Father Malebranche his treatise concerning the search after truth The whole work complete. To which is added the author's Treatise of nature and grace: being a consequence of the principles contained in the search. Together with his answer to the animadversions upon the first volume: his defence against the accusations of Monsieur De la Ville, &c. relating to the same subject. All translated by T. Taylor, M.A. late of Magdalen College in Oxford.

F. MALEBRANCHE'S TREATISE, CONCERNING The Search after Truth. BOOK the FIRST. Concerning The ERRORS of the SENSES.

CHAP. I.

I. Of the Nature and Properties of the UNDERSTANDING. II. Of the Nature and Properties of the WILL, and wherein the Liber∣ty of the SOUL consists.

ERROR is the Vniversal Cause of the Misery of Mankind; 'tis the corrupt Principle that has Produc'd Evil in the World: 'Tis this which breeds and cherishes in our Soul, all the Evils that afflict us; and we must never hope to establish a solid and real Happiness, but by seriously labouring to avoid it.

We are taught by the Holy Scriptures, that Men are only miserable, because they are Sinners, and Criminals; and they would neither be Sinners, nor Criminals, did they not make themselves Slaves to Sin, by taking part with Error.

If it be true then, That Error is the Source of all the Miseries of Men, 'tis very reasonable that Men should endeavour to free themselves from it; and certainly their Endeavour would not be altogether unprofitable, and unrewarded, though it met not with all the Success that they could wish. If Men should not hereby become Infallible, yet they would be much less sub∣ject to be Deceiv'd; and though they obtain'd not an absolute Deliverance from their Evils, they would however avoid a great part of them. An intire Felicity ought not to be expected in this Life, since in this Mortal State there can be no Pretensions to Infallibility; but the Endeavour against Error should be earnest and continual, because the Desire to being freed from Misery is incessant. In a word, as we fervently desire perfect Happiness, without the hopes of it; so we should ever industriously tend towards Infallibility, without pretending to it.

It should not be imagin'd there is much Difficulty to be undergone in the Search of Truth; 'Tis but opening the Eyes, becoming Attentive, and exactly observing some Rules we shall give in the * 1.1 following Discourse. An exactness of Thought has scarce any thing painful in it; 'tis not a slavery, as the Imagination represents it, and though we meet with some Difficulty at first, yet we find Satisfaction enough to recompense our Pains; for at last, 'tis this only which enlightens us, and guides us into Truth.

But not to spend time in preparing the Mind of the Reader, whom 'tis much more just to be∣lieve, sufficiently, of himself, dispos'd to the Search of Truth; let us examine the Causes and Na∣ture of our Errors; and since the Method of examining things by considering them in their Birth, and Origine, is the most regular and perspicuous, and serves better than others to give us a tho∣rough Knowledge of them, let us try to put it here in Practice.

The Mind of Man, being neither Material nor Extended, is undoubtedly a simple Substance,* 1.2 in∣divisible, and without any Composition of Parts; Notwithstanding it has been the Custom to di∣stinguish in it two Faculties, namely, the Vnderstanding and the Will, which it is necessary in the first place to explain. For it seems that the Notions or Idea's Men have of these two Faculties, are not so clear or distinct as they ought to be.

But because these Idea's are very Abstract, and fall not under the Imagination, it seems not amiss to express them by the Resemblance they bear to the Properties belonging to Matter, which being easie to be Imagin'd, will render the Notions which may conveniently be apply'd to these two Words Vnderstanding and Will, more distinct, and also more familiar to Vs; only this Cau∣tion must be observ'd, that these Resemblances betwixt the Mind and Matter, are not perfectly just; And that these two kinds of Beings are only compar'd in order to make the Mind more At∣tentive, and to make others, as it were, sensible of our meaning.

Matter, or Extension, contains in it two Properties or Faculties; the first Faculty is that of receiving different Figures, and the second is its capacity of being mov'd: In like manner the Mind of Man includes two Faculties; the first, which is the Vnderstanding, is that of receiving many Idea's, that is, of perceiving many things; the second, which is the Will, is the Faculty of re∣ceiving many Inclinations, or of Willing different things. We will begin with an explication of the Resemblances the first of the Faculties belonging to Matter, has to the first of the two Facul∣ties appertaining to the Mind.

Extension is capable of admitting two kinds of Figures, The one is only External, as the Round∣ness of a piece of Wax, the other is Internal, and is peculiar to all the little parts the Wax is com∣pos'd of; for it is most certain that all the little parts which go to the Composition of a piece of Wax, are of a Figure very different from those, which constitute a piece of Iron. Therefore I call that which is external, barely Figure, and I term the internal Figure, Configuration; which is peculiarly necessary to the Wax to make it what it is.

So likewise it may be said that the Idea's of the Soul are of two sorts, taking the name of Idea in general for whatever the Mind immediately perceives. The first give Us a Representation of something without Us, as of a Square, or an House, &c. The second represent to Us only what we find within Us, as our Sensations, Pain, Pleasure, or the the like. For we shall make it plain hereafter, that these last Idea's are only a manner of the Mind's existing; and for that reason I call them the Modifications of the Mind.

Thus also the Inclinations of the Soul might be call'd Modifications of the same Soul: For it be∣ing manifest that the Inclination of the Will is a manner of existing of the Soul, it might be term'd a Modification of the Soul; just as Motion in Bodies, being a manner of existing of those Bodies, might be said to be a Modification of Matter: Notwithstanding I do not term the Inclinations of the Will, or the Motions of Matter, Modifications, for as much as both those Inclinations, and those Motions have commonly a reference to something that's external; for the Inclinations stand related unto Good, and the Motions have a reference to some separate Body. But the Figures and Configurations of Bodies, and the Sensations of the Soul have no necessary relation to any thing with∣out. For as a Figure is round when all the external parts of a Body are equally distant from one of its parts, which we call the Centre, without relation to any thing external; so all the Sensa∣sations we are capable of, might have their subsistence, though there were no outward object in the World: Their being includes not any necessary relation to the Bodies which seem to cause them, as we shall elsewhere prove; and they are nothing but the very Soul, modify'd in such, or such a manner; so that they are properly Modifications of the Soul. Let me then take leave to name them so, in order to explain my self.

The first, and principal Agreement, or Resemblance, that is found betwixt the Faculty which Matter has of receiving different Figures, and different Configurations; and that which the Soul has of receiving different Idea's, and different Modifications is this, That as the Faculty of re∣ceiving different Figures, and different Configurations in Bodies, is intirely passive, and contains nothing at all of Action, so the Faculty of receiving different Idea's, and different Modifications in the Mind, is altogether passive and includes no Action at all. I call that Faculty or Capacity, the Soul has of receiving all these things, the UNDERSTANDING.

Whence we ought to conclude, That 'tis the Vnderstanding which perceives; since 'tis only its business to receive the Idea's of Objects: For, for the Soul to perceive an Object, and to receive the Idea which represents it, is one and the same thing: 'Tis also the Vnderstanding which per∣ceives the Modifications of the Soul, since I mean by this word Vnderstanding, that passive Faculty of the Soul, by means of which it receives all the different Modifications it is capable of. For it is the same thing for the Soul to receive a mode of existence, which we call pain, as to perceive Pain, since it has no other way of receiving Pain, than by the Perception of it; whence it may be inferr'd, that 'tis the Vnderstanding that imagines the Objects that are absent, and is sensible of those that are present; and that the Senses and Imagination, are nothing but the Vnderstanding, perceiving Ob∣j••cts by the Organs of the Body, as shall be explain'd hereafter.

But because in the Sensation of Pain, or any thing else, Men generally perceive it by the media∣tion of the Organs of Sense; they customarily say they are the Senses which perceive it, without knowing distinctly what it is they mean by the word Sense: They fancy there is some Faculty di∣stinct from the Soul, which renders It, or the Body capable of Sensation, as believing the Organs of Sense do really participate of our Perceptions. They imagine the Body is so assistant to the Mind, in its Sensations, that if the Mind was separate from the Body, it could have no Sensation at all. But these thoughts are the effects of Prejudice; and because in the State we are in, we are sensible of nothing but through the use of the Instruments of Sense, as shall be shewn elsewhere more at large. 'Tis by way of accommodating my self to the ordinary way of Speaking that I say, in the Process of my Discourse, the Senses perceive; but by the word Sense I mean nothing but that passive Faculty of the Soul before-mention'd, that is, the Understanding perceiving any

thing, on occasion of what happens in the Organs of her Body, according to the Institutions of Na∣ture, as shall be explain'd in another place.

The other Resemblance between the passive Faculty of the Soul, and that of Matter, is this, That as Matter receives no real alteration by the change which happens in its Figure; I mean, for instance, that as Wax receives no considerable change by becoming Round or Square; so the Mind receives no change by the diversity of Idea's it contains; I would say, the Mind receives no consi∣derable change though it receives the Idea of a Square, or a Circle, in perceiving a Square, or a Circle.

Again, As it may be said that Matter receives considerable Changes, when it loses the Configu∣ration, peculiar to the parts of Wax, to take that which is proper to those of Fire and Smoak, when the Wax is chang'd into Fire and Smoak; so it may be said that the Soul undergoes very conside∣rable Changes, when it alters its Modifications, and suffers Pain after it has felt Pleasure. Whence we ought to conclude, That Idea's are to the Soul, in a manner what Figures are to Matter, and that Configurations are to Matter, almost what Sensations are to the Soul.

There are still other Corrsepondencies betwixt the Figures and Configurations of Matter, and the Idea's and Modifications of the Mind; for Matter seems to be an Image, or Representative of the Mind, I mean only that there are Properties in Matter which have some mutual Respects between them, not unlike those which we find between the Properties belonging to the Mind; though the Nature of the Mind is very different from that of Matter, as we shall clearly see in that which follows.

From what I have said I would have it well remember'd, That by Vnderstanding I mean that passive Faculty the Soul has of Perceiving, that is of receiving not only different Idea's, bat also an abundance of different Sensations, as Matter has a capacity of receiving all sorts of external Figures, and internal Configurations.

The other Faculty of Matter is that of its being capable of receiving many Motions, and the other Faculty of the Soul is that Power it has of receiving many Inclinations.* 1.3 Let us make the Com∣parison between them.

As the Author of Nature is the Universal Cause of all those Motions which we find in Mat∣ter, so also he is the general Cause of all those natural Inclinations which are found in the Mind: And as all Motions proceed in a right line, unless otherwise determin'd by the Rencounter, of some foreign and particular Causes, which by their Opposition, put them into a Circular course; so all the Inclinations we receive from God, have a direct tendency, and could only aim at the possession of Good and Truth, were there not some extraneous cause, which biass'd that natural Impression towards corrupt and mischievous Ends: Now 'tis that foreign Cause which is the cause of all our Evils, and depraves all our Inclinations.

To understand this rightly, we must know, there's a very considerable difference, between the Impression or Motion the Author of Nature produces in Matter, and the Impression or Motion to∣wards Good in general, wherewith the same Author of Nature continually influences our Soul: For Matter is wholly inactive; it has no power of retarding, or stopping its Motion, or determining and turning it one way rather than another. Its Motion, as I have said, proceeds always in a right line, and if at any time it is hindred, from continuing it in that manner, it describes the greatest circular Line it can, and consequently that which comes nearest to a right, because 'tis God that impresses its Motion, and rules its Determination. But 'tis not so with the Will, which may in one sense be said * 1.4 to be Active, and to have a Power in it self of giving a different Determination to the Inclination, or Impression it receives from God; for though it cannot stop this Impression, it may in one sense cause a Deviation to what side it pleases, and thereby produce all those Disor∣ders, which happen in its Inclinations, and all the Miseries which are the certain and necessary Consequents of Sin.

So that by the Word WILL, I would be conceiv'd to design, That natural Motion or Im∣pression which carries us towards Good universal, and undetermin'd. And by that of LIBERTY, I mean nothing more than The Power the Mind has of turning that Impression towards agreeable Objects; and terminating our natural Inclinations upon some particular Object, which before were loose and undeter∣min'd, except towards general or universal Good; that is to say, towards God, who is alone universal Good, since 'tis he alone who comprehends in himself all Goods.

Whence it is easie to discover, That though our natural Inclinations are Voluntary, yet they are not Free with that Freedom of Indifference I am speaking ••f; which contains a Power of wil∣ling or not willing, or rather of willing the contrary to what our natural Inclinations carry us. For though it is Voluntarily and Freely that a Man loves Good in general; since there is no Love but proceeds from the Will, and 'tis a contradiction, for the Will to suffer violence or constraint: However 'tis impossible to Love it with that Freedom I have just explain'd, since 'tis not in the Power of the Will not to wish to be Happy.

But it must be observ'd, that the Mind consider'd under so strong a bent towards Good in ge∣neral, cannot determine its Motion towards a particular Good, unless the same Mind, consider'd as susceptible of Idea's, has knowledge of that particular Good; I would say, to make use of the ordinary terms, that the Will is a blind Power, that can make no advances to things but what are represented to it by the Vnderstanding; so that the Will can not diversly determine its Propensity to Good, or over-rule the direct Bent of his natural Inclinations, but by * 1.5 commanding the Vnder∣standing to represent it to some particular Object. The power then that the Will has of determi∣ning its Inclinations, necessarily contains an ability of applying the Uderstanding to the Objects which it likes.

That what I have said concerning the Will, and Liberty may be better understood, I will make it familiar by an Instance: A Man represents to himself an Honour or Preferment under the Notion of a Good, which he may hope for, and immediately his Will wills this Good; that is, the Impression which is continually carrying the Soul towards Universal and undetermin'd Good, inclines it to∣wards this Honour; But whereas this Honour is not the Universal Good, nor is consider'd by a clear and distinct view of the Mind, as Universal Good, (for the Mind can never see clearly That which is not) the Impression we have towards Universal Good is not stopt by this particular Good: The Mind has a tendency to go farther; it is not necessarily and invincibly in Love with this Honour, but is intirely at its Choice and Liberty in this respect. Now its Liberty consists in this, that being not fully convinc'd that this Honour comprehends all the Good it is capable of Loving, it may suspend both its Judgment and its Love; and thereupon, as shall be shewn in the Third Book, may, through the Union it has with the Universal Being, or that Being which contains all Good, think of other things, and consequently Love other Goods: Finally, it may compare all Goods toge∣ther, and love them according to that order, in the Proportion they are lovely, and refer them all to that one which contains all, and which alone is fit to fix bounds to our Love, as being the only one, that is capable of filling all the Capacity we have of Loving.

Almost the same thing may be said of the Knowledge of Truth, as of the Love of Good. We Love the Knowledge of Truth, as the Injoyment of Good, through a natural Impression; and that Impression is no more invincible, than that which carries us towards Good; that which makes it so, is only Evidence, or a perfect and intire Knowledge of the Object. And we have equal Liberty in our false Judgments as in our inordinate Affections, as shall be made to appear in the next Chapter.

CHAP. II.

I. Of our Judgments, and Reasonings. II. That they depend upon the Will. III. The Vse which should be made of its Liberty on their account. IV. Two general Rules for the avoiding Error and Sin. V. Some general Refle∣ctions upon those Rules.

IT might be readily inferr'd from what has been said in the precedent Chapter, that the Understanding never judges,* 1.6 since it goes no farther than Perception; or that the Judgments and Reasonings which the Understanding makes, are nothing but pure Perceptions: That 'tis the Will alone which really judges, by acquiescing in, and voluntarily resting upon, what the Understanding represents: And thus it is the Will alone which leads us into Error: But this requires a larger Explication.

I say then, there is no other difference on the part of the Understanding, between a simple Perception, a Judgment, and a Reasoning, than that the Understanding perceives a simple thing, with∣out relation to any thing whatsoever, by a simple Perception; that it perceives the Relations be∣tween two things or more, in its Judgments: And lastly, that it perceives the Relations, which are betwixt the Relations of things, in its Reasonings; wherefore all the Operations of the Under∣standing, are nothing but pure Perceptions.

In Perceiving, for Example, twice 2, or 4, there is only a simple Perception. In Judging that twice 2 are 4, or that twice 2 make not 5, the Understanding only perceives the Relation of Equality found between twice 2 and 4; or the Relation of Inequality between twice 2 and 5. Thus the Judgment, in point of the Understanding, is only the Preception of the Relation which is found between two things or more. But Reasoning is the Perception, not of the Relation which is found between two things or more, for that would be a Judgment; but, of the Relation which is found between two or more Relations of two or more Things. Thus when I infer that 4 being less than 6, twice 2 being equal to 4, are consequently less than 6, I not only Perceive the Relation of Ine∣quality between 2 and 2, and 6, for that would be only a Judgment; but the Relation of Inequa∣lity which is between the Relation of twice 2 and 4, and that Relation between 4 and 6, which is a Reasoning: The Understanding then does only perceive, and 'tis the Will alone which judges and reasons by voluntary resting upon what the Understanding represents to it; as has been already said.

* 1.7Notwithstanding, when things which come under our Consideration, are palpably Evident, our Consent seems to be no longer Voluntary, whence we are ready to believe that 'tis not our Will but our Vnderstanding that judges thereof.

But that we may be sensible of our Error, we must know that the things we consider never appear with that Convincing Evidence, till the Understanding has throughly examin'd all their Parts and Relations necessary to form a Judgment of them; whereupon it happens that the Will, which can will nothing without knowledge, can act no longer on the Understanding; that is, cannot desire the Understanding to represent something new in its Object, since it has already consider'd all the parts of it any ways relating to the question to be decided, it is therefore ob∣lig'd

to rest upon what has been already represented, and cease from its Agitation and Casting about; 'tis this Acquiescence of the Will which is properly a Judgment or Reasoning. Thus be∣cause this Acquiescence or Judgment is not left Free, when things strike us with that Evident Con∣viction, we fansie likewise that it is not Voluntary.

But as long as there is any Obscurity in the Subject we consider, and we are not perfectly assur'd, we have discover'd all that's necessary to the Resolution of the Question, as it most commonly happens in those which are abstruse and difficult, and include many Relations; we are free to deny our Consent, and the Will may still command the Vnderstanding, to apply it self to something new: Which makes us not so averse to believe that the Judgments we form on such kind of Subjects are Voluntary.

Howbeit, the generality of Philosophers suppose that even the Judgments we form upon things obscure, are no ways Voluntary, and will have the Consent to Truth in general, to be an Action of the Vnderstanding, which they call Assensus, to distinguish it from the Consent to Good, which they attribute to the Will, and term Consensus; but see the cause of their Distinction and Mistake.

Which is, That in this state of Life, we often evidently perceive some Truths, without any reason to Doubt of them; and so the Will remains not indifferent in the Consent it gives to Truths so manifest, as has been just explain'd: But 'tis not so in point of Good, there being no Particu∣lar Good we know, but we have reason to doubt, whether we ought to Love it. Our Passions and Inclinations, which we naturally have for Sensible Pleasures, are, though confus'd, yet, through the Corruption of our Nature, very strong Reasons, which render us cold and indifferent even in the Love of God himself: And so we are manifestly sensible of our Indifference, and are inward∣ly convinc'd, we make use of our Liberty in our Loving GOD.

But we do not in like manner apprehend that we imploy our Liberty in Consenting to Truth, especially when accompanied with full Evidence and Conviction; which induces us to believe our Consent to Truth is not Voluntary: As if it was necessary our Actions should be indifferent to be∣come Voluntary, and that the Blessed did not love God most Willingly, without being diverted from it by something or other; in like manner as we Consent to that evident Proposition that twice 2 are 4, without being diverted from the Belief of it by any shew of a contrary Reason.

But to the end we may distinctly discover, what the difference is between the Consent of the Will to Truth, and its Consent to Goodnes••, it is requisite to know the difference which is found between Truth and Goodness, taken in the ordinary acceptation, and with reference to us. That difference consists in this, That we have an Interest and Concern in Goodness, but Truth does not at all affect us: For Truth consists only in the Relation which two things or more ha•••• between them, but Goodness consists in the Relation of agreement which things have with our selves;* 1.8 which is the reason that the Will has but One Action in respect of Truth, which is its Acquie∣scence in, or Consent to, the Representation of the Relation which is betwixt things; and that it has two in respect of Goodness, namely, its Acquiescence in, or Consent to, the Relation of agree∣ment the thing has with our selves, and its Love or Tendency towards that thing, which actions are extreamly different, though they are usually confounded: For there is a great deal of diffe∣rence betwixt simply Acquiescing, and being carried to love the thing which the Mind repre∣sents, since we often Acquiesce in things we could gladly wish were not, and which we have an aversion to.

Now upon a due consideration of things, it will visibly appear; That 'tis ever the Will which Acquiesces, not only in things if they be agreeable to it, but the Representation of things; and that the reason of the Will's Acquiescing always in the Representation of things of the clearest Evidence, is, as we have already said, because there is no farther Relation in them necessary to be consider'd, which the Vnderstanding has not already throughly discuss'd: Insomuch that 'tis, as it were, necessary for the Will to leave off disquieting and tireing it self in vain, and to rest satis∣fy'd in a full assurance, that it is not deceived, since there is nothing left, to put the Vnderstand∣ing upon a fresh Inquiry.

This is especially to be observ'd, that in the Circumstances we are under, we have but a very imperfect Knowledge of things, and consequently there is an absolute necessity we should have this Liberty of Indifference whereby we are impower'd to withold our selves from giving our Consent.

For the better discovering this Necessity, it must be consider'd, that we are carry'd by our Natural Inclinations to the imbracing Truth and Goodness; so that the Will, never reaching after things, but what the Mind has some notice and apprehension of, must needs pursue that which has the Face and Appearance of Truth and Goodness. But because all that has the look of Truth and Good, is not always what it appears to be; it is plain that if the Will had not this Liberty, but must infallibly and necessarily have embrac'd every thing that came cloath'd with an Appea∣rance of Truth and Goodness, it would have almost ever been Deceived. Whence probably it might be concluded, That the Author of its Being, was the Author of its Errors and Seducements.* 1.9

We have therefore a Liberty given us by God, that we might avoid falling into Error, and all the Evils consequent upon Errors, by not resting with a full Assurance upon Probabilities, but only upon Truth; that is, by commanding the Mind, with an indefatigable Application, to examine every thing till it has fully enlightned and unravell'd all that comes under its Examina∣tions. For Truth generally comes attended with Evidence, and Evidence consists in a clear

and distinct View of all the Parts and Relations of the Object which are necessary to give a cer∣tain and well-grounded Judgment.

The use then we should make of our Liberty is to IMPLOY IT AS FAR AS IT WILL GO. That is, never to consent to any thing whatever until we are, as it were, forc'd to't, by the secret Reproaches of our Reason.

To submit our selves to the false Appearance of Truth, is to inslave our selves contrary to the Will of God; but honestly to yield to the inward Reproaches of our Reason, which accom∣pany the Denial of our Submission unto Evidence, is to obey the Voice of Eternal Truth, which speaks within us. Here then are Two Rules founded upon what I have been saying, which are the most necessary of all others, both for Speculative Sciences and Morality, and which may be look'd on as the Foundation of all Humane Sciences.

* 1.10The First which respects the Sciences is this: A Man should never give an entire Consent, but only to Propositions which appear so evidently true, that he cannot deny it them without feeling an internal Pain, and the secret Vpbraidings of his Reason: that is, without being plainly convinc'd, he would make an ill use of his Liberty, in case he should refuse to give his Consent, or would extend its Power over things where it has no Right, or Jurisdiction.

The Second relating to Morality is this: A Man ought never to fix his Love absolutely on any Good, if he can without Remorse refuse to Love it. From whence it follows, That nothing but God ought to be Loved absolutely, and independently. For He alone it is, that we cannot forbear Loving in that Nature without an inward Remorse, that is, without evident Conviction of doing Ill, upon Sup∣position we have arriv'd to the Knowledge of Him, through the means of Reason or of Faith.

* 1.11But it must here be observ'd, That when things which we perceive come recommended with strong Probability, we are extreamly ready to Believe them. We feel our selves in Pain, when we will not suffer Persuasion to Break in upon us; insomuch that were we not very cautious, we should be in danger of Consenting to them, consequently of being Deceiv'd; for 'tis a great Chance, whether Truth be found entirely to agree with the Probability. And for this Reason, I have expresly put in the two Rules; That nothing should be consented to, without palpable Conviction, that Evil use would be made of a Man's Liberty in not Consenting.

But though we find our selves most readily inclin'd to Consent to a Probability, or a likelihood, yet if we would be at the pains of making Reflexion, whether we perceive our selves evidently oblig'd to consent to it, we should doubtless find we were not. For if this likelihood be founded upon the Impressions of our Senses, (a likelihood by the way that very ill deserves the Name) a Man finds himself readily dispos'd to yield consent to it. But no other Cause can be assign'd for this, but some Passion or general Affection he has for that which affects or concerns the Senses, as shall be sufficiently shewn in the following Discourse.

But if the likelihood proceeds from some Conformity with Truth, as ordinarily Probable No∣tices are True, taken in a certain Sense; then if a Man examines his own Breast, he will find himself inclin'd to do two things; The one is to Believe, and the other to make farther Inquiry still: But he will never find himself so fully persuaded, as to think he does evidently ill, if he does not Consent at all.

Now these two Inclinations, a Man has in respect of Things Probable, are very Good. For He may and ought to give his Consent to Things Probable or Verisimilar taken in a Sense which de∣notes the Image of Truth; but he ought not however to yield an entire Consent, as we have precaution'd in the Rule; and he must examine all the latent sides, and faces yet undiscover'd; so as to enter fully into the Nature of the thing, and to distinguish what is True from what is False, and then to give an entire Consent if the Evidence oblige him to it.

He must then be well accustom'd to distinguish Truth from Probability, by examining himself inwardly, as I have been Explaining: For 'tis for want of this Care of Examining a Man's self in this Nature, that he perceives himself Touch'd and Affected almost in the same manner, by two different things; For, in fine, 'tis of the greatest Consequence to make a good use of this Liberty by perpetually bridling in our Consent, and Affection to things, till we find our selves, as it were, forc'd to let them go, by the Commanding Voice of the Author of Nature, which I call'd before the Reproaches of our Reason, and the Remorse of our Consciences.

All the Duties of Spiritual Beings, as well Angels as Men, consist principally in the good use of this Liberty; and we may say, without any scruple, That if they carefully Imploy their Li∣berty, and not preposterously render themselves slaves to Lyes and Vanity, they are in the ready way to the greatest Perfection they are naturally capable of; Provided, in the mean time, their Vnderstanding stands not idle, and that they are careful continually to excite it to new Discove∣ries, and that they render themselves dispos'd for the Reception of greater Truths, by perpetu∣ally Meditating on Subjects worthy of their Attention.

For that the Mind may advance to its Perfection, it will not suffice a Man constantly to make use of its Liberty, by Consenting to nothing at all; like those Men who take Pride in knowing nothing, in doubting and boggling at every thing in Nature: Nor on the other hand must he Consent to all things like many Others, who fear nothing so much as to be Ignorant of any thing, and pre∣tend to Universal Knowledge. But he must make so good use of his Vnderstanding, by continual Meditations, as to find himself in a Capacity of being able to Consent to what it represents, with∣out Fear or Danger of being Deceiv'd.

CHAP. III.

I. The Answers to some Objections. II. Observations upon what has been said concerning the Necessity of Evidence.

'TIS no hard thing to foresee that the Practice of the First Rule, which I have been treating of in the foregoing Chapter, will not go very well down with a great part of Mankind; But especially with those Imaginary Philosophers, who pretend to the Knowledge of every thing, but really know nothing at all: Who please themselves in talking Positively upon the most difficult Subjects, and yet are certainly at the same time Ignorant of the more Ordinary and Easie.

I question not but they would be ready to say with Aristotle, That Absolute Certainty is no where to be sought for, but in the Mathematicks;* 1.12 That Physicks and Moral Philosophy are such Sci∣ences as take up with meer Probability. That Des-Cartes was very much out in his Design of handling Physicks like Geometry; and that for that Reason he had no better Success. That 'tis not possible for Men to arrive to the Knowledge of Nature, that her Secret Springs and Move∣ments lie too deep to be pierc'd by an Humane Mind; with a great deal more of such fine Things as these, which they put off with Pomp and Ostentation, and which they support with the Au∣thority of a vast Flight of Authors, whose Names they can repeat, and out of which they can quote a Passage on Occasion; and this is sufficient for them to plume themselves and look big upon.

I would heartily beg of these Gentlemen, they would leave off talking of those things which they themselves acknowledge they do not Understand; and would put a stop to the ridiculous Motives of their Vanity, by ceasing to compose large Volumes on those Subjects which, by their own Confession, they Know nothing of

But I would have those Men seriously examine, whether one of these two Things is not ab∣solutely Necessary, either to fall into Error, or never to give an entire Consent, except to things entirely Evident; Whether the Reason that Geometry is ever attended with Truth, may not be ascrib'd to the Geometricians Observation of that Rule: And whether the Errors some have fallen into touching the Quadrature of the Circle, the Duplication of the Cube, and some other very difficult Problems, have not proceeded from an heady and conceited rashness which has pos∣sess'd them with Likelihoods, and made them pass for Truths.

Let them consider likewise on another hand, whether the Cause of Error and Confusion's reigning so much in the Ordinary Philosophy, may not be imputed to the Philosophers content∣ing themselves with Probability, very easie and obvious to be met with, and highly advantagious to their Vain Humour and their Interests? Do not we almost every where find an infinite Diver∣sity of Opinions upon the same Subjects, and consequently infinite Errors? Notwithstanding a prodigious number of Disciples give way to their own Seducements, and submit themselves blind-fold to the Authority of these Philosophers, without so much as Understanding what their Opinions are.

It is true there are some of them that after twenty or thirty Years time lost, confess they have learnt nothing by their Reading; but yet this their Confession is not so Ingenuous as it should be. They think it requisite first to prove after their fashion, that nothing can be known; and after that they will make Confession of their Ignorance, as Believing then they have the Privilege of doing it without being laught at for their Pains.

Yet were a Man dispos'd to entertain himself, he would not want a proper Subject for his Laughter and Diversion, should he handsomely Interrogate them, concerning the Progress of their Learned Acquisitions: and were they in Humour to declare in particular all the Fatigues they have undergone in the Study and Purchace of Nothing.

But though this their Learn'd and Profound Ignorance deserves to be well rally'd, yet it seems not amiss to spare them at present, and to commiserate those who have spent so many Years in Learning nothing but that false Proposition, the irreconcileable Enemy to all Science and to all Truth, That nothing can be known.

Since then the Rule I have establish'd is so necessary as has been seen, in the Search after Truth, let no Man Cavil at the proposing it. And let not those, who will not be at the pains of observing it themselves, be forward to condemn so celebrated an Author as Des-Cartes for following it, or according to their Notion, for indeavouring so zealously to follow it.

They would not be so peremptory to condemn him, did they know the Man on whom they pass so rash and unadvis'd a Sentence, and did they not read his Works as they do Fables and Romances, which they take up to entertain their idle Minutes, but never to Study or be Instru∣cted in. Would they Meditate with that Author, they might probably still find in themselves some Notions and Scatter'd Seeds of Truth, which he teaches, that would grow up, and unfold themselves in spight of so disadvantagious a Load of mistaken Learning which oppresses them.

The Master that speaks and teaches us within, challenges our Submission to him rather than to the Authority of the greatest Philosophers: He takes pleasure in instructing us, provided we ap∣ply

our Minds to what he says. 'Tis by Meditation and a very exact Attention we Inquire of him; and 'tis by a certain internal Conviction and the secret Lashes and Reproaches felt upon our Non-submission that he answers us.

We ought in such wise to read the Works of Men, as not to expect to receive Instruction from Men: We must consult Him who Enlightens the World, that with the Rest of the World he may Enlighten us. And if he fails to Enlighten us, after we have consulted him, 'tis doubtless, because we have ill consulted him.

Whether then we read Aristotle or whether we read Des-Cartes, we must not instantly believe either Aristotle or Des-Cartes: But we should only Meditate as they have done, or as they ought to have done, with all the Earnestness and Attention we are capable of, and thereupon Obey the Voice of our common Master, and honestly yield up our Consent to that Internal Conviction, and those Motions we find in us upon our Meditation.

This being done, it may be allow'd a Man to pass a Judgment for or against an Author. But he must first have digested the Principles of Des-Cartes and Aristotle's Philosophy before he can reject the one, and approve the other; before he can maintain concerning the Latter, that no one Phaenomenon of Nature can ever be explain'd by the Principles peculiar to him, as they have been of no use for this two thousand Years, though his Philosophy hath been the Study of the most In∣genious Men in most parts of the World: And on the contrary, before he can boldly pronounce of the Other, that he hath penetrated those recesses of Nature that lay deepest conceal'd from the Eyes of Men, and hath open'd to them a most certain and infall••ble way of Discovering all the Truths 'tis possible for a limited understanding to Comprehend.

But not to dwell upon the Notion we may conceive of these two Philosophers, and of all others; let us ever look upon them as Men: And let not those of Aristotle's Party take it ill, if after they have travell'd so many Ages in the Dark without finding themselves one step farther advanc'd than at their setting out; there are some at last that have a Mind to see clearly what they do: And if after the former have suffer'd themselves to be led like the blind, there are those who remember they have Eyes with which they will attempt to conduct themselves.

Let us then be fully persuaded that this Rule, viz. That an entire Consent should never be given, but to things evidently perceiv'd, is the most necessary of all others in the Search after Truth; and let not our Mind embrace any thing as True, which is not accompany'd with all the Evidence it de∣mands. 'Tis requisite we should be persuaded of this to disburthen us of our Prejudices: And 'tis absolutely necessary we should entirely quit our Prejudices, to enter into the Knowledge of Truth, for as much as there is an absolute Necessity that our Mind be purify'd before it be inlight∣ned. Sapientia prima Stultitiâ caruisse.

* 1.13But Before I conclude this Chapter, 'tis necessary to observe three Things. The First is, That I speak not here of things of Faith, which have no Evidence attending them, as have Natural Sci∣ences: The Reason of which seems to be this, That we can have no Perception of Things but from the Idea's we have of them. Now the Idea's we have, are only given us by God, according to our Exigencies and the need we have of them to conduct us in the Natural Order of Things, according to which he has Created us. So that the Mysteries of Faith being of a Supernatural Or∣der, we need not wonder if we want that Evidence, since we want the Idea's of them; because our Souls were Created by vertue of a General Decree, through which we have all the Notions that are necessary for us,* 1.14 but the Mysteries of Faith have receiv'd their Establishment only from an Order of Grace; which, in our ordinary way of Conception, is a Decree posteriour to this Or∣der of Nature.

Mysteries then of Faith must be distinguish'd from things of Nature: We ought equally to sub∣mit to Faith and to Evidence; but in the concernments of Faith, we must not look for Evidence; as in those of Nature, we ought not to take up with Faith: That is, with the Authority of Philo∣sophers. In a word, to be a Believer, 'tis requir'd to Assent blindly, but to be a Philosopher, it is necessary to See plainly.

'Tis not however to be deny'd but there are some Truths besides those of Faith, for which it would be unreasonable to demand indisputable Demonstrations, as are those which relate to Mat∣ter of Fact in History, and other things which have their dependence on the Will of Men. For there are two kinds of Truth; the one Necessary, the other Contingent. I call Necessary Truths those which are immutable by their Nature, and those which have been fix'd and determin'd by the Will of God, which is not subject to Change. All other sorts of Truth are Contingent▪ Ma∣thematicks, Physicks, Metaphysicks, as also a great part of Morality contain Necessary Truths: Hi∣story, Grammar, Private Right, or Customs, and such other things as depend on the changeable Will of Man, contain only Contingent Truths.

We demand therefore an exact Observation of the Rule we have been establishing, in the Search of Necessary Truths, the Knowledge of which may be call'd Science; and we must be content with the greatest Probability in History, which includes the Knowledge of things Contingent. For under the general Name of History may be concluded the Knowledge of Languages, Customs, as also of the different Opinions of Philosophers; when Men have only learnt them by Memory, without having either Evidence or Certainty concerning them.

The Second thing to be Observ'd, is that in Morality, Politicks and Medicine, and in all Practi∣cal Sciences, we are obliged to be content with Probability; Not Universally, but upon occasion; not because it satisfies the Mind, but because the Instance is pressing: And if a Man should al∣ways delay Acting, till he had perfect Assurance of Success, the Opportunity would be often

lost. But though it falls out that a Man must inevitably act, yet he should in acting doubt of the Success of what he does: And he should indeavour to make such Advances in Sciences, as to be able on Emergencies to act with greater Certainty; For this should be the constant end of all Mens Study and Employment, who make any use of Thought.

The Third and last thing is this, That we should not absolutely despise Probabilities, since it often happens that many of them in Conjunction, have as convincing a force, as most evident Demonstrations. Of which Nature there are infinite Examples to be found in Physicks and Mo∣rality: So that 'tis often expedient to amass together a sufficient number of them in subjects not otherwise Demonstrable, in order to come to the Knowledge of Truth, impossible to be found out any other way.

And now I must needs confess that the Law I impose is very Rigorous and Severe; That there are abundance of Those who had rather renounce Reasoning at all, than Reason on such Condi∣tions; That 'tis impossible to run so fast, with such retarding Circumspections. However, it must be granted me, that a Man shall walk with greater Security in observing it, and that hither∣to those who have march'd so hastily, have been oblig'd to return upon the same Ground: Besides, there are a great number of Men who will agree with me in this, That since Monsieur Des-Cartes has discover'd more Truths in Thirty Years, than all the Philosophers that preceded him, meerly for his Submission to that Law; if many others would study Philosophy as he has done, we should in time be acquainted with the greatest part of those things which are necessary to make Life as happy as is possible, upon an Earth which God has Curs'd.

CHAP. IV.

I. Of the Occasional Causes of Error, whereof there are Five Principal. II. The general Design of the whole Work. III. The particular Design of the First Book.

WE have seen from what has been said, that a Man falls not into Error, but for want of making a due use of his Liberty; that 'tis for want of curbing that eagerness of the Will, and moderating its Passion for the bare appearances of Truth, that he is de∣ceiv'd: And that Error consists only in the Consent of the Will, which has a greater Latitude than the Perception of the Understanding, since we should never err if we only simply judg'd according as we perceiv'd.

But though, to speak properly, there is no other cause of Error,* 1.15 than the ill use of our Li∣berty, it may notwithstanding be said, we have several Faculties that are the Causes of our Er∣rors; not Real Causes, but such as may be term'd Occasional: All the ways of our Perceiving are so many occasions of Deceiving us. For since our false Judgments include two things, namely the Consent of the Will, and the Perception of the Vnderstanding, it is manifest that all the ways of our Perception, may afford us some occasion or other of falling into Error, forasmuch as they may in∣cline us to rash and precipitate Consents.

But because it is necessary first to make the Soul sensible of her Weaknesses and Wandrings, in order to possess Her with just Desires of a Deliverance from them, and that she may with grea∣ter ease shake off her Prejudices; We will endeavour to make an exact Division of her Manners of Perception; which may serve as so many Heads, to one or other of which, may be referr'd as we proceed, the different Errors whereunto we are obnoxious.

The Soul has three several ways of Perception: By Pure Intellect, by Imagination, and by the Senses.

By Pure Intellect, she perceives things Spiritual, Universals, Common Notions, The Idea of Perfection, that of a Being infinitely perfect, and in general all her own thoughts, when she knows them by a Reflexion made upon her self: 'Tis likewise by Pure Intellect she perceives Ma∣terial things, Extension with its Properties. For 'tis the pure Understanding only which is capa∣ble of Perceiving a Circle, and a perfect Square, a Figure of a thousand sides, and such like things. Such sort of Perceptions bear the name of Pure Intellections or Pure Perceptions, since there is no necessity of the Mind's forming Corporeal Images in the Brain to represent them by.

By Imagination, the Soul only perceives things Material, when being Absent she makes them present to her, by forming the Images of them in the Brain. This is the way whereby a Man Imagines all sorts of Figures, a Circle, a Triangle, a Face, an Horse, Towns and Fields, whe∣ther he has already seen them or not. This sort of Perceptions, we may call Imaginations, be∣cause the Soul represents to her self these things, by framing Images of them in the Brain. And for as much as Spiritual things cannot be represented by any Image, it follows, the Soul cannot imagine them; which is a thing worthy to be remember'd.

Lastly, By Sense, the Soul perceives only Sensible, gross, and ruder Objects, when being present they cause an Impression on the external Organs of her Body. Thus it is the Soul sees things

plain and rugged present to her Eyes; thus she knows the Hardness of the Iron, the point of a Sword, and the like; and this kind of Perceptions one may call Sentiments or Sensations.

The Soul then has no more than these three ways of Perceiving; which will easily be granted, if we consider that the things we perceive are either Spiritual or Material. If they be Spiritual, they are perceptable only by the Pure Vnderstanding: If they be Material, they are either Pre∣sent or Absent. If they be Absent, the ordinary way of the Soul's representing them is by the Imagination: But if they be Present, the Soul can perceive them by the Impressions they make upon her Senses. And thus Our Souls are not capable of more than a three-fold Perception, by Pure Intellect, by Imagination, and by Sense.

These three Faculties therefore may be lookt upon as so many certain Heads, to which we may reduce the Errors of Men, and the Causes of their Errors, and so avoid the confusion into which the multitude of them would infallibly cast us, should we talk of them without Order or Method.

But moreover, our Inclinations and our Passions act very strongly upon us: They dazzle our Mind with their false Lights, and overcast and fill it with Clouds and Darkness. Thus Our In∣clinations and our Passions engage us in an infinite number of Errors, when we suffer our selves to be guided by that false Light, and abusive Glare which they produce within us. We must then, together with the three Faculties of the Mind, consider them as the Sources of our Devia∣tions and Delinquencies, and add to the Errors of Sense, Imagination, and Pure Intellect, those which may be charg'd upon the Passions and Natural Inclinations. And so all the Errors of Men and the Causes of them, may be reduc'd to five Heads, and we shall treat of them according to that Order.

* 1.16First, We shall speak of the Errors of the Senses; Secondly, Of the Errors of Imagination; Thirdly, Of the Errors of the Pure Intellect; Fourthly, Of the Errors of our Inclinations; and Fifthly, Of the Errors of the Passions. And thus, having made an Essay to rid the Soul of the Errors which she's subject to, we shall, Lastly, lay down a General Method to Conduct her in the Search of Truth.

* 1.17We will begin with an Explication of the Errors of our Senses, or rather, of the Errors into which we fall for want of making the due use, we should do of our Senses: And here we shall not so much descend to our Particular Errors, which are almost infinite, as fix upon the general Causes of these Errors, and such things as seem most necessary to inform us of the Nature of the Humane Mind.

CHAP. V.

Of the SENSES. I. Two ways of explaining how they were corrupted by Sin. II. That 'tis our Liberty, and not our Senses, which is the true Cause of our Errors. III. A Rule for avoiding Error in the use of our Senses.

UPON an attentive Consideration of the Senses and Passions of Man, we find them so well proportion'd to the End for which they were given us, that we can by no means agree with those who say, they are to all intents and purposes debauch'd and spoil'd by Original Sin. But that it may appear it is not without Reason we are of a different Opinion, it is necessary to Explain, in what manner we may conceive the Order and Regularity which was to be seen in the Faculties and Passions of our First Parent in his State of Righteousness, and the Chan∣ges, and Disorders that were consequent to his Fall. Now there are Two ways of Conceiving these things; of which this is the First.

* 1.18That it seems to be a common Notion, That it is necessary to the right ordering of Affairs, that the Soul should perceive lesser or greater Pleasures, according to the proportion of the Littleness or Greatness of the Goods which she enjoys. Pleasure is an Instinct of Nature, or to speak clea∣rer, 'tis an Impression of God himself, who inclines us towards some Good; which Impression should be so much stronger, by how much that Good is greater. According to which Principle, it seems not to be contested that our first Parent before his Sin, coming fresh out of the Hands of his Maker, found greater Pleasures in the most solid Goods, than in those that were not so. Wherefore since he was created in order to Love God who created him, and that God was his true Good; it may be said, God gave him a Taste and Relish of himself; That he inclin'd him to the Love of the Divine Perfection, by a Sense of Pleasure, and that he possess'd him with those Internal Satisfactions in his Duty that counter-balanc'd the greatest Pleasures of the Senses,

whereof since the State of Sin, Man is altogether insensible, without a Supernatural Assistance and particular gift of Grace.

Notwithstanding, since he had a Body which God design'd he should take care of, and look upon as a Part of himself, he gave him to Perceive by the Mediation of his Senses, Plea∣sures like those we our selves are sensible of, in the use of things which are proper for, and adap∣ted to the Preservation of our Life and Being.

We presume not here to determine whether the First Man before his Fall, had a Power to hin∣der agreeable or disagreeable Sensations, in the instant that the principal part of his Brain was agitated by the Actual Impression of Sensible Objects: Possibly he had that Soveraignty over him∣self, because of his Subjection to the Will of God, though the contrary Opinion seems more pro∣bable. For though Adam might stop the Commotions of the Blood and Spirits, and the Vibra∣tions of the Fibres of his Brain, which Objects excited in it, because being in a Regular State, his Body must needs submit to his Mind; yet it is not probable, he was able to prevent the Sensa∣tions of Objects at the time he had not stopt the Motions they produc'd in that part of his Body, to which his Soul was immediately united. For the Union of the Soul and Body consisting prin∣cipally in the mutual Relation there is betwixt Sensations, and the Motions of the Organs, this Union would rather seem Arbitrary than Natural, if Adam had been capable of hindring Sensa∣tion, when the Principal Part of his Body receiv'd an Impression from those round about it. How∣ever I declare for neither of the two Opinions.

The First Man therefore felt Pleasure in that which was Perfective of his Body, as he felt it in that which was Perfective of his Soul; And because he was constituted in a Perfect State, he found that of the Soul far greater than that of the Body. Thus it was infinitely easier for him to pre∣serve his Righteousness, than for Us without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST; since without this we have no Delight or Satisfaction in our Duty. Albeit, he misfortunately suffer'd himself to be seduc'd: He lost that Uprightness by his Disobedience; and the Principal Change he un∣derwent, and which was the cause of all the Confusion of his Senses and his Passions was, that GOD,* 1.19 by way of punitive Justice, withdrew himself from him, and would no longer be his Good; or rather Ceas'd to make him sensible of that Pleasure, which pointed out GOD, as his Sovereign Good. So that Sensible Pleasures, which only carry'd him to the Injoyment of the Goods of the Body, being left alone and no longer counterpois'd by those, which drew him before to his True and Proper Good; the close Union that he had with GOD was wonderfully loosen'd, and that which he had with his Body, as much strengthned or increas'd. Sensible Pleasure, having got the Dominion, debauch'd his * 1.20 Moral Powers, by fastening them upon all Sensible Objects; and this Corruption of his Morals darkned his † 1.21 Intellectual Parts,- by turning him from that Light which Enlightned him, and inducing him to form his Judgments on things, only from the Rela∣tion or Analogy they could have to his Body.

But as to the Nature of the thing it self, it cannot be said, That the Change which happen'd on Part of the Senses was very considerable. For as when two Weights are plac'd in Equilibrium in a Balance, if you take away one of them, the opposite Scale will be weigh'd down by the other, without any alteration on part of the former weight, since that still remains the same: So after Sin, the Pleasures of Sense bow'd and weigh'd down the Soul towards Sensible Objects, for want of those Internal Delectations which, before Sin, counterpois'd that Inclination unto Sen∣sible Good; but without any so Substantial a Change in point of the Senses, as is generally Imagin'd.

I come now to the Second Way of accounting for the Disorders introduc'd by Sin, which is certainly more Reasonable than that we have been explaining. It is very different from it, be∣cause it is founded on a different Principle; yet both these ways are very consistent and agreeable, as to what respects the Senses.

Being we are made up of a Body and a Mind, there are two sorts of Goods to imploy our Researches about; the Goods of the Body, and the Goods of the Mind. We have likewise two means of Discovering whether a thing be good or ill for us, either by using the Mind alone, or by the use of the Mind in Conjunction with the Body. We can discover our Good by a clear and evident Knowledge; we can discover it likewise by a dark and confus'd Sensation. Reason teaches me that Righteousness is Amiable; My Taste informs me that such a Fruit is Good. The Beauty of Righteousness is not Sensible, nor the Goodness of a Fruit Intelligible. The Goods of the Body deserve not the application of the Mind, which GOD has created only for himself: It must needs be then, That the Mind discovers such kind of Goods without Examination, and by the short and incontroverted Proof of Sensation. Stones are not fit for Nourishment, the Tryal is a convincing Argument, and the Taste alone has made all Mankind agree to it.

Pleasure then and Pain are the Natural and undoubted Characters of Good and Evil; I con∣fess it: But 'tis only so in respect of those things, which, having no Power of being Good and Evil in themselves, cannot be known for such by a Knowledge clear and evident; 'tis so in re∣gard of those things only, which, being inferiour to the Mind, can neither Punish nor Reward it. In fine, 'tis only so in point of such things and Objects as are undeserving of the Soul's Applica∣cation, and concern about them; such things as GOD, not willing we should be taken up with, inclines us to only by Instinct, that is, by Agreeable or Disagreeable Sensations.

But as for GOD, who is the True and only Good of the Mind, who is alone above it, who alone can Reward it in a thousand different ways; who is only worthy of its Application, and who is under no Fear of not being found Amiable by those that know him; he is not con∣tent

to be belov'd by a blind and Instinctive Love, he will be lov'd by a Rational Love, and a Love of Choice.

If the Mind saw only in Bodies what was really in them, without being sensible of what was not therein, it could not possibly Love them, nor make use of them without great Pain and Re∣luctancy; so that it is as it were necessary they should appear Agreeable, by producing Sensations, of which themselves are Destitute. But 'tis far from being so with GOD. 'Tis sufficient to see him such as he is, to be inclin'd to love him as we ought: Nor is there any Necessity he should imploy that Instinct of Pleasure as a kind of Bait and Artifice to allure our Love, without de∣serving it. The Pleasure which the Blessed enjoy in the Possession of GOD, is not so much an Instinct which inclines them to the Love of Him, as the Recompence of their Love. For it is not for the sake of that Pleasure that they Love GOD, but because they manifestly know Him to be their True, their Only Good.

* 1.22This being the Case, it ought to be concluded, That Adam was not invited to the Love of GOD and the rest of his Duty by a Preventing Pleasure; forasmuch as the Knowledge which he had of GOD, as of his Good, and the Joy he was continually possess'd with, necessarily conse∣quent to the View of his Felicity, in his Uniting himself with GOD, were sufficient Motives to recommend his Duty to him, and to make his Actions more Meritorious, than if he had been, as it were, determin'd by a Preventing Pleasure: In this manner he was in perfect Liberty. And 'tis possibly in this Capacity the Scripture means to represent Him to us in these words, — He himself made Man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his Counsel, to keep the Command∣ments,* 1.23 &c. Eccles. 15.14. That is, kept him closely united to Himself, only through the clear View he gave him of his Happiness and his Duty, without alluring him to it by any Taste of a Preventing Pleasure. But Experience has convinc'd us, to the Eternal Reproach of Free Will, and the Glory of GOD alone, of the Frailty Adam was obnoxious to, even in a State of such Perfect Order and Sublime Happiness, as was that, he was possess'd of, before his Disobedience.

But it cannot be said Adam was inclin'd to the Searching out, and Using of Sensible things, through a nice and exact Knowledge of the Relation and Correspondence they might bear to his Body. For, indeed, if it had been necessary for him to have examin'd the Configurations of the parts of any Fruit, those likewise of all the parts of his Body, and the Agreement and Disagree∣ment resulting to each other from their respective Constitution, before he could judge whether as to the present Temperature of his Blood, and a thousand other Dispositions of his Body, that Fruit was good for his Nourishment; it is plain that the whole Capacity of his Mind had been entirely fill'd up, with things altogether unworthy of its Application; and that too to ve∣ry little Purpose, since we see he was not able to preserve himself long, though we suppose him so accomplish'd.

Upon Consideration then that the Mind of Adam was not Infinite, it should not be taken ill, that we say he was not acquainted with all the Properties of Bodies that encompass'd him; since it is certain those Properties are Infinite. And if it be granted, which no Man of any Atten∣tion can deny, that his Mind was not made to examine the Motions and Configurations of Mat∣ter, but to be continually Intent on GOD; we need incur no Blame, in Maintaining, it had been a Disorder and Irregularity, at a time when all things should have been perfectly adjusted, if he had been oblig'd to call off his Mind from the View of the Perfections of his Sovereign Good, to contemplate the Nature of a Fruit, and Examine whether it was fit to Nourish him.

Adam then was furnisht with Senses like to ours, by which he was admonish'd, without being taken off from the Contemplation of GOD, of what was necessary for him to do for the Pre∣servation of his Body: He was sensible of Pleasures as we are, and also of preventing and inde∣liberate Pains and Dislikes. But those Pleasures, and those Pains were incapable of inslaving him, and rendring him Unhappy as they do us; forasmuch as being absolute Master of all the Motions excited in his Body, he could quiet them in the same instant (if he desir'd it) that he was aware of them: And doubtless he always desir'd it in respect of Pain. Happy had we been, if he had done the same thing in respect of Pleasure too, and had he not Voluntarily divorc'd himself from the Union and Presence of his GOD, by suffering the Capacity of his Mind to be fill'd with the Beau∣ty, and the expected Sweets of a forbidden Fruit, or possibly with a presumptuous Joy kindled in his Soul, upon Reflexion on his own Natural Perfections.

But after he had Sinn'd, those Pleasures which before only respectfully caution'd him; and those Pains, which, not disturbing his Felicity, only gave him to understand he was capable of lo∣sing it, and becoming Miserable, preserv'd no longer that Deference and Submission. His Senses and his Passions obey'd not his Orders, rebell'd against him, and enslav'd him as they do us to all kinds of Sensible Objects.

Thus the Senses and the Passions in no wise ow'd their Birth to Sin, but only their Power of Tyrannizing over Sinners: And that Power was not so much a Disorder on part of the Senses, as it was of the Mind or the Will of Man, which having loosen'd the strict Union which they had with GOD, receiv'd no longer that Light and that Strength, by means whereof they pre∣serv'd their Liberty and their Happiness.

Upon concluding these two Ways of Explaining the Disorders Sin has been the Cause of, we ought to infer that there are two things necessary to Re-instate us in the Order of Nature.

* 1.24The first is this, That we should take off, from that weight which sinks us down, and bends us towards sensible Goods, by a continual defalcation of our Pleasures, and by mortifying the sensibility of our Senses by Repentance and Circumcision of heart.

The second is this, That we ought to implore of GOD the poize of his Grace, and that Pre∣venting Delight, which * 1.25 JESVS CHRIST has particularly merited for us, without which, let us lighten the former Scale as much as we can, it will constantly be lowermost; and (though never so little heavier) will infallibly sink us into Sin and Disorder.

These two things are absolutely necessary to restore us to, and continue us in our Duty. Rea∣son, as we see, agrees intirely with the Gospel, by both which we are taught, that the Privation, Denegation, and Diminution of the Weight of Sin, are necessary Preparatives for the Weight of Grace to re-establish us and unite us unto GOD.

But though in this State of Ours, we are under a Perpetual Obligation of warring with our Senses, yet we should not conclude from thence, they are absolutely corrupted, or disorder'd. For if it be consider'd, that they were given us for the Preservation of our Body, we shall find them acquit themselves of their Duty so excellently well, and conduct us in that just and faithful manner to their End, that they seem to be injuriously charg'd with Corruptness and Irregularity: They so readily advertise the Soul by Pleasure and Pain, by agreeable and disagreeable Tasts and other Sensations, of what she ought to do, or not to do, for the preservation of Life, that it cannot but be unreasonably said, that this Order and this Exactness are the consequents of Sin.

Our Senses therefore are not so Corrupted as is imagin'd,* 1.26 but 'tis that which is more Inward to the Soul, 'tis our Liberty which is corrupted. They are not our Senses that deceive us, but the Will, by its rash and precipitate Judgments, leads us into Error. When, for instance, we see Light, it is most certain that we see Light; when a Man feels Heat, he is not mistaken in be∣lieving that he feels it, whether before or after the first Sin. But thus we deceive our selves in judging that the Heat which is felt, is out of the Soul which feels it, as we shall explain hereafter.

The Senses then would in no wise cast us into Error, did we not imploy our Liberty amiss, and judge of things upon their Report, without sufficient Caution and Advertency. But because it is very difficult to help this, and we are, as it were, forc'd to't, on the account of the strict Union of our Soul and Body, see in what manner we ought to behave our selves in using them, that we may avoid falling into Error.

We ought exactly to observe this Rule;* 1.27 Never to judge by the Senses what things are in them∣selves, but only of the Relation they have to one another: Because, indeed, the Senses were not gi∣ven us for the knowing the Truth of things as they are in their own Nature, but only for the Preservation of our Body.

But that we may be altogether deliver'd from that Facility and Inclination we have to follow the Guidance of the Senses in the Search after Truth, we shall in the succeeding Chapters, give a Summary of the most Principal and General Errors into which they throw us, whereby the Truth of what we have been advancing will be manifest and acknowledg'd.

CHAP. VI.

I. Of the Errors of Sight in respect of Extension absolutely consider'd. II. A Continuation of these Errors about invisible Objects. III. Of the Errors of Sight touching Extension relatively consider'd.

THE Sight is the First, the most Noble and Comprehensive of all the Senses, insomuch that had it been given us for the Discovery of Truth, it alone had had more to do than all the Other; wherefore if we can overthrow the Authority the Eyes obtain over our Reason, it will be sufficient to undeceive us; and to possess us with a general distrust of all the other Senses.

Our business therefore is to make it appear, That we ought in no wise to rely on the Testimo∣ny of our Sight, in our Judgment of the Truth of things, as they are in their own Nature, but only in discovering the Relation they have to the welfare and preservation of our Body. That our Eyes generally deceive us in all the Representations they make of things, in the Magnitude, in the Figures, and Motions of Bodies, in Light and Colours, which are the only things we see: That none of these things are really what they seem to be, that all Mankind is mistaken in them, and that hereby we fall into other Errors numberless and infinite.

We begin with Extension. Lo!* 1.28 then the Reasons that induce us to believe that our Eyes never represent it to us such as it is in it self. With Glasses we discover as often as we please, Ani∣mals much less than a grain of Sand, which is almost invisible: * 1.29 Nay, there have been seen a thousand times less than they. These animated Atoms walk and move no less than other Animals: Therefore they must have Legs and Feet, Bones in their Legs to support them, Muscles to move them, Tendons and infinite Fibres in every Muscle; lastly, Blood or animal Spirits extreamly subtil and refin'd, either to fill or make these Muscles move successively. Without this it is im∣possible to conceive they live, are nourish'd, or translate their little Bodies into different places, according to the different Impressions of Objects; or rather 'tis impossible for those Men them∣selves

have spent all their Life in Anatomy, and in disclosing Nature, to imagine the number, the diversity, the delicacy, of all the parts these little Bodies are necessarily compounded of, whereby they live and perform all those things we see them do.

The Imagination is lost and confounded at so incredible a littleness; it cannot catch the va∣nishing parts, nor take hold of them, as being too little to be grasp'd by it: And though Reason justifies our Assertion, the Senses and Imagination withstand the Conviction, and bring us back to Doubt and Uncertainty.

Our Sight is extreamly short and limited; but it ought not to prescribe limits to its Object: The Idea it gives us of Extension has very narrow bounds, but it does not from thence follow the bounds of Extension are so. It is doubtless infinite in a certain Sense; and that diminutive part of Matter which is hidden from our Eyes is capable of containing a World, in which may be hid as many things, though less proportionably, as appear in this great World in which we live.

These little Creatures, which we have been speaking of, may possibly have other little Ani∣mals to prey upon them, and which are imperceptible to them by reason of their unspeakable smallness, as the others are imperceptible to us. What an Hand-worm is in comparison to us, That those little Animals are in respect of an Hand-worm; and perhaps there may be in Na∣ture less, and less still to infinity, proceeding in that prodigious proportion of a Man to an Hand-worm.

We have Evident and Mathematical Demonstrations of the Divisibility of Matter in infinitum, and that's enough to persuade us there may be Animals, still less and less than others in infini∣tum; though our Imagination is frighted and starts at such a conception. GOD made Matter only to frame his wonderful Works out of it; wherefore since we are certain that there are no parts of it, the Minuteness whereof is capable of giving Limits to his power, in the forma∣tion of these little Animals, why should we unreasonably confine and lessen the Idea of an In∣finite Artist by measuring the Greatness and Depth of his Power and Wisdom, by our finite and shallow Imagination?

We have been in part undeceiv'd by Experiment, which hath discover'd to us such Animals as are a thousand times less than an Hand-worm, why should we suppose that they are the Last and the Least of all? For my part, I see no reason to imagine: 'Tis much more reasonable to be be∣liev'd, there are far less than those already discover'd: For, in fine, little Animals are never wanting for the Microscopes, but we want Microscopes for them.

If one examines in the midst of Winter the Cicatricle of a Tulip-roop, with a plain Magni∣fying or a Convex Glass,* 1.30 or even with the bare Eye, one may easily discover it in the Leaves which are become green: Those which are to make the Flower or the Tulip, the little triangular part which contains the Seed, and the six little Columns that incompass it at the bottom of the Tulip. Thus it cannot be doubted but the Cicatricle of a Tulip-root contains in it a Tulip all entire.

It's reasonable to believe the same thing of the Cicatricle of a grain of Mustard, of that of the kernel of an Apple, and generally of all sorts of Trees and Plants, though it cannot be dis∣cern'd with the Eye, nor yet with a Microscope; and we may with some sort of certainty affirm, That all Trees lye in Miniature in the Cicatricle of their Seed.

Nor does it appear unreasonable to think that there are infinite Trees conceal'd in a single Ci∣catricle; since it not only contains the future Tree whereof it is the Seed, but also abundance of other Seeds, which may all include in them new Trees still, and new Seeds of Trees: Which new Seeds possibly may be big with other Trees, and other Seeds of Trees as fruitful as the former, in an incomprehensible littleness, and thus in Infinitum. So that, according to this Notion (which will not be thought impertinent or whimsical, except by those who measure the Wonders of the Infinite Power of GOD, by the Idea's of their Senses and Imagination) it may be said, that in the single kernel of an Apple, may be involved Apple-trees, Apples and Seeds of Apple-trees, for infinite or almost infinite Ages, in that proportion of a perfect Apple-tree to an Apple-tree in its Seeds. And, That Nature does only open and unfold these little Trees, by giving a sensible growth to that which is out of its Seed; and insensible, but most real increases, to those which we conceive to be in their Seeds, in proportion to their Bigness. For it cannot be doubted but there are Bodies little enough to insinuate themselves between the Fibres of those Trees, which we conceive in their Seeds, and to be serviceable to their Nourishment.

What has been said of Plants and their Cicatricles, we have liberty to conceive of Animals, and of the Cicatricles of which they are produc'd. We see in the Cicatricle of a Tulip-root an entire Tulip. * 1.31 We see in the Cicatricle of a new-laid Egg, and which had never been brooded, a Chicken, which is possibly compleatly form'd. We see † 1.32 Frogs in the Eggs of Frogs, and we shall see other Animals still in their Cicatricles when we have Art and Experience enough to discover them. But 'tis not for the Mind to stand still, when the Eyes can go no farther: For the view of the Soul is of a greater com∣pass than the sight of the Body. Besides this therefore, we ought to think, That all the Bodies of Men and of Beasts, which should be born or produc'd till the End of the World, were possibly created from the Beginning of it: I would say, That the Females of the Original Creatures were, for ought we know, created together, with all those of the same Species which have been, or shall be, begotten or procreated whilst the World stands.

We might push this Thought much farther yet, and it may be with a great deal of Reason and Truth: But we have just cause to fear, lest we should be too desirous of penetrating too far into the Works of GOD: We see nothing but Infinities round about us: And not only our Senses and our Imagination are too limited to comprehend them; but the Mind it self, however pure and dis∣engag'd from Matter, is too gross as well as too feeble to pierce into the least of the Works of the Almighty. 'Tis lost, 'tis dissipated, 'tis dazled and amazed at the view of that, which, ac∣cording to the Language of the Senses, is call'd an Atom. Notwithstanding, the Pure Intellect has this advantage above the Imagination of the Senses, that it acknowledges its own Weakness, and the Almightiness of GOD: Whereas our Imagination and our Senses bring down the works of GOD, and audaciously set themselves above them, and so throw us headlong and blind-fold into Error. For our Eyes furnish us not with the Idea's of any of those things we discover by Microscopes and our Reason. We perceive not by our Sight any less Body than an Hand-worm, or a Mite. The half of a Hand-worm is nothing if we rely on the Report of our Eyes. A Mite is a Mathematical point in their account, which you can't divide, but you must annihilate. Our Sight then does not represent Extension to us, as it is in it self, but as it is in Relation to our Body: And because the half of a Mite has no considerable relation to our Body, and has no influence either towards the Preservation or Destruction of it; therefore our Eyes entirely conceal it from Us.

But if we had Eyes made after the manner of Microscopes, or rather, if we were as little as Hand-worms and Mites, we should judge of the Magnitude of Bodies in a far different manner. For, without doubt, these little Animals have their Eyes so dispos'd as to see the Bodies that sur∣round them and their own Bodies, far greater than we see them▪ for otherwise they could not receive such impressions as were necessary to the Preservation of Life, and so the Eyes they have would be altogether useless.

But that we may throughly explain these things, we must consider, that our Eyes are in effect only Natural Spectacles; that their humours have the same way of Operating as the Glasses in the Spectacles, and that according to the figure of the Crystalline, and its distance from the Retina, we see Objects very differently; insomuch that we cannot be assur'd there are two Men in the World that see Bodies of the self-same bigness, since we cannot be assur'd there are two Men's Eyes altogether made alike.

'Tis a Proposition that ought to be imbrac'd by all those who concern themselves with Opticks, That Objects which appear equally distant are seen so much bigger, as the figure which is deli∣neated in the fund of the Eye is bigger. Now it is certain that in the Eyes of those Persons whose Crystalline is more convex, the Images are painted lesser, in proportion to the convexity. Those then who are short-sighted having their Crystalline more convex see the Objects lesser than those whose Crystalline is of the common standard, or than old People, who want Spectacles to read with, but see perfectly well at a distance; since those whose Sight is short must necessarily have the Crystalline more convex, on supposition their Eyes, as to the other parts, are equal.

'Twere the easiest thing in Nature to demonstrate all these things Geometrically; and were they not of the number of those which are very well known, I would insist longer upon them to make them evident. But because several have already handled this Subject, I desire such as are willing to be instructed therein, to turn to them and consult them.

Since it is not manifest that there are two Men in the World who see Objects in the same bulk and magnitude, and generally the same Man sees them bigger with his left Eye than his right, according to the Observations which have been made, and are related in the Journal of the Lear∣ned from Rome, in January 1669, it is plain we ought not to build upon the Testimony of our Eyes, so as to pass our judgment from it. It is much better to attend to Reason, which proves to us, That we are unable to determine what is the absolute Magnitude of Bodies which encom∣pass us, or what Idea we ought to have of the Extension of a Foot-square, or of that of our own Body; so as that Idea may represent it to us as it is. For we learn from Reason, that the least of all Bodies would be no longer little, if it were alone, since it is compounded of an infi∣nite number of parts out of each of which GOD could frame an Earth, which yet would be but a single Point in comparison of the rest in conjunction. Thus the Mind of Man is incapable of forming an Idea great enough to comprehend and embrace the least Extension in the World, since the Mind has bounds, but that Idea should be infinite.

It is true, The Mind may come very near the Knowledge of the Relations these infinites have to one another, which constitute the World; it may know, for instance, one of them to be dou∣ble to another, and that a Fathom is the measure of six Foot. Yet for all this it cannot form an Idea to it self that can represent these things as they are in their own Nature.

Well, but let it be suppos'd that the Mind is capable of Idea's, which equal or which measure the Extension of Bodies, which we see; for it would be a difficult undertaking to convince Men of the contrary: Let us see what may be concluded from the Supposition. Doubtless this will be the Conclusion, That GOD does not deceive us: That he has not given us Eyes like Glasses, to magnifie or diminish the Object, and therefore we ought to believe that our Eyes represent things as really they are.

'Tis true, GOD never deceives us, but we often deceive our selves, by judging of things with an unwarrantable rashness. For we often judge that the Objects whereof we have Idea's exist, and likewise that they altogether resemble their Idea's; when yet it often falls out that the Objects are neither like their Idea's, nor do they exist at all.

The Existence of a thing does no ways follow from our having an Idea of it, much less does it follow that the thing is perfectly like the Idea which we have thereof. It cannot be concluded from GOD's giving us such a sensible Idea of Magnitude upon the presentation of a six Foot-rule to our Eyes, that this Rule has the same Extension, as it is represented to us by that Idea? For first, All Men have not the same sensible Idea of this same measure, since all Men have not their Eyes disposed in the same manner. Again, The same Person has not the same sensible Idea of a six Foot-rule, when he beholds it with his left Eye, as when he views it with his right, as has been already said. Finally, It often happens that the self-same Person, entertains quite different Idea's of the same Objects at different times, according as they are suppos'd nearer or farther off, as shall be explain'd in its proper place.

It is then nothing but prejudice grounded upon no good reason to think we see Bodies accor∣ding to their real Magnitude; for our Eyes being not given us for any other purpose than the se∣curity of our Body, they discharge their Duty admirable well, in giving us such Idea's of Ob∣jects as are proportion'd to its magnitude.

But the better to conceive what ought to be our judgments concerning the Extension of Bodies, from the Report of our Eyes, let us imagine GOD to have created in Epitomie, out of a por∣tion of matter of the bigness of a small Globe, an Heaven and Earth, and Men upon this Earth, with all other things, the same proportion being observ'd, as in this Grand World. These little Men would see each other, and the parts of their Bodies, as likewise the little Animals which were capable of incommoding them. Otherwise their Eyes would be useless to their preserva∣tion. It is manifest then from this Supposition, these little Men would have Idea's of the magni∣tude of Bodies quite different from ours; since they would look upon their little World, which would be but a Ball in our account, as stretch'd out into infinite spaces, just as we do in respect of the World in which we are.

Or if this is not so easie to be conceiv'd, let us suppose GOD had created an Earth infinitely vaster than this which we inhabit, so that this new Earth should be to ours, what ours would be to that we have spoken of in the fore-going Supposition. Let us moreover conceive GOD Almighty to have observ'd in all the parts which went to the Composition of this New World, the very same proportion he has done in those which make up Ours. It is plain, that the Inhabitants of this latter World would be Taller, than the space betwixt our Earth and the most distant Stars we can discover: And this being so, it is manifest that if they had the same Idea's of Extension of Bo∣dies as our selves, they would be able to discern some of the parts of their own Bodies, and and would see others of a prodigious unweildiness; so that 'tis ridiculous to think they would see things in the same Bigness as they are seen by us.

It is apparent in these two Suppositions we have made, that the Men, whether of the Great or Little World, would have Idea's of the Magnitude of Bodies very different from ours, supposing their Eyes to furnish them with Idea's of the Objects round about them, proportion'd to the Magnitude of their own Bodies. Now if these Men should confidently affirm upon the Testimo∣ny of their Eyes, that Bodies were of the very same bigness whereof they saw them, it is not to be doubted but they would be deceiv'd; and I suppose no Man will make a question of it: And yet it is certain that these Men would have as Good Reason to justifie their Opinion, as we have to defend our Own. Let us acknowledge then, from their Example, That we are very uncertain of the Magnitude of Bodies, which we see, and that all which can be known by us concerning them from the Testimony of Sight, is only the mutual Relation there is between Them and Us. In a word, that our Eyes were never given us whereby to judge of the Truth of things, but only to give us notice of such as might either molest or profit us in something or other.

But 'tis not thought sufficient for Men to credit their Eyes only, in order to judge of Visible Objects:* 1.33 They think they are to be trusted farther, even to judge of those which are Invisible. Because there are some things which they cannot see, they conclude they do not exist, attributing to their Sight a Penetration in a manner Infinite. This is an Impediment which prevents their discovering the real Causes of abundance of Natural Effects: For that they ascribe them to Ima∣ginary Faculties and Qualities, is often meerly for want of discerning the True, which consist in the different Configurations of these Bodies.

They see not, for Instance, the little parts of Air or Flame, much less those of Light, or of a matter still more fine and subtil: And upon this score they are ready to believe, they are not in being, at least, conclude them void of force and action. They betake themselves to Occult Qua∣lities, or Imaginary Faculties to explain all the Effects, whereof those Imperceptible parts are The True and Natural Cause.

They had rather have recourse to the horror of a Vacuum to Explain the Elevation of water in the Pump, than impute it to the Gravitation of the Air. They chuse to ascribe the Flux and Re∣flux of the Sea, to the Qualities of the Moon, rather than to the pressure of the Atmosphere, that is, to the Air which surrounds the Earth; and the Elevation of Vapours to the Attractive Facul∣ties of the Sun, than to the simple Motion of Impulse, caused by the parts of the Subtil Matter, which it continually diffuses abroad.

They look upon those as Men of trifling and impertinent Thought, who have recourse only to the Flesh and Blood, in accounting for all the Motions of Animals: Likewise for the habits, and the Corporeal Memory of Men: And this partly proceeds from the Conception they have of the littleness of the Brain, and its incapacity thereupon to preserve the Traces of an almost in∣finite number of things, lodg'd in it. They had rather admit, though they can't conceive how,

a Soul in Beasts, which is neither Body nor Spirit; Qualities and Intentional Species, for the Habits and Memory of Men; or such like things, notwithstanding they have no particular Notion of them in their Mind.

I should be too tedious should I stand to reckon up all the Errors we fall into through this Pre∣judice. There are very few in Natural Philosophy, to which it has not given some occasion; and if a Man should make a considerate Reflexion thereupon, he would possibly be astonish'd at it.

But though I am not willing to dwell too long upon these things, yet I cannot so easily pass by the contempt Men generally have for Insects, and other little Animals which are produc'd out of a Matter, call'd by them Corrupted. 'Tis a very unjust contempt, founded only on the Ignorance of the thing despis'd, and the fore-mention'd Prejudice. There is nothing despicable in Nature, and all the Works of GOD are worthy of our Respect and Admiration; especially if we attend to the wonderful ways he takes both in making, and perserving them. The least of Flies are as compleat, as Animals of an excessive bulk or stature: The proportions of their Limbs are as just as those of the other: And it seems moreover that GOD has design'd them greater Orna∣ments to recompense them for the Littleness of their Bodies. They have Coronets and Plumes, and other Attire upon their Heads, which out-shine all that the Luxury of Men can invent. And I dare venture to say, that all those who have never made use of any thing but their Eyes, have never seen any thing so splendid, so exact, or so magnificent in the Palaces of the greatest Princes, as may be seen with Glasses on the Head of an ordinary Fly.

'Tis true, these things are exceedingly Little, but it is still more surprizing to find such a Col∣lection of Beauties in so little Room; and though they are very common, yet that is no Diminu∣tion to their Value; nor are those Animals thereby less perfect in themselves; but on the contrary, the Power and Wisdom of GOD appear more wonderful, who with such Profusion and Magnifi∣cence has shewn an almost infinite number of Miracles in their Production.

And yet our Sight conceals all these Beauties from us: It makes us despise all these Works of GOD so worthy of our Admiration: And because these Animals are little in Relation to our Bo∣dy, it causes us to consider them as little absolutely, and consequently as despicable by reason of their Littleness; as if Bodies could be little in themselves.

Let us strive then to forbear following the Impressions of our Senses, in the judgment which we pass on the Magnitude of Bodies: And when we say, for Instance, That a Bird is little, let it not be absolutely understood: For nothing is Great or Little in it self: Even a Bird is great, in comparison of a Fly; and if it be little in respect of our Body, it doth not follow it is absolutely so; since our Body is not the most perfect Rule by which we ought to measure others. It is it self very little in reference to the Earth, as is the Earth it self in respect of the Circumference which the Sun or Earth describe round each other: And so is that Circumference in relation to the space contain'd betwixt us and the six'd Stars; and so continuing the progression on. For we may still imagine spaces greater and greater ad infinitum.

But it must not be imagin'd that our Senses exactly inform us of the Relation other Bodies have to our own: For Exactness and Justness are no ways essential to sensible Notices,* 1.34 which should only be Instrumental to the Preservation of Life. It is true we know exactly enough the Rela∣tion Bodies, which are near us, have with our own. But in proportion to the distance these Bo∣dies are remov'd from us, we know less of them, because then they have less relation to our Bo∣dy. The Idea or Sensation of Magnitude, which we have upon sight of a Body, lessens in pro∣portion to the Body's being in a less capacity of hurting us: And that Idea or Sensation increa∣ses proportionably as the Body approaches nearer, or rather, as the Relation it has to our Body, is augmented. Finally, If this Relation altogether ceases; that is, if any Body is so little or so distant from us, as to be incapable of hurting us, we forthwith lose the Sensation of it. So that by our Sight we may sometimes judge pretty nearly of the Relation other Bodies have to ours: And of that which they have to one another: But we ought never to think they are of the same Magnitude they appear to us.

Our Eyes, for Example, represent the Sun and Moon of one or two Feet diameter, but we should not imagine with Epicurus and Lucretius, that they are really of that dimension. This same Moon seems to us upon sight far greater than the greatest Stars, yet no Man doubts but it is in∣comparably less: Thus we see daily on the Earth two things or more, of whose magnitude we can have no exact assurance; because to make a judgment of this Nature, 'tis necessary to know the precise distance of these Bodies, which is very difficult to be known.

We are even hard put to't to judge with any kind of certainty of the Relation there is betwixt two Bodies though never so near us. We are forc'd to take them in our hands, and hold them one against the other to compare them; and after all, we often hesitate without being able justly to determine any thing. This is visibly acknowledg'd as often as a Man would examine which are biggest of some pieces of Coin that are almost equal; for he is then oblig'd to put them one upon another, to discover by a surer Method than by Sight whether they correspond in bigness. Our Eyes therefore not only deceive us in the Magnitude of Bodies absolutely consider'd, but even in the Relation those Bodies have betwixt themselves.

CHAP. VII.

I. Of the Errors of Sight about Figures. II. We have no Knowledge of the least of them. III. The Knowledge we have of the greater, is not exact. IV. An Explication of some Natural Judgments which prevent our Decepti∣on. V. That these very Judgments deceive us in some particular junctures.

* 1.35OUR Sight is less liable to deceive us in the Representation of Figures, than in the Repre∣sentation of any other thing; because Figure is not a thing of an absolute kind, but its Nature consists in the Relation which is between the parts which terminate some space, and a certain point, which we conceive in that space, and which we may call, as in a Circle, the Centre of the Figure. Notwithstanding, we are mistaken a thousand ways in Figures, and the Knowledge we receive from our Senses, is not exceedingly exact concerning any one of them.

* 1.36We have already prov'd that our Sight discovers not to us all sorts of Extension, but only that which is in some considerable proportion to our Body; and that for this reason we see not all the parts of the minutest Animals, nor those that constitute all hard and liquid Bodies. Thus, not being able to perceive these parts by reason of their Littleness, it follows we are as unable to perceive their Figures; since the figure of Bodies is nothing but the Term that bounds them. See here what an infinite number of invisible figures present themselves in an instant, which are far more numerous than those our Eyes acquaint us withal: which yet induce the Mind, that trusts too much to their reach and capacity, and stands not to examine things to the bottom, to believe these Figures don't exist.

* 1.37As for Bodies proportion'd to our Sight, (the number whereof is very inconsiderable in com∣parison of the other) we discover their figure tolerably well, but never know it exactly by our Senses. Nay, we cannot so much as be assur'd from our Sight if a Circle or a Square, which are two of the most simple figures that are, be not an Ellipsis and a Parallelogramme, though these figures be both in our Hands, and very near our Eyes.

I add farther, that we cannot exactly discern whether a Line be Right or not, especially if it be somewhat long. We must then have a Rule for it: But to what purpose? we know not whe∣ther the Rule it self be such as we suppose it ought to be; nor can we be fully satisfy'd concern∣ing it. And yet without the knowledge of this Line, we can never know any figure, as is evi∣dent to all the World.

This is what may be said in general of Figures, which we have before our Eyes, and in our Hands. But if we suppose them at a distance from us, how many changes do we find in the projection they make in the fund of our Eyes. I will not stand to describe them here; they may easily be learn'd in any Book of Opticks, or by examining the Figures which we see in Pictures. For since the Painter is oblig'd to change them almost all, to the end they may appear in their Natural site, and to paint, for instance, Circles like Ellipses: 'Tis an infallible sign of the Errors of our Sight, in Objects that are not Painted; But these Errors are corrected by fresh Sensati∣ons, which possibly may be lookt upon as a sort of Natural Judgments, and may be term'd the Judgments of the Senses.

* 1.38In beholding a Cube, for Example, it is certain that all the sides we see of it never cause a Projection, or an Image of an equal dimension in the fund of our Eyes; since the Image of all these sides, when painted in the Retina or the Optick Nerve, nearly resembles a Cube pictur'd in Perspective; and consequently the Sensation we have of it, ought to represent the faces of a Cube unequal; because they are so in Perspective. This notwithstanding, we see them all equal, nor are we in an Error.

Now it might be said, That this is occasion'd by a kind of Judgment, which we are naturally inclin'd to make; namely, That the Faces of the Cube which are farthest from us, ought not to cast on the fund of our Eyes so large Images as the Faces which are nearer; but whereas Sensa∣tion, is only peculiar to the Senses, and Judgment, in propriety of Speech cannot be ascrib'd to them; it is certain this Judgment is only a Compound-sensation, which consequently may be sometimes false.

However, since that which is only Sensation in us, may in Relation to the Author of Na∣ture, who excites it, be consider'd as a kind of Judgment, I speak sometimes of Sensations as of Natural Judgments; because this form of Speaking is expedient in giving an ac∣count of things; as may be seen towards the End of the Ninth Chapter, and in several other places.

* 1.39Though the Judgments I speak of, are serviceable in correcting our Senses, a thousand dif∣ferent Ways, and without them we should hardly ever be in the Right, nevertheless they fail not to be sometimes the occasion of our Error. If it happens, for instance, that we see the Spire of a Steeple behind a great Wall, or beyond a Mountain, it will appear to us to be both little and at no great distance: But if we should see it at the same distance, but with many Fields and Houses lying betwixt us and it, it would undoubtedly appear both much bigger and more remote; although in both cases the projection of the Rays of the Steeple or the ••mage of

the Steeple, which is pictur'd in the fund of our Eye, is altogether the same. Now it may be said that the reason why we see it greater, is the judgment we naturally make, viz. That be∣cause so many Fields lie betwixt us and the Steeple, it must needs be more remote, and conse∣quently greater.

But if on the other hand, we saw no interjacent Lands betwixt our Eyes and the Steeple, tho' at the same time we knew there were many, and that it was a great way off, which is very ob∣servable, it would notwithstanding seem to us to be very little and very near, as I have said be∣fore: which we may farther suppose to happen from a kind of judgment natural to our Soul, whereby she sees the Steeple in this manner, because she judges it to be at five or six hundred paces distance. For generally our Imagination represents no greater space betwixt the objects and our selves, unless assisted by a sensible view of other intervening objects; and beyond which, it has still liberty to imagine something more.

'Tis for this reason that the Moon at the Rising or Setting, is seen much bigger,* 1.40 than when elevated a good height above the Horizon: For this elevation removes our view from off the ob∣jects lying betwixt us and her, the dimensions whereof we know; so that we cannot judge of that of the Moon by forming the comparison between them. But when she is just risen, or about to set, we see a great many Fields, betwixt her and us, of whose extension we have a tolerable know∣ledge; and thus it is that we judge her more remote, and upon that reason see her so large as we do.

And it must be observ'd, That when she is elevated above our heads, though our Reason most infallibly assures us, she is vastly distant, yet we cannot avoid seeing her very near, and very little; because indeed these Natural Judgments of the Sight, are founded only on the Percepti∣ons of the same Sight, and Reason is unable to correct them: So that they frequently lead us in∣to Error, by making us form voluntary judgments, that go hand in hand along with them. For when we judge according to our Sensations, we are always deceiv'd, though we never err in judg∣ing according to our Conceptions: because the Body is no farther instructive, than is condu∣cing to the Body, and 'tis only GOD who always teaches us the Truth, as shall be shewn here∣after.

These false Judgments not only deceive us in the Distance and Magnitude of Bodies, which are not the Subject of this Chapter, but in representing their Figure otherwise than it is. We see, for Instance, the Sun and Moon, and other very remote Spherical Bodies as if they were flat, and only circular: Because at that great distance we are unable to discern whether the part opposite to us, is nearer us than the others; and on that account, we judge it is equally distant from us: And thus upon the same grounds we conclude the Stars with the Azure which appears in the Heaven, are rang'd in the same just distance, in a vault perfectly convex, since our Mind ever supposes Equality, where it discovers no Inequality; which yet it ought not positively to admit, unless there be evident conviction for it.

I shall not here insist longer on the Errors of our Sight, in respect of the Figures of Bodies, since a Man may be sufficiently instructed in any Book of Opticks. That Science in effect does only instruct us how to put fallacies on our Eyes; and its whole drift and artifice consists meerly in finding means of making us form those Natural Judgments, I have been speaking of, at a time when they are most impertinent and unseasonable. And this cheat may be acted in so many dif∣ferent ways, that, of all the Figures that are in the World, there is not any single one, but may be painted in a thousand different fashions; so that the Sight must unavoidably be deceiv'd. But, this is not the proper place of explaining these things more throughly. What I have said is suffici∣ent, to let us see we should not give over-much credit to the Testimony of our Eyes, even in their Representations of the Figures of Bodies, though in point of Figures, their reports are much more faithful than in any other occasion.

CHAP. VIII.

I. That our Eyes are incapable of informing us of the Quantity or Swiftness of Motion considered in it self. II. That Duration, which is necessary to our Knowledge of the Quantity of Motion, is unknown to us. III. An In∣stance of the Errors of Sight about Motion and Rest.

HAVING already discover'd the most Fundamental and General Errors of our Sight touching Extension and its Figures, I come now to correct those in which this same Sight ingages us, about the Motion of Matter. And this has no great difficulty in it, after what I have already said of Extension. For there is so necessary a relation and depen∣dence betwixt these two things, that if we are deceiv'd in the Magnitude of Bodies, we must as certainly be deceiv'd in their Motion too.

But, that I may advance nothing but what is clear and distinct, it is necessary to take off what∣ever is equivocal from the word Motion. For this Term has generally two significations. The

first denotes a certain Power or Force, which we imagine in the Body mov'd, and which we suppose the cause of its Motion: The second is the Translation or continued Conveyance of a Body, either in its removal from, or approaching to another, which we consider as at rest.

When I say, for Instance, That a Boul has communicated its Motion to another, the word Mo∣tion is to be understood in its first signification: But if I say simply, that I see a Boul in a great Motion, it is to be taken in the second. In a word, the Term Motion signifies at once both Cause and Effect, which are yet two things altogether different.

I am perswaded that Men are under most palpaple and most dangerous mistakes, concerning the Force that gives this Motion, and Translation to the Bodies mov'd. Those fine Terms, Na∣ture and Impress'd Qualities, are good for nothing but to shelter the Ignorance of the Falsly Learn∣ed, and the Impieties of the Libertine; as I could easily demonstrate. But this is not a place pro∣per to discourse of the Power that moves Bodies,* 1.41 since that is not of a visible Nature; and I am only speaking here of the Errors of our Eyes. I defer it till a time when it will be more ••ea∣sonable.

Motion taken in the second sense, that is, for the Translation of a Body in its removal from an∣other, is something of a visible kind, and the Subject of this Chapter.

* 1.42I have, I think, sufficiently demonstrated in the sixth Chapter, that our Sight does not ac∣quaint us with the Quantity or Magnitude of Bodies, in themselves; but only with the mutual relation they stand in, to each other, and especially to our own. From whence I infer, that we are incapable of knowing the true and absolute Magnitude of their Motion, that is, of their swiftness or slowness, but only the relation these Motions have to one another, and more espe∣cially to the Motion ordinarily incident to our own Body. Which I thus prove.

It is certain that we know not how to judge how great the Motion of a Body is, but by the Length of the Space the Body has ran over. Thus our Eyes not informing us of the true Length of the Space describ'd by the Motion, it follows that 'tis impossible for us to know the true Quan∣tity of the Motion.

This Argument is only a Corollary of that which I have said of Extension, and all the force it has proceeds from its being a necessary Conclusion of what I have there Demonstrated: I shall now give one which depends on no Supposition. I say then, that supposing we were able clearly to dis∣cover the true Quantity of the Space describ'd, it would no way follow, that we could know the Quantity of Motion also.

The Greatness or the Swiftness of Motion includes two things. The first is the Translation or Conveyance of a Body from one place to another, as from Paris to St. Germains: The second is the Time that necessarily goes to the making this Conveyance. Now it is not enough to know exactly how far Paris is distant from St. Germains, to know whether a Man has gone it with a Quick or a Slow Motion: But it must moreover be known how much time he has imploy'd in his Jour∣ney: Granting then that the Length of the Journey may be truly known; I utterly deny we can have an exact knowledge by our Sight, or indeed any other way whatever, of the Time that is spent in the passage, and of the true Quantity of Duration.

This is sufficiently evident, in that at certain times one Hour seems to us as long as four; and on the contrary at other times,* 1.43 four Hours slip insensibly away: When, for Instance, a Man's Mind is fill'd with Joy, Hours seem no longer than a Moment; because then the time passes away without thinking of it. But when a Man is dejected with Grief, and lies under some sensible Pain or Affliction, every day is thought an entire Year. The reason of which difference is, That in this case the Mind is weary of its Duration, because it is Painful. The more it applies it self to the thought of it, the more it discovers it, and thereby finds it longer than in the season of Mirth and Joy, or some diverting Imployment, which as it were carries the Soul out of it self, to fix her closer to the Object of her Joy, or her Diversion. For as a Man finds a piece of Painting so much larger, by how much he stands to consider all the little things represented in it, with greater at∣tention; or as he finds the head of a Fly considerably great, when he discerns all the parts of it with a Microscope; so the Mind finds its duration so much longer, as it considers it with greater Attention and is sensible of all the parts of it.

Insomuch that I dont at all doubt, but that GOD could so apply our Mind to the parts of its Duration, by giving us abundance of Sensations in a very little time, as to make one Hour appear as long as many Ages. For as there are no Indivisible Points in Bodies, so there are no Indivisible In∣stants in Duration. But as the least parts of Matter may be divided to Infinity, so the parts of Du∣ration may be assign'd less and less to Infinity, as is easy to demonstrate. If then the Mind were made Attentive to the minutest parts of its Duration, by its Sensations which should leave some Traces in the Brain, whereby to remember them, it would undoubtedly seem much longer to it than it does.

But finally, the use of Watches is a convincing proof, that there can be no exact knowledge of Duration, and I desire no more. For since the knowledge of the absolute Greatness or Intense∣ness of Motion depends on a preceding knowledge of the Length of Duration, as we have shewn it does; it thence follows, that on Supposition we can never exactly know the absolute Quantity of Duration, we shall never be able to know exactly the absolute Quantity of Motion.

But because some Relations, which Duration, or one time has to another may be known, some Relations likewise which Motions have to one another may be equally understood: For as we can certainly know that the Solary Year is longer than the Lunary; so we can certainly know that a Cannon Bullet has greater Motion than a Tortoise. So that though our Eyes will not let

us see the absolute Quantity of Motion, yet they fail not to assist us in discovering, nearly enough, the Relative Intenseness of it; I mean the Relation or Proportion of one Motion to another: And we have no need of any farther knowledge thereof for the Preservation of our Bodies.

There are many Instances to be given,* 1.44 which manifestly shew that our Sight deludes us touch∣ing the Motion of Bodies; it very often happens, that the things which seem to us in Motion, are perfectly at Rest; and on the contrary those which seem to us at Rest, notwithstanding, are in Motion. As when a Man, for instance, sits on shipboard whilst the Vessel is under sail in a swift and steady Motion, he seems to see the Lands and Towns fly from him; they seem to be in motion, and the Vessel to stand still.

So if a Man were plac'd upon the Planet Mars, he would conclude upon sight that the Sun, the Earth, and the rest of the Planets together with all the Fixed Stars perform'd their circumvolu∣tion in about 24 or 25 hours; which is the space of time that Mars imploys in turning round his own Axis. And yet the Earth, the Sun, and the Stars never circuit round that Planet. So that this Man would see things in Motion which were at Rest, and would think himself at Rest, tho' he were in Motion all the time.

I stand not here to explain, how it comes to pass that the Man on shipboard would easily cor∣rect the mistake of his Eyes, but the Man suppos'd on the Planet Mars would obstinately defend his Error. The Reason of it is easie to be known: and we shall more readily find it by reflecting on what would happen to a Man that were asleep in a Vessel, who starting on a sudden, saw no∣thing when he wak'd, besides the top of a Mast of some Vessel that made towards him. For in case he saw not the Sails swell'd with the Wind, nor the Mariners at work, nor felt any Agitation or concussion of the Ship, or the like, he would absolutely be at a loss and in doubt, without know∣ing which of the two Vessels was in Motion; and neither his Eyes nor his Reason could give him any Information.

CHAP. IX.

A Continuation of the same Subject. I. A general Demonstration of the Er∣rors of our Sight concerning Motion. II. That the Distance of Objects is necessary to be known, in order to judge of the Quantity of their Mo∣tion. III. The Mediums, whereby we know the Distances of Objects, are Examin'd.

I COME now to give a General Demonstration of all the Errors,* 1.45 into which our Sight leads us, in respect of the Motion of Bodies.

Let A be the Eye of the Spectator; C the Object, which I suppose at a convenient di∣stance from A. I say, that though the Object remains fix'd in C, it may be thought to be re∣mov'd as far as D, or to approach as near as B. And though the Object recedes towards D, it

[illustration]

may be believ'd immoveable in C, and even to approach towards B; and on the contrary, though it approaches towards B, it may be thought to be immoveable in C, or even to recede towards D. That though the Object be advanc'd from C as far as E or H, or to G or K, it may be thought to have mov'd no farther than from C to F or I. And again on the other hand, that though the Ob∣ject be mov'd from C unto F or I, a Man may think it mov'd to E or H, or else unto G or K. That if the Object be mov'd in a line equally distant from the Spectator, that is, in a circumference whereof the Spectator is the Centre; though that Object be mov'd from C to P, it may be thought to be mov'd only from B to O: and on the contrary, though it be mov'd only from B to O, it may be thought mov'd from C to P.

If beyond the Object C there happens to be another Object, suppose M; which is thought at rest, and which notwithstanding is in motion towards N: Though the Object C remains unmo∣ved, or is mov'd with a more gentle motion towards F, than M is mov'd towards N, it will yet seem to be oppositely mov'd towards Y; and on the contrary, if &c.

* 1.46It is plain that the proof of all these Propositions except the last, in which there is no difficulty, depends on one Supposition only, namely this, that we cannot with any assurance determine concerning the Distance of Objects. For if it be true that we cannot judge thereof with any cer∣tainty, it follows that we cannot be assured whether C is advanc'd on towards D, or has ap∣proached towards B, and so of the other Propositions.

Now to know whether the judgments we form of the Distance of Objects are infallible, we have no more to do than to examine the means we make use of to judge concerning it. If these means are uncertain, 'tis not possible the Judgment's depending on them should be more infallible. There are many of them, which it is necessary to explain.

* 1.47The first, the most universal, and sometimes the safest way we have, whereby to judge of the distance of Objects, is the Angle made by the Rays of our Eyes, whereof the Object is the Verti∣cal Point, that is, the Object is the Point, where the two Rays meet. When this Angle is very large, the Object appears near at hand, on the contrary when it is very acute, we see the Object a great way off. And the change which happens in the situation of our Eyes, according to the changes of this Angle, is the means the Soul imploys to judge concerning the Distance or Nigh∣ness of Objects. For just as a Blind Man having two strait Sticks in his hands, the length whereof he did not know, may by a kind of Natural Geometry give a tolerable conjecture concerning the di∣stance of any Body, in touching it with the end of his two Sticks, by reason of the Disposition and Distance he finds his hands in,* 1.48 with respect to one another; so it may be said that the Soul judges of the Distance of an Object by the Disposition of her Eyes, which is different according as the Angle, whereby she sees, is great or little, that is, as the Object is nearer or farther off.

A Man would easily be convinc'd of what I say, if he would be at the trouble of making a very easie Experiment: As, let him hang a Ring at the end of a thread, so plac'd that the hoop being turn'd directly towards him, the aperture of it may not appear; or if he please let him drive a Stick in the ground, and take another in his hand, that is curv'd at the end; let him retreat three or four steps from the Ring or the Stick, and shutting one Eye with one hand, let him try to hit the aperture of the Ring, or with the bent end of the Stick in his hand to touch the other across, at an height that is much upon a level with the Eye; and he will be surpriz'd to find himself in∣capable of doing it at an hundred tryals, though nothing in the world seems easier: Nay, though he should lay aside the Stick▪ and only endeavour to direct his finger cross-ways into the concavi∣ty of the Ring, he would find it difficult enough to be done, though he stood very near it.

But it ought to be well observ'd that I have said, A Man should endeavour to hit the aperture of the Ring, or to touch the Stick cross-wise, and not by way of a Right Line from our Eye to the Ring; for so indeed there would be no difficulty at all: so far from it, that it would be much easier to effect it, with one Eye shut, than with both of them open, since that would be a Rule to direct him.

Now it may be said, that the Difficulty, which is found, when a Man tries to direct the end of the Stick through the Ring cross-wise, with only one Eye••open, proceeds from this, namely, that one Eye being shut, the Angle I have mention'd is unknown. For to know the Magnitude of an Angle, it is not enough to know the length of its Base, and the Bigness of the Angle made by one of its Sides upon the Base; for this is known in the foregoing Experiment: But it is yet farther ne∣cessary to know the other Angle, which is made by the other Side upon the Base, or the length of one of the Sides. Which cannot be exactly known without opening the other Eye. And thus the Soul cannot make use of her Natural Geometry to judge of the Distance of the Ring.

The Disposition then of the Eyes, which accompanies the Angle made of the Visual Rays which cut each other and centre in the Object, is one of the best and most universal means the Soul im∣ploys whereby to judge of the Distance of things. If then that Angle receives no sensible Alterati∣on, upon a little removal of the Object, whether it approaches nearer us, or recedes from us, it will thence follow, that it is a fallacious means, and unserviceable to the Soul whereby to judge of the true distance of that Object.

Now 'tis plain that this Angle is notably chang'd, when an Object at about a foot distance from our Sight is translated four foot off: but if it be only translated from four to eight, the Altera∣tion is much less discernible; if from eight to twelve, less yet: if from a thousand to an hundred thousand, hardly at all: Lastly, in carrying the Object farther on, even to the imaginary spaces, the change of the Angle grows imperceptible, and is quite lost. So that were there a considera∣ble space betwixt A and C, the Soul could not by that means know whether the Object were near B or D.

This is the Reason why we see the Sun and Moon, as if they were involv'd in Clouds, tho' they are vastly distant from them; and that we naturally think all the Stars rang'd in an equal distance from us; that we imagine the Comets are fixt, and almost motionless, at the end of their course. We imagine too that Comets are entirely dissipated in some Months time, because they recede from us in almost a right Line, or a Line direct from our Eyes; and are going to lose themselves in the vast spaces, from whence they return not till after many Years, or even many Ages.

The second Medium the Soul imploys to judge concerning the Distance of Objects,* 1.49 consists in a Disposition of the Eyes, different from that I have been speaking of. In order to explain it, we must know it is absolutely necessary that the figure of the Eye be different, according to the diffe∣rent Distance of Objects which we see: For when a Man sees an Object near him, there is a neces∣sity of his Eyes being longer, than if the Object were farther off: Because to the end the Rays of this Object may be collected in the Optick Nerve, which is necessary to its being seen, the di∣stance between this Nerve and the Crystalline ought to be greater.

It is true, If the Crystalline became more convex when the Object were near, that would effect the same thing as the Elongation of the Eye. But 'tis not credible that the Crystalline can easily change its convexity; and on the other side, we have a most evident Experiment for the E∣longation of the Eye: For Anatomy informs us, there are Muscles that surround the middle of the Eye; and we are sensible of the Effort these Muscles make to compress it, and lengthen it, when we have a mind to see any thing very near.

But it is not at all necessary, we should know here, by what way this is done; it is enough that there happens a Change in the Eye, whether it proceeds from the Pressure of the Muscles, that surround it; or whether the little Nerves, which answer to the Ciliary Ligaments which hold the Crystalline, suspended betwixt the other Humours of the Eye, become relax'd, to augment the convexity of the Crystalline; or intense, to diminish it.

For this Change which happens, whatever it be, is only to collect and unite the Rays of Ob∣jects, with an exact justness, upon the Optick Nerve. But it is certain that when the Object is five hundred Paces, or ten thousand Leagues distant, we behold it with the same Disposition of Eyes, without any sensible Change in the Muscles which surround the Eye, or in the Nerves which answer to the Ciliary Ligaments of the Crystalline: And the Rays of Objects are very exactly collected upon the Retina, or the Optick Nerve. Thus the Soul judges, that Objects at ten thousand or an hundred thousand Leagues distance, are no more than five or six hundred Paces off; when she judges of their Distance, only by the Disposition of the Eyes, which I have been speaking of.

However, it is certain this Medium is of use to the Soul, when the Object is nigh at hand. If, for instance, an Object is only at half a foot Distance, we discern its Distance well enough, through the Disposition of the Muscles which constringe our Eyes, in order to make them some∣what longer: And this Disposition is moreover painful. If the Object be remov'd two foot, we can still discern the Distance, because the Disposition of the Muscles is somewhat sensible still, although no longer painful. But if the Object be remov'd still some feet farther, this Disposition of our Muscles, grows so imperceptible, that it is altogether useless to us in judging of the Di∣stance of the Object.

These then are two Means the Soul makes use of, to judge of the Distance of the Object, which are altogether useless, when the Object is remote to five or six hundred Paces, and which are ne∣ver infallible, though the Object be much nearer.

The third Medium consists in the Greatness of the Image painted on the fund of the Eye,* 1.50 and that makes the Representation of the Objects which we see. 'Tis confess'd that this Image grows less in proportion as the Object is remov'd to a greater Distance, but this Diminution grows so much less discernable, as the Object which changes its Distance is more remote. For when an Object is at a considerable Distance, as of five or s••ix hundred Paces, under or over in Pro∣portion to its Bigness, there happens very considerable Changes in its remoteness, without any considerable Changes occasion'd in the Image which represents it, as is easie to be demon∣strated. Thus the third Medium has the same defect as the other two, of which we have been speaking.

It is farther to be observ'd, That the Soul does not judge those Objects the remotest, that have the least Images painted on the Retina. When I see, for instance, a Man and a Tree at an hun∣dred Paces distance, or suppose many Stars in the Heaven, I do not judge the Man to be more remote than the Tree, and the Little Stars farther distant than the Greater; though the Images of the Man, and the little Stars, that are pictur'd on the Retina, are less than the Images of the Tree and the Greater Stars. Besides it is necessary to know the greatness of an Object, to be able to judge nearly of its Distance, and because I know an House is bigger than a Man, tho' the Image of the House be bigger than that of a Man, I do not however judge the House nearest upon that account. And so it is in respect of the Stars; Our Eyes represent them to us equally remote, though it is very reasonable to believe some of them at a far greater distance than others. Thus there are infinite Objects, the Distance whereof we cannot know, since there are infinite Objects with whose Magnitude we are unacquainted.

We judge farther of the remoteness of an Object by the Force wherewith it acts upon our Eyes, because a remote Object acts more languishing and weakly than another; and again,* 1.51 by the Di∣stinctness and Clearness of the Image, which is form'd in the Eye; because when an Object is re∣mote, the Pupil of the Eye must needs be more open and Capacious▪ and Consequently the Rays must be collected somewhat confusedly. 'Tis for this reason that obscurer Objects, and such as we see confusedly, appear remote; and on the contrary, that luminous Bodies, and such as we see distinctly, seem near. It is plain enough, that these last Means are too fallible whereby to judge with any kind of Certainty concerning the distance of Objects: and I shall not any longer insist upon them, but come to the last of all, as being that which helps the Imagination most, and in∣clines the Soul more easily to judge that Objects are very remote.

* 1.52The sixth then and the Principal Medium of all, consists in this, viz. that the Eye exhibits not to the Soul a single Object separate from others, but gives her View at once of all those which lye, betwixt us and the Principal Object of our actual Consideration.

When for instance, we behold a Steeple at a considerable Distance, we usually see a great many interjacent Lands and Houses at the same time: and because we judge of the Remoteness of these Lands, and Houses, and in the mean time see the Steeple beyond them, we judge likewise, that it is not only more remote, but a great deal larger and taller, than if we saw it all alone: Not∣withstanding the Image which is projected in the Fund of the Eye, is always of an equal Bigness, whether there are Lands and Houses lying betwixt us and it, or whether there are none, pro∣vided we see it from a place equally Distant, which is suppos'd. Thus we judge of the Big∣ness of Objects, according as we believe them remote from us; and the Bodies which we see betwixt us and the Objects, assist the Imagination mightily in judging of their Remoteness: just as we judge of the Extent of our Duration, or of the time that has pass'd since we have done any Action by the confus'd Remembrance of the things we have done, or of the Thoughts we have had successively since that Action. For they are all these Thoughts and Actions that have succeeded one another, which are assistant to the Mind in judging of the length of any Time, or of any part of our Duration: Or rather the confus'd Remembrance of all these successive Thoughts, is the same thing as the judgment of our Duration; as the confus'd View of Lands betwixt us and a Steeple, is the same thing as the judgment concerning the Remoteness of the Steeple.

Hence it is easy to assign the true Reason of the Moon's appearing larger at her Rising, than when considerably elevated above the Horizon. For at her Rising she appears many Leagues di∣stant, and even beyond the sensible Horizon, or the Lands which terminate our Sight. Where∣as we judge her but at half a Leagues Distance, or seven or eight times higher than our Houses when she is ascended above our Horizon. Thus we judge her far greater when she is near the Horizon, than when at a great distance from it; because we judge her to be far more remote from us, when she rises, than when mounted very high above our Horizon.

I confess a great part of the Philosophers attribute what I have been saying to the Vapours arising from the Earth. I agree with them in this, that the Rays of Objects being refracted by the Vapours, are a reason of the Objects seeming larger. I know there are more Vapours betwixt us and the Moon when rising, than when she is elevated a good height; and consequently she ought to appear somewhat larger than she would seem, if she were always equally remote. But yet it cannot be said, that this Refraction of the Lunary Rays is the cause of those apparent Changes of her Magnitude: For that Refraction is no Impediment why the Image delineated in the Fund of the Eyes when we see the Moon rising, may not be less than that which she pro∣jects, when she hath been a long time risen.

The Astronomers who measure the Diameters of the Planets, observe that the Diameter of the Moon is magnify'd in proportion to her Distance from the Horizon, and consequently in Pro∣portion to her Appearing lesser to us: thus the Diameter of the Image which is painted in the Fund of our Eyes, it at that time least when we see the Moon biggest: Indeed, the Moon when she rises, is remoter from us by a Semidiameter of the Earth, than when she is perpendicular∣ly over our Heads, and 'tis upon that account her Diameter grows greater in her Ascent above the Horizon, because then she's approaching nearest us.

The reason then that we see her Greater when she rises, is not the Refraction of her Rays meeting with the Vapours which proceed from the Earth, since the Image which is at that time form'd from those Rays, is lesser; but 'tis the Natural Judgment we make of her Remoteness, occasion'd by her appearing beyond those Lands which we see at a vast Distance from us, as has been before explain'd; and I am amaz'd to find Philosophers asserting that the reason of this Appearance, and Delusion of our Sences, is harder to be discover'd than the greatest Aequations of Algebra.

This Medium whereby we judge of the Remoteness of any Object, by knowing the Distance of the things betwixt us and it, is often of considerable use, when the other means I have spoke of, are wholly insignificant: for by this last Medium, we can judge that certain objects are ma∣ny Leagues distant which we cannot do by any of the other. And yet if we strictly survey it, it will be found in several things deficient,

For, first, we can only make use of it, about things upon the Earth, since it can be but very rarely, and then very unprofitably imploy'd upon those in the Air, or in the Heavens. Se∣condly, it cannot be made use of on the Earth, but about things a few Leagues distant. In the third place, we ought to be certain that there are neither Mountains, nor Valleys, nor any thing of the like nature betwixt us and the Object, that hinders us from applying the afore-said Me∣dium. Lastly, I am perswaded there is no body but has made sufficient Tryals upon the Sub∣ject, to be convinc'd, that it is a thing extreamly difficult to judge with any certainty of the Re∣moteness of Objects by a sensible View of the things lying betwixt us and them: and we per∣haps have dwelt two long upon it.

These then are all the Means we have to judge of the Distance of Objects; in which, since we have found considerable Imperfections we cannot but conclude, that the Judgments that are grounded upon them, must needs be very Precarious and Uncertain.

Hence it is easy to manifest the truth of the Propositions I have advanc'd. The Object C was suppos'd considerably remote from A: Therefore in many Instances it may be advanc'd on to∣wards

D, or may have approach'd towards B, and no one can discover it, because there is no infallible Means whereby to judge of its Distance. Nay, it may recede towards D when it is thought to approach towards B; because the Image of the Object is sometimes augmented, and inlarged upon the Retina; whether it be because the Air betwixt the Object and the Eye occa∣sions a greater Refraction at one time than at another; whether it proceeds from some little Trem∣lings, which happen in the Optick Nerve; or lastly, that the Impression, which is caus'd by an unexact Union of the Rays upon the Retina, is diffus'd and communicated to the parts, which ought to receive no Agitation from it; which may proceed from any different causes. Thus the Image of the same Objects, being larger on these occasions, gives the Soul reason to believe the Object approaches nearer. The like may be said of the other Propositions.

Before I conclude this Chapter, I would have it observ'd, That it is of great concern to us, in order to the Preservation of our Life, to have a nicer Knowledge of the Motion or Rest of Bodies, in Proportion to their Nighness to us: and that it is a thing useless and insignificant, to know exactly the truth of these things, when happening in places very remote. For this evi∣dently shews that what I have generally advanc'd concerning all the Sences, how they never Dis∣cover things to us as they are absolutely, and in their own Nature; but only in Relation to the Pre∣servation of our Body, is found exactly True in this particular: since we know the Motion or Rests of Objects proportionably better, as they approach nearer to us, and are incapable of judging of them by the Sences, when they are so remote as to seem to have no Relation at all, or very little to our Body: as, for instance, when they are five or six hundred Paces distant, if they be of a Moderate Bigness; or even Nearer than this, when they are Lesser; or some∣what farther off, when they are proportionably Greater.

CHAP. X.

Of our Errors about sensible Qualities. I. The Distinction of the Soul and Bo∣dy. II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses. III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately united. IV. An Instance to explain the Effect which Objects have upon our Bodies. V. What it is they produce in the Soul, and the Reasons why the Soul perceives not the Motions of the Fi∣bres of the Body. VI. Four things which are generally confounded in every Sensation.

WE have seen in the fore-going Chapters that the Judgments we form upon the Testi∣mony of our Eyes, concerning Extension, Figure, and Motion, are never exactly true. And yet it must not be allow'd that they are altogether false; they contain so much Truth at least as this amounts to, that there are Extension, Figures, and Motions, whatever they be, which are extrinsical, or without our selves.

I confess we often see things that have no Existence, nor ever had, and it ought not to be concluded that a thing is Actually without us, from our Seeing it without us. There is no neces∣sary Connexion between the Presence of an Idea to the Mind of a Man, and the Existence of the Thing represented by the Idea. Which is manifest enough from the Consideration of what happens to Men in a Dream or a Delirium: And yet we may safely affirm, that ordinarily, Ex∣tension, Figures, and Motions, are without us when we see them so. * 1.53 These things are not in the Imagination only, but are Real. And we are not deceiv'd in believing them to have a Real Existence, and wholly independent on our Mind; tho' it be a very hard thing to prove it.

It is certain then that the Judgments we form concerning the Extension, the Figures, and Mo∣tions of Bodies, contain some Truth: But 'tis another case in point of those Judgments we make concerning Light, Colours, Tasts, Smells, and all other Sensible Qualities: For Truth has no∣thing to do with them, as shall be made manifest, in the remainder of this First Book.

We make not here any Distinction between Light and Colours, because we suppose them to have no great Difference; and that they cannot be separately Explain'd. We shall likewise be oblig'd to speak of other Sensible Qualities in general, at the same time we shall treat of these Two in particular, because they may be accounted for upon the same Principles. The things which follow demand the greatest Attention imaginable, as being of the highest Impor∣tance, and very different, as to their Usefulness, from those of the foregoing Discourse.

We instantly suppose a Man to have made some Reflections upon two * 1.54 Idea's which he finds in his Soul: one that represents the Body, and the other which represents the Mind;* 1.55 and that he is able easily to distinguish them by the positive Attributes they contain: In a word, that he is very well satisfi'd, that Extension is a different thing from Thought. Or we will sup∣pose he has read and meditated on some places of St. Austin, as the 10th Chapter of the 10th Book,

Concerning the Trinity, the 4th and 14th Chapters of his Book concerning The Quantity of the Soul, at least Mr. Des-Cartes's Meditations, especially that Part which treats of the Distinction of the Soul and Body: or lastly Mr. Cordemoy's sixth Dissertation, concerning the Difference of the Soul and Body.

* 1.56We suppose farther, that he is acquainted with the Anatomy of the Organs of the Senses; and knows that they consist of little Threads or Fibres, which derive their Origine from the middle of the Brain: that they are dispers'd through all the Members wherein there is Sensation, and being continued without any Interruption, are terminated upon the External parts of the Body; that whilst a Man is awake and in health, one of the Extremities cannot be mov'd but the other will be mov'd in the same time, because they are always somewhat Intense and upon the stretch: the same thing which happens to a Cord that is intense, one part whereof cannot be mov'd, but the other must receive some Vibration.

'Tis farther necessary to know that these little Threads or Fibres may be mov'd by two seve∣ral ways, either by that end that is external to the Brain, or by the end which terminates in the Brain. If these Fibres are externally agitated by Objects acting on them, and this Agi∣tation be not communicated so far as the Brain, as it happens in Sleep, the Soul receives no fresh Sensation from them at that time: But if these Fibres are moved in the Brain by the course of the Animal Spirits, or by any other cause, the Soul has a Perception of something: though the Parts of these Fibres which are without the Brain, and are dispers'd throughout all the Parts of the Body, are quiet and undisturb'd; as it happens when a Man's asleep.

* 1.57It will not be amiss to observe here, by the way, that Experience certifies us, it is not impos∣sible to feel Pain in those parts of our Body, which have been intirely cut off: Because the Fi∣bres of the Brain, which correspond to them, being Vibrated in the same manner, as if those Parts were actually wounded, the Soul feels in those Imaginary Parts, a most real Pain. For all these things are a palpable Demonstration, that the Soul immediately resides in that Part of the Brain in which all the Organs of the Senses terminate and centre: I mean that in this Part she receives the Sensation of all the Changes, that there occur, in reference to the Objects that have caus'd them, or have us'd to cause them: and she has no Perception of any thing happening in any other Part, but by the Intervention of the Fibres which terminate therein. This being laid down and well understood, it will be no hard thing to discover how Sensation is effected, which is necessary to be explain'd by some particular Instance.

* 1.58When a Man thrusts the Point of a Needle into his hand, this Point moves and separates the Fibres of the Flesh. These Fibres are extended from that Place to the Brain and whilst he is awake, they are so Intense, that they can receive no Concussion or Vibration, but it is Com∣municated to those in the Brain: It follows then that the Extremities of the Fibres in the Brain must be in like manner mov'd. If the motion of the Fibres of the Hand is Moderate, that of the Fibres of the Brain will be so too: and if this Motion is violent enough to break something in the Hand, it will be more forcible and violent in the Brain.

Thus if a Man holds his Hand to the Fire, the little parts of the Wood, whereof it continu∣ally throws out innumerable quantities with great violence (as Reason, upon the defect of our Sight, demonstrates) beat against the Fibres, and communicate a Part of their Agitation to them. If that Agitation be but moderate, that of the Extremities of the Fibres in the Brain which answer to the Hand will be moderate also. And if this Motion be violent enough in the Hand, to separate some Parts of it, as it happens when it is Burnt; the Motion of the Internal Fibres of the Brain will be proportionably stronger and more violent. This then is what occurs in our Body when Objects strike upon us: we must now see what happens to our Soul.

* 1.59She is principally Resident, if we may be permitted so to speak, in that Part of the Brain, where all the Fibres of our Nerves are centred. She is seated there in order to cherish and pre∣serve all the Parts of our Body: and consequently it is necessary she should have notice of all the Changes that occur therein, and that she be able to distinguish those which are adapted and agreeable to the Constitution of her Body, from the contrary; since it would be to no use or purpose for her to know them absolutely and without Relation to the Body. Thus though all the Changes of our Fibres do, in true speaking, consist merely in the Motions of them, which are ge∣nerally no farther different, than according to the Degrees of more or less; yet it is necessary for the Soul to look upon these Changes as Essentially different: For though they differ very little in themselves, they ought however to be consider'd as Essentially different, in reference to the Preservation of the Body.

The Motion for instance, that produces Pain, has rarely any considerable difference from that which causes Titillation:* 1.60 There is no necessity there should be any Essential Difference betwixt these two Motions, but it is necessary there should be an Essential Difference betwixt the Titil∣lation and the Pain, which these two Motions cause in the Soul. For the Vibration of the Fi∣bres which accompanies Titillation, certifies the Soul of the good Constitution of her Body, and assures her it has Strength enough to resist the Impression of the Object, and that she need not be under any Apprehensions of its being injur'd by it: But the Motion which accompanies Pain, being somewhat more violent, is capable of breaking some Fibre of the Body, and the Soul ought to be advis'd of it by some Disagreeable Sensation; so as to be aware of it for the fu∣ture. Thus though the Motions, which are occasion'd in the Body, are no farther different in themselves than according to the Degrees of more or less; yet being consider'd with Relation to the Welfare and Preservation of our Life, they may be said to differ Essentially.

'Tis upon this account our Soul has no Perception of the Vibrations, which are excited by Objects, in the Fibres of our Flesh: It would be of very little use for her to know them; nor could she from thence receive sufficient Light to judge, whether the things about us were capa∣ble of Destroying or Maintaining the oeconomy of our Body. But she feels her self touch'd with Sensations essentially different, which shewing precisely the Qualities of Objects, as they are related to her Body, make her most exactly sensible in what capacity these Objects are in to hurt it.

We may farther consider, That in case the Soul had no Perception, but of that which hap∣pen'd in her Hand, when it were burnt, if she saw nothing there but the Motion and Separa∣tion of some Fibres, she would not much concern her self about it: Nay, she might probably sometimes out of an Humour or a Frolick, take some satisfaction in doing it, like those Freakish kind of Men, who divert themselves in their Passions or Debauches, in breaking all things they light upon.

Or as a Prisoner would not be much concern'd, to see the Walls batter'd down about him, that confin'd him, but rather would be glad of it, upon the hopes of a Deliverance: So if we had no other Perception than of the Separation of the Parts of our Body, when we were burnt or hurt in any manner, we should soon be perswaded that our Happiness was not confin'd to a Body which prevented our Injoying those things, which ought to make us Happy; and so should be glad of seeing it destroy'd.

Hence it is apparent that the Author of the Union of our Soul and Body, hath with greatest Wisdom ordain'd, That we should be sensible of Pain, whenever any Change happen'd to our Body, capable of incommoding it; as when a Needle pierced the Flesh, or the Fire separated some parts of it; and that we should be sensible of a Titillation, or an agreeable Heat, when these Motions were moderate, without perceiving the Truth of that which occur'd in our Body or the Motions of the Fibres, we have been speaking of.

First, because in the Sensation of Pleasure and Pain, which are things far more different than in Degree, we distinguish with greater Ease the Objects which occasion them. Secondly, be∣cause this way of Informing us, whether the Uniting our selves with the Bodies that encompass us, or the Separating from them be most convenient, is the shortest and the speediest, and takes up the capacity of the Mind the least; which is only made for GOD himself.

Lastly, because Pleasure and Pain are Modifications of our Soul, which she feels with Relation to her Body, and which more nearly affect her than would the Knowledge of the Motion of some Fibres belonging to it; this obliges her to be more sollicitous about them: And this is a Reason of the most strict Union betwixt the two Constituent Parts of Man. From all which it is manifest that the Senses are given us, for the Preservation of our Body only, and not for the Discovery of the Truth.

What hath been said concerning Titillation and Pain, ought universally to be understood of all other Sensations, as we shall see hereafter. I chose to begin with these two Sensations ra∣ther than others, because they are more Strong, and Lively, and Proper to make my Meaning more Sensibly conceiv'd.

It is at present a very easie thing to shew, That we fall into infinite Errors, concerning Light and Colours, and generally concerning all Sensible Qualities; as Cold, Heat, Smells, Tasts, Sound, Pain, and Titillation; and if I would stand to make a particular Enquiry into all those we fall into about all the Objects of our Senses, whole Years would not suffice to make a De∣duction of them; because they are in a manner Infinite. It will be sufficient therefore to speak of them in general.

In almost all Sensations there are four different things which Men confound with one another, because they happen altogether, and as it were in the same Instant: And this is the Prin∣ciple of all the Errors of our Senses.

The first is the Action of the Object, that is in Heat, for instance,* 1.61 the Impulsion or Motion of the little parts of the Wood against the Fibres of the Hand.

The Second is the Passion of the Organ of Sense, that is to say, the Agitation of the Fibres of the Hand caused by that of the little Parts of Fire, which Agitation is communicated to the Brain, because otherwise the Soul would have no Sensation of it.

The Third is the Passion, the Sensation or Perception of the Soul, that is, What every one Feels in himself when he is near the Fire.

The Fourth is the Judgment the Soul makes, that what she feels is both in her Hand, and in the Fire: Now this Judgment is Natural, or rather is only a Compound Sensation. But this Sensation or this Natural Judgement, is for the most part attended with another Free or Voluntary Judge∣ment, which is so customary for the Soul to make, that she is almost incapable of preventing it. Here then are four things of a very different Nature, as may be seen, which Men are not nice enough to distinguish, but are apt to confound, because of the strict Union of the Soul and Bo∣dy, which hinders them from making an exact distribution of the Properties of Matter, and of the Mind.

'Tis notwithstanding easie to discover, That of these four things, which occur within us, in the Sensation of an Object; the two first belong to the Body, and the two last appertain to the Soul only, provided a Man has any whit meditated on the Nature of the Soul and Body, as he ought to have done, as I before suppos'd him. But these things demand a particular Explication.

CHAP. XI.

I. The Error we fall into concerning the Action of Objects against the Ex∣ternal Fibres of our Senses. II. The Cause of this Error. III. An Ob∣jection and Answer.

IN this and the three succeeding Chapters, I shall treat of these four things above-mention'd, which I said us'd to be confounded, and taken for a simple Sensation: and I shall only give a general Explication of the Errors we fall into, because if I would descend to Particulars, there would never be an end of them: But I hope however to put the Mind of those, who will seriously consider what I am about to say, in a condition of discovering with a great deal of Ease, all the Errors our Senses can make us Subject to; But in order to this it is demanded, That they would attentively Meditate as well upon the following Chapters, as upon that they have last been Reading.* 1.62

The first of the things we confound, in each of our Sensations, is the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Body. It is certain a Man makes hardly any Difference betwixt the Sensation of the Soul, and that Action of Objects; which is so plain as not to need any farther Proof. The generality of Men imagine that the Heat, for instance, which they Feel, is in the Fire which causes it; that Light is in the Air, and Colours are upon colour'd Objects. They have no Thought of any Motions of Imperceptible Bodies which are the Cause of these Sen∣sations.

It is true they do not judge that Pain is in the Needle which pricks them, in like manner as they judge that Heat is in the Fire: But the reason of it is, That the Needle and its Action are visible,* 1.63 but the little parts of the Wood that proceed from the Fire, and their Motion against our Hands are altogether invisible. Thus, seeing nothing that strikes upon our Hands when we warm our selves, and yet feeling Heat in them, we Naturally judge this Heat to be in the Fire, for want of discovering any thing in it besides.

So that it is generally true, that we attribute our Sensations to the Objects themselves, when we are Ignorant of the Causes of these Sensations: And because Pain and Titillation are pro∣duc'd by Sensible Bodies, as by a Needle or a Feather, which we both see and touch, we for this Reason do not conclude, that there is any thing in these Objects like the Sensations which they cause in us.

* 1.64And yet I confess that we do not fail to judge Combustion is not in the Fire, but only in the Hand, though it proceed from the same cause, i. e. the Action of the little parts of the Wood, as well as Heat, which yet we attribute to the Fire. But the Reason of this is, That Combustion is a Species of Pain: For having often judg'd that Pain is not in the external Body which produces it, we are induc'd to form the same Judgement of Combustion.

That which is another Reason of our Judging in this manner, is, that Pain or Combustion, most strenuously applys our Soul to the consideration of the parts of her Body; and this Intension of the Soul turns off her thoughts from any other thing: Thus the Mind attributes the Sensation of Combustion to the Object that is most present and nigh her self. And because we find pre∣sently after, that the Combustion has left some visible marks in the part in which we felt the Pain, this is a Confirmation of the Judgement we have made, that Combustion is in the Hand. But this is no Impediment, why we should not embrace this general Rule, That we are accustom'd to attribute our Sensations to Objects, when-ever they act upon us by the Motion of some Invisible Parts. And upon this ground it is, that we usually believe Colours, Light, Smells, Tasts, Sounds, and some other Sensations, to be in the Air, or in the External Objects which produce them: for as much as all these Sensations are produc'd in us by the Motions of some Imper∣ceptible Bodies.

CHAP. XII.

I. Of our Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses. II. That we have no Perception▪ of these Motions, or that we confound them with our Sensations. III. An Experiment that proves it. IV. Three kinds of Sensations. V. The Errors that accompanie them.

* 1.65THE second thing that occurs in every Sensation is the Vibration of the Fibres of our Nerves, which is communicated to the Brain: And we err in confounding always this Vibration with the Sensation of the Soul, and in judging there is no such Vibration at all, when we have no Perception of it through the Senses.

We confound, for instance, the Vibration excited by the Fire in the Fibres of our Hand,* 1.66 with the Sensation of Heat: And we say the Heat is in the Hand: But because we are insensible of any Vibration caus'd by Visible Objects in the Optick Nerve, which is in the Fund of the Eye, we think this Nerve is not vibrated at all, nor cover'd with the Colours that we see. On the contrary, we judge these Colours are spread only on the surface of the External Objects. Yet it is manifest by the following Experiment, that the Colours are as strongly and lively express'd on the Fund of the Optick Nerve as in visible Objects.

For, take but the Eye of an Ox just kill'd, and strip off the Coats that are opposite to the Pu∣pill, and situate near the Optick Nerve, putting a piece of very transparent Paper in their room: This done, place the Eye in the hole of a Window, so as the Pupill may be towards the Air,* 1.67 and the hind-part of the Eye in the Chamber; which should be close▪ shut up and darken'd all over: And upon this the Colours of Objects that are out of the Chamber will appear to be spread upon the Fund of the Eye, but painted topsy-turvy. If it fortunes that the Colours are not lively enough, on the account of the too little distance of the Objects represented in the Fund of the Eye, the Eye must be lengthened by constringing the sides of it, or shortned if the Ob∣jects are too remote.

We see by this Experiment, that we ought to judge or perceive that Colours are in the Fund of the Eye; in like manner as we judge that Heat is in our Hands, if our Senses were given us for the Discovery of Truth, and if Reason conducted us in the Judgments we make upon the Objects of our Senses.

But in accounting for this inconsistent Variety of our Judgements about Sensible Qualities, it it must be consider'd, That the Soul is so intimately united to her Body, and moreover, has contracted so much Carnality since the Fall, that she attributes a great many things to the Bo∣dy, which are only peculiar to her Self; and can hardly any longer distinguish her self from it. Insomuch that she does not only attribute to it all the Sensations we are at present speaking of, but also the Force of Imagination; and even sometimes the Power of Reasoning: For there have been a multitude of Philosophers, stupid and senseless enough to believe, the Soul was no∣thing else but the more refin'd and subtle part of the Body.

A Man that shall read Tertullian considerately, will be but too sensibly convinc'd of what I say: since he subscribes to this Opinion, after a great number of Authors whose Authority he al∣ledges: This is so true, that he endeavours to prove in his Book, Concerning the Soul, that we are oblig'd by Faith, Scripture, and particular Revelations, to believe the Soul a Corporeal Being. I design not a Refutation of his Notions, because I have suppos'd a Man to have read some of St. Austin's or Mr. Des-Cartes's Works, which will sufficiently discover the Extravagance of these Thoughts, and confirm and corroborate the Mind in the Distinction of Extension and Thought, of the Soul and Body.

The Soul then is so blind, as not to know her self,* 1.68 nor discern that her own Sensations do belong to her. But to explain this, it is necessary to distinguish in the Soul three kinds of Sensations, some Vigorous and Lively, others Faint and Languishing; and lastly, a Middle sort between these two.

The Vigorous and Lively Sensations, are such as surprize and quicken the Mind with a sort of Violence: as being either very grateful or disagreeable to it: Such as are Pain, or Titillation great Cold, or vehement Heat; and, in general, all such as are not only attended with Traces in the Brain, but moreover with some Motion of the Animal Spirits towards the Internal Parts of the Body; such a Motion as is proper to excite the Passions, as shall be explain'd in another place.

The faint and languishing Sensations are such as affect the Soul very little; and are neither very Pleasant, nor very Disagreeable to her; as moderate Light, all Colours, weak and ordi∣dinary Sounds, &c.

Lastly, The Middle kind, betwixt the Vigorous and Faint, I call such sorts of Sensations, as moderately affect the Soul; as a great and glaring Light, a loud and mighty Sound, &c. But it is observable, that a Weak and Languid Sensation may become a Middle one, and proceed to be a Vigorous and Lively one. The Sensation, for instance, a Man has of Light is faint, when the Light of a Flambeau is but glimmering or remote; but this Sensation may become a Middle one upon the approaching of the Flambeau nearer us: It may, lastly, grow most strong and lively, by holding the Flambeau so close to the Eyes as to dazle them; or suppose a Man beholds the Sun: Thus the Sensation of Light may be Vigorous or Faint, or neither, but Mo∣derate, according to its different Degrees.

Let us see then the Judgments the Soul passes upon these three sorts of Sensations:* 1.69 wherein we may observe that she almost ever blindly and implicitly follows the sensible Impressions, or the Natural Judgments of the Senses; and that she is delighted, if I may so term it, to dif∣fuse her self upon the Objects she considers, by dismantling her own Being, to cloath and adorn External Objects.

The first of these Sensations are so Vigorous and Powerful, that the Soul must, whether she will or not, acknowledge they do, in some measure, belong to her: So that she not only judges them to be in the Objects, but believes them also to be in the Members of her Body, which she considers as a Part of her Self. Thus she judges that Heat and Cold are not only in the Fire and Ice, but in her own Hands also.

As to the Languid Sensations, they so little concern the Soul, that she concludes they do not belong to her; that they are neither in her self, nor in her Body, but in Objects only. And for this Reason it is we devest our own Soul, and our own Eyes, of Light and Colours to cloath and beautifie the Objects that are without us, though Reason teaches us that the Idea we have of Matter does not include them in it. And Experience visibly manifests, that we ought equally to judge them in our Eyes as on the Objects; since we see them no less upon the one than the other, as I have experimentally prov'd by the Eye of an Ox plac'd in the hole of a Window.

Now the Reason why Men do not so readily perceive Colours, Smells, Tasts, and all other Sensations, to be the Modifications of their Soul, is, because we have not any distinct Idea of the Soul. For when we know a thing by the Idea that represents it, we know clearly the Mo∣difications it is capable of. All Men whatever agree that Rotundity, for instance, is a Modifi∣cation of Extension; because all Men know what Extension is by a clear Idea that represents it. Thus, because we know not the Soul by its Idea, as I shall explain hereafter, but only by an Internal Sensation that we have of it, we can't understand by a simple View, but by the force of Reasoning only, whether Whiteness, Light, Colours, Sounds, and other faint and languish∣ing Sensations are the Modifications of our Soul, or not. But as to the lively Sensations, as Pain and Pleasure, we easily judge that they are within us; because we feel them sensibly affect us; and there is no need of our knowing them by their Ideas, to understand that they belong to us.

As for the Middle Sensations, the Soul seems dubious and at a Fault about them. For on one hand she is willing to follow the Natural Judgments of the Senses, and thereupon she removes as far from her as possible this kind of Sensations, to bestow them upon the Objects: But, on the other hand, 'tis Impossible but she must feel within her self, and be conscious, that they belong to her; especially when these Sensations come up near to those, which I have named the Strong and Live∣ly; whereupon let us see how she behaves her self in respect of the Judgments she makes con∣cerning them: If she is smartly touch'd with the Sensation, she judges it to be in her own Body, as well as in the Object: If the Sensation affects her but a very little, she judges it only in the Object: If the Sensation be of a Middle sort, betwixt those we call the Strong, and the Weak, the Soul then knows not what to think of it, whilst she judges only by the Senses.

For instance, If a Man sees a Candle at a good competent distance, the Soul judges the Light to be only in the Object; if he puts it very near his Eyes, the Soul judges the Light to be not only in the Candle, but likewise in the Eyes; but if he withdraws about a foot from it, the Soul is at a pause without determining whether or not the Light be in the Object only. But she is never so wise as to think as she ought to do, that Light neither is, nor can be any Proper∣ty or Modification of Matter; and that it is only within her self; because she never thinks of imploying her Reason in discovering the Truth of the Matter, but only her Senses, which never can discover it, nor indeed were given us for any other use than the Preservation of the Body

Now the cause why the Soul makes no more use of her Reason, that is, of her pure Intellection, in considering an Object which may be perceiv'd by the Senses, is this, that the Soul is not at all mov'd or concern'd on the account of those things she perceives by pure Intellection, but on the contrary, is most nearly touch'd by things Sensible: For the Soul applies her self intensely to that which affects her most; but is too careless to apply her self to things that work in her no Concernment. Thus she almost universally suites her Free Judgments to the Natural Judg∣ment of her Senses.

To judge aright then of Light and Colours, as of all other sensible Qualities, we must care∣fully distinguish between the Sensation of Colour, and the Motion of the Optick Nerve; and we must find out by our Reason, that Motions and Impulsions, are Properties of Bodies, and therefore may possibly be found both in Objects, and in the Organs of our Senses, but that Light and Colours which we see, are Modifications of our Soul, very different from the other, and of which we have quite different Idea's.

For it is evident that a Peasant, for instance, sees Colours very well, and can distinguish them from all things else that are not Colour. It is evident too that he perceives nothing of Motion either in the colour'd Objects, or in the Fund of his Eyes; therefore Colour is not Motion: In like manner, a Peasant is very sensible of Heat, and he has knowledge clear enough to distinguish it from all thing else, which are not Heat. Yet he never so much as thinks of the Fibres of his Hand's being mov'd. Heat then which he feels is not Motion, since the Idea's of Heat and Mo∣tion are different, and one may be had without the other. For we have no other Reason to af∣firm a Square is not a Circle, but because the Idea of a Square is different from that of a Circle, and we can think of one without thinking of the other.

There needs but a little Attention to discover, that it is not necessary the cause which occa∣sions a Sensation of such or such a Thing in us, should contain that thing in it self. For, as there is no necessity there should be Light in my Hand, when I see a flash, upon giving my Eye a blow; so there is no need that Heat should be in the Fire, to make me sensible of it, upon the approach of my Hand towards it; nor indeed that any other sensible Qualities, should be in the Objects that produce them. 'Tis enough that they cause a Vibration in the Fibres of my Flesh, to the end my Soul which is united to it, may be modify'd by some Sensation. There is no Analogy, I confess, between Motions and Sensations: Nor is there any betwixt Body and

Spirit. But since Nature, or the Will of the Creator, associates these two Substances, though essentially different, we need not wonder if their Modifications are Reciprocal. It is necessary it should be so, that both of them might constitute but one entire Being.

It should be well observ'd, that our Senses being given us only for the Preservation of our Body, it is most conveniently order'd that they should induce us to judge of sensible Qualities just as we do. It is abundantly more for our advantage to receive the Sensation of Pain and Heat as being in our own Body, than to judge they were only in the Objects that occasion'd them: Because Pain and Heat being capable of injuring the Members of the Body, it is most requisite we should be warn'd of them whenever they attacqu'd us, to prevent our Body's being endammag'd by them.

But in point of Colours 'tis another case; for the generality, they are unable to hurt the Fund of the Eye, where they are collected, and it is an useless thing to us to know they are painted on it. These Colours are only necessary to us, as far as they are conducible to a more distinct Dis∣covery of Objects; and upon that account our Senses induce us to attribute them to Objects only. Thus the Judgments which the Impression of our Senses incline us to make, are most exact, if consider'd only in Relation to the Preservation of our Body. But yet they are altogether Phantastical, and very remote from the Truth, as we have already seen in part, and shall be more abundantly manifest in that which follows.

CHAP. XIII.

I. Of the Nature of Sensations. II. That a Man knows them better than he thinks he does. III. An Objection and Answer. IV. Why a Man imagines he has no knowledge of his own Sensations. V. That 'tis an Er∣ror to think all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects. VI. An Objection and Answer.

THE third thing which is found in each of our Sensations, or that which we Feel, for instance, when we are near the Fire, is a Modification of our Soul,* 1.70 in Relation or Cor∣respondence to that which occurs in the Body, to which she is united. This Modification is grateful or agreeable when that which occurs in the Body, is proper to promote the Circulation of the Blood and other Vital Functions: And this is nam'd in an Equivocal Term, Heat: But this Modification is painful, and quite different from the other, when that which occurs in the Body, is capable of incommoding or burning it; that is to say, when the Motions which are in the Body are capable of breaking some of it Fibres, and this generally goes by the Name of Pain or Combustion; and so 'tis with the other Sensations: But now let us see what are the Thoughts Men usually have upon this Subject.

The first Error is this,* 1.71 that a Man unreasonably imagines he has no Knowledge of his Sensa∣tions. We daily find a great number of such Men as are much concern'd, and very sollicitous to know what Pain and Pleasure, and the other Sensations are: Neither will they grant that they are only in the Soul, and the Modifications of it: I confess these are a strange sort of Men, who would needs be taught what they cannot be ignorant of: For 'tis impossible a Man should be absolutely ignorant what Pain is, when he is under the sense of it.

A Man, for example, that burns his Hand, does very well distinguish the Pain he feels from Light, Colour, Sounds, Tasts, Smells, Pleasure, and from every other Pain besides that he feels. He distinguishes it very well from Admiration, Desire, and Love. He distinguishes it from a Square, a Circle, and a Motion; in a word, he finds 'tis very different from every thing which is not the Pain he feels. Now if he has no Knowledge of Pain, I would fain be satisfy'd, how he can tell with any certainty of evidence, that what he feels is none of all these things.

We know then in some measure what we are immediately sensible of; as when we see Colours or have any other Sensation: And if it were not for this Knowledge, it is certain we could know nothing of any sensible Object. For 'tis manifest, for example, that we would be unable to distinguish Wine from Water, did we not know that the Sensations we have of the one were different from those we have of the other; and so 'tis with all other things which we know by our Senses.

'Tis true, should a Man be importunate in desiring me to explain what is Pain, Pleasure, Co∣lour, or the like, I should not be able to define it in words as it ought to be. But it does not follow from thence, that if I see a Colour, or burn my self, I have no manner of Knowledge of that whereof I have an Actual Sensation.

Now the reason why our Sensations cannot be explain'd by words, as well as all other things, is, because it depends on the Arbitrary Will of Men,* 1.72 to joyn the Idea's of things to what Names they please. They may call the Heavens Ouranos, Shamájim, as the Greeks and Hebrews: But the same Men have not an equal Liberty of affixing their Sensations to words, nor indeed to any thing else. They see no Colours, unless they open their Eyes, discourse to them what you will about them. They have no Relish of Tasts, unless some change happens in the dispo∣sition

of the Fibres of their Tongue and Brain: In short, the Sensations have no manner of De∣pendence upon the Will of Men: And 'tis only he that created Men, that still preserves them in that mutual correspondence of the Modifications of their Soul to those of their Body. So that if a Man would have me represent to him Heat, or Colour, I cannot make use of words to do it: But I must impress in the Organs of his Senses, such Motions as Nature has affixt these Sensations to. I must bring him to the Fire, and shew him a piece of Painting.

And this is the reason why 'tis impossible to give Men that are born Blind the least Know∣ledge of that which we understand by Red, Green, Yellow, or the like. For since 'tis impos∣sible for a Man to make another understand him, when he that hears, has not the same Idea's as he that speaks; it is manifest that since Colours are neither conjoyn'd to the sound of words, nor to the Motion of the Auditory, but to that of the Optick Nerve, we can never represent them to Men that are Blind, since their Optick Nerve cannot be Vibrated by colour'd Objects.

We have therefore some sort of Knowledge of our Sensations. Let us now see how it comes to pass that we are still casting about to know them, and that we believe our selves destitute of any Knowledge of them. The reason of it undoubtedly is this.

* 1.73The Soul, since the Original Sin, is now, as it were, Corporeal in her Inclination; the Love she has for sensible Objects, is perpetually lessening the Union or the Relation she has with those that are intellectual. She is disgusted and uneasy in conceiving things that will not enter by the Sen∣ses, and is presently for leaving the Consideration of them. She imploys her utmost endeavour to produce the Images that represent them in her Brain, and she is so throughly inur'd to this kind of Conception from our Infancy, that she thinks that she can have no Knowledge of what she can have no Imagination. Notwithstanding there are a great many things, which, being not Cor∣poreal, cannot be represented to the Mind by Corporeal Images; as, to instance, our Soul with all her Modifications. At what time therefore our Soul would represent to her self her▪ own Nature, and her own Sensations, she endeavours to form a Corporeal Image thereof. She is in search of her self amongst all Corporeal Beings. One while she takes her self for one Thing, and another while for Another; sometimes for Air, sometimes for Fire, or for the Harmony of the parts of her own Body. And being thus desirous of finding her self among the mass of Bodies, and of imagining her own Modifications, which are her Sensations, as the Modifications of Bodies, we need not wonder if she's bewildred in her wandrings, and is misguided out of the Knowledge of her self.

That which induces the Soul to be still more fond of Imagining her Sensations, is her judging them to be in the Objects:* 1.74 And moreover, that they are the Modifications of them; and con∣sequently that they are something Corporeal, and fit to be Imagin'd. She judges then that the Nature of her Sensations consists only in the motion which produces them, or in some other Modification of a Body, which is manifestly different from what she feels; this being nothing Corporeal, nor possible to be represented by Corporeal Images: This is what confounds her, and makes her believe she is altogether ignorant of her own Sensations.

As for those who make none of these fruitless Attempts, to represent the Soul and its Modifi∣cations by Corporeal Images, and yet are desirous of having their Sensations explain'd to them; they must understand that neither the Soul nor its Modifications can be known by Idea's, taking the word Idea in its most proper signification, as I have determin'd and explain'd it, in the third Book; but only by Conscience or Internal Sensation. So that when they ask us to explain the Soul and her Modifications by any Idea's, they demand what is impossible for all the Men in the World put together to give them: Because Men cannot instruct us by giving us Idea's of things, but only by making us attentive to those we have already.

The second Error whereinto we fall about our Sensations, is the attributing them to Objects; which has been explain'd in the XI and XII Chapters.

* 1.75The third is our judging that all Mankind have the same Sensations of the same Objects. We believe, for example, that all the World sees the Sky Azure, the Meadows Green, and all visible Objects in the same manner as we see them; and so likewise all the other sensible Qualities of the other Senses. There are many who will wonder even that we call in question those things, which they believe indubitable. However, I can certify them they have not any Reason to judge of these things as they do. And though I cannot Mathematically demonstrate they are in an Er∣ror, I can nevertheless demonstrate, 'tis the greatest chance in the World, if they are not: And I have Arguments strong enough to convince them they are certainly deceiv'd.

That the Truth of what I here advance may be here acknowledg'd, we must call to mind what has been already prov'd; namely, That there is a vast difference betwixt our Sensations and the causes of our Sensations. We may conclude from thence, that absolutely▪ speaking, it is possible for similar Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Optick Nerves, to produce in different Persons, different Sensations, that is to cause them to see different Colours: And it may so fall out, that a Motion which shall produce in one Person the Sensation of Blew, shall cause the Sensation of Green or Gray in another, or perhaps a new Sensation, which never any man had besides.

It is certain, I say, that this is possible, and there is no reason in the World that can prove the contrary: However, we will grant that it is not probable it should be so. It is much more rea∣sonable to believe that GOD acts always uniformly in the Union he has establish'd betwixt our Souls and our Bodies; and that he has affixt the same Idea's and the same Sensation to similar Mo∣tions of the Internal Fibres of the Brain of different Persons.

Let it be granted then that the same Motions of the Fibres which terminate in the middle of the Brain, are accompany'd with the same Sensations in all Men; if it fortunes that the same Ob∣jects produce not the same Motions in their Brain, they will not, by consequence excite the same Sensations in their Soul: Now to me it seems indisputable, that the Organs of the Sen∣ses of all Men, being not dispos'd in the same manner, cannot receive the same Impressions from the same Objects.

The blows, for instance, that Porters give one another by way of Complement, would cripple some sort of People: The same blow produces very different motions, and consequently excites very different Sensations, in a Man of a Robust Constitution, and in a Child or a Woman of a tender make: Thus, since we cannot be ascertain'd that there are two Persons in the World, who have the Organs of their Senses exactly match'd; we cannot be assur'd there are two Persons in the World who have altogether the same Sensations of the same Objects.

This is the Original cause of the strange Variety which is found in the Inclinations of Men. Some there are who are extremely pleas'd with Musick, others find nothing agreeable in it: And even between these who delight in it, some one sort of Musick, some another, according to that almost Infinite Diversity which is found in the Fibres of the Auditory Nerve, in the Blood, and the Animal Spirits. How great, for instance, is the difference between the Musick of Italy, of France, of the Chinese, and other People; and consequently between the Relish these diffe∣rent People have of these different sorts of Musick? It is usual likewise for the same Men at several times to receive different Impressions from the same Consorts. For if the Imagination be well warm'd by a great plenty of brisk and active Spirits, a Man is much more pleas'd with a bolder Hand or a Voluntarie, wherein there are many Discords; than with a softer Musick, that is compos'd with exacter Rules and a Mathematical Niceness. Experience proves this, and 'tis easie to give a Reason for it.

'Tis just the same with Smells. He that loves an Orange-flower, possibly cannot endure a Rose; and so on the contrary.

As for Tasts, there is no less a Diversity in them than in the other Sensations. Sawces must be made wholly different, equally to please different Men, or equally to please the same Person at different times: One loves Sweet, another Sowre; One loves the Taste of Wine, another abhors it; the same Person who thinks it pleasant when he's in Health, finds it bitter in a Fever; and so 'tis with the other Senses. And yet all Men are fond of Pleasure; they all delight in agreeable Sensations: And in this have all the same Inclinations. They receive not therefore the same Sensations from the same Objects, since they do not love them equally alike.

Thus, that which makes one Man say, he likes sweet things, is the agreeable Sensation he has of them; and that which makes another say, he does not love sweet things, is, indeed, because he has a different Sensation from him that loves them. And so in saying he loves not sweet things, it is not imply'd that he would not have the same Sensation as the other; but only that he has it not. Wherefore 'tis an Impropriety of Speech for a Man to say, he loves not what is Sweet; he should say, he loves not Sugar, or Honey, or the like, which, to others, seem sweet and agreeable; and that he has not the same Taste as others, because the Fibres of his Tongue are differently dispos'd.

But to give a sensible Instance; Let us suppose that among twenty Men there were some one of them whose Hands were Cold, and that he was unacquainted with the words they make use of in England to explain the Sensation of Heat and Cold by; and on the contrary, that the Hands of all the rest were extreamly Hot. If in Winter some Water somewhat frigid should be brought them all to wash in, those whose Hands were very Hot, washing after each other, might very well say, This Water is very Cold, I can't endure it: But when the other, whose Hands were extreamly Cold, came to wash at last, he might say on the contrary, I can't imagine, Gentle∣men, why ye like not the Cold Water; for my part, I take pleasure in feeling it Cold and washing in it.

It is manifest in this particular instance, That the last, in saying he lov'd the Cold, could mean nothing else but that he lov'd the Heat, and that he felt the Water Hot, whilst others felt the contrary.

Thus when a Man says, I love what is bitter, and can't endure sweets; no more is meant thereby, than that he has not the same Sensations, as those who say they love sweets, and have an aversion to what is bitter.

It is certain therefore, that a Sensation which is agreeable to one Man, is so to all others who have the same; but the same Objects does not cause the same Sensation in all Men; because of the different disposition of the Organs of the Senses; which is a thing of greatest consequence to be observ'd both as to Natural and Moral Philosophy.

To this only one Objection can be made, and that very easie to be answer'd; which is this: It sometimes happens that those very Persons, who love extreamly some sorts of Meat,* 1.76 at length shall hate them in as great a degree, either because in eating they met with some uncleanliness in the Dish, which surpriz'd and disgusted them; or because they surfeited on them by eating to excess, or for several other reasons: These Men ('tis objected) love not the same Sensations as they lov'd before: For still, though they eat the same Meats, yet they find them no longer plea∣sant and palatable.

In answering this Objection, it must be observ'd, that these Men upon eating those Meats, to which they have so great an abhorrence and loathing, have two very different Sensations at the same time. They have that of the Meat which they eat, as 'tis suppos'd in the Objection: And they have yet another Sensation of Distaste or Loathing, which proceeds, for instance, from a strong imagination of some uncleanliness they have formerly seen mingled with what they eat. The reason of this is, that when two Motions are occasion'd in the Brain at the same time; one of them is never excited without the other, unless it be some considerable time after. Thus because the Agreeable is always accompany'd with the Loathsome Sensation; and we usually confound things which happen at the same time, we imagine with our selves, that this Sensation which was formerly pleasant and agreeable is no longer so. And yet if it were always the same, it must necessarily be always agreeable: Wherefore supposing it to be disagreeable and unpleasant, 'tis because it is joyn'd and confounded with another Sensation, which is more distastful than it is it self agreeable.

There is much more difficulty to prove that Colours, and such other Sensations, which I term'd the Faint and Languid, are not the same in all Mankind. Because all these Sensations af∣fect the Soul so weakly, that a Man cannot distinguish as he may in Tasts or other more power∣ful and lively Sensations, whether one is more agreeable than another; nor discover the di∣versity of Mens Sensations by the variety of Pleasure or Distast, which might be found in dif∣ferent Persons. Yet Reason which shews that the other Sensations are not all alike in different Persons, does likewise shew there must necessarily be variety in the Sensations we have of Co∣lours. And, indeed, it cannot be doubted but there is much diversity in the Organs of Sight of different Persons, as well as in those of Hearing and Tasting. For, what reason is there to suppose an exact conformity and resemblance in the disposition of the Optick Nerve of all Men, since there is such an infinite variety in all the things of Nature, but especially in those that are Material. There is then great probability that all Men do not see the same Colours in the same Objects.

* 1.77Nevertheless I am of Opinion that it never happens, at least very rarely, that any Persons see Black and White of a different Colour from what our selves see them, though they do not see them equally Black or White. But as to middle Colours, such as Red, Yellow, Blue, and espe∣cially those that are compounded of these three, I am persuaded there are very few Men that have exactly the same Sensations. For there are Men sometimes to be met with, who see some sort of Bodies of a yellow Colour, for instance, when they view them with one Eye, and of a Green or Blue when they behold them with the other. And yet supposing these Men to be born with one Eye only, or with two Eyes so dispos'd as to see that of a Red or Yellow Colour, which others call Green or Blue, they would believe they saw Objects of the same Colours as others do, because they would always have heard the Name Green given to that which they see Yellow, and Blue to that which to them seems Red.

It might, as a farther proof, be alledg'd, that all Men see not the same Objects of the same Colour, because, according to the Observations of some Men, the same Colours are not equally pleasing to all sorts of People; since on supposition these Sensations were the same, they would be equally agreeable to all Mankind: But because very strong Objections might be urg'd against this Argument founded on the Answer I gave to the former Objection, I thought it not solid enough to be propos'd.

Indeed is is very rarely found that a Man is much more pleas'd with one Colour than another, as he takes greater pleasure in one Taste than another. The reason of it is, That the Sensations of Colours, are not given us to judge whether the Bodies about us are fit to nourish us or not: This is the part of Pleasure and Pain, to shew which are the Natural Characters of Good and Evil. Objects in point of Colours, are neither good nor bad to eat: If Objects, on account of their Colour, should either seem agreeable or disagreeable, the Sight of them would con∣stantly be succeeded with the course of the Animal Spirits, which excite and accompany the Pas∣sions; since the Soul cannot be affected without some Commotion. We should often hate good Things, and be fond of the bad; so that our Life could not be long preserv'd. In short, the Sensations of Colour are given us meerly to distinguish Bodies from one another; and this is effected well enough, whether a Man sees Grass green or red, provided the Person who sees it green or red, sees it always in the same manner.

But so much for our Sensations: Let us now say something of our Natural Judgments, and our Voluntary Judgments that attend them. The fourth thing to be consider'd which we confound with the three others, whereof we have been speaking.

CHAP. XIV.

I. Of the False Judgments that accompany our Sensations, and which we confound with them. II. The Reasons of these False Judgements. III. That Error is not in our Sensations, but only in these Judgments.

WE instantly fore-see,* 1.78 that there are very few Persons who will not be offended at this general Proposition we lay down, namely, That we have not any Sensation of Exter∣nal things, but contains one or more Judgments. We know well enough too that the generality of Men are of opinion that there is not any Judgment True or False in our Sen∣sations: Insomuch that these Persons, surpriz'd with the Novelty of this Proposition, will un∣doubtedly say with themselves; How is this possible? I do not judge the Wall to be white, I see well enough it is so. I do not judge that Pain is in my Hand, I feel it most infalliby there. And who can doubt of things so certain, unless he has a different Sensation of Objects from what I have my self? In fine, their Inclinations for the Prejudices of Childhood will carry them much farther. And if they proceed not to Contumely, and to the Contempt of those whom they believe of a contrary Sentiment to themselves, they will doubtless deserve to be reckon'd amongst the moderate sort of People.

But 'tis not our business to stand prophesying any longer what ill Reception and Success our Thoughts shall meet with; 'tis much more expedient to draw them out with such convincing Arguments, and to set them in so clear a Light, as to leave it impossible for a Man to engage them with his Eyes open, or to consider them attentively, without submitting to them. We are to prove that we have no Sensation of External things, which does not include some false Judg∣ment or other. And the Proof is as follows.

To me it seems past Controversie, that our Souls take not up such vast spaces as are those we see betwixt us and the fix'd Stars, though it should be allow'd that they are extended. Thus it is unreasonable to believe our Souls are in the Heavens, when they see the Stars there: Nor is it more credible that they depart out of their Bodies a mile, suppose, when they see the Houses at that di∣stance: The Soul then must necessarily see Stars and Houses where they are not, since she goes not out of the Body wherein she is, and nevertheless sees them out of it. Now whereas the Stars which are immediately united to the Soul, and which are the only Stars the Soul can see, are not in the Heavens, it follows that all Men who see the Stars in the Heavens, and thereupon voluntarily judge that they are there, make two false Judgments; the one Natural, and the other Free and Voluntary. The one is a Judgment of the Senses, or a Compound Sensa∣tion, which ought not to be a measure for us to judge by. The other is a Free Judgment of the Will, which a Man may avoid making, and consequently must not make, if he would avoid falling into Error.

But let us see upon what grounds a Man believes those same Stars he immediately sees,* 1.79 to be out of the Soul, and in the Heavens: The reason is this, That it is not in the power of the Soul to see them when she pleases: For she can perceive them only at such times as those Motions are excited in her Brain, to which the Idea's of these Objects are affix'd by Nature. Now be∣cause the Soul has no Perception of the Motions of her Organs, but only of her own Sensations, and is confident these same Sensations are not of her own producing in her; she is induc'd to judge they are without her, and in the Cause that represents them to her. And she has so often made these kinds of Judgments, at the time of her perceiving Objects, that 'tis hardly in her power at last to prevent them.

In order to explain more throughly what I have been saying, it would be necessary to shew the unusefulness of those infinite numbers of little Beings, which we call Species and Idea's, which are, as it were, Nothing, and yet represent all things; which we Create and Annihi∣late at our pleasure, and which our Ignorance has caus'd our Imagination to invent, that we might account for those things which we do not understand. We should shew too the solidity of those Mens Opinion, who believe GOD to be the True Father of Light, who alone en∣lightens all Men, without whom, the most simple and easie Truths would not be intelligible, nor the Sun, as bright and glorious as he is, be visible; who acknowledge no other Nature, than the Will of the Creator; and who, upon these Considerations, have discover'd that Idea's which re∣present the Creatures to us are nothing but the Perfections of GOD himself, which are corre∣spondent to the same Creatures, and which represent them.

Lastly, It would be necessary to treat of the Nature of what we call Idea's; and afterwards we might with greater ease, discourse more distinctly of the things I have been speaking of: But this would lead us too far; and these things shall be reserv'd for the Third Book only, because our method will require them there. At present let it suffice, that I bring a most sen∣sible and uncontroverted Instance; wherein we find many Judgments confounded with one and the same Sensation.

I suppose there is no Man in the World, who, looking on the Moon, does not see her about a mile's distance from him, and finds her greater at her Rising and Setting, than in the Meri∣dian,

or when a good way Elevated above the Horizon: And perhaps too he fancies he only sees her larger, without thinking there is any Judgment in his Sensation. However, it is undoubted∣ly certain, that if he had no kind of Judgment included in his Sensation, he would not see her at that distance she appears to him; and besides, would see her lesser at her Rising, than when in her Exaltation above the Horizon; since we only see her greater at her Rising, be∣cause we judge her more remote by a Natural Judgment which I have spoke to in the sixth Chapter.

But besides our Natural Judgments, which may be regarded as Compound Sensations, there occurs in almost all our Sensations a Free or Voluntary Judgment. For Men do not only judge by a Natural Judgment, that Pain, for instance, is in the Hand, they judge it is by a Free and Voluntary Judgment also, They not only Feel it there, but Believe it there too; and they are so strongly habituated to form such sort of Judgments, that they find great difficulty to for∣bear them when they would.

And yet these Judgments are most false in themselves, though very advantageous to the Welfare and Preservation of Life. For our Senses do not instruct us but with reference to the Body: And all our Free Judgments which are conformable and adapted to the Judgment of the Senses, are very remote from Truth.

But not to leave these things without shewing how to discover the Reasons of them; we must take notice that there are two sorts of Beings: Beings which our Soul immediately sees, and others which she knows only by the Mediation of the former. When, for instance, I perceive the Sun arising, I first perceive that which I immediately see; and because my Perception of the for∣mer, is only occasion'd by something without me, which produces certain Motions in my Eyes and in my Brain, I judge the former Sun which is in my Soul, to be without me, and to Exist.

It may notwithstanding happen that we may see the first Sun which is intimately united to our Soul, though the other were not above the Horizon, or though it did not Exist at all. And thus we may see the first Sun greater when the other rises, than when elevated high above the Horizon; and though it be true that the first Sun, which we see immediately, be greater at the other's Rising, it doth not follow that the other is so too. For 'tis not properly that which Rises which we see, since that is many Millions of Leagues remote; but 'tis the former, which is truly greater, and such exactly as we see it; because all the things we immediately see, are always such as we see them: And we should not be Deceiv'd, did we not judge that what we immediately see is to be found in External Objects, which are the cause or occasion of what we see.

In like manner, when we see Light by beholding the First Sun, which is immediately united to our Mind, we are not mistaken in believing that we see it: 'Tis even impossible to doubt of it. But herein consists our Error, that without any Reason, and indeed against all Reason, we will have this Light, which we see immediately, to exist in the Sun, which is without us; and thus it is with the other Objects of our Senses.

Upon a due Attention to what has been said from the Beginning, and in the Process of this Work,* 1.80 it will be easie to see, that amongst all the things which occur in every Sensation, Error is only to be found in the Judgments we make, that our Sensations exist in the Objects.

First: 'Tis an Error not to know that the Action of Objects consists in the Motion of some of their Parts, and that That motion is communicated to the Organs of our Senses, which are the two first things observable in every Sensation: For there is a great deal of difference between not knowing a Thing, and being in an Error in respect of that thing.

Secondly, We are right as to the third thing, which is properly Sensation. When we Feel Heat, when we see Light, Colours, or other Objects, it is certainly true that we see them, though we are Mad or Phrentick, for there is nothing more infallibly true, than that your Visi∣onary People see what they think they see; and their Error consists only in the Judgments which they make, that what they see has a real Existence without them, because they see it with∣out them.

This is the Judgment that implies a Consent of our Liberty, and which consequently is lia∣ble to Error. And it is our Duty ever to refrain from making it according to the Rule which was given in the beginning of this Book: That we should never judge of any thing whatever, when we could avoid it, and were not oblig'd to't by the certainty and evidence thereof; as it happens in this place: For though we feel our selves extreamly dispos'd by a confirm'd and inve∣terate Habit to judge our Sensations are in the Objects, as that Heat is in the Fire, and Colours in the Pictures; yet we can see no evident and convincing Reason, or forcible enough to oblige us to believe it. And thus we voluntarily subject our selves to Error by the ill use we make of our Liberty, when we freely form such Judgments as these.

CHAP. XV.

An Explication of the Particular Errors of the Sight, which may serve as an Exemplar of the general Errors of our Senses.

I Have, if I am not mistaken, given a sufficient inlet to the Discovery of the Errors of our Senses in respect of sensible Qualities in general, of which I have spoken, on the account of Light and Colours, which our Method oblig'd us to explain. It may now be expected I should descend to Particulars, and examine the respective Errors into which each of our Sen∣ses casts us: But I shall not insist long upon these things, because after what I have already said, a little Attention will do the business of those tedious Discourses I should be oblig'd to make. I shall only recount the general Errors our Sight occasions us to fall into, touching Light and Colours; and this Example will, I believe, suffice to give us an insight into the Errors of all our other Senses.

When we have fixt our Eyes upon the Sun for some moments, this is what occurs both in our Eyes and in our Soul, and these are the Errors into which we fall.

Those who are acquainted with the First Elements of Dioptricks, and with any thing of the admirable Contexture of the Eyes, know that the Rays of the Sun are refracted in the Crystal∣line, and in the other Humours; and that they are thence recollected upon the Retina or the Optick Nerve, which cloathes all the Fund of the Eye; in the same manner as the Rays of the Sun passing through a convex burning Glass, reunite in the Focus, or in the burning point of the Glass at three or four Inches distance from it, in proportion to its convexity. Now we are taught by Experiment, that if we place in the Focus of the Glass a piece of stuff or brown Paper,* 1.81 the Rays of the Sun make so great an Impression on the stuff or on the Paper, and agitate the little parts thereof so violently, as to break and separate them from one another; or, in a word, to burn them, and reduce them into smoak and ashes.

So we ought to conclude from this Experiment, that if the Optick Nerve were black, and the Pupil or the Aperture of the Vvea, through which the Light enters into the Eyes should widen and enlarge it self, to take in freely the solary Rays, instead of which it contracts and straitens it self to prevent their passage, the same thing would happen to the Retina, as to the stuff or the black or brown Paper, and its Fibres would be so violently agitated as to be speedily broken, and burn'd in pieces. And for this reason it is, that the generality of Men feel great Pain in be∣holding the Sun for a moment; because they cannot so closely shut the Aperture of the Pupil, but there will still pass Rays enough to agitate the Fibres of the Optick Nerve so violently, as to give us Reason to apprehend their breaking.

The Soul is altogether ignorant of all this we have said; and when she beholds the Sun, she neither has any Perception of her own Optick Nerve, nor of any Motion in the Nerve: But this cannot be call'd an Error, 'tis purely Ignorance: The first Error she falls into, is her judging the Pain she feels, to be in the Eye.

If instantly upon a Man's beholding the Sun, he withdraws into a dark place with his Eyes open, that Concussion of the Fibres of the Optick Nerve, caus'd by the Rays of the Sun, de∣creases and wears off by little and little; and this is all the alteration we can conceive in the Eyes. But the Soul perceives nothing of this in them, but only a whitish or a yellowish Light; and the second Error is, her judging this Light which she sees, to be in her Eyes, or in the Neighbour∣ing Wall.

Finally, The Agitation of the Fibres of the Retina constantly decreases and dwindles away by degrees: For after a Body has been vibrated or shaken, we should consider nothing in it more than the Diminution of its Motion. But this is not the thing the Soul is sensible of in her Eyes. She sees the whitish Colour metamorphos'd into Orange, after chang'd into Red, and lastly into Blue. And the third Error into which we fall, is our judging there are in our Eye, or on the next Wall, such alterations as differ more than Secundum magis & minús; because the Colours Blue, Orange, and Red, which we see have a more considerable difference than according to de∣grees of more or less.

These are some of the Errors into which we fall in point of Light and Colours; and these are the occasion of our falling into many others, as we are going to explain in the following Chapters.

CHAP. XVI.

I. That the Errors of our Senses serve us instead of general and very fruit∣ful Principles, from whence to draw false Conclusions; and these Conclusi∣ons again become other Principles in their turn. II. The Origine of Essen∣tial Differences. III. Concerning Substantial Forms. IV. Of some other Errors of the School-Philosophy.

* 1.82I HAVE, I think, given a sufficient Explication (to unprejudic'd Persons, and such as are capable of Thinking any thing Attentively) of the Nature of our Sensations, and of the general Errors that accompany them: It is not amiss to shew at present that these general Errors are made use of, as uncontroverted Principles, to explain all things by: That infinite false Consequences have been drawn from them, which in their Turn have serv'd as Principles for a train of other Consequences: and thus by little and little those imaginary Sciences void of Body and Reality, have been establisht, which have such multitudes of blind Followers; but which like Fantoms leave nothing in their Embraces, but the Shame and Confusion of suffer∣ing themselves to be seduc'd, or that Brand and Character of Folly, which makes Men delight to feed on Delusions and Chimera's. This is what we must shew in particular by some Examples.

It has been already said, that we are us'd to attribute to Objects our own Sensations, and we judge that Colours, Smells, Tasts, and other sensible Qualities, are in the Objects which we call Colour'd, and so of the rest. We have found this to be an Error. At present 'tis our Business to shew, that we make use of this Error by way of Principle, to deduce false Consequences from: which last Consequences afterwards we respect as other Principles, upon which we go on to found our Reasonings. In a word, we shall here manifest what Progress and Advances an Humane Mind makes in the Search of some Particular Truths, when once this false Principle has been taken for granted, That Our Sensations are in Objects.

But in order to render this more sensibly manifest, let us suppose some Particular Body, whose Nature some Person is in Search of: Let us see what a Man would do, who has a mind to know what Honey or Salt is. The first thing this Man would do, would be to examine the Colour, the Taste, and Smell, and the other sensible Qualities of them: What are the Properties of Salt, and what of Honey: Wherein they agree, and wherein they differ; and the Analogy there may be betwixt these, and those of other Bodies. Which done, he would doubtless reason and infer much after this manner, supposing he laid this down as an uncontroverted Principle, That our Sensations were in the Objects of our Senses.

* 1.83Whatever I have a Sensation of in Tasting, Seeing, and in Handling Salt and Honey, is in the Salt and in the Honey. But it is certain that what I sensibly perceive in the Honey essentially dif∣fers from what I sensibly perceive in the Salt: The whiteness of the Salt differs more doubtless than according to the degrees of more or less, from the Colour of the Honey; and the Sweetness of the Honey from the pungent Taste of the Salt; and consequently there must be an essential dif∣ference betwixt Salt and Honey, since all that I am sensible of both in the One and the Other, not only differs according to more or less, but has an essential Difference.

This is the first step this Gentleman would make. For doubtless he could not judge there was an essential Difference between Salt and Honey, did he not think the Sensible appearances of the One essentially differ'd from those of the Other: that is to say, That the Sensations he has of Honey essentially differr'd from those he has of Salt; for as much as he only judges of them by the Impression they make upon the Senses. Hence he looks upon this his Conclusion as a new Principle from whence he deduces other Conclusions in like manner.

* 1.84Seeing then Salt and Honey, and other Natural Bodies differ essentially from one another, it follows, that those are grosly deceiv'd, who would have us believe, That all the difference which is found in Bodies, consists only in the different Configuration of the little parts, that go to their Constitution. For since Figure is not essential to a figured Body, let the Figure of these little parts, which they imagine in the Honey, change how they will, the Honey will still continue Honey, even though the parts of it should take the Figure of the little parts of Salt. And thus there must of necessity be some substance or other, which being joyn'd to the first Matter, that is common to all different Bodies, must cause an essential difference betwixt them.

This then is the second Advance this Gentleman would make, and the happy Discovery of Sub∣stantial Forms: Those fruitful substances which cause every thing we see in Nature, though they have no subsistence of themselves, except in the Imagination of our Philosopher. But let us see the Properties which he goes so liberally to bestow on this Being of his own Creation; for doubtless he will rob all other Substances of their most essential Properties, to cloath this Creature of his withall.

Since then there is found in every Natural Body, two Substances which go to its Composition;* 1.85 the one which is common to Honey and Salt, and all other Bodies; and the other which makes Honey to be Honey, and Salt to be Salt, and all other Bodies to be what they are; it follows that the first of them which is Matter, having no Contrary, and being indifferent to the Recepti∣on of all Forms, must remain without Force and Action, since it has no occasion to defend it self: But as to the others, which are the Substantial Forms, they have need always of being attended with Qualities and Faculties, for their own defence. They must necessarily be always upon their guard, for fear of being surpriz'd: They must be labouring continually for their Preservation, and ex∣tending their Dominion over the bordering Matters, and pushing their Conquests as far as possi∣bly they can; because if they were forceless, or should desist from their Activity, the other Forms would fall upon them by surprize, and forthwith reduce them to Nothing. They must then be always fighting, and nourishing these Antipathies and irreconcilable Hatreds against their Rival Forms, which are continually seeking to destroy them.

Let it happen that a Form should seize the Matter of another: Let the Form of a Carcass, for in∣stance, seize the Body of a Dog; it is not enough for this Form to rest satisfy'd in the Annihila∣tion of the Form of the Dog, she must gratifie her Hatred and Revenge with the Destruction of all the Qualities which have sided with her Enemy. The Hair of the Carcass must immediately turn white with the whiteness of a new Creation; the Blood must be red with the redness, which was never dreamt of; and the whole Body must be surrounded with Qualities faithful to their Mistress, whom they must defend according to the small strength and capacity, which may be sup∣posed in the Qualities of a dead Body, which in their turn must quickly perish too. But because it is impossible to be always in Battel, and all Bodies have a place of Rest; the Fire, for instance, must undoubtedly have its Centre, where it ever strives to go by its own Levity, and Natural Inclination, in order to Rest, to burn no longer, and also to resign its Heat, which it preserv'd here below, meerly for its own safety and defence.

These are a small part of the Consequences which are deduced from this last Principle, that there are Substantial Forms; which Consequences we have brought in Our Philosopher, somewhat too frankly and airily concluding; for generally others say the same things, in a more serious strain than he hath done here.

There are still infinite other Consequences, which Philosophers daily infer according as their Humour and Inclination leads them, or according as they are determin'd by the Fruitfulness or Barrenness of their Imagination; for this is all the Difference that is between them.

I shall not stand here to ingage these Imaginary Substances, others have sufficiently examin'd them. They have made it evidently appear, that there were never Substantial Forms in Nature; and that they serve for no other use, than to infer abundance of False, Ridiculous, and even Contradictory Conclusions. I am satisfy'd to have discover'd their Origine, in the Mind of Man, and to have shewn that they are at present altogether owing to that Prejudice common to all Men; That Sensations are in the Objects of their Senses. For if what I said before be consider'd with any attention, namely, that it is necessary for the Preservation of our Bodies, we should have Sensa∣tions essentially differing, though the Impressions which Objects make upon our Bodies, differ ve∣ry little; it will manifestly appear he his much in the wrong, who imagines such wide differences in the Objects of our Senses.

But, by the way, I think it not amiss to declare, that no fault is to be found with these Terms, of Form, and Essential Difference. Honey is doubtless Honey, by its Form, and thus it is that it differs essentially from Salt; but this Form or this Essential Difference consists only in the different Configuration of its Parts. 'Tis this different Configuration, which makes Honey to be Honey, and Salt to be Salt: And though it be accidental to Matter in general, to have the Configurati∣on of the parts of Honey or Salt, and so to have the Form of Honey or Salt; yet it may be said to be essential to Honey or Salt, that they may be what they are, to have such or such a Configurati∣on in their parts; just as the Sensations of Cold, of Heat, of Pleasure, and Pain, are not essential to the Soul, but only to the Soul which feels them; in as much as by these Sensations, she is said to feel Heat, Cold, Pleasure, and Pain.

CHAP. XVII.

I. Another Instance taken from Morality, which shews that our Senses offer us nothing but false Goods. II. That GOD alone is our true and proper Good. III. The Origine of the Error of the Epicureans and Stoicks.

I HAVE, I think, brought sufficient Arguments to prove that this Prejudice, That our Sen∣sations are in the Objects, is a most fruitful Principle of Errors in Natural Philosophy. It is my Business at present to bring others drawn from Morality, wherein the same Prejudice joyn'd with this other, That the Objects of our Senses are the true and sole Causes of our Sensations, is most highly dangerous.

* 1.86There is nothing so common in the World, as to see Men devoted to sensible Goods; some love Musick, some Banquetting, and others have a Passion for other things. Now this is the way of Reasoning these Men must have taken to perswade themselves that these Objects are their Goods. All the pleasant Tasts we are delighted with in Feasting, the Sounds which gratifie the Ear, and those other Pleasures we are sensible of, upon other occasions, are doubtless contain'd in sensible Objects; or, at least, these Objects give us the Sensation of them; or, lastly, are the only means of Conveying them to our Senses. Now it is impossible to doubt that Pleasure is good, and Pain evil. We receive a Conviction from within, and consequently the Objects of our Passions, are most real goods, to which we must cleave, if we will be happy.

* 1.87This is the Reasoning we generally fall into almost without being aware of it; Thus, because we believe that our Sensations are in Objects, or that the Objects are of themselves capable of giving us the Sensation of them, we consider these things as our own Goods, though we are infi∣nitely exalted above them; since they are able to act only upon our Bodies, and to produce some Motion in their Fibres, but are incapable of acting upon our Souls, or making us sensible either of Pleasure or Pain.

Certainly if our Soul acts not upon her self, on occasion of what happens in the Body,* 1.88 it is GOD alone who hath that Power: And if she be not the Cause of her own Pleasure and Pain, according to the Diversity of the Vibrations of the Fibres of her Body, as it is most highly probable she is not, since she feels Pleasure and Pain without consenting thereunto; I know no other Hand potent enough to make her sensible thereof, except that of the Author of Nature.

Certainly it is GOD alone who is our true Good: He only is able to fill us with all the Plea∣sures we are capable of enjoying; and it is only by the Knowledge of Him and Love of Him, He has resolv'd to make us sensible of them. Such as He has affixt to the Motions which hap∣pen in our Body, to make us the more sollicitous for its Preservation, are very little in themselves, very weak as to their Capacity, and very short in their Duration. Notwithstanding in the estate Sin has reduc'd us to, we are, as it were, become their Vassals. But those which He shall make His Elect sensible of in Heaven, will be infinitely greater, since He hath Created us that we might know and love Him. For whereas ORDER requires the Perception of the grea∣test Pleasures in the Possession of the greatest Goods, GOD being infinitely above all other things, the Pleasure of those who shall enjoy Him, will certainly exceed all other Pleasures.

* 1.89What we have said of the Cause of our Errors in respect of Good, gives us a sufficient Knowledge of the falsity of the Opinions the Epicureans and Stoicks embrac'd, touching the Sovereign Good. The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure; and because a Man is sensible of this no less in Vice than in Vertue, and more generally in the former than in the other, it has been commonly thought they let loose the Reins to all sorts of Sensible Pleasures.

Now the first cause of their Error is this, That judging falsly there is something pleasant and agreeable in the Objects of their Senses, or that they were the real Causes of the Pleasures they felt; and being moreover convinc'd by an Internal Sensation, which they naturally had, that Plea∣sure was good for them, at least for the time wherein they enjoy'd it, they let themselves loose to all sorts of Passions, from which they had no Apprehensions of receiving any dammage in the Consequence. Whereas they ought to have consider'd, that the Pleasure they reap'd from sensi∣ble things, could not exist in those things as their true Causes, nor any other way, and conse∣quently that sensible Goods could not be Goods in respect of the Soul, and they should have thought of the things we have already explain'd.

The Stoicks on the other hand, being perswaded that sensible Pleasures were only seated in, and fitted for the Body, and that the Soul ought to have a peculiar Good of her own, plac'd Felicity in Vertue; see then the Origine of their Errors, Viz.

They believ'd that Sensible Pleasure and Pain were not in the Soul, but in the Body only; and made use of this their false Judgment as a Principle for other false Conclusions; as that Pain was not an Evil, nor Pleasure a Good: That the Pleasures of the Senses were not Good in their own Nature, that they were common to Men and Beasts, &c. Notwithstanding it is easie to see, that though the Epicureans and Stoicks were in the wrong in many things, they were in the right in some; for the Happiness of the Blessed consists only in a perfect and accomplish'd Vertue, that is to say, in their Knowledge and Love of GOD, and in a most exquisite Pleasure that never fails to accompany them.

Let it then be well remembred, That External Objects contain nothing either Pleasant or Trou∣blesome in themselves; that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures; that we have no reason ei∣ther to fear or love them; but it is GOD alone, whom 'tis our duty to fear, and our duty to love; since 'tis only He that has Power enough to Punish and Reward us; to make us sensible of Pleasure and of Pain: Finally, it is only in GOD and from GOD, we ought to hope to receive the Pleasures, towards which we have so strong, so natural, and so just an Inclination.

CHAP. XVIII.

I. That our Senses make us liable to Error, even in things which are not sen∣sible, II. An Example taken from the Conversation of Men. III. That sensible Manners are not to be regarded.

WE have sufficiently explain'd the Errors of our Senses, in respect of their Objects; as of Light, Colours, and other Sensible Qualities. Now let us see how they misguide us, even in regard to those Objects which are not of their Jurisdiction, by diverting us from an attentive Consideration of them, and inclining us to judge of them from their Testi∣mony and Report; a thing that well deserves to be throughly explain'd.

Attention and Application of the Mind to the clear and distinct Idea's we have of Objects,* 1.90 is the most necessary thing in the World, to discover what truly they are: For as it is impossible to see the Beauty and Excellency of any piece of Art, without opening the Eyes, and looking fixed∣ly upon it: So the Mind cannot evidently see the most part of things, with the Relations they bare one to another, unless it considers them with Attention. But it is certain that nothing casts us off more from our Attention to clear and distinct Idea's, than our own Senses, and consequently nothing sets us so remote from Truth, or so soon throws us into Error.

For our better conceiving these things, 'tis absolutely necessary to know, That the three ways the Soul has of perceiving, viz. by the Senses, by the Imagination, and by Intellect, do not all equally affect her; and consequently, she does not fix an equal Attention on every thing she perceives by their means: For she applies her self most to that which touches her nearest, and she is care∣less enough of that which affects her but a little.

Now what she perceives by the Senses affects her much, and takes up all her Application; what she knows by her Imagination, touches her less pathetically: But that which the Vnderstan∣ding represents to her; I would say, what she of her self perceives independently on the Senses and Imagination, scarce quickens or awakens her at all. No body doubts but that the least sensi∣ble Pain is more present to the Mind, and makes it more attentive than the Meditation of a thing of far greater Importance.

The reason which may be given for this, is, That the Senses represent the Objects as present, the Imagination represents them as absent. Now the order of things requires that among ma∣ny Goods, or many Evils propos'd to the Soul, those which are present should give her more concern or application than others which are absent; because 'tis necessary for the Soul sudden∣ly to determine what ought to be done on this occasion. And thus she is more intent to a simple prick of a Pin, than to the most exalted Speculations. And the Pleasures and Evils of this World make a greater Impression on her, than the ineffable Pains and infinite Pleasures of Eternity.

The Senses then do extreamly warp and bend down the Soul to what they represent to her: But whereas she is of a limited and finite Nature, and so cannot conceive distinctly many things at once; she cannot have a distinct Perception of what the Understanding represents to her at the same time her Senses offer any thing to her consideration. She forsakes then the clear and di∣stinct Idea's of the Understanding, however proper to discover the truth of Things in their own Nature, to apply her self intirely to the confus'd Idea's of the Senses, which affect her tenderest part, and give her not a representation of things as they are in their own Nature, but only as they stand related to her Body.

If a Man, to give an instance, would explain any Truth,* 1.91 he must necessarily make use of Speech and express his Notions and Internal Sensations by Motions and Manners sensible. Now the Soul is incapable of perceiving many things distinctly at the same time; so having always a great Attention to what comes in to her by way of the Senses, she is scarce at leisure to consi∣der the Reasons which she hears alledg'd: But her greatest Application is confin'd to the sensible Pleasure she receives from the finely turn'd Periods, the Conformity of the Gestures to the Words, from the Genteel Mein of the Face, from the Air, and the Way and Manner of the Speaker: Yet after she has heard, she will needs judge, because it is the Custom. And thus her Judgments must be different, according to the diversity of the Impressions she has receiv'd through the Senses.

If, for example, the Speaker has a voluble Tongue, and easiness of Delivery; if he observes the numerousness of Words, and a delightful Cadence in his Periods; if he has the Look of a Gentleman, or of a Man of Parts; if he be a Person of Quality, or is attended with a great Re∣tinue; if he dictates with Authority, or speakes in a grave decisive Manner; if others listen to him with Silence and Respect; if he has some Reputation in the World, or is acquainted with the great Wits of the Age; In fine, if he has the happiness to please, or to be esteem'd, he will have Reason in every word that he advances; and there shall be nothing even to his Band and Cuffs, but shall prove something or other.

But if he be so unfortunate as to have the Qualities quite contrary to these, let him demon∣strate as long as he pleases, he shall prove nothing. Let him say the finest things in the World, no Man shall ever regard them. The Attention of the Auditors being imploy'd upon that only which strikes their Senses, the Disgust they conceive at the sight of a Man so uncouth and ill-con∣triv'd, will wholly take them up, and hinder the Application they ought to allow to his Thoughts; A dirty or a rumpled Band is enough to make the Wearer despis'd, and all that comes from him; and that way of talking like a Dotard or a meer Philosopher, will make the most noble and ex∣alted Truths, which are above the reach of the generality of Mankind, be look'd on as Ravings and Extravagances.

Such are the ordinary Judgments of Mankind. Their Eyes and their Ears set up for Judges of Truth, and not their Reason, even in things that depend only on Reason; because Men apply themselves meerly to the Sensible and Agreeable Manners of Men, and seldom afford any Atten∣tion that is Resolute and Serious, towards the Discovery of Truth.

Yet what greater Injustice is there, than to judge of things by the Manner of them, and to despise Truth,* 1.92 because it comes not dress'd in those Ornaments that please us and indulge and flatter our Senses? It should be reckon'd a Reproach to Philosophers, and such as pretend to Sense, to be more inquisitive after these agreeable out-side Manners, than Truth it self; and ra∣ther to entertain their Mind with the Noise and Emptiness of Words, than with the Solidity of Things. 'Tis for Men of a Vulgar Stamp, 'tis for Souls of Flesh and Blood, to suffer themselves to be won with Rhetorical Periods, and captivated with Figures and Motions that awake and excite the Passions.

Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque, Inversis quae sub verbis latitantia cern••nt: Veráque constituunt, quae bell•• tangere possunt Aures, & lepido quae sunt fucata sonore.

But wise Men endeavour to arm themselves against the malignant force, and the powerful charms of these sensible Manners. The Senses impose on them as well as on other Men, since they are no more than Men, but they have the Wisdom to disregard the Reports they make. They imitate that famous Example of the Judges of the Ar••opagus, who, upon a severe Penalty, forbad their Advocates the use of any fallacious Words and Figures, and never heard them plead but in the dark; for fear the Pleasantness of their Words and Insinuating Gestures should per∣swade them to any thing prejudicial to Truth and Justice, and to the end they might apply them∣selves with less distraction to the Solidity of their Reasons.

CHAP. XIX.

Two other Examples. I. The first, concerning our Errors about the Na∣ture of Bodies. II. The second, concerning those which respect the Qua∣lities of the same Bodies.

WE have been shewing that there are a vast multitude of Errors, which are originally owing to the strong Application of the Soul to that which enters by the Senses, and that Lukewarmness and Indifference to things represented by the Understanding. We have given an Instance of very considerable Importance in Morality, taken from the Conver∣sation of Men; we shall produce some others drawn from the Commerce we have with the rest of Nature, which are absolutely necessary to be observ'd in Natural Philosophy.

One of the Principal Errors we fall into in point of Natural Philosophy, is our Imagining there is much more Substance in Sensible,* 1.93 than in Imperceptible Bodies. The generallity of Men are of Opinion there is much more Matter in Gold and Lead, than in Air and Water: And Children who have made no Observation by their Senses of the Effects of Air, ordinarily imagine it has nothing of Reality in it.

Gold and Lead are extreamly ponderous, very hard, and very sensible; Water and Air, on the contrary, are scarce perceptible by the Senses. Whence Men conclude the former are more real than the other. They judge of the Truth of things by the Sensible Impression, which is ever fallacious; and they neglect the clear and distinct Idea's of the Intellect which never deceives us; because that which is sensible affects us, and challenges our Application; but that which is Intelligible lays us to sleep. These false Judgments respect the Substance of Bodies; let us now see the others about the Qualities of the same Bodies.

* 1.94'Tis the way for Men, almost universally, to judge that the Objects which excite in them the most Pleasant Sensations, are the most Perfect and Pure of all others; without so much as know∣ing wherein the Perfection and Purity of Ma••ter consists, and, indeed, without caring whether they do or not.

They say, for instance, that Mud is Impure, and that the clearest Water is very pure. But Camels which love Muddy Water, and those Animals which delight to wallow in Mire, would be of another opinion. They are Beasts, 'tis true; but those Men who love the Entrails of a Wood∣cock, and the Excrements of a Civit-Cat, do not say they are Impure, though they say so of the Excrements of all other Animals. Finally, Musk and Amber are in general Esteem with all Men, though they are suppos'd to be nothing but Ordure.

It is certain Men judge of the Perfection and Purity of Matter, with Relation to their own Senses; whence it falls out, that the Senses being different in all Men, as has been abundantly explain'd, they must needs judge very differently of the Purity and Perfection of Matter. So that those Books which are daily compos'd upon the Imaginary Perfections attributed to cer∣tain Bodies, must needs be stuff'd with Errors, in all the strange and odd variety that can be; since the Reasonings they contain are founded only on the false, confus'd and irregular Idea's of the Senses.

It is not the Part of Philosophers to call Matter Pure or Impure, till they know what they precisely mean by the Words Pure and Impure. For a Man should never talk without knowing what he says; that is to say, without having distinct Idea's, which answer to the Terms he uses. Now if they had fixt clear and distinct Idea's to each of these Terms, they would see that what they call Pure would prove often very Impure, and what seems to them Impure would be found pure in an high degree.

If, for instance, they would have that Matter to be most Pure and Perfect, whose Parts are most fine and disunited and easiest to be mov'd; Gold, Silver and Precious Stones, would be extreamly Imperfect Bodies; Air and Fire on the other hand would be the most perfect, When Flesh began to putrifie, and cast a very noisom stench, it would then be commencing its Perfection, and stinking Carrion would be a more perfect Body, than sound and common Flesh.

Again, if on the other hand they would have those to be the most perfect Bodies, the parts where∣of are most gross, solid, and difficult to be mov'd; the Earth would be perfecter than Gold, and Air and Fire would be more imperfect Bodies.

But if they are not willing to affix the clear and distinct Idea's I have mention'd, to the Terms Pure and Perfect, let them substitute others in their room. But if they pretend to define these words only by sensible Notions, they will eternally confound things with one another, since the Signification of the Terms that express them can never be fix'd and determin'd. All Men, as we have already prov'd, have very different Sensations of the same Objects: Wherefore a Man ought not to define these Objects by the Sensations he has of them, unless he has a mind to be unintelli∣gible, and to put all things in confusion.

But at the bottom, there is no matter to be found, (not that which the Heavens are fram'd of) which has more Perfection in it than any other. All that Matter seems capable of, are Fi∣gures and Motions, and 'tis indifferent to it whether it has Figures and Motions regular or irregu∣lar. Reason does not tell us that the Sun is more Perfect or more Luminous than Dirt; nor that the Celebrated Beauties of Romancers and Poets, have any advantage over the most corrupted Car∣casses; they are our false and treacherous Senses thot tell us this. It is in vain for Men to cry out against what we say; all their Railleries and Exclamations will appear frigid and ridiculous, to such as shall seriously examine the Reasons we have alledged.

Those who are us'd to no other Preception than that of their Senses, believe the Sun to abound with Light; but those who can be Sensible and Reasonable at the same time, are of another opinion; provided they have as good a Faculty of Reasoning, as they have of Sensation. I am very well perswaded, that even those who pay the greatest Deference to the testimony of their Senses, would close with our Opinion, had they well consider'd the things that we have said: But they are too much in love with the Delusion of their Senses; they have obey'd their Prejudices too long, and their Soul is too unthoughtful, or forgetful, to acknowledge or remember that all the Perfections she imagines she sees in Bodies, belong only to her self.

But it is not to this sort of Men we address our selves, we are very little concern'd for their Approbation and Esteem: They refuse to hearken to us, and consequently are incompe∣tent Judges; we are satisfy'd in defending Truth, and having the Approbation of those who seriously labour to rid themselves of the Errors of their Senses, and to employ the Light of their Understanding. We only require of them, that they would seriously Meditate on these Thoughts, with the greatest Attention they can, and then let them judge of them: Let them condemn them or acquit them; we submit them to their Judgment, since by their Meditation they have ob∣tain'd a Supreme Power and Jurisdiction over them, which without Injustice cannot be contested with them.

CHAP. XX.

The Conclusion of the First Book. I. That our Senses are given us only for the Preservation of our Body, II. That we ought to doubt of the Re∣ports they make. III. That 'tis no little thing to doubt, as we ought to do.

I HAVE, if I am not mistaken, made a sufficient Discovery of the General Errors into which our Senses lead us, whether in regard to their own Objects, or in respect of Things, which can only be perceiv'd by the Understanding: And I am of an Opinion, that we fall into no Error by their Conduct, the cause whereof may not be discover'd by the things that have been said, in case a Man will bestow a little Meditation upon them.

We have hitherto seen, that our Senses are most faithful and exact in instructing us in the Re∣lations,* 1.95 which all the Bodies which surround us have with our own, but are incapable of teach∣ing us what these Bodies are in their own Nature; that to make the best use of them, they must only be imploy'd to the Preservation of our Health and Life; and that they can't be sufficiently despis'd, when they pretend to raise themselves to a Sovereignty above the Understanding. This is the Principal Thing I would gladly have well remembred in all this First Book, viz. Let a Man throughly consider, that our Senses were only given us for the Preservation of our Body, let him fortifie himself in this Notion; and in order to free himself from the Ignorance he is under, let him seek out other Succors and Assistances, than those his Senses furnish him withall.

* 1.96 But supposing there be some such Men to be found, (as doubtless there be but too many of them) who will not be perswaded of these last Propositions by what we have hitherto said, we demand of them still much less than this; we only desire of them to enter into some Distrust of their Senses, and if they cannot entirely reject their Testimonies as false and treacherous, let them only seriously doubt, lest these Reports should not be absolutely true: And certainly, in my Opinion, enough hath been said, to cast at least some Scruple in the Mind of Reasonable Men, and consequently to excite them to the Employing their Liberty otherwise than they have hitherto done: for if they could once begin to doubt, that the Reports of their Senses were not true, they might with greater Ease with-hold their Consent, and so prevent their falling into those Errors, into which they have hitherto fallen especially if they could remember that Rule we have given at the Beginning of this Discourse, That we ought not to give an entire Consent, ex∣cept to Things that appear entirely evident, and to which we could not forbear consenting, without being certainly convinc'd, we should make an ill us•• of our Liberty in not consenting.

* 1.97 For what remains, let not a Man imagine he has made but an inconsiderable Progress, if he has only learn'd to Doubt. To know how to Doubt with Judgment and Reason, is not so small a thing as is suppos'd. For we must needs say, there is a great deal of difference betwixt Doubt∣ing and Doubting. Some Doubt out of a Rash Passion, and a Brutish Resolution; others out of Blindness and Malice, out of Humour and Fancy, and because they will do so; But there are others likewise, that Doubt out of Prudence and Caution, out of Wisdom and Penetration of Mind. The Academicks and Atheists Doubt after the former manner; but true Philosophers Doubt in the latter. The first Doubt is a Doubt of Darkness, which never conducts us towards the Light, but sets us at a greater Distance from it. The second Doubt proceeds from Light, and is assistant in some measure, to the production of it, in its turn.

Those who only Doubt in the former manner, know not what it is to Doubt with Under∣standing: They Laugh at Monsieur Des Cartes's teaching us to Doubt, in the first of his Metaphy∣sical Meditations; because it seems to them, that it is no other, than a Fantastick Doubting; That it can only be said in general, that our Nature is Infirm, that our Mind is full of Blind∣ness, that we ought to be very careful to rid our selves of our Prejudices, and some such things as these. They suppose that this is enough to prevent being seduc'd by their Senses, and not to be deceiv'd at all. But it is not enough to complain, that the Mind is weak; we must make her sensible of her Weaknesses: It is not enough to say, She is subject unto Error; we must discover to her wherein her Errors consist, to which I think we have given an Introduction in this first Book, by accounting for the Nature and Errors of our Senses; and we will still pursue the same Design, in explaining the Nature and Errors of our Imagination in the Second.

Notes

• * 1.1

  See the 6th. Book.
• * 1.2

  Of the Na∣ture & Pro∣perties of the Vnder∣standing.
• * 1.3

  II. Of the Na∣ture and Properties of the Will, and of its Liberty.
• * 1.4

  See the Illustrati∣ons.
• * 1.5

  See the Illustra∣tions.
• * 1.6

  I. Of our Judgments and Rea∣sonings.
• * 1.7

  II. That Judg∣ments and Reasonings depend up∣on the Will.
• * 1.8

  Geometri∣cians love not Truth, but only the Knowledg of Truth, tho' it be otherwise said.
• * 1.9

  III. What use should be made of our Liberty that we ne∣ver may be deceiv'd▪
• * 1.10

  IV. General Rules for the avoid∣ing Error and Sin.
• * 1.11

  A necessary Reflexion on the two Rules.
• * 1.12

  I. The An∣swer to some Obje∣ctions.
• * 1.13

  II. Observa∣tions on what has been said concerning the necessi∣ty of Evi∣dence.
• * 1.14

  See the Il∣lustrations.
• * 1.15

  I. Of the Oc∣casional Causes of our Errors, and that there are five prin∣cipal.
• * 1.16

  II. The Gene∣ral Design of the whole Work.
• * 1.17

  III. The parti∣cular De∣sign of the first Book.
• * 1.18

  I. Two ways of explain∣ing how our Senses were cor∣rupted by Sin.
• * 1.19

  S. Gregor. Homil. 39. upon the Gospels.
• * 1.20

  Fr. Son ••••ur.
• † 1.21

  Fr. Son Esprit.
• * 1.22

  See the Il∣lustrations.
• * 1.23

  Deus ab initio con∣stituit ho∣minem, & reliquit il∣lum in ma∣nu Consilii sui, adjecit mandata & praecep∣ta sua, &c. Ec. 15.14.
• * 1.24

  A Remedy for the Dis∣order which Original Sin has caus'd in the World, and the Foundation of Christian Morality.
• * 1.25

  See the Il∣lustrations.
• * 1.26

  II. That our Liberty, not our Senses is the true cause of our Errors.
• * 1.27

  III. A Rule for avoid∣ing Error in the use of our Sen∣ses.
• * 1.28

  I. Of the Er∣rors of sight in respect of Extension absolutely consider'd.
• * 1.29

  See the Journal of the Learn∣ed. Nov. 12. 1668.
• * 1.30

  Fr. Le germe.
• * 1.31

  The Cicatricle or the Sperm of the Egg is a little white spot upon the Yolk. See Mal∣pigh. de Formatione Pulli in Ova.
• † 1.32

  See Swammer∣dam's Miraculum na∣turae.
• * 1.33

  II. A Conti∣nuation of these Er∣rors about Invisible Objects
• * 1.34

  III. Of the Er∣rors of sight touch∣ing Exten∣sion rela∣tively con∣sider'd.
• * 1.35

  I. Of the Er∣rors of sight about Fi∣gures.
• * 1.36

  II. We have no know∣ledge of the least of them.
• * 1.37

  III. The know∣ledge we have of the greater, is not exact.
• * 1.38

  IV. An Expli∣cation of some Natu∣ral judg∣ments which prevent our deception.
• * 1.39

  V. That these very judg∣ments de∣ceive us in some parti∣cular jun∣ctures.
• * 1.40

  See the 9. Chapter towards the end.
• * 1.41

  See the 3d. Ch. of the 2d. Part of the 6▪ Book.
• * 1.42

  I. That our Eyes are incapable of inform∣ing us of the Quanti∣ty or Swift∣ness of Mo∣tion consi∣der'd in it self.
• * 1.43

  II. That Du∣ration which is necessary to our know∣ledge of the Quantity of Motion, is unknown to us.
• * 1.44

  III. An In∣stance of the Errors of Sight in respect of Motion and Rest.
• * 1.45

  I. A general Demon∣stration of the Errors of our Sight concerning Motion.
• * 1.46

  II. That the Distance of Objects is necessary to be known in order, to judge of the Quanti∣ty of their Motion.
• * 1.47

  III. The Medi∣ums where∣by we know the Distan∣ces of Ob∣jects, are examined.
• * 1.48

  The Soul does not make all those judg∣ments I a••tribute to her; these Na∣tural judg∣ments are nothing but Sensa∣tions, and I only speak thus, the better to explain things.
• * 1.49

  The second Medium whereby to judge of the Di∣stance of Objctes.
• * 1.50

  The third Medium whereby to judge of the Distance of Objects.
• * 1.51

  The fourt•• and fifth Mediums.
• * 1.52

  The sixth Medium whereby to judge of the Di∣stance of Objects
• * 1.53

  Seethe Il∣lustrations.
• * 1.54

  I call by the Name of Idea here whatever is the Immediate Object of the Mind.
• * 1.55

  I. The Di∣stinction of the Soul and Body.
• * 1.56

  II. An Expli∣cation of the Organs of the Sen∣ses.
• * 1.57

  III. The Soul is immedi∣ately uni∣ted to that part of the Brain where the Fibres of the Organs of the Sen∣ses centre.
• * 1.58

  IV. An In∣stance to explain the effect which Ob∣jects have upon our Bodies.
• * 1.59

  V. What it is that Objects produce in the Soul, and the Reasons why the Soul per∣ceives not the Moti∣ons of the Fi••res of the Body.
• * 1.60

  This con∣fus'd Rea∣soning or this Natu∣ral Judge∣ment is on∣ly a Com∣pound Sen∣sation. See what I have said before of Natural Judge∣ments, and the first Ch. of the 3d. Book.
• * 1.61

  VI. Four things which are generally confound∣ed in every Sensation.
• * 1.62

  I. Of the Er∣ror we fall into con∣cerning the Action of Objects a∣gainst the External Fibres of our Senses.
• * 1.63

  III. The Cause of this Er∣ror.
• * 1.64

  III. An Obje∣ction and Answer.
• * 1.65

  I. Of our Er∣rors con∣cerning the Motions or Vibrations of the Fibres of our Senses.
• * 1.66

  II. That we confound them with the Sensa∣tions of our Soul, and sometimes have no Perception of them.
• * 1.67

  III. An Expe∣riment that proves it.
• * 1.68

  IV. An Expli∣cation of three sorts of Sensa∣tions of the Soul.
• * 1.69

  V. The Er∣rors that accompany the Sensa∣tions.
• * 1.70

  I. The Defini∣tion of the Sensations.
• * 1.71

  II. That a Man knows his own Sensa∣tions better than he thinks he does.
• * 1.72

  III. An Obje∣ction and Answer.
• * 1.73

  IV. From whence it proceeds that a Man imagines he has no knowledge of his Sen∣sations.
• * 1.74

  See the Illustrati∣ons upon the▪ 7. Ch. of the 2d. Part of the 3d. Book.
• * 1.75

  V. That 'tis an Error to think all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects.
• * 1.76

  IV. An Obje∣ction and Answer▪
• * 1.77

  This Pa∣gra••h is wanting in some Editi∣ons, and is obscure in the French and there∣fore has re∣ceiv'd some alteration, that it might be perspicuous
• * 1.78

  I. Of the false Judgments that accom∣pany our Sensations, and which we con∣found with them.
• * 1.79

  II. The Reason of these false Judg∣ments▪
• * 1.80

  III. That Error is not in our Sensations, but only in these Judgments.
• * 1.81

  Brown Paper presently takes fire; but the Glass must be larger or more convex, to burn white Paper.
• * 1.82

  I. That the Errors of our Senses serve us instead of general and very fruitful Principles, from whence to draw false Conclusions, and these Conclusions again become other Principles in in their turn.
• * 1.83

  II. The Ori∣ginal of the Diffe∣rences at∣tributed to Objects: That these Differen∣ces are in the Soul.
• * 1.84

  III. The Ori∣ginal of Substantial Forms.
• * 1.85

  IV. The Ori∣gine of all the other more gene∣ral Errors of the School-Philosophy.
• * 1.86

  I. An In∣stance ta∣ken from Morality, which shews that our senses offer us nothing but false goods.
• * 1.87

  I will ex∣plain in the last Book, in what sense Ob∣jects act upon the Body.
• * 1.88

  II. That GOD only is our Good; and that all sensi∣ble Objects cannot give us any sense of Pleasure.
• * 1.89

  III. The Ori∣gine of the Errors of the Epicu∣reans and Stoicks.
• * 1.90

  I. That our senses make us liable to Error, even in things which are not sensible
• * 1.91

  II. An Exam∣ple taken from the Conversa∣tion of Men.
• * 1.92

  III. That Sensi∣ble and Agreeable Manners ought not to be re∣garded.
• * 1.93

  I. The Errors concerning the Nature of Bodies.
• * 1.94

  II. Errors con∣cerning the Qualities and Per∣fection of Bodies.
• * 1.95

  I. That our Senses are given us only for the Preser∣vation of our Body.
• * 1.96

  II. That we ought to doubt of the Reports which our Senses make of Things
• * 1.97

  III. That 'tis no little thing to doubt as we ought to do.