagus in the like case) 〈◊〉〈◊〉 infantis necati ultionem, quam a patre non potuisset, a mini∣stro exigeret: he began to counsell Livia, Ne arcana

Domus, ne consilia amicorū, ministeria militum vulgarentur.

The conceit of Tiberius was good, that he would have, (as I imagine) the Centurion goe to the Senate to tell them, he had executed the Commandement of Augustus about the death of Agrippa; but yet that of Sallust likes me better: because there is no likelihood it would ever be beleeved, that Augustus appointed the death of a Nephew, for security of a son in law: seeing as he could get nothing by it, so he might loose much; because the Prince shewing he cared not to have his death known, there is no doubt but men would talke of it with more boldnesse: from which talke, there of∣tentimes grow ill affections against the Prince; where∣as, if Tiberius had passed it (as he did) in silence, it would not have come to many mens eares, & they that would have heard it, would have kept it secret, as knowing how dangerous a thing it is, to discover & talk of that which Princes would have to be concealed. Besides, if he made it be told in the Senate, he did by such feig∣ning more incense the minds of all men; seeing doing it, without telling it, he had used but force, but telling it withall, he used craft; and because it grieves inferi∣ours more, when they are overcome by craft, then when they are oppressed by force: consequently, they would have taken greater indignation for the death of Agrippa, if to the force there had been added this craft, to make the Senate beleeve such tales, as one would not looke should be beleeved of Children. And therefore we see the Romane Nobility tooke it ill at Neroes hands, that he would goe about to make them beleeve, that the shipwrack of his mother was a thing happened by chance; and that she had sent Agerinus to kill him, which were all but foolish devises, to cover his most nefarious fault. Yet I say not, if Tiberius had used that cunning before spoken of, that he had been ere the more in danger by it; seeing they who under∣stand

these tricks, are men of braine, who as they have judgement whereby they discerne such subtilties of the Prince; so by the same judgement they know how to hide them, by making a shew that they be∣leeve them. And upon such men it is that the people, (the Princes onely feare) cast their eyes, and beleeve verily all that to be true, which they see wise men make a shew to beleeve: as one that lookes only upon the barke of things, discernes not that which is true, from that which is feigned; whereof, we have an ex∣ample in Tacitus, in the fore-alledged case of Nero, in which, although the chiefe men had taken distaste to be mocked with those foolish inventions of Nero, yet they all made shew to beleeve it when it was told them. Miro tamen certamine Procerum, decernuntur suppli∣cationes, apud omnia Pulvinaria. Herod was much afraid, if he should cause Saint John to be beheaded, least the people would make some insurrection; whereupon he found this tricke, to bind himselfe by oath; there∣by to make the people beleeve, that it was against his will he put him to death, but that he was tied by oath; and it succeeded well with him, for the chiefe men, both out of interest and out of feare made shew to beleeve him; and the people beleeved him indeed: yet in this present case, when together with securing themselves from the people, they may also avoyd the distast of the Senate; this opinion of Sallust likes me better.

But be it how it will, this is a cleere case, which we may gather from this place, that those Officers who have served their Lords, and been their instruments in cruell and tyrannicall executions, have come them∣selves at last, for the most part to a miserable end. And this happens for divers reasons.

First, because oftentimes they surfeit of them, and knowing their owne villanies, in which many times

they goe so farre, that Neque peccata, neque Remedia pati possunt, as Livy saith, they feele themselves torne in conscience, which is alwaies gnawing, Sicut vestimen∣tum sic comedet eos vermis, & sicut lana, sic devorabit eos tinea; a misery which for the most part happens to tyrants. And this Plato teacheth us, as Tacitus speaking of Tiberius relates, Ad•…•…o Facinora atque flagitia sua ipst quoque in supplicium verterent. Neque frustra Praestantis∣simus sapientiae (that is Plato) firmare solitus est, si reolu∣dantur Tyrannorum mentes, posse aspici laniatus & ictus; quando ut corpora verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceratur. As was seene also in Nero, who after he had killed his mother, was continually affrighted in his mind, as fearing the wagging of every leafe. And Alphonsus of Aragon had alwaies appari∣tions before his eyes, where he thought he saw those Lords, whom he had put to death. So the King Theodoricus, having put Boetius and Symmachus to death, when the head of a great Fish was served to his table, he thought he saw the head of Symmachus threatning him; wherewith affrighted, he cast himselfe upon his bed, and died. So Poets feine, that Oresies ha∣ving killed his mother, was tormented by the Furies: whereupon the Ancients, seeing these tyrants stan∣ding alwaies in continuall terrour, Sonitus terroris sem∣per in auribus illius; & cum pax sit, ille insidius suspicatur: have conceived that such men were frighted with the Ghosts of those whom they had killed. Seeing there∣fore these Princes cannot hinder a thing done, from being done; they desire at least to have them taken away, who having beene their instruments, doe with their presence refresh the memory of the villanies they have commited: So Tacitus saith, speaking of Anicetus whom Nero imployed to kill his mother. Levi post ad∣missum scelus gratia, dein graviore odio, quia graviorum facinorum ministri, exprobrantes aspiciuntur. And there∣fore

Tiberius used often to rid away those servants, whō in such villanies he had imployed. And that his cruelty might not want worke, in their places he supplied still others; which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 relates where he saith, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ministros ut praeventi ab aliis nolebat, ita 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in eandem operam recentibus, veteres & pergraves afflixit.

Secondly, they oftentimes put to death such ser∣vants; specially whom they have imployed in mur∣thering any of the blood Royall: and the reason is, lest having now imbrued their hands in Royall blood, they should 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sticke to murther them too. So Per∣seus put him to death, who had been his instrument in killing Demetrius; so Otho all those who had beene his ministers in killing of Galba.

Thirdly, this happens sometimes for securing of Princes, that their villanies may not be knowne: for when they have done them, and can finde no other way to hide them, they then lay another upon them; as David did, who to cover his adultery, committed a murther; and therefore they put all those to death, who have any hand, or have any knowledge of their faults: so did Bassianus the sonne of Severus, who ha∣ving caused his brother Geta to be killed, caused also Letus that had beene his Counsellour, and all other that were acquainted with it, to be slaine. Perseus also standing in feare of the Roman Army, appointed Niceas to cast all his Treasure into the Sea; and An∣dronides, to burne the Navy: but afterward, being sen∣sible of his cowardice in shewing such feare, and asha∣med of it; to the end it might not be knowne, he cau∣sed both of them to be put to death.

Fourthly, it often happens that such servants runne a hazzard, because a Prince having used them, in the executing a thousand cruelties and tyrannies, through which they come to be odious to all the City; he hopes that by putting those servants to death, the

odiousnesse shall be turned upon them•…•… as whereby the subjects shall be made beleeve, that those cruelties were committed without their consent. So Valentinus used to doe, who having imployed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 d'Orco, with great cruelty to extinguish the factions of Romagna; after most tyrannically, he had made himselfe Lord of it, and had obtained his purpose; not without bring∣ing upon himselfe the infinite hatred of all his subjects; at last he cut in pieces that miserable minister of his, to the end, the hatred of his subjects might be turned upon him: and the like did Tiberius to Sejanus, and of such examples Histories are full. Rather indeed, ty∣rants ingrosse to themselves such fellowes, to the end, that when the scores of seditions shall be cast up, they may excuse themselves, and make the people wreck their anger upon the servant.

Fifthly, such servants runne a hazzard; because the foundation upon which they build their Lords favour is soone ended: the cause of their favour, being onely the hatred that is borne to another, which ceaseth as soone as he is dead; and consequently the affection ceaseth, which was borne for putting the murther in execution: so much Tacitus intimates, speaking of Plancina, who after the hatred to Germanicus was en∣ded, was her selfe in danger, Vbi odium & Gratia desit, jus valuit.

But these waies never bring forth any good effect to a Prince: First, because it is false, that they can ever cancell the remembrance of such villanies out of their minds; seeing their owne conscience is too great a witnesse against them. Whereupon, although our Lord God, (as Theodoret saith) tooke away the life of that sonne of David, which was borne in the adultery with Bersabee, that it might not remaine a shame to him, for the •…•…inne he had committed, Vivus erat futurus argumentum sceleris ac iniquitatis, 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 Regis qui erat, &

Propheta, curant gerens Dominus, non sinit eum vivere: yet it served not to remove the gnawing of his conscience: as he saith, Peccatum moum coram me est semper. Second∣ly, this is no sufficient way to keepe their crimes from being knowne, Nihil occultum quod non reveletur, neque coopertum, quod non sciatur. And if it be not knowne at other times, at least it shall not be hidden at the day of judgement. Thirdly, it is no fit way to make the peo∣ple beleeve, that the cruelties executed by servants, were done without the Princes consent; and although it have sometimes succeeded well, yet this hath not beene because the people beleeved it, but (as I said before, upon the place of Justin) because when the people cannot wreake their anger upon the Prince, they will for the present upon his ministers, and after∣ward when time serves, upon the Prince himselfe: as it happened to Valentinus. Sometimes also, the people make a shew to beleeve that the villanies committed, were done without the Princes consent; to the end, that to preserve this good opinion of himselfe, he may, after the death of such ministers, give over his cruelty: and lastly, it saves them not from being slaine; for if they be not by them, they are by others, and of∣tentimes by themselves, as it happened to Otho.

This way therefore doth no good at all, and is the worst wicked course that can be imagined, being no∣thing but a meere multiplying of villanies. It is true, if a Prince should imploy a servant to kill a delin∣quent, and so both of them should juridically deserve death; in this case, he should commit no errour, in putting also the servant to death; but herein, he should imitate our Lord God, who oftentimes makes use of the wicked to punish the wicked; and they once punished, he then as a loving father, having corrected his child, casts the rod which was the instrument of correction, into the fire; and more then this, he often∣times

punisheth those whom he hath used for execu∣ting his anger, Vae Assur; virga furorismei, & baculus ipse est, saith the truth in the mouth of Esay. So our Lord God made use of the King of the Assyrians, and of his Army, to punish the people of Israel, for their sinnes; and that done, he punished also the Assyrians themselves, in such sort that he destroyed them all. There is no doubt but our Lord God did it all with exceeding great justice and providence, punishing justly those Assyrians, who besides their being a most persidious people, they fell upon the Israelites (as Theo∣doret expounds it) not for any zeale of executing Gods justice, but onely for the hatred they bore to that Nation.

To returne to our purpose, I conclude that Sallust had an excellent braine, not to suffer the cause to be brought before the Senate, which if it had beene there agitated, and Tiberius not discover himselfe, all the mischiefe would have lighted upon him, and they would have beene revenged upon the servant, when upon the Prince they could not. So it happened to Piso, who having beene imployed by Tiberius to kill Germanicus, and the cause brought before the Senate; Tiberius shifted it off from himselfe, and it fell to Pisoes lot to suffer for it. Not without cause therefore did Sallust: Monuit Liviam, ne arcana domus, ne consilia amico∣rum, ministeria militum vulgarentur.

Monuit Liviam ne arcana domus, ne consilia amicorum, ministeria militum vulgarentur.

That Princes ought not to reveale the secrets of their State; and how it happens, that oftentimes men are drawne to speake some things which ought to be concealed. The eighth and twentieth Discourse.

ALI States, whether they be Commonwealths or Kingdomes, have certaine foundations, or as we call them secrets, by which they governe them∣selves, both for conservation and augmentation. And therefore they endeavour in such sort to conceale them, that they may not be knowne to any but their successours. So did Augustus, in giving instructions to Tiberius; so did David, acquainting Salomon with them at the time of his death: so finally did Charles the fifth, teaching them to Philip the second when he renoun∣ced the Empire: for if these secrets by which they go∣verne, should be publiquely knowne, it would be a great advantage against them, for loosing their states. And therefore Sosybus, understanding that Cleomenes the Spartan, was informed of all the most inward secrets of Ptolomey, would not suffer him to goe out of Aegypt, for feare (as Plutarch relates) he should raise some sharpe warre in that Kingdome, whereupon finally he put him to death. We may see also, that the Romans never were in greater danger to be over∣throwne, then when by Coriolanus, their owne Citizen, & consequently acquainted with all their secrets, they were assaulted. This praecept was so well observed by the ancient Romane Commonwealth, that though we

have all the Histories of those times, yet to this day we know not, otherwise then by some conjecture, by what means it was, that they maintained their govern∣ment, and augmented it.

Justly therefore did Sallust advise, Ne arcana domus vulgarentur: that is, that those secrets of State, upon which the Empire is founded, should not be made knowne to any but to the Prince. And Salomon in his Proverbs observes as much where he saith, Coelum sur∣sum, terra deorsum, & cor Regis inscrutabile.

But because oftentimes men overshoote themselves, in discovering the secrets of their mind, it shall be our worke in this Discourse, to shew what policies are wont to be used to make men reveale their secrets; and then, what remedy there is for it, which consists indeed in onely the knowing them, as it is in snares, which if they be knowne, are easily avoyded.

Secrets then are either discovered of ones owne accord, or else one is drawn to discover them, by some other. The first case may happen by many occasions: First, out of a certaine vanity, that is commonly in all men, to shew they are privy to the secrets of Princes; and this is most seene in women and yong men: and thus the conspiracy of Catiline came to be discovered. Secondly, it may happen through drunkennesse, which is apt to disclose any secret, how great soever, as it happens at feasts. And therefore Salomon would not have Kings to drinke Wine, Noli regibus O Lamuel, noli regibus dare 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quia nullum secretum est, ubi regnat Ebrietas: there being this nature in Wine, that it makes those things be laid open, which should be hid∣den: as we see in Noe, who no sooner drunke Wine, but he laid open those parts, which he should have hidden. And this is one reason why the Ancients pain∣ted Bacchus naked; thereby to intimate that Wine discloseth secrets. Thirdly, it happens oftentimes

through hatred and indignation, which they, to whom secrets are imparted, conceive against the Prince: whereupon, they knowing the danger of this, as soone as they find they have discontented one in whom they had confidence, either they poyson him, or some way or other bring him to his end. So dealt Ptolomy (as we said before) with Cleomenes, certainely a most wicked course. Fourthly, secrets oftentimes are disclosed out of hope of reward; so did Elvidius the freed man of Scevinus, who acquainted Nero with a conspiracy a∣gainst him, onely out of hope to be well rewarded. Nam cum secum servilis animus praemia perfidiae reputavit. Lastly, this happens sometimes through feare of pu∣nishment. And therefore Cifrone (as Philip Cominaeus relates) when he saw himselfe carried to die, would then reveale to the Duke of Burgundy, the treason which the Count of Campobasso had plotted against him. And thus much concerning the revealing of se∣crets of ones owne accord. And though it may seem to be in our owne power to hold our peace, (as Tacitus saith) Si tam in nostra potestate esset, oblivisci, quam tacere; yet many times a man is allured, and in a manner for∣ced to discover his mind; a thing which may many waies be done. First, by Rhetoricke and Eloquence, which moving the affections, and stirring up the pec∣cant humour of him whose secrets we desire to know; he without perceiving it, is easily transported, to re∣veale what ever is in his breast. This cunning was used by Sejanus against Nero, and against Agrippina also, when Agrippinae quoque proximi inliciebantur pravis ser∣monibus tumidos spiritus perstimulare. Whereupon, it is no marvell, that Latiaris finding the peccant humour of Sabinus, easily drew him to tell him at full his dis∣contentment. Igitur Latiaris jacere fortuitos primum ser∣mones (feeling him first a farre of,) mox laudare Con∣stantiam, quod non ut caeteri florentis domus anticus, afflictum

deferuisset, simul honora de Germanico, Agrippinam mise∣rans disserebat. Another way the foresaid Latiaris used, and it was to feine a confidence, with making Sabi∣nus beleeve, he was his true friend, and pretending to be of his mind, in those dangerous things which he would not have communicated to another, iique ser∣mones tanquam vetita miscuissent, speciem arctae amicitiae facere. And this is an easie way, by entrusting some se∣cret to a man, whose mind we desire to know, as Ta∣citus plainely expresseth, where he saith, Nihil eorum Vitellianos fallebat, crebris ut in Civili transfugi•…•…s & ex∣ploratores cura diversa sciscitandi, sua non occultabant. Thirdly, men are oftentimes drawne to discover se∣crets, by being asked upon a suddaine, because the understanding operating naturally, and not having time to operate with art, must needs either answer that which is the truth, or be silent and say nothing, or lastly intangle it selfe. Whereupon 〈◊〉〈◊〉 who loved none of his qualities better then his 〈◊〉〈◊〉; yet being asked upon the suddaine could not hide the displeasure he had taken against Asinius Gal∣lus, of whom, perculsus improvisa interrogatione paulu∣lum reticuit. As likewise interrogations often multi∣plied, confound secrets in the mind, and therefore Tiberius in the death of Piso, Crebrisque Interrogationi∣bus exquirit, qualem Piso diem supremum noctemque exegis∣set atque illo pleraque sapienter, quaedam inconsultius 〈◊〉〈◊〉. The same way also he used with Syllanus, who Creberrime Interrogabatur. Fourthly, oftentimes men of themselves, and against their will discover se∣crets, either by their voyce, or by some motion not usuall, or by some cast of their eyes, and other exte∣riour signes, by which the secrets of the heart are often discovered: Tiberius knowing this, to the end he might not make appeare the secret contentment he tooke at the death of Germanicus, would not shew himselfe

in publique: Tiberius atque Augusta publico abstinuere, in∣ferius Majestate sua rati, si palam lamentarentur, anne omnium oculis vultum eorum scrutantibus, falsi intelligerentur. By this way the conspiracy of Scevinus came to be known, Simul affluentibus solito Convivium initum servorum cha∣rissimi libertate, & alii pecunia donati, atque ipse moestus, & magnae cogitationis manifestus erat, quamvis laetitiam vagis sermonibus simularet. Fifthly, it is easie to draw a secret from ones mouth, by asking him, not with doubtfull, but affirmative words; thereby seeming to know that, which he desires to know: so dealt our Lord God with Eve, who to the end she should not deny her sinne, omitted as a thing knowne, that which he would have had her to confesse, saying, Quare hoc fecisti? and so not enquiring of the fact, he asked of the cause: and this he did (saith Abulensis) not for any need he had to use this way, for knowing the truth, but onely for instructing of us.

These then are the waies by which secrets often∣times, are voluntarily and of ones owne accord disclo∣sed; either out of vanity, or through drunkennesse, or through hatred, or for hope of reward, or for feare of punishment; and sometimes also a man is drawne to disclose secrets, by Art, that is, by moving the affe∣ctions, and by finding out the peccant humour, and by entrusting his owne secrets, or by asking questions upon a sudden, or by reiterating interrogations, or by meanes of some motions and actions of the body; or lastly, by feigning to know it already.

Princes therefore must be well advised, to whom they impart these secrets; that they intrust them not to such, as may afterward voluntarily discover them; and servants to whom they are imparted, must be very vigilant, that they be not drawne from them by any cunning.

But although ordinarily and for the most part,

secrecy be a commendable thing, yet not commenda∣ble in all things, seeing to hold ones peace, or to deny in some cases, is not onely unprofitable, but pernici∣ous, as making some act or accident, to be more and with worse circumstances published, which would not be if it were confessed freely. Into this errour fell Vi∣tellius, In hunc modum etiam Vitellius apud milites disseruit, praetorianos nuper exauctoratos insectatus, a quibus falsos rumores dispergi, nec ullum civilis belli metum asseverabat, suppresso Vespasiani nomine, & vagis per urbem militibus, qui sermones populi coercerent, id praecipuum alimentum famae erat. And in another place, of the same Vitellius, he saith, Fractis apud Cremonam rebus, nuntios cladis oc∣cultans, stulta dissimulatione, remedia potius malorum, quam mala differebat. Quippe Confitenti, consultantique supererant spes viresque, cum e contrario, laeta omnia fingeret, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in∣gravescebat. Mirum apud ipsum de bello silentium. Prohi∣biti per civitatem sermones, eoque plures, ac si liceret vera narraturi, quia verebantur, atrociora vulgaverant. More wisely did Galba carrie himselfe, when, Ne dissimulata seditio in majus crederetur, ultro asseverat quartam & duo∣devicesimam legiones, paucis seditionis authoribus, non ultra verba ac voces errasse, & brevi in officio fore. But yet, if one would desire to have some accident to be kept secret and concealed, there is no better way, then immediately and by himself to give out false rumours, and to spread reports contrary to the truth, as Scipio did, to whom when Ambassadours came from Syphax, he searing least by concealing their message, the army would grow jealous, and suspect something, suddenly called them to counsell, where with a cheerfull coun∣tenance he told them that Syphax had sent to sollicite him to come into Africke: and although the truth was, that he sent rather a threatning message; yet his readinesse and resolution prevailed so farre, that the Army did verily beleeve it to be as he said. And thus

it ought to be done as often as the discovery of a secret may be hurtfull, as it was in this case; but when con∣cealing may be prejudiciall, as it was with Vitellius, a contrary course must then be taken.

Monuit Liviam ne arcana Domus.

How Princes should make use of Counsell. The nine and twentieth Discourse.

BY occasion of Sallust, who without being required by any, put forward himselfe to give Livia coun∣sell, either I cannot, or I like not to forbeare the de∣livering my owne opinion, or that at least, which best likes me, concerning the counselling of Princes. Where, I will first shew how necessary it is for Princes to have counsell. Secondly, the waies that are used in it. And lastly, delivering my owne opinion, I will (as my custome is) endeavour to prove it, with reason, and with Authorities. And beginning with the first, I say, that nothing is to Princes more necessary, then to be counselled; whereupon David, though as being a Pro∣phet himselfe, he had no need of another Prophet, yet our Lord God, gave to him as to a Prophet-King, ano∣ther Prophet to be his Counsellour. And therefore not without mystery, it is said in Ecclesiasticus, (as a certaine Writer observes) Surrexit Nathan Propheta in diebus David: as though by these words In diebus David, he would intimate, the need that Princes have of Coun∣sellours. Also Moyses, though himselfe most wise, yet followed the counsell of Jethro: and Salomon was not without counsellours; and even God himselfe, when he made man, by saying, Faciamus hominem ad imaginem & similitudinem nostram, would seeme to take counsell;

no doubt for our instruction, that we should doe no∣thing without counsell. And David speaking of our Lord God said, Glorificatur in consilio sanctorum, Magnus & terribilis super omnes qui in circuitu ejus sunt. And our Lord Jesus Christ, to shew of how great importance counsell is, to counsell himselfe, as in Saint John where he saith, Vnde ememus panem? and in another place, Quid tibi videtur Simon, Reges terrae a quibus accipiunt Tributum vel censum, à filiis suis, an ab alienis? and Peter answered, Ab alienis. Also the Apostles, though in∣structed by the Holy Ghost, yet oftentimes made use of counsell; as Saint Paul, who went as farre as Hieru∣salem, to take counsell of Saint Peter and Saint John. It is then most evident, and which none is so blind but sees, that all men have need of counsell, whether they be learned or ignorant; yet with this distinction, that the Learned make most benefit, and have least need; the ignorant have most need, and make least benefit.

But as it is necessary for a Prince to have counsell, so it is hard for a Writer to shew the way he is to hold in being counselled, as being a thing in ancient time very diversly used, and with great variety observed.

The first way hath beene to take no counsell at all, but to doe all things of his owne head; so did Charies the eighth, and many others. And this they doe, as conceiving, that to aske counsell of another, shewes want of judgment in ones selfe; and that by this means a Prince makes himselfe inferiour to him that gives him counsell, then which there is nothing to Princes more distastfull.

Others doubting to commit some errour, by doing all things of themselves, and for the reasons aforesaid, not willing to be counselled by others, have therefore neither taken any counsell of others, nor yet done any thing of their owne head: which quality, Writers

attribute to the Emperour Maximilian, who refusing to be counselled by any, used to give out what it was he went about; and then listned to heare, whether it were liked of, or no; and if it were, he then put it in execution; if not, he would then alter it of himselfe. But in truth this was no good way, nor fit to be fol∣lowed, because while he sought to avoyd disparage∣ment, by shewing himselfe to be lesse judicious then others, he fell into that which disparaged him more, by shewing himselfe to be mutable and inconstant. Which being once knowne, every one could then tell, not onely how to counsell him, but also how to reprehend him, nothing being worse, then to subject ones selfe to the debatings of the common people. And Emilius knowing this, while he was passing with his Fleet to Larissa, and hearing that this course was much murmured at by his followers, he called the Rhodians to him, and demanded of them, whether the Haven of Patera, were of capacity to hold his whole Fleet, and they answering, no; he thereupon tooke occasion to returne, and not to goe thither; and this he did, to the end, that altering his course upon so good a colour, they that had murmured, might not take heart to give him counsell.

Others have used another way quite contrary to the first, and I doubt is at this day more used then is fit; and it is, to give eare and heare what every one sayes, and to take any mans counsell, that will give it; which thing (be it spoken with others leave) seemes to me, not onely to be subject to confusion, but also to contempt; because every one will then pretend to counsell the Prince, who hearing continually such di∣versity of opinions, must needs be confounded in him∣selfe, and despised of others: whereupon in the Hi∣stories of Tacitus, when it was debated to send Em∣bassadours to Vespatian, Elvidius Priscus was of mind,

that men of great wisedome and judgement should be sent, who might helpe the Prince, with good ad∣vises; but Marcellus Epirius was of another mind, as knowing it to be a most distastefull thing, to give a Prince counsell without being required. Whereupon although Plato commend Cyrus for giving leave to any of his subjects to speake his opinion in any thing that was to be done; yet to me it seemes a thing dan∣gerous for him that gives it, and more for him that takes it. And therefore Claudius hearkning once to counsell in this manner, was confounded, not know∣ing what he should doe, turning himselfe sometimes to one mans counsell, and sometimes to anothers, Ipse modo huc, modo illuc, ut quemque suadentium audierat: and at last finding his errour, he called a counsell.

A Prince therefore in my opinion, ought alwaies to have about him him, a Band of experienced men; In quibus sit veritas, & qui oderint avaritiam; by truth is meant wisdome, which (according to the Philoso∣pher) is nothing else but a knowledge of the truth; and by covetousnesse are understood all vices; be∣cause as the Scripture saith, Avaritia est Principium omnium malorum: if then they have wisedome, they will be able to give counsell; and if they be free from vice, they will give it. but yet, I hold it not fit, that at their owne pleasure, without being called by the Prince, they should fall a counselling; which perhaps Sallust knowing, was the cause he durst not give Ti∣berius counsell, about the death of Agrippa, Sed mo∣nuit Liviam, ne arcana domus; consilia amicorum, mini∣steria militum vulgarentur: an arrogancy not sufferable in a servant, to presume to give his master counsell, without being called. And who knowes but this pre∣sumption in Sallust, might be the cause of his fall? see∣ing he was out of the Princes favour before he died, as Tacitus relates. Amasias being reproved by the Prophet

answered, Nunquid Consiliarius regis es? by which it ap∣peares, that those Kings used not to be counselled but by their Counsellours.

But if it be arrogancy in a servant to give counsell not being asked, it as is much indiscretion in a Prince, not to aske it. This is that I would have Princes to doe, have alwaies about them a Band of choice coun∣sellours, to aske their advice in all his affaires: so did Nerva, so Salomon teacheth to doe, when in his Pro∣verbs, he saith, Gloria regum est investigare sermonem; that is, a Prince ought not to stand expecting he should be counselled, but rather it is fit he should go and seek after counsell.

After a Prince hath heard the opinions of his coun∣sellours, it may be doubted whether he ought to de∣liver his owne opinion; and when, and in what man∣ner he should doe it. As farre as I can judge, I thinke it not fit he should deliver his owne, either first or last, or in the midst. For if he doe it first, all the rest will presently consent; and if he doe it last, every one will come about to his opinion: as it happened to Henry the third, who (as Historians relate) delibe∣rating about the death of the Duke of Guise, called foure to counsell, of whom when two had spoken their opinions, the King had scarcely heard them out when he delivered his owne, cleane contrary to theirs: whereupon the two that were to speake after, pre∣sently fell to be of the Kings opinion; and the two that had spoken before, retracting their former ad∣vice, consented to that the King had determined; which determination was the ruine afterwards of France, and of the King himselfe. So in Spaine, when it was deliberated about making peace betweene Henry the fourth King of France, and the King of Spaine; after Il Moro had spoken, and the Kings sonne being present replied the contrary, all the rest

came presently to be of his opinion: Whereupon, not without great judgement, Cneius Piso in Tacitus, when Tiberius would deliver his opinion in a certaine cause, said, Quo loco censebis C•…•…esar, si post omnes, vereor ne im∣prudens dissentiam, si primus, habebo quod sequar. There∣fore Tiberius another time commanded Drusus that he should be the first to deliver his opinion.

The Prince therefore should be silent, and finding his Counsellours of different opinions, let them de∣bate the matter betweene themselves, that he may see who gives the best reasons; so he shall avoyd con∣tempt, by not suffering himselfe to be counselled, without asking it; and he shall not be flattered, if concealing his owne opinion, the truth is made mani∣fest, by l•…•…tting them debate it betweene themselves: and lastly, he shall shew himselfe more learned and more wise then the other, if of himselfe without any others direction intervening, he shall determine the matter. All these things (in my opinion) are compri∣sed in that place of Ecclesiasticus, Audi tacens simul & qu•…•…rens; how can he be still, that askes and heares? but onely as I have explained it; to aske counsell in all things, to heare counsels, and in hearing them to be silent; and after, of himselfe to determine as rea∣son adviseth. In this regard the ancient Poets feigned that Jupiter tooke counsell to be his wife; meaning to shew, that it is necessary for Princes to be counsel∣led; and after, that his wife being great with child, he swallowed her up, and became himselfe great with child in his head, and at the due time was delivered of Pallas, which is wisdome; to shew that counsell would be ruminated in the mind, and that a Prince ought not to suffer his counsellours to be delivered themselves; but ought by swallowing them up, to make that to be his owne issue which was anothers.

That a Prince ought to determine of himselfe, and

ought not to determine of himselfe; that is, deter∣mine with counsell is the best, of those that are given him, and so not of himselfe; seeing the coun∣sels are other mens: and yet of himselfe, seeing the determination proceeds from his owne judgement: I conceive, it is sufficiently expressed in the booke of the Kings, where Salomon saith, Dabis ergo servo tuo cor dooile; having said before, Da mihi sapientiam. For explanation of which passage, we must know, that understanding can have no knowledge of things, but such as either it invents of it selfe, or learnes of o∣thers. To the finding them of it selfe, is required a sharpnesse of wit, and being found, a judgement to choose the good, and refuse the bad: and lastly, a memory to retaine that which is imprinted. To the learning them of others, is required a perspicacity, which is all one with docility, & makes the understan∣ding apt to apprehend those things which are taught by others. There is required also judgement, to dis∣cerne good things from bad; and lastly, a memory to reteine them. So as the memory is as the matter of the one and the other, the judgement as the Forme of them both, and perspicacity and acutenesse are as the differences. Salomon desires Wisedome, but not with acutenesse to invent things; that is wisedome which consists in the sharpnesse of wit, but he desires wisedome together with dociblenesse; that is, wis∣dome and perspicacity, which is all one with docible∣nesse: perspicacity, to be able to understand rightly the opinions and reasons of his counsellours; and wisedome, that is judgement, to be able to discerne the good from the bad. Salomon therefore shews, that a Prince ought not to care for inventing of his owne head, but to content himselfe with having docible∣nesse, to understand things invented by others; and wisedome to know the truth, and to discerne the

good from the bad. And therefore he saith well, Da mihi sapientiam: and after, Dabis ergo servo tuo cor docile: Where we must observe, that though he say, The Heart, and not the Understanding, yet he meanes the same thing; seeing those faculties, which Galen attributes to the understanding, many others attribute to the heart: and in holy Scripture it selfe, the heart oftentimes is put for the understan∣ding: as in Esay it is said, Excaeca cor populi hujus, & aures ejus aggrava, & oculos ejus claude, ne sorte videant oculis suis, & auribus suis audiant, & corde suo intelligant.

Neve Tiberius vim Principatus resol∣veret, cuncta ad Senatum vocando. Eam conditio∣nem esse Imperandi, ut non aliter ratio constet, quam si uni reddatur.

How Princes ought to make use of Magistrates and Officers. The thirtieth Discourse.

SAllust counsels Tiberius, to take heed that he re∣mit not so many causes to the Senatours, as thereby to weaken his owne soveraighty, there being nothing so proper to a Prince, as to be sole Com∣mander. A counsell worthy to be well considered, by occasion whereof, it will be •…•…it to discourse: First, how Princes ought to order the remitting of causes to the Senate, or to other Officers; and then whether they should take the administration of all things into their own hands.

It seemes a thing impossible, that one man alone

can by himselfe be able to judge all causes, which Jethro, Moyses father in law, considering, and see∣ing him to take the reckonings of all the people of Israel, without assistance of any; and wondring at it, he said, Vltra vires tuas est, negotium; solus illud non po∣teris sustinere.

For Resolution then, either we speake of giving Authority to a Senate, or else of committing causes to other Officers. If we speake of the Senate, either the causes are great and weighty, or else but of small moment. If they be great, then ought the Prince to reserve them for himselfe to determine: if slight, and of small value, he may doe well to remit them to the Senate, that so he may please them with a shew of liberty, without any prejudice to himselfe. This Tiberius well understood; and therefore when the subject Provinces made suit for the continuance of certaine Franchises, he remitted them to the Se∣nate; to the end, that being matters of small mo∣ment, the Senate might determine of them as they pleased; which Tacitus expresseth where he saith, Ti∣berius vim Principatus sibi firmans imaginem antiquita∣tis Senatui praebebat.

Secondly, the affaires that are handled, are either such, as deserve reward and grace; or else such as are odious, and deserve punishment and censure. If they be such as deserve reward, the Prince ought to de∣termine of them himselfe: but if they be odious and deserve punishment, he ought then to shift them of from himselfe and leave them to the Senate; or if he cannot to the Senate, at least to other Officers. Honores autem (saith Aristotle) ipsemet tribuere debet; poenas & animadversiones per alios infligere, per Magi∣stratus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & per judicia: So Simonides in Xeno∣phon adviseth Hiero: so Simonides in Dio, Augustus. Our Lord God when he punisheth, he doth it by the mini∣stery

of others, Immissiones per Angelos malos: whereof Saint Chrysostome speaking saith, Igitur quando servare oportet, per seipsum hoc facit, ita 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in salutem generis Humani, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉: tunc inquit, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Angelis, congregate facientes iniquitatem, & projicite in Camino, de justis vero dicit, non sic; sed qui vos suscipit, suscipit me, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ligate illius manus & pedes, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in tenebras exteriores: videillic servos qui 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 autem beneficiis opus est, seipsum Benefactorem vo cat. Venite Benedicti Patris 〈◊〉〈◊〉, percipite 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vobis regnum, quando loquendum cum Abraham, ipse adest, quando in Sodoma 〈◊〉〈◊〉, servos mittit, & iterum: euge serve bone & fidelis, supra pauca fuisti fidelis, su∣pra multa te constituam; & tunc ipse benedicit; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 autem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, non ipse, sed servi 〈◊〉〈◊〉. By this, you may see, that a Prince ought to have no hand in punishments, but leave all such distastefull things to Officers.

It was handled in the Senate to take order for re∣straining of luxury, which was now growne exces∣sive, and beyond all measure; and because there was scarce a man in the whole City free from this vice, it was a thing exceeding 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as Tacitus shewes, where he saith, Nec ignoro in conviviis & cir∣culis incusari ista, & modum posci, sed si quis legem san∣ciat, poenas indicat, iisdem illi civitatem verti: splendi∣dissimo cuique exitium parare, nentinem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 expertum clamitabunt. Tiberius therefore finding of what na∣ture the cause was, would not determine it selfe, but cast it upon the Senate, as Tacitus in his person saith, Si quis ex 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tantam angustiam vel 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pollicetur, ut 〈◊〉〈◊〉 obviam queat, hunc & 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & exonerari laborum meorum partem fateor, sin accusare vitia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dein cum gloriam ejus rei 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sunt, simul∣tates 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ac mihi 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Credite P. C. me quoque non esse offensionis avidum: Which the Senate per∣ceiving

they also remitted the cause to the Aediles: and so it vanished.

In this point, there is no Kingdome better gover∣ned, then that of France, which leaves all matters to the Parliament, that might any way make the King distasted; and matters of most importance, the King himselfe in his Privy Counsels determines. And thus much for giving Authority, and remitting causes to the Senate.

Now if we speake, how a Prince ought to serve himselfe, of his Officers; I say generally, that the lesse he doth by their ministery, the better; whom he should use as instruments to execute, and not as prin∣cipals to deliberate. For betweene the governing reason, and the things that are governed, there may intervene another reason, two waies: one, when it supplies some thing which was wanting in the gover∣ning reason: for example, If it have not ordered and provided all things, but left some to be ordered by the inferiour reason, which it takes notwithstan∣ding by meanes of the superiour reason providing: and in this manner, the inferiour reason is a meanes, and intervenes as a reason to the disposition of the government. Secondly, the inferior reason may be a meane in the government, as a servant, and not as reason: that is, that the principall reason, dispose all things how small and particular soever; and then give the execution to the inferiour reason, as to a servant. In the first way our Lord God did not serve himselfe, of the inferiour reason; for he provided e∣very thing, great, small, universall and particular: but in the second way he serves himselfe in the govern∣ment of humane reason, yet not as humane but as ministeriall. And this is the doctrine of Cajetan: whereupon if it be true that Kings are called Gods, Ego dixi Dii estis, & filii Excelsi omnes; then ought

they as farre as they are able, to imitate the Great Maker and Governour of all things: that is, to de∣termine all things they are able to determine; and leave the execution to their Officers. But if a Prince shall leave it to his ministers, to determine, and pro∣vide things necessary for the state; he shall not then make use of his ministers, as ministers; but rather as of reason, which is nothing else, but as of King.

Let a Prince therefore leave to his ministers, such things as are proper for ministers; and such as for their smalnesse, need not the understanding of a Prince; and though he be able to doe such things of himselfe, yet by all meanes let him leave the care of them to his ministers; for therefore in the Scripture we see all things of small moment were done by An∣gels: it was an Angell that appeared to Agar, they were Angels that destroyed the Tower of Babell, Angels that burnt Sodome, an Angell that shewed the way to Eleazar: but great things were alwaies done by God himselfe, as the delivering of the Hebrewes out of Aegypt, the giving the Land of Promise, to Abraham, Isaak, and Jacob: and the reason why our Lord God would do•…•… thus, (say Writers) was, to the end, least if the Hebrewes had received such great benefits from Angels, they might have thought, that all their good came from them, and consequently have adored them as Gods. So likewise, if a Prince shall suffer his ministers to bestow great things upon the people, they will be ready to take the minister for Prince, as from whose hand they receive all fa∣vours. Our Lord Jesus Christ, going to raise Laza∣rus, was able no doubt, of himselfe to remove the stone from the grave, seeing he was able to raise one that had been foure daies dead; but because it was so small a matter, he would not doe it himselfe, but said to the Jewes, Tollite 〈◊〉〈◊〉 lapidem, whereof Saint

Austin saith, Sed quia ab hominibus fieri poterat, homines facere praecepit: quae autem Divinae virtutis erant, sua potentia demonstravit. So also, a Prince ought to commit such things to servants, which are proper for servants; and doe such things himselfe, as are proper for a Prince.

And yet to this opinion of mine, the counsell of Jethro is no way discordant: for though I grant, that a Prince cannot doe all things of himselfe; yet I deny not but he may doe all things of himselfe, that are of importance: for so we may finde did Moyses, if the words be well considered, Constitue ex eis Tribunos & Centuriones & Quinquagenarios, & decanos, qui ju∣dicent populum omni tempore; quicquid autem majus fuerit, referant ad te, & ipsi minora tantum Iudicent. See here, how Jethro shews plainly, that a Prince ought to doe all things himselfe, that are of weight; which is so true, that if he doe otherwise, he shall shew himselfe not onely ignorant and irresolute, but by preferring his servants, he shall give them occasion, from get∣ting authority, to get into the Kingdome it selfe, and set him at naught; seeing there is no readier way to make ones selfe King, then by drawing all businesses of the Kingdome into his hand. And there∣fore Sejanus knowing this to be the onely meanes for attaining the Empire to which he aspired, used many devices to worke himselfe into affaires; so much, that at last he got Tiberius to goe live in the Countrey; to the end that the Emperour being out of Rome, all matters might passe through his hands alone. And indeed Tiberius was by this very neere to have lost at once both life and reputation; but that perceiving at last his errour, he would ever after, not onely dis∣patch businesses himselfe, when he was in health, but even when he lay dying.

The like art and cunning was practised by Assan

Beglerby of Greece, and prime Favorite of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Great Turke, who perswaded him not to stirre out of the Seraglio, making him beleeve, there were plots laid to kill him if he came abroad; which, A∣murath sillily believed, and kept himselfe up 〈◊〉〈◊〉, leaving Assan in the meane time to manage all af∣faires alone, whereby he had a faire field to play the tyrant at his pleasure; and the State had soon been ruined, and with the State the Prince, if Amurath at last perceiving his errour, had not gone out of the Seraglio, and provided in time for all things neces∣sary. No man knew this better, then Lewis the ele∣venth, King of France, a Prince no lesse judicious then valiant, in peace and warre admirable; who tooke so much pleasure to dispatch affaires of his Kingdome himselfe, that it may be truely said, he died dispatch∣ing businesse.

Many opposing this opinion, alledge, that Prin∣ces are not Hackney men nor Porters, to kill them∣selves with labour: but (with reverence I speake it) I yet hold, that either Princes must leave their States, or else must be content to labour for the subjects good. In figure of this it is, that in Esay the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 power is laid upon the shoulders, where he saith, Dabo clavem domus David super 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ejus. Likewise in the old law, besides the twelve precious stones, wherin were written the names of the twelve Tribes, which the high Priest bore in his Rationall upon his breast; there were also in two stones, engraven six names apiece, which by Gods appointment he car∣ried upon his shoulders: by which was intimated, that it is not sufficient to have the subjects in his breast; that is, to love them: but he must also carry them upon his shoulders, that is, endure any labour for their good. And for this onely cause perhaps, a Prince in Deuteronomy is likened to an Oxe, that

should not be dainty and given to rest; but apt to la∣bour, and to carry the yoake upon his shoulders.

Two things remaine to be advertised: the one, that when I say, a Prince ought to doe all principall things himselfe, I meane not things of the Law, which consist in the judiciall part, where onely par∣ticular things and of private interest are handled; and have nothing to doe with the maine of the state; but I meane it in the deliberative part, where pub∣lique matters of the Kingdome are handled, and such businesses, in which consists the foundation of the state: and therefore with good reason is by Aristotle preferred for the judiciall part.

Secondly and lastly I advertise, that this my dis∣course is not meant of Princes that are unfit; for as those Princes that are judicious, cannot doe worse, then to suffer themselves to be ruled by their mini∣sters; so those that are of little judgement cannot doe better then to do all things by faithfull and pru∣dent ministers, as Nero in his beginning did under Burrhus; Seneca and Corbulo, men fit to have ruled the whole World; and whom as long as he imployed, his state was so managed, that justly a wise Emperour said; no Prince, how judicious and wise soever, could possibly governe better then Nero at his beginning did: but as soone as he left to be ruled by those wor∣thy men, it may as truely be said, No Prince how foo∣lish and wicked soever, could possibly governe worse then Nero did.

Nam Tiberius cuncta per Consules in∣cipiebat, tanquam vetere Reipublica, & ambiguus Imperandi.

Why Tiberius made a shew he would not be Emperour, and that to make Princes discover things they would have concealed, is dangerous. The one and thirtieth Discourse:

TIberius after the death of Augustus, as though he were doubtfull to take upon him the Em∣pire, as a burthen too heavy for his shoulders, made a shew he would restore it to the Commonwealth, Se in parten•…•… onerum vocatum a Divo Augusto, experiendo didicisse, quam arduum, quam subjectum fortunae, Regendi cuncta onus. But to the Praetorian souldiers, he gave watchwords as Emperour, Signum Praetoriis cohortibus ut imperator dederat. Lastly, he made it be spread in the Army, that he was already elected Emperour by the Senate. Dabat & famae, ut vocatus electusque potius a Republica videretur, quam per uxorium ambitum, & senili adoptione irrepsisse. And because these were three waies, all of them (in my opinion) used with great mystery, I will search into them a little narrowly.

First then, Tiberius made a shew he would restore liberty, whereof one reason Tacitus alledgeth, where he saith, Postea cognitum est, ad introspiciendas Proce∣rum voluntates, inductam dubitationem: as though he would say, He was moved to doe thus, thereby to see whether the chiefe men either desired liberty, or otherwise distasted his Dominion; to the end, that

comming to know every ones mind, he might worke his owne ends, and security accordingly.

This reason, if Tacitus bring it as a popular reason, may passe; but if he bring it as the true intention of the Prince, it is very unlikely, as not at all suiting with Tiberius subtilty: and if it be Tacitus his owne invention, it comes farre short of his great wit. For two kinds of Noblemen may be considered in the Senate: The one, of men eminent for judgement and valour; the other, of men little experienced, and lesse witted. If Tiberius had any doubt or feare, it could be of none but of those eminent men: for, as for ther est, either they will never dare to attempt any thing against the Prince; or if they attempt, ne∣ver succeed. And for this it is we said before, that Augustus had great lucke to finde the City full of such men, Cum ferocissimi per acies, aut proscriptione ce∣cidissent. I say then, that if any were moved to lay himselfe open and discover his mind, upon Caesars words, It must needs be, they were of those of little judgement; because men, I say not of great, but of any meane understanding, would never be brought to beleeve, that a man so greedy of the Empire, and that by plots and wiles had procured his owne mo∣thers death, and the death of Augustus himselfe; would after attaining it with so much labour relin∣quish it againe, and restore them to liberty. So that, if Tiberius by this meanes did discover the mind of any Senatour, it must needs be of those, of whom as he could justly have no feare; so it should be absurd, without any benefit to take revenge. For this cause, Marcus Lepidus gave counsell in the Senate, that Luto∣rius should not be put to death, VitaLutorii in integroest, qui neque servatus in periculum Reipublicae, neque inter∣fectus in exemplum ibit. Studia illi ut plena vaecordiae; ita inania & fluxa sunt. Nec quidquant grave ac serium

ex eo metuas, qui suorum ipse flagitiorum proditor, non virorum animis, sed muliercularum adrepit.

It is not therefore likely, that Tiberius a man so wise, and of so great judgement, would ever be mo∣ved upon such slight grounds, to cover his intention; we must therefore looke out some other reason, that may be more likely.

There were two things, of which Tiberius might be afraid: First, of the Senate, least not brooking his government, they should rise in Armes against him: secondly, of Germanicus, least having a power∣full Army in his hand, and withall the favour of the people, he should with a little danger, prevent a suc∣cession that was uncertaine. To meete therefore with both these difficulties, he feigned in the Senate and with the people, that he was unwilling to be Emperour; to the end, that if the Senatours should make any demonstration against him; the people might beleeve they were not moved to it for the pub∣lik good, but onely for their private hatred; seeing to seeke to kill a Prince that would reftore liberty, is a signe they love not liberty.

I would therefore construe it, that when Tacitus said, Vt introspiceret Procerum mentes; he meant, that Tiberius, before he declared himselfe to accept the Empire, desired to see first, whether any in the Se∣nate made any opposition, that so (as I have said before) by using the name of liberty, he might the better prevent such mischiefe; and the rather, as not having omitted any other essentiall things, for strengthning of himselfe, as I shall shew hereafter.

The second reason, why Tiberius was moved to such feigning, is set downe by Tacitus in those words, Cansa praecipua ex formidine ne Germanicus in cujus manu tot legiones, immensa sociorum auxilia, mirus apud populum favor, habere Imperium quam expectare mallet:

Tacitus then saith, that Tiberius feigned to be un∣willing to accept the Empire, because he doubted Germanicus would pretend u•…•…to it: in truth, he that should take these words in an ordinary sense, must needs make it one of the poorest reasons that can be given; for what hath the not accepting the Em∣pire to doe with Germanicus? rather insteast of hel∣ping him, it would be his greatest hurt, seeing the irresolution of Tiberius might encourage Germanicus to attempt many things which he would not have done, if he had knowne him to be Emperour, and Tiberius himselfe, being aware of this, writ Letters to the Armies, as being Emperour already; Literas ad exercitus tanquam adepto Principatu misit. And if any shall say, that he spake in such termes, because he was ashamed to call himselfe by a name, which might easily be taken from him, I say, that this would have beene a most dangerous vanity, because I con∣ceive that Tiberius seeing the love of the people to Germanicus proceeded onely from a hope they had, (as Tacitus in another place shews) that if he came to the Empire, he would restore the government to the Commonwealth: he knew, that by making them the same offer, he should both diminish the peoples love to Germanicus, and also abate his owne hatred, which the name of a Prince brings with it; and yet by this not deprive himselfe of that autho∣rity which should strengthen him. From hence it is, that to the souldiers he gave the signe of being Em∣perour; as well because, if occasion were they should defend him; as also because he knew they loved a Prince better then a Commonwealth, under which they are deprived of Donatives, and driven out of the City. Whereupon he might doubt that if they should find Tiberius unwilling to accept the Empire, and so feare the restoring of liberty, they should

thereupon he moved to choose another Emperour. Asinius Gallus finding Tiberius at this ward, to make him speake plainely, whether he meant to be Empe∣rour, or no, asked him what part of the Empire it was he desired, making as though he beleeved really that he meant not to be sole Emperour, a thing which brought him to his ruine; seeing Princes speake many things which yet they would not have others to take as they are spoken. Caesar was by some called King; and though he were well pleased with it; yet he said, he would not be called King, but Caesar; and yet when the Tribunes upon these words of his, prohibited any to call him King, he tooke it in so ill part, that from that time forward, he put them out of office. The reason of this is, because they who take these courses, it seemes would either put the Prince to a necessity, of loosing his authority, or else to lay open his intentions, which is a thing most odious. Whereupon another time, Tiberius com∣plaining, he thought himselfe not secure: Asinius Gallus pressed him to tell of whom it was he stood in feare, promising they should be all put out of their offices; and he Eo acrius accepit, recludit quae preme∣ret. The same Gallus at another time, as it were seek∣ing how to make the Prince offended with him, gave counsell, that Magistrates should be new chosen every five yeeres; and that the Legats of Provinces, who had not yet been Praetors, should by having such legation, be the next admitted to the Praetor∣ship, and that the Prince should be tied every yeere to name twelve Candidates: which counsell no doubt did Altius penetrare, & arcana Imperii tentandi, seeing it restrained the Princes authority, and limi∣ted it to a certaine time, and to a determinate num∣ber; and priviledged the Legats of Legions to attaine

to the Praetorship without other election or dependence upon him, which much distasted Tiberius: and therefore, pretending that this counsell of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, tended onely to inlarge his owne authority, he refused it. To be short, when Princes are not willing to be understood, it is fit to make shew of not understanding them; it being a dangerous mat∣ter, to enter into the search of Princes secrets: Abdi∣tos Principis sensus, & siquid occultius parat exquirere, illicitum, anceps, nec ideo assequare.

Nusquam Contabundus nisi cum in sena∣tu loquebatur; Causa praecipua ex formidine, ne Germa∣nicus in Cujus manu tot legiones, Immensa socio∣rum auxilia; mirus apud populum favor, habere Imperium quam expectare mallet.

What course a Prince should take to secure himselfe from Generalls of Armies: and what course Generalls should take to secure themselves from te Prince; and from a Common-wealth. The two and thirtieth discourse.

TIberius beginning to suspect Germanicus, that ha∣ving the love of the Army, hee would rather take the Empyre, then expect it; We by occasion of this, will first discourse, of the doubt, which a Prince, or a Common-wealth may have, to stand subject to Gene∣ralls of Armies; Secondly, of the danger such Generalls stand in, of falling into the suspition of them they serve: by which oftentimes is caused their death; and how they should carry themselves to avoid it.

Concerning the first; there is no doubt, but a Gene∣rall having once gotten Reputation, oftentimes puts the Prince whom he serves in danger: which commonly happens; First, because they are not rewarded according to their merit; as it happened to Ferdinand King of Spaine; who having never rewarded the great Cap∣taine, might well feare he would take it in scorne; and thereupon seeke to right himselfe; by procuring to him∣selfe the state. Secondly, It may happen by reason of the insolencies; which victory commonly brings with it; as it happened to the Thebans, who having made Philip of Macedon, their Generall; he, after the victory

gotten, tooke away their liberty. Thirdly, It may hap∣pen thorough suspition; which the Common-wealth or Princes take of them that serve them; which suspiti∣on once perceived by the Generall; he must necessarily put another in danger, to secure himselfe; because to seeke to justifie himselfe in such suspitions, is for the most part, in vaine; as may be seene, under a Prince, in Corbulo; and under a Common wealth, in Scipio Africa∣nus. The very same happened to the Romans, who threatning Caesar, about bringing in his account of ma∣naging the Army; and shewing a suspition they had of him; were cause, that he tooke this feare of theirs, for a beginning to make himselfe Lord of Rome; which, when no forraigne Force was able to bring it into servi∣tude, was by their owne forces easily oppressed.

I am perswaded the danger is so manifest, which Common-wealths, or Princes incurre by occasion of Generalls; that every one knowing it sufficiently of him∣selfe, will never looke I should stay to prove it, either by Examples or by reasons; and especially seeing there are few Histories, that are not full of such accidents.

But having said, that this danger proceeds from three occasions; It is necessary to examine every one of them. Concerning the first, which was the ingratitude of the Prince: It will be easie to remedy that, by recompensing him that serves; for by this meanes, hee shall have no cause, to seeke to have all by force; when he may have a part with love. It is true, a Prince in rewarding such, should not doe it, by giving them Cities or goods; in the places where they have waged warre; for either, they are Conquerours of the whole Country; and then by possessing goods there, they will take occasion after the victory, to make themselves the Lords; or else not con∣quering the whole Country; the contrary part will still be growing: and then they, not to loose the reward gi∣ven them, will either proceed slowly in the warre; or

else turne to that side that hath the better. This Guicci∣ardine attributes to Prospero, and Fabritius Colonna; who having beene rewarded by the King of France, with Dukedomes, and Castles in the Kingdome of Naples; when they saw the Aragonesian side get the better; they went and tooke pay of Ferdinand. Therefore Princes shall do well, to reward them in other states, where they have not warred; and where their reputation is not in Fame: and thus I have knowne it many times done in our time. Also they shall doe well, not to put them into choller; although faulty perhaps in other things; so long as it is not in matters essentiall, and proper to their places. So did David with Ioab; bearing with many Insolencies and murthers committed by him; to the end he should not fall into choller, and make Insur∣rection.

Concerning the suspition, which the Prince may shew to have of a Generall; and which is wont to be followed with rebellion; It will be an easie matter to remedy that, if the Prince will not fall to suspect for trifles; which is the quality of base persons; as Iso∣crates intimates in his Euagoras; or else, if suspecting him, he conceale his suspition, till hee remove him from the Army; So did Domitian with Agricola: So did Tiberius with Germanicus, who removing him out of Germany, sent him into Africk with Cueius Piso. And this, the Queene Teuca (in Polybius) not observing, was cause that Demetrius her Generall in Slavonia, understanding that the Queene was by his Adversaries incenst against him, and fearing her Indignation; he sent to Rome to deliver into their hands, the Citie, the Army; and all he had under his charge.

The third cause alledged before, was the pride and reputation which victory brings with it: for remedy whereof in particular, and of the rest in generall: there have beene advertisements given by many, in divers manners.

The first way is, for a Prince to goe himselfe in per∣son; and for a Common-wealth to send thither, their Principall Magistrate; so the Turke in times past, hath used to doe; to goe himselfe in person; So the Com∣mon-wealth of Rome used to doe; sending forth the Consul or Dictatour. But in truth, in this way, the Re∣medy seemes to mee, more dangerous then the evill, be∣cause if the Prince goe himselfe in person; hee must be sure to have alwayes the victory; for otherwise if hee loose, hee will either bee slaine or taken prisoner: If •…•…aine, as was Charles of Burgundie, what hinders but the victour may enter upon the State, at least make spoyle of it? If taken prisoner, as was Francis King of France, and Syphax King of Numidia; I see not, but his State will bee as much in danger; and therefore of this mans State, it was easie for Massinissa to get possession: and for the other, his Repuration, and state and life were all Endangered. We may then conclude, that this way of encountring disorders, is a dangerous way.

A second way is, every yeere to change the Generall, as the Ancient Romans used to doe; and as at this day the Common-wealth of Venice, in their Maritime Navy u∣seth to doe. But yet in this way also there may infi∣nite disorders happen: First, if the Army chance to mutinie, which is commonly the Correlative of an Ar∣my; In this case, a man new come, not beloved, not feared, will be little fit to appease such tumults. Second∣ly, they that make warre in this manner, are like to doe but little good, because the Souldiers can have no con∣fidence in such a one: and it is the confidence in their Captaine, that for the most part, is the cause of victory. For confirmation whereof, wee may see in Livie; that the same Army, which under other Captaines was al∣wayes beaten, when it came to be commanded by Furi∣us Camillus, had alway victory: and this, by reason of the great confidence, the Souldiers had in him. Third∣ly

there appeares another danger, not inferiour to any; and it is, that when a Generall knowes he shall be chan∣ged at the year•…•…s end: either hee will not with any great heat begin that, which he knowes he cannot finish; or else beginning it, and impatient that another should bee companion of his victory, he will rashly, and preci∣pitantly hazard both the Army and himselfe; which hath beene the cause, that the Romans have lost whole Armyes: as it happened at Trebia against Hanniball; where Cornelius the then Consul, to the end hee might have all the glory himselfe; unadvisedly stroke battaile with Hanniball, and was with much danger to the com∣mon-wealth, utterly defeated, of whom Livie saith: Stimulabat & tempus propinquum Comitiorum ne in novos Consules differretur, O occasio in se unum vertendae gloriae!

But granting this Captaine should have made a good beginning, and have prepared a faire way for victory, yet certainely when he heares a successour is to come, though he praecipitate not himselfe as Cornelius did; at least he will doe all he can to hinder, that another shall not rcape the benefit of his labours, or otherwise will not stick to make any shamefull Peace; as Marcus Atti∣lius did, who having beaten the Carthaginians by Sea and land; and upon the point of obtaining a Compleate victory; yet when hee heard another Consull was to come into Africk; to the end, the fruit of his labours should not be reaped by him, he presently fell to a Trea∣•…•…ie of peace. So Scipio, one time by occasion of Tibe∣rius Claudius, another time, of Cneius Cornelius, preci∣pitated the victory with making peace. Ferunt postea (saith Livie) Scipionem dixisse, Tiberii Claudii primum Cupiditatem; deinde Cnei Cornelii fuisse in mora; quo minus idbellum exitio Carthaginis finiretur. There bee some, that have hindred their successours from victory, by o∣verthiowing of purpose all that themselves had well begun; such a one was Quintus Metellus; who having

very neere subdued Spaine, when hee heard that Pompey the Consull, was to come in his place, he disbanded al his Souldiers, gave all his provision of victualls to the Ele∣phants, and broke up the Army; So also in Numidia, hearing that Marius was to come his successour; he en∣devour'd all he could to marre the Enterprise.

Others againe, although their predecessours have done nothing to hinder them; but have endeavoured to leave them the victory, in a manner prepared; yet to the end all should be attributed to themselves, have refused to make use of the wayes and courses their predecessours had used. Whereupon our Lord Christ, when he would doe the Miracle of wine, he rather made use of water, a thing already created, then of any new matter; where∣of Saint Chrysostome saith, It was a manifest argument, that he who made wine of water, was the same God, who had made water of nothing. Nam si ipsi Deo contrarius Opifex fuisset: non utique alienis usus esset Christus ad propriae virtutis demonstrationem. And Saint Ambrose speaking of the first miracle, which Christ did on the Sabboth, saith; Et bene Sabbatho coepit, ut ipsum se ostenderet Creatorem, qui Opera Operibus intex∣eret; & prosequeretur Opus quod ipse jam coeperat. And thus when a Generall is changed, the Instruments also, and all other things are changed with him: and there∣fore Cneius Pompeius being sent Successor to Lucullus in Asia; altered all that Lucullus had done, for not only it is the nature of men, that succeeding another in any office, they will seldome follow their predecessours courses, but in this case, there is another reason for it also; to the end, It may not be thought, that getting the victory, they get it more, by their Predecessours carriage then by their owne; and therefore no mervaile, that Drusus tooke contrary courses in Germany, to those which Germanicus before him had begun. I conclude then; These Generalls to whom a successour is sent, are

either needy of glory: or else they have gotten glory enough: If they be needy, they will then precipitate the Army and themselves to get it; as Cornelius did with Hanniball at Trebia: if they have glory enough already, they will then endevour to make a Peace, that they may not hazard their Reputation with a successour, as Corbu∣lo did, when hee heard of one that was to come in his place. Corbulo meritae per tot annos gloriae, non ultra pericu∣lum faceret. But there are two oppositions, may in this place be made, which I cannot omit, & I ought not to shun: The first is, that the Romans changed their Ge∣neralls every yeere, and yet they alwayes got the victory, as in the first Decad of Livie may be seene. The second, that the Venetians, men of so great valour and prudence, that they may serve for an example to all the world; have alwayes taken this course, and alwayes it hath suc∣ceeded well.

To these reasons it is no hard matter to give an answer. And first, for that of the Romans, it may be said, that this happened thorough the weaknesse of their neighbouring Nations, with whom they had war. Secondly, and perhaps better; that although in the Roman Army, they sent yeerely a New Consull: yet there were many o∣thers in the Army, who had beene Generalls themselves before: a thing which at this day, is not possible: see∣ing every one thinks scorne to goe a private Souldier: not onely if he have beene a Generall; but if he have been but onely a simple Corporall before. Thirdly, the warres they had then, were at the gates of Rome; & were such warres, as were finished, I say not in one yeere; but oftentimes, in one day. But when they came to have warres farre off, and that lasted long; they then suffered their Generalls, to continue many yeeres; and grow old in their places. From hence it was: that at one and the same time, having warre with Hanniball in Italy; and with Asdrubal in Spaine, they very often changed their

Generalls in Italy, but Cneius Pompeius that was their Generall in Spaine, they never stird. So as when they had to doe against Powerfull Armies, in places far off, they were then forced, to send a Scipio Africanus, or a Caesar, or some such, as knowing how much it impor∣teth the maine of the warre, to have one sole com∣mander.

As to the Particular of Venice, It is no mervaile, that they in their Fleets at Sea, doe every yeere change their Generalls, seeing the warre, and the Generalls Office, end both at once, because actions at Sea, are begun and ended all at one time; but when they make warre by land, they change not then their Generalls every yeere, as in Histories may be seene. Lastly, in the Common-wealth of Venice, one reason there is; and in Rome there was; which makes the matter, the lesse dangerous: and it is, because that Common∣wealth hath so many in Sea matters so expert and ex∣cellent, that they might easily change their Generall eve••y day without any danger; which I cannot say e∣ver happened to any other then to the Common∣wealth of Rome, and to that of Venice; and the reason is, because in these Common-wealths, men of valour are rewarded.

A third way to secure a Prince from his Generalls of Armies, is to send Persons of trust, & of his own blood; as Tiberius did, in sending Drusus and Germanicus: but neither doth this course like me; First, because Princes have not alwayes, of their blood, that are fit to be Ge∣neralls. Secondly, although they have, yet it seemes to me so much the more dangerous, as the Army is in a mans hand of more Power, and specially one, not far from the Crowne; and for this cause, Ludouicus Sforza, chose rather to leave the Castle of Milan, in the custo∣die of a stranger: who afterward betrayed it, then of his owne brother. And it availes not to say, he is a

neere kinseman, seeing as I have else-where said, Jnvi∣dia Regni etiam inter Domesticos infida omnia facit: there being few, qui malint expectare quam accipere Imperium. And therefore Jsocrates in his Oration concerning the Government of a Kingdome, saith, that a Prince should bestow the highest Honours upon those of his blood, but the solidest Honours upon those that love him. When Vespasian was made Emperour; his Son Domitian had the honour: but Mucianus, the Authori∣ty. Caesar Domitianus Praeturam cepit, ejus Nomen Episro∣lis Edictisque praeponebatur; Vis penes Mucianum: by all meanes, there was care taken to order it so, that hee might not usurpe the Empire. The like course Otho took: Profecto Brixellum Othone, honor Imperii penes Titianum fratrem, Vis ac Potestas penes Proculum Praefe∣ctum. If afterward it succeeded well with Tiberius, It was because, Vterque filius legiones obtinebat.

A fourth way is, when a Generall hath gotten Re∣putation by some victory; then presently to remove him before hee grow too famous, and use him in the warres no more. So did Pharao by Moses; when im∣ploying him against the King of Aethiopia, he no soo∣ner got the victory in a battaile, but he presently cal∣led him backe into Aegypt. So did Anthony with his Captaine Ventidius; after he had overcome Pacorus. So did the King of Spaine in calling home Gonsalvus. But neither doth this course like me: for either the victory will make an end of the warre, and then there will be no need of calling him home: and yet the Prince not without danger: seeing one victory alone, if it be finall, will be sufficient to get the Generall a Name, and make him presume. And if that one victory end not the warre, the Prince then that takes this course, will have little will to proceed any further, for the reasons before alleadged. and if by ill luck, Fortune should chance to turne: he will be

forced, with shame and danger, to send the same Gene∣rall againe; as the King of Spaine would have done, af∣ter the defeat at Ravenna, for if the French had followed the victory, which was hindered by the death of the Generall, the King of Spaine had determined to send Gonsaluo againe into Italy.

The last remedy which hath beene invented, to pre∣vent this danger, specially in Common-wealths, is to joyne two Generalls together in the Army: So the Romans used often times to doe, So the Carthagenians, So finally the Athenians; yet I cannot satisfie my selfe, that this is a good way; First, because it is commonly the overthrow of the action: as was seene by the King of France, in the Kingdome of Naples, by the Duke of Vrbine, and by the Cardinall of Pavia, in the Popes Ar∣my, by Marcus Varro, and by Paulus Aemilius amongst the Romans, whereof in all Histories, there are Ex∣amples.

Secondly, this way is not sufficient to take away the danger, we speake of, as was seene in Augustus, who al∣though hee had two companions Hircius and Pansa, joyned with him, yet could not they hinder him, from getting into his hand, the Army of both the one and the other, having first by devises, put them both to death; as Tacitus intimates, where he saith; Caesis Hircio & Pan∣sa, (sive hostis illos, seu Pansa veneni vulnere effusum; •…•…five milites Hircium & machinator doli Caesar abstulerant) u∣triusque copias occupavisse.

Thus for a Prince to goe himselfe in person, is dan∣gerous, to change his Generalls every yeere, is not com∣mendable, to send one of his owne blood, not safe; to remove a Generall after getting a victory, worst of all; lastly to make more Generalls at once then one, of little benefit, and consequently, how to avoyde this danger, is very difficult. The best counsell I could give, should be that which Augustus gave to Tiberius; Consilium Co∣ercendi

intra terminos Imperium, and in briefe, as much as may be, to avoid warres: and therefore Tiberius know∣ing these difficulties, although he heard of the Rebellion of the Grysons, yet hee made no shew of it, because hee had no mind to send thither any person of reputation: Dissimulante Tiberio damnum, ne cui bellum permitteret. But because it is impossible, but that occasions of warre will sometimes happen; I should like well, in such case, that a Prince being doubtfull of his Generall, should goe himselfe to be neere the Army; but not to bee in the Ar∣my; or if in the Army, yet hee should never expose him∣selfe to danger, unlesse the maine of the state depended upon it. This, Charles the fifth King of France know∣ing, (for which hewas called Charles the wise) would be himselfe in person in the Army; but when the bat∣taile was to be fought, he then attyred a servant of his, in his owne Armour, and by this meanes, the Army had the benefit of the Princes presence, without the Princes danger. Pyrrhus also put his Armour upon another, finding how faine the Romans were to kill him. David, as long as matters were in manifest danger, thought it necessary to fight himselfe in person. But if the presence of the Prince can doe no more good, or else, if having lost a battaile, he have Forces 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to renue his Army, in this case, a Prince should not doe well to goe in per∣son, and therefore David, in the like case, saying, Egre∣diar & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vobiscum, the people answered; Non exibis, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 enim fugimus, non magnopere ad eos denòbis pertinebit; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 media pars ceciderit de nobis, a non satis curabunt, quia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unus pro decem millibus computaberis. Otho therefore shewed little Judgement, and had ill counsell, when deliberating about a battaile against Vitellius, he let it bee knowne, that hee meant not to goe himselfe in person, seeing when the maine of the businesse is at stake, the Prince ought then to goe himselfe, because, if his Army should be lost, he were as good be lost himselfe, as was

seene in Otho; for he staying behind, and not going in person in the Army, both abated the courage, and also the number of his Souldiers. Their courage, because they lookt for him, Militibus ut Imperator pugnae adesset poscentibus, Their number, because hee retained many companies for his owne Guard, and though Tacitus, in that oration which Otho made, seeme to shew, he had for∣ces enow to renue the Army, and that he killed himselfe onely because hee would not doe the Common-wealth so much hurt, yet I cannot beleeve, that a man so wic∣ked as Otho was, would ever bee so Compassionate, and take such pitty of the Common-wealth:

A Prince then ought to goe himselfe in person, when either the danger is such, that if the Army bee lost, the whole state is lost: or when it is such, that Ioosing the battaile, the Prince cannot doe better, then to dye: see∣ing there is no doubt, but it is a great encouragement to the Souldiers, to see their prince amongst them, as it happened in the battaile at Tarus, where the onely pre∣sence of the King, was the cause, they got the victory, whereupon, it is no mervaile, that the Israelites going upon a difficult action, and hearing that our Lord God, their chiefe Prince would not goe himselfe, but would send an Angell to be their Generall; Et mittam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tui Angelum, ut eiiciam Chananaeum, & Amorrhaeum, & Ethaeum, & Pheresaeum, & Iebusaeum, & intres in ter∣ram fluentem lacte & melle, Non enim ascendam tecum, that the people hearing themselves thus vilified, made the greatest demonstrations of sorrow that could be, Audiens autem populus sermonem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, luxit; & nullus ex more indutus est cultu suo: so as, if the Lord God did not goe himselfe, the people could have no heart to under∣take that Enterprise.

But if the state of the Prince, though that Army bee lost, be able in any sort to defend it selfe, in this case the Prince shall do well, not to goe himselfe in person; but

shall set onely One Generall over the Army, and him∣selfe not to be farre off, but so, as in occasion of cer∣taine victory, hee may remoove into the Army; This Joab teacheth us, when he advised David, to come in∣to the Campe, being now in his power, to take the City of Rabbat, to the end, the glory of the Action might bee Davids, and therefore in the second of the Kings, he saith: Misit Ioab nuntios ad David, dicens, Di∣micavi adversus Rabbath, & capienda est Vrbs aquarum. Nunc igitur congrega reliquam partem populi, & obside Ci∣vitatem, & cape eam; ne cum a me vastata fuerit Vrbs, No∣mini meo ascribatur Victoria. Maharbale left by Hanniball to Oppugne Saguntum, left the Oppugnation in good termes; and then stayed for Hanniballs comming. Strataque omnia (saith Livie) recentibus ruinis, adveni∣enti Annibali ostendit. In this manner, a Prince shall fully secure himselfe, from any Generall, whose Re∣putationi growing onely from the victories hee hath gotten, the Prince shall convert all that Reputation upon himselfe: and therefore Ioab said; Ne ascribatur Nomini meo Victoria.

But if the Prince bee not willing to bee himselfe in such actions, hee may yet with his onely being neere, prevent all inconveniences, by imploying one Gene∣rall still: and himselfe in no danger; imitating herein Moses, who sending Iosua against the 〈◊〉〈◊〉: would not be himselfe farre off; Egressus pugna contra Amalech, & ego stabo in vertice collis. This course was a great help to Philip the second, with the Duke of Alva. From hence it is, that as long as the Romans had warre neere home, they never doubted any Generall, of their Ar∣my, but when they had warre farre off, the Senate no more then the Prince, not being able to follow the Army, they then began to doubt, and a while after, it fell out as they doubted; as it is in daily experience, that Princes, in warre neere home, never make any

doubt of their Generalls. Moreover, if hee be not in the Army, he is sure to be safe: and this I hold to be the most principall thing that can be, because it would be much, if a Prince carrying away, (as the Proverb is) the Hide, although he should loose his whole state, and all his Army, should not be able to finde meanes, to come afresh upon the enemy; as was seene in Massinissa, in Iugurtha, and in Ludovico Mo∣ro, untill he was taken prisoner: and would to God we might see no Examples of it, in our times. Howso∣ever, whether Princes be in the Army, or be not, they shall doe well to looke to their owne safety.

It is then cleere that a Prince should have but one Generall, and himselfe not to be farre off: as we may learne from our Lord God: who not onely is neere, but in Essence, in Presence, and in Power, is in all things: and having made use of Michael the A•…•…chan∣gell, as his Generall in the first battaile, as it is written in the Apocalyps; Factum est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 magnū in Coelo, Michael & Angeli ejus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cum Dracone, & Draco pugna∣bat & Angeli ejus, & non valuerunt, neque locus inventus est eorum amplius in Coelo: Hee will make use of him also in the last, as may be gathered from Daniel: In tem∣pore autem illo (speaking of Antichrist) Consurget Micha∣ell Princeps magnus: qui stat pro filiis populi sui, & ve∣niet tempus quale non fuit ab eo, ex quo Gentes esse coeperunt usque ad tempus illud. And thus much concerning a Prince.

Now Common-wealths in this point have greater difficulties. There is a Politician that counsells, they should send of their owne Citizens: and he instances in Venice, who making their Generalls, Bartholmew of Bergamo, and Nicholas Orsino Count of Pitigliano, that were strangers, they lost at Vayola in one battaile, all they had gotten with infinite labours, in eight hun∣dred yeeres; and another time (saith he) they were

faine to put Carmignola (another forreigne Generall) to death. I lay no blame upon this opinion, but yet I commend rather, that common-wealths should imploy such strangers to be their Generalls, with whom, for their owne security, they may send a paire of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Senatours, that they paying the Souldiers, may not suf∣fer the Souldiers love to be cast all upon the Generall, and representing the Senat, not suffer any thing to bee done without their consent. This way is at this day used: but is not new, as that which was knowne in the time of the Carthagenians, as farre as I can find by Polybius: who shewes, that Xantippus their. Captaine, would not strike batraile with the Romans, untill he had 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their leave, who were sent by the Carthagenian Senat. Xantippus accept â a Ducibus Cartha∣ginensium potestate, pugnandi copiam •…•…ostibus facit. The Example of the Romans in opposition to this, is of no force; because that was an Age, not greedy of Domini∣on; but when it cameto be so, they then too well per∣ceived, how dangerous it was to put an Army into the hand of a Citizen, as was seene in Marius, in Sylla, in Caesar the Dictatour: in Anthony, in Augustus; and in a thousand others. So also it would have been in Pompey, if he had gotten the victory of Caesar, Pompeius occultior (said Tacitus) non melior. Secondly, it availes not to say, that the Venetians were forced to put Carmignola to death, seeing the Romans also caused Scipio, when they had banisht him, to be put to death: and it was their ruine, they could not doe as much to Caesar: being a much harder matter, when a Generall is to bee put to death, to put it in execution, if he be a Citizen, then if he be a stranger, because a Citizen hath alwayes a Faction in the Senat, that will defend him: and therefore in Rome, there was never any Generall put to death, where a stran∣ger as having none to stand for him, will easily be op∣pressed, as I shall shew hereafter. Thirdly, the exam∣ple

he brings of the defeat the Venetians had at Vayola, is of no•…•… force, seeing there are none that make warre, that have not sometimes defeats; and who ever had more then the Romans? who though their Generalls were al∣wayes Citizens, yet in three Defeats they had, one at Trebia, another at Cannae, and another at 〈◊〉〈◊〉, they lost all they had, (I may say) but onely the City of Rome, which Hanniball after his victory, at Cannae, might have taken also, and would not. And if there were no∣thing else to make me be of this Opinion, yet the Exam∣ple at this day, of the Common-wealth of Venice, a City full of such excellent men, would perswade me to it.

We have now shewed, the best course that Princes or Common-wealths can take, to secure themselves from their Generalls: It remaines to shew, what course Generalls may take to secure themselves, from Com∣mon wealths & Princes. And because we have said, that a Prince may doubt them, either because they have not beene rewarded, or by reason of the Glory they have gotten, or thorough suspition, which oftentimes Prin∣ces and Common-wealths doe vainely conceive; I say.

The first of these is easily to be avoyded, if the Gene∣rall shall shew himselfe to be without interest; and not to care for any thing but the honour, for by this meanes he shal keep the Prince from any jealousie in this behalfe, and shall not precipitate himselfe into danger.

As concerning the second, of Glory, they shall doe well to imitate the Allmaines: who (as Tacitus relates) used to attribute all the praise of their great atchieve∣ments, wholly to their Princes. And this precept a Ge∣nerall may observe, either by requiring the Prince to come, when he sees a victory is certaine, as Ioab did, or if the Prince cannot come, then to cause his name to bee called upon in the Army, and to erect Trophies to him; and therefore Germanicus knowing this, after hee had subdued many Nations of Germany, in the Title he pub∣lished

of them, made mention onely of the Prince: and of himselfe said nothing at all. Debellatis inter Rhenum Ablimque nationibus, exercitum Tiberii Caesaris, ea Monu∣menta Marti & Iovi & Augusto sacravisse. De se nihil ad∣didit, metu invidiae, an ratus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 facti satis esse; and indeed there is nothing more pernitious to Generals, then to ascribe victories to themselves. This was it, that brought Saul to hate David, in his victory of the Phi∣listine Gyant: and it is indeed a great Vanity, where there are manifest deeds, to puff them up with words. It was many times said to our Lord Christ, Daemonium hahes, and he answered; Daemonium non 〈◊〉〈◊〉; another time, when he had heased a blind man, and it was said unto him Daemonium habes, he made no 〈◊〉〈◊〉 at all, because the worke he had done, answered for him, that hee had not a devill; where therefore there are great workes, it is needlesse to adde words.

The greatest difficulty of a Generall, is to keepe him∣selfe from being suspected, for this hath be•…•…ne the undo∣ing of an infinite number of worthy Captaines; a∣mongst whom, speaking of Princes, was Corbulo; One of the greatest souldiers, the Romans ever had; and speaking of Common-wealths, Paullus Vitelli, a famous Cap∣taine of his time, who onely upon suspition, was by the Common-wealth of Florence, beheaded.

A generall then may incurre danger, in two things, in sulpition, and in death; To prevent suspition, bee can∣not doe better, then to use severity in the Army; follow∣ing the example of Hanniball rather then of Scipio, and therefore Corbulo in his Beginning, while he used Disci∣pline, Incurred no danger. To this may be added, that which we spake of before, which is, to shunne all vaine glory, but because it is sometimes impossible, not to in∣curre suspition; the best instruction I can give in this point, is to advertise, in which of the two Services, is the greater danger.

I say then, that strangers shall runne more hazard, by serving a Common-wealth, then by serving a Prince; and subjects shall runne more danger, by serving a Prince, then by serving a Common-wealth; an example whereof, we have given in Paullus Vitelli; who being a stranger, and serving a Common-wealth, lost his life. This made Xantippus, who was generall of the Com∣mon-wealth of Carthage; assoone as he had gotten one glorious victory against the Romans, to leave the Army, and returne home. The reason of this distinction, is in my opinion, plaine, because Generalls under a Prince; either they have friends to defend them, or they have not: if they have not, then they lye open to calumnies with∣out any defense; if they have, then will the danger bee the greater; because the Princes suspition will be the greater, to see them have such friends and adherents in the City; where if the Generall be a stranger; there can bee had of him no such suspition. Now, if it bee in a Common∣wealth; the stranger having few adherents will bee little defended from the blowes of calumnies: where the Citizen having his faction to protect and assist him; will easily avoyd the danger, at least of life. And this is the reason Polybius brings; why Xantippus, after the victory he had gotten, left the Army: where he saith, Nam prae∣clara facinora, & res a quocunque egregiè gestae, magnam plerumque invidiam, & graves Calumnias conflare solent, quiqus Cives quidem affinium ac amicorum multitudine freti, facile resistunt hospites vero omnis praesidii expertes, utro{que} malo quam celerrime conteruntur. And where under a Prince, to have Citizens to defend him, is a dangerous thing; the suspition encreasing with the defense; under a Common-wealth, it is a benefit, to have part of those, to take his part, that may deliberate; and therefore in the Common-wealth of Rome; when they have not beene able to answer the Accusation; yet they have beene able to scape death; in such sort, that for any misadventures

in battailes, or for any suspition of the people or of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉; I never could see any that incurred danger: where under a Prince, there may bee found a thousand ex∣amples.

Above all, Generalls must take heed, they take not courses, against the nature of him they serve; for in so doing, they may bee sure, they shall never bee well thought of for what they doe; and besides, with their owne danger, they shall breed a jealousie in them they serve. This had happened to Alvianus at Geradada; if he had not beene taken Prisoner; because being in the service of a Common-wealth, so advised and wary in all their affaires, hee by giving battaile so precipita•…•…tly, shewed he knew not, at least, observed not the nature or them 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉. And therefore Corbulo (as Tacitus re∣lates) venturing upon hazardous attempts, under Claudi∣us a timorous Prince; not onely was blamed for it; but was faine, with little honour to himselfe, and much 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Prince, to leave the Army, and with∣draw himselfe: Corbulo semina rebellionis praebebat; ut laeta apud pleros que, it a apud quosdam Sinistra fama. Cur hostem conciret? adversa in Rempublicum casura, cum prospe∣re egisset; formidolosum paci; virum in signem & ignavo Principi praegravem. Ideo Claudius adeo novam in Ger∣manias Vim probibuit; ut referri praesidia cis Rhenum Iuberet.

Dabat & Famae, ut Vocatus Electusque potius a Republica videretur; quum per uxorium ambitum; & senili adoptione irrepsisse.

Of Succession and Election. The three and thirtieth Discourse.

BY occasion, that Tiberius would rather have it bee thought he was chosen Emperour, by the Senat, then

by Augustus; we thinke fit, to examine these points; when Election is good, and when succession; and last∣ly, which of them is the better.

To begin with the last; because upon this, the other depend; there are many of opinion, that Election is the better; which (they say) may be proved by Examples & by reasons. By examples, because of all the many Em∣perours that Rome had, if any were ever good; they were those, that came in, by Election: and if we looke into the holy Scripture; we shall finde, that the Judges came no sooner to be by succession, but they ended in the sonnes of Samuell; and the Regall Dignity assoone as it came to be by succession, presently became a Tyranny, beginning in Salomon; and Encreasing in Roboam; who were not Elected, as Saul and David were. Then a∣gaine by reason, it may be proved; because Election is in our owne power: where succession is in the power of Fortune, which, though it may sometimes give a good Prince, yet it cannot continue to doe it so long, but that at last (as Aristotle observes) It will give a had, who alone is enough to overthrow all the good, his Prede∣cessours had done. To this may be added, that successours are alwayes full of domineering pride, which makes them beleeve, they are greater then ever their Ance∣stours were; and having had no part, nor labour in ac∣quiring the Kingdome, they little care for conserving the Kingdome; and lastly, having honour and glory enough; they trouble not themselves for getting of more; where he that comes in by Election, will by the same vertues with which hee hath attained the Empyre, be able al∣so to conserve the Empyre; and seeing hee hath perhaps but little glory by his Ancestours, he will endevour to get glory by himselfe.

On the other side, there want not reasons to prove, that succession is the better: and the first is taken from Aristotle, who in his Politicks, speaking against Plato

shewes: how different and much greater the love is, that is borne to things which are our owne: whereup∣on a successour having the Kingdome as his owne, and one that is chosen, having it but as lent; It must needs be beleeved, that a successour is likely to make the better Governour: Men commonly not having so great care, of things which they have but for terme of life; as of things in which they have inheritance, and may leave them to their Heire. To this may be added: that the conditions of those, who come newly to their greatnes; (as Aristotle speaking of the Common-wealth of the Chalcedons saith) are evermore intolerable, as a Poet saith, Asperius nihil est humili cum surgit in altum. Moreover they who come in by Election, as not having had education in the Princes house, can have but meane information of the affaires of state; where if sonnes succeed, as no New Dignity accrewes unto them, so no occasion of growing proud befalls them; and being trained up and acquainted with affaires: as they themselves will be better able to governe; so both People, and Nobility will be willinger to bee governed by them; the People, as having beene accustomed to o∣bey their Fathers; The Nobility, as being farre remo∣ved from Equality: we may adde further; that succession takes away all occasion of discords, which in Election, must needs fall out; and falling out, It is impossible, a person of any goodnesse should be chosen, or if a ver∣tuous person happen to be chosen, yet having been con∣tested against, by some part of the Electours, he cannot chuse but beare them grudges; and hardly be able to go∣verne as a King should doe.

For resolution, I say; that Election and succession, be it good or bad, may be considered either with regard to the Prince, or with regard to the people. If to the Prince; then the question is, which of them is the more available either for his security, or for his Reputation.

Beginning then with Reputation, there can bee no doubt, but it is more honour to a Prince to be Elected, then to succeed: seeing this comes by Fortune, without any merit in the successour; the other comes by merit which is wholly in him that is Elected. This Galba understood; when adopting Piso, he said, Generari nas∣cique a Principibus fortuitum, nec ultra aestimatur, adop∣tandi Iudicium integrum; & si velis eligere, Consensu monstratur.

As for security; I hold it safer to succeed, then to bee chosen, because he that is Elected, is either chosen by the Prince, or by the People, or by the Senat. If by the Prince, he wil want many of those graces, which make a successour secure: as the merits of his Father: which sa∣ved Salomon from utter ruine, and the being of the blood Royall, hath beene a cause of preserving many in their states. Besides this, he will have many things in his disfavour; as, that hee is but newly risen up from E∣quality, and divers other. If wee speake of those that are Elected by the People, I cannot deny but they will have the people of their side: but then consequently, they will have the Nobility against them: and so of the one sort, they are like to be hated; and to the other sort, obliged; and being never able to satisfie so much, as the obligation requires, in short time there will follow, with a generall hatred, their owne particular ruine. Lastly, if he be Elected by the 〈◊〉〈◊〉; hee is like to have the people his enemy, and be sure to be himselfe a flave to the Nobility, whereupon, wee may conclude, that Election is the more Honourable; and succession the more secure.

Concerning the last point; which is, whether of the two is the more profitable to Cities; Election or succes∣sion; I say, that if the Prince choose him, and be the Electour, either he is a good Prince, or a bad; if a good, he cannot choose but make a good choice, and conse∣quently

will bee better for the City, then succession 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that being certaine, and this uncertaine, and therefore the Election of Antoninus, was better then the successi∣on of Marcus Aurelius: and yet Marcus Aurelius was no lesse vertuous then Antoninus. But if the Prince bee bad; no doubt then, but choosing a successour, he will choose one starke naught, and therefore it was thought that Augustus chose 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 deterrima sibi gloriam quaerens; as Dio and Tacitus say; and not onely for getting themselves glory, as in this case, but some∣times they will doe it, out 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sympathy of Conditions, in which regard, Otho speaking of Galba, who had chosen Piso, as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a man as himselfe, said; Ac ne quo saltem in successore Galbaespes esset; accersit ab exilio, quem tristitia & avaritia sui simillimum 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whereupon, in this respect, it is better a Prince should be by successi∣on, then by Election, seeing at least, it will bee put into the hand of Fortune, and such a one like to succeed, as a better were not like to be Elected. With this opinion of mine, agrees that which Capitolinus in the life of Mes∣salina relates, as a Common Proverbe: sapienter electi Principes sic agunt; per Imperitos electi, sic pereunt. If againe the Election bee made by the souldiers, as often∣times was done at Rome, in this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 likewise, successi∣on will be better then Election: because souldiers make Election onely for their profit; and of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to make the like profit, of another, they murther one assoone as they have chosen him: So saith 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in the life of Galba; Et 〈◊〉〈◊〉: libidine que 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Imperatore veluti Clavum Clavo expellebant; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vero palatium 〈◊〉〈◊〉 domus breviori temporis spatio quatuor Imperatores ex∣cepit, militibus tanquam in Scena, modo introducentibus a∣liquem, modo educentibus. If lastly the Election bee by the people, either they are at variance with the Nobility, or Not: if they bee at variance, no doubt they will then make choyce of a Factious person; one of a turbulent

spirit, and an enemy to the Nobles; as they did in the choyce of Tribunes in Rome, at the time when there was dissention, betweene the Nobility and the people; and though there were no discord between them; yet I could never like of Election by the people, who being for the most part corrupt, and little able to discerne who is good, and who is bad; and apt to value men by riches, and not by vertue, cannot chuse but make a most un∣worthy choyce. Neque enim Illis (saith Tacitus) Iudi∣cium aut veritas. But if the Senat be at concord with the people, then no doubt, the Election will be excel∣lent, as being made by a number of understanding men; and therefore we see, that Numa Pompilius who was thus chosen, proved one of the best Kings, the Romans ever had: there concurring in his Election, the choyce of the Se∣nat, and consent of the people. It is true, such Electi∣on is hardly made; because few would like to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 another to that degree, which hee aymes at himselfe: And if any man should object, that it proves well in Ve∣nice, where the Election of their Duke, is alwayes made by the Senat, I would answer (taking no notice of the kind of that Dignity) that this happens, because that E∣lection is made by most understanding men; who ayme more at the Common-wealths profit, then at their own. But if the Senat or Magistrate, that is to make the Ele∣ction, be it selfe corrupt: wee may then expect a choyce betweene good and bad; because a very good one, they would not choose, for feare least out of his precisenesse, he should reforme many things to the undoing of the wicked; and a very bad one, they would not choose, for feare least hee should be the undoing of the King∣dome. To which purpose are those words of Tacitus; Exoptimis periculum sibi, expessimis dedecus publicum me∣tuebat.

I here advertise, that neither the Reasons alleadged at first, nor yet this last, are in any opposition to the King∣domes

that are at this day, whereof the greatest part goes by succession; for there is great difference betweene speaking of times, in which were Tyrants; and times in which are civill Princes; who have so many Coun∣sells, so many orders and Consultations, that it is im∣possible, but they must governe well. No man there∣fore ought to take my Discourse as a taxing of Princes in these times; but whether it be Election, or succession, I hold that way alwayes to be best in a City, which hath formerly beene used.

Lastly for resolution of those Arguments which in the beginning were brought against Election: (Those a∣gainst succession being tacitely already answered) I say, that either wee speake of choosing a private man to bee Prince; and then those difficulties will bein force; or else we speake of choosing one, who is already mounted to the height of a Prince; and then those difficulties will be laid asseepe: and this we see notably observed at this day, in places of Election; as in creation of the Pope, which can never fall upon a person, that is not first a Cardinall, It being fit, that one should first come out from Equality, before he should rise to the highest de∣gree of superiority, and that he should first be taken into part of affaires, who is to come afterward to governe the whole. So likewise in Election of the Emperours; we see alwayes Princes of such blood to be chosen, that comming to the Empyre, they seeme not to come to any new greatnesse.

Tiberius therefore (to come to our purpose) having beene chosen by Augustus, that was a Tyrant, had reason to have it beleeved, that he was chosen by the Senat, ra∣ther then by old Augustus, Comparatione deterrima, or per 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ambitum: but if Augustus had beene an excellent King; I beleeve hee would then have rather had it thought, that he was chosen by the Prince. So did Sa∣lomon, who comming to the Crowne after David, would

have it knowne, that hee was made successour by his father: Vt notum fiat universo Populo Regem eum a Patre Declaratum.

Nihil primo Senatus die agi passus, nisi de supremis Augusti; cujus Testamentum inlatum per virgines Vestae, Tiberium & Liviam haeredes habuit. Livia in familiam Juliam; Nomenque Augustae adsu∣mebatur. In spem secundam, Nepotes Pronepotes∣que. Tertio gradu Primores Civitatis Scripse∣rat, plerosque invisos sibi, sed Jactantia gloriaque ad Posteros.

Whether Tiberius did ill, in causing Augustus his will to bee read; and why Augustus in the third place, made ma∣ny his heires that were his Enemies. The foure and thirtieth discourse.

ONe of the first things that Tiberius did in the Se∣nat; was the causing Augustus his will to be read; where Livia and himselfe were made his heires in the first place: In the second, his Nephewes; and Grand∣children. In the third place: the principall men of the City; many of whom were known to be his enemies. In this, there are two things wee may wonder at; one that Tiberius would have this will of Augustus to bee read openly; the other, that Augustus had set many in his will, that were his Enemies.

Beginning with the first, I say; that Tiberius not be∣longing to Augustus by any respect of blood; but one∣ly by being his Sonne in law; to be preferd by Augustus will, before Agrippa Posthumus, that was his Nephew, to whom by Right of kinred, the Empyre belonged; It seemes that in true politick consideration, Tiberius did

ill, to cause a thing so odious to be published, which he ought rather, if it had beene possible, to have hidden: as was seene in Claudius, who by his Testament making his Sonne in Law, Nero his heire; and preferring him before Britannicus, his true and legitimate Sonne; A∣grippina a suttle woman, after the death of Claudius, would not suffer his will to be read; least the people should mutiny; to see a sonne in Law preferd before a Sonne: I estamentum tamen haud recitatum, Ne antepo∣situs filio privignus, Injuria & Jnvidia animos vulgitur∣baret. By this example related by the same. Tacitus, we must necessarily say, that one of them, either Agrip∣pina or Tiberius did ill: or else we must bee driven to shew some difference betweene these two cases: which may be, and is in many things. First, because Britanni∣cus was Claudius his Sonne; and Agrippa, Augustus his Nephew, but by the line of women. Secondly, be∣cause Agrippa was farre off; and perhaps dead, when Augustus his will was read; Britannicus was living, and present there in Rome: and so by his presence, might have given occasion to the people, of making in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which Tiberius needed not to feare: and lastly Tiberius was a man of ripe age, experienced in the warres, and conversant in affaires of state, where Nero was but a child, & had hitherto given no proofe of him∣selfe at all; and besides, it caused much lesse envy, to see a Sonne in Law of so excellent qualities, preferred before a Nephew rude and foolish, and full of Indigna∣tion; then it would have done to see a rude Sonne in Law, preferd before a Sonne of so great expectation: and because to be made heire by the former Prince, is a great helpe for being accepted by the Subjects, as by the Example of Salomon and others, I have elsewhere shewed; Tiberius knowing, that those things would be no trouble to him, which to Nero would have been pernicious; he therefore did very wisely and

with great Judgement, to make it knowne to all men; that Augustus by his will had left him his heire.

The other Errour which was intimated in the begin∣ning, consists in this: that Augustus in his will, nam∣ing many of his enemies to be his heires; seemed by this as it were to encourage them to oppose those of his own blood; that so they might come to that, of which his will had given them a hope. And it would not be rea∣sonable to say, that he was moved to doe it; (as at this day in some places is used) as not thinking hee should dye; to the end, that they seeing themselves made his heires, might not longer be his opposites, but rather be tyed to be at his service; an invention which hath no o∣ther effect, but to make him that useth it, be knowne for a man of little braine, with prejudice to his Posterity. This reason therefore is in it selfe of little strength; and squares not with Augustus, seeing his will was made in secret, and of as little strength is that Reason which Ta∣citus brings, in these words, Iactantia Gloriaque apud Posteros; which is, that Augustus did it to get himselfe glory in aftertimes, as much as to say, that hee preferd publick profit, before private hatred, and that hee made no reckoning of the injuries done him; no doubt a great Glory; but yet not such, as was worthy of Augustus his Consideration.

We may say then, that Augustus not without great cunning tooke this course, to secure both himselfe and his successour: seeing, that if any were likely to con∣spire against the Prince: it was those principall men whom hee named in his will; whereupon by this de∣monstration of affection, he thought to bind their hands: because beleeving the Prince did truly love them, (men being apt of themselves to beleeve they deserve to be loved) and more, to beleeve those demonstrations, which being made in a Iast will, seeme to be farre from flattery, they could not chuse but lay away all hatred: and

though they should be suspitious, though aware of the devise, yet they should have no meanes to conspire a∣gainst the Prince, seeing the people, they might bee sure, would be against them: as they who looking to the apparence of things, take no notice of fictions, and hate ungratefulnesse; and this was it, that spoy∣led the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus; because the people understood that hee was adopted by Caesar to be his sonne, and named in his Testament, and for him to conspire against him was such an ingratitude, that they were easily perswaded to take revenge; so much is that accursed vice detested.

Non aliud Discordantis patriae remedi∣um, quam ut ab uno regeretur.

That corrupt Common-wealths have need of a Monarch to Reforme them. The five and thirtieth Discourse.

IF Agis the Spartan had knowne the foresaid reason brought by Tacitus in excuse of Augustus, he would certainely have attained the end he aimed at; which was to restore his Country to the first Ordinances and lawes that the most wise Lycurgus had made: but his fault was, that he sought to doe that by many, which he was to have done himselfe alone: which Cleomenes perceiving, and advised by the wife of Agis, whom af∣ter his death he tooke to wife himselfe, and having heard her a thousand times relate the case of her de∣ceased husband, he came to know, that Non aliud pa∣triae Discordantis remedium quam ut ab uno regeretur; whereupon (though wickedly) he put down the Ma∣gistracy of the Ephori, and easily brought the City to

such termes, that within a few dayes, he was able, with∣out any feare of the Citizens, to leave his Country, and go•…•… person to the warre: and if the City in the meane time ran a hazard; it was not by any default of Cleo∣menes, but for want of money, as Plutarch witnesseth, where he saith; Quemadmodum exercitatione robur mem∣brorum adepti Athletae, spatio temporis opprimunt at que su∣perant agiles, artificiososque; Ita Antigonus magnis opibus in∣structus, his que bellum reficiens, defatigavit tandem supera∣vitque Cleomenem, vix habentem, unde tenuiter 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mercedem, civibus alimenta suppeditaret: and therefore was forced to give him battaile, where if he could have stayed but onely two dayes, Antigonus must of necessi∣ty have returned back, into Macedon, and Cleomenes had remained Lord of all Greece.

It is therefore held by all Experienced Politicians, for an infallible Rule, that not onely for the founding of Common-wealths, but also for the Reforming of them; the Government of one alone is necessary; and this, Romulus knowing, (though wickedly as for the Act) killed his brother, and was cause of the death of his Compagnion. So Cleomenes (as we have said before) de∣siring to reform his Country of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which was at the last Cast of Ruine; no lesse wickedly then Romulus, kil∣led all those that might oppose his Power, and gave them new lawes and new ordinances for reformation of the City. And not unlike to these was Hiero the Syra∣cusan, who seeing his Country in a neere degree of ruine; was forced to make use of those Armes to make himselfe Lord of the Country, which he had received for defence of the Country. It is therefore no marvell, that Augu∣stus seeing Rome so full of Discords, so much degenera∣ted from the antient lawes and customes, and so deepely plunged in a thousand kinds of wickednesse, did imitate Romulus in being the cause of his Companions death; did imitate Cleomenes, in putting many Senatours to death,

that might have opposed his greatnesse; and lastly did imitate Hiero the Syracusan; in turning those Armes a∣gainst the Common-wealth, which he had received of the Common-wealth, to defend it against Anthony; as knowing well, that to rectifie the City and reduce it to reformation, there was no other way, but onely for him∣selfe to governe alone. For having a purpose to set up an Aristocracy; he was first, (as Aristotle in his Ethicks teacheth us) to bow the staffe the contrary way to make it afterward streight; and if in doing this, hee used vio∣lence, it was, because it was impossible to doe it other∣wise. And therefore Plato in his book of lawes, saith; that it is impossible to passe from the Government of a few, to a good Common-wealth: because it is seldome seene, that they who are in authority, will yeeld to any of their fellowes to reforme them; where Plato shewing the difficulty of reforming a Common-wealth; shew∣eth withall, that it must be done, by reducing the go∣vernment into one mans hand. And if Augustus after∣ward, did not pursue his purpose; and left not the Citty in liberty; it was, because he saw the Citizens were not fit for it; as Galba, in the oration he made at the Adop∣ting of Piso said: Imperaturus es hominibus, qui nec totam libertatem; nec totam Servitutem pati possunt; and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 this cause it was, that Augustus made himselfe sole Lord; Non aliud Discordantis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 remedium, quam ut ab uno re∣geretur; and therefore hee gave them halfe a liberty; leaving a great authority in the Senatours; and not a lit∣tle in the people; which Tiberius afterward tooke away, and he put them in halfe a servitude, being himselfe su∣periour in all causes. The like conceit had Galba, when he made himselfe sole Lord of the Empire; as in the fore∣said oration, every one may see. Augustus therefore is no more to be reproved, then Cleomenes, and Galba, and Hiero are, and if his purpose tooke not effect, it is not to be attributed to his fault, but to the ill fortune of his suc∣cessour;

seeing as long as he lived himselfe, till he came to his decrepit age; he maintained the City in great qui∣et, and the whole world in Peace, Nulla in praesens formi∣dine, dum Augustus aestate validus, seque, & Domum, & Pacem sustentavit. And if to Romulus there had succee∣ded Tarquinius Superbus, and to Augustus Numa 〈◊〉〈◊〉; 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 thinke the City of Rome had in her begin∣ning beene ruined; and after by Augustus beene restored. And as after him the City of Rome fell to a Tyrant, and the power of the Caesars ended in Nero, so also the Po∣wer of Romulus ended in Tarquinius Superbus, the Po∣wer of Cleomenes, in himselfe, that of Hiero, in his ne∣phew Hieronymus, and finally, that of Galba, presently after his death, fell to a Tyrant: and all these Powers, ex∣cept that onely of Cleomenes, came to ruine by wicked successours. The reason, why these mens power was not able to hold out long; and to conserve their Cities in tranquillity, is by some assigned, to the accommoda∣tions, which either are so ordered, that all the parts of the City rest contented, and then it will last; or else the Ac∣commodation 〈◊〉〈◊〉 founded upon the Person, who by his authority makes it apt to continue, and then it will last no longer, then while he lives, or at most, till it fall in∣to the hands of a wicked successour, this, in my opini∣on, David knew well, when in a Psalme he said, Deus Iudicium tuum Regi da, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tuam filio Regis; as though he would say, it is not enough for the continu∣ance of an empyre, that the first King be good; but it is necessary, his successours be good also, and then it is like to last a long time. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cum sole, & ante lu∣nam, in Generatione & Generatione; but because after Salomon, there followed a wicked successour, the King∣dome was in part dissolved. So the Kingdome of Ro∣mulus succeeded well with him, because there came af∣ter him Numa Pompilius, who by giving good lawes, filled it with Religion, but afterwards in Tarquinius Su∣perbus

it came to ruine. So also that of Hiero came to nothing, through a wicked successour. So the reforma∣tion which Augustus made of his Country, succeeded ill to him, because there came after him a Tiberius, a Caius, a Claudius, and lastly a Nero, who abrogating Lawes & Religion, it could not choose but come to ruine. The reformations therefore are ill founded, and never last long, that are founded upon the Authority of one, see∣ing the City is eternall, & the Prince mortall; but then are reformations like to continue, when they are foun∣ded upon those that receive them. Wherein, for ano∣ther reason, I would helpe my selfe with a doctrine of S. Thomas, where he saith, That when a forme comes to be perfectly received of the matter, although the Agent that introduced the forme, be removed, yet the forme remaines in the matter still; if Fire be introdu∣ced in Wood by another Fire, though the agent be removed, yet the Fire remaines in the Wood still; but when a forme is introduced unperfectly, or to use the word of S. Thomas, Inchoative; there, If the Agent be removed, either it lasts but little, as water that is heated; or else goes wholly away with the agent, as the enlightning the aire, by the departing of the Sun. So likewise when a Prince hath perfectly introduced good Ordinances in the matter of a City; although he die himselfe, yet they will still remaine: but if they be introduced but unperfectly, that is, not fully establi∣shed; then certainly, either they will last but little, as water heated, or with his death that introduced them, will die also, as the enlightning of the Aire.

To returne to our purpose, I said before, that the City of Rome was not capable of liberty: and there∣fore that Augustus was not too blame, for not giving it liberty; that it was not capable, is manifest, seeing in processe of time, the Empire comming into the hands of such persons as more regarded the good of their

Countrey, then their owne dignity; such as Trajan, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and others were: if they had knowne that it had been for the good of the City of Rome, to have had liberty, they certainly would have given it.

I have beene willing to give examples of Hiero, as being indeed most like to Augustus. For he being a Citizen of Syracusa, had in his hand an Army for de∣fence of his Countrey; and by devises cut them all in pieces that were not for his turne: and afterward, with those very Armes he made himselfe Lord of Sy∣racusa, in which government he raised not himselfe above equality, ruling with much prudence, and con∣tents of the Subjects; as also he enlarged the Domi∣nion of Syracusa: and lastly intended to leave it in liberty, but that he did it not, there were two impe∣diment; the first, because the City was not fit for it: and therefore Livie saith, Syracusaeque cum breve tem∣pus affulsisset, in antiquam servitutem reciderant. And in the same booke, speaking of the people of Syracusa, he saith, Aut servit 〈◊〉〈◊〉, aut superbe dominatur, Libertatem quae media est, 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 modice, nec habere sciunt. A second impediment were the women, who through desire of rule, wrought so with him, that he left his Nephew Hieronymus his successour, a most per∣fidious and cruell man, and farre differing from the conditions of his unkle. Augustus likewise was a Citizen of Rome, and had in his hand an Army, for defence of his Countrey; when he put all those to death, that were able to oppose him, and then turning those very Armes against his Countrey, he made himselfe 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Lord; in which government he used great equa∣lity, shewed great prudence, enlarged the Empire, and lastly had a purpose to leave it in liberty, whereof he had often speech with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Agrippa; and if he left it not in liberty, it was long of two things:

one, because the City was not capable of liberty, Non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 discordantis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 remedium, quam ut ab uno rege∣retur: and as Galba said of the Romans, Nec totam liber∣tatem, nec totam servitutem pati possunt. A second cause was Livia, who having besotted the old man Augustus, perswaded him to leave Tiberius his successour, a cruell man, and one that was no more of kinne to Augustus his conditions then to his blood, as Tacitus shewes where he saith, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Tibero morum via. And thus it appeares that Augustus and Hiero were very like; but yet in one thing they had very unlike for∣tune; for the Empire of Augustus ended not in him∣selfe, but was continued in Tiberius, who also was able to elect a successour after him; but with Hiero it was not so, for his Kingdome ended in his Nephew Hieronymus, who was miserably slaine. And the reason of this, is because Tiberius in company of many vices had some vertue, (as I said before speaking of Nero) but Hieronymus, without any vertue, had all the vices of Tiberius.

Non aliud discordantis patriae remedium quam ut ab uno regeretur.

Why the City of Rome from a Regall power under Romulus recovered liberty under Tarquinius, and from the Regall power of Augustus was never able to shake off servitude. The six and thirtieth Discourse.

TO make that be better understood, which we said before; that the City of Rome in the time of Augustus, was not fit to receive liberty; I conceive it will be a good helpe to examine the reason, why

from the Regall power of Romulus, it came to liberty under Tarquinius; and afterward from the Regall power of Augustus, it was never able to free it selfe from servitude.

The first is a generall reason, and brought by all Writers: that is, the imperfection and corruption of the Citizens. For liberty, (as I shall shew in my Dis∣course of Optimates) requires men perfect, and not corrupt, at least so many as may be enow to make a Senate. But surely, this reason, (with leave of the many great men that alledge it) may be of some force to prove that the City of Rome under Augustus, was not capable to receive liberty, but it is of no force to prove, that from the Regall power of Augustus, it might not as well recover liberty, as it had done from that of Romulus. Seeing the City of Rome was never so full of imperfect men, in the time of Augustus, as it was in the time of Romulus, when there was in it in∣deed a nest of the scumme of the most wicked men, that were in all Italy. We may say then, that both the one and the other of these Kings had an intention to set his Countrey in liberty, (as of both of them, in divers discourses, I have made it appeare) but neither of them in his life time, put this intention of theirs in execution. And the reason is, because when men are imperfect, and not fit to tolerate liberty, it is im∣possible that in the life of one Prince alone, they can be brought to perfection, in such sort, as to be made fit to receive it; but this must be wrought by the continuance of many good successours, who may all of them intend to prepare the Citizens for it: and because it was thus with Romulus, therefore after him the Romans obtained liberty; but being not so with Augustus, who had many wicked successours after him therefore the City after him continued alwaies in most, miserable servitude.

A Second reason, was the slaughter of Caesar: which not being sufficient, to reduce Rome to liberty, was therefore sufficient to make the Regall power unalte∣rable. For Augustus making himselfe Lord of the Em∣pyre by force; was able by the same force to secure himselfe in it, the rather under the Excuse of Caesars slaughter; and the corrupt times of the Common∣wealth, which served him for Engines to put many things in execution, that fortified his Power. Pieta∣tem erga Parentem (saith Tacitus) & tempora reipublicae obtentui sumpta; whereupon, the best Politicall in∣struction, that in like cases can be given, is this; that when a Familie hath lost the authority it once had in a City; It is better to yeeld it up with love, then to strive by force to recover it with danger: for this hath beene the cause, that many Cities relapsed under Prin∣ces, have never after beene able to recover liberty; a relapse in all things, being alwayes worse then the first Evill: and of this there want not examples, if there were need to bring them.

A third reason, and of importance is, because the Election was come into the hands of the Souldiers; who by reason of the gaines they made: and of the un∣measurable Donatives that belonged to them, at the Coronation of Emperours; would never be brought to give their consent for the introducing of liberty, in which it is wont, to be the first lesson, He that labours not shall have no pay: and so much more, as Com∣mon-wealths that are good, need no such guard.

Fourthly, I conceive it to be of some moment, that after the death of Nero in whom the house of the Cae∣sars ended; yet Rome was not then reduced to liberty: seeing Galba being chosen, every one of those great ones, might begin to hope, that it might be their turne at some time or other, to come to the Empyre; and consequently very likely, they were not much discon∣tented

with that forme of Election: and so much, (in my opinion) did Galba himselfe expresse, in the speech he made to Piso, when he said, Sub Tiberio & Caio & Claudio unius familiae quasi haereditas fuimus: Loco liberta∣tis erit, quod Eligi coepimus: & finita Juliorum Claudio∣rumque domo, optimum quemque Adoptio Jnveniet: as if he would say, Now that the line of the Caesars is extinct, everyone may hope to attaine that degree; which hope I conceive, may be the cause, that those potent men, in whose hands it is to alter states, like best of that forme, in which the first degree they can hope to at∣taine, is that of Excessive greatnesse: and from hence perhaps it was, that Caesar the Dictatour, was never much troubled with the Conspiracy of Catiline, but ra∣ther excused and defended it, as lesse caring for the Ci∣ties liberty, then that it should come under the Po∣wer of one alone, which Power hee doubted not in time to attaine to himselfe.

Fifthly, the greatnesse of the Romane Empire, was it selfe, (in my opinion) a great cause, It could never returne to liberty, because at the time of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, being but in low estate, it was more reasonable, they should desire Equality: which in small things is easi∣ly borne: and because else, they must have passed a thousand difficulties: as the subduing of Ryvall Common-wealths, the Conquering of Enemy Princes, and the like, where in the time of Augustus, the City being growne great, & become mistresse of the world; her Ryvalls spent, and all things at Peace and quiet; it was not now easie to support Equality: and there∣fore from that time afterward, there was no contesting but for the Empyre, and a man will easily hazard both life and reputation, where the reward that may be got∣ten by it, is both great and secure, but where the re∣ward is but little, full of toyle and danger; there men are contented and glad to have company: and there∣fore

Brutus brought Rome to be a Common-wealth; whereupon we see in our times, that (Venice excep∣ted) all other Common-wealths are of no great mo∣ment, and all this (as I conceive) Tacitus very lively ex∣presseth, where he saith; Vetus ac jampridem Jnsita mor∣talibus Potentiae Cupido, cum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 magnitudine adolevit, erupitque. Nam rebus modicis Aequalitas 〈◊〉〈◊〉 habebatur, sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 subacto orbe, & aemulis urbibus Regibusve excisis, securas opes concupiscere vacuum fuit, prima inter. Patres plebemque certamina exercere. Modo turbulenti Tribuni, modo Consules 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ac foro 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Civi∣lium be llorum. Mox è 〈◊〉〈◊〉 infima Cajus Marius, & nobi∣lium saevissimus Lucius 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Victam armis libertatē, in 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉. Post quos Cneius 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, non melior, & nunquam postea nisi de principatu quaesitum.

A sixth reason may be taken from the Ordinances and lawes of the Romans, which though at the first times of the Common-wealth they were good, yet in processe of time they became naught, It being not pos∣sible, and indeed not sit, to make a law, that is simply and at all times good, as it happens with Physitians, who cannot prescribe meats that are simply good for all, seeing respect must bee had to temperatures, and bodyes in health simpliciter, (to use Galens word) that if a meat could be found good for all diseases; that meat simply should be naught. It is necessary there∣fore that lawes should have conformity, with the men; and with the times, whereupon the law of Moses being given to one People, was not simply good; but contey∣ned in it many precepts, repugnant to our Christian Policy; and if any man object, that the law given by Christ our Lord in the New Testament, is simply good I answer, that this Law was not given to one particu∣lar people, but to all the whole world: Ite per univer∣sum mundum, Praedicate Evangelium omni Creaturae, saith our Lord in Saint Matthew. Now the Lawes and Or∣dinances

of the Romanes, were all intended for en∣crease of Dominion, and consequently for war: where∣upon it is no marvaile; if that City, having now at∣tained to Peace, and no more need of Augmentation, but onely of Conservation, became uncapable of re∣ceiving liberty; and being bred and accustomed to getting, having now nothing more to get, they all en∣deavoured by the same Arts to get the Empire.

Seventhly and lastly, I have drawne a reason of ex∣cellent Doctrine from Aristotle in his Philosophie, for knowledge whereof, it is to be knowne, that living bodyes have naturally a Terme and bound beyond which they cannot goe; as witnesseth the Philoso∣pher in his Bookes of Animalls: where he saith; Perficiendi cujusque animalis certa est magnitudo; tum ad majus, tum ad minus, quem terminum non supergrediuntur, ut vel majora, vel minora evadant; and in his Physicks he saith: Quod impossibile est, carnem aut os, aut aliquid aliud, quantumcunque magnitudine, aut in majus aut in mi∣nus; and finally in his Bookes de Anima he saith; Natu∣ra autem Constant ium omnium Terminus est, & ratio Mag∣nitudinis & Augmenti; by which authorities it is ma∣nifest, that all Naturall things, have a certaine bound which they cannot exceed; and this happens because nature hath made them for their proper operations, which they cannot execute but under a certain and de∣terminate greatnesse: seeing therefore a Common∣wealth is nothing but a body consisting of many bo∣dies, and ordained to the intent to live well; It ought to have a due greatnesse, fit to mainteine it selfe; which greatnesse if it exceed, it will not bee able any longer to exercise its operation, in regard whereof Lyvie saith; Donec ad ea tempora pervenerunt, ut magni∣tudine propria Laborarent; whereupon as long as the City of Rome stayed within its certaine bound, so longit maintained it selfe a Common-wealth; but after it ex∣ceeded

this greatnesse; it then fell into the hands of Kings, and could not otherwise have subsisted. This, Taci∣tus in the mouth of Galba meant, when he said: Si im∣mensum imperi•…•… Corpus stare ac librari, sine Rectore posset, dignus er am a quo Respublica inciperet. The body then of the Common-wealth, was growne so vast and great; that it was not able to suffer liberty: for although to possesse much, be commonly good; yet it is not al∣wayes good for every body: as we see in wrestlers; whose Constitutions, (as witnesseth Hippocrates) have no greater Contestation, then with their owne goodnesse; as being full of so many good humours; that thorough the excesse of them, they are not able to exercise their due operations: and therefore neces∣sarily must either breake or be evacuated. And this happens not onely in bodies, but as well also in King∣domes and Common-wealths: Trajan by subduing an infinite number of Provinces; had so enlarged the Empire, that it was come Ad Maximum quod non; to a pitch above the proportion of a Monarchie; and per∣ceiving the danger of it; hee had recourse to the Re∣medy prescribed by Hippocrates; Quocirca statim bo∣num habitum solvere oportet, and giving some of those Provinces Freedome; he Evacuated (I may say) the Empire; like to this was the counsell of Augustus (cited by us before) Addideratque Consilium Coercendi in∣tra terminos imperium. Likewise in Common-wealths, I think none will deny; but that the Swizzers, the free Citties, and Lucca, the onely Common-wealths (after Venice) that are at this day in the world, have for no o∣ther cause held out so long, and maintained themselves to this time; but because they have not arrived to that bound, of Maximum quod non magnitudinis; and their little Greatnesse hath beene their defence, and made them great. Also to the Venetians, it hath beene no small helpe for preserving them in liberty: because

they have not exceeded the bound, of Maximum quod Non: And therefore the Image in Daniel, assoone as it came to have a head of Gold, was struck by a stone falling from the mountaine, and cast downe to the ground. This Image, by many writers, is taken for the Empire, which having Feet of Earth, no sooner come to have Heads of Gold, but they presently fall; seeing the Circulation of this world, is founded upon Ascending and Descending, and that which is the end of Ascending, is the beginning of Descending, as Ari∣stotle learnedly teacheth: where he speakes of a Circle; because humane powers are like to shadowes, which never continue at one stay; as Iob excellently saith: Et fugit velut Vmbra, & nunquam in eodem statu permanet; and in another place, Elevati sunt ad modicum, & non subsistunt, where S. Gregory citing that place of the 72. Psalme, Deiecisti eos dum allevarentur, and that of Saint Iames, Quae est Vita Vestra? Vapor est ad modicum parens, and expounding that place of the Prophet Esay, Om∣nis Caro Foenum: Carnalis Gloria dum nitet cadit; dum apud se Extollitur, repentino intercepta fine terminatur. Sic nam∣que aurarum flatu in altum stipula rapitur, sed casu concito ad Ima revocatur. Sic ad Nubila fumus extollitur, sed re∣pente in nihilum tumescendo dissipatur. Sic ab infirmis, Ne∣bula descendendo se erigit, sed exortus hanc solis radius, ac si non fuerit, abstergit. Sic in herbarum superficie, nocturni roris humor aspergitur: sed diurm Luminis subito calore sic∣catur. Sic spumosae aquarum bullae inchoantibus fluviis exci∣tatae, ab intimis certatim prodeunt, sed eo celerius diruptae de∣pereunt, quo inflatae citius extenduntur. Cumque 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ut appareant, Crescendo peragunt, ne subsistant. I cannot bring a better example, in conformity to this Doctrin, then of Venice; which was never in any great danger: but when it was at the greatest, as drawing then neere to the bound, of Maximum quod Non; whereupon, if it had not beene for the strength of its scituation, (as Hi∣storians

say) assisted with the great Prudence of the Senatours, and with the great valour of the Citizens, in defending Padua, It had utterly come to ruine. And therefore Augustus seeing, Non aliud Discordantis patriae remedium, quam ut ab uno regeretur, made himselfe Em∣perour, wherein notwithstanding Christians must not imitate him, whose duty it is, to set Religion before Country and life, and Common-wealth and all: ra∣ther suffering death, then be drawne to commit any wickednesse: and rather then imitate Augustus; fol∣low the course of Marcus Aurelius, who though he saw his Country upon the point of loosing, and himselfe also, thorough the wickednesse of his Compagnion, yet he tooke all things patiently, and would not put him to death, though it was in his power to doe it. For Conclusion I say, that a Prince ought not to governe his Country by force: although force bee sometimes necessary for correcting of Errours: as Sallust teacheth where he saith; Nam Vi quidem Regere patriam, aut Pa∣rentes, quamquam & possis & delicta corrigas; Importu∣num tamen est.

Comparatione Deterrima sibi Gloriam quaesivisse.

That to Elect a wicked successour, thereby to get glory to himselfe; is a beastly Course. The seven and thirtieth Discourse.

BY that which Tacitus and Dio relate, many con∣ceive, that Augustus made choice of Tiberius, whom he knew to be a proud and cruell man, to be his suc∣cessour; to the end, that the ill conditions of Tiberius so much differing from his owne, might turne to his

Glory. I cannot indeed deny; but that a worse suc∣cessour, is apt enough to make a lesse evill Predeces∣sour be thought a good one: which Galba well know∣ing, speaking of Piso said; Nero a pessimo quoque desidera∣bitur. Mihi ac tibi providendum est; ne etiam a bonis deside∣retur. He seeing, that if a wicked Prince, should come af∣ter Nero; his errours would be converted, to the o∣thers Glory; and this is so true, that the holy Spirit, in the mouth of Ezechiel said, that the wickednesse of the Hebrewes, before the comming of our saviour; made the people of Sodome and Samaria to seeme Just, which could not certainly happen, but long of the Compa∣rison, Vivo ego dicit Dominus Deus, (these are the words of Ezechiel) quia non fecit Sodoma soror tua, ipsa, & fi∣liae ejus, sicut 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tu, & filiae tuae, and a litle after; Et Samaria Dimidium peocatorum tuorum non 〈◊〉〈◊〉, sed 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 sceleribus tuis, & Iustificasti sorores tuas in omni∣bus 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉, quas operata es; Ergo tu 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & porta confusionem tuam, quae vicisti sorores 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 is 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 agens ab 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 sunt a te. And he that would see a passage more like to that of Tacitus; let him reade those words in Jeremy, where he saith: Iustificavit animam suam aversatrix Jsrael, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 praevaricatricis Iudae.

But yet this way of acquiring Glory, attributed here to Augustus, is not to be imitated, not only of Chri∣stians, but not so much as of impious Barbarians: see∣ing there are better and directer wayes, (I meane not, to governe well, but speake onely of a successour) be∣cause, if they have children to succeed them in the Kingdome, there will Glory enough accrew to the fa∣ther, if he give them good education; whereby they may come to prove good: This Salomon affirmes in his Proverbs where he saith, Filius sapiens 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉, or as others read it, Filius sapiens Gloria patris, that is, a wise sonne is the honour and Glory of his Father,

and keepes him alive, after he is dead: and therefore it is said in Ecolesiasticus, Mortuus est pater ejus, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non est mortuus, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 enim reliquit sibi post se; and there∣fore Princes need not desire, their successours should be worse then themselves, seeing they may hope for more glory by them, if they shall be better, and there∣fore David tooke great Joy to heare, that Salomon was like to be greater, then himselfe had ever beene: Sed & Salomon sedet super Solium Regni, & Jngressi servi ejus, benedixerunt Domino nostro Regi David dicentes: Amplificet Deus Nomen 〈◊〉〈◊〉, super 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & magnificet Thronum ejus super thronum tuum: rather indeed, a wicked suecessour is a Prejudice to a good Prince. Therefore writers say, that Marcus Aurelius had dyed a happy man, if he have not left Commodus his successour; for this cause, many of the Antients (as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉) were of opinion, that Children living, might make their dead fathers unhappy: in such sort, that he who living was happy, yet could not be called happy, if after his death, hee had ill 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and were un∣fortunate in his children.

To give therefore his successours good education, is a matter of much honour to Princes, and in case they prove not to have those vertues which are required in a Prince, hee must not suffer Paternall piety to pre∣vaile with him, but wholly abandon, and utterly dis inherit them of the royall dignity; (though as Aristotle saith) it be hard for a father to doe.

This Plato expressed in his Common-weath, who ordained, that they should be Princes, who in their Nativity had Gold mingled with Earth, meaning, that if their Sonnes had together with Earth, either Iron or brasse in them, they should not then be admitted to the Kingdome. Qua propter ipsis Principibus, & Primo & maxime Deus praecepit, ut nullius rei majorem curam custodiamque 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quam natorum, ut dignoscant quid

ex quatuor his potissimum illorum animis sit immixtum; & si quis ex ipsis nascatur 〈◊〉〈◊〉, aut serreus, nullo pacto mise∣reantur, sed honorem illi naturae convenientem, tribuentes, interopifices vel agricolas mittant: and therefore Moy∣ses was contented, that our Lord God, should chuse Iosuah, of another Tribe, to be his successour, ra∣ther then his owne Sonne. In consideration whereof, Saint Hierome saith, Moises amicus Dei, cui 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad faci∣em 〈◊〉〈◊〉 loquutus est, potuit utique successores Principatus filios suos facere, & Posteris propriam relinquere dignita∣tem: sed extraneus de alia Tribueligitur Iesus, ut sciremus Principatum in populos non sanguini deferendum esse, sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and this is the true way for acquiring of Glory: so much more, as it is more repugnant to Naturall af∣fection.

And if it happen that in default of children, he be to chuse a stranger for his successour, what better can he doe, to get himselfe glory, then to chuse a person of prudence and vertue, in whom, his Iudgement in choosing may appeare? and if the Prince living be good; it will encrease his glory, that he hath cho∣sen another that is good: if bad, it will lessen his own ill name, to have chosen a good successour. So it hap∣pened to Adrianus, (as Iulius Capitolinus and Spartia∣nus relate) because Antoninus Pius succeeding him by way of Election, and knowing that the Senat meant to burne all the Acts of Adrianus, as to whom they were deadly enemies, for the many slaughters he had committed of the Nobility, he out of his goodnesse, pacified the Senat: placed Adrianus amongst the Gods, and erected a Temple to his Name. Igitur nec ipse (said he) Princeps vester ero, si omnia Acta ejus in quibus est Adoptio mea, rescinditis. This Glory Galba sought after, when adopting Piso, he said, Vt nec mea Senectus conferre plus Populo Romano possit, quam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Successorem.

Thus a Father receives honour, by a good Sonne, and Predecessours, by good successours; whereupon, that great Oratour, who spake in praise of Philip King of Macedon, could not find auy greater praise, then that of his sonne: Hoc tibi unum sufficiat, te filium 〈◊〉〈◊〉 A∣lexandrum.

Tacitus therefore is not to be blamed, as he, that al∣ledgeth not his owne opinion; but relates it onely as the opinion of others: for as for himselfe, he shewes rather, he thought Augustus worthy to be blamed for it; and he had reason, because, though a Prince by chusing a wicked successour, make his owne actions to seeme good; yet this is so farre from making him praise-worthy, that it brings him more dishonour, as being a concurrent cause, of all the Evill his successour doth.

Let not men therefore blame Tacitus, at all adven∣ture, but consider, that all that which Tacitus saith; it is not Tacitus that saith it, neither the things he re∣lates, are they all to be imitated, no more then all those things which Moses relates, who relates a thou∣sand villanies of the Hebrewes: seeing it is the part of Historians, to speake of all things, whether good or bad: the good, to the end we may follow them; the bad, to the end we may avoid them; and this, saith Ta∣citus in the third of his Annalls, is the end of an 〈◊〉〈◊〉: Exequi sententias, haud institui, nisi in signes per honestum, aut notabili dedecore, quod praecipuum munus An∣naliumreor, Ne virtutes sileantur, utque gravis Dictis Fa∣ctisque ex posteritate, & Infamia metus sit.

Tiberioque etiam in rebus quas non oc∣culeret, seu Natura, sive adsuetudine, suspensa sem∣per & obscura verba, and a little after: At Patres quibus unus metus si intelligere viderentur, in questus, lachrymas vota, effundi.

That a Prince should be both loved and Feared. The eight and thirtieth Discourse.

FRom the obscure speaking which Tiberius used, the senatours conceived no little feare, and wish∣ed, the Prince would speake in such a manner, that he might be understood.

I cannot in truth blame Princes, for speaking obscure∣ly: seeing vulgar and too open speech abase th them, and make them vilified: the rather because I see our Lord Christ, (as Saint Matthew, and Saint Marke 〈◊〉〈◊〉) solitus erat loqui in parabolis, and Salomon, for the most part, used to speake Riddles; whereupon, it may justly be said of Princes, who lay themselves open to all mens view, that which Salomon saith, in the Can∣ticles: Oculi tui Columbarum, absque eo quod intrinsecus latet, that is, the eyes being beautifull of themselves, appeare more beautifull, when they are shaddowed & covered with some Feathers; and so the Discourses of Princes, will be so much the fairer, as they are in some part, covered with a little obscurity; and there∣fore Salomon in his Proverbs, commends much this kind of speaking, where he saith; Mala aurea in lectis Argen∣teis, qui loquitur verbum in tempore suo.

But because the obscure speaking of Tiberius was not to this end, but onely ut intro spiceret Procerum mentes: it neither ought, nor can be praised; being in truth, the

fashion of a Tyrant, and thorough which, those Prin∣cipall Senatours remained full of feare, who were go∣verned before by Augustus with so much love; upon occasion whereof, we will make this discourse, what carriage a Prince should use, to make himselfe, to bee both loved and feared.

It hath beene debated in times past, whether a Prince ought tobe loved 〈◊〉〈◊〉 feared of his Subjects, or whether loved and feared both at once, yet no writer hath beene found so void of Judgement, as not to know, that nothing is to a Prince more profitable, then to be loved and feared both together, but that they thinke it a very hard, and almost impossible thing they should meet together. So as many have liked, hee should rather make himselfe be loved, then be feared. I therefore will endeavour to make it appeare, that a Prince shall not doe well, to make himselfe onely to be loved. Secondly, that he shall not doe well, to make himselfe, onely to be feared; and lastly, that he ought 〈◊〉〈◊〉 one and the same time, to make himselfe, be loved, and feared, both together: shewing, that not onely this is easie to be done, but impossible that a Prince should be good, if he couple not together these two Extreames.

Concerning the first, this is certaine, that if love come not accompanyed with feare, the Prince in short time, will grow into contempt: which Moses under∣standing, who had not perhaps his equall in mildnesse, yet after, for the love hee bore the people, hee had prayed our Lord God, Aut dele me de libro vitae, aut parce populo huic: when he came downe from the mount, hee caused many thousands of them to be out in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, thereby shewing, that together with the love of the Prince, there should be severity, which be∣getteth feare. Therefore Saint Austin saith, Estote mi∣sericordes, pensantes quantum Moses misericordia floruit

propter populum, pro cujus salute petiit deleri de libro vitae; & quando iterum zelo rectitudinis; cum obtinuisset Veniam, ait ad populum, Ponat vir gladium super femur suum, Ecce quod vitam omnium cum sua morte petiit, paucorum vita cum gladio destruxit. Intus igne amoris, & foris accensus Zelo Iustitiae & severitatis; where it is plainly seene, that a Prince ought not onely to be loved, but to bee feared also: seeing love alone of it selfe, is cause of contempt: and therefore Iob said: Si quando ride∣bam adeos, non credebant; & Lux vultus mei non cadebat in terra, that is, his Gravity was so great, that though he laughed, yet they stood with feare and reverence: where we must weigh those words; Lux vultus mei non cadebat in terra, which according to another sense, in the Hebrew, is rendred in Latin, Lucem vultus mei non abiiciebant: that is, they despised not my mirth. So as, Feare is so necessary, that Domitian, although terrible to the Senat, as governing with feare, yet af∣ter his death, he was wished for againe of all men, see∣ing with that feare, he kept his owne officers in awe; whereupon it happens sometimes, to bee worse for a Prince, with too much mildnesse, to make himselfe be loved, and therefore the Kingdome of France, under Charles the simple, and Charles the grosse, was (as an Authour writes) most miserable, on the contrary, at the end of Francis the first, it was a flourishing King∣dome, although they were milde; and he a sharpe and terrible King; afterward againe, in the time of Henry his sonne a most gentle Prince, the treasury was all wasted: Pertinax and Heliogabalus with their mildnesse, had brought the Empire almost to ruine, when after∣ward Severus Africanus, and Alexander Severus raised it up againe, with incomparable Severity. It is not therefore enough for a Prince to be loved, but hee must be feared also.

Concerning the second point, which is, that feare

alone is pernicious to a Prince, is easily proved: first, from that place in Genesis where Noe with his sonnes going out of the Arke, our Lord God said unto him, Tremor & Timor vester sit super cuncta Animalia terrae: as though he would say, you must make your selves be feared of beasts, not of men. And therefore Moyses comming downe from the Mount, with a horny splen∣dour, and finding that it made his face strike the peo∣ple into feare, he covered it with a vaile; whereby he shewes plainely, that a Prince ought not to make himselfe onely to befeared. This also our Lord Christ shewes, who amongst the first precepts he gave his Apostles, gave this for one, that they should carry no Rod with them; where S. Ambrose well observes, that a Prince ought to governe more with love then feare. And in another place he saith, David Rex, cum omnibus aequabatsuam militiam, fortis in praelio, mansuetus in Im∣perio; Ideo non cecidit, quia charus fuit 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & diligi a subjectis quam timeri maluit. Timor enim, temporalis tuta∣minis servat excubias, nescit diuturnitatis custodiam. And therefore it is said in the Psalme, Memento Domine Da∣vid, & omnis mansuetudinis ejus. Whereupon S. Bernard upon those words of the Canticles, Dilectus meus mihi, & ego illi qui pascitur inter Lilia, amongst those Lillies where the Spouse feedeth, reckons gentlenesse and love, by which he reigned. Specie tua (saith the Pro∣phet) & pulchritudine tua, intende prosperè, procede & Regna.

Therefore love alone is not good, because it cau∣seth contempt; and feare alone is not good, because it begets hatred. This the Ancients meant to signifie, by the Fable of Jupiter, who at the Frogs desire to have a King, gave them a Blocke, and he not stirring, the Frogs despised him; whereupon Jupiter changed their King, and gave them a Storke; but he eating them up, they hated him more then they despised the other:

by this they meant to shew, that a King should not be so gentle, to have more of the blocke then of the man; nor yet so severe, as to resemble a beast, in sucking the blood of his Cittizens. A Prince therefore ought to joyne the one with the other; which how easie and necessary it is, may easily be knowne, if we distinguish feare into two kinds: one, a feare which is but a re∣verence, as a filiall feare is, whereof, the holy Text in Job saith, Vir rectus timens Deum. The other, a feare which is a terrour; and this is that feare which Adam had, when he heard the voyce of our Lord God, Adam ubies? and he answering said, Vocem •…•…uam Domine au∣divi, & abscondime & timui, quia nudus essem. Secondly, we must distinguish of men; that some are perfect, and some unperfect; which is common also to all Cities, whether great or small.

I say then, that if the men be imperfect, it is fit to make them feare; not the filiall, but the servile feare: and therefore Esay saith, Sola vexatio tantum dabit in∣tellectum auditui: and Jeremy, Per omne flagellum, & do∣lorem erudieris Hierusalem. And Salomon in his Proverbs saith, In labiis sapientis invenitur sapientia, & virga in Dorso ejus, qui indiget corde: by the Rod is meant feare; and by Ejus qui indiget corde, are meant the wicked; who are said to be without heart; as Osee the Prophet saith, Factus est Ephraim, quasi Columba seducta, non ha∣bens cor. With these men therefore, it is fit to use a Rod of Iron to make them feare, being the onely meanes to returne the heart into its place. The Nini∣vites had removed their hearts out of their proper places: and our Lord God, with his Rod, Ad quadra∣ginta dies & Ninive subvertetur, brought them againe into their right places. Because (as Aristotle in his Physicks saith) Every thing that is made, proceeds from its like; but every thing that is borne, from its contrary. Quodlibernon non fit a quolibit, sed a suo contrario.

So to beget love, where it is not, we must not use Love, but its contrary, which is feare; and as in Generation the Contrary departs, when the thing is generated; so when Love is once generated, the feare departs, where∣upon Saint Bernard and Saint Austin, Compare feare to the Needle, and love to the Thread, because the Needle brings in the threed, and having brought it in, departs away. A Prince therefore ought to make himselfe be feared, even with Servile feare, by the wic∣ked.

It remaines to shew, how a Prince ought to carry himselfe, towards men that are good and perfect, but having shewed before, that love alone begets con∣tempt, and feare hatred, it is fit, he make himselfe be loved, and feared, both at one time; but not with that servile Feare, which for the most part is cause of Rebel∣lions, as was seene at the time, when our Lord God appeared to the Jsraelites upon the Mount; which be∣getting in them a great feare, there followed a Re∣bellion; but with that f•…•…are, which is a vertue; For knowing of which feare, it is to be knowne, that feare may have two objects; the one is, some terrible mis∣chiefe; the other is the Person, who hath power to doe the mischiefe; as Saint Thomas saith: and be∣cause our purpose is not in this place, to speake of the first object, but onely of the second; as speaking of a Prince; I say, that he may be considered, in as much, as he hath power to hurt, or in as much, as he hath will to hurt: if we consider him, in as much as he hath will to hurt, in this manner, he ought not to make himselfe be feared; but leave the subjects to feare him of them∣selves; So our Lord God would be feared, and not be feared; So Saint Paul to the Philippians saith, Cum me∣tu & tremore vestram Salutem Operamini: See here, Saint Paul would have us to feare, not of God, that is, that God hath not a will we should be saved; for, Deus

vult ommes homines salvos fieri, but hee would have us to feare, least our actions be such, as to provoke our Lord God to anger. Therefore in the mouth of the Pro∣phet Esay he saith, Feare not, Saint Paul saith, we must feare, Esay saith, wee must not feare, therefore Esay meanes, that we must not feare Gods will, and Saint Paul meanes, that we must feare our owne workes. So a Prince ought not to carry himselfe in such manner, that there be feare of his will, because his will should alwayes be for the good of his subjects; but that there be feare in the subjects, of their owne workes.

Againe, if we consider the Prince, the second way, that is, in as much as he hath power to hurt, in this sense, he ought so to carry himselfe, that his Person may be feared, because he that hath power to punish, must have (as Saint Thomas saith) such eminent autho∣rity, as can hardly be resisted, for if it may casily be resi∣sted, it will be no cause of feare. And therefore of∣tentimes, though there be no feare of mischiefe from One in eminent authority, yet the Reverence that is borne to eminency, is justly called Feare: So in Saint Luke, accepit autem omnes timor, & magnificabant Deum. So also that place of Saint Paul is to be expounded, Red∣dite omnibus Debita: cui Timorem, timorem; cui vectigal, vectigal; and he that will be feared in this manner, must doe some great and wonderfull things; that men ad∣miring them, may acknowledge his eminency aboue others; whereupon our Lord Christ, stroke a feare into the Jewes, when they saw him doe such great mi∣racles: Repleti sunt timore, dicentes, quia vidimus Mira∣bilia hodie. And the subjects, though good, need not be greeved to feare the Prince in this manner; this being a vertuous feare, which was in Christ also towards his fa∣ther; as witnesseth Saint Thomas in the foresaid place, Alensis, Bonaventure, Gabriel, and with them the whole Schoole of Divines. So as a Prince ought to make

himselfe universally to be loved, and generally to be feared: in confirmation whereof, S. Gregory saith, Ta∣lis debet esse dispenfatio Regiminis, ut his qui praeest, ea se circa subditos mensura moderetur, quatenus & arridens timeri debeat, & Iratus amari, ut eum nec nimia laetitia vi∣lem reddat, nec immoderata severitas odiosum. And in ano∣ther place, weighing those words of Job, Cum sederem quasi Rex, circumstante exercitis, eram tamen moerentium consolator. S. Gregory exhorts a Prince to doe, as the Sa∣maritan did, who powred into his wound, that was hurt upon the way, Wine and Oyle, Vt per vinum inor∣deantur vulnera, per oleum faveantur. And the Psalmist saith, Virgatua, & baculus tuus, ipsa me consolata sunt: The Rod serving to strike, and the staffe, to defend. This also was expressed in the Arke, in which, toge∣ther with the Table of the Law, was put the Rod with the Manna, there being necessarily required for obser∣ving the Law, love and feare. In signe whereof, our Lord Christ in his transfiguration upon the Mount Tabor, appeared in the midst, betweene Elias, who to move men, wrought by feare; and Moyses, who wrought all by love. And therefore in the Scrip∣ture, when the qualities of a Prince are spoken of, alwaies with beauty to make him be loved; there is joyned, Power, to make him be feared. Where∣upon in Salomons Epithalamium, after he had praised the Bridegroome for his Beauty; speciosus prae filiis ho∣minum; he praiseth him also for his strength; Accingere gladio tuo super faemur tuum Potentissime. So in Genesis in the Benediction of Juda, and in Deuteronomy, in the Be∣nediction of Joseph: Quasi primogeniti Tauri, pulchri∣tu•…•…o ejus; corn•…•…a Rhinocerontis cornua illius. And in the second of Kings, Saul & Jonathas amabiles & decori in vita sua, & Aquilis velociores, Leonibus fortiores. And of God himselfe the Prophet saith, 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 est, indutus est Dominus fortitudinem & praecinxit se: and in

the Proverbs, Fortitudo & decor indumentum ejus: and in the 28. Psalme, Dilectus quemadmodum filius unicornium; that is, though as beautifull, he is worthy to be loved, yet as powerfull also he deserves to be feared.

A Prince then ought to make himselfe be feared of wicked men, with a servile feare, and this he shall doe if he duely punish them for their faults; and he ought also to make himselfe be feared of good men, with a reverentiall feare: and this he shall doe, if he give proofe of his valour, by doing great actions: (as I have shewed before) which justly make a Prince be feared with reverentiall feare. And because above all things, he ought to procure the love of his subjects; we must know, that never was any Prince so good, whom some of his subjects did not hate; nor ever any so bad, whom some of his subjects did not love: as may be seene in Tarquinius Superbus, whom some of the principall youth of the City so much loved, that they made a conspiracy in his behalfe. So Nero (as Galba witnessed) had many that loved him; Nero à pessimo quoque desidera∣bitur. And this happens by reason of sympathy of con∣ditions; there being in all Cities, whether little or great, some men that are warlike, and some peaceable; some that are ignorant, and some learned; some that are good, and some bad: whereupon seeing a Prince must of necessity be either good or bad; war-like, or peaceable; ignorant, or learned; it will follow, that if he be learned, he shall be hated of the ignorant; if he be war-like, of the peaceable; if good, of the bad. And this is the work of contraries, whose nature being to destroy one another, it is as impossible that one of these should love the other, as it is impossible, that one should love his owne destruction.

The second difficulty, which makes it hard for a Prince to procure himselfe to be beloved, is justice; which if it be not duely administred, it makes a Prince

odious to all good men; and if it be duely executed, either in civill or criminall causes, it will be an occa∣sion every yeere to get him the hate of many, and even of those that are good, there being few men that like of justice, when it goes not on their side. These many then, whose hatred the Prince is like every yeere to incurre, being multiplied many yeeres, must needs at last make a mighty number; and from hence, (as I conceive) may be drawne an excellent reason how it happens in governments, that the first yeere for the most part Governours are well beloved; the second yeere, they are hated, and the third yeere detested: as every one looking into it, of himselfe may see.

Yet a Prince amidst all these difficulties, must not be discouraged: First, because he need not care much to be loved of any, but onely of the good: to which purpose Galba said, it needed not trouble them, to see Nero beloved of the wicked; but this was a matter that needed regard, to give no occasion, he should be wished for againe of the good: Nero a pessimo quoque desiderabitur: Mihi ac tibi providendum est, ne etiam a bonis desideretur. Secondly, the end of a Prince, is as of an Oratour, or of a Physitian, who being to intro∣duce a forme in another, and not having it in their power to doe it, yet they have discharged their office, if they have applied fit meanes to introduce it: no better a Physitian is he that heales, then he that heales not; nor any better Oratour he that perswades, then he that perswades not; so long as they use the fittest meanes, he to heale, and this to perswade. So for our purpose, seeing love is in him that loveth, in such man∣ner, as honour is in him that honoureth: a Prince shall have performed his charge, and done as much as he need to doe, as long as he hath used all fit meanes, to procure his subjects love, by doing good to all, by maintaining them in plenty, by shewing himselfe farre

from cruelty, by defending them from their enemies: and finally, by making it appeare, that he loves them exceedingly; seeing this is a sure rule, He that will be loved, must love.

Vnum esse Reipublicae Corpus, atque nuius animo Regendum.

Whether an Aristocracy, or a Monarchy be the more profita∣ble for a City. The nine and thirtieth Discourse.

ASinius Gallus having too sharply spoken to Tibe∣rius, and finding his owne errour, and the Princes indignation; meant with a flattering speech, to cover the one, and pacifie the other: and therefore shewed, that for an Empire to be well governed, it was neces∣sary it should be governed by one alone. And because from this place of Tacitus many gather, that he held the government of a Monarchy to be better then that of optimates: I conceive it to be no digression from our purpose, that I shew first, according to my understan∣ding, the truth of this question; and then declare, how this place of Tacitus must be understood. And herein, no man need to marvell, that I vary from the opinions, or to say better, from the approved opinions, of many excellent men, as though I meant to vilifie them; but I desire they would take into consideration, the River of Rho•…•…e, which although it seeme by his course, as though it meant to drown the legitimate sons of the Celti, yet indeed it exalts them, and gives a true testi∣mony of their legitimate birth to all that see it. So it will be no small matter, if I with my weaknesse, can make the others worth appeare the greater.

To come then to the matter: It is commonly held, and all men almost are of opinion, that a Monarchy is the better. For proving whereof, there being two waies; one, Authority: the other, Reason: in each of these, there will not be wanting meanes sufficient to make it plaine. In considering authority, the first that present themselves, are the holy Fathers, S. Chry∣sostome, Justin, Athanasius, Gyprian, S. Hierome, and finally S. Thomas in many places. Secondly, come Philoso∣phers, naturall and morall: Plato, Aristotle, Sen•…•…ca, Plu∣tarch, Herodotus, and finally amongst Poets, Homer.

If we come to reasons, there present themselves an infinite number: and first, if we consider profit, we shall finde, (as S. Thomas saith) that a more profitable government cannot be found, then that of a Monarch; seeing the profit & welfare of that which is governed, that is, of Cities and Provinces, consists in nothing but in conserving of unity, which we call peace: at which, they who governe must chiefly aime: and seeing there is no government so fit to preserve peace, as that of a King, we cannot choose but give it the name, to be the better, and the more profitable. Because peace consists in nothing but unity, which certainely is bet∣ter had in one, who is by himselfe one, as a King is; then in those that are many, as Optimates are: as we see, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thing which is hot of it selfe, is a more efficient cause of heating, then that which is but hot by acci∣dent, the state of Optimates being never good, but in as much as they who govern it, approach by accidentall union, to be one.

But laying profit aside, and entring into considera∣tion, which of them is most naturall, who sees not, that a Monarchy is the most? seeing nature governes and moves all the parts of our bodies, by one onely which is the heart: likewise the sensitive soule is governed by the rationall; and Bees naturally are governed by

one that is King: and if Artificiall things be so much the better, as they imitate nature; and the Artificers worke be so much the perfecter, as it holds similitude with nature; then certainely, must every one needs yeeld, that in the multitude of governments that State is the best, which is governed by one alone.

Againe, if we looke upon experience, we shall find, that in a house, there is but one Master; in a flocke, but one Shepheard; and in the old Testament, the Israelites were alwaies governed by one alone, whe∣ther under Kings, or under Judges.

But laying also this aside, and comming to examine the power: who sees not that a Monarchy is farre more potent then an Aristocracy, considering that of the foure Empires and powers of the World: that is, the Assyrians, the Persians, the Grecians, and the Ro∣mans; onely one of them was under Optimates.

Then if we consider order: where is it more found, then in a Monarchy? where every one is subject, but he onely that rules the rest; there being no order be∣tweene equals, but onely betweene superiour and inferiour.

If then we consider duration and stability, this cer∣tainely is most found in the government of one alone, seeing Omne Regnum in se divisum desolabitur: and every one knowes, that division fals out more easily in an Optimacy, then in a Monarchy: as experience hath made it manifest in the Monarchy of Ninus, which continued without interruption, a thousand two hun∣dred and ninety yeeres. If then we consider, which is furthest off from discords, we may take example in Rome, which was never without discords, but when it was under Kings.

But laying all these considerations aside, it will be proofe enough of this assertion, to consider the simi∣litude, that is betweene the government of God, and

that of a Monarch, because as he rules all the World, so a King rules all his subjects.

By these reasons it might be concluded, that a Mo∣narchy, as being most profitable, most naturall, most potent, most durable, most orderly, most free from discords, and finally most like to the government of God, should without comparison be better, then a State of Optimates. But seeing there are many diffi∣culties in the question, I hope I shall have leave to ex∣amine the truth of it a little better. And where it may be discoursed of in two senses; the spirituall, and the temporall: In the spirituall, it cannot be denied, a∣gainst Calvin and other hereticks, but that a Monar∣chy is the best kind of government that can be given: and of this there needs be no disputing, being as cleare as the Sunne, both by authority of Scripture, by deter∣mination of Councels, by consent of the Church, and finally by the common opinion of all the Fathers, such a Monarchy having been instituted by our Lord Christ himselfe.

But in the second case, which is, considering it in the temporall sense; I hold the Question may hold dis∣putation, and be handled politically: where we shall not find, all the reasons that were in the former: be∣cause a King, as a King, may erre a thousand times a day: but the Pope, as Pope, can never erre, as being assisted by the Holy Ghost. Whereupon, as it is un∣doubted, that in the spirituall, there cannot a bet∣ter government be then a Monarchy: so in the Tem∣porall, every one may be left to take which side he likes best. The first question being betweene an Is∣raelite, and an Egyptian, was consequently easily de∣termined by Moses; but the second betweene the Israe∣lite, and the Israelite, was very hard to be determined. And therefore as 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Gregory Nyssen well observes, by killing the Egyptian, Moses ended that strife, but for

the strife between the two Israelites, he was never able to accord them. So the strife, which we had with Heretickes may easily be determined, by killing them with the holy Scripture, but with strifes that grow between our selves, are left to every ones free liking: and therefore very hardly can be ended.

He then that would hold an Aristocracy to be bet∣ter then a Monarchy, might easily prove it by reason, and by authority. By reason, because (as S. Thomas saith excellently well) that government is the best, and the most profitable, that can best procure the unity of the Cittizens: whereupon we must necessa∣rily confesse, that an Optimacy is the best; for seeing that an univocall riseth not but from an univocall; and that the unity of the Optimates is more univocall to that unity which is required in the people, then the unity of a Monarch is; therefore also it is more fit, and able to produce it: for, the unity of the Prince, is an unity of person, and of end: unity of person, as much as to say unity of number: as being one alone, unity of end, because all his cares are directed to one sole end, which is the good of his subjects; but the unity of the Optimates, is an unity of end, in plurality of persons, I say plurality, but not disunion; because the Optimates being many persons, cannot have unity of number, but agreeing in the end which is the good of the City, in this they are one. And the unity of sub∣jects ought to be an unity of end, in plurality of per∣sons: so as by this, it manifestly appearing that the unity of the Optimates is more univocall with that of the people, then the unity of the King is; therefore consequently it must be granted, that it is more able to produce it. There being two things necessary to generation, (as Cajetan saith) first, the distinction of that which is generated, from that which generates: the second, that there be a similitude in nature, be∣tween

the one and the other, because, that which Generates, intends to introduce a thing like to it selfe, and therefore (saith he) where there is more Identity and similitude in nature, betweene that which Gene∣rates and that which is generated, there the generati∣on will be perfitter, and more easie, and from hence it comes that the Univocall generation is more excellent then the Equiuocall, and therefore, seeing the Identi∣ty, betweene the unity of the Optimates, and that of the People, is more then the unity of the Prince, and that of the People; it followes, that the generation shall be more noble, more persit and more easie, and the more, seeing that unity of a King, which is unity of number, is rather contrary to the union we speake off, because as one in number is a denying of more parts; So unity in number, is an affirming of more parts, rather that one, which is of number, is the ru∣ine of a City; as Aristotle prooves strongly against Plato, where he saith; Atqui constat, quod ea si proce∣dat, ut una fiat magis Civitas non erit. Est enim Civitas multitudo qu•…•…dam, secundum Naturam, quae dum fit una magis Domus erit ex Civitate, & homo ex Domo. Vnam e∣nim magis Domum censemus esse quam Civitatem, & homi∣nem unum quam Domum; quare etiamsi posset quis•…•…iam am hoc facere, tamen non esset faciendum, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 perimit Ci∣vitatem. So as, a City should not make it selfe one in number, but in discipline, as the said Aristotle saith, Oportet cum Civitas sit multitudo, per Disciplinam commu∣nem facere. And although, to shew that the unity of a King is better, then that of Optimates; It might be said, that the unity of number shewes Perfe∣ction; God being one by reason of Perfection: and many holding, that in every sort of Angells, there is one chiefe: as that which concernes their Perfecti∣on; yet I could easily answer with Saint Thomas: that one as it implies Negation, addes nothing to the

Perfection of being; and if we take one as excluding other things, and as in its formall sense, it signifies to be alone and solitary: This of it selfe expresseth no Perfection, but rather many times imperfection, be∣cause in God, the being alone by Essence, proceeds from Perfection; but if he should be one in Person, it should be an imperfection. So as one, if you take it for solitary; signifies not so much Perfection, as im∣perfection.

But if we come to consider the Naturalnes of this go∣vernment; we cannot then have a better thing, to make it manifest, then the government of our body, which ac∣cordingto the doctrin of Plato (with the consent of Ari∣stotle) is governed by nature Aristocratically, with three faculties, The sensitive, the Animall, and the Vitall; the sensitive consisting in the Braine, which is the Be∣ginning of all the sinewes; the vitall, in the heart, the beginning of all the Arteries; The Animall in the Liver, the Fountaine of all the veines: whereupon e∣very member containing Arteries, Nerves and veines, they consequently are governed by three, by the liver, by the heart, and by the braine; and therefore that Doctrine of the heart, which is brought in opposition, is false, which Aristotle in his workes of Physick, hath many times confuted. And their Reason, to say a house is governed by one alone, is of no force: which ra∣ther is a reason that makes for us, seeing that, as na∣ture, amongst things that are unequall, as those in a house are, hath ordained the Government of one a∣lone, so betweene those that are Equall, as it is in a Citt•…•…y, there should be an Optimacy, which by 〈◊〉〈◊〉: in the first of his Politicks, is plainly Intimated. Neither is it of any force to say, that Bees naturally are governed by one alone, or that the sensitive soule is governed by the Rationall, or that a Flock is guided by one Shepheard, seeing the King of the Bees (as

Pliny saith) is much greater then any of the other bees, & the rational faculty is so much more noble then the sen∣sitive that hardly there can be assigned any proportion: & finally, the shepheard is so beyond comparison superi∣our to the flock, that it is most reasonable & indeed most naturall, hee should command; and therefore when in a City, there is any one found, so much superiour to all the rest, as the King of the Bees is in greatnesse to the other Bees; or so much in Noblenesse, as the rationall faculty is to the sensitive, or so much in ability, as the Shepheard is to the flock, then such a one in all reason should be King; as Aris•…•…otle grants where he saith: Quicun{que} igitur di∣stant tantum quantum Animus a corpore, & homo a bestia, per hunc modum se habent: having said before, Hic imperans, illa vero parens. And in another place he saith, if any one in a City, be found so much excelling all the rest, as Jupiter excells men, that man by right should be made King: Sed siquis excellat virtute, quid de eo sit faciendum? Non enim dicendum est, ut talis vir sit de civitate pellendus: atqut neque gubernationi aliorum, talis vir erit subjiciendus, perinde enim est, ac si qui Jovem Gubernare velint. This very thing God meant to shew, when he gave to man the rule over beasts as Salomon Interprets it, when asking wisedome, to the end God should give it him, he said Et sapientia tua consti∣tuisti hominem ut Dominaretur; as though he would say, as thou hast shewed, in giving Regall Dominion to man, that hee who will governe others, should in wisdome be as much superiour to his subjects, as a man is to Beasts: so you are bound, having made me King over so many People, to give a like proportion of wisedome, as not able otherwise to deserve to be a King.

With this supposition then we may grant, that the go∣vernment of a monarch is the better, as wherof we have an example in the Pope: but this is to handle the questi∣on Secundu quid: for if we handle it simpliciter; we denyit.

If we come to consider the Power, which is requi∣red for Augmentation, I then verily thinke there is

none so ignorant, but that he knowes, how much an Optimacy is fitter for augmenting, then a Monarchie, whereof we have Example in Athens, which, assoone as it freed it selfe from the Tyranny of Pisistratus, It presently grew to be of inestimable greatnesse. And if you will not stand to this Example, then take Rome, which was no sooner freed from Kings, but that it came to so great greatnesse, that it could not be op∣pressed but by it selfe. And it availes not to say, that of the foure Empires, one onely was a Common∣wealth, that is, that of the Romanes, and that the o∣ther three were Monarchies, as that of the Assyrians, of the Persians and of the Graecians, because if this rea∣son were of any force, It would prove, that a Tyran∣ny is the best government of all, seeing it is then a Mo∣narchie, when the subjects are used, as Children, and not as the Persians and Medes did, and at this day, the Turke, who useth his subjects as servants, or to say bet∣ter, as slaves.

In comming to consider duration; I care not to prove, that Optimacy continues longer, then Mo∣narchie, seeing this would not serve to prove my intent that therefore it is better, for duration as Aristotle saith, encreaseth not goodnesse, and therefore one white thing, that continues longer then another, is not thereby whiter then the other; but rather the best things of this world, as they are hard to find, so being found, they are soonest lost, as Galen faith of bo∣dyes, that are come to the height of health; and Ta∣citus, the like of states; whereupon it is no marvell, that the Monarchie of the Assyrians continued longer, then any Common-wealth ever did, which happened, because Tyranny held a proportion with that People, seeing People that are 〈◊〉〈◊〉, are necessarily to be governed by a Monarch, and not by Optimates. And therefore our Lord God, alwayes governed the Israe∣lites by one alone, because that rude people was not

able to suffer Liberty, as liking better to live under a Tyrant, as they made appeare, when they demanded a King of Samuel; for though he threatned them, they •…•…hould have a Tyrant, yet this made them not give over their demand. So when the Senat of Rome gran∣ted liberty, to Paslagonia and Cappadocia; the Cappado∣cians saying they could not live without a King, the Se∣nat was faine to send them Ariobarzanus, to be their King; whereof Livie saith, Barbari quibus pro legibus semper Dominorum Imperia fuerunt, quo gaudent, Reges ha∣beant; and Aristotle speaking of this shewes, that they were by Nature made to serve; Obidenim (saith he) quia magis aptae sunt Natura ad serviendum Nationes bar∣barum quam Graecorum; & eorum qui in colunt Asiam: quam eorum qui Europam, per serunt servile Jugum aequo animo, & ob hoc Tyrannica sunt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Regna. And there∣fore from hence, there can no argument be drawne, that Monarchie, is a better government then Optima∣cy, seeing (as Aristotle saith) although one Forme of Common-wealth be in it selfe better; yet for some people, another that is not good, may be more pro∣fitable. There might also be brought another Rea∣son, why Tyrannies are of longer Continuance, then Aristocracies, a Reason, which hath beene intimated, by a certaine Author; and it is because they are more hard to be surprised, because where all are servants, there can be none to lend a hand, to let in strangers, as hath beene often done in France, in England, and other pla∣ces: which will alwayes happen, and hath often hap∣pened to Monarchies, because such Princes hold their subjects rather as Companions, then as slaves; and there∣fore in this point, the Turke stands secure; and if A∣lexander Magnus overcame Darius, it was his owne Act. It is indeed true, that as Monarchies are more hardly ta∣ken then Common-wealths; so more easily they are held, where common-wealths are easily taken, (all the sub∣ject Cities being male content, & consequently ready to

assist strangers; but being taken, they are hard to be held by reason of the name of Liberty; which makes them apt every minute to fall into rebellion. Tyranny then is the most durable of all kinds of states, and if the reason a∣bove alleaged were of force it would prove it also to be the best, which no man that hath braines will say. But let us come to consider the order of Optimates; which is the same, that is in an I•…•…strument of Musick, order so much commanded by all the Holy Fathers, and by all Philosophers; where many Diverse sounds make but one sound, of which order, Saint Chrisostome in ad∣miration saith Et est videre mirabilem rem: in multis unum: & in uno multa. And then, if they will consider, the unaptnesse it hath to Discords, let him take the City of Venice for an example, which for many ages together, hath never had any. And it availes not to say, that where many are, they may be at ods betweene them∣selves, but one cannot be at oddes with himselfe, for I answer with Aristotle, Quod studiosi viri sunt omnes ut Ille unus. And the Example of Rome is of no force, because when the Discord entred betweene the Nobility and the People, It was not then an Optimacy but a mixt Estate: and by reason of the predominating Element, might be called a Popular state, and if ever it were an Optimacy, it was in the beginning, in which they lived in excee∣ding great concord, untill the state came to be corrup∣ted, rnd here we must advertise, that when we compare a Monarchie with an Optimacy, wee compare them in their perfection, and not in their corruption: because it is of the Essence of an Optimacy, that all in it should be good men, for else we should dispu•…•…e Aequivocally.

But to let many other things passe, who knowes not that a City will be better governed by Optimates; then by a Monarch? seeing the most virtuous, Governes best, and a King being but one virtuous, and the Opti∣mates many vertuous, seeing many know more then

one, although that one, in some thing may exceed those many, as Aristotle excellently shewes in his Politicks, yet if you grant that the Optimates be all vertuous men; you must withall grant, that they are able to governe better, then any King whatsoever; and the rather, because a King deserves then most praise, when he is governed himselfe by good counsellours, and consequently in as much as he is ruled by many, in the manner of Opti∣mates. So our Lord God appointed Moses, that he should rule by the counsell of Iethro. And this me thinkes might serve to make men capable, that an Optimacie is better, then a Monarchie, yet there is a further Reason: For not onely an Optimacy may Governe bet•…•…er, as be∣ing more vertuous; but as being more then a King, who not being able himselfe alone, to governe all the state, Solus illud non poteris sustinere; he must of necessity com∣mit it to officers; and who knowes not, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 how much more love and Iustice the people are governed, by the Lords themselves being vertuous, then under a King by officers that are strangers; they governing their owne, and these another mans; and therefore Aristotle speaking against Plato saith; that Propriety, a thing being ones own•…•…, is a speciall cause of love, and makes the greater care be taken of it, Nam de propriis maxime Cu∣rant homines; and if men (as he shewes) use little dili∣gence, in things that are common; they will use much lesse in things that are neither common nor proper: as we see it daily, (though it be but a homely instance) that a husband-man will till land better, that is his owne possession, then that which he is hired to till; as in that, regarding his owne particular profit; in this; the Com∣mon: in the one, the present onely, in the other, the present and the future both. And if it be answered, that a King may have good officers; I say, that when we grant the government of a King, to be good, wee 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that he be good himselfe; but it followes not,

that a good King must necessarily have good Officers, seeing it is not a thing essentiall to him: and though we should grant it to be essentiall, yet it is not consti∣tuent, but onely consequent; though I rather thinke it is neither one nor other; but for the present, let it it be as it will: This is most certaine, that in Optimacy, for all to be good, is both essentiall and constituent; for otherwise (as I have said) we shall but labour in Aequivocals.

Also secrecy gives an Optimacy right to be prefer∣red before a Monarchy: for proofe whereof, the ex∣ample of onely the Venetians may suffice, who (as Guicciardine relates) have alwaies kept their counsels secret: a thing which Princes cannot doe; who being to consult with persons, not interressed in the affaires that are handled, can never be sure, but that they may reveale them. And though none of these reasons were sufficient to winne perswasion to this opinion, yet this certainly must needs be sufficient, to shew, how much the government of God, is more like to an Op∣timacy, then to a Monarchy: and this will be easily shewed, because our Lord God operates Immediatione virtutis; and is, in all things, I•…•…diatione suppositi: to which kind of operating and being, the Optimates approach neerer, then the Monarch; who must of ne∣cessity make use of Officers, as not able being but one, to be himselfe in all places: whereby it often happens, that a State is more governed by the Officers vertue, then by the vertue of the Prince. But the Optimates being many, may all together doe that of themselves, which a Prince doth together with officers, and may governe the State by their owne vertue, and conse∣quently operate Immediatione virtutis: yet I meane it, in the manner, that a second cause can operate: know∣ing well, not onely in Theologicall verity, but also in Philosophicall doctrine, that all vertue proceeds from

Heaven: as Aristotle in his Meteors teacheth us, where he saith, Oportet hunc mund•…•…m inferiorem, superioribu•…•… lationibus esse contiguum: and therefore in a certaine manner, the government of Optimates is more like to that of God. And it availes not to say, that our Lord God is but one alone, that governes the whole world; because in him is one Essence, indeed one Will, one Soule, one Intellect onely; but then in three Persons really distinct, in three Suppositi, in three Hypostases, in three Substances; (as substance is distinct from Acci∣dents, which are In alio tanquam in subjecto.) And finally in three Subsistences, as subsistence signifies Essentiam per se subsistentem: which three Persons, doe in such sort governe the universe, that although the workes of Creation be attributed to the Father, the workes of Wisedome to the Sonne, the workes of Love and Grace to the Holy Ghost; yet all the three concurre equally in all workes ad extra, which are common to them all. The Universall therefore is governed by three Persons with one will alone: and the Divine Unity, is an unity of end in plurality of Persons, such as we have shewed the unity of Optimates to be. And this is that unity, which our Lord Christ, desires should be in us, as being like his owne, as he sheweth in S. John, where he saith, Pater Sancte serva eos in nomine tuo (spea∣king to his Father) quos dedist•…•… mihi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sint unus sieuti & nos. And a little after, Non pro eis rogo tantum, sed & pro eis qui crediture sunt per verba 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in me; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 omnes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sint, sicut tu Pater in me, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in te. So this is a cleere Text, and by every one interpreted to be meant of that unity, which ought to be in all the faithfull, which our Lord God would have to be like the unity of the Divine Persons: and as in them there is a reall distinction of persons in unity of Essence; so in the many faithfull, there ought to be one Spirit, one love, one will. They then that have plurality of persons

in one will, are in that manner one, as the Father, the Sonne and the Holy Ghost are, as in the Gospell our Lord Christ expounds it.

And now who is he, that by the force of so many reasons, will not confesse, that an Optimacy, as being more profitable, more Noble, more potent, more naturall, more secret, more concordant: and finally more like to the government of God, is farre a better kind of state then Monarchy.

As for authorities, I commonly make no great reckoning, but only of those which I am bound to be∣leeve, by commandement of the holy Church; other authorities must convince by reason: and this leave S. Austin gives me, where he saith, Neque quorum libet disputationes quamvis Catholicorum & laudatorum homi∣num velut Scripturas Canonicas habere debemus; ut nobis non liceat, salva Honorificentia, quae•…•…illis debeatur homini∣bus, aliquid in eorum scriptis improbare, atque respuere, si forte invenerimus quod aliter senserint, quam veritas habet, divino adjutorio, ut ab aliis intellecta •…•…nobis. Talis ego sum in scriptis alionum, quales volo esse intellectores meorum. And in another place he saith, Sacrae Scripturae est ad∣hihenda fides, alios autem Scriptores licet nobis impugnare. But because it becomes not my youth and weaknesse, to stand in defiance with so many excellent and wor∣thy men; I will endeavour to make it appeare, that some of the Authours cited before for the contrary, spake not in our sence; and that some of them speake of our side; some of them irresolutely, and some again, with passion.

Beginning then with the holy Fathers, I say, they spake in another sence, meaning it of the spirituall Monarchy: and though many times they speake gene∣rally, which may reach as well to a temporall Monar∣chy, yet this they did to the end, that Heretickes see∣ing it granted them, in the government of Cities, an

Optimacy to be better then a Monarchy, should not from hence take occasion to affirme the like of the spi∣rituall Monarchy, And this is a course, that hath been much used by the holy Fathers, who sometimes have not yeelded to things most cleere and evident, onely because they would not give hereticks occasion, by ill interpreting them, to make simple people encline to their opinions. It is a matter cleere and evident, and granted by all Divines, that in God there are three Hypostases, and yet many of the holy Fathers, and particularly S. Hierome, have not been willing to grant it; for no other reason, but least Gatholicks granting three Hypostases, heretickes should thereupon make simple people beleeve, that in God there were three Essences: and this interpretation is made of it, by all the Doctours upon S. Thomas.

Leaving then the opinion of these Fathers, who speake in another sense, let us come to Philosophers: where I cannot but account my assertion safe; having Aristotle, Plato, and Pythagoras of my side. And it availos not to say, that Aristotle in his Ethicks understands it one way; and in his Metaphysicks another: seeing Aristotle when he speakes of the same things in divers Bookes, speakes of them diversly; and Arts and Scien∣ces consider oftentimes the same things, and yet not in the same manner. A Philosopher and a Physitian, both of them consider the same body; but a Physitian considers it as it is capable of healing, and a Philoso∣pher as it is capable of motion. So as I never make reckoning of the authority of Aristotle; but in places, where he handles Ex professo; because many times, he discourseth in one manner morally in his Ethicks: and in another manner diversly in his Politickes; so in his Rhetoricks, he speakes of felicity in one manner, and in his Ethicks in another. In his Physicks he discour∣seth as a Philosopher one way, another way in is Pro∣blemes.

The authority then of Aristotle in matters Po∣liticall, must be taken from his Politicks; where I am much deceived, but he is of my opinion: though all men cite him for the contrary; I know not how he could possibly speake more plainely, then where in his Politicks he saith, Si ergo plurium Gubernatio bonorum autem virorum omniae Optimatium dicitur, unius autem Reg∣num, optabilius esset civitatibus ab optimis Gubernari, quam a Rege. And in a thousand other places, whereof some are cited here and there in my Discourse; and other, every one may looke out of himselfe, being all so cleere that they have no need of my interpreting them. It is true indeed, that once he was transpoted to say, that the Regall government is the best of all; because a Tyranny is the worst: but he spake then in Idaea, mea∣ning if there could be found one as much superiour to others, as God is to men: and therefore in another place, where he leaves his Idaea, and comes to Fact, he saith, that all Kings are tyrants: seeing there cannot any one be found, so much superiour to others in goodnesse, as that he should be worthy to command alone. Non fiunt nunc amplius Regna (saith Aristotle) sed si qua fiunt, Monarchiae, & Tyrannides magis sunt; Ob id quia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 spontanea Gubernatio est, ac Majorum proprie, & plurimi pares sunt, neque usque adeo praesellentes, ut ad magnitudinem, dignitatemque 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gradus se possint attol∣lere. And then that reason, which Aristotle brings, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 bona pessima, is false; and is not to be understood as men commonly take it. To prove it to be false, is easie: seeing not onely Plato, but Aristotle himselfe saith, that the government of Optimates, is better then the popular: yet in the second of his Politicks he saith, that the worst formes of government, are a Tyranny, and a Democracy; so as if that reason were true, the corruption of Optimates should be worse then that of the people. Besides I should alwaies hold, that the cor∣ruption

of an Optimacy is worse then that of a Mo∣narchy; seeing an evill is so much worse as it is multi∣plied: specially, being impossible that those few should ever be in concord. And in truth, this reason may be strongly fortified by example; seeing in the govern∣ment of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus, and in that of Le∣pidus, Anthony, and Augustus, both of them comprised under the worst forme of a few, assigned by Aristotle; the Commonwealth of Rome, was more torne and wa∣sted then under Nero, or any other Tyrant whatsoever. Then againe, the proposition is not so to be under∣stood, but thus, that an evill will appeare so much worse, as a man hath beene accustomed to a greater good, as it would be a greater evill, to a Prince who hath alwaies lived deliciously, to be cast into prison, or into servitude, then to a Husbandman that hath beene used to digging and hardnesse; because in the Prince is corrupted a greater good: but in Genere entis, the same evill is all one, to a Husbandman, and to a Prince. Thus much by way of digression.

To returne to our purpose. As concerning Plato, al∣though he be alledged for the contrary, yet seeing he is but wavering, and speakes diversly; sometimes, as in his Dialogues of a Common-wealth, that an Optima∣cy is the best; and sometimes as in his Dialogues of a Kingdome, that a Monarchy is the best: and often∣times, that a government mixt of People and Tyrant is the best: we shall doe well to waive his words, and have recourse to that he shewed in de eds, as better expressing mens minds then words. And Plato being as∣ked of Dio, how a Common-wealth might best be go∣verned, he found fault with Monarchy, and counselled him to bring in Optimacy: by which it appeares, that this indeed, was his very opinion. Now for Pythagoras, we say, The Pythagorans endeavoured all they could, to bring into Italy the government of Optimates: and

if it succeeded not, yet that happened not for want of judgement, but of forces. Then for Plutarch, if he un∣derstood it otherwise, we may say he had rea∣son, as being the Schoolmaster to an Emperour; and therefore should have shewed himselfe very simple, to blame a Monarchy. As for Homer, he no doubt is most fit to be brought in proofe of that, which I my selfe in another Discourse, have resolved; which is, that an Army indeed, should be governed by one alone, the Verse which is commonly alledged out of Homer, being spoken by Agamenmon to the Army. And lastly, Herodo∣tus also had reason to conclude, that amongst the Per∣sians, a Monarchy was a fitter government then an Aristocracy; because the Persians were a rude imper∣fect Nation, as we have shewed in another place.

But because the most of the Arguments, brought a∣gainst my opinion, are taken out of a booke of S. Tho∣mas, intituled, De Regimine Principis: I desire men would take notice, that I goe not about, to impugne the Doctrine of that Saint, of whom I have made choice for my Advocate with God, and for my Master in all Sciences: but the truth is, that booke is none of S. Thomases, as is easily proved, seeing in that booke many persons are spoken of, which lived not till long after S. Thomas his time, as in the 20. Chapter of the third Booke, De Regimine Principis, it is said, that Adul phus succeeded Ridolphus Count of Habspurg in the Empire, which hapned in the yeere 1292. full eighteen yeeres after S. Thomas was dead; and in many other places, which for brevity I omit. But let the booke be whose it will, there is nothing in it against my opini∣on; seeing he meanes onely, that a Monarchy is the better, where the people are imperfect: and this is no more, then what I have said my selfe. As in his fourth book, and eighteenth Chapter he saith, Quaedam autem Provinciae, sunt servilis naturae, & tales Gubernari debent

Principatu Despotico; Includendo in Despotico etiam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 qui autem Virilis animi, & audacia Cordis, & in Confidentia suae Intelligentiae sunt; tales regi non possunt, nisi Principatu Politico; communi nomine extendendo ipsum ad Aristocraticum. This Text sufficiently shewes the Authours opinion; and it differs not from mine.

As for the authority of Tacitus, before alleadged; it is easily answered, if we consider, that he speaks not those words as his owne opinion: but by the mouth of Asinius Gallus, who having offended the Prince before, meant afterward by flattering words to pacifie him.

In the last place I advertise, that I counsell not Peo∣ple to change their government, though it be not an Optimacy; but rather, I like that every Country should keepe the forme of government they have; Ferenda Re∣gum Ingenia (saith Tacitus) neque usui Crebras mutationes; and in another place, Vlteriora mirari, Praesentia sequi: bo∣nos Jmperatores Voto expetere, qualeseunque tolerare, because to alter the forme of government, is a mischievous thing: not onely when it is good; but even when it is bad; whereupon it is better to endure a Tyrant, then to rise up against him: for if he should prevaile, he would grow more cruell, as having beene provoked; and if he should be put downe, there would grow a thousand diffe∣rences about ordering the government: and oftentimes he, that was the forwardest to put downe the Tyrant; would be the readiest to be Lord in his place, and would then governe the more cruelly, for feare to be put downe, as his Predecessour was. And this is his Doctrin, that made the Booke De Regimine Principis. Let People therefore keepe that forme of government they have, and remember that notable Aphorisme of Hippocrates, Consueta longo tempore, etiamsi deteriora, Insuetis minus mo∣lesta esse solent.

Lastly I advertise, that governments would be pro∣portioned to the Nature of the People; and therefore in some places a Monarchie may do well, where an

Optimacy would not; whereupon, we see many Cities in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as Perugia, Florence, Siena, Bolonia, & others, which never were in peace, till they came to be under a Prince.

Nec ideo Iram ejus lenivit pridem in visus, tanquam ducta in matrimonium. Vipsania Marci Agrip∣pae filia; quae quondam Tiberii uxor fuerat; plusquam Civi∣lia agitaret.

That it is a great helpe for attaining a Kingdome, to have a wife of the blood Royall: and in what danger a Prince is, that hath none but daughters. The Fortieth Discourse.

HAving at this time, no conveniency to Discourse upon all the Bookes of Tacitus: I am forced to take all occasion, though never so small, to handle those things, which more properly would be treated of in a∣nother place; I shall therefore desire my reader, that if in these Discourses, I open many Sentences of Tacitus, which might fitter be opened somewhere else; it may be rather attributed, to defect of occasion, then to want of Judgement.

This Passage of Tacitus, in which Tiberius shewed him∣selfe doubtfull of Asinius Gallus, that Plusquam Civilia agitaret, as having taken one to wife, that had beene his wife before: gives me occasion, first to shew there is great reason to suspect such, as get them wives of the blood Royall; as being a speciall helpe for attaining the Em∣pire, and having attained it, to maintaine it. Secondly, to shew the danger a Prince is in, that hath none but Daughters; and lastly to shew the course he ought to hold, that would secure himselfe in these cases. Saul had reason to doubt David, having taken his daughter Micholl to wife, and knowing this important point of state; he sought by a thousand impertinencies to free himselfe, but being forced at last to give her to him, the

Scripture relates, that he then began to fea re David ex∣ceedingly, whereupon it is said, Deditque ei Saul Micholl filiam suam, and it followes, Michol autem diligebat eum, & Saul caepit timere David. The most wise Salomon who al∣so knew this danger, when Bersabee unadvisedly asked Abisac the Shunamite for Adoniah, answered, Quare postu∣las Abisac Shunamite Adoniae? Postula ei & Regnum; and as he denyed to Adoniah his wife, So Tiberius denied to Agrippina her husband, whereof Tacitus speaking, saith; Caesar non ignarus quantum ex Repubitca peteretur, ne tamen offensionis aut metus manifestus foret, sine reponso, quanquam Instantem reliquit. Likewise the same Tiberius knew, that when Seianus demanded Livia, who had beene the wife of Drusus, it was as much as to demand the Kingdome, and therfore denyed her to him, saying Falleris enim Seiane si te mansurum in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Ordine putas, & Liviam quae Caio Caesari, mox Druso nupta fuerat, ea mente acturam ut cum equite Romano senes•…•…at. It is no marvell also, if •…•…itel∣lius shewed to be afraid of Dolobella, as being in the same case Tiberius was with Asinius Gallus, having taken her to wife, who had beene his wife before; Vitellius metu & odio (saith Tacitus) quod Petroniam uxorem ejus mox Dolo∣bella in matrintonium accepisset, vocatum per epistolas, vitata Flaminiae viae celebritate, divertere Interamnam, atque ibi Jnterfici Iussit. And therefore Phalti shewed great Iudge∣ment, who when Micholl marryed before to David, was given him by Saul, yet he never touched her, but (as Rabbi Salomon saith) laid a sword betweene Micholl and himselfe, when he was in bed with her, to keepe him from touching her: and indeed it was well he did so, seeing no sooner was Saul dead, but that David, not thinking himselfe King, if his wife were married to a∣nother, said to Abner, Non videbis faciem meam antequam adduxeris Micholl filiam Saul.

This therfore is a special help, for attaining a kingdom; & our Lord God, although he be able of himselfe, to ac∣complish whatsoever he pleaseth; yet as willing to make

use of second causes; he caused David, to the end he might more easily attaine the Crowne, to which hee was designed Abaeterno; and to which Samuel had anoin∣ted him, to take to wife adaughter of Sauls. And Salomon who was all wisedome and prudence, shews it us himselfe and finally the most subtile Seianus, having an intent to get the Empire, knew this way to be, if not necessary, at least most profitable.

Thus my intention is proved by Examples, but be∣cause there is more force in Reasons to move the under∣standing; and therefore Philosophers never speak, but they bring their reason; I have therefore sought out one, which I have found, me thinkes, in Aristotle, in his Books of generation; where speaking how Elements are transmuted, hesaith: In Elementis habentibus Symbo∣lam qualitatem, facilior est transitus. As the Earth which is cold and dry, is more converted into water, which is cold and moist; then into aire, which is hot and moist; as agreeing with that in one quality, of cold; and disa∣greeing with this in both: So in our case, the attaining to a Kingdome, being in a private person, a transmu∣tation more difficult then that of the Elements, it will more easily be attained, where there is one symbolizing quality, then where there is none.

He therefore is more likely to attaine the Empire, who being himselfe a privat man, shall have a wife of the blood Royall; then he, that both himselfe and his wife are of private estates.

A Second Reason (omitting Philosophicall, to come to a Politicall) is, that people bearing affection to their Prince, more easily suffer themselves to be go∣verned, as long at there remaines in the Kingdome any spark of his blood. Darius a man of exceeding great Judgement, comming from a private man to be a Prince; for confirming him in the Empire, tooke to wife a daughter of Cyrus; as knowing, of how great impor∣tance it was, to have a wife of that blood, which had

beene King before; where of Iustin saith; Principio igitur Regni Cyri Regis filiam Regalibus nuptiis Regnum firmaturus in matrimonium accepit; ut non tam in extraneum translatum, quam in familiam Cyri reversum videretur. The like con∣sideration had the sonnes of Tigranes; and if with them, it had not good successe, this happened upon other oc∣casion; and therefore good cause had Tacitus to mar∣vell, where he saith; Nec Tigrani diuturnum Jmperium neque liberis ejus, quanquam sociatis more externo in matrimo∣nium Regnumque. This brought Demetrius to be King of Macedon; that he had Fila to wife, who was daughter to the old King Antipator.

From this passage now spoken off, with good conse∣quence comes in, the second: that a Prince is in great danger, who hath none but daughters: seeing if he mar∣ry them, hee can never be secure, that his sonne in law will not take the Kingdome from him: for the facility, we have shewed to be by this occasion.

To meet with this danger, many have taken divers courses: the first hath beene to marry them to meane men; and such, as may have no thought of comming to the Empire, before the time; because such a one seemes rather likely to be assistant to the Prince, in his affaires; seeing he may justly hope for more faithfulnesse from a Sonne in law, then from strangers; and need not make doubt of a person, that is not of any Noble Lynage. This conceit was in Augustus; and Tacitus expresseth it in the Person of Tiberius; At enim Augustus filiam suam E∣quiti Romano meditatus est. Mirum hercule, si cum in omnes Curas distraheretur; Immensumque attolli provideret, quem Conjunctione tali super alios extulisset Cajum Proculeium, & quosdam in sermonibus habuit; Insigni tranquillitate vitae, nullis Reipublicae negotiis permixtos.

This indeed would be no ill course, so long as those persons of meane condition, be not of a spirit to aspire to the Empire, such as those named by Tiberius were, in whom, those words of Tacitus are to be considered: Tran∣quillitate

vitae: as though he would say, a man free from audacious & haughty though•…•… and such may safely and without danger be advanced to honour. Whereupon Aristotle in his Politicks, meaning to teach, what kind of men may safely be raised & made great, he saith, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 si quē extollere oporteat non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cum qui sit moribus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hujusmodi homines aptissimi sunt, ad invadondu circa 〈◊〉〈◊〉. And if Augustus gave her afterwards to Agrippa, Igno∣bilem loco bonum Militia, & victor•…•… socium this happened because he could not choose but feare Agrippa; where∣upon he was forced, either to put him to death; a thing most scandalous not onely in a Christian, but even in a Heathen; or at least to put him in some certaine hope of cōming to the Empire. This, Dio in the mouth of Moecae∣nas teacheth us, who speaking of Agrippa saith, that when a Prince makes a servant too great, and advanceth him too highly, giving him excessive and unlimitted autho∣rity, he hath then no way to secure himselfe, but either to kill him, or by some match to make him his kinsman.

Cyrus also followed this course, who married: his sister to Sibares, a person of most base estate: & as he took the same course that Augustus did, so it was upon the same occasion that Augustus had, whereof Justin saith, Sybarem Caeptorum quem juxta nocturnum visum ergastulo liberaverat comitemque in omnibus rebus habuerat (all one with those words (Victoriae socium) Persis praeposuit, sororemque suam ei in matrimonium dedit. And because Galba tooke not this course with Otho, which Cyrus tooke with Sybares, and Augustus with Agrippa; It lost him the Empire, as in the first booke of Tacitus Histories, is to be seene.

But yet in truth, this course seems to me both very dan∣gerous, and very uncertaine, because although he to whō their daughter or other of their blood is married, be himselfe a man ignoble and of little spirit, yet he may have a sonne, that may resemble his grandfather more then his father. Astyages was of this opinion, and put it in practice, doubting the future husband of his daughter,

and no lesse, the nephew that should be born of them: Neque Claro 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (saith Justin) neque civi dedit filiam, ne pa∣terna maternaque nobilitas Nepotis animum extolleret: sed de gente obscura tunc temporis Persarum Cambysi mediocri viro in matrimonium tradidit. And see how vaine his conceit was; seeing of her was born Cyrus, who in few yeers took the Kingdome from his grandfather Astyages by force.

Again this course takes ill successe oftentimes, through the haughtinesse of the women, who though married to men of meane spirits, and quiet dispositions, yet stirre them up, and provoke them to doe things which of themselves they would never doe, or at least, not doe so soon. Tullia the daughter of Servius was one of these, who impatient to wait upon succession, forced in a man∣ner her husband Orontes Tarquinius, to enter upon the Kingdome, with the death of her father; thinking it but fit, that being borne of the Blood-Royall, she should be able both to give and to take away the Kingdome at her pleasure, whereof she oftentimes complained, Ipsa Regio semine orta, nullum momentum in dando adimendoque Regno faceret. Thus Tarquinius by the instigation of this infernall fury, got possession of the Kingdome: and it made Servius no whit the safer, that he had married his daughter to Orontes Tarquinius, a man (as Livy reports) of a mild and peaceable disposition, Mitis ingeniiIuvenem.

To be briefe, the daughters of Kings, either cannot, or know not how to live in a private estate. And there∣fore Damarata the daughter of Hiero King of Syracusa; and married to Andromadorus, with such violence instiga∣ted her husband, that she forced him extremely against his will, to take possession of the Kingdome; which Livy shewing, where he alledgeth the reason, why An∣dromadorus was moved to seaze upon the Kingdome saith, Qui fessus tandem uxoris vocibus, monentis nunc esse tem∣pus occupandi Regnum.

A second way used by some, for freeing themselves of this danger, hath been to make such women to enter

into Monasteries, or to spoake after the custome of the Ancients, into Temples; and so remove them from their husbands and sonnes, of whom there might be feare: to the end, that they in such places observing chastity, the Princes might live secure from the one and the other. This course was followed by Amulius, who having driven out Numitor, and killed his sonne; he made his daughter who only remained, under colour of honour to become a vestall Virgin, thinking by this meanes to secure him∣selfe, both from her, and from any whom she should marry, and from any sonnes that should be born of her: where of Livy 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Fratris filiae Rheae Silviae per speciem honoris cum vestalem vestal•…•… legisset perpetua virginitate spem partus adimit. But neither did this course do Amulius any good: for of her were borne Romulus and Remus, who deprived him of his Kingdome.

I finde therefore another way perhaps better: and it is to keepe these women at home with him, of whose husbands or sonnes there may be any doubt, bearing many Princes in hand, he meanes to marry her to them; but in the meane time, not to bestow her upon any: for by this meanes, not onely they shall be safe from any danger of their owne, but from any also that may arise by enemies, either forraine or at home: seeing out of this hope, every one will be ready to defend them; and where by marrying her, they might have one defendour indeed, but him with danger, now holding them all at a bay, they will have many defendours without danger. This course was notably put in practice by the Duke of Burgundy, who (as Argenton relates) having one onely daughter, he Promised her to the Duke of Guyenne, and to Nicholas Duke of Calabria, and to Philibert Duke of Savoy; and finally, to Maximilian Duke of Austria: and (as Argentone verily thinks) never meant to marry her to any at all, as long as himselfe lived. And in truth, if this Duke had carried himselfe as wisely in other things as in this, he had never so foolishly overthrowne himselfe, as he did.

Quippe Augustus supremis sermonibus cum tractaret, quinam adipisci Principem locum suffecturi abnuerent, aut impares vellent; vel iidem possent cuperentque: M. Lepidum dixerat capacem, sed aspernantem; Gallum Asinium avidum, at minorem: L. Arun∣tium non indignum, & si casus da∣retur, ausurum.

Whether it be better to refuse Dignities, or to seeke after them. The one and fortieth Discourse.

AMongst the last secrets of State, with which Augustus before his death acquainted Tib•…•…rius, he propounded three for the Empire, in a •…•…∣verse manner: One that desired it, but was unwor∣thy: Another that was worthy, but despised it: A third able to discharge it, and if occasion served, would attempt it: Of which three, when Augustus dyed, there was none left living but Marcus Lepidus, who was the man that was worthy of it, but despised it. Omnésque praeter Lepidum, variis mox criminibus struente Tiberio, circumventi sunt. We shall not need to examine which of these would have done best, in the case proposed by Tacitus, but rather consider the like persons in a Dig∣nitie or Office, which the Prince should give. We will therefore examine, First, which is best; either to de∣serve an Honour, and despise it; or else not deserving it, to seeke it. Secondly, whether hee that deserves ought to stay till the Prince offer it; or else put himselfe forward by some honest wayes to obtaine it.

Concerning the first: It seemes, that as to desire Honours, of which one is not worthy, is a presuming of himselfe, and as an act of Pride, is worthy of blame;

So not to accept those Honours, of which a man is worthy, as being an act of Humility, is exceedingly to be commended.

But if I shall speak my minde freely, I conceive that he is more to be blamed, and commits a greater er∣rour; and deserves the Princes displeasure more, who refuseth Honours out of contempt, then he that seekes them without merit; because the one by desiring them, shews he holds them in great account; the other by slighting them, shews he makes no reckoning of them. Whereupon, as contemning is odious to a Prince, and valuing pleaseth him; so more distastfull must he needs be, that being worthy rejects an Ho∣nour, then he that seekes it, and is not worthy: And this is Saint Chrysostomes Doctrine, where hee saith, Quare judicio quidem meo, qui istos despiciunt, contem∣•…•…ntque, multo sceleratiores, & pejori supplicio digni fue∣rint, quam fuerit Dathan unà cum suis omnibus. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 enim, tametsi Principatum ad se non spectantem sibi vindicabant; tamen miram quidem de eo Principatu animo opinionem •…•…on∣ceperant: Id quod declaravit, ingens rei concupitae studium. And a little after: Neque enim perinde est ad despicien∣tiae rationem subducendam, honorem aliquem indebitum ap∣petere, & tot tantaque bona fastidire: verum facinus hoc tanto est illo gravius, quanto inter se dissident intervallo, Fastidium & Admiratio. So as he not onely incurres the Princes disliking, but deserves also his reprehen∣sion; seeing he that seekes a Dignitie without desert, comes within compasse of being proud by admiring; where he that deserving it despiseth it, is as proud as the other, if not more, as counting himselfe worthy of greater honours; and while he despiseth honours e∣quall to his merits, hee falls into as great a degree of presumption as the other, and is guilty of contempt besides. This David understanding, although hee knew he could not fight with Goliah in armour, yet

(as Robert Abbat observes) to the end hee might not seeme to despise the honour the King offered him; he put on Sauls Armor, and tryed whether he could use it. Accinctus er go David gladio ejus super vestem suam, coe∣pit tentare si armatus posset incedere; non enim habebat con∣suetudinem, dixitque David ad Saul, non possum sic ince∣dere: and so hee laid away those Armes thorow im∣possibility, which if he had laid away thorough con∣tempt, it might have made him odious. Marcus Fa∣bius, when the Senate offered him the honour of Tri∣umph, refused to accept it, and thereby got the grea∣ter glory: whereof Livy speaking, saith, Adeo spreta in tempore gloria, interdum cumulatior redit: where the word In tempore is to be noted; as though hee would say, if he had refused it at some other time, he might be thought to refuse it out of pride, as accounting the ho∣nour too little for his merits: whereupon see (as Dio relates) that Caesar never refused any honour the Senate offered him, to the end they might not thinke him proud.

Another errour also hee falls into, that despiseth a Dignitie conferred upon him; and it is, that he shews himselfe unfit for it: so much Plutarch makes Numa Pompilius tell his father. And Junius Blaeus, when the great men who hated Vitellius, went about to make him Emperour, and he refused it; for so doing was thought unworthy.

Concerning the second: Whether he that is worthy of a Dignitie, and despiseth it not, ought when occa∣sion is offered, then to seek it, or else to stay till it be of∣fered.

In this case, I distinguish of Offices, which may ei∣ther be of Honour, or of Danger: In this last case, there is no doubt, a man ought not to stay till his Prince require him; but finding himselfe fit for it, he ought to offer himselfe; because Princes oftentimes in

such cases, would have their Subjects to understand their thoughts, without further expressing. Our Lord God had a purpose to send one to threaten the Israe∣lites, a perfidious Nation, and that used to stone and kill the Prophets, but not willing to impose the charge of this message upon any; hee seemed as though hee knew not whom to imploy: as it is written in Esay, Quem mittam, aut quis ibit nobis? Then Esay knowing perhaps by a Propheticall spirit, that this was an im∣ployment of danger, stayed not to be required, but rea∣dily offered himselfe, saying, Ecce ego, Mitte me: Where besides the reason alleadged before, there may an ex∣cellent lesson be learned, either little knowne, or little used now adayes in Courts: and it is, that Esay offe∣ring himselfe, spake in generall, Ecce ego, mitte me; as though he would say, Send me whither you please, I am ready to goe: But on the contrary, I have seene men offer their service unto the Prince, as if they would put a halter about his neck, standing upon termes; If you will bestow upon me such or such an honour, I will then serve you: and when offices are to be be∣stowed, set themselves downe for one of the chiefest; a fashion much used, but with little judgemen•…•…: be∣cause by so doing, they manifestly shew they seeke to serve themselves, and not the Prince. The obedience of Abraham was not of this sort: who, when our Lord God commanded him to goe out of his Countrey, say∣ing, Egredere de terratua, & de domo Patris tui, & veni in terram quam monstravero tibi; presently without ask∣ing whither hee should goe, hee put himselfe on his journey. So also it is written in the Apocalyps, where Saint John speaking of the Elect, saith, Et sequuntur ag∣num quocunque ierit. Whereupon the Prophet com∣pares himselfe to a beast, Vt jumentum factus sum apud te, A beast carryes that which his owner layes up on him, and doth that which his owner pleaseth; he is

not ashamed if hee carry Earth, and hee growes not proud if hee carries Gold: So ought the Servants of Princes to doe, goe whithersoever they command them: carry Earth, or carry Gold; that is, goe in im∣ployments great or small, as occasion is offered. This is the conceit of Saint Gregory, upon occasion of that place of Esay, Ecce ego, mitte me: and although he apply it to Preachers, yet I conceive it may not unfitly be ap∣plyed to our Discourse.

But to returne to our purpose, and come to the se∣cond case proposed before, and is a little more difficult; which is, if occasion be presented of bestowing an ho∣nour, whether a man ought to offer himselfe, and seek it; or otherwise stay and waite till the Prince appoint him?

Every one perhaps (at least the greatest part) will thinke it better, he should be required: First, because it is a signe of lesse ambition. Secondly, because when a Prince, of himselfe puts a servant in any imployment, hee is bound to defend him in it; if in any thing hee should erre. Thirdly, by the example of Moses, who when God said, he would make him Leader of his peo∣ple; not onely he stayed to be required, but he also re∣fused it: And in truth I was once of opinion, that from hence might bee gathered the reason why Esay (not being required) offered himselfe; and Moses be∣ing required, refused; and it is, because Esay knew he went in an imployment of danger, and Moses in an imployment of honour: whereupon it seemes that we also, in some o•…•…casions should stay to be required, and in some other offer our service.

Yet notwithstanding all these reasons, I should al∣wayes hold the contrary: and for the first reason, that it is lesse ambition; I know not what ambition can be greater, then to desire an honour, to deserve it, and yet looke to be required.

As for the second reason, which is, That the Prince is bound to defend him, if he commit any errou•…•…: I am easily able to prove the contrary, both by reason and example. Saul the sonne of Cis sought not after the Kingdome of Israell, but sought after his Fathers Asses; and meeting with Samuel, who had much talke with him about the Kingdome, hee shewed himselfe wholly averse from it: and if it had not beene that God commanded him expresly by the mouth of Sa∣muel, he would never have suffered himselfe to be an∣noynted King. Moses also in like manner feeding his sheep, without the least thought of governing the Israe∣lites: when God commanded him to undertake it, yet with great importunity he opposed it. So likewise Eli the Priest, not onely sought not to be Iudge over the people, and the Priesthood, but was indeed not ca∣pable in regard of his Familie: whereupon after some repulse he accepted it. Yet neither Saul, nor Moses, nor Eli, were the more excused of God, for having offices put upon them without their owne seeking: but the first committing a notable errour, after the victory of Achab, was by our Lord God (by the mouth of Samuel) deprived of his Kingdome, which was transferred up∣on David; and finally brought to a miserable end. And Moses, when water failed, had condigne punish∣ment, being denyed to gather the fruit, which in so ma∣ny yeares, and with so much sweat and labour he had sowed. And lastly Eli, for too much bearing with the faults of his Sonnes, was by our Lord God severely in∣deed, but yet justly punished.

These men therefore if they erre, not onely will not be excused, but will perhaps become more odious to the Prince, and be more severely punished for their doings. Whereupon our Lord God, (as Origen ob∣serves) when Saul left to governe after his Comman∣dements, denyed that hee had made him King; and

therefore hee saith in Osea, Ipsi regnaverunt, sed non ex me; Principes extiterunt, & non cognovl. The reason is, because they who are thus chosen, not onely erre in prejudice of themselves and their office, but in preju∣dice also of the Princes discretion; who shewes little judgement to make choyce of a person that is not fit for the charge: and so, he that should be a Protectour to defend the errour of another, shall need a protecti∣on himselfe for his owne errour. So as the Prince will have no place to say, that his Servant erred thorough ignorance, because by saying so, hee should presently shew himselfe of little judgement, to imploy a man whom hee did not know; and therefore the Servant must needs shew hee hath committed errours of ma∣lice, and consequently to have done the Prince disho∣nour; at which the Prince must needs take greater in∣dignation: and all these things being not found in him, that hath an Honour, or Office, upon his owne requi∣ring it, makes him more easily excused by the Prince, who erres in an imployment himselfe hath sought for, than him, who of the Princes owne motion is elected; and is therefore more obliged to demeane himselfe well in it.

Concerning the third reason brought of Moses, I say that we are not in his case; seeing Moses refused the Dignitie, not onely because it was a place of Ho∣nour; but because, and the more, because he thought himself not fit for it: and this is not that we speak of, presupposing a fitnesse alwayes. That he knew him∣selfe not to be fit is apparent; where he saith, Quis sum ego ut vadam ad Pharaonem, & educam filios Israel de Ae∣gypto? as though he should say, I am a worme, unfit for so great a dignitie, which afterwards hee shewes againe in Exodus; where answering God, hee saith, Obsecro Domine, Non sum Eloquens: as though he would say, this is an imployment that requires an Eloquent

man; and as for me I can scarce speake: whereby it manifestly appeares, that Moses refused it not for the greatnesse onely of the dignitie, which certainly hee esteemed highly; seeing in those words, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quem missurus es, he shewes it was an office fit for the Mes∣sias; but for this rather he refused it, because he knew himselfe unworthy, and not proportioned for such a place.

Whereupon, the reason why Esay offered himselfe without being required; and Moses being required, ex∣cused himself, and Ieremie would not have preached to the Hebrews, in my opinion is this; because Esay could not say, he was unfit; seeing, although at the first, till an Angell had purged him with a coale, he stood mute, bewailing his inabilitie to speake; Vae mihi quia tacui, quia vir pollutis labiis ego sum: yet after hee heard the Angell say, Et auferetur iniquitas tua, & peccatum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mundabitur; as thinking himselfe now fit for any im∣ployment whatsoever, since hee had his lips touched with a coale: that is, since he had God in his mouth, he made no stay, but offered himselfe presently. And Moses also, after he heard he should have this coale in his mouth, Et ero in ore tuo, he never offered to make any reply to God. So Ieremie at the first said, A, A, A, Domine Deus; Ecce nescio loqui, quia puer ego sum; but when he heard God say, Ne timeas à facie eorum, quia te∣cum ego sum, ut eruam te, dicit Dominus. Et mifit Dominus manum suam, & tetigit os meum, & dixit ad me; Ecce dedi verba mea in ore tuo: he also finding that coale in his mouth, prepared himselfe to performe the imploy∣ment which was commanded him. And now I con∣ceive the reasons alledged to the contrary, are suffici∣ently answered; whereby it is manifest, that it is bet∣ter to seeke a dignitie not deserving it, then deserving it to despise it: And again, that it is better, when one de∣serves it, and despiseth it not, to offer himselfe, then to have it put upon him.

Nihil in vulgo modicum, terrere ni paveant, Vbi pertimuerint, impune contemni.

That it is eafier to passe from one extreame to another, then from an extreame to the middle. The two and fortieth Discourse.

SEeing Vertue is scituate and consists in the midst, no marvell if the ignorant multitude, leaving one extreame, instead of comming to the middle, goe to the other extreame: whereupon Averroes said ex∣ceeding well, that a Coward becomes sooner bold, then valiant; Facili•…•… est à superabundantia ad defectum venire; & ab hoc ad iilam, quam ad medium. And a little after, Timidus enim facilius aliquid audax operabitur, quam forte. It is therefore no marvell, if the people passe from Timiditie to Boldnesse; seeing it passeth also from base servitude to proud domination: Aut servit humiliter, (saith Livy) aut superbo dominatur; Liberta∣tem quae media est, neque spernere satis, neque habere sci∣unt. It may be said by some, that I contradict my selfe; having said in another discourse, that it is a most diffi∣cult thing to goe from one extreame to another, with∣out passing by the middle first. And besides, a Text in Aristotle may be brought for it; where hee saith, Medium est in quod continue mutans prius devenit quam in ultimum: For answer whereunto, wee must know that there are two middles; one which is Secundum Mutationem; (give me leave to use these termes) and in this, it is more easie to goe from one extreame to the middle, then from one extreame to another: and this is that which Aristotle meanes in his Physicks, and I in my other Discourse. The second middle is called Per Abnegationem, and it is the middle, which is be∣tweene

Excesse and Defect; and in this, it is more ea∣sie to passe from one extreame to the other, then from one extreame to the middle: and this is the midst, I meane in this Discourse.

Faustis in Germanicum ominibus, & si vellet imperium promptos ostentavere.

That Germanicus could not carry himselfe in such sort, as to keepe Tiberius from suspecting him; and that he re∣fused the Empire for feare of death, and not out of goodnesse. The three and fortieth Discourse.

GErmanicus being invited by the Legions in Ger∣many, while they were in mutinie, to take upon him the Empire; not onely was displeased with it, but in great choller refused it; by occasion where∣of, I conceive it fit to examine, whether this act of Ger∣manicus were done out of goodnesse, or out of feare.

All Authors for the most part are of this opinion; that he refused the Empire, as one that was most free from any such ambition; seeing, having the love of the people, as by a thousand Demonstrations was appa∣rent; and withall an Army in his hand: It seemed an easie matter for him to have made himselfe Emperour, if he had affected it; and in truth, hee shewed partly his good intention, seeing, when it was offered him by the Army, he not onely came downe from the Tri∣bunall in a great chafe, but also fell presently into pray∣ses of Tiberius: Tunc à veneratione Tiberii orsus, flexit ad victorias triumphosque Tiberii, praecipuis laudibus cele∣brans, quae apud Germanias illis cum legionibus pulcherri∣ma feeisset. An excellent course in truth, and used also

by Saint Paul, and Saint Barnabas, who having done a miracle in Lystra; and seeing the people ready to offer sacrifices to them, as to Iupiter and Mercury; Vbi audie∣runt (as is written in the Acts) Apostoli Barnabas & Paulus, conscissis tunicis suis, exilierunt in turbas clamantes & dicentes: Viri quid haec facitis? & nos mortales su∣mus, similes vobis: and then fell presently to preach Christ Iesus.

Yet looking a little narrower into this Fact of Germa∣nicus; I am of opinion, he did it more for fear, then love; there being no doubt, but that men, although assured of succeeding in an Empire, yet to make that present which is future, they will not stick to hazard their very lives; a small present pleasure, being alwayes a stronger motive, then a much greater that is future: And the rea∣son is, because the will which hath good for its ob∣ject, in such manner, as the externall senses have theirs, is not moved with any, but that which is present. But it may be said unto me, that the future also may be pre∣sent, In esse cognito, & objectivo; to which I answer, that this Abstractive presence hath not the like force as the Intuitive hath; seeing the Intuitive even in future things is much more perfect then the Abstractive is; whereupon those Divines who hold, that future things are not present with God, but onely In esse cog∣nito; affirme, that the having them in esse cognito, is as much with him, as for us to have them present; and therefore this knowledge in God they call intuitive, grounding it upon a doctrine of Aristotle, in his Books De Anima; where he saith, if the Species of things could be conserved in such manner as they are, our sight would never be altered, although an object farre off were made to be present. Indeed, that which is good, or true, or appearing so, and is present, doth so much the more forcibly move, then that which is future; that many men for things present, which are not truely

good, but onely in appearance, lose the eternall good of the beatificall vision. So as it is no marvell, if many men, though in other things wise, have beene content with a doubtfull end to prevent a secure succession; as Absolon, and infinite others, of whom Histories are full. Whereupon I cannot chuse but thinke, that if Germanicus could have come securely to be Emperour, he would never have beene so angry at the Souldiers invitation: but because he knew it was not without infinite difficulty to be effected, he therefore shewed himselfe averse from harkning to it. And it availes not to say, hee had the Army of Germany in his power; seeing there wanted not Legions and Armies in Hun∣garie, in Sclavonia, and other places, that would have stood for Tiberius; and this no man knew better then Germanicus, as appeares; where speaking to the muti∣nous Army, he said, Non mihi uxor aut filius Patre & Republica cariores; sed illum quidem sua Majestas, Impe∣rium Romanum caeteri exercitus defendent. And of as little force is the second reason, for his being beloved of the people; seeing when there are Souldiers in a City, the people are able to doe little: as it happened to the people of Tarentum, who favoured the Carthage∣nians; to the people of Vicenza, who favoured the Ve∣netians; to the people of Milan, who favoured Francis∣co Sforsa; and whereof there may be found a thousand Examples.

Many other difficulties Germanicus should have met with; and this amongst others is not of least moment, that Augustus Caesar had declared Tiberius to bee his Successour; in which consideration, Bathsheba used meanes that David should declare Salomon for his Suc∣cessour; knowing, that whomsoever he should name, though he were not the eldest, yet should be accepted. Verumtamen Domine mi Rex, in te oculi respiciunt totius Israel, ut ni dices eis quis sedere debeat in solio tuo post te.

Which words Hugo Carenfis thus expounds; Ille quem volueris regnabit post te, & hunc quafi Regem sequetur populus, & non alium. Besides, Tiberius had gotten the hearts of the Praetorian Souldiers; and to make a Prince be accepted, it is a matter of great importance to come accompanied with the guard of the deceased King: and therefore the Holy Scripture in the Book of Kings, reckoning those up who went with Salomon, makes mention of the Captaine of the Guard with his Soul∣diers. D•…•…scendit Sadoc Sacerdos, & Nathan Propheta, & Banaias filius Iehojadae, & Cerethi, & Pheleti: Where∣upon David said a little before, to Sadoc and Banaia, sending them to Salomon; Tollite vobiscum servos Do∣mini vestri; meaning they should take with them the Souldiers of his Guard. To all these difficulties may be added the knowledge Germanicus had of Tiberius; to be a man of excellent vertue, and of singular wise∣dome; Maturum annis, spectatum bello; which things all together, made the difficulty so great, that I cannot chuse but beleeve, Germanicus refused the Empire, as Claudius Pompeianus did, when it was offered him; Sed ille recusavit, quia Imperatorem Pertinacem videbat. So Scipio the Carthaginian, when he was proclaimed King by the Army of Spaine, would not accept it; Quia Rome intolerabile nomen Regium erat. It is therefore no marvell, that Germanicus entred into choller upon it; seeing to ascend to the Empire, is a thing that requires two extreames; either to shew himselfe desirous, and at the same time to be neare at hand for procuring it; or else, to shew himselfe wholly averse from it, not onely in effects, but in desire; because they who stand farre off in effects, and neare hand with desire; easily in a little time come to ruine. Esse privatis cogitationibus progressum, (saith Tacitus) & prout velint plus minusve, sumi ex fortuna imperium cupientibus nihil medium inter summa aut praecipitia. Christ our Saviour was as farre

from desiring to be a worldly King, as could be; and therefore being called to be a King by the people, hee presently got himselfe farre off from the multitude, be∣cause his houre being not yet come, in which hee meant to expose himselfe to die; hee knew it stood him upon, to avoyde such apparence: and more (as Robert Abbat observes) our Lord Christ never spake of his being a King, till the time of his Passion; knowing that the very name of a King carries death with it. If Germanicus had done thus, after he had quieted the mu∣tinies of the Army; had returned to Rome, and had left the Legions behind, that had called him Emperour, he had then freed Tiberius from suspition; who un∣derstanding the inclination of the Army, could not chuse but be in continuall feare, least the Empire should be taken from him: Whereupon, knowing the danger he stood in, he was not willing that Ger∣manicus should conquer Germany; least having once made himselfe Lord of that Country, he should doe as Caesar did, having conquered France. Seeing victori∣ous Armies are formidable and invincible things, and in this case the more; Germanicus being much more like to Caesar, then to Cato; the one, (as Salust saith) a∣spiring to the Empire; the other, desirous to preserve the Common-wealth: betweene themselves, both like and unlike; like in Age, in Eloquence, in noble∣nesse of minde; and finally in glory: but unlike in this, that Caesar made himselfe famous by his services and curtesies; Cato by sincerity and holinesse of life: Caesar got him a name, with being gentle and merci∣full; Cato by being severe and sterne. He by giving, by helping, by pardoning, came to be famous: This by finding fault with Donatives, and by not pardo∣ning any, nor so much as himselfe, came to be adored: Cato was the scourge of the wicked; and Caesar, the re∣fuge. Caesar was commended for affabilitie, and Cato

for constancy; and because Caesar aspired to the Em∣pire, and Cato was alwayes a good Cittizen; we may therefore say, that the manners of Cato ought to be imi∣tated of those that are not ambitious; and the manners of Caesar, of those that are: and therefore seeing Ger∣manicus (as may be gathered by his life) had all those manners and fashions of Caesar; I cannot but con∣clude, but that his ambition was to aspire to the Em∣pire. So as indeed, hee was not well advised to take such courses, and give Donatives to the Souldiers; Quibus nisi ab Imperatore, neque praemia accipere par esset, as Tacitus in the second of his Annals saith: where we may see, that Tiberius knew well of what great impor∣tance Donatives are to corrupt the Souldiers. Second∣ly, Germanicus was not well advised, to procure the ap∣plause of the Legions, with such artifice as he did; and then mannage it onely with curtesie and love, which perhaps I should not blame, if hee had beene Lord of Rome: but seeing not onely he was not Lord, but was suspected of him that was Lord; hee should not have used the Souldiers with such plausiblenesse as hee did. And it availes not to say, that if he would do any good in Germany, it behoved him to procure the love of the Army, seeing he might have done as much good with feare, as hee did with love; and never have put the Prince into jealousie: and Generalls in warre proceed and prosper, as well with the one as the other. Scipio Africanus prospered with love, and Hannibal with feare. The course of Scipio will alwayes doe well, where the Commander is Prince; at least, if he can a∣void contempt; a companion oftentimes of mildnesse: and indeed, Scipio by his mildnesse fell so farre in con∣tempt, that if at last he had not turned his course to a way of feare, he had beene in danger to bee utterly undone.

I have the more willingly used the example of Scipio

in this case, because indeed in many things hee was most like Germanicus: As Scipio was sent into Africk, where his father had mannaged the warre before; so Germanicus was sent into Germany, and might follow the steps of his father Drusus, who had beene there before. Scipio was a young man of most goodly pre∣sence, and Germanicus a young man of most beautifull aspect. The one, and the other, of most pleasing carri∣age towards confederates; towards friends & enemies. Against Germanicus the Legions in Germany rebelled, upon the death of Augustus; against Scipio the Armies in Spaine rebelled, upon the false report of his death: both of them tooke the same course for reducing the Armies to obedience, and both of them were blamed for it: Germanicus by Tiberius, as a corrupter of the Army; Scipio by Fabius Maximus, for the like; Natum eum ad corrumpendam Disciplinam arguere; sic in Hispania plus propter seditionem militum quam bellum amissum. Each of them was more able to commit no errours themselves, then to correct the errours committed by others. Both of them victorious in battailes; and as Scipio at last made the Senate suspect hee meant to make himselfe Lord of Rome; so Germanicus made Tiberius suspect he meant to make himselfe Emperour of Rome. To Scipio the Army offered the Empire, and hee refused it; to Germanicus also the Army offered it, and he with great indignation likewise refused it. Scipio after all his vi∣ctories died in exile, thorough the ungratefulnesse of the Senate; and Germanicus died out of Rome, thorough the ungratefulnesse and practises of Tiberius. To the one and the other was sent a Successour, to the end they should not finish the warre: and if Germanicus were in this not well advised, as I have shewed before; and perhaps had a meaning to make himselfe Prince; certainly Scipio was not much better advised; of whom that Tribune in Livy saith, Dictatorem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 consuli non

legatum in Provincia fuisse, neque ob aliam rem eo profe∣ctum, quam ut id quod Hispaniae, Galliae, Siciliae, Africae jampridem persuasum esset hoc Graeciae, Asiaeque; & omni∣bus ad Orientem versis regibus gentibusque appareret; unum hominem caput columenque Imperii Romani esse. These are not wayes for men to use, that have no o∣ther end then to be good Citizens; rather, their cour∣teous carriage towards the Souldiers, was done with a minde to make use of them in the Citie; as Livy in another place shewes: Scipionum nomini auspiciisque om∣nes assuetos quos secum in patriam ad meritum triumphum deducere velitis, quos consulatum petenti, velut si omnium communis agatur honos, ad futuros speret. It is therefore no marvell to see so great likenesse between these two Captaines, seeing Germanicus tooke Scipio for his ex∣ample to imitate; as may be seene in the voyage hee made in Aegypt: Sine milite incedere, pedibus intectis, & pari cum Graecis amictu; Publii Scipionis 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quem eadem factitavisse apud Siciliam, quamvis flagrante adhuc Poenorum bello, accepimus. Yet in matter of for∣tune they were something unlike; for Scipio was able to settle, and I may say to finish his victory, which Germanicus was not suffered to doe: but if the warre which the Romans had with the Carthagenians, had beene Ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum, po∣tius quam cupidine proferendi Imperii; as that of Ger∣manicus was; I make no doubt but Scipio would have beene as little suffered to finish the warre, as Germani∣cus was. Now if we aske which of them deserved most praise, and was most worthy of commendation; I account Germanicus so much worthy of more, as he was able in so great vertues to be like Scipio, in a time so unlike; and under a Tyrant Prince: and though by a little unadvisednesse hee fell to be suspected of Tibe∣rius, yet he is more to be excused then Scipio was; see∣ing a Tyrant Prince is sooner put into suspition, then a

well-govern'd Common-wealth. And therefore Cor∣bulo (as Tacitus relates) being hindred by a Letter from Claudius, for going forward with his enterprise; called the ancient Romane Captaines happy: Jam Castra in hostili solo molienti Corbuloni hae litterae redduntur; ille re subita, quamquam multa simul offunderentur, metus ex Impe∣ratore; contemptio ex Barbaris; ludibrium apud socios; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aliud prolocutus, quam beatos quondam Duces Romanos.

Periculosa severitas, flagitiosa largitio: seu nihil militi; seu omnia concedentur, in ancipiti Republica.

That it is a hard matter to settle the Insurrection of an Army. The foure and fortieth Discourse.

BEing a little after to examine the wayes, how to settle and compose the Insurrection of an Army; I will in this place, by occasion of this Text, only say, That to grant them all their demands, is dange∣rous; because they will make it but a steppe to make greater demands. The Ianizaries made an Insurrecti∣on against Amurath the Great Turke, demanding the head of Ebraim Beglerbey of 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and the Great Turkes entirest friend: and when Amurath gave con∣sent to their demand, they then fell to demand a thou∣sand other extravagant things; and put the Great Turke into no small danger. On the other part, to grant them nothing they demand is as bad: as that, which exasperates them in such a degree, that they can hardly be ever pacified after; as in the case of Galba was seene. All this we have now said, is expressed in Polybius, by a most excellent similitude; whose words as most

worthy to be read, I have thought good to set down at large, as they are translated into Latine, Si quis haec recte intueatur (he speakes of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Army being in mutiny) non dubitet affirmara 〈◊〉〈◊〉 modo corpora hominum, & quaedam in illis ulcera, ita 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉, ut sanari nullo modo possint, sed id longe magis humanis animis accidere; ut enim in ulceribus evenit, ut si illis me∣dicamentum curandi gratia adhibeas, ulcus ipsum vi medi∣caminis augescit, si vero curam ejus negligas, longe sua ip∣sius natura extenditur, neque prius definit, quam omne sub∣jectum corpus corruptum labefactumque 〈◊〉〈◊〉; ita animis quoque consimiles interdum morbi ac tabes accidunt, ut nul∣lum ex reliquis ani•…•…libus homine 〈◊〉〈◊〉 atque efferacius fiat, cui si interdum veniam aut impunitatem aliquam con∣cesseris, aut aliter benignitate cum prosequutus fueris, id omne dolum fraudemque existimans, deterior 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 beneficum longe magis infidus; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vero te contra opposueris, nihil est adeo durum, crudele, nefarium, quod non facile aggrediatur, laudem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 temeritatem temeritatem existimans, donec ad extremum omnino, efferatus animus humanam naturam exuat.

Eo in metu arguere Germanicum omnes; quod non ad superiorem exercitum pergeret; ubi ob∣sequia, & contra rebelles auxilium, satis superque mis∣sione & pecunia & mollibus consultis peccatum; vel si vilis ipsi salus, cur filium parvulum, cur gravidam conjugem inter furentes, & omnis humani juris vi∣olatores haberet? Illos saltem uno & Rei∣publicae redderet.

In what kinde of affaires, it is fit to carry their Wives with them. The five and fortieth Discourse.

UPon this passage, there are two Discourses seem to offer themselves: The first, whether it be fit for Governours to carry their Wives with them, and consequently whether Germanicus did well, to have his Wife and Children in the Army. The se∣cond, how insurrections of Armies may be quieted.

Beginning with the first, I say, that Officers may be sent by the Prince, in three kindes of imployment: in governments, in war, or in Embassages. If they go to be Governours, it is then a fair course, and far from being dangerous, as was agreed upon in the Senate, in favour of Valerius Messalina against Caecina, that they might take their Wives with them: Neque enim ut olim obsideriurbem bellis, aut Provincias hostiles esse. But yet in my opinion, it is fit in this matter to proceed with distinction, because if we speak simpliciter, I should thinke it better, they should not leade their Wives with them, as those who for the most part can do little good, by reason of their unskilfulnesse in affaires, and may do much hurt by reason of their avarice and pride; whereupon as Caecina well said, there seldom came any appeales against the Governours of Pro∣vinces,

for oppressing the people, but they were more against the Women than the men, Cogitarent ipsi quo∣ties repetundarum aliqui arguerentur, plura uxoribus ob∣jectari. To this may be added, that by reason of their weaknesse, they give ear to the most wicked of the Province, they keep a Court of themselves, give au∣dience, divide Tribunals, and cause a thousand other errours, which by the foresaid Caecina are well expres∣sed, His statim adhaerescere deterrimum quemque Provin∣cialium, ab his negotia suscipi, transigi, duorum egressus co∣li, duo esse Praetoria, and that which followes: where∣upon I have reason to believe, that the antient Ro∣mans made the Laws, that it should not be lawfull for Governours of Provinces, to carry their Wives with them, not so much for the danger they incurred, by be∣ing in Countries of little safety, as least the people newly come under the Roman Empire, should through the avarice and pride of the Women be pro∣voked to rebell. The reason that Valerius brings to beat down that of Caecina, is this, that to charge Wo∣men for doing ill Offices in a Province, is but a weak argument, seeing it is their Husbands fault, who al∣low their Wives to take more upon them than is fit: Frustra nostram igna•…•…iam alia ad vocabula transferri, nam viri in eo culpam, si foemina modum excedat: and therefore Sara in the holy Scripture knowing this, when Agar contested against her with proud termes, she complained not of her, but of Abraham, as knowing it to be the mens fault, if their Wives grow insolent. This reason makes a fair shew, but it clear∣eth not the difficulty, seeing it makes no matter, when a Province is ill governed, whether it be long of the Man, or of the Woman, so long as it is done; where∣upon I should thinke it better, to provide for things before they be done, according to the advice of Agri∣cola, who Officiis & administrationibus potius non pecca∣turos,

quam damnare cum peccassent: then to watch with danger when they shall be done; and consequently, if it may be, to leave their Wives at home: and the ra∣ther, seeing Princes commonly send persons of age to be Governours, and consequently easie to be led by their Wives, as in another Discourse is shewed: yet it is true, as I said before, that I would make an Excepti∣on to this Rule, when Women are judicious and very wise, for then no doubt, they may be of great assi∣stance in the Government. The other reason which Valerius brings, that Wives are a recreation to their Husbands, and make them the better able to bear the labours of their Government, is a meer mockery, see∣ing men that take upon them such charges, should have no thought but of the Princes service, nor take pleasure in any thing but in discharging their places.

But be it as it will, it imports us little for the present: this at least is clear, that in imployments of war, it is never fit to carry their Wives with them, and there∣fore the Romans (as Caecina reports) would have them when they went into forreigne Countries, where there was danger of war, to go alwayes without their Wives, Haud enim frustra placitum olim, ne foeminae in so∣cios, aut gentes externas traherentur, inesse mulierum co∣mitatui quae pacem luxu, bellum formidine morentur: Therefore as Aristotle saith well, speaking against Pla∣to, Women in the warres are good for nothing but to be a let, and reckoned inter impedimenta, which is then the more to be observed, when they go with an Army that may be likely to mutiny, and therefore when the Army of Germanie fell to mutiny, Germanicus at last perceived what a mischief it was, to have Women a∣mongst seditions: and who knowes but he forbore to use discipline and force against them, onely for the Womens sake? We may then conclude, it was not well done of him, to carry his Wife with him in the

Army. Our Lord God, Maker and Governour of all things, knew the Israelites would rebell against Moses, whereupon having made him his Captain Generall; and he upon the way with his Wife Sephora, God met him, and threatned to kill him. Cumque esset in itinere, in diversorio occurrit Dominus, & volebat occidere eum: which Saint Austin interprets thus, that God made this shew, because Moses led his Wife with him, as not being convenient, when a man goes about great affaires, he should be troubled with Women, and therefore he saith, Forsitan in hoc loco possum intelligere quod displicuerit Deo, quare Moses tanta mirabilia fact•…•…∣rus, uxoris impedimentum secum ducere vellet in Aegyptum.

But if novv he go upon Embassage, then if the Women be but mean of understanding, let them never be car∣ried, as those that may do much hurt; but if they be discreet and wise, it will do well to take them along, as those that may do much good, because one of the chief things an Embassadour is to look to, is to under∣stand and finde out secrets, and none fitter to finde them out than discreet Women, seeing oftentimes, ei∣ther Senators in Common-wealths, or Princes in their Kingdomes, or their Officers and Secretaries, dis∣cover unadvisedly to their Wives many secrets of State, which they afterward being in company with Embassadours Wives, (to shew their intolligence in great matters) easily blab out again, and are apt to reveal, and in this manner in some Courts of Italie, matters of great consequence have been boulted out by some discreet Embassadours. And how came Tibe∣rius to know that Augustus went to visit Agrippa Post∣humus in the Island of Pianosa, but by this meanes? For Augustus having Fabius Maximus in his company, he unadvisedly told it to his Wife Martia, and Martia as unadvisedly told it to Livia, and Livia to Tiberius, which was the cause of Fabius his death, and as it is

thought of Augustus his too. Quippe rumor incesserat, paucos ante menses, Augustum electis consciis, & comite uno Fabio Maximo Planafiam vectum, ad visendum Agrip∣pam, multas 〈◊〉〈◊〉 utrinque lachrymas, & figna cha•…•…itatis, spem{que} ex eo fore, ut juyenis penatibus uvi redder etur. Quod Maximum uxori Martiae aperuisse, illam Liviae, C. Navum id. Caesari.

We may then conclude, that mens secrets come ea∣sily to be known by the meanes of Women, and there∣fore Tyrants (as Aristotle saith) allow oftentimes great Authority to Women, to the end, they may reveal their Husbands secrets.

Satis superque missione & pecunia & mollibus consultis peccatum.

Whether Germanicus did well to grant so many things to the Army being in mutiny, what other course he might have taken; lastly, that in diverfity of times, and upon diverfity of occafions divers courses are to be taken. The six and fortieth 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

Germanicus returning from collecting the taxes, found the Legions in mutiny, demanding that the veteran souldiers might have leave to go home, and to have their pay increased, and also to have the Legacy left them by Augustus, and he to quiet them, yeelded to many of their demands, for which he was by many much blamed, as in the vvords here alleaged appeares. By occasion vvhereof, vve purpose to examine vvhat courses are fit to be taken, vvhen Ar∣mies are in Rebellion.

I say then, that all mutinies and insurrections re∣quire not one kinde of Remedy, but according to the

divers times in vvhich they happen, to the divers occa∣sions upon vvhich they happen, and lastly, to the di vers Captaines under vvhom they happen, a divers re∣medy is to be applied. For if the Generall be a man of vvhom the Army stands in avve, he may expose him∣selfe to any danger vvithout any danger, and have all things succeed vvell. The Macedonians in Afia, being quite tired with the War, and far from their Coun•…•…ry, fell to mutiny under Alexander Magnus, standing up∣on the like termes as they in Germany did, where Cica∣trices ex vulneribus, verberum notas exprobrant, so here, Omnes fimul missionem postulare coeperunt, deformia or a cicatricibus, canitiemque capitum ostentantes: whereup∣on Alexander calling the souldiers together, to hear him speak, no sooner ended his speech, but he thrust into the midst of those infuriated beasts: and caused the most insolent of them to be taken, and not a man of them durst offer to make resistance, Defiluit deinde (saith Quintus Curtius) frendens de Tribunali, & in medium armatorum agmen se immifit, notatos quoque qui ferocissime oblocuti erant, fingulos manu corripuit, nec ausos repugnare, tredecim asservandos custodibus corporis tradidit, quis crederet saevam paulo ante concionem obtor∣puisse subito metu? & cum ad supplicium videret trahi, nihil ausos graviora quam caeteros. And thus this brave Resolution in a Generall of whom they stood in fear, sufficed to pacifie this great insurrection. But if a Captain be onely loved and not feared, let him never put himselfe upon such adventure, or thinke in such sort to cyment the matter, for it will undoubtedly be his death; whereupon we see that Germanicus though he exposed himselfe to no danger, yet was not far from losing his life, as by reading Tacitus we may perceive. And the reason of this difference is, because as Choller overcomes Love, so Fear overcomes Choller, which (as Aristotle saith) being with hope of Revenge, as far

as is possible, that Hope is taken away by Fear; and in the place of it enters Sorrow, as Avicen excellently shews in his Book De Anima. And for this cause also it happens, that more Armies mutiny under Cap∣taines that are loved, than under Captaines that are feared, as was seen in the Army of Alexander the Great, and in that of Annibal, Captaines that were fea∣red, the contrary in the Army of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and in that of Scipio, Captaines that were loved.

It is very clear, that Germanicus was never able to take any of these violent Resolutions, yet I commend not the course he took to pacifie the mutiny of his Army, by yeelding to them in so many things, because being suspected of the Prince, any course had been fit∣ter for him than this, by which he corrupted military discipline, and by giving of his own, he as it were bought the Army, and therefore where Tiberius heard, in what manner he had pacified them, it troubled him not a little; Nuntiata ea, Tiberium laetitia curaque adfe∣cere, gaudebat oppressam seditionem, sed quod largiendis pecuniis & missione festinata, favorem militum quaesivisset, bellica quoque gloria Germanici augebatur. And so much more as there wanted not other wayes to have appea∣sed the sedition, and the first way for him being so well beloved, had been that which in matters of love is of such force, and that is, by making them jealous he would leave them, and go to some other Army, shewing how little he regarded this mutinous Army; and in truth, if any notice might have been taken of such conditionall propositions, I verily thinke, the sedi∣tion by it selfe only would have bin appeas•…•…d; and there are two things that move me to thinke so; One, the Example of Alexander the Great, who in a mutiny making shew as though he regarded not his Macedon souldiers, by taking Persians for the Guard of his Bo∣dy, and doing them other Honours, all the Macedonians

prostrated themselves, and in most humble manner sued unto him, whereof Quintus Curtius saith, Post∣quam vero cognitum est, Perses ducatus datos, barbaros in varios ordines distributos, atque Macedonica iis imposita nomina, se vero ignominiose penitus rejectos esse, non jam amplius conceptum animis dolorem perferre potuerunt, sed concursu in Regiam facto, interiori duntaxat retenta tu∣nica, arma ante januam, poenitentiae signum projecerunt, ac prae foribus stantes, intromitti se, sibique ignosci suppliciter atque flentes orabant, utque Rex suppliciis suis potius satu∣ret se, quam contumeliis, ipsos nisi venia impetrata, non discessuros. See here the fruit of jealousie. The second thing that makes me beleeve, this way would have succeeded well with Germanicus, is the Example we have, in the very mutiny it selfe of the same Army, wherein when the granting them so many things, would not yet pacifie the sedition, then Germanicus (not to this end, but to set them out of danger) was sending away his Wife and Children, to be out of the reach of this tumultuous Army, which the soul∣diers perceiving, and thereupon growing jealous that any other strange people should keep their Cap∣taines Wife safer than Roman Legions; to the end, he should not send her away, they presently grew quiet, Sed nihil aequè flexit (saith Tacitus) quam invidia in Treueros; orant, obsistunt, rediret, maneret; pars Agrip∣pinae occursantes, plurimi ad Germanicum regressi. And if the departing of his Wife onely could prevail so much, what jealousie would they have had at the de∣parting of their beloved Captain? certainly, without making them any other promises, this alone would have pacified the sedition: and in case this jealousie alone had not been sufficient, he might then have gone to the other Army, and sent messengers to let them know, that if they delivered not up into his hands the heads of the Rebellion, he would come and cut them

in pieces good and bad, a thing which without doubt would have done much good, as was seen, when at last he was forced to use such termes with his soul∣diers under Caeciua, At Germanicus quanquam contracto exercitu, & parata in defectores ultione, dandum adhuc spatium ratus, si recenti exemplo 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ipsi consulerent, prae∣mittit literas ad Caecinam, venire se valida manu, ac ni supplicium in malos praesumant, usurum promiscua caede. This once heard by the souldiers, they presently cut them all in pieces that were guilty of the mutiny: and if this way yet would not have been sufficient, seeing this tumult was grown out of idlenesse, and he was not willing to use violence, he might have taken the other Army, and put himselfe in the way to go against the Enemy; this course Caesar took, who when the Army in France rebelled, he took one Le∣gion which he specially favoured with him, and gave leave to the mutinous Legions to go home to Rome, which once seen, there vvas not a souldier that left not presently his mutinying & follovved him: a most easie vvay, for if any thing hinder an Army that is in mu∣tiny (I mean not out of hatred) from pacifying and appeasing, it is a fear they have to be punished, vvhich fear ceaseth as soon as they are taken to go against the Enemy, every one hoping by some notable deed to cancell the blot of their Rebellion, and therefore as soon as those first Legions vvere quieted, they pre∣sently demanded to be led against the Enemy: Pu∣niret noxios, ignosceret lapsis, & duceret in hostem. Whereupon we see that after such mutinies, Armies commonly shew more valour than at any time be∣fore, as Livie shews in a thousand places; and this Germanicus knew full well, who after the slaughter the souldiers of Caecina had committed, led them pre∣sently out against the Enemy. Truces etiam tum ani∣mos cupido involat •…•…undi in hostem, piaculum furoris, nec

aliter posse placari Commilitonum manes, quasi si pectoribus impiis honesta vulnera accepissent; sequitur ardorem mi∣litum Caesar. And further, if Germanicus were not wil∣ling to depart from the Army, being in mutiny; yet the mutiny, having beene caused by a sudden motion, he needed not have beene so hasty, to seeke the appeasing of so new a mutiny, but might have given the Souldi∣ers deliberation; and then reason taking place, hee might without doubt have quieted them at his plea∣sure. Our Lord Christ in a parable, would not have the tares to be rooted out with the corne, as long as it was in blade and greene; but appointed to stay, till they were dry; and then dividing them, cast the tares into the fire: so should he doe with Armies that are in mutiny, that seekes to preserve them, and not to de∣stroy them all.

He had another excellent way, and most wor∣thy for a Generall to follow; and it was, to threaten, that whosoever did not follow him, should be coun∣ted a Rebell; and as a Rebell, should be proceeded a∣gainst; a way of exceeding great force, and especially in tumults, where there is not a head; and where they are all equally stub borne, and every one feares for him∣selfe, as was seene in Saul; who being declared King, was yet not followed, but onely of some few; where∣upon, an occasion falling out for relieving the Citie of Jah, to the end the whole Army should follow him, he caused two Oxen to be cut in pieces, and be spread about all the borders of Israell; threatning, that who∣soever did not follow him, should have all his heards of cattell cut in pieces, as those Oxen were: Quicunque non exierit, & secutus fuerit Saul, & Samuel; sic fiet bobus ejus: and where the Israelites before would not all follow him, now out of feare of the particular punish∣ment, there was not a man that did not follow him. Invasit ergo (it followes in the holy Text) Timor Domi∣ni

populum, & egressi sunt quas•…•… vir unus. Now that it had beene easie for Germanicus, by taking this course, to have quieted the tumult, is very evident; seeing Menius, onely by this course, brought one of those Le∣gions to returne backe into their Quarters; where finding a particular punishment was designed, where before they had a purpose to kill him; now every one readily was content to follow him: Raptum vexillum ad ripam, & fi quis agmine discessit pro desertore fore, cla∣mitans, reduxit in Hyberna turbidos; & nihil ausos.

Germanicus also might have used another excellent way; and it is, he should have caused some trusty Cen∣turion or Souldier, to declare to this mutinous multi∣tude, the danger into which they were fallen, and the errour they had committed; for such people common∣ly give credit to men of such ranke, as was seene in Iu∣lius Arufpex; who shewing to the people of Germany the danger they should incurre, by rebelling against the Romans; he easily quieted them, though he had Iu∣lius Valentinus that opposed him. At Iulius Aruspex 〈◊〉〈◊〉 primoribus Remorum vim Romanam pacisque bona disser∣tans; & sumi bellum etiam ab ignavis, strenuissimi cu∣jusque periculo geri; jamque super caput Legiones, sapien∣tissimum quemque reverentia, fideque; juniores periculo ac metu continuit, & Valentini animum laudabant, confilium 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sequebantur. So Cerealis also speaking to the Treviri after that manner, appeased them; as by the pro∣cesse of that Oration he makes in Tacitus, may be seene. The very same manner Drusus used with the Legions of Illyricum; imploying one Clement a Centurion, in grace with the Souldiers, for his meanes to pacifie that sedition. Accitur Centurio Clemens, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 qui alii bonis artibus grati in vulgus; in Vigiliis, stationibus; custodiis portarum se inserunt; spem offerunt; metum intendunt. And that this way would have beene available also to Germanicus, is evident; seeing Caecina making use here∣of,

with two of those Legions; he so wrought them, that they spared not to punish the chiefe of the sedi∣tion.

Another way also he might have used; and that was, to have pretended himself their Captain in the Sedition: or if not himselfe, (which in many respects was not fit for Germanicus) at least, to have caused some other prin∣cipall man to feigne himself to be of their opinion; and all other remedies fayling, I suppose this might have stood Germanicus in great stead; because men common∣ly give great credit to their counsels, who are interes∣sed in the matter, as beleeving they speak sincerely. For this cause, David caused his trusty friend Chusci the Ara∣chite, to feigne himselfe of Absaloms side; to the end he might hinder the counsell of Achitophel, and it happily succeeded. So Gamaliel standing amongst the Priests, was a meanes to save Peters life. Spurinna being in Placentia, for defence of that Citie; and seeing the Soul∣diers bent to fight with the Vitellians, who farre excee∣ded them in number, and in all advantages; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 himselfe to be of their opinion: seeing them in such a tumult, and thereupon leading them forth, hee easily made them see their errour, and perceive the danger; and shewing them good reasons, he reduced them to obedience. Fit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 alienae comes Spurinna; primo coactus, mox velle 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quo 〈◊〉〈◊〉 authoritatis inesset confiliis, si seditio mitesceret. And a little after, Ipse po∣stremo Spurinna, non tam culpam exprobrans, quam ratione ostendens, relictis exploratoribus, caeteros Placentiam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 minus turbidos, & imperia accipientes. The Nolani also, seeing the people bent to take part with Hanniball, seigned themselves to be of the same opinion; and by this means gained time till Marcellus came: Vbi Sena∣tum metus accepit, si palam contra tenderent, resisti mul∣titudini concitatae non posse; clam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dilationem mali inveniunt: placere enim fibi defectionem ad Annibalem si∣mulant.

This in truth is an exquisite way, when a peo ple cannot be mastered, then to second them; because, being not suspected, they may doe much good: an example hereof we have in the first booke of Tacitus, of that Clement the Centurion; who speaking to the Army, said not, doe you, and say you; but let us doe, and let us say; thereby to shew he was interessed as well as they; Quanquam filium Imperatoris obsidebimus, quis certaminum finis? Percennioni & Vibuleno sacra∣mentum dicturi sumus?

Seeing then Germanicus had so many wayes, availe∣able to appease the Insurrection, and he made use of the worst; I cannot but think he was either very unad∣vised, or very malicious.

Having now distinguished the Captaines; it re∣maines (for performance of my offer) to distinguish the occasions and the times. The occasions then, may in part be just, or wholly unjust: Of the first kinde, are want of Pay, want of Victuals, and such like; and in such insurrections, it is necessary, if hee can, to give the Souldiers satisfaction; if hee cannot, to shew at least that he is not any cause of the want: and if it be in default of Victuals, the Captaine shall doe well to eate in publike of the same meates that others eate; to shew, that hee himselfe suffers as well as the Army: This way hath often beene used, and alwayes with good successe. The occasions that are unjust, are wont to happen, either out of some sudden anger, upon de∣nyall of some particular demand; or else out of ha∣tred, and a resolution not to serve. In the first case, it is no doubt, more easie to pacifie an Insurrection, then in the second; because hatred is much more durable and incurable, then anger is; as that which growes from a more durable occasion then anger doth: that growing out of a habit, and this out of passion; and as a passion passeth away sooner then a disposition, or a

habit; so anger is sooner passed over and gone, then ha∣tred: Besides, it is also much the worse, because 〈◊〉〈◊〉 wisheth an enemy evill, as it is evill; where hee that is angry wisheth an enemy evill, but not as evill: but Sub ratione boni, (to use this terme) esteeming the evill to be just, as being vindicative; and seeing it is mani∣fest, (according to Saint Thomas) that to wish evill un∣der the colour of good, hath lesse evill in it then to wish evill simply: it followes, that hatred is not on∣ly of more continuance; but of a worse condition also then anger is. In the first case then, that is of anger; a valiant Captaine shall either by temporizing, or else by bold opposition, which is indeed more becoming a generous spirit, easily appease them. The Legions in Germany, under Flaccus Ordeonius, were in mutiny, and would kill the Captaine for putting a Souldier in prison: whereupon Vocula, Legat of a Legion, being a bold and couragious Captaine, gave order the priso∣ner should be put to death; which so affrighted the Souldiers, that they were presently quiet: for indeed, it is the nature of common people, if they feare not o∣thers, they will make others feare them; but if they feare, they will be as quiet as Lambes; and a childe may beat them: according to that place of Tacitus; Terrere ni paveant, ubi pertimuerint, impune contemni. And sometimes they love a man the better for making them feare, as admiring the greatnesse of his spirit: whereupon we see, that those Legions, after that Vocu∣la had put the Souldier to death, would have him to be their Captaine: Conscendit Tribunal Vocula (saith Tacitus) mira constantia; prehensumque militem ac vocife∣rantem duci ad supplicium jussit. Et dum mali pavent, op∣timus quis que jussis paruere. Exin consensu Ducem Vocu∣lam poscentibus, Flaccus summam rerum ei permisit. Ano∣ther time those Legions mutinying again, tooke that Flaccus Ordeonius and bound him; but upon the com∣ming

of Vocula, they presently unbound him: and Vo∣cula meaning to punish this disorder, forbore for a time, till their choler were over; by which means the day following, he eafily put to death the Authours of the mutiny. Is postera die, authores seditionis morte affe∣cit; tanta illi exercitui diverfitas inerat, licentiae patientiae∣que.

But if the occasion grow from hatred, and from a resolution to serve no longer; I then see not any way there is to pacifie it: because if they demand Pay, or such like, they doe it to this end; that being denied it, they may have colour for their insurrection; and to grant them that which they demand, is to give them occasion to aske afterward things impossible. This very thing happened to Flaccus; who having sent cer∣taine companies of Batavians towards Rome; and they by the way receiving Letters from Civilis, fell to de∣mand a thousand impertinencies: of which, when Flaccus had granted them a part; they then tooke oc∣cafion to demand farre greater. Iisdem diebus, Batavo∣rum & Caninefatium cobortes, cum jussu Vitelli in urbem pergerent; missus à Civile nuntius assequitur. Intumuere statim superbia, ferociaque & pretium itineris Donativum, duplex stipendium: augeri equitum numerum, promissa sanè à Vitellio postulabant, non ut assequerentur, sed causam sedi∣tioni. Et Flaccus multa concedendo, nihil aliud effecerat, quam ut acrius exposcerent, quae sciebant negaturum. The like befell the Carthagenians, whose rebelling Souldi∣ers finding many of their demands granted, they be∣came more insolent then before: for it is not alwayes true, that Humilitie is opposite to Pride; but some∣times, and particularly in this case, Humility makes the Pride the greater: such men thinking, that whatso∣ever is granted them, is not granted them out of hu∣manity, but out of feare; and thereupon taking heart, they grow to demand farre greater matters. This,

those Senatours in Livy meant to inferre, when they said, Certum habere majores quoque si divinassent, conce∣dendo omnia, non mitiorem in se plebem, sed asperiorem; alia ex aliis iniquiora postulando, cum prima impetrasset. And Tacitus also, when in the life of Agricola, he saith, Nihil profici patientia; nifi ut graviora, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex faoili tolerantibus imperentur. Whereupon against such, there is no better way then to shew teeth; (as the Italian Proverbe is) which is, to be rough with them: seeing it is easie for one to make himselfe be feared, if from being vilified before thorough mildnesse; he sudden∣ly, contrary to expectation, alter his countenance, and looke bigge.

There is another way also that may be used; and it is, to goe gaining of time so long, till all things need∣full may be provided; and then, to cut them all to pie∣ces: seeing, (as I said before) that to quiet such, is a thing impossible. He that would now see a manifest example of the difference that is betweene an Army, that mutinies out of hatred, and a determinate will; and an Army that mutinies upon some other occasion; let him look upon Vocula, who two severall times found it easie to appease a sedition, growne in the Ar∣my out of anger; but the third time, when out of a determinate will and hatred they rebelled, and meant to run to the Enemy; he then seeking to quiet them, was instantly by them slaine. And thus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 concer∣ning the occasions.

Now for the times; either they are of peace, or of great enterprises that are in hand; or of the Enemies approaching. In the first, there want not wayes; see∣ing they can never doe much hurt. In the second, though it seemes hard, yet it is but easie; and the best way is, to make a shew, not to regard them. The Soul∣diers of Augustus fore-seeing a warre which was like to be against Anthony, (as Dio relates) desired leave to

be excused from the service; not because they would be so indeed, but because they meant to hold Augustus (as the saying is) to hard meat, and make him grant what they demanded, for feare they should leave him; and he as crafty as they, finding it not fit, for a Captaine to submit himselfe to the Souldiers wils, answered them, They had reason to aske leave, and gave it them; retay∣ning onely those that had served in the warres ten yeares: and thus by slighting those other, and shew∣ing he cared not whether they stayed or no; There was not a man went from him, but all stayed with him. The last time is of all the hardest, or rather is impossible; and that is, when they are in face of the Enemy: and in this case, the best way is, to seeke to quiet them by any means, though never so bad, and by granting them all they demand; whether it be just, or unjust. The Romans having their Enemies at hand, and being at variance with the people, who retyred to the Hill Aventine, and would not stirre a foot against the Enemies, unlesse they might have their demands granted: the Senate resolved to satisfie them howso∣ever, and therefore granted all they demanded; Eam per aequa, per iniqua, reconciliandam Civitati esse.

At Romae nondum cognito, qui fuisset exi∣tus in Illyrico; & Legionum Germanicarum motu audito; trepida Civitas incusare Tiberium.

That Tiberius did well not to stirre from Rome. The seaven and fortieth Discourse.

ALthough the Citie of Rome, when they heard the Armies of Pannonia and Germany were in sedition, openly complained of Tiberius; and

blamed him, that he would not goe in person to ap∣pease those tumults; yet Tiberius for all that, was resol∣ved not to stir from the Citie: which resolution, though it succeeded well with him, yet it is not necessarily to be commended; seeing oftentimes a Councell not ve∣ry advised, hath yet through the favour of fortune, had admirable successe; and on the contrary, a mature deliberation, an unhappy issue. So as, seeing wise men ought not to judge of Deliberations, which are sub∣ject to Accidents, by onely the understanding: It is no marvell 〈◊〉〈◊〉 some imagine, that Tiberius understood not this, who would stay in Rome, when the Armies were in such confusion. Seeing in Insurrections, the autho∣rity of a Prince, and specially when he is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 bello, is able to prevaile much: Nothing in such cases being of greater moment then Majestie, by means whereof, notonely Augustus, (who by one word speaking, ap∣peased a great Sedition) but infinite others have had in tumults happy successe. Yet notwithstanding all this, I am of opinion, that in so great a man as Tiberius was, the Deliberation was not lesse advised, then the successe was happy; seeing (as Tacitus saith) if he had gone, he must of necessity have gone to one Army, be∣fore he went to the other; and by so doing, should have shewed himselfe partiall, the onely way to have lost their love to whom he went last as in the processe of Tacitu•…•… his Histories is often to be seene. To this may be added the danger; that if the Army by his com∣ming should not have beene quieted, there had beene afterward no other refuge: And therefore for my part, I should thinke it the best course, when rebelli∣ons a•…•…ise, to send thither some such person, that if he be slighted, another greater may be sent, and not to shew the uttermost at first. This is made plaine to us by our Lord God in Saint Matthew, where in a Pa∣rable he saith, that a Father of a Family, seeing the hus∣bandmen

of his Vineyard suffering all things to go to wrack, and having none to send to them but servants and his sonne: at first he sent servants, and them they killed and stoned; and then at last he sent his sonne, which was the last refuge in this case, as Tiberius was in ours: Whereupon he saith, Pater familias Dominus Vine•…•… 〈◊〉〈◊〉 servos ad Agricolas, qui ex illis alios occiderunt, alios lapidaverunt; Novissime autem misit ad eos filium su∣um, dicens, Reverebuntur filium meum; hoc est •…•…nim ulti∣mum refugium. Thus our Lord God sent first his Pro∣phets, to pacifie the Rebellion of men; of whom when part were slaine, and part despised, he came at last himselfe in person. It is therefore the best course, to try first all other wayes, before a Prince expose himselfe amongst Rebels; for if he should be slighted, there then remains no further refuge. Quod aliud sub∣•…•…dium, fi Imperatorem sprevissent? and therefore Galba had counsell given him, to try the mindes of the Prae∣torian Souldiers, being in mutiny, by some other: Nec per ipsum Galbam cujus integra authoritas majoribus reme∣diis servabatur; and so much the more, because the Prince being away, the Souldiers perhaps will beare respect to his Ministers; as fearing otherwise, least the Prince may seeke to be revenged: but if the Prince goe himselfe in person, and be killed; what feare can they have of any to revenge it? whereupon it is writ∣ten in Saint Matthew, Hic est 〈◊〉〈◊〉, venite occidamus eum; & occupemus haereditatem 〈◊〉〈◊〉. To this may bee added, that if Tiberius had gone himselfe to these Ar∣mies, he must have beene forced to cut in pieces the whole Legions: for if the Army in Germany should have stood upon such termes with him, as it did with Germanicus, he must for his honours sake have made them resent it in a very great degree; and could never have condescended to many things which Germanicus granted: Majus enim quid à Principe expectatur: see∣ing

there are many things tolerated by Generalls of Armies, which if the Prince were there himselfe, would never be tolerated. Whereupon, when Moses prayed God that he would be the Armies Guide into the Land of Promise; He answered him, I will send an Angell to be their Guide; for if I should goe my selfe, and the Army happen to rebell, I should be for∣ced utterly to destroy them. Non enim ascendam tecum, quia populus durae cervicis est; ne forte disperdam te in via: and therefore Princes oftentimes should avoide such encounters, that they may not aggravate their Subjects faults. And for this, Germanicus said, he would send away Agrippina from the Army, least her death should be the more grievous for aggravating the Souldiers fault. And Ieremie, when the Synagogue went about to kill him; seemed to grieve for nothing so much, as that his death should aggravate their offence. Cogno∣scite, quia fi occideritis me, sanguinem tradetis contra vos∣metipsos. Lastly, if there were no other reason for it, this one would much prevaile with me: that a Prince come newly to his State, and but ill beloved of all, should upon no occasion stirre out of the Citie, and specially in his beginning; seeing the presence of the Prince is of greatest force to hinder Rebellions. Where∣upon it is no marvell, that Pistoia rebelled against A∣guccio of Fagivola, as soone as they saw him gone out of the Citie. And likewise Florence against Charles the King of France his brother. And the people of Israel fell one time to mutiny, for no other cause, but because their Leader Moses was gone from them, be∣ing called up by our Lord God into Mount Sinai. If then the people of Israel so much bound to Moses, and after so many yeares, who had freed them from the bondage of Aegypt, had nourished them with Manna in the Wildernesse, had made water flow out of Rocks, and many such like benefits; yet onely because

he was gone up to Mount Sinai to speake with God for their good, could finde in their hearts to rebell: what would have beene done against a Tyrant, a per∣fidious man, an enemy of the Citie; and in the begin∣ning of his Empire, if he had gone into Germany to pa∣cifie those tumults? and so much the more, as not ha∣ving any trusty person to leave behinde him in his stead, for the Senate was his enemy; his mother repen∣ted that ever she holpe him to the Empire: and as for the Traytour 〈◊〉〈◊〉, what trusting was there to him? And indeed, if there had beene any whom he might have trusted, it would have done him no good; no more then it did Moses to leave Aaron in his place. Also Abimelech Prince of the Sichemites, going out of the City, in the beginning of his Empire, left in it his assu∣red friend Zebull, yet it did him no good; for no soo∣ner was he gone, but the people mutinyed, and made Gaall their Prince; as plainly appeares in the Book of Judges. So as we may conclude, Tiberius should have hazarded himselfe exceedingly if he had lest, and there∣by lost the City of Rome: which he knowing (saith Tacitus) Fixumque Tiberio fuit, non amittere caput Im∣perii. For, having the Senate and people his enemies; These for taking away their Liberty, Those for taking away their Authority; and then the Armies in muti∣ny, and calling upon Germanicus to be Emperour, he might well thinke, that if Germanicus had once seene him out of Rome, he would never have refused the Em∣pire in choler. To this I adde, that though Tiberius had beene sure of the Citie of Rome, yet he had no rea∣son to put himselfe into the hands of the Army; which having intended to kill the Legates, and Germanicus himselfe; plainly shewed, they had cast off all respect and reverence. Ne in colluvione rerum Majestatem suam contumeli•…•… offerret.

As for the reasons before alleadged, they are of 〈◊〉〈◊〉

forces to say, that Majestie is able to appease tumults. Ire ipsum & opponere Majestatem imperitoriam debuisse: for Majestie when it is not accompanied with force, runnes alwayes a hazard; at least, for the most part, as was seene in the Prophets, who came unarmed; which the Romane Souldiers well perceived, in a dis∣cord they had with the people: In which Livy saith, Huic tantae tempestati cum se consules obtulissent, facile ex∣perti sunt, parum tutam Majestatem fine viribus esse: seeing (as he saith a little after) there is not a more weake thing then Majestie is, when it is alone. Nihil contemp∣tius, neque infirmius, si fint qui contemnant: Yet I say not but that Majestie may do some good at a first brunt, before it be sound to be nothing but a shadow with∣out substance, consisting onely in opinion. I doe not therefore marvell that the Emperour Rodolphus passing in his Coach to the Army that was in mutiny, with∣out staying a jott, in manner of a lightening, was able to quiet it. For so also it succeeded well with Caius Fabius, who passed from the Capitoll to the Mount, where he meant to sacrifice, thorough the French Ar∣my, in habit of a Priest; seeing it was done in so short a time, and upon such a sudden, as they had not space to take notice of it: Whereupon we see, that Ferdi∣nand of Arragon, going forth amongst the people in a tumult, suddenly appeased it; but then upon conside∣ration of this reason, he presently returned into his Castle. And for this it was, as I conceive, that when Drusus had quieted the Legions of Illyricum, he would not stay the comming of the Embassadours; but in∣stantly went away to Rome: Whereupon those old Senatours, who at the first taking of Rome, stayed in their houses in their Senatours Robes, were by the ma∣jesty of their persons for a little time defended; but it was not long ere the French perceived that this maje∣sty of theirs was without any power, onely in opini∣on;

so as they began at first to scorne them, and at last to kill them.

It may therefore be concluded, that to trust to Ma∣jesty without force, is a dangerous businesse; and therefore Tiberius meaning tacitely to answer the ob∣jection, said, Majestate salva, cui è longinquo major re∣verentia; meaning to shew, that Majestie doth not the like good neare hand, as it doth a farre off; seeing the further it is off, the greater it growes; the nearer it comes, it growes the lesser. This was plainly seene, when Scipio and Lucius Quintius standing in compe∣tition for the Consulship, it was given to Lucius Quin∣tius, for no other cause but this: whereof Livy saith, Accedebat quod alter decimum jam prope annum assiduus in oculis hominum fuerat: quae res minus verendos magnos homines ipsa satietate facit. And of this, besides Exam∣ples, there may be given Philosophicall reasons: The first, because reverence to a man farre off, must needs grow from Fame; and Fame cannot come, but it must needs passe by the mouthes of many; so as the first mouth which begins to relate it to another, alwayes addes something out of love and affection to him, whose actions he relates: and the second mouth when it comes to his turne, cannot relate againe, without ad∣ding something of his owne; and so that other to ano∣ther, In infinitum. Seeing we consift of parts that have a naturall instinct, never to returne things in the same manner they receive them, without imparting some∣thing of theirs: so the stomack converts the meate in∣to Chylus; the liver, the Chylus into bloud; and so from hand to hand: Whereupon, not without cause it is said of Fame, that it increaseth as it flyes, like a snow-ball falling from a hill; which, though little at first parting, yet every place where it passeth adding snow unto it, It growes at last to a huge bignesse; and this greatnesse it gets by removing farre off from its beginning.

Another reason, if I be not deceived, may be drawn from the conception of the understanding, as being able to forme in it selfe a conceit of things, more or lesse perfect, then it is it selfe; If of things more per∣fect, then it formes a conceit more imperfect; as while it conceives God: If of things lesse perfect, then it formes a conceit more perfect; and therefore in Gods under∣standing, all things are in such a manner, as he him∣selfe is. In understanding, materiall and sensible things are much more perfect then they are in them∣selves: the understanding being more perfect, be∣cause spirituall; whereupon all Philosophers hold, that the patterne of a House is more perfectly repre∣sented in the understanding, then the fabrick of the House it selfe is in existence: so as by this reason, it is plaine, that a thing is greater contemplated then seene: And so it followes, That the Majestie which is contemplated, as represented onely to the understan∣ding; is greater then that which is beheld, as presen∣ted to the sense. Whereupon the Prophet Esay, mea∣ning to shew, who they are would follow Christ most; saith, Et qui non audierunt contemplati sunt: as though he would say, that they were most like to ad∣mire the Majestie of Christ, who had neither heard him, nor seen him, but only contemplated him. Plato therefore spake not idly when he said, That love en∣creaseth by remotenesse, in regard of the Idaea. And Aristotle said well, That when men are not knowne, they are reverenced; and when knowne slighted: which was found true in Saul; who when at first he was chosen King, the people desired infinitely to see him; and assoone as they saw him, they began to despise him.

It is therefore manifest enough, that remotenesse is an encrease; and by the contrary, that nearenesse is a diminisher: For the vulgar sort, of whom we now

speake, judgeth things according to sense, from with∣out and in the barke; so as comming to have those things to be present, which they conceived to be great; and not judging them answerable to their expectati∣on, they quickly grow to contemne them, and count all but fables they had heard of them: Therefore our Lord God knowing that this race of people stands onely upon apparences, he gave them Saul to be their King; which Procopius relating, upon those words; Foenitet me quod constituerim Saulem, saith, Saulem ele∣git propter egregiam staturam; non quod ipse qui omnium est Opifex, tanti eam faoeret: sed propter populum, qui ea quae sensibus apparent pulchra, tantum inspicit, & ad∣miratur.

This also may happen thorough mens defects, as well in their mindes as bodies; seeing there is no man so perfect, but he hath some defect or other; which Fame carryes not abroad, but Nearenesse discovers. No marvell therefore that the common people of Rome, seeing Galba not to be so handsome a man as Nero, be∣gan to despise him: which happened also to Lewis the eleventh. With good reason then, and notably well did Tiberius make answer to the objection of the Citie; Ire ipsum, opponere Majestatem: by saying, Majestate sal∣va; cui è longinquo major Reverentia.

De sententia legati statuunt tempus, quo sedi∣tiosissimum quemque & seditioni promptum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 invadant. Tunc signo inter se dato, irrumpunt contubernia, trucidant ignaros.

That to punish seditious Souldiers, by the Souldiers own hands, is very profitable, and that ministers for the most part, in punishing exceed their limits. The eight and fortieth 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

AS soon as Germanicus had punished the heads of those Legions that were amongst the Cauci, those other Legions, which were governed by Cacina, went away to the Vbij, whereat Germanicus taking great indignation, was preparing to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 them by force, who thus voluntarily had revolted from him; yet he would first send letters to Caecina, ad∣vertising him, that if the souldiers did not themselves punish their seducers, hee would come upon them with his Army, and kil both good and bad together; when they who were free from the contagion heard this, they determined between themselves (yet with Caecinaes consent) to kill all those souldiers that had any hand in the Rebellion, and after the signe given for the Execution, they fell with great confusion to cut in pieces, as well good as bad, in such sort, that Germani∣cus comming to the Campe, with teares reproved them, for so severely executing his will, and passing their bounds.

By occasion of this passage, there are many things that offer themselves to be discoursed of; the first, what the occasion was, why in the former Rebellion, onely the Heads were punished, and in this were punished all that any way were guilty of it; secondly, whether this way of punishing by their own Companions be

good. Thirdly and lastly, by occasion of these soul∣diers, who in punishing their Companions, farre ex∣ceeded the command given them; we will see whe∣ther this happen not also in the Officers of Princes, and why for the most part, they punish more, and re∣ward lesse than they are commanded.

Concerning the first, there was great reason why these should be more severely punished than the other, because having their Example before them, they yet persisted in the same rebellious courses, as Tacitus shews in these words, At Germanicus quanquam con∣tracto exercitui, & parata in defectores ultione, dandum adhuc spatium ratus, fi recenti exemplo fibi ipfi consulerent. But seeing their Example did not mend them, they were justly punished more than the other. So God pu∣nished Lamech more than Cain, and yet Lamech had not killed a brother, but onely because he was not amend∣ed by the others Example, and thus Theophylact upon Saint Matthew expounds it in those words, Vt veniat super vos omnis sanguis justus, qui effunditur super ter∣ram, à sanguine Abel justi, usque ad sanguinem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whereupon this Authour saith, super Iudaeos illos, qui tunc erant, dicit, veniat omnis sanguis injustè effusus, plus enim punientur quam patres sui, nam neque post tanta exempla emendati fuerunt, ficut enim Lamech post Cain, plus enim punitus fuit; licet non interemisset fratrem, eo quod non fuisset ad exemplum Cain emendatus. Good reason there∣fore had Germanicus to have them be more punished, who were not amended, by having an Example before their eyes, so Scipio Africanus did, and many others: but because contrariwise, the first of•…•…entimes are more pu∣nished than the second, as was seen in Ananias and Sa∣phyra, in the Acts of the Apostles; in the Deluge, in the subversion of Sodome, & infinite many in our time, who committing the same faults, yet have not the same pu∣nishments, (I speak not of the Eternal) I wouldtherfore

make distinction, either it is the same party that com∣mits both faults, and then the Law is, he should be more punished, for the second time offending, or else they are severall pa•…•…ties, and then, either of faults com∣mitted against some new Law, and then the first are more to be punished than the second, to the end there may grow no abuse, and that the Law with more care may be observed, or else we speak of faults com∣mitted against a Law already established, and then the second is more to be punished than the first; in regard of the Example he hath before him. To come finally to the particular of these Rebellions; if the first time, the fault be severely punished, it will be a cause, that hardly it will be committed the second time; but if by ill fortune, it be committed, and they rebell the second time, there will be then little hope to quiet them; be∣cause the feare to be punished, as at the first time, will hinder them from quiching; and if in the first insur∣rection there be not used an excesse of rigour, it will be an occasion, they will easily make insurrection the second time; but yet it will be easie then to quiet them, as it hapned to Scipio.

Concerning the second, to punish the seditious by the souldiers own hands, is occasion of many lauda∣ble effects. First, the hatred goes alwayes against them that act the punishment, and therefore when the Ar∣my now quieted, would have Germanicus to punish the offendours, he answered, Ipfi exequerentur; whereof Tacitus a little after shewing the reason, saith, Nec Cae∣sar arcebat, (meaning that had done the slaughter) Quando nullo ipfius jussu, penes •…•…osdem saevitia facti, & in∣vidiaerat.

A second reason is, that seeing all the seditious can∣not be punished, but onely the Heads; unlesse he should destroy the whole Army, it seemes that if the baser sort be not punished, it will give them meanes to

be able, and occasion to be ready upon every light distaste to mutiny again, which by punishing the Heads by the proper hands of the multitude, will be remedied and prevented, because they will finde none afterward forward to incite them, when they see such an Example of their ungratefulnesse towards them them that incited, and were their Heads before, and of themselves, they will be never able to make any in∣novation, Nihil ausuram plebem principibus amotis.

Thirdly, because the Generall by this meanes will remove the hatred which might grow by such slaugh∣ters, from himselfe to the souldiers; this way John Ben∣tivoglio in Bolonia took, when being advertised by his Adversary Duke Valentine, that many of the principall of the City had a meaning to receive him into Bolo∣nia with an Army, which perhaps Valentine did, to the end that Bentivoglio might shed the blood of his No∣bles, and thereby make the Heads of them his Ene∣mies, and finally be murthered by them, but he giving credit to what Valentine writ, caused his son Hermes and the greater part of the young Nobles of Bolonia to go and commit those slaughters, to the end that they imbruing their hands in the blood of Bentivo∣glio his Enemies might run the same fortune with himselfe, and consequently never after abandon their Prince, because if he should chance to be driven out, they might be sure themselves to fare no better; so as Bentivoglio made that a meanes to make himselfe se∣cure, which Valentine intended should have made him odious. Herod fearing John the Baptist, and meaning to put him to death, invited to supper all the principall men of Galile, to the end that they also might have a part in the slaughter, and thereby be tied to defend him, if there should be need, of which the holy Text in Saint Marke saith, Herodes autem metuebat Johannem, sciens eum virum justum & sanctum, & custodiebat eum;

& audito 〈◊〉〈◊〉, multa faciebat, & libenter eum audiebat; & cum dies opportunus accidisset, Herodes natalis sui coenam fecit, Principibus, & Tribunis, & Primis Galileae, and that which followes. A pestilent course, because as well in the case before as in this, there was a most cruell and unlawfull Execution. But if (as in our case we pre∣suppose) there should be an occasion deserving death, I then conceive, it would not do well, unlesse execu∣tion of the slaughter were conferred upon their ovvn companions; And thus did Moses, vvho almost just in the same manner as Caecina did, punished his peo∣ple vvhen they rebelled against him, or rather against God, in vvorshipping the golden 〈◊〉〈◊〉, for he caused the Tribe of Levi, to enter into the Campe, and to go from one end to the other, forward and backward, and cut them all in pieces whom they found to have upon them a certain marke, which what it was I will not at this time stand to speak of; Si quis est Domini, (saith Moses) jungatur mihi; congregati{que} suntomnes filij Levi ad eum, quibus ait, Haec dicit Dominus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Israel, Ponat vir gladium super faemur suum, ite & redite de porta usque ad portam, per medium castrorum, & occidat unusquisque fratrem & amicum, & proximum suum: and therefore the way which Caecina used in the Rebellion was a good way.

Fourthly, those Souldiers which were no parta∣kers in the Rebellion are the gladder, if they can wash their hands in the blood of the offenders; Laetabitur justus, cum viderit vindictam, manus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 lavabit in san∣guine peccatoris. Whereupon in that first sedition, when the Souldiers had killed them that were guilty, as though that slaughter were their own absolution, they rejoyced; Gaudebat caedibus miles, tanquam semet ab∣solveret.

It remaines to shew whether it be true, that Offi∣cers in execution of punishments use to exceed their

commission: and that it is true, is plainly shewed by Saint John in the Apocalyps, where a voyce saying to the seven Angels, Ite & effundite septem phialas irae Dei interram: they went and powred them out, not onely upon the land, but upon the rivers also, upon the foun∣taines, upon the sea, and even upon the sun: upon the same occasion, in another place of the Apocalyps, an Angel cried aloud to four Angels, to whom power was given to hurt the Earth and the Sea, saying, Nolite nocere terrae & mari neque arboribus: he needed not have said, arboribus, seeing those Angels had power to hurt but onely the Earth and the Sea, he therefore cried so (as a Writer observes) because he saw those Angels interpreted the power given them to hurt, in too large a sense, as meaning to hurt not only the Earth and the Sea, but the trees also; or perhaps he doubted, least as Officers interpret alwayes too largely the power gi∣ven them to inflict punishments, so they should inter∣pret too narrowly, the power given them to bestow benefits; whereupon he thought it not enough to say, Nolite nocere terrae & mari, and therefore added, neque arboribus: so also in Esay, our Lord God commanded that the Israelites should be humbled by the King of the Assyrians, and he intended to destroy them, God commanded him to tread upon them, and he went a∣bout to put them all to the sword.

This therefore is an ordinary thing with Officers to restrain favours, and inlarge punishment, which growes upon this, because as building their fortunes upon the Princes treasure and honours, they thinke every thing lost to themselves which is given to ano∣ther, and therefore alwayes interpret favours narrow∣ly, and punishments largely, as well to second the Prince in his anger, and make him the more gracious to themselves, as taking to heart the wrongs that are offe∣red him, as also to make the delinquents faults seem

greater than they are; to the end, the Prince seeing them so cruell to them, that so perfidiously had vvron∣ged him, may take notice hovv faithfull they are in his service, and hovv much they resent his injuries.

Iunctoque Ponte tramittit duodecim millia E legionibus sex, & viginti socias cohortes, octo Equitum Alas, quarum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 seditione inte∣merata modestia suit.

Whether an Army be apter to rebell, that consists of one Na∣tion onely, or that which consists of many. The nine and fortieth Discourse.

BY occasion of auxiliary Souldiers, (vvhich for any thing can be gathered from the forealleaged vvords of Tacitus) stood alvvayes quiet, and kept themselves in good order, vvhen the Roman Legions oftentimes sell into seditions; Iam dravvn to think, that Armies composed of divers Nations, are lesse apt to be mutinous than those which are all of one Nation; having a manifest Example thereof in the Army of Hannibal, which being composed of an infinite num∣ber of Nations, differing in Language, in customes, in Religion, yet they never mutinyed nor rebelled, al∣though they had a thousand times occasion, by the many wants they suffered, which Livy wondred at, saying, Quippe qui cum in hostium terra, per annos trede∣•…•… jam procul à domo, varia fortuna bellum gereret; exer∣citu non suo civili, sed mixto ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis, alius habi∣tus, alia vestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra, alii prope dii essent, ita quodam uno vinculo 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉, ut nulla nec inter ipsos, nec adversus ducem seditio 〈◊〉〈◊〉. The

reason of this is, because being of divers language, they do not so easily accord, and if one part should happen to mutiny, it is easie to oppose it with another, which either through emulation, or some other cause, can seldom times be brought to agree together; be∣sides it happens, because if one of those Nations chance to mutiny, and abandon the Army, yet the Army will not be much weakened by it, as a thousand times hath been seen in Flanders in the King of Spaines Armies, and other places. When Hannibal meant to passe into Italy, the Carpetani forsook him, and he ma∣king shew he had given them leave, made no matter of it, and his Army was not thereby vveakened, vvhere if his Army had consisted of one Nation, he had never been able to passe into Italy. And this Lu∣dovico Il Moro found, against whom vvhen his Army rebelled, vvhich consisted all of Swis•…•…ers, he vvas for∣ced to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his state, and be taken prisoner.

But if by ill fortune an Army consist•…•… of divers Nations happen to mutiny, as it is hard to happen; so if it happen, it is impossible to appease it, of vvhich the Carthaginians had a notable experience, vvhen ha∣ving an Army of that sort, they vvanted not much of loosing their whole state, and Carthage it selfe. The reason is, because there cannot be speeches made to the whole Army when it consists of divers Languages, as there might be if it consisted but of one.

An Army then, if onely one Nation, is more apt to mutiny, but is withall more easie to be quieted; an Army of divers Nations is lesse apt to mutiny, but if it mutiny, is impossible to be quieted: moreover, it is to be known, that as such Armies seldom grow tu∣multuous against their Commanders, so amongst themselves, there grow tumults often, and of these cases Histories are full, their being alwayes discord where there are divers Nations. Rebe•…•…ca being great

with childe by Isaak, and having in her wombe Jacób and Esau, she felt a great striving of these two sonnes, which put her to much pain, whereof complaining to our Lord God, he answered, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gentes sunt in utero tuo, & duo populi ex ventre tuo 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as though he would say, Marvell not if they strive together, see∣ing they are two divers Nations, which thou hast in thy body.

Alia Tiberio morum via, sed populum per tot annos molliter habitum, nondum audebat ad duriora vertere.

That to passe from one extreme to another is dangerous, and how it happens that su•…•…cessours commonly take courses differing from their predecessours. The fiftieth Discourse.

TO passe from one extreme to another without comming to the middle, not only is dangerous, but in many things is held impossible, as in motion, in such manner that some Divines deny, that Angels can move from one extreme to another, with∣out passing by the middle, so as Hippocrates with good reason in his book of Aphorismes, mislikes the pas∣sing from a surfet to a diet; and yet a surfet is bad, a diet good, but the passing from a surfet to a diet is most dangerous, whereof Aristotle in one of his Problemes, brings Dion•…•…sius the Tyrant for an Example, who in the siege of his City, forbearing to eat and drinke as he was wont, by this passing from Intemperance to Temperance, he fell into a Leprosie. What is worse than a corrupt Common-wealth? What better than a regall Government? yet he that hath gone about to

passe from the one to the other, as it were at one jumpe, either it hath not been succesfull; or it hath not been durable: whereupon we see that Musicians will not make a passage from a Discord (as a seventh) to a perfect Concord, as a fifth, without passing first to a sixth, and when they mean to make good a second they go to a third, and not to an eighth. By 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de∣grees the Common-wealth of Rome came to a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all power; for from a Democracy, it passed to an Oli∣garchy; from that, to the Government of One; and this One not willing to make that jumpe contented himselfe to be called Dictator, for if he had been cal∣led King, he had run a manifest hazard, as was plain∣ly seen, when Antonius would have put a Crown up∣on his head; and indeed Cicero said, that Anthonies tongue calling him King, was more the occasion of Caesars death than Brutus his dagger. After him comes Augustus, and Caesar having passed from one extreme, it was now easie for him to passe toward the other extreme, and therefore he was able after taking up∣on him the Tribunitiall dignity, to take upon him also that of Emperour; but he came not full out to the other extreame, seeing hee carried himselfe as a companion, an equall, and as it were a Citizen with the rest, at least in shew; as leaving some authority to the people, and deliberating in a manner of all things with the Senate. After Augustus came Tiberius, and he was able fully to reach the other extreame; but yet not all at once: For, first he raised himselfe from e∣quality; then he took from the people that little au∣thority they had; and then lastly would be feared, and acknowledged for Prince. Alia Tiberio morum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sed populum per tot annos molliter habitum, nondum audebat ad duriora vertere.

Augustus then, a Prince of that Prudence, as every one knows, not onely ordained new sports for recre∣ation

of the people; but he in person would be present at them. Tiberius on the contrary, an excellent man, full of all the State wisedome that can be in a Prince, was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from delighting in the sports; yet durst not take them quite away. Whereupon, it should seeme to him that would consider these things to the full; that one of them did doe well the other ill: seeing of two contraries, when one is good, the other must needs be bad. Yet, I am of opinion that both of them did well; and if they had done otherwise, they would have met with difficulties. For, as for Augustus, there was reason, that the people, who for so many yeares had beene toyled with continuall warres, should be refreshed with some recreations; as Augustus did, by ordaining of sports, and himselfe oftentimes to be present at them; that he might not at first shew that inequality, from which but a few dayes before he had beene raised: But because, as after a cruell Prince, if there come another that is cruell; he easily, by reason of the peoples hatred, runnes a hazard: So if after a Prince so milde, that rules onely with love, there come another Prince of like nature, he easily falls into con∣tempt, and thereby stands in hazard of his state. It was therefore necessary, that Tiberius, to make a compleat setling of his power, should use a little rigour; and differing from Augustus, should shew how much a Prince differs from a private person, by getting him∣selfe not onely love, but fear also; which cannot well be maintained by him that carryes himselfe mildely, and suffers himselfe to be often seen. Tiberius then, being to use a diverse manner, hee could not in those beginnings, Ad•…•…duriora vertere; seeing (as I have said) that passing from one extreame to another, is extream∣ly dangerous, and was it that ruined Galba; for the people and the Souldiers being accustomed to the bounty of Nero, finding themselves upon a suddaine

restrained, could not endure it; Nocuit antiquus rigor: & nimia severitas cui jam pares non sumus: and there∣fore they who conspired the first time against Nero, meant to make Piso Emperour; a man that favoured sports and pleasures exceedingly: Idque pluribus pro∣babatur, qui in tanta vitiorum dulcedine, summum Imperi∣um non restrictum, nee perseverum volunt. The City of Ferrara was accustomed under Duke Alphonso of glo∣rious memory, to live in delights and sports; and there∣fore when it came into the hands of Pope Clement the eighth, a man of singular prudence, and never enough to be commended; he would not upon the suddaine restraine the people, but leaving them their delights, maintained them with sweetnesse in the Vigils, and Turneaments, and other generous Exercises.

But that Tiberius, Successour of Augustus, was un∣like to his Predecessour, is no marvell; seeing it is com∣monly so, and in all times hath ever beene so. Numa Pompilius was most differing from Romulus. David a war-like man, had for his Successour Salomon a peace∣able man. To Moses a Law-giver, succeeded Josua a warriour. I forbeare to bring moderne Examples, as a thing odious; and looke, that every one should of himselfe consider, that he who in a government suc∣ceedes another that is cruell, is commonly mercifull; and he who succeedes one that is growne odious to the people, makes himselfe commonly odious to the Nobility. And this is so true, that I thinke it more needfull to seek out the reason, then to doubt the effect; and although the search of it be difficult, yet I would say first, that every one having a certaine inbred de∣sire to outgoe his Predecessour, which is a thing easier to be done, in matters wherein, he either excelled not, or did ill, they betake themselves to a contrary course. Whereupon, if Numa Pompilius would have gone about to exceed Romulus in warre, he had never attained it;

but to excell him in Religion, which by his Predeces∣sours was little esteemed, was easily done. Drusus also going into Germany, if he would have meant to ex∣ceed his Predecessour Germanicus in glory of Armes, it would not perhaps have succeeded with him; but to exceed him in crast and stratagems, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 easily succeeded. From hence it is why many believed (as Plutarch re∣lates) that Tiberius Gracchus, seeing he could never be able to exceed Fluvius Posthumius in glory of warre, sought to get himselfe fame by peace; and by bringing in new Laws among the people.

Secondly, Princes and Governours have before their eyes a politicall passage, which is held for an infallible rule; that Governours ought to imitate their Prede∣cessour in things commended, and not to imitate him in things distasted: and so much Nero in Tacitus pro∣mised to doe. And therefore a Prince, finding that his Predecessour had made every one his enemy thorough cruelty; he too much desiring to avoid the like, ende•…•…∣vours by all meanes to win their love with mildnesse; into which he transports himselfe, sometimes so farre, that to avoid hatred, he falls into contempt.

Thirdly, Princes and Governours carry a certaine envy towards their predecessours, and desire to be more beloved then they: whereupon for example; if the predecessour were beloved of the Nobility, he will seeke to be beloved of the people, by being their 〈◊〉〈◊〉. First, because the people will be gladder of his comming to be Prince, then the Nobility will be; as those that cannot looke for more at this Princes hands, then they had at the others; and consequently cannot chuse but shew some passion, at either the death, or at the departing of the predecessours: which how odious a thing it is to a new Prince 〈◊〉〈◊〉 teach∣eth us; where he shews, that after the death of Augu∣stus, the Senatours made shew to have no lesse joy in

the new Prince, than they had in the old: At Romae ruere in Servitium Consules, Patres, Eques: quanto quis Illustrior, tanto magis falsi ac festinantes, vultuque com∣posito; ne laeti excessu Principis, neu tristiores primordio lachrymas, gaudium, quaestus, Adulationes miscebant.

Secondly, because it is more easie to content the part oppressed, then the part advanced; as every one knows: and thus much for this.

Simul Segestes ipse ingens visu, & me∣moria bonae societatis impavidus; verba ejus in hunc modum fuere.

What course is to be used in demanding Peace, and when is the fit time. The one and fiftieth Discourse.

SEgestes boldly and without any feare, being brought before Germanicus, with great confi∣dence delivers his Speech; though it might bee doubted, he had a hand in the death of Varro, and of the three Legions that were with him: and because this place of Tacitus containes in it many Arguments of Discourse; I will first examine, when it is a fit time for men to seek friendship with their Enemies, and in what manner they ought to excuse themselves; and though I may seeme to goe astray from this place of Tacitus, yet I will not omit to explain the words it con∣taines; that we may see why Segestes speaking of him∣selfe, spake with great boldnesse: and comming after∣ward to speake of his sonne, with great humblenesse craves pardon. Pro Iuventa & errore filii, veniam pre∣cor. Wherein wee may see, how men that desire to cleare themselves of any thing laid to their charge, ought to treat for procuring of Amity.

Such men therefore, either they have committed some fault, or they have not: if they have committed any fault, either they were at first friends, and after∣wards are become enemies; or else they have been al∣wayes enemies. If they have beene alwayes enemies, either they have beene Principalls, or but Adhaerents. Beginning then with the last; if these enemies that de∣sire to become friends, were onely Adhaerents; they may then doe it, by abandoning their friends in dan∣ger without any cause given them; but then withall, they must doe it with much blushing, or else will ne∣ver be accepted. Seeing hee becomes for ever odious to the world, whosoever is stained with such a blot; as was seene in Bernardino Corte of Pavia; who being left by Ludovico Moro, to keep the Castle of Milan, ren∣dered it up to Lewis the twelfth; and finding himselfe afterward blamed for it of the French themselves; he died with griefe. I cannot forbeare to relate an exam∣ple of hatred that is borne to Traytors; which Guicci∣ardine reports in the person of Burbon, whom the King of Spaine imployed, to require a Captaine to deliver up his Pallace to the King of Spaine; who answered, he could not deny the King; but that assoone as Burbon was gone out of it, he would set it on fire, as a place in∣fected, and unworthy to be inhabited by men of ho∣nour. It is true, that this answer, in my opinion, con∣tained under it another mysterie, which I cannot now examine, as being out of my roade; and therefore will leave it for the Reader to consider it of himselfe. This at least is a cleare case; that Traytours are odious even to those, in whose favour they have done the Treason; whereof many reasons may be given. And first, a rea∣son taken from the danger they incurre, who keepe such fellows about them; and are like to do as much to them as they have done to others: seeing a man that is growne infamous, cannot do better, then to

make a gaine of his infamy; as the Lawgiver said, speaking of Harlots. Secondly, because Obligation is a heavy burthen, which men willingly disburthen themselves of, assoone as they finde any little colour likely to doe it: A Prince therefore being obliged to one for becomming a Traytour for his service, payes him willingly with becomming ungratefull for his reward; and thinks the hatred that is borne to Tray∣tors is colour enough for it. A third reason may be ta∣ken from the pleasure men seeme to take, in overcom∣ming rather by Force, than by Fraud; and therefore oftentimes they kill the Traytors. So the Sabines did to the daughter of Spurius Tarpeius, who had opened to them the Castle of Rome: Seu ut vi capta Arx videretur. So the Romans taking the Fortresse of Tarentum, by the treason of the Brutii; put them all to the sword Brutii quoque multi interfecti, seu per errorem, seu vetere in eos infito odio; seu ad proditionis famam, ut vi potius atque ar∣mis captum Tarentum videretur. Fourthly, they are so odious, that they are alwayes in danger, in regard of the Example; for if Princes should make much of them, and hold them in any account; they should give an Example to encourage others to doe the like to themselves: This reason Livy also alleadgeth in the fore-said case of the Sabines; Seu prodendi Exempli causa, ne quid usquam fidum proditori esset.

Lastly, Segestes saith of such, Nam proditores etiam iis quos anteponunt invisos: and in truth, these reasons are so cleare, that I should marvell there could be any Traytours; if it were not for the force which particu∣lars have to darken an understanding, that is cleare in universals.

Secondly, this may happen for some ill usage from them, to whom he adheres; and in such case, he may speak without blushing: but yet he ought not to staine his honest parting with taking reward. And so

much Indibile did, when passing with his Souldiers from the Carthagenians to the service of Scipio; he rather excused himselfe for abandoning his friends; then ex∣pected thanks for the ayde he brought. Whereof Livy saith; Propiorque excusanti tranfitionem, ut necessariam; quam glroianti eam velut primam occafionem raptam. Sai∣re enim transfugae nomen execrabile veteribus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 novis suspectum esse: neque enim se reprehendere morem homi∣num, fi tam anceps odium causa non nomenfaciat: Meri•…•…a deinde sua in Duces Carthaginenses memora•…•…it avaritiam contra corum superbiamque, & omnis 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 in se, atque populares. Itaque corpus duntaxat suum ad id tem∣pus apud eos fuisse: animum jampridem ibi esse, ubi jus ac f•…•… crederet coli: se id Scipionem orar•…•…; ut tranfitio •…•…bi, nec fraudi apud eum, nec honori fit. Likewise segestes in his speech to Germanicus, amongst other principall things he saith, this is one; that he had not left his friends to get reward; Neque ob praemium, sed ut me perfidia exol∣vam: but because, knowing Peace to be more profi∣table, he advised those people to give over warre: and Anthony, who by meanes of his faction prevailed, thought the contrary; therefore for his owne safety, and that he might not be oppressed, he had left that side, and was come to the Romans. The very like to this doth Livy relate of Appius Clausus, who advised the Sabines not to enter into warre with the Romans; and finding he was not able to withstand the •…•…action, which perswaded the contrary, he went away to Rome; Cum Pacis ipse Author, à turbatoribus belli preme∣retur, nec par factioni esset; ab lacu Regillo magna clienti∣um comitatus manu, Romam transfugit.

Thirdly, it may happen by his being dead, to whom he adhered; and then, though the case may seeme more difficult, yet it is more easie; at least, if he can make it appeare, that he adhered to the other, more for love to him, then for any hate to the contrary side;

and in such case he may speak boldly, and the more boldly the better. Herod the great had followed the fortune of Antonius untill his death, not for any hate he bore to Augustus, whom he never knew, but for the love he bore to Marke Antony, from whom he had received benefits, after whose death he feared not to present himselfe before Augustus, to whom he spake with a gravity becomming a King, and by this meanes was received of Augustus into a firme league of friendship: the reason of this is, because the cause of their enmity being ceased, which was the love to the person now dead, and the profit growing by him, they will thinke to have them hereafter their true friends: as conceiving they vvill be the same to them as they vvere to the other before, vvhereupon vve reade in Tacitus that Otho seeing hovv faithfull Celsus had been to his enemy Galba, took him out of the hands of the Souldiers, by putting him in prison, and then gave him a charge, and held him as his speciall friend, and Celsus served him as faithfully, as he had served Galba, Celsus constanter servatae erga Galbam fidei crimen confessus, exemplum ultro imputavit, nec Otho quasi ignosceret, sed ne hostis metum reconciliationis adhiberet, statim intra intimos amicos habuit, & mox bello inter duces dilegit, manfit{que} Celso velut fataliter, etiam pro Othone fides integra & infoelix.

Such then as these shall not need to make any ex∣cuses, but onely shew the love they bore, and the faith∣fulnesse they used towards their friends now dead, and that they did nothing for any hatred they bore to this side, but for the love they bore to the other; out of this respect I conceive it was, that Caesar pardoned all those that had borne Armes against him, saying, that they who had taken part with Pompey out of friend∣shiphaddone him no wrong: to these things may be added, the force that a free confessing hath (not onely

in this case, but in all other) to procure ones pardon; and the Reason is, because one cannot voluntarily con∣fesse an errour, but he must withall at the same time commend and praise him to whom he confesseth it; seeing no man would willingly confesse an errour, if he did not hope it would be pardoned: and out of such hope he grows confident, and fals to praising the Prince for his clemency; things of great force to move one to pardon: whereupon not without mystery, the word Confiteor in the holy Text signifies not onely to confesse, but also to praise: and we see that our Lord Christ, who being without sin needed not to make Confession to his Eternall Father, yet notwithstand∣ing he said, Confiteor tibi Domine coeli & terrae; which meanes nothing (as Saint Austin and all the Fathers ex∣pound it) but, I praise thee Eternall Father, Lord of Heaven and Earth. We may justly say then, that this word Confiteor signifies as well To praise, as to con∣fesse, seeing in confessing, one is praised. And thus much for Adherents.

Now concerning a Principall: if he have been al∣wayes an Enemy, either it is in time of war, or in time of peace; if in war, either he is superior, or inferior; if superior, either he knows he is able to hold out, or else he doubts he is like to go down: if he know he be able to hold out, he ought not then to seek after amity; and therefore the Romans meaning to destroy Carthage re∣fused peace: but if he doubt himselfe, and finde diffi∣culties in it, he shall then do well to accept of peace, if it be required. This made Lutatius the Consul (as Po∣lybius relates) after he had overcome the Carthaginians by sea, not to refuse peace when it was offered him by Amilcar, because he found there were many difficul∣ties yet remaining, before he could get an absolute vi∣ctory; rather if he stand in doubt he shall come to be inferiour, he shall then do well, not onely to accept of

peace, if it be required, but to require it himselfe: it is true, it is an hard matter to perswade men against reputation, whereupon we see, it succeeded not well with Hanno, when after the defeat the Romans had at Cannae, he counselled the Carthaginians to demand peace, whose counsell was rejected, not so much for his being of a contrary faction to that of Hannibals, as for the reputation. I cannot therefore but account the Se∣nate of Venice to be full of men of great wisdom, who after the victory the Christians had gotten in a naval battell, yet taking into consideration the depth of things, they made a peace with the Turke, accoun∣ting it lesse evill for the conservation of their State, to live in peace, than to be turmoiled with war.

But if such a one be inferiour, either he knowes he is like to be inferiour still, or else he is in hope to get the better; if thus, not onely he ought not to seek for peace, but not to accept it, if it be offered. Perseus having overcome the Romans in battail, by the advice of his friends demanded peace, but the Consul denied it. So Pyrrhus after he had won the first battail de∣manded peace, and was denied it. But if he be infe∣riour, and hath no hope to get the better, he shall do well not to stay to the last, seeing as long as he hath any strength left, he may demand peace with the more boldnesse, and make the better conditions: so Hannibal before his last battail demanded peace of Scipio, with great majesty; where if a man stay till he be at the last cast, he must come as a suppliant, and aske with submission, and be fain to take what conditions he can get, and it is great foolery to go to aske pardon, with boasting of his merits, and standing upontermes. And this our Lord Christ expressed in the Parable of the Pharisee and the Publican; where the Publican humbly asking pardon for his sinnes vvas heard, and the Pharisee not, because instead of humbling him∣selfe,

he boasted of himselfe, saying, Deus, gratias ago ti∣bi quia non sum ficut caeteri hominum, raptores, injusti, adul∣teri, velut etiam hic Publicanus, jejuno bis in sabbato, deci∣mas do omnium quae possideo. The reason of this saying is, because when one confesseth his errours he makes himselfe judge, and consequently him his advocate, to whom he confesseth, vvhere he that speakes vvith in∣solence makes himselfe his ovvn advocate, and con∣sequently him judge to vvhom he speakes; vvhere∣upon hovv much it is better for a delinquent to make him he hath offended to be his advocate than his judge, so much it is better to aske pardon with humi∣lity than with boasting: and therefore, when after the Romans had entred Afia, and had gotten some vi∣ctories, an Ambassador comming to Scipio from Antio∣chus, to demand peace; he was answered by Scipio, Quod Romanos omnes, quod me ad quem missus es ignoras minus miror, cum te fortunam ejus à quo venis, ignorare cernam; Lyfimachia tenenda erat, ne Chersonesum intra∣remus; aut ad Hellespontum obfistendum, ne in Afiam traji∣ceremus, fi pacem à sollicitis de belli eventu petituri eratis, concesso vero in Afiam tranfitu, & non solum fraenis, sed etiam jugo accepto, quae disceptatio ex aequo cum imperium patiendum fit, relicta est? And finally he gave him this counsell, Nuntia meis verbis, bello abstineat, pacis condi∣tionem nullam recuset. For this cause the Etolians did ill, to speak so boldly after they were brought to the last cast, and that they would not accept of such conditi∣ons of peace as the Romans offered them, seeing it is a meer foolery to stand upon termes with a Conque∣rour, as they at last perceived, when the Consul bring∣ing out his Forces, they were glad to humble them∣selves, and abate their boldnesse; Tunc fracta Phaneae ferocia Aetolis{que} aliis est, & tandem cujus conditionis essent, sensere, & Phaneas se quidem, & qui adfint Aetolorum scire facienda esse, quae imperentur. There is therefore

in such cases no better course than to lay conditioning aside, and to put ones selfe into the victors hand, who no doubt will remit the more when he findes it is left in his power to do it: so Alorcus counselled the Sa∣guntines to do, that seeing they had now no hope left, they should rather put themselves into the victors hand, than stand upon conditioning; Haud despero, cum omnium potestas ei à vobis facta fit, aliquid ex his re∣bus remissurum: which when the Saguntines would not do, they were all put to fire and sword.

I cannot omit by way of digression, to speak of a custome the Romans had; which at first sight seemes to have been a great errour, and it is, that they offered the same conditions of peace in the uncertain beginning of a War, as after they had gotten an absolute victory; as by the answer of Scipio to the Ambassadours of An∣iochus may appear, Romani ex his quae in deorum immor∣talium potestate erant, ea habemus quae dii dederunt, ani∣mos, qui nostrae mentis sunt, eosdem in omni fortuna gessi∣mus, gerimusg{que} neque eos secundae res extulerunt, nec ad∣versae minuerunt; ejus rei, ut alios omittam, Annibalem ve∣strum vobis darem testem, nifi vos ipsos dare possem: posteaquam Hellespontum trajecimus, prius quam castra regia, prius quam aciem videremus, cum communis Mars, & incertus belli eventus esset; de pace vobis agentibus, quas pares paribus forebamus conditiones, easdem nunc victores victis ferimus. This way of doing served, it seemes, to no other purpose, but to encourage their Enemies, to cyment their fortune, till they should be brought to extremity, and I make no doubt but that Antiochus ha∣ving before him the Example of the Carthaginians, would never be brought to accept conditions of peace till he was brought upon his knees with the War. To take away this difficulty, it would not suffice to answer, as Scipio said, that it came from generousnesse of spirit, that they altered not for fortune, seeing little

praise can be given to such a dangerous and prejudici∣all Generousnesse, and therefore I should rather attri∣bute the cause to too great a greedinesse of getting that which is anothers; seeing the Romans made war with Antiochus, and with the Carthaginians, as thinking they could not be quiet, if the one were Lord of this side the mountain Taurus, and the other were possest of Africke, and this being their motive, there is no doubt but the War would neverend, till they had triumphed both over Africa, and over Asia: Whereupon when War is waged with such people, we must make account ei∣ther to get the victory, or otherwise to be absolutely de∣stroyed: and therefore when Samuel meant to shew Saul, that God intended to root out his House, to the end he might know he would not pardon him till he were utterly destroyed, he called our Lord God by the Name of Triumpher, Porro Triumphator in Israel non parcet: as though he would say, as they who fight to triumph, do not pardon till they have utterly destroyed their Enemies, so O Saul, will our Lord God do with thee. But to returne to our purpose, if they who would come to amity were friends before, and are afterward become Enemies, they must then come with blushing and with great humblenesse, at least if they can shevv no just occasion, but let them not then stay til they come to extremity, for then they vvil never be accepted: therefore the Capuans did ill, not to open their Gates to the Romans vvithin the time given them; for vvhen they vvere come to extremity, it availed not then to open their Gates, but all of them vvere misera∣bly put to the svvord.

The last case is of him that demands amity, and comes to excuse himselfe, as having never committed any fault, alvvayes really been a friend, and never done them any vvrong; and such an one may, or rather must speak boldly. Such a one vvas Segestes, vvho

speaking of himselfe, Memoria bonae societatis impavidus, never asked pardon. Such then may speak vvith confi∣dence, and ought to be hearkened to of the Prince vvith patience: and this vvay vvas a great helpe to Terentius in Tacitus, vvho being accused for having had friendship with Sejanus, he confessed it boldly, shewing not onely that he was his friend, but that he had laboured much to come to be so, as seeing him a Companion of Caesar in his Consulship, a Kinsman, an inward friend, and a stay of the Empire; and this constancy of his pre∣vailed so far that not onely he was pardoned, but his accusers also were ill intreated. Saul must pardon me, if I thinke him in this case, a more Tyrant than Tiberius, seeing when Abimelech the Priest was accused for gi∣ving David meat, and the sword of Goliah, and was charged for it by Saul, he made the like ansvver as Te∣rentius did, Et quis in omnibus servis tuis sicuti David fi∣delis, & gener Regis, pergens in imperium, & gloriosus in domo tua. But the boldnesse and innocency of Abime∣lech vvas not so great, but the cruelty of Saul was great∣er, vvho for this cause put him to death; certainlya most perfidious act, seeing as I have said, and say still, He that is innocent & comes without fault, both ought to speak with boldnes, and ought to be heard with patience: and herein Princes should imitate our Lord God, who takes pleasure in such disputes, as S. Austin witnesseth in his exposition of those words in the Psalme, Jucundum fit ei eloquium meum; which he reades thus, Suavis fit ei disputatio mea; and then saith, Ostendit Propheta sua∣vem Deo esse disputationem, & argumentationem gratam, quae post peccatorum poenitentiam fit, cum eo pias querelas proponendo & irae illius refistendo viriliter: so Job spake, pretending to be innocent, Ad Omnipotentem loquar, & disputare cum Deo cupio; and a little after addes, Quis mihi tribuat ut cognoscam & inveniam illum, & veniam usque ad solium ejus, ponam coram eo judicium, & os me∣um

replebo increpationibus, ut sciam verba quae mihi re∣spondeat. And therefore Esay having in his first Chapter said, Lavamini & mundi estote; he addes, Venite & ar∣guite me; which Saint Gregory interpreting, saith, Ac fi patienter dicat; recta agite, & animad verfionis meae motibus non jam per deprecationem gemitus, sed per fiduci∣am authoritatis obviate: whereupon after Job had said, Taedet animam meam vitae meae, with great confidence he addes, Dicam Deo, Noli me condemnare; as the foresaid S. Gregory in a thousand places excellently observes: with good reason therefore Terentius spoke boldly to Tiberius, rather as disputing than as intreating; with good reason Segestes in our case shewed he did not fear, seeing neither the one nor the other had com∣mitted any fault: whereupon there was no just cause that Tiberius should not accept Terentius for his friend; and Germanicus, Segestes.

Vt quibus initiis, quanta Tiberii arte, gravis∣simum exitium irrepserit, dein repressum fit; postremo arserit, cunctaque corripuerit, noscatur.

With what cunning Tiberius introduced and augmented the Law of Treason. The two and siftieth Discourse.

PErsuaded by the foresaid words of Tacitus, in which he shewes what cunning Tiberius used to bring in the Law of Treason; I have much mu∣sed in what that cunning consisted, seeing neither Ta∣citus declares it, but would have us gather it out of the History our selves, neither can I thinke, I have fully apprehended his meaning, I will therefore onely say that little which my weaknesse hath been able to con∣ceive

of it, that some stronger brain may thereby the more easily finde out the truth.

First then it might be said, that he used this cun∣ning, when being asked, An judicia Majestatis redde∣rentur? He answered, Exercendas esse leges. The cun∣ning consists in this, that being asked in a particular which concerned onely himselfe, he answered in a generall, which concerned the profit of the whole City; as though he should say, for as much as con∣cernes me, which is the particular of Treason, I make no reckoning, nor require any to be made; but as much as concernes the Law, I would have that to be obser∣ved, seeing it is of great importance, that Lawes be not abused: and in confirmation of this his will, he granted pardons to all those who at that time were accused of any crime, and consequently with great sweetnesse gave a beginning to a most bitter thing; because by his pardoning the Law was set on foot, and he brought it in, with such a kinde of clemency, that it remained ever after in the Princes power to take it away again.

But in the introducing this Law by Tiberius, his cunning may perhaps be better considered another way; for understanding whereof, we must take into consideration, two cases that are in Tacitus; the first, is in this place, where Falanius and Ruberius being both of them accused, Falanius for placing amongst certain priests of Augustus one Cassius a Buffone; Ru∣berius for violating with perjury the name of Augustus; Tiberius with divers wayes colouring their errour, cleared them both; Scripsit consulibus, non ideo decre∣tum Patri suo coelum, ut in perniciem civium is honor ver∣teretur, Cassium histrionem solitum inter alios ejusdem artis interesse ludis, quos mater sua in memoriam Augusti sacras∣set: nec contrareligiones fieri, quod effigies ejus, ut alia nu∣minum fimulachra, venditionibus hortorum, & domuum

accedant: Jusjurandum perinde •…•…svimandum, ac si Jovem fefellisset. Deorum injurias diis curae. It was not long after, but Marcellus was accused for speaking ill of Tiberius, vvhereat though he seemed a little angry, yet he suffered him notwithstanding to be acquitted. The second case we are to consider, is written in the se∣cond Book of his Annals, where Apuleia Varilla being accused of Adultery, & for speaking scandalous vvords of Augustus, of Tiberius and of Livia, he gave sen∣tence, that for what she had spoken against Augustus she should be punished, but for what she had spoken against himselfe, he vvould have no matter made of it, and being then asked by the Consul, vvhether she should not be punished for the vvords spoken in dis∣grace of Livia, for that time he made no ansvver, but the day follovving he desired in his mothers name, that the vvords against her, might be no prejudice to Apuleia.

Novv if these cases be vvell underst•…•…od, vve shall easily discover the cunning of Tiberius, vvhich con∣sisting in the vvay of introducing and enlarging the Lavv, hath need to take in a former consideration; and it is, that the Lavv of Treason, as concerning the name was in use also in the time of the Common∣vvealth, but contained not the same Heads, he onely being then intended to fall into this crime, vvho pra∣ctised any thing against the Common-vvealth, either by raising of Armies, or by making seditions amongst the People, never making reckoning of vvords, nor of such small matters, but onely of hainous things, as Ta∣citus in this place delivers.

To come then to our purpose, Tiberius being asked, if he vvould have the Lavv of Treason to be observed, ansvvered, the Lavves must be observed, as though he would say, he would have them in use, as they were in the time of the Common-wealth: where∣of he gave a proof in the first case, where Augustus

and Livia, and himselfe being injured, he pardoned all: and so you see the birth of the Lavv. Afterward in the second case, where himselfe and Augustus and Livia were injured, where in the first he had said, Deorum injurias diis curae; speaking of Augustus: in the second, he would have Apuleia for the words she had spoken against Augustus, to be punished; for the injury done to himselfe and Livia, he pardoned her: and so you see the growth of the Law: in confirma∣tion whereof, Tacitus hath these vvords, Adolescebat intercalex Majestatis. And here is to be considered, that Tiberius meaning to begin the grovvth of the Lavv of Treason, vvould not begin it, vvith making it be observed in his ovvn case, but in the case of Augu∣stus, requiring that boldly for another, vvhich vvith∣out blushing he could not have required for himselfe: and so much more in this case, as the demand vvas coloured vvith paternall piety, and therefore obliged the Senate the more, to punish them also vvho should use any such vvords against himselfe. Finally, there passed not much time, but by meanes of this Lavv, not onely they vvere punished who committed crimes against the Prince, but it came to that passe, that to every petty fault, and though but against a private per∣son, they gave the name of Treason, that so they might have colour to inflict capitall punishment at their pleasure, as in a thousand places of Tacitus his Bookes is written.

Id quoque Tiberii morum •…•…uit, continuare Imperia, ac plerosque ad finem in iisdem exercitibus aut Iurisdictionibus habere.

Whether it be good, that Officers should continue in their Places; and why this course was observed by Tiberius. The three and fiftieth Discourse.

TIberius (by as much as these words of Tacitus shew) used not to change his Officers, where∣by it happened, that oftentimes they died in their charge; but because Tiberius had many particu∣lar occasions that made him observe this custome, which in other Princes are not usuall; We will first speak of it in generall, whether it be a good course; and then in particular; and lastly we will give the rea∣sons of all.

Concerning the first, We cannot proceed vvithout distinction: vvhen the question is therefore, vvhether it be good to continue Officers, We may either mean it of Officers of Warre, or of those of Peace: If we speak of Officers in Warre, either it is in a warre where the Prince desires to make new Acquests; or else in a war which he makes onely for reputation, or some other small interest. If he make it, with a purpose of enlarg∣ing his Dominion, I cannot then commend the change of Officers, so long at least as there is no deme∣rit in the Captaine; (and this, for the many reasons I have shewed in a Discourse before:) but if hee have no other end, but onely to continue the warre, he may then change them as he pleaseth: whereupon we see, that Tiberius himself making warre in Germany for Re∣putation onely; Potius quam cupidine proferendi impe∣nii: changed his Generall, calling home Germanicus.

If we speake of Officers in Peace; either they are meane places, which can neither bring honour nor damage to the Prince, or some midling places; that have other Officers above them; or else they are chiefe & Principall places, that have none above them; and in these (to begin with the last) to continue the same men, is in a manner necessary (so long at least as they carry themselves worthily) as well because they are better acquainted with businesses; as also because it is a hard thing to find men able to discharge such places: and lastly, because if they should be removed; to ex∣alt them, is impossible; they being now at the highest; and to abase them, is dangerous: whereof in the Booke of Kings we have a notable Example in Iero∣boam, who rebelled against Solomon (as some Rab∣bines interpret; and very well in my opinion) onely for being put in an Office meaner than that he had before: For where before, he was collectour of the Tributes, of the Tribes of Manasses and Ephraim, he was now made overseer of the building of Millo, a much in∣feriour place than the other. In this case therefore it shall do well to use the custome of Tiberius, to continue them in their places, during their lives: provided that they be not made hereditary, as in some Kingdomes hath been done, with much detriment to the Prince.

Again, if we speake of midling places; to suffer them to continue, without hope of being changed, brings forth commonly many evil effects. The first is because all men labour for advancement, and their aime is al∣ways at principal places: endeavouring so much the more to do good service, as they know it to be a means to raise them higher; there being no doubt, but he will serve better, that hath advancement for his end, than hee that hath onely conservation for his Object: as we see, that young men eat more than old, because the end of these is onely to conserve themselves; but of the o∣ther,

to augment themselves. And therefore Sinan the Primovisior Generall of the Turke, against the Persi∣ans, knowing he could rise to no higher Dignity than he had already, was willing to hearken to Treatyes of peace, and pursued the war but coldly. Whereupon Benhadad (as in the sacred Text is written) had good counsell given him, that where in his armye hee had Two and thirty Kings, he should put in their places as many other valiant men, because They being at the highest, would never strein themselves much to fight, as knowing they could rise no higher: where other men to get advancement, would bestir themselves with greater vigour. This reason Abulensis brings in these wordes. Amove Reges fingulos ab Exercitutuo, & pone pro eis principes. For confirmation of this I have now said, the Example of Seianus (in my opinion) serves very fitly, who as long as hee had any hope to be ad∣vanced higher, he continued a good servant, and an ex∣cellent counsellour to his Prince: Quia Seianus incipiente adhuc potentia, bonis confiliis notescere volebat, but as soon as he was got to such a heigth that he could not hope to rise any higher, he then fell from his good service, and plunged himselfe in manifest villanyes. This rea∣son Tiberius understood well, and therefore when Sejanus was growne to a mighty heigth of greatnesse, to the end he might have occasion to continue his good service, made a shew he would yet raise him higher, Ipse quid intra animum volutaverim, quibu•…•…adhue necessi∣tudinibus immiscere te mihi parem, omittam ad praesens referre. Id tantum aperiam, nihil esse tam excelsum, quod non virtutes istae, tuusque in me animus mereantur. This is an excellent way, and ought to be observed with those who hold the prime places. Those therefore that are in midling places, should not be continued still, but have hope given them, that by their good service they may rise higher. Otherwise, besides the

reasons alleadged, there would follow another incon∣venience, that when they of the chiefe places die, the Prince should want others to put in their roomes; and consequently should be driven, to goe begging in forraine parts for principall Officers: who not being acquainted with businesses, and little affectionate (un∣lesse for their owne ends) to the Prince; they were like, (in my opinion) to doe but ill service, as neither knowing, nor being knowne. Whereupon the Apo∣stles, being make make an Election, did not use this man∣ner, Oportet ex his viris qui nobiscum sunt congregati, in omni tempore: and as it follows. To this may be ad∣ded, that Princes should continue meaner Officers in their places, but to make them fit for greater. This course the Venetians have alwayes used, and it was the ancient custome of the common-wealth of Rome, that when by the death of Senatours there were places void, they would fill them up out of the rankes next below them: an excellent course certainly; for their carriage being continually seene in lesse matters, It may easily be gathered what good service they are like to do in greater. From hence it was, that Fabius Ma∣ximus knew, that Titus Ottacillus was no fit man to go∣verne an Army; Titi Ottacilli in minore re experti operam tuam sum•…•… haud sane cur ad majora tibi fidamus, docu∣menti quicquam dedisti: But though I like well the changing of Officers, yet I like not they should bee changed often. First, because it is the property of them that are to leave a place, to burne (as the Proverbe is) their Cabbins; not so much for any hatred or envie they beare to their Successours, as for their owne be∣nefit: Whereof we have an example in Saint Matthew; where he relates, that one had beene possessed with a Devill many yeares, and never found any hurt by the evill Spirit all that while; but when the Devill percei∣ved he was to go forth of his body, he then fell to tea∣ring

him in most cruell manner. And just so it is with some that are in offices; if they thinke they shall stay any while in their places, they do not then so suddenly fall to fleece the Subjects; but if they finde they shall shortly leave them, they then begin to use extremities. And therefore the Officers of Galba, (as Tacitus reports) doubting they should stay but a small time in their places, by reason of the Princes old age, fell to fleecing: Jam afferebant vaenalia cuncta 〈◊〉〈◊〉 liberti. Ser vo∣rum manus subitis avidae; & tanquam apud senem festi∣nantes. But seeing it is necessary sometimes to change them, (as wee have observed before) whether the change be sooner or later; the best course is to do it upon a suddaine; that they may not do as Farmers use to do, when they are to part with a Farme, who to make the greater Vintage in their last yeare, care not how barren they make the Vines for the yeare fol∣lowing.

Now if we speak of those meane places, which bring some profit to the Officers, without any danger to the Prince, as some Magistrates that serve for shew, with little substance; in these the changes should be often; as well to the end, many may come to partake of the profit, as also thereby to get the love of all. And this differs not from the opinion of Tiberius; who when the Senate would have perswaded him to make a Magistrate, that continued in his place but one yeare, to continue in it five; he would not grant it. Grave moderationi suae tot eligere, tot differre; Vix per fingulos annos offensiones vitari; quamvis repulsam propinqua spes soletur; quantum odii fore ab his, qui ultra Quin quennium projiciantur. I know well, that this was not the mea∣ning of Tiberius; but yet the sentence hee gave may serve for my purpose. It remaines to shew, why Ti∣berius would never be drawne to change those he had once put in Offices: The first reason which Tacitus

alleadgeth, is set down in those words; Tedio novae cu∣ra, semel placita pro aeternis servavisse: that is, Tiberius finding it a trouble to make new Elections, was wil∣ling to continue the old; but seeing Tacitus tels not why it should be a trouble, it seemes to be but a cold reason which he brings: we may therefore rather say, that (as other Authours relate) Tiberius had in such manner used cruelty against any that had any vertue in them; that unlesse he should place men in Offices, that were unfit, he had much adoe, and hardly could finde any: and therefore no marvell, having once found some, if he were afterward loath to remove them. To this may be added (as Tacitus a little after saith) that though he saw many great wits in the Citie, that would have beene able to discharge such Offices; yet he, standing in feare of such men, chose rather to let them die in idlenesse, as seeking to put men in places, to which they were onely equall: Neque supra; that is, such as should not be good at making Innovations: of which sort of men, there is in all places great scarcity; and therefore when he once found such a one, he was never willing to change him; as by whom he might have good service done him; and that without dan∣ger. And this is an Exception to the Rule I made be∣fore; when they who are imployed are but equall to their imployment, and cannot hope to be imployed in any greater businesse; not for default in the Prince, but of ability in themselves. Again, it put him to the more trouble, as having a most acute wit; and consequently a wavering judgement, as Tacitus shewes us in those words: Vt callidum ejus ingenium, ita anxium judicium; a thing which alwayes happens to such persons, be∣cause being men that know much, they pierce into all difficulties; and consequently hardly resolve upon any thing, finding the darknesse of difficulties even in the light it selfe: as Moses, the first time that God called

him, having yet but a grosse braine, thought every thing Light; but the second time, when his braine was purged, he thought every thing Darknesse. The last reason, which Tacitus brings, (for the other to my seeming, are but confirmations of the first) is set down in these words; Quidam invidia, ne plures fruerentur; that is, Tiberius would not change his Officers, because he would not have many to be enriched by them. This conceit I cannot beleeve, that either Tiberiut, or Tacitus had; but that it is a meere idle fancie of the vulgar: seeing amongst the chiefe Precepts that Aristotle gives to Tyrants, this is one; Not to suffer Riches to be re∣duced into few hands: And besides, we may give the words a fitter exposition; which is, That T•…•…berius ha∣ving very few friends, if he should change his Officers often, he should be forced at last to bring in some that were his enemies: Whereupon out of very envy, least any enemy of his should grow rich, or get reputation; he was never willing to change his Officers often: which, when at last he could not avoid, but had pla∣ced in the Provinces certaine of his enemies, he would never suffer them to goe to their charge, but kept them alwayes neare about him, a course which many Prin∣ces take vvith their enemies; as by a thousand Exam∣ples (which for brevity I omit) may easily be known: wherein it happens to Princes, contrary to that of pri∣vate men; for these are safest, when their enemies are furthest off; but Princes, when they are nearest: and to this purpose are those words of Tacitus; Quae baefita∣tione postremo eo provectus, ut mandaverit quibusdam Pro∣vincias, quos egredi urbe non erat passurus. I should not give this sense to this place, if my interpretation were not made good by a passage in Suetonius; where hee saith, Vnum & alterum consulares, oblatis Provinciis, non ausus à se dimittere, eosque adeo detinuit, donec successores, post aliquos annos praesentibus daret.

I conclude then, that Tiberius did well to continue Officers in their charges; as well for the scarcity he had of fit persons, as also, and more, because he used to imploy men that were onely equall to the businesses: Other Princes shall do well to avoid all extreames.

One onely thing remaines to be advertised; that when I commend the course, not to change Officers often; I meane it should proceed from the Princes owne will, not thinking it fit he should binde him∣selfe to let them stay in their places any determinate time; as three yeares, or five, or more; without lea∣ving himselfe a power to remove them: For this would be to the Princes great prejudice; which Tibe∣rius considering, made the fore-alleadged answer to Asinius Gallus; Grave moderationi sue, and as it fol∣lowes: whereby vve may plainly see, that though Tiberius did not like to change his Officers often; yet he liked well to have it in his power to change them often.

FINIS.