CHAP. III.

1. HIS first Argument runs thus (I will repeat it in his own words, as also the rest of them as they are to be found in his Page  138 Treatise of Liberty and Necessity) I conceive, (saith he) that nothing taketh beginning from it self, but from the action of some other im∣mediate agent without it self; and that therefore, when first a man hath an appetite or Will to something, to which immediatly be∣fore he had no appetite nor Will, the cause of his Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in his own disposing: So that where∣as it is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the Will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said the Will is also caused by other things, whereof it disposeth not, it follow∣eth, that voluntary actions have all of them ne∣cessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.

2. His second thus, I hold (saith he) that to be a sufficient cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needfull to the producing of the effect: The same also is a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was needfull for the producing of it, and so the cause was not suf∣ficient; but if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause, for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that what∣soever is produced, is produced necessarily. For whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient Page  139 cause to produce it, or else it had not been. What followes is either the same, or so closely depending on this, that I need not adde it.

3. His third Argument therefore shall be that which he urges from Future disjuncti∣ons. For example, let the case be put of the Weather, 'Tis necessary that to morrow it shall rain, or not rain; If therefore, saith he, it be not necessary it shall rain, it is neces∣sary it shall not rain, otherwise there is no ne∣cessity that the Proposition, It shall rain or not rain, should be true.

4. His fourth is this, That the denying of Necessity destroyeth both the Decrees and the Prescience of God Almighty. For whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man, as an Instrument, or foreseeth shall come to pass, a man, if he have liberty from necessitation, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass; and God should either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he should foreknow such things shall be as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.

5. The Entrance into his first Argument is something obscure and ambiguous, No∣thing taketh beginning from it self: But I shall be as candid and faithfull an Interpreter as I may. If he mean by beginning, beginning of Existence, it is undoubtedly true, That no Substance, nor Modification of Sub∣stance Page  140 taketh beginning from it self; but this will not infer the Conclusion he drives at. But if he mean, that Nothing taketh be∣ginning from it self, of being otherwise af∣fected or modified then before; he must either understand by nothing, no Essence, neither Spirit nor Body, or no Modification of Essence. He cannot mean Spirit, as admitting no such thing in the whole comprehension of Nature. If Body, it will not infer what he aims at, unless there be nothing but Body in the Universe, which is a meer precarious Principle of his, which he beseeches his credulous followers to admit, but he proves it no where, as I have already noted. If by Modification he mean the Modification of Matter or Body, that runs still upon the former Principle, That there is nothing but Body in the world, and therefore he proves nothing but upon a begg'd Hypo∣thesis, and that a false one; as I have else∣where demonstrated. Wherefore the most favourable Interpretation I can make is, That he means by no thing, no Essence, nor Modification of Essence, being willing to hide that dearly-hug'd Hypothesis of his (That there is nothing but Body in the world) under so generall and uncertain termes.

6. The words therefore in the other sen∣ses Page  141 having no pretence to conclude any thing, let us see how far they will prevail in this, taking no thing, for no Essence, or no Modification of Essence, or what will come nearer to the Matter in hand, no Faculty of an Essence. And from this two-fold meaning, let us examine two Propositions, that will result from thence, viz. That no Faculty of any Essence can vary its Operation from what it is, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it self; or, That no Essence can vary its Modification or Operation by it self, but by the action of some other im∣mediate Agent without it. Of which two Propositions the latter seemes the better sense by far, and most naturall. For it is very harsh, and, if truly looked into, as false, to say, That the Mode or Faculty of any Essence changes it self, for it is the Es∣sence it self that exerts it self into these va∣riations of Modes, if no externall Agent is the cause of these changes. And Mr. Hobbs opposing an Externall Agent to this Thing that he saies does not change it self, does naturally imply, That they are both not Fa∣culties but Substances he speakes of.

7. Wherefore there remains onely the latter Proposition to be examined, That no Essence of it self can vary its Modification. That some Essence must have had a power Page  142 of moving is plain, in that there is Motion in the world, which must be the effect of some Substance or other. But that Motion in a large sense, taking it for mutation or change, may proceed from that very Essence in which it is found, seemes to me plain by Experience: For there is an Essence in us, whatever we will call it, which we find endued with this property; as appears from hence, that it has variety of percep∣tions, Mathematicall, Logicall, and I may adde also Morall, that are not any impresses nor footsteps of Corporeall Motion, as I have already demonstrated; and any man may observe in himself, and discover in the writings of others, how the Minde has passed from one of these perceptions to another, in very long deductions of De∣monstration; as also what stilness from bo∣dily Motion is required in the excogitation of such series of Reasons, where the Spirits are to run into no other posture nor motion then what they are guided into by the Mind it self, where these immateriall and intel∣lectuall Notions have the leading and rule. Besides in grosser Phantasmes, which are supposed to be somewhere impressed in the Brain, the composition of them, and disclusion and various disposall of them, is plainly an arbitrarious act, and implies Page  143 an Essence that can, as it lists, excite in it self the variety of such Phantasmes as have been first exhibited to her from Externall Objects, and change them and transpose them at her own will. But what need I reason against this ground of Mr. Hobbs so sollicitously? it being sufficient to discover, that he onely saies, that No Essence can change the Modifications of it self, but does not prove it; and therefore whatever he would infer hereupon is meerly upon a begg'd Principle.

8. But however, from this precarious ground he will infer, that whenever we have a Will to a thing, the cause of this Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in our own disposing; the meaning whereof must be, That whenever we Will, some corporeall impress, which we cannot avoid, forces us thereto. But the Illation is as weak as bold; it being built upon no foundation, as I have already shewn. I shall onely take notice how Mr. Hobbs, though he has rescued him∣self from the authority of the Schools, and would fain set up for himself, yet he has not freed himself from their fooleries in talking of Faculties and Operations (and the absurditie is alike in both) as separate and distinct from the Essence they belong to, wich causes a great deal of distraction and Page  144 obscurity in the speculation of things. I speak this in reference to those expressions of his of the Will being the cause of willing, and of its being the necessary cause of vo∣luntary actions, and of things not being in its disposing. Whenas, if a man would speak properly, and desired to be understood, he would say, That the Subject in which is this power or act of willing, (call it Man or the Soul of Man) is the cause of this or that volun∣tary action. But this would discover his So∣phistry, wherewith haply he has entrapt himself, which is this, Something out of the power of the Will necessarily causes the Will; the Will once caused is the necessary cause of voluntary actions; and therefore all voluntary actions are necessitated.

9. Besides that the first part of this Ar∣gumentation is groundless (as I have al∣ready intimated) the second is sophisticall, that sayes That the Will is the necessary cause of voluntary actions: For by necessary may be understood either necessitated, forced and made to act, whether it will or no; or else it may signify that the Will is a requisite cause of voluntary actions, so that there can be no voluntary actions without it. The latter whereof may be in some sense true, but the former is utterly false. So the Conclusion being inferred from assertions Page  145 whereof the one is groundless, the other Sophisticall, the Illation cannot but be ri∣diculously weak and despicable. But if he had spoke in the Concrete in stead of the Abstract, the Sophistry had been ← more → grossly discoverable, or rather the train of his reasoning languid and contemptible. Omitting therefore to speak of the Will separately, which of it self is but a blind Power or Operation, let us speak of that Essence which is endued with Will, Sense, Reason, and other Faculties, and see what face this argumentation of his will bear, which will then run thus;

10. Some externall, irresistible Agent does ever necessarily cause that Essence (call it Soule or what you please) which is endued with the faculties of Will and Understanding, •o Will. This Essence, endued with the power of exerting it self into the act of Willing, is the necessary cause of Voluntary actions. There∣fore all voluntary actions are necessitated. The first Assertion now at first sight ap∣pears a gross falshood, the Soule being endued with Understanding as well as Will, and therefore she is not necessarily deter∣mined to will by externall impresses, but by the displaying of certain notions and per∣ceptions she raises in her self, that be pure∣ly intellectuall. And the second seems a Page  146 very slim and lank piece of Sophistrie. Both which my reasons already alledged doe so easily and so plainly reach, that I need add nothing ← more → , but pass to his second Argu∣ment, the form whereof in brief is this;

11. Every Cause is a sufficient cause, other∣wise it could not produce its effect: Every sufficient cause is a necessary cause, that is to say, will be sure to produce the effect, other∣wise something was wanting thereto, and it was no sufficient cause: And therefore every cause is a necessary cause, and consequently every Effect or Action, even those that are termed Voluntary, are necessitated. This reasoning looks smartly at first view, but if we come closer to it, we shall find it a pittifull piece of Sophistry, which is easily detected by observing the ambiguity of that Proposition, Every sufficient cause is a ne∣cessary cause: For the force lyes not so much in that it is said to be Sufficient, as in that it is said to be a Cause; which if it be, it must of necessity have an Effect, whether it be sufficient or insufficient; which disco∣vers the Sophisme. For these relative terms of Cause and Effect necessarily imply one another. But every Being that is sufficient to act this or that if it will, and so to become the Cause thereof, doth neither act, nor ab∣stain from acting necessarily. And therefore Page  147 if it doe act, it addes Will to the Sufficiency of its power; and if it did not act, it is not because it had not sufficient power, but be∣cause it would not make use of it. So that we see that every sufficient Cause rightly understood without captiositie is not a ne∣cessary cause, nor will be sure to produce the Effect; and that though there be a suffici∣ency of power, yet there may be something wanting, to wit, the exertion of the Will; whereby it may come to pass, that what might have acted, if it would, did not: but if it did, Will being added to sufficient Power, that it cannot be said to be necessary in any other sense, then of that Axiome in Metaphysicks, Quicquid est, quamdiu est, ne∣cesse est esse: The reason whereof is, because it is impossible that a thing should be and not be at once. But before it acted, it might have chosen whether it would have acted or no; but it did determine it self. And in this sense is it to be said to be a free Agent, & not a necessary one. So that it is manifest, that though there be some prettie perversness of wit in the contriving of this Argument, yet there is no solidity at all at the bottome.

12. And as little is there in his third. But in this, I must confess, I cannot so much accuse him of Art and Sophistrie, as of igno∣rance of the rules of Logick; for he does Page  148 plainly assert That the necessity of the truth of that Proposition there named depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts there∣of; then which no grosser errour can be com∣mitted in the Art of reasoning. For he might as well say that the necessity of the truth of a Connex Axiome depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts, as of a Disjunct. But in a Connex, when both the parts are not onely false, but impossible, yet the Axiome is necessarily true. As for ex∣ample, If Bucephalus be a man, he is endued with humane reason; this Axiome is ne∣cessarily true, and yet the parts are impos∣sible. For Alexanders horse can neither be a man, nor have the reason of a man, either radically or actually. The necessity there∣fore is only laid upon the connexion of the parts, not upon the parts themselves. So when I say, To morrow it will rain, or it will not rain, this Disjunct Proposition also is necessary, but the necessity lyes upon the Disjunction of the parts, not upon the parts themselves: For they being immediately disjoyned, there is a necessity that one of them must be, though there be no necessity that this must be determined rather then that. As when a man is kept under custo∣die where he has the use of two rooms only, though there be a necessity that he be found Page  149 in one of the two, yet he is not confined to either one of them. And to be brief, and prevent those frivolous both answers and replyes that follow in the pursuit of this Argument in Mr. Hobbs; As the necessity of this Disjunct Axiome lyes upon the Dis∣junction it self, so the truth, of which this necessity is a mode, must lye there too; for it is the Disjunction of the parts that is affir∣med, and not the parts themselves, as any one that is but moderately in his wits must needs acknowledg.

13. There is a ← more → dangerous way that Mr. Hobbs might have made use of, and with ← more → credit, but yet scarce with better suc∣cess, which is the consideration of an Axi∣ome that pronounces of a future Contingent, such as this, Cras Socrates disputabit. For every Axiome pronouncing either true or false, as all doe agree upon; if this Axiome be now true, it is impossible but Socrates should dispute to morrow; or if it be now false, it is impossible he should: and so his Action of disputing or the omission thereof will be necessary, for the Proposition can∣not be both true and false at once. Some are much troubled to extricate themselves out of this Nooze; but if we ← more → precisely enquire into the sense of the Proposition, the difficultie will vanish. He therefore that Page  150 affirms that Socrates will dispute to morrow, affirms it (to use the distinction of Futuri∣ties that Aristotle somewhere suggests) either as a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, either as a thing that is likely to be, but has a possi∣bility of being otherwise, or else as a thing certainly to come to pass. If this latter, the Axiome is false; if the former, it is true: and so the liberty of Socrates his action, as also of all like contingent effects, are thus easily rescued from this sophistical entan∣glement. For every Future Axiome is as incapable of our judgment, unless we de∣termine the sense of it by one of the fore∣named modes, as an Indefinite Axiome is, before we in our minds adde the notes of Universality or Particularity: Neither can we say of either of them, that they are true or false, till we have compleated and deter∣mined their sense.

14. His fourth Argument he proposes with some diffidence and dislike, as if he thought it not good Logick (they are his own words) to make use of it, and adde it to the rest. And for my own part, I cannot but approve of the consistency of his judgment, and coherency with other parts of his Phi∣losophie: For if there be nothing but Body or Matter in the whole comprehension of things, it will be very hard to find out any Page  151 such Deity as has the knowledg or fore∣knowledg of any thing: And therefore I suspect that this last is onely cast in as argu∣mentum ad hominem, to puzzle such as have not dived to so profound a depth of naturall knowledg, as to fancy they have discovered there is no God in the world.

15. But let him vilifie it as he will, it is the only Argument he has brought, that has any tolerable sense or solidity in it; and it is a Subject that has exercised the wits of all Ages, to reconcile the Liberty of mans Will with the Decrees and Praescience of God. But my Freeness, I hope, and Mo∣deration shall make this matter ← more easy to me, then it ordinarily proves to them that venture upon it. My Answer therefore in brief shall be this;

16. That though there be such a Faculty in the Soule of man as Liberty of Will, yet she is not alwaies in a state of acting accord∣ing to it. For she may either degenerate so far, that it may be as certainly known what she will doe upon this or that occasion, as what an hungry Dog will doe when a crust is offered him; which is the generall condition of almost all men in most occur∣rencies of their lives: or else she may be so Heroically good, though that happen in very few, that it may be as certainly known Page  152 as before what she will doe or suffer upon such or such emergencies: and in these cases the use of Liberty of Will ceases.

17. That the use of the Facultie of Free∣will is properly there, where we finde our selves so near to an AEquiponderancy, being toucht with the sense of Vertue on the one side, and the ease or pleasure of some vitious action on the other, that we are conscious to our selves that we ought, and that we may, if we will, abandon the one and cleave to the other.

18. That in this Conflict the Soule has no such absolute power to determine her self to the one or the other action, but Temptation or Supernaturall assistance may certainly carry her this way or that way; so that she may not be able to use that liber∣ty of going indifferently either way.

19. That Divine Decrees either find men sit, or make them so, for the executing of whatever is absolutely purposed or pro∣phesied concerning them.

20. That the Praescience of God is so vast and exceeding the comprehension of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is this, That this knowledg is most per∣fect and exquisite, accurately representing the Natures, Powers and Properties of the thing it does foreknow. Whence it must Page  153 follow, that if there be any Creature free and undeterminate, and that in such circum∣stances and at such a time he may either act thus or not act thus, this perfect Fore∣knowledge must discern from all eternity, that the said Creature in such circumstances may either act thus, or so, or not. And fur∣ther to declare the perfection of this Fore∣knowledg and Omniscience of God; as His Omnipotence ought to exten so far, as to be able to doe whatsoever implyes no con∣tradiction to be done; so his Praescience and Omniscience ought to extend so far, as to know precisely and fully whatever implies no contradiction to be known. To conclude therefore briefly; Free or Contingent Effects doe either imply a contradiction to be fore∣known, or they doe not imply it. If they imply a contradiction to be foreknown, they are no Object of the Omniscience of God, and therefore there can be no pretence that his Foreknowledg does determinate them, nor can they be argued to be deter∣mined thereby. If they imply no contra∣diction to be foreknown, that is to acknow∣ledg that divine Praescience and they may very well consist together. And so either way, notwithstanding the divine Omnisci∣ence, the Actions of men may be free.

21. The sum therefore of all is this, That Page  154 mens actions are sometimes free and some∣times not free; but in that they are at any time free, is a Demonstration that there is a faculty in us that is incompetible to meer Matter: which is sufficient for my purpose.