A brief reply to a late answer to Dr. Henry More his Antidote against idolatry Shewing that there is nothing in the said answer that does any ways weaken his proofs of idolatry against the Church of Rome, and therefore all are bound to take heed how they enter into, or continue in the communion of that church as they tender their own salvation.

CHAP. III.

His Answer to the first Paragraph.

It had been ingenuous in the Doctor whilest he states Catholick ••octrine to speak Catholick language. The Council of Trent (even as quoted by himself) mentions not the ••ost but onely the ••••oration of the Blessed Sacrament or (which is the same) of Iesus ••hrist in the Sacrament. Which is a quite different thing from that uncatholick expression of worshipping the Host; For Catholick Principles own nothing of the Host to remain after Consecration, but the species or symbols. Nor does the Council enjoyn the Worship of Latria to the symbols but to ••esus Christ veiled with these symbols.

The Reply.

THis Answer is most what but a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or strife about words. Whether it be called Host or Sacrament, it is all one to me, and to the Cause I undertake. For by the Host I mean t••e conse∣crated Bread, and it is familiar in common sp••••ch to understand the Host in that sense. As when they say, At the elevation of the Host, and, As the Host passes by, a••d the like, which is under∣stood of the Sacrament, as my Adversary here had rather have it called. Besides that, the very Reason of the name implies so much, that it is the

Consecrated Bread; because Hostia, from whence the word Host is, signifies a Sacrifice; Which your Church will not grant the Bread to be before Consecration, whereby you conceive it to become Christ himself. And lastly Durandus, and I doubt not but many others of your Church, do call the Sacrament it self Hostia very often. So that there is more of pomp then solidity in this rebuke, and a cunning endeavour to make me seem less skilfull in these Points of Controversie in the eyes of your Party.

But now to the Second part of your Answer which seems more material, That the Council enjoyns not the Worship of Latria to the symbols, but to Jesus Christ veiled with the Symbols: I Reply, That for as much as they enjoyn adorati∣on or bowing to this effigiated bare or visible s••mbolical Presence of Christ invisibly there, it is Idolatry by Conclusion 20th. Chapter 2. And though they pretend to omit the external species or shew of the pread in their Worship; yet while it is acknowledged that they Worship Christ as Hypostatically united with the substance of the Bread not annihilated but changed and transub∣stantiated into his body there veiled with these Species, and being this Transubstantiation is not, this Latri•• of theirs is turned into Idolatry by the twenty first, twenty second, and twenty fifth Con∣c••usions of the second Chapter. As it is manifest to any one that lists to compare the Case with these Conclusions, which stand very firm still, for any thing he has been able to alledge against them.

After this my Adversary gives a brief sum of this third Chapter of mine in this Enthymeme, Transu••∣stantiation is a meer Figment; Ergo, The adoration of the Eucharist is palpable ldolatry, and so runs out pre∣posterously to the eighth Paragraph, in Answer to the concealed Proposition of the Enthymeme. But I will rather set his Answers in the same order that the numbers of the Paragraphs require. And so his Answers to the Antecedent of the Proposition will come in view first. We will consider his Answer to the consequence of it, at the eight Paragraph which is its due place.

His Answer to the Argument in the fourth Paragraph.

To this he Answers, This is indeed a fair demonstration that Dr. More is acquainted with Plautus his Come∣dies, and can when he pleases descend from the Di∣vinity-chair to a piece of unseasonable mirth an•• stage Drollery. But let this pass as a pleasant skirmi•• before the main charge.

The Reply.

If it was not indecorous for St. Paul to quot•• Heathen Poets, as Aratus and Epimenides, yea Co∣medians as Menander in his Thais, how can it be below such an one as I to quote a Comick Poet▪ 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in any point of Drollery, but for an earnest 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ration, That ••t never was seen nor is it possible that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 body can be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 two places at once. But if this Testim••••

does not like you, you may remember how I showd you above, That Athanasius and Anastatius ancient Christians declare, ••hat an Angel himself, nor a Soul separate can be in two places at once. But the stress of my Argument yes not in the ••uthority of P••autus, but in t••e sense of all mankind as I have in••ima••ed, who by common suff••age, unless infinitely prejudiced, do ratifie this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 That one body cannot be in two places at once. Which distinct force of this my first Argu∣ment 〈◊〉〈◊〉 A••versary endeavoured to smother, by a Rhetorical flourish, and nimble-paced Transition 〈◊〉〈◊〉 those fetc••ed from Arts and Sciences, &c. To which you shall now hear his Answers.

His Answer to the Argument from Physicks in the fifth Paragraph.

To this he Answers, First, by asserting it possible, That a Body occupying a space equal to it self in one place, may ••et be elsewhere without occupying any place at all; and he would prove this more then possible, from the opinion of the Learned, who maintain that actually the supreme Heaven occupies no place. Secondly, by denying the Inferences I make 〈…〉〈…〉 of one Body being in two places at once, as first, That the Body will be equal to those 〈◊〉〈◊〉 s••aces, What needs that, Mr. Doctor, sa••s he, It is enough that in each of those two spa∣ce•• it be onely equal or commensurate to that deter∣mina••e place it there occupies, suppose of six cub••••s, and in neither of them equal or commensurate to a

space of twelve Cubits. And then for my Inference, That granting this Body equal to the spaces it occu∣pies at once, it will be double to it self, he denies the consequence. Because a Body of one Cubit rare∣••ied into a double dimension, and therefore occupying a double space, will not be double to it self. And a rational Soul informing a Body of a span length, when the Body is grown to another span still in∣formed by the same Soul, it does not follow that the Soul is double to it self. Is not this rare Di∣vinity, says he. Let the Doctor show a material di∣sparity in these two Cases, or else acknowledge the unconclusiveness of his own Objection. This is the sum and substance of that wherewith he would en∣••rvate my Argument, drawn from Physicks against Transubstantiation. What follows belongs rather to his Answer to my Argument drawn from Meta∣physicks which we shall consider there.

The Reply.

In the mean time to his first Answer, I Reply thus, That it is a fetch beyond the Moon or rather beyond the World, to endeavour the en∣ervation of my Consequences from the supposal of a Body in two internal places at once, that it so filling those two places, is equal to the two places equal to one another, and that therefore it is double to it self; by saying, that a Body occu∣pying a place equal to it self in one place, may yet be elsewhere without being in any place, be••cause the supreme or extimate Heaven is in no

place; which yet is to be understood of no ex∣••ernal place. But Eustachius and other School∣••hilosop••ers, and all that hold an internal place •• which Truth is plainly demonstrable) do hold that it is in a place internal, upon which our Argument goes, but is equally true of locus externus. Nor then will this high flight beyond 〈◊〉〈◊〉 supreme or extimate Heaven serve for any ev•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. For as much as we speak of Bodies placed ••n this side of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 extimate Heaven, and no Bo••y can b•• found amongst Bodies, but it will be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cumscr••bed b•• the ambient superficies of the next Bodies about it, that superficies of the ambient Bodies that do immediately compass 〈…〉〈…〉 Body being its place. And every Body ••ill h••ve such a place that is found on this 〈…〉〈…〉 extimate Heaven. This is a Truth that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be denied. And our Question is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 onely of suc•• Bodies as are on this side 〈◊〉〈◊〉 extimate Heaven. From which the unsea∣sonablen••ss of my Adversaries subter••uge is plainl•• d••cerned, which in no sense will serve his turn, unle••s for the amuzing the minds of the People.

To 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Second Answer I return this; To the first 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thereof, That it is not onely enough to him but it is also en••ugh to me that in each of the two ••paces the Body be equal to that de∣••erminate place it t••ere occupies, understanding either an internal or external place. For sup∣pose one and the ••ame Body at each place at ••nce 〈◊〉〈◊〉 either an internal or external place of

such a quantity, of six Cubits suppose, which it cannot fill unless it be commensurate to them, it is plain it fills as much space as comes to twelve Cubits, if six and six make twelve, which is as sure as two and two make four. And there∣fore that it is equal to twelve Cubits, be∣cause it plainly fills up the space of twice six Cubits. Or how ever at the same time fills the ambient superficieses that would exactly fit twice six Cubits in several. There is no great∣er demonstration of equality then this, which the Geometricians call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Co••gruen∣tia. So certain is it that a Body adequately fil∣ling two places of six Cubits big at once, has it self the magnitude of twelve Cubits: But the Body is supposed but one and the same Body in both places, and therefore can be but six Cubits. Wherefore it is both six Cubits and twelve Cubits at once, that is to ••ay, it is double to it self at the same time, which is impossible.

Nor does the Second part of my Adversa∣ries Answer evade this Impossibility: That it will no more follow that a Body occupying at ••he same time two places, and so being equal to those two places, which are double to one single place, that the Body is double to it self, then that a Body of one Cubit ••a••ified into a double dimension and therefore occupying a double space is double to it self: Or the rational ••oul informing a Bod•• of a span length at first, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the same Body grown another span, is thereby

double to it self. For not at all to quarrel with the mistake of the nature of Rarefaction, which I must confess I take to be the Cartesian way not the ••ristotelean, and candidly interpreting his meaning, in those words, (a body of a span length and then grown up to another span) which grown up to another span naturally implies the Body not double but octuple to what it was before, passing by these and medling onely with his own meaning, (as it may be hoped) and Hypotheses, the examples do not at all reach the present pur∣pose. For speaking in his sense, a body of one Cubit rarified into a double dimension is double to it self unrarified; that is, It is as big again as it was when it was unrarified. But it is not as big again or double to it self at the same time, but double it is to what it was before. And the same is to be said of the soul, (in such a sense as extension is applicable to her, and increase or de∣crease of it, namely by dilatation and contraction Spiritual) that it is double when the Body is grown as big again as it was when it was but a span long, to what it was when the Body was but a span long. But here in the present Case a Body is de∣monstrated double to it self, compared with it self and its present condition at the same time: Which is impossible, viz. That the same Body should be double now to what it is now. That it now should be as big again as it self is now. For neither can the Soul her self be said to be now as wise again as she is now, but onely as wise again as she was some time ago. And so my

Adversaries Answer does not at all reach the point in hand. And therefore my Demonstrati∣on stands firm and unshaken, of the Impossibili∣ty of Transubstantiation from this Argument taken from Physicks, as any unprejudiced eye may easily discern. Nor had we any need here to consider the continuity or discontinuity of places. But all is clear from what we have thus briefly represented.

His Answer to the Argument from Meta∣physicks in this fifth Paragraph.

To my Metaphysical Argument that infers, that the Body of Christ will be Divisum à se, and both Unum and Multa. First he Answers to the first part; If divisum à se secundum substantiam, I de∣ny it, If divisum à se quoad locum, transeat. To the Second, That it will not be Unum & Multa, but onely Unum in Multis, one and the same in many places.

His second Answer is, that I go upon a false supposition, That essential Vnity is derived from the Vnity of local Presence, not from the Intrin∣sick Principles of the subject. For unless this be granted, Plurality of local Presence at once will not prove a thing divided from it self.

His last Answer is, That by this and my former Argument I put armes into the hands of Infide••s against the Mystery of the Holy Trinity. For it will follow, saith he, That one and the same Divine Na∣ture being in three distinct Persons at once, the same Nature will be treble to it self, as much as the

same Body being in two places at once will be double to it self. And secondly, that one Divine Nature being in three distinct Persons it will be as much Divisa à se (besides that it will not be Di∣visa ab aliis, viz. from the three distinct Persons with which it is really identified) as a Body will by being in two distinct places at once. Th••s is the bare edge and full strength of his Answers against my Metaphysical Argument. As for his Rheto∣rical Flourishes and Boasts, they are no part of any proof, and I list not to meddle with such things.

The Reply.

To the First part of his first Answer I Reply, That it is plain that it is divisum à se secundum sub∣stantiam, both quoad totum, and quoad partes, be∣cause it is separate or distant so many yards or so many miles suppose from it self, nothing of it self being between. As distant and separate as two several Individual Bodies at the same distance, that is to say, A is as many yards or miles distant from A quoad integram suam substantiam, as to its intire substance, as B is from C. But B is really distant or separate from C suppose twenty yards or miles, as to their intire substances. Ergo, A is distant or separate from A twenty yards or miles as to its intire substance, nothing of its substance being between. So that it is both present with it self and absent from it self at the same time twenty miles, and may be many thousands ac∣cording

to this impossible Hypothesis. In so much that it is plain this part of his Answer is weak and insufficient. To the other part I say, That it manifestly follows from my former Reply, (that shows plainly that A is distant and separate from A which is a plain and palpable Division of A wholly and intirely from it self) That A is not Ens unum, but Entia multa or plura, because the very definition of Ens unum is, that it be indi∣visum à se. This is perfect demonstration to any ones whose eyes are not obstructed with preju∣d••ce.

And now to his Second Answer, I deny that I go upon any such supposition, That Essential Unity is derived from the unity of local Presence. But what I contend for is this, T••at unity of local Presence is a necessary consequence of Essential Unity: Nor can any finite Essential Unity be in any m••re than one place at once, as Athanasius and Anastatius also have concluded. And there may be as ne essary and indubitable reasonings ••rom the property of a thing as from its intrin∣sick Principles. As a man may as certainly con∣clude such a Triangle to be a Rectangle Triangle from the equality of the Power of the Hypote∣nusa to the Powers of the sides including the Angle subtended by the Hypotenusa, as from the very definition of a Rectangle Triangle it self. And though the ubi of a Being be not essential to it, yet we are sure what ever is is some where, & quod nusquam est nibil est. From whence it is ap∣parent how weak my Adversaries Inference is, That

unless essential Unity be derived from the Unity of local Presence, it will not follow that the same Body being in divers places at once is divided from it self, any more than it is divided from its in∣trinsick Principles, which it can never be by Plu∣rality of local Presence, they being wholly extrin∣sick to the subject. Which is the same as if he should contend that a Man may be and yet be no where, because Vbi or Place is extrinsecal to him. Or that his Soul may be neither wiser, nor less wise, nor equally wise with others; or his Body neither taller, nor less tall, nor equally tall with others, and yet be, these being onely external re∣spects and comparisons, and not in the definition or ••ssential constitution of a Man. To all which I add, That the very intrinsick Principles of any one ••eing supposed to be in two Places are divi∣ded from themselves, that is, are distant or s••pa∣rate so many Yards or Miles, as is plain from my former Arguing. As suppose Plato were at the same time at Athens and Thebes, the intrinsick ••rinciples of Plato, to wit, his Soul and Body would be both divided from themselves at this distance, and con∣stitute two Plato's. These things are so plain, that it is a wonder to me that they can be hid from any Mans eyes, that does not wilfully wink against them; or rather that any Man can wink against them, though in humour or for ends best known to himself he may talk against them.

Now to his third and last I Answer; Who does the greater disservice to the Catholick Church he or I? I dealing bonâ fide and plainly demonstrating

that to be an errour that cannot be hid from the unprejudiced, it being in a subject so easily comprehensible to all mens perceptions, I mean the nature of a Body▪ and the impossibility of what they pronounce thereof. And it being an Opinion unknown or disown'd by the Fa∣thers of the Church, I mean this Opinion of Transubstantiation, not avowed by any Council till about four or five hundred Years ago, when as the Doctrine of the Trinity was repeatedly ratified in the Primitive times by general Councils above 1200 Years ago, with what reason is it that my Adversary will allow no greater certainty of the Mystery of the Trinity then of Transubstantia∣tion, which has such palpable and easily depre∣hensible and plainly demonstrable contradictions in it. Is not this to put weapons into the hands of In••idels with a witness? But I hope I shall easily wrest them out again by a sufficient Reply to this third Answer of my Adversary.

In the First part therefore, I say, his suppositi∣on is very gross and incompetible to the Divine Nature. As if it were in the three Persons as one hand phancyed in three distinct distanced gloves at once, or one finger in three distinct finger••stalls filling them out in several with its presence, when∣as the Divine Nature and the Persons are pro∣miscuously said to be in one another, (Iohn 17. 21.) I in thee, and thou in me; And Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity. Peter Lumbard not unskil∣fully resembles the Trinity and Divine Nature, to the Mind and the three Powers in the Mind,

Memory, and Understanding, and Love, or Will. These three, saith he, out of St. Austin, are not three Lives but one Life, not three Minds but one Mind, one Essence. He descants further on this Similitude, but it is enough to hint thus much, that from hence also it is manifest, That the Di∣vine Nature is not in the three Persons, as one finger that fits three distinct distanced finger-stalls, but as the Memory, Understanding, and Will, are adequately every-where where the Mind is by a Metaphysical Coincidency and ••ongruity, so also is the Presence of the three Persons and Divine Na∣ture every where coincident and adequate: Nor is the Divine Nature any more repeated according to the number of Persons, then the Essence of the Soul is according to the number of those three Powers, Memory, Vnderstanding, and Will. So that nothing more can be concluded then thus, That the number of the Persons are triple to the Divine Nature which is but One, as the Powers of the Soul or Mind are triple to the Soul or Mind that is but One. And what inconvenience is there in this? Do not all Men say, that there are three Persons though but One Divine Nature? But he would bring a thick Night upon Truth, that gross Errour also might find harb••ur under that Covert.

In the second part of his Answer there seems also to be a supposition as Uncatholick and false as the former. As if the Divine Nature in the three Divine Persons were as One common general Hu∣mane Nature in three Men, suppose Pythagoras,

Plato, and Socrates; when as according to St. Austin and others, The Divine Nature is to the three Divine Persons ra••her as the Rational Soul or Mind to the three Powers, Memory, Understanding, and will: ••his is as near as in this impe••scrutable Mystery we can come, speaking in a Parable with that ancient Father. And we must say so rather than acknowledge any similitude with that of the common humane nature in Pythagoras, Plato, and Socrates, least we run into that dreadfull absurdity of making more Gods than One. But now speak∣ing according to the sense of St. Austin, it is plain that that One Divine Nature being not in the three Persons as one general humane nature in three Men, but the Union and mutual inexistence being as that of the Soul and her Powers, it is plain I say, that tha•• One Divine Nature will be no more divided from it self by being thus inexistent in the three Persons, than the Soul will be divided from her self by reason of her three Powers, Memory, Understanding, and will, or M••ns, No∣titia & Amor, or Sapientia & Amor, which Peter Lumbard contends to be the proper titles of the Son and Holy Ghost; which also is very consonant to the doctrine of the ancient Phílosophy of the Jews and Greeks touching their Trinit••. And lastly as the Soul is sufficiently divisa ab aliis in a Metaphysical sense, though she be really identi••ed with her three Powers, so is the Divine Nature suf∣ficiently divisa ab aliis though it be identified real∣l•• with the three Persons. So that my Adversar•• does here nodum in scirpo qu••rere out of an ill will

to the clearness of my Arguments which he would thus obliquely obscure, and teach the Infidel to cavil against the solid Mystery of the Trinity, because neither himself nor any else can make good that false Opinion of Transubstantiation. Which how pious and warrantable an act of him it is, let any man judge. This is onely to cast dust into the eyes of the Vulgar to dishearten them from en∣deavouring to see the Truth.

His Answer to the Argument from Mathema∣ticks in the sixth Paragraph

This Argument is meer Cob-web stuff, half an eye may look through it; For these words of the Doctor, (That a part of the Division is equal to the whole) either refer to the species (and then it is false that a part of the Division is equal to the whole) or they point at the Body of Christ (and then the words are de subjecto non supponente) for there is no division of any part of Christs Body from the whole.

The Reply.

I will not say, That my Adversary looks through too thick a Cob-web to discern the force and scope of my Argument. But this I will say, that he has plainly missed it. For the very absurdity that I drive at is, that in dividing suppose an entire consecra∣ted Host into two parts, (in which one entire consecrated Host there is but one continued Body

of Christ, veiled as he says, but co-extended with the species) that in the dividing this Host or species of the Host if you will, that one continued Body of Christ there before, is discontinued and separated into two as sure as it is in two places at once. And what, I pray you, is this but to be divided into two? And being Division here is in∣to two intirely the same with the divided, what is it but to be divided into parts of a Division which singly are equal to the whole, contrary to that common Notion in Euclid? Or if you think this less absurd, to be divided into two wholes? For they may be called either, in such an Hypothesis, as brings in the con••usion of all things.

His Answer to the Argument from Logick in this sixth Paragraph.

This, says he, is the same in effect with the former and requires no new Answer. Because these his trisling expressions if applied to the separated species are false, if to Christs Body then they proceed upon a false supposition, as hath been declared in my An∣swer to the third Objection.

The Reply.

That this Argument stands upon the same sup∣position that the former, I grant, But that the supposition is false I may well deny, having pro∣ved it true in my Reply to his former Answer. Nor is this Argument altogether the same in

effect, because it illustrates the grand absurdity of the opinion it oppugns from new Maximes. So little tri••ling is the argumentation which I have here produced. But it is the Policy of my Anta∣gonist to slight and make himself merry with such things as are too solid to be really Answered. For this is succedaneous to a real Confu••ation in the eyes of the Vulgar, and it may be of more conse∣quence with them, that are taught not to examine but believe: In which Method he shows himself an egregious Artist in his attaque upon my next Objection, where he begins with some few scoptical and undervaluing Reflections as he calls them. But a Man of his parts and wit cannot but know that they are insignificant to any but the Vulgar, before whom he thinks it very conducing to seem to trample on his Antagonist right loftily acting his part as it were on a Stage.

His Reflections on some Passages in my Ar∣gument from that fundamental Principle in Logick and Metaphysicks in this sixth Para∣graph, together with my Replies thereunto.

First, saith he, a knowing Reader cannot chuse but smile to see (Can be) or a capacity of Being brought in for a piece of an Argument to prove that a thing is not. That individual thing that can be, saith the Doctor, and is to be made of any thing, is not. So my Adversary in his first Reflection.

To which I Reply, That some knowing Reader it may be, may not onely smile but laugh quite out while he ob∣serves

to what pretty shifts my Adversary is pu••, to make the Doctor, as he calls him, seem an old do∣ting fool to the heedless and ignorant. For the knowing Reader will easily discern, that (That that can be) is not to be disjoyned from the rest of the sentence, but that (made) is to be referred 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to (be) in both places, and that the sense is, (though the sentence is then less succinct and ele∣gant) That that individual thing that can be made or is to be made of any thing, is not.

But here he makes another oblique Reflection, and observes how fondly the Doctor playes the confident Dogmatizer asserting as evident, That that individual thing that can be and is to be made of any thing, is not; As if forsooth it were evidently demonstrable, that that individual thing which is to day in actual being could not possibly be destroy∣ed and made anew again to morrow by a second generation.

Reply, This is a very oblique and di∣storted Reflection indeed and cast off quite from the mark it should aim at; nor does it at all respicere Ti∣tulum, the Argument in hand, which is our ever blessed Saviours Body never to be destroyed. So that this Answer is onely an argute Cavil. For my Anta∣nist is not so short sighted but he could easily dis∣cern, that I understand the individual thing I speak of to be such a thing as being once made is not to be destroyed. And therefore to quit my self of my Antagonists crafty Evasions, I will mould my Pro∣position into a consistence more full and close, that there may be no holes nor chinkes for a slippery wit to creep through, and shall argue t••us

That thing that once made is never to be destroyed, when ever it may be truely said of it, That it can be made and is to be made of any thing, it then is not. But the Body of Christ is a thing that once made to exist, is never to be destroyed. Therefore when ever it is truely to be said of it, That it can be made or is to be made of any thing, it then is not. But Transubstantiation even now says, That the Body of Christ can be made and is to be made of Bread or a Wa••er consecrated; Therefore accor∣ding to the doctrine of Transubstantiation, the Body of Christ is not But we know certainly and both the Scripture and the Church Universal do restifie, that the Body of Christ is: Therefore if Transubstantiation be true, The Body of Christ both is and is not at the same time, against that Logical and Metaphysical Principle. Idem non potest esse & non esse simul, Is not this as clear as the Me∣ridian Sun?

But he has not done yet, To say the Body of Christ is to be made of the Consecrate Bread, is suc•• an unhappy absurdity with my Antagonist, that he reflects on that in the third place even with the eye of pitty. It is pitty, says he, to observe his words in the next Proposition. The individual Body of Christ is to be made of the Wafer consecrated. Which implies as if the Wafer were the material cause of Christs Body. What Philosophy ever spake so Unphilosophically?

Reply, Good lack! what Tragedies are here raised upon not an half∣penny of harm done? If my Antagonist had but ob∣served the many significations of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in

Aristotles Metaphysicks, he might easily have ob∣served more significations of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or of, than the Ma∣terial cause. But he proceeds,

Yet to make amends he immediately contra∣dicts himself and adds, That the Wafer is turn∣ed into his individual Body; which is a much different thing from being made of the Wafer,

Reply, Water is turned into Ice or Crystal or in∣to Wine by a Miracle, and Lead, by Chymical transmutation, into Gold; how much is that dif∣ferent, from Ice or Crystal and Wine being made of Water, and Gold of Lead?

But the particle (for) saith he, goes beyond wonder. The individual Body of Christ is made of the Wafer Consecrated (mark the word) for it is turned into his individual Body: Which is a piece of as Learned Non-sense, as if he said in open terms, Because the Wafer is turned into Christs Body by a total Conversion, which ex∣cludes a Material cause, therefore his Body is made of the Wafer by generation, which requires a Material cause. Thus unfortunate are the Arts and Sciences when they ingage against Gods Church.

Reply, Would not one think that in this high bluster and swaggering language he had plain∣ly proved his Antagonist a meer dotard in matters of Divinity? But let us reflect a little on the Reflect∣er, And first upon his Hyperbolical wonderment on the particle (for). Crystal is made of Water, for Water is turned into Crystal, Vineger made of Wine, for Wine is turned into Vineger, Gold sometime made of Lead, for Lead sometimes is

turned into Gold. Is the use of (for) in such cases as these so wonderfull? Or were it not a wonder if (for) were not used upon such occasions. And yet my Antagonist cannot abstain from calling it a piece of learned Non-sense; though not half so Learned as the making of a Child of two spans long, but double to the same Child when but one span long, which yet I had the candour gent∣ly to connive at. Nor do I understand any sense in this saying of m•• Antagonist, That a total con∣version excludes the material Cause, if he will al∣low the matter to be such. For certainly the whole Bread includes the matter of the Bread as well as the form, and the form perishing, else it were Bread still, what remains but the matter of the Bread to be turned into the Body of Christ and to become for∣mally and individu••lly his Body. And whether this may be called generation or no is a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ It is no such generation as is ordinarily seen in Nature, but being it is such a conversion, changing or muta∣tion, as whose terminus is substance, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, says Aristotle 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 it is properly and simpl•• generation. So fortunate are the Arts and Sciences when they engage for Gods Church against Errour and Falshood.

But the best jest is yet behind, All the stir and bluster he makes and crowing over me is, because I say, The Body of Christ is made of the Wafer, which is the v••ry language of the School-men and the Fathers. For besides that conficere corpus Christi is an usual phrase with t••em. St. Ambrose plainly

says, Vbi accessit consecratio de pane sit Christi caro. And again, Scrmo Christi creaturam mutat & ••ic ex pane fit Corpus Christi. The Body or flesh of Christ is made of the Bread. Which ex pane, according to my Adversaries own sense, designs the material Cause. And St. Austin, Corpus Christi & sanguis virtute Spiritûs sancti ex panis vinique substantia effi∣citur. The Body and Blood of Christ is made of the sub∣stance of the Bread and Wine. No words can signifie the material Cause more fully then these expressi∣ons. So that now my Antagonist may clap his wings and crow over St. Austin, and St. Ambrose for their learned Non-sense, as well as over me. Thus unfortunate is humour, wit, and eloquence, when it will ingage against true Religion, sound Philosophy, and right Reason. But he knows this was but a farce to the people, and does ingenuousl▪ at last acknow∣ledge he has said nothing as yet in Answer to my Argument, in that he says he does but now come to it.

His Answer to the Argument from that Logical and Metaphysical Principle, Nothing can be and not be at the same time, in this sixth Paragraph.

I come now to his Argument, saith he; Transubstantiation implies that the same thing is and is not at the same time. This, says he, I deny. First, because Physicks have rendred it probable that a thing which actually is may be reproduced without losing its actual ex∣istence. And if we should say that Christs Body is thus reproduced in the Sacrament, it will not follow that the Body of Christ is, and is not at once, viz. before the

Consecration; But onely that it is by a first pro∣duction, and is not by a second production till after the Consecration.

Secondly, That when the Host is converted into the Body of Christ, there is no necessity of the grant∣ing of the production of a new Body which was not before, but onely that the Body begins to be where it was not before. As in the augméntation of our Bodies there is no need of a new Soul, but the same Soul occupies those parts of matter that have accrew∣ed to the Body in its augmentation. The first is verbatim out of him. The second Answer contains the full strength of his own words.

The Reply.

To the first Answer I Reply, That it has no ba∣sis, For Physicks exhibit no such probability, nor has he nor can he produce the least Instance there∣of. But in the mean time it is worth the taking no∣tice of in this Answer, how well assured in his own mind, for all his external cavilling before, my Adversary is, That the meaning of that Proposi∣tion of mine, That that individual thing that can be and is to be made of any thing, is not, was in∣tended by me of such things as which once made are not to be destroyed: or in such a sense as this, That that individual thing that can be made or is to be made of any thing, in that point of time that it is to be made, is not. Which is an Axiome noematically true. And therefore to say that a Body is by a first production, but yet still remaining

produced is to be again produced entirely, even while it remains produced, that is to say, that it remains produced already in that very point of time that it is to be produced, is plainly to confess that the very same individual thing is produced and not produced, or unproduced at the same time. For the terminus productionis is one and the same in∣dividual body A. Now according to Aristotle and the common sense of all men, all production whe∣ther Accidental or Essential has its contrary termes and proceeds à Privatione ad Actum, from Priva∣tion to Act. So that let A be Accident or Essence, A must be supposed not to be that it may become A, or be made A; supposing A such an Individu∣al Body, when it is to be produced the Termini Productionis are non-A and A. That which is to be made A, from not being A it becomes A. Other∣wise it being the same Individual Body and being before, it could not of not being this Individual Body become this Individual Body A, but onely A would be in a new place. Which is no Essential production as is here supposed, but onely local mu∣tation; and consequently the Individual Body A is not produced, when it is thus supposed reproduced. And therefore if it be really reproduced, as is pre∣tended, it is a demonstration that it then was not. Wherefore it being certain that our Saviours Body does not cease to be; if Transubstantiation be true that pretends it reproduced, it necessarily implies that it then is not. And therefore it plainly is and is not, according to that doctrine, at the same time. Besides, if it were possible that A, suppose Socrates,

could be produced while Socrates is in being, it can be no otherwise then thus, that is to say, That ano∣ther man exquisitely Socrates, to whom Socrateity is fully and essentially communicated in all points, is also produced. But then this will also follow, that Socrates is now become a Genus, and this and that Socrates are the species infimae of it, which we usually call Individuals, and so they will not be idem numero but diversa numero and consequently not the same Persons. And so the same Individual So∣crates or the same Individual A will be produced and not produced at the same breath. For things that differ numerically cannot be the same Individuals. So impossible every way is this first Fiction, and implies still the same Repugnancy. For i•• in the second production, the individual Body of Christ be produced, it necessarily argues that Body before not to be his individual Body, so that his Body then was not, according to the doctrine of, Transubstantia••ion, which yet certain∣ly was, and therefore if that doctrine be true, it is again true, That the Body of Christ is and is not at the same time.

To the second Answer I Reply, First, That it is apparently repugnant to the very Definition of Transubstantiation by the Council of Trent. Which saith, 'That there is a conversion of the whole sub∣stance of the Bread into the substance of the Body of Christ. Which, say they, is fitly and properly called Transubstantiation. But if there were no production of the Body of Christ, but onely the causing of it to be where it was not before,

this would not be properly Transubstantiation, but mutatio Localis. But in the action of Transub∣stantiation the terminus is substantia not Locus, it being the transubstantiating one substance into another.

Secondly, If the Body of Christ be not produ∣ced, but there be onely mutatio Localis; the sub∣stance of the Bread either remains or is annihila∣ted. That the Bread remains is expresly against the doctrine of the Roman Church. That it is annihi∣lated, is to give the power of Annihilation to a crea∣ture which is onely proper to God, and to supose that every consecration of the Host annihilates so much of the matter of the Universe; which mustneeds seem very harsh and absurd to any unprejudiced Judgement. Besides that there is this palpable re∣pugnancy in it, That whereas Transubstantiation is said to be the conversion of all the substance of the Bread into Christs Body, this plainly implies that there is the conversion of none at all into it, it be∣ing all annihilated and exterminated out of the Uni∣verse. To say nothing of the Accidents of the Bread remaining after this Annihilation, it being uncon∣ceivable where they should be subjected, or that any modes of substance should be separated from their substance, and exist without it. And then to what end it should be that the species of the Bread should appear by the Divine Omnipotency, the substance of Bread being annihilated. When it would conduce far more to our belief of the corporeal Presence of Christ, in lieu of the annihilated Bread, if those species did not appear, or were so changed that

they seemed much above the nature of ordinary Bread. Which things being not, it is a plain Judicati∣on to the unprejudiced, that the Bread is still Bread after the Consecration. Else God would be found exercising his Omnipotency, in exhibiting such perfest species of Bread and Wine in such a way as is most effectual to drive all Christians to the misbe∣lief of the pretended Mystery of Transubstantiation: Which were a grand absurdity and incompe••ible to the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, if that My∣stery were true.

And thirdly and lastly, for his quaint allusion to the Soul, which being the same yet extends it self into new parts of matter accrewing to the Body in its augmentation; it is a pretty offer of wit, but in my apprehension it extremely falls short of the present Case. For the Soul being still one and the same Spirit undistanced from it self and uninterrupted can contract and extend it self within moderate bounds. But to imagine Christs Body in Heaven by extending it self from thence to the Earth upon every consecration of the Host, continuedly, so to become present where it was not, is to make him even perpetuall•• in a manner to have a monstrously big and mishapen Body, stretched out into parts God knows how many Thousand miles long, which any judicious minde and of a quick sense cannot but hugely abhor from thinking on. But this being not, He must either come down from Heaven upon the Consecration and Annihilation of the Bread, leaving Heaven quite for the time, and ever and anon travail on

Earth, and so swiftly as to be in many places at once, and some many Thousand miles distant one from another, which how absurd it is has been often intimated; which also seems to clash with, Acts 3. 21. Or else as it were taking leave of himself in Heaven and parting from himself and yet leaving himself behind he comes down to sup∣ply the room of the annihilated Bread. Orlastly, he is present in the room of the said Bread, with∣out at all passing from Heaven to Earth. Both which seem altogether impossible and uncon∣ceivable, For how can one and the same Body go from a place and yet leave it self entirely behind in the said place, and so as it were divide it self entirely from it self? Or how is it possible it should be found in two distant places, without passing at least as great a space as that which lyes directly be∣twixt? These things are clearly and perfectly im∣possible. And if they were not, yet are they quite beside the cushion, this Answer balking the doctrine of Transubstantiation established by the Council of Trent.

So plain is it every way, That neither this nor his former Answer enervates any thing the force of my Argument which proves that Transubstan∣tiation implies that the same thing is and is not at once. And therefore this Argument together with all the former against Transubstantiation, notwith∣standing all the Assaults of my Adversary, remain∣ing so manifestly strong and invincible, let the impartial Reader judge whether I have cryed Victo∣ry before my time or behaved my self any way in

down-bearing words Hector-like, as he says, and not rather like a true Trojan, or to speak more proper∣ly in so weighty a Cause, like a sincere Christian, speaking the Truth from my very heart, as I find it in the innate and indeleble characters writ by Gods own finger in the understandings of all Men that will open their eyes to Read them, even those indubitable first principles of Physicks, Meta∣physicks, Mathematicks, and Logick, and the common sense of all mankind, learned and unlearned. So far am I from those Arts and sleights of Men, who managing a wrong Cause do swagger and vapour to set off a fals••ood. Truth needs no such ill Artifices of wit; My Adversary indeed swaggers much here in bearing us in hand that the difficulties of the Trinity are equal or greater then these of Transub∣stantiation, and so harpes again on the same string, but to this I have sufficiently Answered above, and yet it may be I may touch upon it again in the close of my next Reply.

His Answer to the eight Paragraph touching Costerus the Jesuite.

My Antagonist does altogether decline saying any thing to my seventh Paragraph, which I desire my Reader considerately to peruse, and observe the great judgement and discretion of my Opponent in so doing. But to that about Costerus in this eighth Paragraph he Answers thus. Here is, saith he, the ground of Costerus his concession, That if the true Body of Christ be not in the Sacrament of the

Eucharist, the Church of Rome in that point is in such errour and Idolatry as never was seen or heard of. Namely, because Christ then had dealt unworthi∣ly with his Church, in leaving them to fall into such Idolatry by occasion of his own words, and by consequence would not be the true Christ; And there∣fore the adoration of the Eucharist would be not one∣ly a mistake as to the Circumstance but also as to the Object, there being no such adorable Object in the world as a true Christ according to this supposition, and so the Cultus Latriae would be exhibited to a meer Creature. And adds, That if Transubstan∣tiation can be proved a meer Figment he will will∣ingly grant as much as Costerus to the full. This is the main of his Answer and the full strength thereof.

The Reply.

This is an adventurous Answer indeed which hazards the Divinity of Christ, nay the making him an Impostor and all the Churches of Chri∣stendom single Idolaters at least, and themselves double Idolaters, who then Worship not onely a meer Man, but the symbolical presence of a meer Man, which is double Idolatry by Conclusion 19th. Chap. 2. but this is a cunning though a very evil fetch of my Adversary meerly to elude the Testi∣mony of Costerus, viz That the Divinity of Christ standing, and he still acknowledged the true Christ, ••et the Adoration of the Eucharist is Idolatry, un∣••••s Transubstantiation be true. Which most cer∣tainly

is the sense of Costerus in that place, Chap. 12. N. 10. nor did he dream of any such consequence as my Adversary pins upon him; as if he meant that then Christ would not be the true Christ if Transubstantiation were not true, and that thence the Idolatry would proceed. But I will set the whole argumentation of Costerus before my Rea∣ders eyes, and let him judge, whether his Argu∣ment be such as my Adversary pretends. If in the Sacrament of the Eucharist the true Body of Christ be not contained, Christ dealt unworthily with his Church, whom throughout the world for 1500 years together, he has by occasion of his own words left in such errour and Idolatry as was never in the whole world seen or heard of. And then follows that which I have cited in this eighth Paragraph. For the errours of those, &c. which makes up the whole Argument.

Where I Observe, First, that there is not the least men ion or intimation, That Christ would not be Christ if his words, This is my Body, did not signifie properly but ••iguratively, but rather firme∣ly supposing him to be Christ, he would not do any thing so unworthy of his own Office and Dignity▪ as to use words in such a way as should occasion the Church to plunge into so foul Idolatry for so long a time; acknowledging that it would be Ido∣latry though he were the true Christ, but that he being so would not use such words but in their proper sense, that he might not occasion that Ido∣latry. I say in the first place, there is no such thing in this place of Costerus as my Antagonist puts up∣on him. And then secondly I affirm, That no

man in his wits could be so devoid of either Rea∣son or Piety, as to say, in good earnest, That if these words of Christ, This is my Body, be to be understood figuratively, and not literally or pro∣perly, Christ is an Impostor, that is, is not the true Christ, which is expresly the sense which my Antagonist would pin upon this passage of Costerus. For first it is well known that it is usual in the He∣brew idiome, in which Christ spake, as it is not un∣frequent also in other tongues, to use the verb sub∣stantive [est] when the subject and predicate in a proposition is signum and significatum, or if you will when the subject and predicate are those Argu∣ments which Logicians call Similia. So our Saviour ••ays elsewhere, I am the Vine, I am the door. And St. Paul says, 1 Cor. 10. 4 The rock was Christ; be∣sides the examples I have produced in the fore∣going Paragraph. Will any Body therefore that has the least dram of Reason or Religion in him, when,(This is my Body) may so naturally, and according to the idiome of the ••ongue signifie, This is the sign or symbol of my Body, or this is the Representation of my Body, that is to be broken or crucified for you, affirm, that unless it signifie, This is my very Body indeed, flesh, blood, and bones, Christ must be an Impostor? Nay when Christ himself so plainly affirms, (Mat••h. 26. 26.) that it is Bread For he affirms of that Bread which he had used no consecration to, that even that was his Body.

Indeed if he had first done something to it for the transmutation of it, and then taken it up and

said, This is my Body, here had been more colour of pretence, that it was not ordinary Bread. But he says of this Bread as yet unconsecrated, That it is his Body, and therefore he plainly affirms, that Bread remaining still really Bread is his Body, which can be in no sense so but in a figurative one, that is to say, That it is the sign or symbol of his Body; Wherefore when our Saviour does so plainly affirm, that the Bread is but the symbol of his Body, is it any fault in him, that the Church of Rome or any lapsed Church else will so perversly and absurdly understand it, as if it were the very Body of Christ it self upon Consecration? as if our Saviour Christ had declared it so to be?

And besides this affirmation of our Saviour we may add the Attestation of his Evangelists, whom he lead into all Truth. Does not St. Luke expresly say, C••ap. 22. 19. He took Bread and gave thanks and brake and gave it to them saying, This is my Body which was given for you, do this in remembrance of me. What can possibl•• be more plain then this? He gave what he brake, he brake what he took, and what he took was Bread, and of this Bread which he gave, brake and took, he says, This is my Body; Wherefore it is evident that of the Bread he pronounced, according to the Testimony of St. Luke, That it was his Body. But Bread can∣not be his Body otherwise then symbolically, or by way of token or remembrance, and therefore he adds, Do this in remembrance of me. Now memory is not of things present but of things absent. All which circumstances do so emphatically import,

that the Bread is but still a sign not the Body of Christ himself, that the most cautious Lawyer could scarce express any ones mind in a convey∣ance more certainly and expresly. And yet our Sa∣viour must be an Impostor if he did not mean by This is my Body, This is my real Body, the same that hung upon the Cross, and was born of the Virgin Mary. Can there be any thing more injuri∣ous to Christ and Christian Religion then this?

Add unto all this, That besides that Christ him∣self and the Evangelists declare that it is Bread and not the natural Body of Christ, it is demonstrative∣ly impossible to be so, and openly repugnant to all our senses, which alone would assoile our Saviour from being an Impostor, the words being easily to be understood in a figurative sense.

But I hope by this, my Adversary blushes that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 has pinned so uncouth and incredible a sense on this Argument of Costerus, and will acknowledge that Costerus used this Argument onely as a proba∣bility; namely, That Christ being so certainly the true Christ, it is not probable that he would deal so unworthily with his Church as by these words, This is my Body, occasion so great Idolatry in this Artolatria, or Bread worship continued so long in it, and that therefore it is not Bread, but the real Body of Christ; which yet is as well argued or rather far worse, then if the Anthropomorphites of old should have argued thus: That certainly God would not have dealt so unworthily with his Church, as to occasion so hideous an errour and blasphemy, that the eternal God has limbes and shape like a Man,

from those words, Let us make man after our own Image, if so be he have not so. And that therefore he has the lineaments and shape of a Man.

But besides this, where there is no pretense from Scripture to any such thing, it is plain that the Church for as long a time have defiled themselves with the Invocation of Saints and worshipping of Images, which are gross Idolatries as well as this; nay indeed when the Scripture is expresly against it. Which yet, if you will believe the Romanists themselves, have possessed the Church as many hundred years as this worshipping of the Eucha∣rist, though they be all really Innovations upon the lapse of the Church, as the skilfull in An∣tiquity do abundantly prove. And for this gross errour of Transubstantiation, it was not confirmed by any Council till about 1200 after Christ.

Wherefore what an intolerable injury and ca∣lumny is it against the sacred Person of Christ, to cast this Bread-worship upon him, as if by the occa∣sion o•• his words it was introduced, when indeed both against his words and against all sense and Reason the lapse and corruption of the Church has broug••t it in with other Idolatrous opinions and mispractises. But when all this is so, to say Christ is not Christ, that is, That Christ is an Impostor, if these words, This is my Body, be not literally to be understood, as if it were his very true na∣tural Body, flesh, blood, and bones, I leave to any one to judge, if it be not so groundless and so hide∣ous a reproach, that it will be hard to find any name ill enough for it.

And here I profess, I cannot but stand i••finitely astonish'd at the bold Rhetorick of my Adversary, and such like Patrons of the Roman Cause: who for the swaggering of the credulous people into a belief of Transubstantiation, do not stick to own it as reasonable and certain as that Iesus is the Mes∣sias, or that the Mystery of the holy Trinity is true. When as the Mystery of the holy Trinity has been no less then three or four times confirmed by general Councils in the more pure Times of the Church, before her grand Apostasy, and Christ al∣ways held the true Messias, nor can it be doubted but he is so by any that is a Christian; and may be demonstrated to be so to any that do doubt, if they approve themselves but idoneous Auditors. Nor can there be any Reason or demonstration brought against the Mystery of the holy Trinity, ••o far forth as the Scripture and the ancient Councils have de∣fined any thing therein; But the Triunity of the eternal Deity has seemed to the best and wisest Philosophers so reasonable and venerable a Tradi∣tion, that without any force or fear of any external Power, they have embraced it of themselves and spoken many things therein very cons••nant to the Christian verity. And therefore this Myster••, though it be competently obscure, whereby it be∣comes more venerable, to say it is as repugnant and as impossible to Reason as Transubstantiation, whenas it was Confirmed by so many general Coun∣cils in the purer times of the Church, and intimated by so many places of Scripture, as also is the Divini∣ty of Christ most expresly and indubitably, and his

Messias-ship not questioned bv any Christian; to set these Fundamentals of our Religion on the same tickle point, nay on the same impossible point that Transubstantiation stands upon, not countenanced by any Council, till about four or five hundreds years ago, and repugnant to Scripture and Com∣mon sen••e, and to the very first Principles of all solid knowledge and science, were it not charitably to be interpreted a ranting piece of Rhetorick to be∣fool the ••ulgar; as if they would say, As sure as Christ is the Messias and that the Mystery of his Di∣vinity and of the Triunity of the Godhead is true, Transubstantiation is so; it•• ere either a careless disregard what became of Christianity, or a subdo∣lous and operose endeavour of betraying it, and ob∣lique insinuation, that Transubstantiation and the rest of those Mysteries of our Religion are alike false and impossible. But I hope better things of my Ad∣versary, and that he is rather an over officious pro∣pugner of a beloved falshood, and of so great inte∣rest to his Church, then a sly Impugner or Be∣trayer of these sacred Truths.

And now, I hope, I have fully cleared all the Objections that my Antagonist has brought against this third Chapter, or any Paragraph therein: So that it remains invincible and unshaken, That the Opinion of Transubstantiation is not one∣ly false but impossible, and consequently the Ado∣ration of the Eucharist palpable Idolatry. Which my Adversary himself cannot deny, no more than Franciscus C••sterus who has so expresly affirmed it, as I have shewed in this eighth Paragraph.

As for that further o••fer towards a plausibili∣lity for the Truth of Transubstantiation, (for the Mystery of the holy Trinity wants no such small apologies) that the seeming Impossibility thereof, is an Argument of its being a doctrine Divinely inspired, and that that saying rightly here takes place, The more incredible the more credible: These are fine Lullaby-songs to be sung to babies half asleep; But we have most evidently demonstrated, even as clear as Noon∣day, that Transubstantiation is not a seeming Im∣possibility but a palpable and real one. And as for that saying, The more incredible the more cre∣dible, it is a foundation so large, that all the Figments, even the most extravagant of all the Religions of the World may equally be found∣ed upon it, and by how much more incredible and impossible any Figment, is by so much the more stronger faith it ought to obtain, and may the more firmly be supported by this Foundation. For the more impossible the more incredible, the more incredible the more credible. As for exam∣ple, the more incredible it is that Mahomet put the Moon into his bosome, and that it came out at each sleeve divided into two, and that he strait∣ways sodered it together, and sent it back whole to Heaven again, the more incredible this story is, the more credible it is. That is, saith my An∣tagonist, (for he explains this venerable Aphorism) By how much the more incredible the Mystery is; if we onely consult our senses and the bare sentiments of the natural Man, by so much the

more credible it is that there lyes a Divine Re∣velation at the bottom. Cannot the Mahumetan defend his Religion as wisely as thus from this ground?

It is not a sign of our meer natural or unregene∣rate estate when we will not nor can believe things that are apparently repugnant to the indeleble Principles of natural Understanding. But it is a sign of their being the slaves of the Man of sin in a doub ••esense, who can swallow such gudgeons. For for this cause God sends them strong delusi∣ons, saith the Apostle, (2 Thes. 2.) that they may believe alye, because they love not the Truth but have pleasure in unrighteousness. But (Iohn 8. 36.) if the Son makes us free by his spirit of real Regene∣ration, then are we free indeed, even from all such Impostures as these, while the world (Apoc. 17. 8.) wonders after the Boast, and the strange stories that he utters. But we know who those are that are ex∣cluded out of the holy City, even every one that (Apoc. 22. 15.) loves and makes a lye, and those cer∣tainly are none of the Regenerate. And who should those be that love and embrace l••es, but those that take up such Principles that they cannot discern a lye or withhold their assent from it? For the more Impossible, which should turn any Mans stomach from believing, makes it but the more Incredible, and the more Incredible the more Credible.

But we have harped too long on a string which will sound over harsh to such ears as are less ac∣customed to Truth. My main purpose I had dis∣patch'd

before, But I could not but say something to the fine popular fetches of my Adversarie, who cunningly insinuates into the minds of the unskil∣full and simple, that it is a sign of a more then or∣dinary Religious and regenerate estate, far remo∣ved above the meer natural Man, to believe things that are plainly and apertly repugnant to the light of Nature and right Reason. For this is such a gap as may let in the grossest falsities and Immorali∣ties that can be invented, and that upon the shew of Religion and Supernaturality. For giving up their faith to their Priest and his Church, the more incredible the Act to be good or Doctrine true, the more credible. What therefore may not Men be brought to believe and act upon so unsound a Principle? I pass now to his fourth Section, which encounters all my three next Chapters at once.

Notes

• Physic. lib. 5.