A defence of the people of England by John Milton ; in answer to Salmasius's Defence of the king.

CHAP. VIII. (Book 8)

IF you had published your own opinion, Salmasius, concerning the Right of Kings in general, without affronting any persons in particular, yet, notwithstan∣ding this alteration of affairs in England, as long as you did but use your own liberty in writing what your self thought fit, no English man could have had any cause to have been displeased with you, nor would you have made good the opinion you maintain, ever a whit the less. For if it be a positive command both of Moses and of Christ himself, That all men whatsoe∣ver, whether Spaniards, French, Italians, Germans, English or Scotch, should be subject to their Princes, be they good or bad, which you asserted (Page 127.) to what purpose was it for you, who are a foreigner and unknown to us, to be tampering with our Laws, and to read us Lectures out of them as out of your own Papers and Miscellanies, which, be they how they will, you have taught us already in a great many words, that they ought to give way to the Laws of God. But now it is apparent that you have underta∣ken the defence of this Royal Cause, not so much out of your own inclination, as partly because you were hired, and that at a good round price too, con∣sidering how things are with him, that set you on work; and partly, 'tis like, out of expectation of some greater reward hereafter, to publish a scandalous Li∣bel against the English, who are injurious to none of their Neighbours, and meddle with their own mat∣ters only. If there were no such thing as that in the case, is it credible that any man should be so impu∣dent or so mad, as though he be a stranger, and at a

great distance from us, yet of his own accord to in∣termeddle with our affairs, and side with a party? What, the Devil, is it to you what the English do a∣mongst themselves? What would you have, Pragma∣tical Puppy? what would ye be at? Have you no con∣cerns of your own at home? I wish you had the same concerns that that famous Olus, your fellow busie-bo∣sie body, in the Epigram had; and perhaps so you have; you deserve them I'm sure. Or did that Hot∣spur your Wife, who encouraged you to write what you have done, for out-law'd Charles his sake, pro∣mise you some profitable Professors place in England, and God knows what Gratifications at Charles his Re∣turn? But assure your selves, my Mistress and my Master, that England admits neither of Wolfes, nor Owners of Wolfes. So that it's no wonder you spit so much ve∣nom * 1.1 at our English Mastiffs. It were better for you to return to those Illustrious Titles of yours in France, first to that hunger∣starved Lordship of yours at St. Lou; and in the next place to the Sacred Consistory of the most Christian King. Being a Coun∣sellor to the Prince, you are at too great a distance from your own Country. But I see full well that she neither de∣sires you, nor your Counsel; nor did it appear she did, when you were there a few years ago, and began to lick a Cardinal's Trencher; she's in the right, by my troth, and can very willingly suffer such a little fellow as you, that are but one half of a man, to run up and down with your Mistress of a Wife, and Desks full of Trifles and Fooleries, till you light some

where or other upon a Stipend, large enough for a Knight of the Grammar, or an Illustrious Critick on Horseback; if any Prince or State has a mind to hire a Vagabond Doctor that is to be sold at a good round Price. But here's one that will bid for you; whether you're a Merchantable Commodity or not, and what you are worth we shall see by and by. You say, The Parricides assert, that the Government of England is not meerly Kingly, but that it is a mixt Government. Sir Thomas Smith, a Country-man of ours in Edward the Sixth's days, a good Lawyer, and a Statesman, one whom you your self will not call a Parricide, in the beginning of a Book which he wrote of the Common∣wealth of England, asserts the same thing, and not of our Government only, but of almost all others in the world, and that out of Aristotle; and he says it is not possible that any Government should otherwise subsist. But as if you thought it a crime to say any thing, and not unsay it again, you repeat your former thread-bare Contradictions: You say, There neither is nor ever was any Nation that did not understand by the very name of a King, a person whose authority is inferior to God alone, and who is accountable to no other. And yet a little after you confess, that the name of a King was formerly given to such Powers and Magistrates, as had not a full and absolute right of themselves, but had a dependance upon the people, as the Suffetes among the Carthaginians, the Hebrew Judges, the Kings of the Lacedemonians, and of Arragon. Are you not very consistent with your self? Then you reckon up five several sorts of Monarchies out of Aristotle; in one of which only that Right obtain'd, which you say is common to all Kings. Concerning which I have said already more than once, that nei∣ther doth Aristotle give an instance of any such Mo∣narchy, nor was there ever any such in being; the

other four he clearly demonstrates that they were bounded by Establisht Laws, and the King's Power subject to those Laws. The first of which four was that of the Lacedemonians, which in his opinion did of all others best deserve the name of a Kingdom. The second was such as obtain'd among Barbarians, which was lasting, because regulated by Laws, and because the people willingly submitted to it; whereas by the same Author's opinion in his third Book, what King so ever retains the Soveraignty against the people's will, is no longer to be accounted a King, but a down∣right Tyrant; all which is true likewise of his third sort of Kings, which he calls Aesymnete, who were chosen by the people, and most commonly for a cer∣tain time only, and for some particular purposes, such as the Roman Dictators were. The fourth sort he makes of such as reigned in the Heroical days, upon whom for their extraordinary merits the people of their own ac∣cord conferr'd the Government, but yet bounded by Laws; nor could these retain the Soveraignty against the will of the people; nor do these four sorts of King∣ly Governments differ, he says, from Tyranny in any thing else, but only in that these Governments are with the good liking of the people; and That against their will. The fifth sort of Kingly Government, which he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or absolute Monarchy, in which the Supreme Power resides in the King's person, which you pretend to be the right of all Kings, is utterly condemn'd by the Philosopher, as neither for the good of Mankind, nor consonant to Justice or Nature, un∣less some people should be content to live under such a Government, and withal confer it upon such as ex∣cel all others in vertue. These things any man may read in the third Book of his Politicks. But you, I believe, that once in your life you might appear witty

and florid, pleased your self with making a compari∣son betwixt these five sorts of Kingly Government, and the five Zones of the World; betwixt the two extremes of Kingly power, there are three more temperate Species interpo∣sed, as there lie three Zones betwixt the Torrid and the Frigid. Pretty Rogue! what ingenious comparisons he al∣ways makes us! May you be for ever banished, whi∣ther you your self condemn an absolute Kingdom to be, to wit, to the frigid Zone, which when you are there, will be doubly cold to what it was before. In the mean while we shall expect that new fashioned sphere which you describe, from you our modern Archime∣des, in which there shall be two extreme Zones, one Torrid, and the other Frigid, and three temperate ones lying betwixt. The Kings of the La∣cedaemonians, you say, might lawfully be Imprisoned, but it was not lawful to put them to Death. Why not? Because the Ministers of Justice, and some Foreign Soldiers, being surprised at the Novelty of the thing, thought it not lawful to lead Agis to his Execution, though condem'd to die? And the people of Lacede∣mon were displeased at his death, not because con∣demn'd to die, though a King, but because he was a good man and popular, and had been circumven∣ted by a faction of the great ones. Says Plutarch,

Agis was the first King that was put to death by the Ephori;

in which words he does not pretend to tell us what lawfully might be done, but what actually was done. For to imagin that such as may lawfully accuse a King, and imprison him, may not also lawfully put him to death, is a childish conceit. At last you betake your self to give an account of the Right of English Kings. There never was, you say, but one King in England. This you say, because you had said before, that unless a King be sole in the Government, we cannot be a King. Which if it be true, some of

them, who I had thought had been Kings of England, were not really so; for to omit many of our Saxon Kings, who had 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their Sons, or their Brothers Partners with them in the Government, it is known that King Henry the Second of the Norman Race, reign'd together with his Son. Let them show, say you, a President of any Kingdom under the Government of a single person, who has not an absolute power; though in some Kingdoms more re∣miss, in others more intense. Do you show any Power that's absolute, and yet remiss, you Ass; is not that power that's absolute, the Supreme Power of all? How can it then be both supreme and remiss? What∣soever Kings you shall acknowledg to be invested with a remiss (or a less) power, those I will easily make ap∣pear to have no absolute power; and consequently to be inferior to a People, free by nature, who is both its own Law given, and can make the Regal Power more or less intense or remiss; that is, greater or less. Whether the whole Island of Britain was anci∣ently Governed by Kings, or no, is uncertain. It's most likely that the form of their Government changed according to the Exigencies of the times. Whence Tacitus says, The Britains anciently were under Kings; now the great man amongst them divide them into Parties and Factions. When the Romans left them, they were about forty years without Kings; they were not always therefore under a Kingly Govern∣ment, as you say they were; but when they were so, that the Kingdom was Hereditary, I positively deny; which that it was not, is evident both from the Series of their Kings, and their way of Creating them; for the consent of the people is asked in express words. When the King has taken 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Oath, the Archbishop stepping to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 side of the Stage erected for that purpose, asks

the people four several times, in these words, Do you consent to have this man to be your King? Just as if he spoke to them in the Roman Stile, Vultis, Jubetis hunc Regnare?

Is it your pleasure, do you appoint this man to Reign?

Which would be needless, if the Kingdom were by the Law hereditary: But with Kings, Usurpation passes very frequently for Law and Right. You go about to ground Charles's Right to the Crown, who was so often conquered himself, upon the Right of Conquest. William, surnamed the Conqueror, ••orsooth, subdued us. But they who are not strangers to our History, know full well, that the Strength of the English Nation was not so broken in that one Fight at Hastings, but that they might easily have renewed the War. But they chose rather to accept of a King, than to be under a Conqueror and a Tyrant: They swear therefore to William, to be his Liege-men, and he swears to them at the Altar, to carry to them as a good King ought to do in all re∣spects. When he broke his word, and the English be∣took themselves again to their Arms, being diffident of his strength, he renewed his Oath upon the Holy Evangelists, to observe the Ancient Laws of England. And therefore, if after that he miserably oppressed the English, (as you say he did) he did it not by Right of Conquest, but by Right of Perjury. Besides, it is cer∣tain, that many ages ago, the Conquerors and Con∣quered coalesced into one and the same people: So that that Right of Conquest, if any such ever were, must needs have been antiquated long ago. His own words at his death, which I give you out of a French Manuscript written at Cane, put all out of doubt: I appoint no man (says he) to inherit the Kingdom of England. By which words, both his pretended Right of Conquest, and the Hereditary Right, were

disclaim'd at his death, and buried together with him. I see now that you have gotten a place at Court, as I foretold you would; you are made the King's Chief Treasurer and Steward of his Court-Craft: And what follows, you seem to write ex Officio, as by vir∣tue of your Office, Magnificent Sir. If any preceding Kings, being thereunto compelled by Factions of Great Men, or Seditions amongst the Common People, have receded in some measure from their Right, that cannot prejudice the Successor; but that he is at liberty to resume it. You say well; if therefore at any time our Ancestors have through neglect lost any thing that was their Right, why should that prejudice us their Posterity? If they would promise for themselves to become Slaves, they could make no such promise for us; who shall al∣ways retain the same Right of delivering our selves out of Slavery, that they had of enslaving themselves to any whomsoever. You wonder how it comes to pass that a King of Great Britain must now-adays be looked upon as one of the Magistrates of the King∣dom only; whereas in all other Kingly Governments in Christendom, Kings are invested with a Free and Absolute Authority. For the Scots, I remit you to Buchanan: For France, your own Native Countrey, to which you seem to be a stranger, to Hottoman's Franco Gallia, and Girardus a French Historian; for the rest, to other Authors, of whom none that I know of, were Independents: Out of whom you might have learned a quite other lesson concerning the Right of Kings, than what you teach. Not being able to prove that a Tyrannical Power belongs to the Kings of England by Right of Conquest, you try now to do it by Right of Perjury. Kings profess themselves to Reign By the Grace of God: What if they had professed themselves to be gods? I believe

if they had, you might easily have been brought to become one of their Priests. So the Archbishops of Canterbury pretended to Archbishop it by Divine Pro∣vidence. Are you such a fool, as to deny the Pope's being a King in the Church, that you may make the King greater than a Pope in the State? But in the Statutes of the Realm the King is called our Lord. You are become of a sudden a wonderful Nomenclator of our Statutes: But you know not that many are called Lords and Masters, who are not really so: You know not how unreasonable a thing it is to judge of Truth and Right by Titles of Honour, not to say of Flattery. Make the same Inference, if you will, from the Parliament's being called the King's Parlia∣ment; for it is called the King's Bridle too; or a Bri∣dle to the King; and therefore the King is no more Lord or Master of his Parliament, than a Horse is of his Bridle. But why not the King's Parliament, since the King summons them? I'le tell you why; be∣cause the Consuls used to indict a Meeting of the Se∣nate, yet were they not Lords over that Council. When the King therefore summons or calls together a Parliament, he does it by vertue and in discharge of that Office, which he has received from the peo∣ple, that he may advise with them about the weighty affairs of the Kingdom, not his own particular Af∣fairs: Or when at any time the Parliament debated of the King's own Affairs, if any could properly be called his own, they were always the last things they did; and it was in their choice when to debate of them, and whether at all or no, and depended not upon the King's Pleasure: And they whom it con∣cerns to know this, know very well, That Parlia∣ments anciently, whether summoned or not, might by Law meet twice a Year: But the Laws are called

too, The King's Laws. These are flattering ascriptions; a King of England can of himself make no Law: For he was not constituted to make Laws, but to see those Laws kept, which the People made. And you your self here confess, That Parliaments Meet to make Laws: Wherefore the Law is also called the Law of the Land, and the Peoples Law. Whence King Ethelstane in the Preface to his Laws, speaking to all the People, I have granted you every thing, says he, by your own Law. And in the form of the Oath, which the Kings of Eng∣land used to take before they were made Kings, The People stipulate with them thus; Will you grant those Just Laws, which the People shall chuse? The King An∣swers, I will. And you are infinitely mistaken in saying, That When there is no Parliament sitting, the King Governs the whole state of the Kingdom, to all intents and purposes, by a Regal Power. For he can determine nothing of any moment, with respect to either Peace or War; nor can he put any stop to the Proceedings of the Courts of Justice. And the Judges there∣fore Swear, That they will do nothing Judicially, but according to Law, tho the King by Word, or M•…•…te, or Letters under his own Seal, should command the contrary. Hence it is that the King is often said in our Law to be an Infant; and to possess his Rights and Dignities, as a Child or a Ward does his: See the Mirror, cap. 4. Sect. 22. And hence is that common saying amongst us, That the King can do no wrong: Which you, like a Raseal, interpret thus, Whatever the King does, is no Injury, because be is not •…•…∣ble to be punished for it. By this very Comment, if there were nothing else, the wonderful Impudence and Villany of this fellow, discovers it self suffici∣antly: It belongs to the H••ad, you say, to command, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the Members: The King is the Head of the Parlia∣ment.

You would not trifle thus, if you had any guts in your brains. You are mistaken again (but there's no end of your mistakes) in not distinguishing the King's Counsellors from the States of the Realm For neither ought he to make choice of all of them, nor of any of these, which the r••st do not approve of; but for electing any Member of the House of Com∣mons, he never so much as pretended to it. Whom the people appointed to that Service, they were se∣verally chosen by the Votes of all the people in their respective Cities, Towns, and Counties. I speak now of things universally known, and therefore I am the shorter. But you say, 'Tis ••al••e that the Parlia∣ment was instituted by the people, as the Worshippers of Saint Independency assert. Now I see why you took so much pains in endeavour••••g to subvert the Pa••••cy; you carry another Pope in your belly, as we say. For what else should you be in labour of, the Wi••e of a Woman, a He-Wolf, impregnated by a She-Wolf, but either a Monster, or some new sort of P•…•…cy? You now make He-Saints, and She-Saints at your pleasure, as if you were a true genuine Pope. You absolve Kings of all their sins; and as if you had ut∣terly vanquish'd and subdu'd your Antagonist the Pope, you adorn your self with his spoils. But because you have not yet profligated the Pope quite, till the Second and Third, and perhaps the Fourth and Fifth Part of your Book of his Supremacy come out, which Book will nauseate a great many Readers to death, sooner than you'll get the better of the Pope by it; let it suffice you in the mean time, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 you, to become some Antipope or other: There's another She-Saint, besides that Independency that you de••ide, which you have Canonized in good earnest; and that is, the Tyranny of Kings: You shall therefore by

my consent be the High Priest of Tyranny; and that you may have all the Pope's Titles, you shall be a Servant of the Servants, not of God, but of the Court. For that Curse pronounced upon Canaan, seems to stick as close to you, as your Shirt. You call the People, a Beast. What are you then your self? For neither can that Sacred Confistory, nor your Lord∣ship of St. Lou, exempt you its Master from being one of the People, nay, of the Common People; nor can make you other than what you really are, a most loathsome Beast. Indeed, the Writings of the Prophets shadow out to us the Monarchy and Domi∣nion of Great Kings by the Name, and under the Resemblance of a Great Beast. You say, That there is no mention of Parliaments held under our Kings, that reigned before William the Conqueror. It is not worth while to Jangle about a French word: The thing was always in being; and you your self allow that in the Saxon times, Concilia Sapientum Wittena-gemots, are mentioned. And there are wise Men among the Body of the People, as well as amongst the Nobility. But in the Statute of Merton made in the twentieth year of King Henry the 3d, the Earls and Barons are only named. Thus you are always imposed upon by words, who yet have spent your whole Life in nothing else but words; for we know very well that in that age, not only the Guardians of the Cinque-Ports, and Magi∣strates of Cities, but even Tradesmen are sometimes called Barons; and without doubt they might much more reasonably call every Member of Parliament, tho never so much a Commoner, by the Name of a Baron. For that in the fifty second Year of the same King's Reign, the Commoners as well as the Lords were summoned, the Statute of Marlbridge, and most other Statutes, declare in express words, which

Commoners King Edward the Third, in the Preface to the Statute-Staple, calls, Magnates Comitatum; The Great Men of the Counties, as you very learnedly quote it for me; those to wit, That came out of the several Counties, and served for them; which number of Men constituted the House of Commons, and neither were Lords, nor could be. Besides, a Book more Ancient than those Statutes, called, Modus habendi Parliamenta, i. e. The manner of holding Parliaments; tells us, That the King, and the Commons may hold a Parliament, and enact Laws, tho the Lords, the Bishops are absent; but that with the Lords, and the Bishops, in the Absence of the Commons, no Parliament can be held. And there's a reason given for it, viz. because Kings held Parliaments and Councils with their People before any Lords or Bishops were made; besides, the Lords serve for themselves only, the Commons each for the County, City, or Burrough that sent them. And that there∣fore the Commons in Parliament represent the whole Body of the Nation; in which respect they are more worthy, and every way preferable to the House of Peers. But the power of Judicature, you say, never was invested in the House of Commons. Nor was the King ever possessed of it: Remember tho, that ori∣ginally all Power proceeded, and yet does proceed from the People. Which Marcus Tullius, excellently well shows in his Oration, De lege Agraria, Of the Agrarian Law.

As all Powers, Authorities, and publick Administrations ought to be derived from the whole Body of the People; so those of them ought in an especial manner so to be derived, which are ordained and appointed for the Common Benefit and Interest of all; to which Impolyments every particular Person, may both give his Vote for the

chusing such Persons, as he thinks will take most care of the Publick, and withal by voting and making Interest for them, lay such Obligations up∣on them, as may entitle them to their Friendship, and good Offices in time to come.

Here you see the true rise and original of Parliaments, and that it was much ancienter than the Saxon Chronicles. Whilst we may dwell in such a light of Truth and Wis∣dom, as Cicero's Age afforded, you labour in vain to blind us with the darkness of obseurer times. By the saying whereof, I would not be understood to derogate in the least from the Authority and Pru∣den••e of our Ancestors, who most certainly went further in the enacting of good Laws, than either the Ages they lived in, or their own Learning or Education seem to have been capable of; and tho sometimes they made Laws that were none of the best, yet as being conscious to themselves of the Ig∣norance•• and Infirmity of Humane Nature, they have conveyed this Doctrine down to Posterity, as the foundation of all Laws, which likewise all our Law∣yers admit, That if any Law, or Custom, be contra∣ry to the Law of God, of Nature, or of Reason, ••••ought to be looked upon as null and void. Whence it follows, that tho it were possible for you to disco∣ver any Statute, or other publick Sanction, which ascribed to the King a Tyrannical Power, since that would be repugnant to the Will of God, to Nature, and to right Reason, you may learn from that ge∣neral and primary Law of ours, which I have just now quoted, that it will be null and void. But you will never be able to find that any such Right of Kings has the least Foundation in our Law. Since it is plain therefore, that the Power of Judica∣ture was originally in the People themselves, and

that the People never did by any Royal Law part with it to the King, (for the Kings of England neither use to judge any Man, nor can by the Law do it, otherwise than according to Laws settled and agreed to: Fleta, Book 1. Cap. 17.) It follows, that this Power remains yet whole and entire in the People them∣selves. For that it was either never committed to the House of Peers, or if it were, that it may lawfully be taken from them again, you your self will not deny. But, It is in the King's Power, you say, to make a Vil∣lage into a Burrough, and that into a City; and consequent∣ly, the King does in effect create those that constitute the Commons House of Parliament. But, I say, that even Towns and Burroughs are more Ancient than Kings; and that the People is the People, tho they should live in the open Fields. And now we are extreamly well pleased with your Anglicisms, COUNTY COURT, THE TURNE, HUNDREDA: you have quickly learnt to count your hundred Jacobusses in English.

Quis expedirit Salmasio suam HUNDREDAM? Picamque docuit verba nostra conari? Magister artis venter, & Jacobaei Centum, exulantis viscera marsupii Regis. Quod si dol••si spes refulserit nummi, Ipse Antichristi modò qui Primatum Papae Minatus uno est dissipare sufflatu, Cantabit ultrò Cardmalitium melos.

Who taught Salmasius that French chatt'ring Pye, To aim at English and HUNDRED A cry? The starving Rascal, flusht with just a Hundred English Jacobusses, HUNDRED A blunder'd. An out-law'd King's last stock.—A hundred more, Would make him Pimp for th' Anchristian Whore; And in Rome's praise employ his poyson'd Breath, Who threatn'd once to stink the Pope to death.

The next thing you do is to trouble us with a long Discourse of the Earls and the Barons, to show that the King made them all; which we readily grant, and for that reason they were most commonly at the King's beck; and therefore we have done well to take care, that for the future they shall not be Judges of a free People? You affirm, That the Power of calling Parliaments as often as he pleases, and of dissolving them when he pleases, has belonged to the King time out of mind. Whether such a vile, mercenary Foreigner as you, who transcribe what some Fugitives dictate to you, or the express Letter of our own Laws are more to be credited in this matter, we shall enquire hereafter. But, say you, there is another argument, and an in∣vincible one, to prove the Power of the Kings of England Superior to that of the Parliament; the King's Power is perpetual and of course, whereby he administers the Go∣vernment singly without the Parliament; that of the Par∣liament is extraordinary, or out of course, and limited to particulars only, nor can they Enact any thing so as to be binding in Law, without the King. Where does the great force of this argument lye? in the words of course and perpetual? Why many inferior Magistrates have an ordinary and perpetual power, those whom we call Justices of Peace. Have they therefore the Supreme Power? and I have said already, that the King's Power is committed to him, to take care, by interposing his Authority, that nothing be done con∣trary to Law, and that he may see to the due obser∣vation of our Laws, not to top his own upon us;

and consequently that the King has no Power out of his Courts; nay all the ordinary power is rather the proples, who determine all Controversies themselves by Juries of Twelve Men. And hence it is that when a Malefactor is asked at his Arraignment, How will you be tried? he answers always according to Law and Custom, by God and my Country; not by God and the King, or the King's Deputy. But the authority of the Parliament, which indeed and in truth is the Supreme power of the people committed to that Senate, if it may be called Extraordinary, it must be by reason of its Eminence and Superiority; else it is known they are called Ordines, and therefore cannot properly be said to be extra ordinem, out of order; and if not actually, as they say, yet vertu∣ally they have a perpetual power and authority over all Courts and ordinary Magistrates, and that with∣out the King. And now it seems our barbarous terms grate upon your Critical ears, forsooth! where∣as, if I had leisure, or that it were worth my while, I could reckon up so many Barbarisms of yours in this one Book, as if you were to be chastiz'd for them as you deserve, all the School-boys Ferulers in Christendom would be broken upon you; nor would you receive so many Pieces of Gold as that wretched Poet did of old, but a great many more Boxes o'th' ear. You say, 'Tis a Prodigy more monstrous than all the most absurd Opinions in the world put together, that the Bedlams should make a distinction betwixt the King's Power and his Person. I will not quote what every Author has said upon this subject; but if by the words Personam Regis, you mean what we call in English, the Person of the King; Chrysostome, who was no Bedlam, might have caught you, that it is no absurd thing to make a distinction betwixt that

and his power; for that Father explains the Apo∣stles command of being subject to the Higher Pow∣ers, to be meant of the thing, the Power it self, and not of the Persons of the Magistrates. And why may not I say that a King, who acts any thing contrary to Law, acts so far forth as a private person, or a Tyrant, and not in the capacity of a King invested with a Legal Authority? If you do not know that there may be in one and the same man more Persons or Capacities than one, and that those Capacities may in thought and conception be severed from the man himself, you are altogether ignorant both of Latin and Common sense. But this you say to ab∣solve Kings from all sin and guilt; and that you may make us believe that you are gotten into the Chair vo••r self, which you have pull'd the Pope out of: The King, you say, is supposed not capable of commit∣ting any crime, because no punishment is consequential up∣on any crime of his. Whoever therefore is not pu∣nisht, offends not; it is not the theft, but the pu∣nishment that makes the thief. Salmasius the Gram∣marian commits no Soloecisms now, because he is from under the Ferular; when you have overthrown the Pope, let these, for God's sake, be the Canons of your Pontificate, or at least your Indulgences, whether you shall chuse to be called the High Priest St. ••yranny, or of St. Slavery I pass by the Reproach∣ful language which towards the latter end of the Chapter you give the State of the Commonwealth, and the Church of England; 'tis common to such as you are, you contemptible Varlet, to rail at those things most, that are most praise-worthy. But that I may not seem to have asserted any thing rashly con∣cerning the Right of the Kings of England, or rather concerning the Peoples Right with respect to their

Princes; I will now alledg out of our ancient Histo∣ries a few things indeed of many, but such as will make it evident that the English lately tried their King according to the setled Laws of the Realm, and the Customs of their Ancestors. After the Ro∣mans quitted this Island, the Britains for about forty years were sui Juris, and without any Kings at all. Of whom those they first set up, some they put to death. And for that, Gildas reprehends them, not as you do, for killing their Kings, but for killing them uncondemned, and (to use his own words) Non pro veri examinatione, without inquiring into the mat∣ter of fact. Vortigerne was for his Incestuous Mar∣riage with his own Daughter, condemn'd, as Nenni∣us informs us, the most ancient of all our Historians next to Gildas, by St. German, and a General Coun∣cil of the Britains, and his Son Vortimer set up in his stead. This came to pass not long after St. Augustine's death, which is enough to discover how ••utilous you are, to say, as you have done, that it was a Pope, and Zachary by name, who first held the lawfulness of judging Kings. About the year of our Lord 600, Morcantius, who then Reign'd in Wales, was by Ou∣deceus Bishop of Landaff, condemn'd to Exile, for the Murther of his Uncle, though he got the Sen∣tence off by bestowing some Lands upon the Church. Come we now to the Saxons, whose Laws we have, and therefore I shall quote none of their Presidents. Remember that the Saxons were of a German Ex∣tract, who neither invested their Kings with any absolute, unlimited power, and consulted in a Bo∣dy of the more weighty affairs of Government; whence we may perceive that in the time of our Saxon Ancestors Parliaments (the name it self only excepted) had the Supreme Authority. The name

they gave them, was Councils of Wise-men; and this in the Reign of Ethelbert, of whom Bede says, That he made Laws in imitation of the Roman Laws, cum con∣cilio sapientum; by the advice, or in a Council of his Wise-men. So Edwyn, King of Northumberland, and Ina King of the VVest-Saxons, having consulted with their VVise-men, and the Elders of the people, made new Laws. Other Laws K. Alfred made, by the advice in like manner of his Wise-men, and he says himself, That it was by the consent of them all, that they were commanded to be observed. From these and many other like places, it is as clear as the Sun, that chosen Men even from amongst the Common People, were Members of the Supreme Councils, unless we must believe that no Men are wise, but the Nobility. We have likewise a very Ancient Book, called the Mirror of Justices, in which we are told, That the Saxons, when they first sub∣dued the Brittains, and chose themselves Kings, re∣quired an Oath of them, to submit to the Judgment of the Law, as much as any of their Subjects, Cap. 1. Sect. 2. In the same place 'tis said, that it is but just that the King have his Peers in Parliament, to take Cognizance of wrongs done by the King, or the Queen; and that there was a Law made in King Alored's time, that Parliaments should be holden twice a year at London, or oftner, if need were. Which Law, when through neglect it grew into disuse, was revived by two Statutes in King Edward the Third's time. And in another ancient Manuscript, called Modus tenendi Parliamenta, we read thus,

If the King dissolve the Parliament before they have dis∣patcht the business, for which the Council was sum∣mon'd, he is guilty of Perjury; and shall be reputed to have broken his Coronation Oath.

For how can he be said to grant those good Laws, which the people

chuse, as he is sworn to do, if he hinders the People from chusing them, either by summoning Parliaments seldomer, or by dissolving them sooner than the Publick Affairs require, or admit. And that Oath, which the Kings of England take at their Coronation, has al∣ways been looked upon by our Lawyers, as a most sacred Law. And what remedy can be found to ob∣viate the great Dangers of the whole State (which is the very end of summoning Parliaments) if that Great and August Assembly may be dissolved at the pleasure many times of a silly, head-strong King? To absent himself from them, is certainly less than to dissolve them; and yet by our Laws, as that Modus lays them down, the King neither can, nor ought to absent himself from his Parliament, unless he be really indisposed in Health; nor then neither, till twelve of the Peers have been with him to in∣spect his Body, and give the Parliament an account of his Indisposition: Is this like the Carriage of Ser∣vants to a Master? On the other hand, the House of Commons, without whom there can be no Parlia∣ment held, tho summoned by the King, may with∣draw, and having made a Secession, expostulate with the King concerning Male-administration, as the same Book has it. But, which is the greatest thing of all, amongst the Laws of King Edward, commonly called the Confessor, there is one very excellent, relating to the Kingly Office; which Office, if the King do not discharge as he ought; Then, says the Law, He shall not retain so much as the Name of a King. And lest these words should not be sufficiently understood, the Example of Chilperic King of France is subjoyn'd, whom the People for that Cause deposed. And that by this Law a wicked King is liable to Punish∣ment, that Sword of King Edward, called Curtana,

denotes to us, which the Earl of Chester used to car∣ry in the Solemn Procession at a Coronation; A to∣ken, says Mathew Paris, that he has Authority by Law to punish the King, if he will not do his Duty: and the Sword is hardly ever made use of but in Capital Pu∣nishments. This same Law, together with other Laws of that good King Edward did William the Conqueror ratifie in the Fourth Year of his Reign, and in a very full Council held at Verulam, con∣firm'd it with a most solemn Oath: And by so do∣ing, he not only extinguish'd his Right of Conquest, if he ever had any over us, but subjected himself to be judged according to the Tenor of this very Law. And his Son Henry swore to the observance of King Edward's Laws, and of this amongst the rest; and upon these only terms it was, that he was chosen King, whilst his Elder Brother Robert was alive. The same Oath was taken by all succeeding Kings, before they were Crowned. Hence our Ancient and Famous Lawyer Bracton, in his first Book, Chap. 8. There is no King in the case, says he, where Will rules 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and Law does not take place. And in his Third Book, Chap. 9. A King is a King so long as he Rules well; he becomes a Tyrant when he oppresses the People committed to his Charge. And in the same Chap∣ter, The King ought to use the Power of Law and Right, as God's Minister and Vice-gerent; the Power of wrong is the Devils, and not Gods; when the King turns aside to do Injustice, he is the Minister of the Devil. The very same words almost another Ancient Lawyer has, who was the Author of the Book, called Fleta; both of them remembred that truly Royal Law of King Ed∣ward, that Fundamental Maxim in our Law, which I have formerly mentioned, by which nothing is to be accounted a Law, that is contrary to the Laws of

God, or of Reason; no more than a Tyrant can be said to be a King, or a Minister of the Devil, a Minister of God. Since therefore the Law is chiefly right Reason; if we are bound to obey a King, and a Minister of God; by the very same Reason, and the very same Law, we ought to resist a Tyrant, and a Minister of the Devil. And because Controversies arise oftner about Names than Things; the same Authors tell us, that a King of England, tho he have not lost the Name of a King, yet is as liable to be judged, and ought so to be, as any of the Common People. Bracton, Book 1. Chap. 8. Fleta, Book 1. Chap. 17. No Man ought to be greater than the King in the Ad∣ministration of Justice; but he himself ought to be as lit∣tle as the least in receiving Justice, si peccat, if he of∣fend. Others read it, si petat. Since our Kings therefore are liable to be judged, whether by the Name of Tyrants, or of Kings, it must not be difficult to assign their Legal Judges. Nor will it be amiss to consult the same Authors upon that point. Bracton, Book 1. Chap. 16. Fleta, Book 1. Chap. 17. The King has his Superiors in the Govern∣ment; The Law, by which he is made King, and his Court, to wit, the Earls, and the Barons: Comites (Earls) are as much as to say, Companions; and he that has a Companion, has a Master; and there∣fore, if the King will be without a Bridle, that is, not govern by Law, they ought to bridle him. That the Commons are comprehended in the word Ba∣rons, has been shown already; nay, and in the Books of our Ancient Laws they are fre¦quently said to have been called Peers of Parlia¦ment; and especially in the Modus tenendi, &c.

There shall be chosen (says that Book) out of all the Peers of the Realm, Five and twenty Persons, of whom five shall be Knight, five Citizens, and five Bur∣g••ss••s; and two Knights of a County, have a greater Vote in granting and rejecting than the greatest Earl in England. And it is but reasonable they should, for they Vote for a whole County, &c. the Earls for themselves only. And who can but perceive that those Patent Earls, whom you call Earls made by Writ (since we have now none that hold their Earldoms by Tenure) are very unfit Persons to try the King, who conferr'd their Honours upon them? Since therefore by our Law, as appears by that old Book, call'd The Mirror, the King has his Peers, who in Parliament have Cognizance of wrongs done by the King to any of his People; and since it is notoriously known, that the mean∣est Man in the Kingdom may even in inferior Courts have the benefit of the Law against the King himself in Case of any Injury, or Wrong sustained; how much more Consonant to Justice, how much more necessary is it, that in case the King oppress all his People, there should be such as have Authority not only to restrain him, and keep him within Bounds, but to Judge and Pu∣nish him? For that Government must needs be very ill, and most ridiculously constituted, in which remedy is provided in case of little Inju∣ries done by the Prince to private Persons, and no Remedy, no Redress for greater, no care ta∣ken for the safety of the whole; no Provision made to the contrary, but that the King may without any Law ruin all his Subjects, when at the same time he cannot by Law, so much as

hurt any one of them. And since I have shown that it is neither good manners, nor expedient, that the Lords should be the Kings Judges; it follows, that the Power of Judicature in that case, does wholly, and by very good Right, belong to the Commons, who are both Peers of the Realm, and Barons, and have the Power and Authority of all the People committed to them. For since (as we find it expresly in our written Law, which I have already cited) the Commons toge∣ther with the King, make a good Parliament without either Lords or Bishops, because before either Lords or Bishops had a being, Kings held Parliaments with their Commons only; by the very same reason the Commons apart must have the Sovereign Power without the King, and a Power of Judging the King himself, because be∣fore there ever was a King, they in the Name of the whole Body of the Nation held Councils and Parliaments, had the Power of Judicature, made Laws, and made the Kings themselves; not to Lord it over the People, but to Admi∣nister their publick Affairs. Whom if the King, instead of so doing shall endeavour to injure and oppress, our Law pronounces him from time for∣ward not so much as to retain the Name of a King, to be no such thing as a King; and if he be no King, what need we trouble our selves to find out Peers for him? For being then by all good Men adjudged to be a Tyrant, there are none but who are Peers good enough for him, and proper enough to pronounce Sentence of Death upon him judicially. These things be∣ing so, I think I have sufficiently proved what

I undertook, by many Authorities, and written Laws; to wit, that since the Commons have Au∣thority by very good Right to try the King, and since they have actually tried him, and put him to Death, for the mischief he had done both in Church and State, and without all hope of amendment, they have done nothing therein but what was just and regular, for the Interest of the State, in discharging of their Trust, becom∣ing their Dignity, and according to the Laws of the Land. And I cannot upon this occasion, but congratulate my self with the Honour of having had such Ancestors, who founded this Government with no less prudence, and in as much Liberty as the most worthy of the Ancient Romans or Gre∣cians, ever sounded any of theirs; and they must needs, if they have any knowledg of our Affairs, rejoyce over their Posterity, who when they were almost reduced to Slavery, yet with so much Wis∣dom and Courage 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and asserted the State, which they so wisely sounded upon so much Liberty, from the unruly Government of a King.

Notes

• * 1.1

  St. Lou, in Latin, Sanctus Lupus; Saint Wolf, is the name of a place in France, where Salmasius had some small Estate, and was called so from St. Lupus a Ger∣man Bishop, who with St. German came o∣ver into England, An∣no Dom. 429.