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PHilalethes, I am glad to see you, though you are so wrapt up in Speculation that I scarce knew you at first sight; pray why so thoughtful? you don't use to have so much Philosophy in your Face.
I have a particular reason to look a little pretendingly at present; therefore I hope you will excuse it.
With all my heart, for I suppose you will not make a practice of it: But what∣ever
Emergency you may be under, I would advise you to appear in your old shape a∣gain; for in my Judgment that contempla∣tive Figure does not become you.
I am sorry to hear Thinking agrees so ill with my Constitution; but I hope this Alteration does not arise from any natural Antipathy I have to Sense, but from the un∣acceptableness of the subject I am upon.
Pray if it be not too free a Que∣stion, what were you musing upon?
Why last night I happened to light upon an overgrown Fop, who plagued the Company with such an impertinent History of his Quality and Performances, and was so vain and insolent in all his behaviour, that as soon as I was delivered from him, I had a plentiful occasion to consider the unreason∣ableness of Pride; which is the present Em∣ployment of my Thoughts, and upon a full view, I find so much folly, and ill humour, and Monster, in the Composition of this Vice, that I am ashamed, and almost afraid, of the Idea I have raised.
'Tis somewhat hard you can't stand the charge of your own Imagination; But though I shall not dispute your Courage, yet I much question your Mortification.
The Reason of your censure?
Because I have observed it's but a bad Sign of Humility to declaim against
Pride; for he that is really humble will be unconcerned about Respect and Applause; such a Person values himself upon nothing but his Conscience and Integrity, and there∣fore the haughtiness of another can't make him uneasie; so that if he finds himself wince upon the account of neglect, he may be pretty well assured he has a fore place.
I think you are somewhat out in your notion of Humility; for that virtue does not make us either servile or insensible, it does not oblige us to be ridden at the pleasure of every Coxcomb. We may shew our dislike of an imperious humour, as well as of any other foolish Action, both for the Benefit of others, and in vindication of our own right.
I am glad to hear this concession from you, because from hence it follows that a man may have a just esteem of himself without being proud: Now if this observa∣tion was remembred and rightly applyed, men would not be so censorious in this point, nor mistake their own Pride for their neigh∣bours so often as they do. For instance, a man whom the Law has made my Superi∣our, may take notice of his Quality if he pleases; but this can't well be done, except he makes me an abatement of the regard he receives from me, therefore I ought not to in∣terpret the Reserve or Familiarity of his Car∣riage
as a Neglect, for provided he keeps within his proportion, he challenges nothing but his own; so that if I am displeased, the Pride lies on my side, for affecting to have an equal Regard paid to persons who are un∣equal.
I have nothing to object against the main of your discourse, and conceive that the best way to know whether we are guilty or not, and to prevent charging this odious Imputation unjustly upon others, is to state the Nature of Pride, and to enquire into the Grounds of it.
I confess that is the way to pinch the Question, therefore let what will come of it, I will stand the Test of your Method, though I am afraid you will say some un∣acceptable things.
Suppose I do; if the subject leads me to it, the fault is not mine: But to come to the point: Pride has a very strong Founda∣tion in the mind; it's bottom'd upon Self-love.
Then I find there is somewhat to work upon.—
Pray give me leave, I say Pride is originally founded in Self-love, which is the most intimate and inseparable Passion of hu∣mane Nature. The kindness men have for themselves, is apt to put them upon over∣valuing their own things: which humour un∣less
check'd in time, will make them take most delight in those Circumstances and Acti∣ons which distinguish them from their Neigh∣bours; and place their supposed Advantages in the best light. Now this design is best pursued by being Master of uncommon Ex∣cellencies, which though desired by all, are possessed but by a few; for the Rareness of things raises their Esteem, and draws a general Admiration. And their desire of be∣ing distinguish'd, is one reason why they love to keep the odds in their own hand, and to make the distance between themselves and their Neighbours as wide as may be, which often runs them upon a vain, and tyranni∣cal Ostentation of their Power, Capacity, &c. For this magnificent discovery makes the difference between them and their Neigh∣bours the more apparent, and consequently occasions their own Greatness to be the more remarkable.
I think you have said something very remarkable, and I don't know but you may grow considerable by it, if you can prove your Assertion.
Pray what rising Doctrine have I laid down?
You say that Pride is founded in Self-love, which is an unseparable Passion of humane nature; from whence I gather, that it's impossible for a man not to be proud, be∣cause
it's impossible for a man not to love himself. We are like to have an admirable Preservative from you at this rate.
Not so fast, If you had attended to the whole, you might have observed that by self-love I meant the Excesses of it.
I thought a Man could not have loved himself too well.
If by loving you mean wishing him∣self happy, I agree with you; for we may, or rather we must desire to be as happy as is possible, provided it be without prejudice to another. But then if Esteem is understood by Love, it's easie (without care) to exceed in our own behalf; and in this sense we cer∣tainly do love our selves too well, as often as we set an overproportioned and unusual value upon any thing because it's our own; as if our fondness and partiality was the true Standard of worth, and we had the faculty of turning every thing we touched into gold.
I will not contest this point any farther with you; but as I remember you started another Paradox, by intimating that it was a sign of Ambition to esteem any Excellency the higher for being uncommon: Now since the value of an Advantage is en∣hansed by its scarceness, and made more re∣putable to the owner; I think it somewhat hard not to give a man leave to love that most which is most serviceable to him,
So it would if he had no body to love but himself; but since he is both obliged and naturally inclinable to universal Benevo∣lence, this alters the Case: for he who va¦lues any thing the more for being uncommon, will desire it should continue so, which is no kind Wish to his Neighbours, and is an Ar∣gument that a man does not delight in an Advantage so much for it self, as for the Comparison; not so much for its own irres∣pective goodness, as because others want it. Now it affords a more generous, and I be∣lieve, a more transporting pleasure, to con∣verse with universal Happiness, though we make no greater figure in it, than the rest of our Neighbours; than to be gazed at, and admired by a Crowd of indigent and infe∣riour People.
The World does not seem to be of your opinion; however I will let your Argument pass for the good nature of it. But after all let me tell you, though I have no mind to be counted proud, yet I have a strong fancy for myself, and therefore if you will not allow me to be civil to my Person, we might e'en as good dispute no farther, for—
Don't trouble your self, if your Terms are moderate, we'll never break off upon the score, therefore I will offer at a short negative description of Pride, in which
if it's possible, I will give you Satisfaction.
Pray let us see how liberal you will be.
First it's no part of Pride to be conscious of any perfections we have, whe∣ther intellectual or moral; for this is in ma∣ny Cases necessary, and impossible to be a∣voided. He that is wise or learned must know it, otherwise he can't understand when he judges true or false, nor distinguish difficult and noble Speculations, from trifling and vulgar Remarks, nor tell when he acts ratio∣nally or not. Now a Man that is ignorant of these things can neither be wise nor know∣ing: Therefore as he that has a just and vi∣gorous sense of the Magnitude, Distance and Colours of Objects, must conclude that he has eyes whether he will or not; so these perfections of the mind discover themselves by their own Light. The Possessour can no more be ignorant of them, than he can doubt of his Existence when he is awake. To give one instance more; How can any Person have true Fortitude, who does not know how far he ought to hazard himself, and wherein the baseness of Cowardise consists? So that to affirm a Man may be ignorant of his own con∣siderableness, is to make him wise and great, and good by Chance, which is a contradicti∣tion to the Excellencies supposed in him.
Right. And since I like the Frank∣ness, and tendency of your Argument, I'll try if I can reinforce it: I say then, suppo∣sing it was possible for a man to be ignorant of his good Qualities; it was by no means convenient: For if he carried such a Trea∣sure about him, without knowing how well furnished he was; its somewhat hard to con∣ceive, how he could either improve or use it. If it lay thus close, it would be little bet∣ter, than a Mine undiscovered, for which nei∣ther the owner of the Ground, or any Bo∣dy else are ever the richer,
You say well, and therefore I shall venture in the second place to affirm, That as we may be acquainted with our own Ac∣complishments, without being guilty of Pride, so neither is it any branch of this sin to discover that they are greater than some of our Neighbours enjoy. If we have a real Advantage over another, it's no sin to be sen∣sible of it; to apprehend otherwise, is to judge contrary to the Reason of things, when the Case is plain, we may believe we have more Honesty, Sense, &c. than some others. This is as allowable as it is for us to think, that we have better Complexions than Moors, and are taller than Pygmies.
Can you go on?
Yes, I'm not afraid to add, Third∣ly, that we don't fall into the sin of Pride,
by being delighted with those Advantages of Mind, Body or Fortune, which Providence has given us; these things in the very notion of them are supposed to be beneficial. Now it's natural and necessary for us to be pleased with the Enjoyment of that which is good; of that which is agreeable to our Faculties, and an Advancement of our Nature: To speak strict∣ly, when the Faculty and the Object are rightly proportioned, Satisfaction follows of course, and its as impossible for us not to be pleased, as it is for fire not to ascend: Far∣ther, if we are not allowed to take any Sa∣tisfaction in our condition, we are not bound to give God thanks for it,; for we are not obliged to be thankful for that which does us no good: But nothing can do us any good, except it be by giving us a pleasure either in hand or in prospect. Fourthly, it is no part of Pride, to be more pleased with hav∣ing an Advantage our selves, than by seeing one of the same value possessed by another.
Make this out and you will o∣blige me.
Very well: I prove my Proposition thus. First, Because that which is in our Possession, or incorporated into our Essence, is always in our Power, and ready to be made use of when we think fit. But that which belongs to another is often at a distance, and out of our reach, and can't be communicated to us, though
the owner was never so willing. Secondly, it must be more agreeable to be Master of any perfection our selves, than to contemplate one of the same nature in another; because every one is more certain of the kind Incli∣nation he has to himself, than he can be of the Affection of any other Person whatever: That I will be always kind to my self, I am as well assured of, as that I have a being; but that another will be so, is impossible for me to know: And therefore let a man be never so good natured, it must be somewhat more satisfactory to him, to see himself well furnished in any kind, than his Neighbour. Thirdly, that which is our own and in our Nature, we have the most intimate and vigorous sense of; for the presence of any desirable Object, we know is more acceptable and entertaining than either the notion or Prospect of it: Possession gives us the Life of the thing, But hopes and Fancy can furnish out no more at the best than a Picture finely drawn. So that, for Example, let a man be of never so generous and disin∣terested a Spirit, yet it's natural for him to be better pleased, with being rich himself (if he has any value for riches) than in having the bare Idea of an Estate: Besides as I ob∣served, that which is our own, is always at our disposal, and does not depend upon the uncertain Inclination and humour of an∣other.
Very comfortably argued. I find then by your discourse that a Man may with∣out vanity be pleased with his Circumstan∣ces, and have good Thoughts of himself too, if he deserves it. Now some People are so unreasonable, that they will neither give Men leave to love, nor understand them∣selves; if they are conscious of any commend∣able Quality, they must be sure to lay it out of the way that they may not see it; nay if a Man has taken never so much care to make himself insignificant, in order to the promoting of Humility, they will scarce let him know he is good for nothing, for fear he should grow conceited of his Virtue. But I perceive you are not so strait laced, and pedantick in your Notions. Therefore if you can recover us no more Ground, let us know directly what Pride is, and be as fair as you can.
Why Pride in the plainest words which I can think of, is too high an Opini∣on of our own Excellency.
How shall we know when we o∣ver-rate our selves?
That is a very seasonable question, and absolutely necessary to the state of the Case: Therefore I shall lay down some indis∣putable Marks of this Vice, that whenever we see the Tokens we may conclude the Plague is in the House.
Let us hear your Diagnosticks.
First, Then we may be assured we have this Disease, when we value any Person chiefly because his advantages are of the same nature with those we enjoy, neg∣lecting others who have an equal right to Regard, only because their Privileges are of a different kind from our own. For instance, when Men who derive their considerableness from the Sword, the Gown, or their An∣cestours, think none worthy their Esteem but such as claim under their own Preten∣ces; In this case it's evident it can be nothing but Partiality and Conceitedness which makes them give the Preheminence.
Secondly, We may certainly conclude our selves infected with this Vice, when we in∣vade the Rights of our Neighbour, not upon the account of Covetousness, but of Domini∣on; only that we may have it in our power to create Dependencies, and to give another that which is already his own.
Thirdly, When Men don't measure their civil Advantages by the Laws of their Coun∣try, but by their own fancies, and the sub∣missions of Flatterers; this is another infal∣lible sign they are Proud.
Fourthly, to mention no more, When Men love to make themselves the subject of dis∣course: To conn over their Pedigrees, and obtrude the Blazon of their exploits upon
the company; this is an argument they are overgrown with conceit, and very much smitten with themselves.
Though I think you have hit the symptoms pretty well, yet except they are marked somewhat more distinctly, 'tis possible for a Man to have most of them without be∣ing e'er the wiser. For unless we are able to draw up a just State of the Degrees of merit, we can never take the true height of our Pretensions, and being in this uncertainty it's odds if self Love does not make us deter∣mine to the prejudice of our Neighbours. Now I would gladly know how we must go to work to be sufficiently informed in this Point.
We must endeavour to get right apprehensions of the several Excellencies of humane Nature, and what proportion they hold to each other: In order to the assisting our Judgment in this case I shall lay down these general rules.
First, Those advantages which spring from our selves, which are the effects of our power and courage, of our Industry or Understan∣ding, are more valuable than those which are derived, and borrowed, because they are a sign of a Richer and more active nature.
Secondly, Those Qualities which are most useful ought to have the Preference: for since acknowledgments ought to be suitable
to the nature of benefits received, those who have the largest Capacity of obliging, may fairly challenge the Perheminence in our E∣steem; and therefore in the third place the duration of an advantage ought to be con∣sider'd; And that which has the firmest Con∣stitution and is most likely to continue, ought to be prefer'd to others which are brittle and short lived. These rules carefully apply'd will snew us how far our pretensions to Re∣gard are short of, or exceed other Mens, and so prevent an over-weening opinion of our selves. However, we are to observe that outward Respect ought to be given according to the Distinctions of; Law, and though a Man may happen to be very defective in point of merit, yet we ought to take notice of the value Authority has set upon him.
Give me leave to put in a word, which is to tell you, that though I am not satisfied with your Instances, yet I am glad to find you will allow us different degrees of worth. I was almost afraid you would have set all Mankind upon a Level.
To deliver you from such appre∣hensions, I freely grant you that the Distin∣ctions of Quality ought to be kept up for the Encouragement of Industry, and the sup∣port of Government. I hope now you have the reason of my Concession, you will not be so suspicious for the future.
No, not till you give me a farther occasion; especially since the inference of your discourse is not unacceptable: from whence it followeth, that when a Man sees plainly that he has the Advantage of his Neighbour, he may let him understand so much without any offence to humility.
No doubt of it, especially when his station is publick; but then the discovery of his superiority ought to be managed with a great deal of Art and good nature, to which we are obliged not only in point of Com∣plaisance but Justice. For though there is often a real difference between one Man and an∣other, yet the party who has the advantgae usually magnifies the inequality beyond all Sense, and Proportion. Men don't consi∣der that the great priviledges of humane Nature are common to the whole Kind; such as being equally related to God and Adam, Reason and Immortality, the same number of Senses, and much of the same perfection and continuance. And as for those things which are the peculiar Advantages of a few; they are either acquired and enjoyed by the strength of those general ones I have mentioned, or else they are forein and in a great measure Chimerical, and therefore can be no real enrichments of our nature. They are often no more than the Blessings of Chance, of Flat∣tery, and Imagination. And though they
may set us upon higher Ground, yet they can add nothing to the true Stature of our Being. But to combate this Vice more suc∣cessfully, we'll examine its most plausible Pretences, and see if we can discover the weakness of them.
What pretences are those?
I mean Learning, Nobility, and Power; for these you know are accounted the brightest and most distinguishing Advantages. But though they ought all to be considered, yet I believe there is much more Weight laid up∣on them, than in strict reason they will bear.
You talk as if you were retain∣ed by the Mobile, and had a Mind to bring us back to our original State of Ignorance and Peasantry.
I tell you once again you are much mistaken. I have no design to lessen the value of any mans Honour, or Under∣standing: Let People have as much Sense and Quality as they please, provided they don't grow troublesom and ridiculous a∣bout it.
I somwhat suspect you have a mind to engross this Vice of Pride to your self. This sort of discourse looks like de∣claiming against Arbitrary Power, where the sharpest Invectives are commonly made by the most Enterprizing, and unmortifyed Men, who are only angry that they are not pos∣sessed
of that absoluteness themselves, which they endeavour to render odious in others.
Hah! you are somewhat smart. However let me tell you, if I have any such project as you imagine, you have me upon a fair Dilemma. For, if my reasons against Pride hold good, they will stand upon record against my self, which I suppose will be no unacceptable revenge for you: if they are in∣significant, you will have the diversion of laughing at the folly of the attempt: and which is more considerable, you may keep your good opinion of yourself into the bargain.
Pray begin your attack as you think fit, and for disputes sake I'll try how far I can maintain the ground against you.
First then, Learning (to begin there) and High Conceit agree very well together: for a Man of Letters may have a clearer no∣tion of the stupidness and deformity of this Vice, and being better acquainted with the frame and passions of humane Nature, he can't choose but discover how unacceptable it must make him to all Mankind. Besides he is supposed to know that nothing in strict reason deserves a true Commendation, but a right use of the Liberty of our Will, which is in every ones power to manage to advantage.
Secondly, Learning gives us a fuller con∣viction of the imperfection of our nature, which one would think might dispose us to Mode∣sty.
The more a Man knows the more he discovers his ignorance. He can scarce look upon any part of the Creation, but he finds himself encompassed with doubts and diffi∣culties. There is scarce any thing so trifling or seemingly common, but perplexes his Un∣derstanding, if he has but sense enough to look into all the objections which may be rai∣sed about it. He knows he has a being 'tis true, and so does a Peasant, but what this thing is which he calls himself, is hard to say. He has reason to believe, that he is compounded of two very different Ingredients, Spirit, and Matter; but how such unallyed and disproportioned substances should hold a∣ny Correspondence and act upon each other, no mans Learning yet could ever tell him. Nay how the parts of Matter cohere, is a Question which it's likely will never be well answer'd in this life. For though we make use of the fairest Hypotheses, yet if we pursue the Ar∣gument home, we shall go nigh to dispute away our Bodies, and reason our selves all in pieces. Insomuch that if we had nothing but Principles to encourage us, we might justly be afraid of going abroad, lest we should be blown away like a heap of dust: For it's no solution to say the greater parts of Matter are connected with hooked parti∣cles; for still the difficulty returns how these Hooks were made? Quis custodiet ipsos
Custodes? What is it that fastens this Soder, and links these first Principles of Bodies in∣to a Chain? And as the more refined Un∣derstandings know little or nothing of them∣selves, and of the material World; so upon Enquiry we shall find them as defective in their Skill about Moral Truths: (excepting those who are taught by Revelation, which supernatural Discoveries the unlearned are capable of understanding, as far as their happi∣ness is concerned.) Those who made Laws in their respective Countries, we have reason to believe had their minds polished above the vulgar rate: And yet we see how unaccount∣ably the publick Constitutions of Nations va∣ry. The Persians and Athenians allowed In∣cest, the Lacedemonians Stealing, and some Indians Herodotus mentions, used to bury their best Friends in their Stomachs. In short, the Rules of Decency, of Government, of Justice it self, are so different in one place from what they are in another, so party-co∣loured and contradictious, that one would almost think the Species of men altered, ac∣cording to their Climates; and that they had not the same Nature in common. One would almost think that Right and Wrong lay rather in the Fancies of men, than in the reason of things, and was bounded more by Seas and Rivers, than by any unalterable limits of Nature; that Virtue and Vice were
minted by the Civil Magistrate, and like Coins would pass for Currant only in his own Dominions. The Heathen Philosophers may fairly be granted to have as good pretences to Learning, as any other sort of men among them: And yet we may observe from Tully and Laertius what a small Proportion of solid Knowledge they were Masters of; how strangely did they differ in Matters of the highest Import? How eagerly did they dis∣pute, and not without probability on both sides: Whether there was any thing certain? Whether the Criterions of Truth and Fals∣hood were clear and indubitable or not? Whe∣ther the Government of the World was ca∣sual, fatal, or providential? How many Sum∣mum Bonums have they presented us with, some of them only fit to entertain a Brute, others noble enough for a Spirit of the highest Order? It were tedious to recount the differen∣ces one Sect had with another, their Incon∣sistences with themselves, and the ridiculous and ill supported Tenets some of the most famous of them have held. Insomuch that Tully takes notice that there was no opinion so absurd, but was held by some Philoso∣pher or other. 'Tis true they could wran∣gle and Harangue better than the common People; they could talk more plausibly about that they did not understand; but their Learn∣ing lay chiefly in Flourish, and Terms, and
Cant; for as for any real Improvements in Science they were not much wiser than the less pretending Multitude. Indeed the more modest of them would confess that the chief use of Learning was to give us a fuller discovery of our Ignorance, and to keep us from being peremptory and dogmatical in our determina∣tions. Now one would imagine the more intimate Acquaintance we had with the Im∣perfections of our Nature, the greater reason we should have to be humble. Is Weakness a proper Foundation to erect our lofty con∣ceits upon? Indeed he that has not the lei∣sure or capacity to examine how it's with him, may be fondly persuaded to fancy him∣self somebody, and grow vain upon the kind presumption; but for a man to be proud who can demonstrate his own poverty, is little less than Madness.
If the case stands thus, to make all sure, we had best get an order to burn the Twenty four Letters, and hang up Cad∣müs in Effigie; for—
Pray don't interrupt me, and I will try if I can give you a little Ease. Grant∣ing therefore, as we may, that Learning does give some advantage, and that our Under∣standings are really enriched by it; yet in regard we have but a few Principles to build upon, the greatest part of our Knowledge must consist in Inferences, which can't be
wrought out without great Labour and At∣tention of mind: And when we are at any distance from self-evident Truths, the mind is not only perplexed with the Considerati∣on of a great many Circumstances, but which is worse, Forgetfulness or Mistake in the least of them, frustrates our whole Design, and rewards us with nothing but Error for our trouble.
Now he that is so liable to be imposed upon, who rises but by Inches, and enriches himself, by such slow and insensible Degrees; 'tis a Sign that his Stock was either very small, or that he is unskilfull in the ma∣nagement of his Business, and therefore he has no reason to be proud of what he has got∣ten: Besides it's an humbling consideration to reflect what pains we are obliged to take to muster up our Forces, and to make that little reason we have serviceable. How fast does Obscurity, Flatness and Impertinency flow in upon our Meditations? 'Tis a diffi∣cult Task to talk to the purpose, and to put life and perspicuity into our Discourses; those who are most ready and inventive have not their best Thoughts uppermost: No, they must think upon the Stretch, ransack, and turn over their mind, and put their Imagi∣nation into a kind of Ferment, if they in∣tend to produce any thing extraordinary: So that considering the Trouble and almost
Violence we are put upon, one would think that Sense and Reason was not made for Mankind, and that we strive against our Na∣tures, when we pretend to it.
Well; What though our Minds were poor, and unfurnished at first, is it a∣ny disparagement to us to have more Wit than we were born with? What though we can't strike out a Science at a Heat, but are forced to polish our selves by degrees, and to work hard for what we have? The less we were assisted by Nature, the greater com∣mendation it is to our Industry, and our at∣tainments are so much the more our own. And since we have thus fairly distinguished our selves by Merit, why should we seem unapprehensive of our Performances? since we have paid so dear for the Improvements of our understanding, and our advantages are gained with so much Difficulty, what harm is it to make our best of them? Why should we not oblige the negligent to Distance and Regard, and make those who are younger or less knowing than our selves sensible of their Inferiority?
I agree with you as I have alrea∣dy hinted, that a Man may lawfully main∣tain his Character and just pretences against Rudeness and Ignorance, especially when the publick Good is concerned in his Reputation. But when he acts a private part, and conver∣ses
with People of Sense and Modesty, he should give them but very gentle remem∣brances of his Prerogative: his Opinion of his own worth should but just dawn upon them, and at the most give them but an ob∣scure and remote notice, that he expected a∣ny singular Acknowledgment: He should take the respect that is paid him rather as a Present than a Debt, and seem thankful for that which is his own: But to be stiff and formally reserved as if the Company did not deserve our Familiarity; to be haughty and contemptuous, and to make scanty and underproportioned returns of Civility: this is a downright Challenge of Homage, and plainly tells people, they must be very man∣nerly: 'Tis in effect to say, Gentlemen, I have more Learning, and have done the publick greater Service than you, and therefore I ex∣pect to be considered for it: you may possibly say that I have more preferment too, and am paid for my merit in mony, but that shall not serve your turn; for except you shew your selves very dutiful, I shall give you broad Signs of my dissatisfaction, and never let you have the Honour of my con∣verse again. Now such a Man if he went much abroad, would plague mankind more with his Company, than he could oblige them with his Writings, though they were never so considerable. Such People seem to
owe their parts to their ill Temper: Their Industry is malicious, and they have taken pains not so much to oblige the World, as to get an Opportunity of trampling upon their Inferiours. Had they been good-natu∣red, they would have been as dull and in∣significant as their Neighbours. But their imperious Carriage is just as reasonable as it would have been for the old Athletae to have drudged hard in Eating and Exercise, that they might employ their Bulk and Acti∣vity in beating every one who was weaker, and less skilful than themselves.
By your discourse you seem to mistake the matter, and not to weigh things rightly. 'Tis not Superiority that these Gentlemen of Learning are so solicitous a∣bout; 'tis not personal Advantage which they chiefly intend by their Reservedness: They have no doubt a more publick and generous Design; for you may observe they usually bear hardest upon those of their own Order and Profession, which is nothing but a for∣ced and politick stateliness for the promoting of Knowledg in others. The young Fry, whether you know it or not, must be held at a Distance, and kept under the Discipline of Contempt. If you give them any tolera∣ble Quarter, you indulge them in their Idle∣ness, and ruin them to all intents and pur∣poses. For who would be at the trouble of
Learning, when he finds his Ignorance is caressed, and that he is easie and acceptable enough in the Company of the best Authors of the Town? But when you brow-beat them and maul them, you make them Men for ever; for Vexatio dat intellectum; though they have no natural Metal, yet if they are spurred and kicked they will mend their pace, if they have any feeling. Such rigorous usage will make them study night and day to get out of this ignominious Condition, in hopes that it may come to their own turn to be proud one day. Take my word for it, there is no such way to make a Scholar, as to keep him under while he is young, or un∣preferred.
Notwithstanding your Flourish I can't perswade my self that this Dispensation of Pride is so mighty useful as you pretend. I should think such an untoward manage∣ment of any Accomplishment should rather discourage others from attempting such dan∣gerous circumstances. If Sense and Learning are such unsociable imperious things, a good-natured Man ought to take especial care not to improve too fast. He ought to keep down the growth of his Reason, and curb his In∣tellectuals when he finds them ready to out∣strip his Neighbours. I assure you, if I was of your opinion, and thought my self near the temptation to so much ill humour, I would never look on a Book again.
Come when you have said all, there is no keeping up the Credit of Learning without that which you call a reserved be∣haviour. For if those who are eminent this way should condescend to those Familiarities which you seem to desire, the honour of their Profession would suffer much by it; if they should converse upon the Level, the veneration which their Inferiours have for them would quickly wear off: And if the vulgar observed there was no distinction kept up amongst the Men of Letters; they would suspect there was nothing extraordinary in any of them. Pray who are supposed to be the best Judges of Learning, those who have it or others?
No doubt those who have it.
Then if they seem to undervalue it themselves, is not this the way to bring it into a general disrepute? I tell you once a∣gain, if the privileges of Merit are not insi∣sted upon all, must go to wrack. If a Man who has digested all the Fathers, and is ready to add himself to the Number, shews any tolerable countenance to one who has scarce rubbed through Ignatius, and lets a pure English Divine to go cheek by jole with him, the Commonwealth of Learning will grow al∣most as contemptible as that of the Pigmies, and be only fit to write Romances upon.
I shall not enquire how far this lofty method may advance the Reputation of Learning, but I am pretty sure it's no great addition to theirs who use it; for it only makes others more inquisitive into their defects, and more inclinable to expose them. If they take them tardy they endeavour to humble them by way of Reprizal. Those slips and mismanagements are usually ridiculed and aggravated, when such Persons are guilty of them, which would be overlooked or excused in others of a more modest and affable Con∣versation. If they happen to be found in∣consistent with themselves: If their vanity of appearing singular puts them upon ad∣vancing Paradoxes, and proving them as Para∣doxically. If a presumption upon their own strength, and a desire of greater triumph makes them venture too far into the enemies Quarters, and take up a Post which they can't maintain; they are usually laught at for their folly and left to shift for themselves; for Pride never has any friends, and all Men are glad of a just occasion to lessen his Re∣putation who makes such an ill-natured use of it.
I conceive you harp a little too much upon one string: do you think the in∣feriour Clergy for whom you are now plead∣ing, are discouraged by none but those of their own Profession?
No, I grant there is another sort of People who use them with neglect enough: But then they are somewhat more to be ex∣cused. They have not such fair opportunities to understand the just pretences of a liberal Education, and a Religious employment. They are apt to fall under unfortunate hands in their minority: The vanity of their Pa∣rents, and the Knavery of Flatterers often gives them a wrong notion of themselves, and makes them admire nothing but Wealt hand Greatness, and think no condition deserves regard but that which resembles their own. Be∣sides their neglect looks less unaccountably by reason of their Quality, and their Breed∣ing makes their Pride sit more decently up∣on them. They usually contemn with a better Grace than others: for there is a great deal of Art and Mystery in Pride to manage it handsomely: A man might almost as soon learn a Trade: and if we observe we shall find that those who were not brought up to it, seldom prove their Crafts-master or practise with any sort of address. To which I may add, that such Persons are usually willing to pay for their imperiousness, so that a Man is not made a Fool for nothing. But when this lofty humour is clumsily and inartifici∣ally managed, when it's affected by those of a self-denying and mortified Profession, and who get their Living by declaiming against
it. When it's taken up by Men of Sense, who may well be expected to see through the folly of this Vice, and who generally have not those pretences of a byassed Edu∣cation to misguide them: especially when they play it upon Persons of their own Order who were born and bred to as fair Expecta∣tions of Regard as themselves, and are some∣times their Inferiours in nothing so much as in Success; this is such a singular Practice that I had rather leave it undescribed than be forced to give it its proper Character.
I believe you will be willing to abate, if not to retract your censure when you consider that these Gentlemen of the Gown, whom you think too much depressed, are many of them Curates; and is it not ve∣ry reasonable there should be a distance ob∣served between Masters and Servants? If you confound these two Relations by lavish and indiscreet Familiarities, you destroy the re∣spect, and by degrees the very notion of Su∣periority. If there is not a due Homage paid in Conversation, those who are in a state of subjection will neither know their Condition nor their Duty: They will be apt to forget they hold by a servile Tenure, and think themselves enfranchised from all manner of Suit and Service. Besides, if the Parson should use his Curate with that freedom which you insinuate, as if there was neither dependence
nor obligation between them; this might be of very ill example to the Parish, and make all other servants challenge the same liberty, and grow pert upon their Masters: And when this Sawciness became universal, as it's likely it might do in a short time, what less Mischief could be expected from it, than an old Scythian Rebellion?
I confess, I was not aware the be∣ing of Government depended so much upon the distinction between Rector and Curate, and that if the modern way of Distance and Subordination was not kept up, we must presently return to Hob's state of Nature. If a Curate be such a dangerous thing, that a little civil Usage to him is ready to make the World fall about our Ears, I wonder why so many of them are suffered. Now without raising the posse Comitatus, if the Pluralists would but do their best to sup∣press them, their Number might quickly be so retrenched, that they would not be in the least formidable. But you seem to ar∣gue all this while upon a wrong Principle, you take it for granted, that Curates are Servants; now if this proves a mistake, you will own they may be treated with a little more freedom, without any danger to Au∣thority.
Who doubts of their being Ser∣vants?
I do, and for very good reasons.
See how a Man may be mistaken! I thought the English of Curate had been an Ecclesiastical Hireling.
No such matter, the proper import of the Word signifies one who has the Cure of Souls; therefore in France all Parochial Priests are called Curates, as they are like∣wise in our Rubrick and Common-Prayer.
I find then there lies no Servitude in the Name, so that it must be either the De∣putation, or Salary which they receive from the Instituted Priest, which sinks them into this condition.
That there is no Servitude in either of these, I am ready to make good. 1. Not in the Office; and here I must crave leave to ask you a few Questions.
Take your own method.
What in your apprehension is a Cu∣rate's Employment?
To serve God in the publick Offi∣ces of Religion, and to take care of the Parish.
Then he is not entertained to serve the Rector.
Go on.
In the next place I desire to know whether Authority is not essential to a Ma∣ster?
Who questions it?
Has the Curate his Authority to Preach, and Administer the Sacraments from the Rector?
No, from the Bishop.
May not a Master turn away his Servants when he pleases?
I think so.
But the Rector has no power to re∣move the Curate after he is Licensed and Fixed by the Bishop. To sum up the Evi∣dence therefore; if the Curate was not en∣tertained to wait upon the Rector, nor has his Authority from him, nor can be removed from his Employment, I think it is pretty plain he is none of his Servant.
Well, but does not the Parson make choice of him, and pay him?
Don't a Corporation choose a Mayor?
What then?
Pray whose Servant is he after his Election?
None but the Kings that I know of: but you have not answered the latter part of my objection about his being paid by the Rector.
If you had not called for my an∣swer, I had waved it for your sake, because I think your objection borders somewhat upon Treason.
How so?
Why, is it not of kin to Treason to say the Subjects are Masters over the Supreme Authority?
If Nonsense will not excuse a Man, I think it is.
But your Argument proves the King a Servant to the People.
How?
Because they pay him Taxes, and that among other reasons, by way of ac∣knowledgment of the benefits of his Govern∣ment, and that they may shew themselves willing, if it was in their power, to requite him for his care of the State.
Pray why so much concerned to prove Curates no Servants?
Because I am willing to rescue them from that contempt, which they will certainly fall into, as long as they pass under this no∣tion: which considering the number of persons Officiating, this way, must be very prejudicial to Religion. Besides it makes some persons, who are fit to do the Church service, suspend themselves, and shew their Priesthood only by their Habit, rather than serve God under such uncreditable circumstances: and for the same reason others are tempted to grow too fond of a Presentation, and choose rather to court it by Flattery, or other indirect pra∣ctices, than be condemned to the servile con∣dition of a Curate. For let me tell you, it is
no ordinary piece of Self-Denial, for a Man of a generous Education, who has been train∣ed up all along to Freedom and good Usage, to be degraded in his Manhood, when the mind is most in love with Liberty, and to en∣ter upon Business with marks of disadvantage, when he stands most in need of Reputation. To my thinking this is a very discouraging and preposterous way of Educating the Cler∣gy. If a Man must go to service, he had better begin with it as they do in Trades, and not be Master at first, and then be forced to turn Apprentice, or Journyman afterwards. Of such ill consequence it is to miscal things, and as Plato observes, that an alteration of the Notes in Musick is apt to produce an Innova∣tion in the Laws and Customs of a Country: so by changing the names of Offices for others of less Repute, we change the Uses and Designs of them, and make them less satis∣factory to those engaged, and less serviceable to the Publick than they would have been, if the Character of their Institution had been kept up.
Granting at present what you say to be true, yet a Curate seems to lie under another disadvantage, which makes him con∣sidered with Abatement.
What is that?
Why, People are apt to fancy that it is the want either of Parts or Conduct, which keeps him without a Patron.
If People think so, I am sorry their Sense and Charity is no greater; for if they examined things fairly, they would find that the being a Curate is no Argument of a Mans insignificancy, nor any just blemish to his Re∣putation. For it is often the integrity and ge∣nerous temper of his mind which hinders him from a better Provision; it is because he will not flatter the Pride of some, nor keep pace with the Bigottry of others: because he will neither court Greatness nor Faction, nor make himself popular to the disadvantage of his Audience. Because he cannot digest a Simo∣niacal Contract, nor charge through Perjury with the courage of an Evidence. In short, it is his plain and impartial dealing with the People, his resolution to preserve the Decency of his Character, and the Innocence of his Conscience which bars his promotion: so that if he was mean enough to complain, he might have the satisfaction to apply this Sen∣tence of Tully to himself, Non nos vitia sed virtutes afflixerunt.
What a broad Innuendo is here up∣on the beneficed Clergy?
I am glad you have given me an opportunity of explaining my self. My mean∣ing is not that those who are possessed of Liv∣ings have gained them, by such indirect Courses: God forbid! I only say, that all Men are not so lucky as to have the offer of fair
Conditions, and those who have not, must be Curates if they will be honest; or else lay by the use of their Priesthood, which I am afraid is not very accountable.
I confess you have brought your self off well enough: But now I think on't you must try to maintain the liberty of your Curate a little more convincingly. For some say there lies Prescription and immemorial Custom against it, and then you know he is a Servant by Common Law.
Not at all: For as we are lately told by a great Lawyer, Prescription is good for nothing where there are any Records to the contrary.
What Records can you produce?
Why, to mention no more, the 18th of the Apostles Canons, and the 80th of the Council of Eliberis, are, I think, considera∣ble Evidence; the first of which forbids the ordaining of those who had married a Servant, and the other excludes manumized Persons, while their Patrons were living, from the Priesthood.
Say you so? Then I fancy those who drew up Queen Elizabeths Injunctions knew nothing of this piece of Antiquity you mention.
Your Reason?
Because by those Injunctions a Cler∣gy-man could not lawfully marry till he had
gone and made his complaint against Celiba∣cy, before two Justices of the Peace, and gained their consent, and the good will of the Ma∣ster, or Mistriss where the Damsel served.
And then I suppose if he could not prevail by his Rhetorick they gave him a Warrant to distrein.
Or possibly if he courted in forma pauperis they assigned him a Wife gratis out of an Hospital.
Upon my word this Order, take it which way you will, has a singular aspect, and looks as if it intended to put the Clergy in mind, that they ought not to aspire above an Abigail. Certainly Discretion and Merit ran very low in the Church at that time, or else, some People were willing to make the Nation believe so. But to return to the Ca∣nons, the design of which was to secure the Reputation of the Clergy; but according to the modern opinion, this provision signifies nothing; for if a man must go to Service af∣ter he is in Orders, had he not as good do it before? In your sence he often only changes his Lay for an Ecclesiastical Master, which sometimes might be so far from an advantage that it would make the Servitude the more uneasie, by being subjected to one no more than equal to himself.
I grant you in the Primitive Times the advantage of Priesthood was equally sha∣red
among all the Order, and none of that Character had any Superiority over another. For then the Revenues of the Church consist∣ed only in the voluntary Offerings of the Peo∣ple, which were all deposited with the Bishop, who assigned every one his respective portion; so that no Priest had any dependence upon another for his maintenance; but now the case is otherwise, and a man ought to be sub∣ject to him that supports him.
It's somewhat hard, that the bare alteration of the Church Revenues should make so wide a difference between those who were equal before; that a man must lose his freedom only for want of a Presen∣tation, and he made a Servant because he does not take Tithes, though he has as much spi∣ritual Authority as if he did. But I perceive you think there is no consideration equivalent to a little money, and that he who receives it must be no longer at his own disposal, though he makes never so valuable a return. Since therefore you insist so much upon main∣tenance, what if it appears that the Curate maintains the Parson?
That would be strange indeed.
To what end were the Church Re∣venues intended?
To keep up the worship of God.
Which way?
By settling a competent maintenance upon the Ministers of Religion, that they may be in the better capacity to discharge their Office, and not be obliged to lose their time, and lessen their Character, by engaging in Labourious or Mechanical Employments.
By your arguing there should be something for them to do.
Yes, they are to take care of that Precinct to which their Endowment is an∣nex'd.
I hope you don't mean not to come at it.
I mean they are to take care of the performance of the duties of their Office.
Then ought not he to have the Revenues who performs these Duties?
I am not willing to grant that.
Have a care of denying the con∣clusion; you grant the Revenues of the Church were designed for the support of the Clergy.
Yes.
Of what Clergy? Those who live many miles distant from the Premises?
No, I'm afraid they were intend∣ed for those who live upon the place, other∣wise methinks Endowments are a very slen∣der Provision for the benefit of the Parish.
Then if the Curate does all the work, ought he not to have the reward for
his pains? In short, either he is qualified to undertake the Parish or not; if not, with what sincerity can he be employed? If he is qualified, why is he barred the profit when he only performs the Conditions upon which they were settled, when none but himself answers the design they were intended for? To speak properly, the Rector seems to live out of the labours of another, he is main∣tained by the perquisites of the Curates Of∣fice; and therefore is in effect but a kind of Pensioner to him.
I see you are an everlasting Level∣ler, you won't allow any encouragement to extraordinary Industry and Merit.
You mistake me. I would have the best men have the best Livings, but then be∣fore we go to doubling of Preferments, possi∣bly it were not amiss to examine whether the number of Benefices exceeds the Persons who are capable of them. Let us first examine whether they will hold out one apiece, and when every man has one, then the supernu∣merary Livings may be divided amongst those who are most deserving.
In good time, when it's likely there there will be none left! Now do you imagine the Church can be defended against her Ad∣versaries by the strength of a single Parso∣nage? But it may be you will say all our Plurality-men are not Writers.
No, nor Readers neither. Besides, we may observe that Heresie and Schism were very successfully combated before Unions, Dispensations, and Consolidations were heard of. If you consult Father Paul's History of the Council of Trent, (p. 216.) he will inform you that Non-residence and Pluralities are things of no very primitive establishment. I confess some of the Lay-managers of our Re∣formation have not been over-kind to the Church, so that Affairs are not in so good a posture as they might have been: But God be thanked there is still some provision left for the Ornament and Defence of Religion.
What Provision do you mean?
Why, to speak to your Case, there are Dignities, to which those Gentlemen who are prepared to engage in the Controversie have a good right: And with submission to better Judgments, I think it would not be amiss if all dignified Persons held their Pre∣ferments by a new Tenure.
What Tenure?
By Knights Service; pursuant to which they should be obliged to draw their Pens in the Cause, when ever their Superi∣ours required them: to appear in the Field upon an Invasion with their Quota, and in short, to maintain any Post that shall be as∣signed.
What if a man has not a mind to quarrel, must he be turn'd out of his Digni∣ty for being of a peaceable Disposition?
Those peaceable men you speak of, are none of the most useful in a time of War, and therefore a smaller Gratification should content them.
What if they are disabled by age?
Then they should be continued for their past Services.
Truly this is a good probable Ex∣pedient to keep the Church Militia in Disci∣pline, and might for ought I know, very much improve the noble Science of Controversie. But to return to the old Argument, if you in∣tend to bring me over to your opinion of the Curate, you must clear the business of his Sa∣lary a little better, for I am afraid where he has his money he ought to own he has his Master too.
I confess there would be a great deal in what you say, if the Rector had the right of Coinage. If the Money had his Image, and Superscription upon it, the Curate's taking it for currant, would con∣clude him under his Jurisdiction: but that the bare receiving a sum should sink a Man into a servile state, is past my comprehension. For considering that Mony is a thing of such quality, and sovereign sway in the World, one would imagine it should bring Power
and Reputation along with it, and rather enlarge than abridge a Man's Liberty by re∣ceiving it. And to mention nothing farther, the nature of the Contract between the Re∣ctor and Curate, is sufficient to give you satis∣faction; for there, as has been observed, the Curate undertakes no other Employment but the Instruction and Government of the Parish. There is no attendance upon the Parson, no running upon his Errands, nor subjection to his Humour indented for.
Methinks it is a little hard a Curate must not be called a Servant, as well as a Cook, or a Footman, since he has Wages as much as the other.
Possibly not always so much nei∣ther; but waving that, if you had remembred what I urged to you before, this Objection would have been no difficulty.
What was that?
Why, that the Curate is to wait upon none but God Almighty, that the manage of his Employment is not prescribed by the Rector, but by the Rubrick and Con∣stitutions of the Church, and that he is not removeable at pleasure. I suppose by this time you apprehend there is a difference between him and a Footman, or a Steward either.
Well! Notwithstanding your sub∣tlety, this notion of Wages sticks in my Sto∣mach still.
I wonder the glitter of a little Mony should dazle your Eyes at that rate, that you cannot see so plain a distinction. You don't seem to understand Commerce, if you think that something of Authority and Do∣minion is always given in exchange for Mony. Now I am of Diogenes his mind, and believe it possible for one to buy a Master, as well as a Servant.
As how?
Why, for the purpose, if a person of twenty one puts himself Apprentice to ano∣ther, you know this is seldom done without charge: now what does a Man do in this case but purchase his subjection, and hire himself a drubbing upon occasion? To give one in∣stance more. When a Woman of Fortune mar∣ries a Man with nothing, does she not give him Meat, Drink, and Wages to govern her? And to end this dispute, you know Physicians, and Lawyers, and Judges, have Fees or Wages, either given, or assigned them by Law, without being thought Servants to those they are concerned with. Now, what reason is there a Curate should have worse luck with his Mony than other People?
To deal plainly, I suppose it is be∣cause he does not get enough of it. If his Fees were as considerable as any of those Gentlemen you speak of, I question not but his Office would be much more reputable.
Well guessed, and therefore what Character do they deserve who confine him to this scandalous Pittance. I believe you can scarcely name any sort of Injustice which has a more malignant influence upon Religi∣on than this oppresion of Curates.
Why so Tragical?
Because their Poverty exposes them to Contempt, which renders their Instructi∣ons insignificant, and which is worse, makes them less considerable in themselves, as well as in the opinion of others.
I hope Poverty is no crime.
No, but it's a scurvy temptation, especially to those who have lived freely, and been bred to better Expectations. For when a man finds his hopes disappointed, himself unsupported, and topp'd upon by Persons of meaner Pretences and Employments; this is apt to pall his Spirits, and check the cou∣rage of his thoughts, so that his Compositi∣ons and Fortune will seem to be much of a piece.
I thought strait circumstances had been none of the worst promoters of Learn∣ing, according to the old saying, Ingenii lar∣gitor Venter.
I grant there is some truth in your observation, and that it is Want which often reconciles men to Labour and Letters; but this is at their first setting out, when though
they have not gained their point, yet they are full of hopes, which pricks them on, and puts them upon their utmost. but after they are once qualified for success, and find their industry discouraged, this makes them sink in the socket, and fret away their strength and Spirits; so that either out of impotence, or disgust, or dispair, they give over the fruitless pursuit, and seldom make any generous attempt ever after. 'Tis true, there are some hardy souls that won't be beaten off by ill usage, but these are very rarely to be met with.
Then you think there would be a strange improvement in the unbeneficed Clergy, if they had a better Salary.
Yes; I think they would have more Books, and more Learning, and more Credit. They would not be so easily obli∣ged to improper Compliances, nor so liable to several other miscarriages in their Conduct.
By your discourse the slender pro∣vision which is made for them, should be very Criminal.
Doubtless so it is. For pray con∣sider.
Pray be as brief as you can.
I say then, for a Clergy-man to en∣rich himself by the labour and necessities of one of his own Order, and make his Figure out of the Church without performing the Ser∣vices
required, is a direct translating the holy Revenues to a Foreign and secular use, and consequently besides other aggravations is no better than sacrilege, which is a very un∣canonical Sin, and unless we are very much in the dark will be accounted for afterwards. In short this Practice has been the main ground of the Contempt of the Clergy, making one part of them grow cheap by their Poverty, and the other by their Covetousness.
Pray what allowance would you oblige the Rector to, if you had the Regula∣tion of that Affair?
To speak within Compass, in my Opinion the Curate ought to have half the profits, let the value of them be never so considerable; for if the Parson has the other moiety for doing nothing, I think he has no reason to complain. But if the Living be small, then he that supplies it should have two thirds assigned him, because he cannot be decently supported under that proportion.
Well, I am not disposed to examin that matter any farther. But I beseech you what is all this to the business of Pride? I think your Zeal for the Curates has tran∣sported you a little out of your Subject.
No such matter; for it is generally nothing but Ambition which makes Men Covetous and Mean: besides, if it is a Di∣gression it is a very seasonable one. However
I am willing to take my leave of this part of the Argument, therefore if you please we will call a new Cause.
I think it is best to adjourn at pre∣sent, and when we meet again I will venture the other Brush with you.
Till then Farewel.