Machivael's [sic] discourses upon the first decade of T. Livius, translated out of the Italian. To which is added his Prince. With some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors. By E.D.

THE SECOND BOOKE. (Book 2)

THE PREFACE.

MEN do alwaies commend, but not alwaies with rea∣son, the times of old, and blame the present: and they take part so much with things past, that they celebrate not onely those ages which they have known by the memory writers have lest them, but those also, which now being old, they remember they have seen in their youth. And when this their opinion is false, as most commonly it is, I perswade my self the reasons that bring them into this error, are di∣vers. And the first I take to be, that of matters of old the truth is not wholly known, & of thoi•• actions most commonly those things are con∣ceal'd that would bring any infamy upon the times, but whatsoever advances their credit & glory is set out with magnificence. For most wri∣ters do so much follow the conquerors fortune, that to make their victories glorious, they not only augment what they have vertuously done

but they so illustrate their enomies actions, that those that are afterwards born in any of their countreys, either conquering or conque∣red, have cause to admire those men and times, and so consequently are forc'd exceed∣ingly to praise and love them. Besides this, men hating things either for fear, or envic, two very powerfull causes of hatred are quite spent in things that are passed, being they are not able to hurt, nor can give occasion of en∣vic. But on the contrary part, it comes to pass that those things that are now in hand, and we see, which by reason of the through know∣ledge we have of them, no tittle thereof being conceal'd from us, and knowing in them to∣gether with the good, many things worthy dislike, hereupon we are compell'd to judge them much Inferior to matters of old, al∣though that in truth the present deserve far more glory and reputation: this I say, not arguing touching the arts, which are now brought to such perfection, that the times can∣not take from them, nor add but little more glory to them; but speaking of things be∣longing to means lives and manners, whereof the proofes are not very evident; I answer, that this custome above written of praising and blaming is sometimes false and sometimes true: for sometimes they must needs light upon the truth; because all humane things are continu∣ally in motion, and either rise or fall. As we see the civil government of a city or countrey so ordain'd by some rare person, that for a time even by reason of the worth of this man, the State mends much, and is more and more amplified: he that is then borne in that State, and commends more the times of old, than

those moderne, is much deceiv'd: and the cause of his errour proceeds from those things that have bin formerly sayd. But those that are afterwards born in that City or countrie, whose dayes are onely during their decline from their excellence, then erre nor. And I devising with my selfe whence these things proceed, I think the world hath continu∣ed alwayes in one manner, and that in i•• hath beene alwayes as much good as evill; but that that good and evill does change from country to country, as it appeares by that which is dis∣cover'd to us of those ancient kingdomes, which alter'd from the one to the other, by change of manners. But the world continued the same. There was onely this difference, that where it first had plac'd its vertue in Assiria, it afterwards remov'd it into Media, then into persia, in so much that at length it came into Italie, and so to Rome. And if after the Romane Empire there succeeded not any other that lasted, nor where the world had retired all its vertue together; yet we see it was spread abroad into severall Nations, where men behav'd themselves very bravely and va∣louroufly, as in the Kingdome of France, the Kingdome of the Turks, and that of the Soldan; so now adayes in Germanie, and so among those that were first of the Saracin sect, which did great exploits, and made themselves masters of so great a part of the world, after they had destroyed the Easterne Empire of Rome. In all these Provinces then, after the Romanes were ruined, and in all these sects hath that vertue resided; and now in some of them indeed it may be wished for, but in other∣some worthily commended. And he that is

borne in those Countries, and praises the times past more than the present, may be deceived: but he that is borne in Italy and not in Greece, and is not become ei∣ther in Italy, a Tramontan, or in Greece, a Turk, hath reason to blame the times pre∣sent, and commend the former, for therein were many things made them marvail, but in these there is nothing can recover them out of extream misery, infamy, and disgrace, where there is no observance either of Religion or Lawes, nor of warlike discipline, but they are wholly bespotted with all manner of filthiness. And so much the more detestable are these vices, by how much they are most in those that are greatest, who sitting in their Tribunals command all, and will be ador'd. But returning to our discourse, I say, that if mens understandings are corrupted in matter of judgment, touching which age is the bet∣ter, the present or that of old, in those things by reason of their antiquitie they could not have such an exact knowledge, as they might have of their own times, yet should they not be corrupted in old men touching the judge∣ment of the times of their youth, and old age, having known and seen equally the one and the other; Which thing would be true, if those men all the time of their lives continued still at the same state of judgement, and had the same desires. But they altering, though the times, change not, yet cannot seem so to men to continue the same, they having other desires, other delights, and other considerati∣ons in their old age, than in their youth: for the strength of mens bodies, when they grow old, decaying, and their judgements and un∣derstandings

increasing, as must needs be, that those things which in their youths they thought supportable and good, becomes afterwards to them growing old intollerable and hurtfull: and where these men ought herein to lay the fault upon their own judgements, they blame the times. Besides this, the desire of man be∣ing insatiable (because of nature he hath it, that he can and will desire every thing, though of fortune he be so limited, that he can attain but a few) there arises thence a dislike in mens minds, and a loathing of the things they injoy which causes them to blame the times present and commend those pass'd, as also those that are to come, although they have no motives grounded upon reason to incite them thereto. I know not then, whether I shall deserve to be numbred among them that are deceiv'd; if too much in these discourses of mine I shall praise the times of the ancient Romans, and blame our own. And truly if the vertue that then reign'd, and the vice that now reigns, were not more clear than the Sun, I should not speak so freely, for fear I should incur the cen∣sure of that error whereof I have now blam'd others: but the matter being so evident, that every man sees it, I shall with boldness speak that plainly which I conceive of those & these times, to the end those young men who shall chance to read these my writings, may avoyd the evil of these times, and prepare their minds to im∣itate the good of these of old, whensoever their good, fortune shall give them occasion: for it is the duty of a good man, to reach unto others that good, which by reason of the ma∣lignity of the times, and of fortune, thou hast not bin able to do thy self, to the end that ma∣ny

being given to understand hereof, some of them, whom the heavens shall more favor, may put it in practice. And having in my former book of discourses spoken of the Romans delibera∣tions, touching their affairs within the City; in this we shall treat of those which the people of Rome did, belonging to the enlargement of the Empire.

CHAP. I.

Which contributed more to the Romans in the con∣quest of their Empire, either their virtue, or their fortune.

MAny have bin of opinion, among whom is Plutarch a great Writer, that the peo∣ple of Rome were more favor'd by fortune, than assisted by their vertues, in gaining their Empire. And among other reasons which he alleadges to that purpose, he sayes, it ap∣pears by the confession of the same people, that they acknowledged all their victories from fortune, having consecrated more Temples to her, than to any other god. And Livie seems to side with this opinion: because it is very seldome, that he brings in any Roman speaking where he makes mention of vertue, but that he joynes fortune therewith. Whereunto I will not yield in any termes, nor think I it can be maintain'd: for if never any Republique made the same Progress that Rome made; it is because never hath any Republique bin so or∣der'd to make its advantage, as Rome was: for the valour of their armies gain'd them their Empire, and their order of proceeding, and

their own mannor with that which their first founder likewise devised for them, made them keep what they had gotten, as hereafter in se∣veral discourses shall be declar'd. That two strong wars never at the same time met toge∣ther to shake their state, they say, it was the people of Romes fortune, and not their va∣lor: for they had no wars with the Latins, til they had not onely beaten the Samnites, but were fain to undertake a war in defence of them. Neither war'd they with the Tuscans, til they had first subdued the Latins, and whol∣ly weakned the Samnices with many routes: whereof if two entire powers (when they were fresh) had joyned together against the Ro∣mans, without doubt a man may easily conject∣ure that the ruine of the Roman Republique would have followed thereupon. But how∣ever this thing came to pass, it never befell them to have two strong wars made against them at once, but rather luckily it proov'd, that when one began, the other ended, and at the end of one another began, Which we may easily see, by viewing their wars, how they followed in order: for letting alone those wars which they made before Rome was ta∣ken by the Frenchmen, we see, that whilest they fought with the Aequi and the Volsci, ne∣ver (so long as these people were of any con∣siderable power) did any other people set upon them. They they being conquer'd, the war against the Samnites began; and though be∣fore the finishing of this war the Latins Re∣bel'd against the Romans, nevertheless, when that rebellion followed, the Samnites were in league with Rome, and with their army help'd the Romans to bring down the Latins pride;

and when they were subdued, the war with the Samnites again was reviv'd. But their for∣ces being broken by divers defeats given them, the war with the Tuscans arose; and when that was quieted, the Samni es began anew to stir, upon Pyrrhus has passage into Italy; when he was defeated, and beaten back into Greece, then first was kindled the fire of the Carthaginian wars: nor was that quenched til that all the French, as well beyond, as on this side the Alpes, conspired against the Ro∣mans; so that between Pobolonia and Pisa, where now is the tower at Saint Vincenti, they were vanquish'd with a very great slaughter. After this, for the space of 20 years, they had not any war of much importance: for they had no quarrel with any but with the Ligu∣rians, and the remainder of those French that werein Lombardie: and so they continued, til the second Carrhaginian war begin; Which troubled Italie for 16 years space. Which being made an end of with great glory, that of Ma∣cedon sprung up, and was ended, when that of Antiochus, and afterwards that of Asia took their turns. After which victorie, there remai∣ned not in the whole world neither Prince nor Republique that either by themselves or alto∣gether could oppose the Roman Forces. But before that last victory, he that considers the or∣der of these wars, and the manner of their proceeding, shall find mingled with their for∣tune much valour and wisdome; so that he who examines the occasion of such fortune, shall easily discover it: for it is very certain, that when a Prince or a people have gained such a reputation, that neither prince

nor people bordering upon him dares by him∣self assault him, and is afraid of him, it will alwaies so fall out, that none of them all will set upon him, unless forc'd thereto, so that it shall be at that great Princes choyce, to war with which of his neighbors he shall please, and the rest with little pains to quiet. Who, partly in regard of his power, partly beguil'd by some devices he shall make use of to lull them asleep, are easily kept from stirring. And for other powerfull Princes, who are more remote and have no dealing with him, they look upon the matter, as a thing afar off, and nothing belonging to them. In which error they continue so long, til the fire comes close to their doors: which then being come so near, they have no means to extinguish it, but only to use their own armes, which suffice nor, the enemy being now grown exceeding migh∣ty. I will let pass, how the Samnites stood still and look'd upon the Romans, while they overcame the Volsci and the Aequi: and that I may not be too tedious, I will satisfie my self with the Carthaginians, who were of great power and estimation, when the Romans war'd with the Samnites and Tuscans: for even then they were Masters of all Affrica, and had Sardinia and Scicily in their hands, and had the rule of some part of Spain. Who being that their forces were remote from the people of Romes confines, never thought of assaulting them, nor of giving succours to the Samnites, and Tuscans; but as if the Romans increase had bin the Carthaginians advantage, they made a confederacy with them, seeking their friendship: nor did they perceive their error committed, til the Romans having sub∣dued

all those peoples that lay between them and the Carthaginians, began to make war with them for the rule of Scicily and Spain. The self-same befell the French, that hapned to the Carthaginians, and so to Philip of Macedon, and Antiochus; and every one of them belee∣ved (while the Romans were busy with ano∣ther) that that other might chance to vanquish them, and that they had time enough, either by peace or war, to defend themselves from them. So that, I beleeve, that the same for∣tune herein the Romans had, all Princes would have had, provided, that they proceeded as the people of Rome did, and were of equal valour with them. To this purpose it would not be unfit, to declare the course the peo∣ple of Rome held in their entryes into o∣ther Princes countreys, but that inour trea∣ty of Principallities, we have discoursed there∣upon at laege. I will only say this in bries, they alwaies did put in practice to make them∣selves some friends in the Countreys they came newly acquainted with, who served them for a ladder to climb up to them, or a gate to en∣ter them, or a tye to hold them; as it appears, by means of the Capuans they enterd into Sam∣nium, by the Camertins into Tuscany, by the Mamertins into Scicly, by the Saguntins into Spain, by Mafinissa into Affrica, by the Ae o∣lians into Greece, by Eumenes and other Prin∣ces into Asia, by the Masilians and the Heduans into France. And so they never fail'd of the like supports, whereby to facilitate their un∣dertakings, either in the inlargement of their dominions, or in the maintaining them. Which, those people that shall observe, shall find them∣selves in less want of good fortune, than they

who neglect it. And to the end, that every one may know of what avail our vertue was beyond their for une, in the conquest of their Em∣pire, we will treat in the Chapter following, concerning the quality of those people with whom they were to make war, and with what obstinacy they defended their liberty.

CHAP. II.

What people the Romans had to make war with∣all, and how obstinately they fought for the de∣fence of their liberty.

NOthing made it more painfull to the Ro∣mans to vanquish their neighbors near a∣bout them, as also some other Countreys fur∣ther off, then the affection that in those days many people did bear to their liberty, which they so obstinately defended, that they had ne∣ver bin subdu'd, but by an excessive valour: for, by many examples, we know to what dangers they expos'd themselves, as well for the maintenance as the recovery of it; and what revenges they took against those that had laid hold on it. We know likewise what dam∣mages peoples and cities receive by servitude And whereas now adayes, there is onely one Countrey that can say, she hath free Cities in her: in ancient-times people liv'd very free in all countreys. We see that in those times whereof at this present we speak, in Italy from the Alpes (which make a partition be∣tween Tuscany and Lombardy) even to the very point of Italy, there were many free peoples, as were the Tuscans, the Romans the Samnites, and many others, that dwelt in the other parts of Italy: nor does any man relate, that there was any King, besides those

that raign'd in Rome, and Porsena King of Tuscany; whose race how it came to an end, history leaves us no memory. But we plainly see, that at the same time the Romans went to incamp before Vejum, Tuscany was free, and so absolutely injoy'd their liberty, and withall so much hated the name of a Prince, that the inhabitants of Vejum for their defence having made a King among them, ask'd aid of the Tuscans against the Romans; but they resolv'd after many deliberations taken, to give them none whiles they liv'd under a King, judging it not right to defend their countrey, who of themselves had subjected it to another. And it is an easy thing to gue••s, whereupon it is that people take such an affection to their liberty: because we see by experience, that cities have never bin much amplified neither in domition nor riches, unless only during their liberty. And truly it is a strange thing to consider, unto what greatness Athens attained in the space of a hundred years, after she had freed her self from Pisistratus his tyranny: but above all it is most strange to think unto what greatness Rome attained after she was deliver'd from her Kings: The reason thereof is easy to be under∣stood: for it is no mans particular go••••, but the common good, that amplifies the city. And without question this com∣mon good is not regarded but in Republiques, for there whatsoever makes for their advan∣tage is put in practice: and though it turns to this or that private mans loss, yet are they so many, whom the said good concerns, that they are alwaies able to put it forward, in de∣spight of those few that suffer by it. The con∣trary falls our, when there is a prince;

where, most commonly, that which makes for him endammages the City, and that which makes for the city hurts him; so that suddenly where a Ty∣ranny * 1.1 growes upon a free state, the least ill that can thence result to those cities, is not to pro∣ceed, nor increase more in power, nor wealth: but for the most part, or rather alwaies, it comes to pass, that they go back∣ward: And if hap would have it, that a Tyranc should proove valorous, who by his courage and prowess should inlarge his do∣minions, there would thence no profit arise to the Republique, but to him alone: for he cannot advance any of these citizens that are brave and worthy, over whom he tyran∣nizes, unless he desires to give himself some jeulousy of them. Nor can he yet subject or make tributary the cities that he conquers, to that city which he tyrannizes over; for it is not for his advantage to make it pow∣erfull; it rather makes for him, to hold

the state disjoyn'd, that each town and province acknowledge him, in so much that of his conquests, he onely reaps he good, and not his countrey. And he hat would see the confir∣mation of this opinion, let him read Xenophon in his treaty of a Tyranny It is no marval then, that the peoples of old did so extreamly harc Tyrants, and lov'd the free gouernment, & that the very name of liberty was in such request amongst them: as it happen'd, when Hierony∣mus, nephew of Hiero the Siracusan, was slain in Siracusa: for the news of his death being brought to his army, which lay not far from the city, they began to rise up in tumult, and take their armes in hand against them that slew him: but when they perceiv'd that in Siracusa all cri∣ed out liberty, allured with the delight of that name, they were all appeas'd, and laid aside their anger conceiv'd against them that kil'd the Ty∣rant, & advis'd together by what means there might be ordain'd in that city a free govern∣ment. And it is no marvail, that people take extraordinary revenge of those that have laid hold of their liberty. Touching which there are many examples, whereof I intend to relate one∣ly one, that fell out in Corcira a City of Greece, in the times of the Peloponnesian wat: where the province being divided into two factions, one of which followed the Athenians, the other the Spartans; it came to pass, that of many cities which were divided among themselves, the one part follow'd the friendship of the Spartans, the other that of Athens; it happening so, that in the said city the Nobility prevail'd, and tooke from the people their liberty; but the people by means of the Athenians took heare again, and having laid hold on the Nobility, shut

them up into a prison capable of them all, from whence they drew them out by eight and by ten at a time, pretending to banish them into severall parts, but they put them to death after a cruell manner. Whereof they that remain'd having some notice, resolv'd as much as lay in their power, to avoid this shamefull death; so that arm'd with what they could get, and fighting with those that sought to enter, they defende'd the passage into the prison: whereupon, the people running together uncovered the top of the house, and with the ruines thereof overwhelm'd them. There follow'd also in the said province many such o∣ther horrible chances, so that we find it true, that people pursue more agerly the revenge of a liberty once taken from them actually, then of that which was onely contriv'd in the intention to be pluck'd from them. Weighing then from whence it may arise, that in the times of old people esteem'd more of liberty, then now a dayes, I beleeve it proceeds from the same cause which makes men lesse valiant now adayes then formerly, which I thinke is the difference of our educa∣tion from that of old, grounded upon the difference of our Religion from the ancient: for our Religion having shew'd * 1.2 us the truth,

and the true way, causes us lesse to make account of the honour of this world; whereupon the Gentiles esteeming much of it, and placing therein their greatest good, became braver in their actions. Which may be consider'd from many of their orders, beginning from the magnificence of their sacrifices and the poore∣nesse of ours, where indeede the pompe is more delicate then magnificke, but not any action of bravery or fiercenesse. And with the Gentiles also there was no want of pompe and magnificence in the ceremonies, but thereunto was added the action of the sacrifice full of bloud and cruelty, slaying a multitude of beasts; The sight of which being terrible made men of the same disposition. Besides, the ancient Religi∣on did not beatificate but onely men fraught with worldly glory, as were the Commanders of armies, and Princes of nations. Our Religion hath rather glorified humble and contem∣plative men, then those of action. Moreover it hath plac'd the chiefe good in humility, and in the rejecting and contempt of worldly things. That other imagin'd the chiefe happinesse to consist in the greatnesse of courage, in the

strength of body, and in all other things fit to make men exceeding valiant: and if our Re∣ligion requires valour in a man, it is rather that he be fit for a strong sufferance, then for a strong action. This manner of living then, as it seemes, hath made the world become feeble, and given it in prey to wicked persons, who may securely rule over it, as they list, seeing that all men to obtaine paradise, think rather of suffering their wrongs, then revenging them: and though it may appeare, that the world is growne effeminate, and the heavens disarm'd, it proceeds without doubt from the cowardise of men, who have given an interpretation of our Religion according to their owne lazy and idle dispositions, and not agreeable to vertue: for if they would consider how much it allowes the advancement and defence of ones country, they should see that it wills, that we should love and honour it, and so prepare our selves that we may be able to defend it. These kindes of educations then, and false interpretations, cause that there be not so many Republiques now adayes in the world as were of old. Nor by consequence do we see among people such an affection to liberty as formerly: although I beleeve rather the reason hereof is, because the Roman Empire with its force and power extinguish'd all the Republiques and free governments. And though afterwards that Empire was dissolv'd, yet could not the cities againe be restor'd, and anew order'd in a civill government, unlesse it were in very few places of that Empire. Yet howsoever it was, the Ro∣mans in every little corner of the world found, as it were, a conspiracy of Commonwealths very strongly arm'd, and very obstinate to

defend their liberties; which shewes that the people of Rome without an extraordinary and rare valour had never made conquest of them. And to give an example of some member thereof, that of the Samnires shall s••ffice me: who (and indeed it is admirable, and so Titus Livius avowes it) were so powerfull and warlike, that they were of force, till the time of Papirius Cursor the Consul, sonne of the first Papirius, to resist the Romans, which was for the space of forty six yeares, after so many routes, destruction of their townes, and so many slaughters made in their country: especially considering the country then, where so many cities were, and such a vast number of men, though now almost not inhabited. And then there was such order, and so great force, that it was insuperable, had it not bin assaulted by a Roman power. And it is an easy thing to know, whence that order and this disorder arise, for all that came from the free manner of living then, and this from the slavery now. For all countries and provinces which live free in every part, as formerly I said, make exceeding large progresses: for here we see the people more numerous, because the marriages are more free, and desir'd by men: being that every one will∣ingly begets those children which he beleeves he can bring up, and nourish, without doubt∣ing their patrimony will be ravish'd from them; and when he knowes they are borne free and not slaves, so that by meanes of their vertue they may become Princes. We see riches likewise increase there in greater measure, as well those which arise from cultivation, as those which are gotten by the trades of handicrafts∣men: for every one is more provident in

gaining and multiplying of those goods, which, when he hath gotten, he beleeves he shall peaceably injoy. From whence it comes to passe, that men even contend who shall more advance the private and publique good; so that the one and the other increase exceedingly. The contrary hereof followes in al those coun∣tries that live in servitude; and so much the more faile they of their accustomed good, by how much their servitude is harder. And of all hard servitudes, none exceeds that which is subject to a free Republique, because ordinarily it is of longest continuance, and so least hopes there are of being deliver'd from it: a second reason is, the end of a Republique is to enfeeble and weaken all other bodies in her, whereby to augment her owne. Which thing a Prince that brings thee under his rule does not, especially if it be not some Barbarian Prince, a ruiner of countries, and a destroyer of all ci∣vill societyes among men, as are the easterne Princes. But if any of them have bin instructed in humane customes and the arts ordinary among men, they most commonly affect equality in the cities they have subdued, and let them still possesse all their arts and ancient customes; so that, if they cannot increase, as in liberty, they goe not to wracke, as in thraldome, speaking of that thraldome into which cities fall, when they serve a stranger; for I have formerly spoken enough of subjection to a native. Whosoever then considers well all that which is said, will not much marvaile at the power which the Samnites had being free, nor at their weakenesse into which afterwards they fell by servitude. And Titus Livius gives us good testimony thereof in many places, in Hanniballs

warres, where he declares, that the Samintes being oppressed by one Legion of souldiers, that were in Nola, sent Ambassadours to Hanniball to intreat him for succours; whose speeches were to this purpose, that they had for a hundred yeares warr'd with the Romans, ser∣ving themselves onely of their owne souldiers and Captaines, and had many times withstood two Consular armies, and two Consuls, and that now they were brought so low, they had much a doe to defend themselves from one small Roman legion that was in Nol••••.

CHAP. III.

Rome became a great citie, by ruining those that were near neighbours to her, and by admitting strangers without difficulty to share in her dig∣nisies.

ALL this while Rome wax'd great upon the * 1.3 ruines of Alba. Those that intend a city should farre inlarge the bounds of her dom∣nions, ought withall indeavour provide, that she be well fraught with inhabitants: for with∣out a great multitude of men in her, she will never be able to grow great. And this is done two wayes, either by love or by force: by love holding the wayes open and secure to strang∣ers, that might have a design to come and dwell in it, to the end that every one might come willingly to inhabit it; by force ruining and de∣facing the neighbour cities and sending out the inhabitants thereof to dwell in thine: all which was punctually observ'd in Rome, so that in the timeof the sixth King in Rome there dwelt 80

thousand men able to beare armes: for the Romans meant to behave themselves like the good husbandman, who to make a plant grow big, and fructify, and ripen well its fruits, cuts off the firstsprouts it thrusts forth, that so the vertue thereof remaining yet in the roote of the plant, may shortly after bring forth others more lively and fruitfull. And that this course held was necessary and good for the founding and inlarging of an Empire, the Example of Sparta and Athens shewes us plaine, who being both very warlike Republiques, and furnished with excellent lawes, yet could they never attaine to the Roman Empires greatnesse, which seemed indeed a little more tumultuary and not so well ordered as they, whereof can be alleadged no other reason, then that aforesaid. For Rome having inlarged by those two wayes the body of her city, was able to put in armes six hun∣dred and 80 thousand souldiers, whereas Sparta and Athens never exceeded each of them twenty thousand men. Which proceeded not from that the scituation of Rome was more bountifull then theirs, but onely from the diffe∣rent course they tooke: for Licurgus founder of the Spartan Republique considering that no∣thing could soone take away the power of his lawes, then a commixtion of new inhabitants, did what he could to hinder strangers from living with them; and that they should neither joyne matrimonies with them, nor admit them into their civill government, nor have any thing to do with them, which are the ordinary occasions of accord among men. He ordained likewise that leather money should passe cur∣rant, thereby to take from every one the defire to come thither and bring any merchandise,

or art to them: so that, that citie could never grow big by multiplying her inhabitants. And because all our actions imitate nature, it is neither possible, nor naturall, that the slender body of a tree should beare a grosse bough; there∣fore a smal Republique cannot hold cities nor kingdomes of greater power and strength then she her selfe is; and if perchance it comes to passe that she layes hold on them, it befalls her as it does that tree the boughs whereof are greater then the body, that sustaining it with much adoe, with every small b'ast it is broken, as we see it happen'd to Sparta: which having seized on the rule of all the cities of Greece, Thebes no sooner rebell'd against her, but all the other cities likewise fell from her, and so remain'd as the dead trunk of a tree without branches: which could never befall Rome, having her body and stocke so huge, that it was of force with ease to support any bough whatsoever. This manner then of proceeding, together with those others which we shall afterwards speake of, made Rome exceeding great and power∣full. Which Titus Livius shewes in few words where he sayes, All this while Rome * 1.4 wax'd great upon the ruines of Alba

CHAP. IIII.

Republiques have taken three particular courses, to amplifie and inlarge their states.

HE that hath read the ancient histories with observation, findes that Commonwealths have three manner of wayes to amplify their states. The one hath bin that which the ancient Tuscans followed, to make a league of many Republiques together, where no

one is preserred before the other, neither in authority nor in dignity; and to make other cities partakers with them in their gains; just as now adayes the Swisses do, and formerly in Greece the Achaeans and Eto∣lians were wont. And because the Romans had much war with the Tuscans, the better to shew the quality of this first way, I will inlarge my self in giving notice of them par ieularly. Before the Romans had any great power in Italy, the Tuscans were very mighty both by sea and by land: and though there is no particu∣lar history that touches their affairs, yet is there some small remembrance thereof, and some signes left us of their greatness; and we know, how they sent a colony to the sea coast above, called by them Adria, which prooved of such renown, that it gave the name to that sea, and the Latins call it the Adri tick to this day. Moreover we know, that they had conquered all from Tiber, to the very foot of the Alpes, which encompass the whole body of Italy. Notwithstanding that two hundred years before the Romans grew to any considerable strength, the said Tuscans lost the dominion of that countrey which is now called Lombar∣dy; Which was seized on by the French; who either driven by necessity, or allured by the delicacy of the fruits, especially the wines, came into Italy under the conduct of Bellovesus their Captain, and having defeated and chased out the natives; seated themselves in that place, therein built many cities, and called the Countrey Gallia, from the name they then bare; and this they held til they were conquered by the Romans. The Tuscans then liv'd with that equality, and

proceeded in the amplifying their State, in that first manner, spoken of before: and there were twelve Cities, among which were Clu∣sium, Vejum, Desola, Aretium, and Volaterra and the like; who by way of league rul'd their dominions; nor could they inlarge their conquests beyond the bounds of Italy, where∣of also there was a great part left untoucht by them, for the reasons which we shall after∣wards tell. The other manner is to make allies, yet not so thought, that thou still reservest not to thy self the principal place in the command & rule and title of all the exploits, which course was alwaies observ'd by the Romans. The third manner is, to make them immediatly sub∣jects, and not allies, as did the Spa••tans and Athenians: of which three waies, this last is altogether unprofitable; as it appears, it was in the two foresaid Republiques, which, for no other cause went to ruine, but for possessing themselves of those dominions, which they were not able to hold. For it is a thing of great difficulty and pains to hold the government of Cities by violence, especially of those that have bin accustomed to live free. And if thou beest not in armes, and well furnished with good numbers of soldiers, thou canst neither com∣mand, nor rule them. And to be able to do this, it is necessary to make friends and com∣panions, who may assist thee in multiplying the people of thy City. And because these two Cities, did neither the one nor the other of these, their manner of proceeding was of no advantage to them. And because Rome which gives us an example touching this third manner, did the one and the other, therefore grew it to that excessive power: and for that

she alone took this course of living, she alone therefore became so mighty: For she having taken to her throughout all Italy many for her companions to help her, who in many things liv'd with her upon equal termes; but on the other side, as is abovesaid, reserving to her self alwaies the seat of the Empire, and the title of commanding, these their companions (who were never aware of it) with their own pains & loss of their own bloud came to bring their own necks to the yoke: for when they be∣gan to transport their Armies out of Italy, and to reduce Kingdomes into Provinces, & to make thosetheir subjects, who for that they were used to live under Kings, were never much troubled to become Subjects; and receiving Roman Go∣vernors over them, and having bin overcome by Armies, whereof the Romans had the name and title, they acknowledged no other head, but Rome. So that those allyes of Rome that were in Italy, found themselves on a sudden be∣girt round by Romes Subjects, and oppress'd by an exceeding vast City, as then Rome was: and when they perceiv'd the deceit into which they had bin train'd, it was too late to help it, Rome had then gotten such authority with forrein Nations, and was then of such strength within it self, the people of their City being grown very numerous and warlike. And al∣though those their companions, to be reveng'd on them for these injuries, conspir'd together against them, yet in a short time were they losers by the war, making their own condi∣tions worse: for of allies, they became Sub∣jects. Which manner of proceeding (as is said) hath bin observ'd onely by the Romans: nor

can a Republique that would enlarge her State take any other; for experience hath not shew'd us any course more certain or true. This way formerly spoken of concerning the leagues, wherein anciently the Tuscans, Acheans, and Aerosians liv'd, and which now adayes the Swisses use, is the better way next after that the Romans took: for, it being not possible by it to grow very great, thou gainest two advan∣tages thereby, the one, that easily thou draw∣est no war upon thee; the other, that what thou gettest thou easily holdest. The reason why they cannot grow great, is, because they are disunited Republiques, and placed in di∣vers seats; which makes it more difficult to consult and resolve. And besides, because they are not very greedy of extending the limits of their dominions; for that divers Commonal∣ties being to participate of that rule, they va∣lue not so much such conquests, as does a Re∣publique alone, which hopes to injoy it all her self. Moreover, they govern themselves by common advice and counsel, and therfore of force they must be slower in every deliberation, then they that live within the walls of the same City. It is plain also by experience, that this manner of proceeding prescribes it self certain bounds, which it passes not; nor have we any example that they were exceeded. And these were to joyn together some dozen or fourteen Commonalties, and afterwards never seek to go beyond that: for being come to those terms, that they think they are able to defend themselves against every one, they desire no greater power, as well because necessity does not bind them to have greater force; as also because they understand not any great profits

that arise from such like purchases, for the causes formerly alledged: for then of ne∣cessity they must either go on forward to make themselves allyes, and so the multitude would make a confusion; or els to make them their subjects: and because they see herein many difficulties, and no great advantage in holding them, they make no account of them. Where∣upon, when they have attaind to such greatness, that they think they may live secure, they apply themselves to two things; the one to entertain others in their protection, and undertake their defences, and by these means to draw money from every part, which they can very easily divide among one another, and the other to serve in the wars under another, and to take pay of this or that Prince, who gives them wages for their service, as now adayes the Switzers do, and as we read, those we spoke of before did, whereof Titus Livius bears witness, where he sayes, that when Philip King of Macedon came to a parley with Titus Quintius Flamminius, to treat an accord in presence of a Prercur of the Aetolians, the said Pretour comming to some words with Philip; was reproved by him for avarice and infide∣lity, saying, that the Ae••olians were not asha∣med to take pay and serve in the wars on both sides, so that many times their ensignes were seen in two contrary Armies. We know with∣all, that this manner of proceeding by Leagues hath bin alwayes alike, and hath prodec'd the same effects. We see also, that that way of ma∣king people become subjects hath bin alwaies weak, and brought forth but small advantages; and when they have exceeded the due mean, they have gone to ruine, And if this course of ma∣king

Subjects, be unprofitable in warlike Com∣monwealths, surely in those that are disorde∣red, it must needs be far worse, as in our daies have bin the Republiques of Italy. Where∣fore we find that to be the true way, which the Romans held, which is the rather to be ad∣mired, in somuch as there was no other ex∣ample thereof before that of Rome, nor since hath bin any that hath imitated it. And touching the leagues, there are the Switzers onely & the Swevian league that follows them. And, as in the conclusion of this matter shall be said, so many orders observ'd by the Romans, as well concerning the affairs within the City, as those without, in these our times are not onely not followed, but made no account of; some of them are deem'd untrue, some unpossble, o∣thers nothing to purpose, or unprofitable: so that whiles we stand still in this ignorance, we become a prey to any that invades our Countrey. And though it should seem difficult to imitate the Romans, yet ought it not seem so, to follow the steps of the ancient Tuscans, especially to the Tuscans now living: for though they were not able for the reasons al∣ledged, to make themselves an Empire like that of Rome, yet could they gain them that power in Italy, that their manner of procee∣ding would permit them, which for a long time was with great glory of their rule, and wars, and with exceeding great commenda∣tion of their manners and religion. Which power and glory was first abated by the French, and afterwards quite put out by the Romans, and so put out, that of this power, which two thousand years since was very great, at this present we have no memory left. Which

hath made me muse, what the cause is that matters are thus forgotten, whereof in the Chapter following we shall treat.

CHAP. V.

That the changes of Religions and Languages, toge∣ther with the chances of floods or pestilences, abolish the memory of things.

TO those Philosophers, who would have made men beleeve that the world is eter∣nal, I think one might have replyed, that if such antiquity were true, it would be conse∣quent, that we should have some notice of more then five thousand years time past, being that it is not apparent, how the remembrances of times by several occasions were abolish'd. Whereof part proceeds from men, and part from heaven. Those that proceed from men, are the changes of sects and tongues: for when a new sect begins, that is, a new religion, the first endeavor, to gain it self reputation, is, to blot out the memory of the old; and when it so falls out, that the founders of the new sect are of a different language, they easily extin∣guish it: which thing is known, by conside∣ring the waies, which the Christian Religion used against the Sect of the Gentiles, whereby it hath cancel'd all their orders and ceremonies, and defac't the whole remem∣brance * 1.5 of thatan∣cient Theology.

It is true, that they attaind not thorowly to wipe out the knowledge of the prime men thereof, which was occasioned by their maintaining of the Latin tongue, to which they were forc't, being they were to write this new Law in it: for if they could have writ it in a new tongue, considering the o∣ther persecutions they made against it, there would have bin no remembrance left of things past. And whosoever reads what courses St. Gregory took, and the other heads of the Chri∣stian Religion, shall see with what obstinacy they persecuted all the ancient memorials, burning all the Poets and Historians works, defacing their images, and destroying every other thing that gave any lightwww. of that antiquity; so that if to this p••rsecution, they had added a new lan∣guage, we should have seen every thing in a short time forgotten. It is very likely therefore that what the founders of the Christian Reli∣gion

did against the sect of the Gentiles, they of Gentilis••••e had done formerly to the Sect that preceded it: and because the sects in a five or six thousand years chance two or three times, the memory of things past before that time is utterly lost. And though yet there remain some remembrance thereof, we take it as some fabulous thing, whereunto no man gives credit, as it befalls the story written by Diodorus Siculus, in which though he gives ac∣count of a forty or fifty thousand years, never∣theless is it esteemed (and so I think it too) a false tail. As for the causes that proceed from heaven, they are such as extinguish the race of mankind, and reduce to a small number the inhabitants of part of the world; and this comes to pass, either by pestilence or famine, or by a deluge of waters; but that of most importance is this last, because it is more uni∣versal, and because those that escape, are all such as live among the mountains and are simple and ignorant people, who having no knowledge of antiquity, cannot derive it to their posterity: and if among them any knowing man chance to escape, to gain himself, reputation and a name, he conceals it, and alters it at his own pleasure, so that there is left to his successors only so much as he hath bin pleas'd to commit to writing, and no more. And that these in undations, pestilences, and famines sometimes come, I beleeve there is no doubt, as well because all histories are full of them, as for that we see this effect of defa∣cing the memory of things, as also becauie it accords well with reason that it is so: for na∣ture, as in simple bodies, when there is gatherd together enough superfluous matter, moves

many times of it self, and makes a purgation, which is the preservation of that bodie; so it falls out in this mixt body of mankinde, that when all countries are stuffed with inhabitants, that they can neither live there, nor go other∣where, because all places are already possessed and replenish'd, and when the subtilty and wickedness of man is grown to that fulness it can attain to, it holds with reason, that of force the world be purged by one of these three waies, that men being become few, and ha∣ving suffer'd much, may live with more conve∣nience and grow better, whereupon it is no∣thing strange, that, as it is abovesaid, the Tus∣can nation in old time was very potent, full of Religion and vertue, had their own man∣ners and their native tongue, which the power the Romans quite abolish'd, so that, as it is said, onely their name remains still in the memory of posterity.

CHAP. VI.

How the Romans proceeded in making of war.

HAving discours'd, how the Romans pro∣ceeded in enlarging their State, we will now treat of their proceedings in making of war, and in every one of their actions it will appear with how great judgement, they left aside the common way that others went, where∣by they might more easily attain the highest pitch of greatness. The intention of that man, that makes war, either by election or by am∣bition, is to get, and keep what he hath got∣ten, and to proceed so there with, that he may enrich and not impoverish his own country. It

is necessary for him then, both in getting and holding, to take a care not to diminish, but ra∣ther to augment the publique profit of his coun∣trey. He that will do these things, must follow the way and course the Romans took, who at first made their wars great and short; for com∣ming into the field with huge armies, all the wars they had with the Latines, Samnites and Tuscans, they dispatcht in a very short time: and if notice were exactly taken of all those wars they made from the beginning of Rome, til the siege of Veium, we should find they were all ended, one in six dayes, another in ten, and a third in some twenty dayes space: for their custome was this; so soon as ever they had dis∣cover'd the war, they presently went out with their armies and fought with their enemies, who being overmaster'd (to save their Countrey from spoil) yeilded to their conditions, and the Ro∣mans condemn'd them in loss of some of their territories, and those they turn'd to their pri∣vate Profits, or bestow'd them upon some Co∣lony they sent thither, which being seituate upon some Frontier of theirs, became Guar∣dians of their confines, to the advantage of the inhabitants of that Colony, who had those fields in possession, and with the profit of the generality of Rome, that held this guard with∣out expence. Nor could there be any way more assured, nor of more strength or advan∣tage: for til the enemy went into the field, this guard was sufficient. And when they went forth strong into the field to oppress that Colo∣ny, the Romans also went out with their for∣ces, and join'd battel with them, wherein having got the day, they laid more heavy bur∣dens on them, and so return'd home. Thus

came they by little and little to great credit a∣mong them, and forces in themselves. And this course held they alwaies, till they chang'd their manner of proceeding in war: which was after the siege of Vejum, where to ena∣ble them to make a long war they determined to pay the soldiers, whereas formerly, being that the wars were short, there was no need to give them pay. And though the Romans gave pay, and that by vertue hereof they were able to make longer wars, and to make those more remote, they were forc'd to stay longer in the field, yet did they never alter from their first order, to dispatch them quickly, according to the time and place. Nor did they ever leave sending of Colonies: for besides their natural guise, the Consuls ambition held them to their first custome of making their wars short; for being created but for a years time, and thereof to stay at home six moneths, they desired to finish the war, that they might triumph. To send Colonies, the profit and great advantage they made thereof, still prevail'd with them. They altered indeed somwhat touching the spoiles, whereof they were not so liberal, as in former times they had bin; because they thought there was not so great need, the soldiers receiving their stipends; as also because the spoiles being greater, they intended therewith so to fill the common treasure, that they might not be con∣strain'd upon any enterprise in hand to leavy monies upon the City. Which order in a very short time much enrich'd their treasury. These two courses then they took, about the dividing the spoiles, and sending of Colonies, caus'd Rome to grow rich by the war, whereas other Princes and Republiques, if they find that

means to releeve themselves, become impove∣rishd; so that it came to this at last, that a Consul thought he might not triumph unless he brought much gold and silver and spoils of every kind into the treasury: Thus the Romans by their above written waies, sometimes by ma∣king a quick end of the wars, otherwhiles by drawing them out at length with discomfitures and invasions and treaties to their advantage, grew alwaies more mighty.

CHAP. VII.

How much land the Romans allowed to each man they sent out to inhabit their Colonies.

BY what parcels the Romans did divide the land among them, I beleeve it is hard to find out the truth, because I think they bestow'd on them more or less, according to the places, whether they sent the Colonies; and it is credi∣ble, howsoever the case went, and whether so∣ever they were sent, the allowance was but small. First to the end they might be able to send the more men thither, they being in∣trusted with the guard of that countrey. Be∣sides, because they living sparingly at home, it agrees not with reason, that they would allow their men, where wishall to abound much a∣broad And Titus Livius sayes, that, * 1.6 when they had taken Veium, they sent a Colony thither, and to each man they gave three acres and a half and a twelfth part. For besides the things above written, they judge it was not the quantity of the land that suppli'd their wants, but the well c••••tia∣ting of it. And moreover it is very necessary,

that the whole Colony have fields in common, were every one may freely feed his cattel, and woods from whence to fetch fuell for firing, without which a Colony cannot well subfist.

CHAP. VIII.

The occasion, wherefore people leave their own native soyles, and invade other countreys.

Seeing that we have formerly discours'd of the manner of proceeding in war which the Romans us'd, and how the Tuscans were assail'd by the French, me thinks it were not much from the matter, to shew, that there are two sorts of war made. The one is through the ambi∣tions of Princes, or Commonwealths, who in∣deavor the inlargement of their dominions; such as were the wars of Alexander the Great, and the Romans, and such as now adayes every Prince and Potentate makes one with another. Which wars are dangerous indeed, but yet they do not wholly chase the inhabitants out of a countrey; for the Conqueror is contented onely with the obedience of nations, and most commonly suffers them to live under their own Laws, and enjoy their own goods in their own houses. The other kind of war is, when the whole people with all their families, rise from a place, forced either by fa∣mine or war, and goe to seek a new habitation and new Countrey, not out of ambition to command, as the others, but to possess it by themselves, and to drive thence or destroy the ancient inhabitants thereof. This kind of war is very cruel and terrible: And touching these

wars, Salust speaks in the end of the Jugurthin, where he sayes, that when Jugurth was over∣come, the French were perceived to stir, who then came into Italy: and there he relates, that the people of Rome fought with all other Na∣tions for rule and command, but with the French every one fought for his life and safety: For it sufficeth a Prince or Commonwealth that assails a Countrey, to destroy onely those that command, whereas these populations must make a general destruction, being that they will live upon that, which formerly sustained others. The Romans had three several wars of these, exceeding dangerous. The first was that when Rome was taken, which was seis'd on by those Frenchmen, that (as is above said) had taken Lombardy from the Tuscans, and seated themselves there; whereof Titus Livius alledges two reasons; The first, as we said be∣fore, is, that they were allur'd by the pleasant∣ness of the fruits and the wines of Italy, whereof they had scarcity in France: the se∣cond, that the people in France being excee∣dingly multiplyed, the Countrey could not seed them, whereupon the Princes of those places thought it fit, that part of them should goe to seek some new habitation, and that re∣solution being taken, they chose for Captains of them that were to depart, Bellovessus, and Sicovessus, two French Kings, whereof Bello∣vessus came into Italy, and Sicovessus went into Spain. Upon the passage of which Bello∣vessus follow'd the seisure of Lombardy, and thereupon the war, which first the French made against Rome. Next this was that, they made after the first Carthaginian war, when between Piombin and Pisa they slew more then

hundred thousand, French. The third was, when the Germans and Cimbrians came into Italy, who having overcome several Roman Armies, were subdu'd by Marius. The Romans then masterd these three very perilous wars, nor was there need of less valor than theirs to overcome them: for we see, how that after the valor of the Romans faild, and their armies lost their ancient vertue, that Empire was ruind by such like people, as the Goths, Vandalls, and such others, who possessd themselves of the whole western Empire. Such people come out of their own Countreys, as is above said, compell'd thereto by necessity, which ne∣cessity proceeds either from famine, or from some war and oppression inflicted on them in their own Countreys. So that they are con∣straind to seek new habitations. And these either are in great multitudes, and then they break with violence into others countreys, destroy the Inhabitants, possess their goods, make a new Kingdome, and change the name of the country, as Moses did, and those people likewise that seiz'd upon the Romane Empire; for these new names, that are in Italy, and in the other Provinces, grew from nothing else, than that they were so named by their new Lords. As is Lombardy now, which was called Gallia Ci∣salpina; France was called Gallia Transalpina, and now is named of the French; for so were those people called, that made themselves masters of it. Sclavonia was called Illyrium; Hungary, Pannonia; England, Brittanny; and many other Countreys, that have changed their names, which it would be too long to recite. Moses allso called that part of Syria, which he made himself master of, Jury. And,

because I have formerly said, that some people are driven out of their own habitations by war, whereupon they are forc'd to seek a new, where to seat themselves, I will alleage an ex∣ample to that purpose, of the Maurusians, an∣cientiy a people of Syria; Who having notice of the Hebrews comming, and thinking they could not resist them, thought it better to leave their Countrey, than in striving to save that, lose themselves; And so rising thence with their families, they went into Affrique, where they sate down, driving out the Inhabitants they found in those places. And so they, who could not defend their own Countrey, could yet take that of others from them. And Procopius, who writes of the war, that Bellifarius made with the Vandals, that possessed themselves of Affri∣que, reports that he read Letters written in certain pillars, in those parts where these Mau∣rusians did inhabite, thus saying, * 1.7 We are Maurusians who fled from the face of Jesu the robber, who was Son of Nave. Where the occasion of the departure of these people out of Syria plainly appears; wherefore these people are very ter∣rible, when they are driven out by extream necessity, and unless they be encountred by pu∣issant forces, cannot be stopd: but when those that are constraind to abandon their Coun∣trey are not very numerous, there is no such danger of them, as of those people we spoke, because they cannot use such violence, but ought rather by some stratagem, make themselves masters of some strong place, and therein be∣ing setled, keep it by making of friends and al∣lies; as we see Aeneas did with Dido, the Massi∣lians and others, who all by agreement with

their neighbors, where they once set themselves down, were able to continue. The people that goe forth in the greatest multitudes, and those also that have gone forth, almost all came out from those parts of Scythia, cold, and poore Countries, where, because there are men in abundance, and the Coun∣try of that condition, that it cannot feed them all, they are compeld to goe forth, having many causes to drive them out, and nothing to keep them in. And if now for these five hundred years it hath not hap∣pend, that any of these nations have made an inundation upon any Countrey, it hath proceeded from several reasons. The first is, the great evacuation that Countrey made in the declining of the Empire, they ha∣ving since sent out huge swarms more than thirty several times: the second is, because Germany, and England, from whence these people came, have their Countries well mended, so that they are able to live there, with better conveniency; and thereupon not necessitated to change their seat. On the other side, these men being very warli••, are as it were a Bulwark against the Scythians, who border upon them, to keep them within their confines and territories: and many times there chance great risings among the Tartars, who are kept in by the Hungarians and Polacks: who vaunt, and not without reason, that were it not for their forces, Italy and the Church had often felt the weight of the Tartars Ar∣mies. And this shall suffice, touching those forenam'd peoples.

CHAP. IX.

Ʋpon what occasions commonly warres are begun among Princes.

THe occasion, that gave beginning to the warres betweene the Romanes and Sam∣nites, who had beeng long in league together, is very ordinary, and happens often to power∣full Principalities Which occasion, either comes by chance, or else is offerd by him that desires to make warre. That which was betweene the Romans and Samnites, feil out by chance: for the Samnites intention was not, by making warre first against the Sidicini, and then against the Campani, afterwards to set upon the Ro∣manes. But the Campani being oppressed, having their recourse to Rome, beyond the Ro∣manes expectation and the Samnites, the Campani giving themselves into the Romans hands, they were constraind to desend them, as their subjects, and take upon them that warre, which they thought with their honour they could not avod: For it seemd very rea∣sonable to the Romans, not to undertake the defence of the Campani, though their friends, against the Samnites their friends; but they thought it also a shame not to dessend them, when they were their subjects; or recommen∣ded to their protection, judging that when they had not taken that defence in hand, they cut off the way from all others that ever should have a mind to shelter themselves under their power. And Rome having for her maine end the Empire and glory, and not qui••t, could not refuse this enterprise. The

selfe same occasion gave beginning to the first warre against the Carthaginians, for the defence of the Massineses, which the Romans under∣tooke in Sicily; which fell out by chance also. But now the second warre, that grew between them, came not by chance. For Hannibal the Carthaginian Captaines, set upon the Saguntins that were allyes to the Romans in Spaine, not so much for to endammage them, as to provoke the Romanes to warres, and to have occasion to fight with them, and so to passe into Italie. This manner of kinoling new warres hath been alwayes usd among those that are mighty and that have some saith joynd, some other respects: for if I desire to make warre with a Prince, and between us some capitulations of peace have firmly been observed a long time, upon some other title fair justifiable, and under some other colour, I will assayle some ally of his, rather than him∣selfe, knowing very well, that in setting upon his alley, eyther he will resent it, and so I shall have my intent of moving warre against him; or not resenting it, his weaknesse shall be dis∣coverd, or his infidelitie, in not defending one that is under his protection; and the one and the other of these two is sufficient to discredit him, and facilitate my designes. Therefore what wee have formerly sayd, may be noted touching the taking occasions to move warre, out of this example of the yeelding of the Campani; and besides what remedie a Citie may have, which cannot by her selfe alone make her defence, and yet in any case would not fall into her assaylants hands. Which is freely to give her selfe into his hands, who thou hast a purpose should defend thee, as the

Capuans to the Romanes, and the Florentines to Robert King of Naples, who though he would not defend them as allyes, yet after∣wards defended them being his subjects, against the forces of Castruvius of Lucca, who then put them hard to it.

CHAP. X.

Moneys are not the sinews of war, according to the common opinion.

BEcause every one can begin a warre at his owne pleasure, but not end it, a Prince should before he undertake an enterprise, measure his owne forces, and order himselfe according to them; he should also have so much judgement, that he deceive not himselfe with the conceit of his owne forces; and he shall alwayes be sure to be deceiv'd when he measures them, either by the scituation, or by the good will of men towards him, his owne proper forces on the other side fayling him: for the things aforesayd may increase well thy forces, though give thee them they cannot; and by themselves alone they are of on worth, nor nothing avayle without the helpe of Souldiers fathfull to thee: for great store of treasure serves to no purpose without that; nor the strength of thy Country, neither doth the faithfulnesse nor good will of men last; for these cannot be faithfull to thee, thou not having force to defend them. Every mountaine, every lake, every unaccessible place is made plaine, where the strong defendants are wanting. Nay rather moneys are so far from defending thee, that they expose thee for a prey. Nor is there any thing more false than that common opinion

that affirmes Moneys to be the sinews of warre, which sentence was first given by Q. Curtius, in the warre betweene Antipater the Mace∣donian, and the King of Sparta; Where he re∣lates, that for want of moneys, the King of Spar••a was forc'd to fight, and was broken whereas if he had deferd the battell a few dayes, newes had come into Greece of Alex∣anders death, where he had remaind conqueror without combat. But his treasure fayling, and he doubting his Armie would leave him for want thereof, was constraind to hazard the battell; whereupon Q Curtius sayes, that mo∣neys are the firews of war; which sentence is alledgd every day, and followd too by some Princes, not quite so wise as they should be: for making this their ground, they beleeve, that this is able to defend them, if they have treasure enough; and never consider, that if treasure were of force to overcome, that Darius would have conquerd Alexander, the Greekes masterd the Romanes, and in our dayes the Duke Charles subdu'd the Swissers, and not long time since the Pope and the Florentins together would have found no difficultie in overcomming Francis Maria nephew of Pope Julius the second in the warre of Orbin. But all these above nam'd, were overcome by those who esteemd not mony, but good Souldiers the sinews of warre. Among other things, that Croesus King of Lydia shewd to Solon the A∣thenian, was a treasure unmeasurable, and asking him what he thought of his power, Solon answerrd him, he thought him no whit the more powerfull for that; for warre was made with iron and not with gold, and some one might come, who had more iron than be,

and take his gold from him. Moreover, when after the death of Alexander the Great, a vast multitude of French pass'd over into Greece, and after into Asia, the French sending Ambassadours to the King of Macedon to treate some accord, that King to shew them his power, and to fright them, let them see his treasure, where was much gold and silver, whereupon these French, who had in a manner concluded a firme peace, brake t; their desire grew so great then to take his gold from him: and so was that King despoyld for that which he had gatherd together to defend him. The Venetians also, a few yeares since, having their treasury full of coyne, lost their whole State, being not able to defend themselves thereby. Wherefore I say, that gold as the common opinion cryes it up, is not the sinewes of warre, but a good Armie of slour Souldiers; for gold is not sufficient to finde good Soul∣diers, but good Souldiers are able well to finde our gold. As for the Romanes (if they would have waged warre by moneyes rather tha with the sword) the treasure of the world, con∣sidering their vast undertakings, and the great difficulties they had therein, would not have servd their turnes. But they making their warres with the sword, never found scarcitie of gold; for they had it in abundance brought even into their Camps by those that stood in feare of them. And if that Spartan King for want of money, were to hazard the fortune of a battell, that befell him upon the matter of moneys, which many times hath chanc'd upon other occasions: for it hath been often seene, that when an Armie wants provision of vic∣tualls, and is necessitated either to samish or

sight, usually they make choyce to fight, because it is greater honour, and where in some sort Fortune hath in her power to savour thee. Moreover, it hath often come to passe, that a Commander perceiving succours comming to his enemies Armie, must either fight with them quickly, and make tryall of the chance of battell, or expecting the i••∣grossing of the Armie, come at length to fight perforce upon many disadvantages. Besides, it hath been seene, as it befell Asdruball, when in the Mar••hes he was ass••ulted by Claudius Nero, together with the other Romane Consull, that when a Captaine is necsstated either to fly or fight, he alwayes makes choyce to fight; think∣ing by this bargaine, though exceeding ha∣zardous, he may gaine; but in that other he must needs lose in any case. There are there∣fore many necessities that can force a Cap∣taine beyond what he intended, to resolve to put it to a battell, among which sometimes may happen the scarcitie of moneys, though not therefore should wee esteeme moneyes to be the sinews of warre rather, than other things, which bring men into the like necessities. Wee may therefore resolve the question, that money is not the sinews of warre, but good Souldiers rather. It is true, moneys are necessary in the second place, but it is such a necessitie, which good Souldiers themselves may overcome: for it it as impos∣sible that good Souldiers should lack money, as by moneys alone to produce good Souldiers. What we here averre, every History shews us to be true in many places, notwithstanding that Pericles perswaded the Athenians to make warre with a••l Peloponnesus, declaring, that

they might overcome that warre with industry and by force of money; and though in that warre the Athenians sometimes prospeed, yet at last they lost it, and the advice, and good Souldiers of Sparta prevayld more, than the industry and money of Athens. But Titus Livius gives us a better testimony for this opinion then any one else, where discoursing of Alex∣ander the Great, whether if he had come into Italie, he had been able to vanquish the Ro∣mans, he shews there three things necessary in the warre; a great number of Souldiers, & those good, wise Commanders, and good fortune: where examining, whether eyther the Ro∣manes or Alexander excelld herein, at length he concludes, without making any mention of moneys. The Capuans, when they were requird by the Sidicins, to take Armes in their behalfe against the Samnites, should not have measurd their power by their treasure, but by their good Souldiers: for by taking that course they tooke to assist them, after two overthrowes, to save themselves, they were forc'd to become tributaries to the Romanes.

CHAP. XI.

It is not a match wisely made, to joyne alliance with a Prince, whose credit is greater then his strength.

TItus Livius having a purpose to shew the Sidicins errour in relying upon the Capuans aid, and the Capuans errour also in beleeving they were able to defend them, could not expresse it in more lively termes then

these, The Capuans contributed to the * 1.8 Sidicins ayd, rather more reputation then forces. Where we may observe, that those leagues that are made with Princes, who have not either the commodity to assist thee by reason of the dist∣ance of place, or forces to do it, because of some disorder of their owne at home, or for some other occasion, add rather reputation to them that trust in them, then any strength to their party: as in our dayes it befell the Florentines, when in the yeare 1479. the Pope and the King of Naples assayl'd them: who being allyes of the King of France, drew from that allyance more reputation to their side, then safe guard: as likely enough it would befall that Prince now, who under Maximilian the Emperours protection should undertake any enterprise: for this is one sort of those allyances, which bring more fame then advantage, as here in this text is alledg'd, that of the Capuans brought the Sidicins. Therefore in this point the Capuans committed an errour, in esteeming their owne forces greater then they were. And so sometimes the small discretion men have, causes them when they neither know how, nor have the meanes to defend them∣selves, to take upon them the protections of others which the Tarentines also did: who, when the Roman army was going to joyne battell with that of the Samnites, sent their Ambassadours to the Roman Consul, to let him understand that they will'd there should be peace betweene those two people; and how that otherwise they should make warre against the party that should refu••e it. So that the Consul scoffing at this proposition, caus'd

the triumphs to sound in presence of their ten Ambassadours, and so made his army march to∣wards the enemy, shewing the Tarentins by his deeds and not by words what answer they deserv'd. And having now discours'd in this Chapter against some courses Princes take amisse for others defence, I will in that that followes speake touching those they take for their owne defence.

CHAP. XII.

Whether it be better for a Prince, fearing to be assail'd by his enemy, himselfe first to begin the warre with him, or to expect while it comes home to him.

I Have heard it disputed sometimes by men well practis'd in military discipline, if there be two Princes neare of equal force, and the one that is the more resolute have proclaim'd warre against the other, which were the best course for that other, either to attend quietly in his owne confines whiles his enemy come upon him, or else to goe finde him at home, and there assaile him. And I have heard them alledge arguments on both sides; and those that argue for this going to assaile him, pro∣duce the counsell that Croesus gave Cyrus, when being arriv'd upon the borders of the Messagetes to make warre against them, their Queene Thomyris sent him word, that he should take his choice, either to enter into her kingdom where she would awaite him, or if he would rather that she should come and si••nde him in his owne. And when the matter

came to dispute, Croesus advis'd against the opinion of the rest, to goe & seeke her in her owne country; urging that otherwise if he overcame her farre from her owne confines, he could not take her kingdome from her, be∣cause she would have time to repaire her losses; but if he conqur'd her within her owne territories, he might pursue her just upon her slight; & so giving her no time of recovery, take the state from her. Moreover they alledge the advice that Hanniball gave Antiochus, when that King had a purpose to make warie against the Romans, where he shewes how the Ro∣mans could not be overcome but in Italy; for there another might availe himselfe of their armes, their wealth, and their friends also. But whosoever fought with them out of Italy, lea∣ving Italy free to them, left them that strength, that never would want life to give them fresh supplies at all occasions. And concluded, that it was easier to take Rome from them, then the Empire; and Italy, rather than their other pro∣vinces. Agathocles also is alleadg'd, who not being able to support the war at home, assail'd the Carthaginians, who then had made warre against him, and brought them to aske peace. The example of Scipio is likewise urg'd, who to take the warre out of Italy, assail'd Affricke. They that maintaine the contrary, say, that he that would bring his enemy to destruction, should withdraw him from home. The Atheni∣ans are brought for example, who while they made a convenient warre at their owne homes, remain'd victors: but when they departed out of their country, and transported their army in∣to S••cily, they quite lost their liberty. They al∣ledge the poeticall sables withall, where it is

shew'd, how that Anteus King of Lybia assail'd by Egyptian Hercules was insuperable, whiles he staid for him within the confines of his owne Kingdome, but when by Hercules subtil∣ty he was trained out of it, he lost both state and life. Whereby occasion was given to the fable of Anteus, that while he was upon the ground, he recovered forces from his Mother, which was the ground, which Hercules per∣ceiving, took him up in his armes, and held him from the earth. Moderne advices also are alledged; every one knowes that Ferdinand King of Naples was in his dayes held a very wise Prince; and some two years before his death fame flying, that Charles the eight then King of France had a determination to come and assail him, after he had made much prepa∣ration fell sick, when on his death-bed, among other memorials he left his sonne Alphonsus, was this also, that he should attend his enemies comming within his Countrey, and upon no case should dr••w any of his forces out of his state, but should await them within his own confines with his strength entire. Which was not followed by him, but there was an army sent into Romania, which without any combat, lost both it self and the state. The arguments, which besides the things abovesaid, are brought on each side, are these; that he, that assailes, comes on with more courage, then he that at∣tends, which gives the army more confidence: Besides this, it takes away from the enemy di∣vers conveniencies of being able to make use of what is his own; for he cannot help himself upon those subjects, whose houses have first bin sackt and their goods pillaged: and for having the enemy in the house; the Prince

is constrained to take more care how he wrings money from them, and vexes them: so that he comes to dry that fountain, as Han∣nibal sayes, which furnishes, him with means to sustain the war. To this may be added, that the souldiers being in a forrain countrey, are forced to fight, and of that necessity makes a vertue, as we have often said; on the other side, they say, when one awaits his enemy, he does it with much advantage: for without any dis∣commodity to thy self thou art able to give thine enemy much trouble to come by his pro∣visions, and other necessaries belonging to an army. Thou canst also better hinder his designs, because thou knowest the countrey better then he. Thou canst also incounter him with more forces, because there they may easily be uni∣ted, which thou canst not draw all from home. Thou canst also being routed, recover thy self with more ease, because many of thy army will save themselves, in that they have their places of refuge near, as well because the supplies are not to come from far; thou bringst to the hazzard all thy forces, and not all thy fortune; whereas parting thence thou hazzardst all thy fortune with but a part of thy forces. And some there have bin who the better to weaken their enemie, suffer him to enter many dayes journies into their countrey, and take divers townes, to the end that leaving gatrisons in all of them, he may weaken his army, and so they may afterwards fight with him at more ods. But to give my opinion herein what I think, I beleeve, this distinction is to be made; Either my coun∣trey is armed, as was that of the Romans, or that of the Switzers is, or it is disarmed as that

of the Carthaginians was, or else that of the King of France, or the Italians countrey is. In this case the enemy is to be kept off from comming in, because thy advantage than con∣sists in thy revenue, and not in thy men, so that whensoever the current thereof is cut off from thee, thou art quite spoil'd; nor doth any thing so much hinder thee, as the war within thy doores. The Carthaginians yeeld us evident examples hereof, who, whiles they had their own home free, were able with their revenue to make war against the Romans, which, when it was assaild, could not supply them a∣gainst Agathocles. The Florentines had not any remedy against Castruccius Lord of ••ucca, because he warr'd with them in their owne country, so that they were faine, for their defence, to yeeld themselves to Robert King of Naples. But Castruccius being dead, the same Florentines had the courage to assail the Duke of Milan at his owne home, and wrought so far as to take his countrey from him; so much valor shew'd they in forrain wars, and such cowardise in their domestick. But when countries are armed, as that of Rome was, and as the Switzers are, the nearer thou com∣mest to them, the harder they are to vanquish; for these bodies are able to bring together more forces to resist a suddain violence, then they are to, assail an enemy abroad. Neither in this case does the authority of Hanniball move me, because his passion, and his own interest, made him say so to Antiochus; ••r if ••h•• Romans had in that space of time received those three routs in France, which they had in Italy by Hanniball, without doubt they had bin quite un∣done: for then they could not have helped

themselves by the remainders of their armies, nor could they have had those conveniencies to repair their losses, nor made head against their enemies with such strength as they did. We never find, that to afsail any countrey they sent out an army passing the number of 50000. But to defend themselves at home against the French after the first Punicke war, they armed eighteen hundred thousand men. Nor could they afterwards defeat them in Lombardy, as they did in Tuscany: because against so great a maltitude of enemies, they had never been able to draw so great forces so far out, nor fight with them upon the like ad∣vantage. The Cimbrians broke an army of the Romans in Germany, nor could the Romans any way help themselves. But when they came into Italy, that they once united their forces together, they presently dispatched them. The Switzers it is easy to vanquish our of their own Countrey, whether they cannot send a∣bove thirty or forty thousand men: but to o∣vercome them at home, where they are able to make a body of a hundred thousand men, is exceeding difficult. I conclude therefore a∣new, that that Prince, who hath his people armed and addrest for war, may alwaies well expect a mighty and dangerous war at his own home, neither let him goe to meet it. But he, whose subjects are unarmed, and his countrey unaccustomed to war, let him al∣waies keep it as far from home as he can. And so the one and the other, each in their degree, will better defend themselves.

CHAP. XIII.

That men rise from poore and small beginnings to great fortunes, rather by the help of guile than force.

I Take it to be very true, that seldome or never it comes to pass, that men of meane fortunes attain to any high degrees without force or fraud: unless that dignity, which a man hath gotten, came to him by gift, or was cast on him by inheritance Neither do I think, we ever find, that force alone suffices; but we often see, that guile alone avails, as he shall clearly perceive, that reads Philip of Macedons life, and that of Agathocles the Sicilian, and many others such like, who from very vile and poore fortunes have gain'd either a Kingdome, or some other great dignities. Xenophon in Cy∣rus his life, declares this necessity of deceit, being that the first expedition which he makes Cyrus to undertake against the Armenian King, is full of guile, and how by deceit, and nor by force he makes him seize on his Kingdom; by which Action he concludes nothing else, but that it is necessary for a Prince, that will at∣cheive great matters, to learn to be a cunning deceiver. Besides this he makes him deceive Ci∣axares King of the Medes his Mothers uncle many waies, without which fraud he shews Cyrus could never have attain'd to that great∣ness he afterwards came. And I beleeve, * 1.9 that there was never any plac'd in a low

condition that ever came to any great dignity onely by plain force; and ingenuously; though I grant that by guile alone one well may, as John Galeacius did who took from his uncle Barnard the state and rule of Lombardy. And that, which Princes are necessitated to do in the beginnings of their increase, Republiques

are likewise forc'd to, till they are become mighty; then force alone suffices. And because Rome in every part lit either by chance or by choyce upon all the necessary means to become great, it failed not also of this, nor in her be∣ginning could have dealt more cunningly, than to take the course we formerly discoursed of, to make her some companions; for under this name, she brought many to be her servants, as were the Latins, and other people neare about her: for first she served her self of their armes in subduing her neighbours round a∣bout, and in taking upon her self the reputa∣tion of the state; afterwards when she had brought them under likewise, she came to such growth, that no power was able to withstand her. And the Latins never perceived their own servitude, til after that they saw the Samnites twice broken, and forced to agreement. Which victory as it gained the Romans great reputation with forrain Princes, whereby they heard of the Romans name, though they ne∣ver felt their armes: so it bred great envie and suspect in those that both saw and felt their strength, among which were the Latins: And so far prevailed this envie and fear, that not onely the Latins, but the Colonies which they had in Latium together with the Capuans by them lately defended, conspired all against the name of the Romans. And the Latins mov'd that war in that manner, as is formerly said, that for the most part wars are mov'd, not assailing the Romans, but defending the Sidicins against the Samnites, against whom the Samnites made war with the Romans leave. And that it is true, that the Latins stirred upon the knowledge of this deceit, T. Livius de∣clares

it by the mouth of Annius Setinus a La∣tin Pretour, who told them in their assemblie, thus, For if yet we can endure * 1.10 servitude, under the name of an equal league. Wherefore we find the Romans in their first growth wanted not that guile, which they had need to make use of, that from low beginnings aim to mount high, which the more covert it is, is the less discommendable, as was this of the Ro∣mans.

CHAP. XIIII.

They are often deceiv'd, who think with humili∣ty to overcome pride.

WEE often see that humility does not onely not help, but hurt some times, e∣specially when it is used towards insolent men; who either for envie or some other occasion, have conceiv'd hatred against thee. Whereof our Historian gives us good testimony in this occasion of war between the Romans and the Latins: for the Samnites complaining to the Romans, that the Latins had assaild them, the Romans would not yet forbid the Latins that war, being desirous nor any way to incense them. Whereby they did not onely not incense them, but made them become more insolent towards them, so that they sooner discover'd themselves enemies, whereof the words us'd * 1.11 by the forenamed: Latin Pretour, Annlus in the same assembly, give good proof, saying:

Te tryed their patience in refusing them souldiers; who doubts but they were angry, yet this disgrace have they sufferd: they have heard we prepare an armie against the Samnites their allyes; nor for this stirred they one foot out of the City: and whence came this modesty of theirs think ye, but from their knowledge as well of your Forces as their own? And therefore hereby we plainly see, how much the Romans patience increased the Latines arrogance. Wherefore a Prince should never agree to descend a whit from his ra••ck, not ever let goe any thing upon accord, if he have a minde to leave it honorably, but onely then when he is able, or when he thinks also he is able to maintain it: for it is better for the most part (the matter being brought to such termes, that thou canst not let it goe in the manner above said) to let it be taken from thee by force, rather than by fear of forces: for it thou lettestit goe for fear, thou do∣est it to free thy self from war, which most commonly it will not doe; for he to whom with such open cowa••dise thou hast yeelded this, will not there with rest satisfi'd, but take o∣ther things from thee also, and will the rather be incited against thee, in that he values thee less; when likewise on the other side, thou shalt finde thy friends more slack in thy defence, esteeming thee either weak or cowardly. But if thou forthwith upon discovery of thy ene∣mies intent, gettest thy forces in a readiness, howsoever they be inferior to his, he will be∣gin to make account of thee, as also will other Princes thy neighbours abou thee, so that some there will be who will have a minde to ayd thee (thou being in armes) who, if thou hadst abandon'd thy self, would never have

struck stroke for thee. This is meant, when thou hast but one enemy. But in case thou hast more, thou shalt do very wisely, to render what thou hast belonging to any one of them for to regain him to thee, notwithstanding the war be discoverd, that thou mayest take him asunder from the other confederates thine enemies.

CHAP. XV.

Weake states are alwaies irresolute in their de∣terminations; and slow deliberations are al∣waies hurtfull.

IN this very same matter, and in the same beginnings of the War between the Latins and the Romans, we may observe, that in every consultation it is good to come to the particu∣lar of that which is to be deliberated on, and not to stay long in doubt, and upon the uncer∣tainty of a thing. Which is manifest in the con∣sultation the Latins made, when they thought to quit themselves of the Romans: for the Romans having had some sent of this ill hu∣mour that had possessed the Latins, to be as∣certained of the master, and to try if without armes they could regain those people, gave order they should send eight Citizens to Rome, to the end they might advise with them. The Latins, understanding this, and being consci∣ous to themselves of many things done contra∣ry to the will of the Romans, called an assem∣bly together, to appoint who should go to Rome, and to give them order what they should * 1.12 say. And Annius their Pretour being in the as∣sembly during this dispute, utter'd these words:

The sum of our affairs is, as I take it, that ye should advise rather what we should do, than what we should say; for it is an easy matter, when things are once resolved on, to put them into fit termes. Without question these words are most true, and ought to be relished by every Prince, and every Commonwealth: for during the uncer∣tainly and doubt of that which a man will do, there is no man knowes what he should say: but when the mind is once setled and re∣solved of what is to be done, words to the purpose easily follow. I have the more wil∣lingly noted this passage, by reason that many times I have known that such doubt hath much wrong'd publick actions, even to the loss and disgrace of our Republike. And it shall ever come to pass, that, in doubtfull cases, and where there is need of judgement to deliberate, this resolution shall be when they are to be advised, and deliberated on by weak man. No less hurtfull also are slick and slow con∣sultations, than these ambigu••us, especially those that are to be taken in favour of any friend; for slowness helps no body, and hurts ones self. These resolutions so taken, proceed either from weakness of courage, or forces, or from their malignity that should resolve, who guided by their own passtors, to ruine a State, and to fulfill some desire of their own, s••ff••r not the consultation to goe forward, but rather hinder and cross it. For good Citizens, though they perceive the whole stream of the people to run the more dangerous way, yet will they never hinder the delibaration, being that those affairs attend not time. When Je∣rome the Tyrant in Syraacusa was dead, there being a great war between the Carthaginians,

and the Romans, the Syracusians put it to question, which allyance they should take, the Roman or Carthaginian; and such was the eagerness of the parties, that the matter re∣main'd in doubt, and they took to neither side, til' that Apollonides one of the cheif men in Sy∣racufia, in a very discreet Oration of his, shew∣ed that they were not to be blam'd that ad∣vised to adhere to the Romans, nor they that would take part with the Carthaginians, but rather that irresolution and slowness in taking to any side was detestable; for he saw fully in that ambiguity the ruine of the Republique. But were it that the party were once made, on which side soe'r it were, a••man might con∣ceive some good hopes upon it. Nor could Ti∣tus Livius more fully shew, than in his part he does, the harme which this hanging in suspence drawes after it. He makes it plain also in this case of the Latins; for the Lavinians being sought to by them for ayd against the Romans, put off the resolut on of it so long, that when they were just going forth of the town to give succors to them, news came that the Latins were defeated. Whereupon their Pretour Milonius said, We shall pay ••ear to the Romans for this little way we have gone: for if at first they had resolv'd either to help, or not to help the Latins, not helping them they had not gi∣ven offence to the Romans; but helping them, had their aid, come in time, with the addition of their Forces, they might have gain'd them the victory; but by delay loss came every way, as it befell them. And had the Florentines ob∣serv'd this well, they had never receiv'd so many dammages nor troubles by the French, as they had in Lewis the twelfths passage into

Italy against Lodowicke Duke of Milan: for the King treating of such a passage, sought the Flo∣rentines for their consent; and their Agents that were with the King, agreed with him, to stand neuters, and that the King comming in∣to Italy, should maintain them in their State, and receive them into his protection, and gave the City a moneths time to ratifie this. Which ratification was delayd by some, who in their little wisdome favour'd Duke Lodowicks affairs, til that the King was even upon the point of victory, when the Florentines offering the rati∣fication, it would not be accepted by the King, who knew the Florentines came by force, and not willingly to his friendship. Which the City of Florence was to buy out dear, and like enough to have lost the state, as afterwards another time upon the like accident it chanc'r. And so much the worse was the course they took; for it was of no advantage to Duke Lo∣dowicke, who if he had bin victour, would have shewed more displeasure against them, than did the King. And though touching the mischief this weakness brings upon a Repub∣lique, we have formerly spoken in another Chapter; yet upon a new occasion offerd by a new accident, I had a minde to repeat it think∣ing it very specially a matter worthy to be noted by all Republiques like unto ours.

CHAP. XVI.

How much the orders used by our Souldiers in these modern times, differ from those of the ancients.

THe Romans fought not a battel in any war they undertook with any Nation, of

greater importance than this with the Latins, in Torquatus and Decius his Consulship: for in all reason it had followed, that as the Latins by losing it became Subjects, the Romans should have undergone the same condition, had not they got the mast••ry; and of this opinion is Titus Livius: for on each part he makes the Armies equal for their order, valour, resolution, and number; he makes there this difference on∣ly, that the Commanders of the Roman Ar∣my were of more valour than those of the Latins. It appears also that in the ordering of this battel, there befell two accidents, the like whereof was never seen before, nor since have we had but rare examples following them: that of two Consuls, to hold their Soldiers minds firm and obedient to their commands, and resolute to fight, the one kill'd himself, the other his Son. The equality which Titus Livius sayes in these two Armies, was, because they had both serv'd in the wars a long time toge∣ther; they used the••ame language, order, and armes: for in the ordering of their battel, they had the same manner, and their Troupes and the Captains of them had the same names; there was a necessity being they were of equal force and valour, that something extraordina∣ry should happen, that could se••tle and fix the ones resolution, rather than the others: in which (as otherwhere we have said) consists the victory: for while that lasts in the combarants hearts, the Armies never turne their backs. And to the end it might last the longer in the Romans breasts than in the Latins, partly for∣tune, and partly the Consùls valour were cause; for Torquatus killed his son, and Decius him∣self. Titus Livius, where he shews the equality

of their forces, sets downe the whole order the Romanes used in their Armies and in their battels. Which being that he relates at large, I will not rehearse againe, but discourse onely upon that I shall thinke remarkable, and which, because it hath been neglected by all our Cap∣taines of later times, hath been the occasion of many disorders in severall Armyes stand battells. I say therefore, that out of Livius his words wee gather that the Romane Army had three prin∣cipal divisions, which in proper termes may be calld Squadrons; the first was of the Hastati, the second of the Prencipi, the third of the Triarij: and each of these had their horsemen. In the ordering of a battell, they plac't the Hastati for most, in the second place on the right side, upon the shoulders of those the Prencipi were set, and in the third place yet in the same file, the riarij came. The horse of all these ranks they plac't on the right hand and on the left of these three battells: which Squadrons of horse from their formes and Places were call'd wings: because they lookt like the two wings of that body. They rangd the first Squadron of the Hastati, which was in front, in a manner close shut together, that it might be able either to force upon, or sustain the enemy. The second Squadron of the Prencipi (because it was not the first to fight, but was ordeind to succour the for most, in case it was either beaten or driven backe) this they made not so compact together, but kept their ranks thinne, so that they might receive in to them without disordering them∣selves the first Squadron, whensoever being prest on by the enemy, they were forc't to retire. The third Squadron of the Triarij had

their ranks yet thinner than the second; that, if need were, they might receive the two for∣mer Squadrons of the Hastati and Prencipi. The troupes then being all plac'd in this order, began the fight: and if the Hastati were forc'd or overcome, they retir'd into the thinnesse of the ranks of the Prencipi, and they united to∣gether, and having made of two battallions one body, undertooke the fight afresh; and if these were beaten back and routed, they fell backe into the thinner rankes of the Triarij, and so all the battallions became one body, renewd the fight againe, where if they vanquished, because they had not other repayre, they lost the day. And because that alwayes when this last quadron of the Triarij came to try for it, the Army was in danger, thereupon grew his Proverb, The∣matter came so farre as the Triarij. The * 1.13 Commanders of our dayes, as they have abandoned all the other instructions, and follow nor in any part the ancient discipline, so have they quite neglected this part, which is of no small importance: for he that so arrang••s his Armie, that in the fight he can three times repair himself, to lose he must have fortune three times his enemy, and be to incounter a valour sufficient to vanquish him. But he that stands onely on the first shock (as now our Christian Armies doe) may easily lose: for every little disorder, or meane valour, is able to take from him the victory. That which makes our Armyes not able to recover them∣selves three times, is, because they have lost the manner of receiving one Squadron within another: Which comes to passe, because now adayes battells are rangd which one of these

two disorders; either they place their troupes at the shoulders the one of another, and make their battell large of breadth, and thinne in depth; which makes it weaker, because there is but small distance from the brest to the backe. And when to make it stronger, they reduce the troupes to the Romane manner, if the first front be broken, not having order to be receivd in the second, they fall together into a confusion, and rout them∣selves: for if that before be beaten backe, it falls upon the second; if the second strives to advance, it is hindred by the first: Whereupon the first and the second both beating upon the third, causes such a confusion, that com∣monly a very little matter destroys a whole Army. The Spanish and French Armyes in the battle at Ravenna, where the Lord de Pors Generall of the French forces dyed, which was (according to our times) a well fought battell, was arranged in one of these forenam'd wayes: which is, that one and the other Armie came on with all their peo∣ple plac'd to shoulder the one the other, so that neither army had but one front, and were much more in breadth then in depth. And this befalls them alwayes, where they have a large plaine, as they had at Ravenna. For knowing the disorder they make in reti∣ring, by placing themselves in one file, they avoide it when they can, which they do by making the front large, as it is said. But when the scite of the country restraines them, they remaine in the forenam'd disorder, without advising themselves of the remedy. In which they passe through their enemies countries, they goe out to forrage, or venture on any

other exploit. And at Saint Regulus in that occasion of Pisa, and otherwhere, where the Florentines were routed by the Pisans, during the warre which was betweene the Florentines and that city, for their rebellion, after Charles the King of France his passage in∣to Italy, those defeates were caused by nothing else but by their owne horse: which being in vantgard, and by the enemies beaten backe into the Florentine foote, routed it, where∣upon all the remainder turn'd their backes; and Criacus de Borgo, the ancient generall of the Florentine infantery, hath said it many times in my hearing, that they had never bin routed but by their own horse. The Swisses who are the principall masters of our modern warres, when they serve with the French, above all things have a care to place themselves on the side, for feare their owne horse driven backe should beate upon them. And howbeit these things seeme easie to understand, and very easie to practise, yet hath not there been any of our contemporary Commanders, that would follow these ancient orders, or amend the moderne. And though they have made their Armies tripartite, terming the one the Vauntguard, the other the Battell, and the last the Rereguard: they make no other use thereof, but to command them when they are quatered in their lodgings, but in any service, very seldome it is (as is formerly said) but that they make all these bodies run one fortune. And because many to ex∣cuse their own ignorance, alledge that the violence of the Artillery permits not that many of the ancient orders be observd, I will argue it in the next Chapter, and examine,

whether the Artillery doe hinder the practise of the ancient valour.

CHAP. XVII.

What esteeme our moderne armies ought to have of artilery, and if the opinion; which is ge∣nerally conceived of it, be true.

WHen I consider, besides the things formerly written, how many pitcht battells were fought by the Romans at severall times, that general opinion which many hold, comes into my minde, that if a••tilery had bin used in those dayes, the Romans could never so easily have subdued the coun∣tryes they did, nor have brought these nations they did, to become their tributaries, nor in any case could they have made such brave conquests. They say moreover, that by reason of these guns, men cannot put in practice nor shew the valour they could of old. And then they adde a third matter, that it makes it more difficult to come to a battell now, then formerly; nor can they containe themselves within the orders of those times, so that in time the warre will be all reduced to the artillery. And being desirous now not out of purpose to argue touching the the truth of such opinions, and how much artillery hath augmented or diminished the force of armies, and whether they bereave or affoard good Captaines occasion to behave themselves valourously, I will begin to speake concerning, their first opinion; that the ancient Roman armies would never have made those conquests they did, had artilery bin then in use. Whereupon I say in answer, that warre is made either in defence or offence. And then we are to examine, to

which of these two parts it does more good or hame. And though reasons may be al∣ledged on both sides, yet I thinke, that without comparison the defendant receives more dammage by it, then the assailant. The reason, which hereof I give, is, that the defendant is either within a walled towne, or in the field within trenches: If he be in a towne, either it is but little, as most com∣monly for tresses are, or great and large. In the first case, the defendant is quite lost; for such is the force of artillery, that no wall be it of what thicknesse it will, but in a few dayes is ruined by it. And if those that are within the walls, have not good roome to retire themselves, with retrenchments and forti∣fications, they are lost; nor can they support the shocke of the enemy, when he would enter by breach in the wall, nor hath he any helpe herein of his artillery: for this is a max∣ime, that where met can enter in by throngs and with violence, the artillery cannot keep them off. Therefore the furious assaults of the Tramontaines it is not possible for the defend∣ant to resist; but the assaults the Italians give, are well enough endured, who never all in a ••hrong, but scatteringly come to the fight, which they by a name very fit for the purpose, call skirmishes. And these that goe with this disorder and timcrousnesse to enter a breach, where artillery is, go to an apparent death, and against them artillery is a good use: but those who in throngs, when the one presses forward the other, come to the breach, unlesse sustained by ditches and ramparts, will enter any place, and the artillery shall never beat them off; and though some few of them

be slaine, yet can they never be so many as can hinder them of victory. That this is true, we finde in many conquests which fortainers have here made in Italy, especially in that of Brescia: for that towne having rebelled against the French, and the fort holding good yet for the French King, the Venetians were to support all the violence, that from thence could fall in upon the towne, having all that way guarded with artillery, that descended from the fortresse into the city, some of them being planted against the front, others upon the flankes, and so in every other place fir. Whereof the Lord of Fois made not any ac∣count, but descending a foote with his troopes passed through the midst of them, and tooke the towne, nor ever appeared it that he had received thereby any notable losse. So that he who defends a little towne (as it is said) which is walled in, but hath not space to retire with ••etrenchments and fortifications, and trusts upon the artillery, is presently lost. And thou defendest a great towne, and hast con∣veniency for retreat, yet without comparison is the artillery more availeable to those with∣out, then within the walls. First, because thou wouldest with thy artillery annoy those without, thou must of force raise thy selfe with it above the levell: for while thou art on the levell, every small fence or trench that the enemy makes secures him, and thou canst no wayes dammage him; so that thou being to raise thy selfe, and to mount thy peeces on the curtaine of the wall, or some other way, drawest two difficulties upon thee. The first is, that thou canst not bring ordnance thither, neither of that bignesse nor effect, that he

without can, being that great things are not manageable in small spaces. The other is, that though we grant thou canst bring such peeces thither, yet canst thou not make those safe and strong fortifications to secure thy arti∣lery within which they without can, being upon the plaine ground, and having those conveniences, and that roome, they can desire. So that it is impossible for him that defends a towne to keepe his artillery mounted on those high places, when those without have store of great and good peeces. And if he brings them into lower places, they become for the most part unprofitable, as it is said. So that the defence of a city is to be made by the bodies of men, as it was the custome of old, and with the small shot: Whereby if they make any small advantage, in regard of the small shot, they suffer as much losse, which counterpoises all the good the artillery can do them: for by them the towne walls are all laid flat, and, as it were, buried in the ditches, so that when the enemy comes to enter by as∣sault, either because the walls are beaten downe, or that the ditches are filled, he that is within, hath more disadvantages thereby, then otherwise he had. And therefore (as it was formerly said) these instruments of wa••re do more helpe the besieger, then the besieged. Touching the third point, which is to retire into the campe, and there to make intrench∣ments, to keepe off from battell till some convenience or advantage gotten, I say, that herein thou hast no more helpe ordinarily to keepe thee from fighting, then had the anci∣ents. And sometimes by reason of the artil∣lery thou hast more disadvantage: for if the

enemy come upon thee, and have some small advantage of the field, as it may easily chance that he gets the upper ground of thee, or that at his arrivall thou hast not fully cast up thy trenches, nor cover'd thy selfe well with them, presently he dislodges thee whithout remdy, and thou art forced to come cut of thy forti∣fications and fight: which befell the Spaniards in the battell at Ravenna, who, being forti∣fied betweene the river Roncus, and a trench they had cast up, the fence whereof was not of that hight was needfull, so that the French had gotten some small advantage of the ground, were forc'd by the artillery out of their fortifications to come to fight. But grant (as most commonly it should be) that the place where thou hast encamped, were higher then those others whereof the enemies were masters, and that their fortifications were good and secure in such sort as by meanes of scituation and other thy preparations the e∣nemy dares not assaile thee, in this case they will be forced to use those meanes, which of old they were wont, when any one lay with his army, where he could not be endammag'd, which were to forrage the country and pillage it, to beleager some of the cheife townes, to hinder thy provisions, so that by some necessity thou shalt of force dislodge and be brought to fight, where the artillery, as we shall here∣after shew is not of so great effect. Con∣sidering then what sort of warres the Romars made, being in all most all of them they were assailants, and not defendants, it shall appeare (being that these things above written are true.) that they would have had greater ad∣vantages, and sooner have made their con∣conquests,

had the artillery bin in those times. Touching the second point, that men cannot make proofe of their valour as of old they might, by reason of the artillery, I say, that it is true, that where men are to shew them∣selves in scattered troops, they run more ha∣zard, then when they are to scale a wall or make such like assaults, where they are not all in one body, but each one a part shewes him∣selfe. It is true also that the Captaines and Commanders of armies are exposed to more danger of death, being that then the artillery can reach them in any place; nor availes it them to be in the hindermost rankes, or in∣vironed by their valiantest Souldiers. Yet we see, that neither of these two dangers do often endammage much; for places fortified are not easily scal'd, nor do they weakly goe to assaile them: but if they will take them, they must besieges them, as it was the custome of old. And where they take their townes by assault, the dangers now a dayes are not much greater then they were wont to be: for even in those times they who defended the townes, wanted not their instruments of warre where with to shoote at their enemies, which (though per∣haps they were not of that violence) yet for slaughter were of the same effect. Touching the death of Captaines and Commanders, in foure and twenty yeares time, that these last warres have bin in Italy, we have not so many examples, as in ten yeares the ancients had: for from Count Lodowicke of Mirandola, that died at Ferrara, when the Venetians, a few yeares since, assai'd that state, and the Duke of Nemours, that died at Cerignuola, there hath not any one bin slaine by the canon: For

the Lord of Fois was slain by the sword at Ravenna, and not by the Cannon. So that if men give no particular proofs of their valour, it is not caused by their canon, but prooeeds from their evil orders, and the feebleness of their armies, which when they want valour in the gross, cannot then in any particular make shew of it. Touching the third allegation made by them, that they can never come to joyne battel, but that the sum of all will de∣pend upon the artillery, I say that this opini∣on is utterly false, and so shall it be held by those who according to the valour of old will imploy their armies: for whosoever will have a good army, must use them in trainings or rather in battels to come up close to the enemy, and there fall to handy blows with him, and take him by the coller: and they ought to ground more upon the infantry then the cavallery, for some reasons we shall here, after alledge. And when they shall rely most upon the foot, and upon these waies we have spoken of, the artillery becomes quite unpro∣fitable; for more easily can the infantry avoyd the blow of the cannon by comming up close to the enemy, then of old they could escape the sury of the Elephants, the chariors arm'd with hooks, and such other unaccusiomed encoun∣ters which the Roman infantry met with, and sound remedy against, which they would to much the more easily have found against these, as much as the time is of very short durance in which the artillery can harme thee, in comparison of of that wherein the Elephan••s and chariots ••id mischeif: for these in the very middle and heat of the battle did put all into disorder; whereas the artillery hinders thee

onely before the battel: which hinderance the infantry easily avoid, either by going co∣ver'd under the naturall scite of the place, or by stooping towards the ground when they shoot: which also we see by experience is not necessary, especially to escape the canon, which can hardly be so right levell'd, but that if they go high they miss thee, if low they come short of thee. Afterwards when the armies are come to handy blowes, this is more clear then the light, that neither the great nor small shot can do thee much harm: for if the enemy places the artillery before him, thou mayst easily take it; if behind him, it hurts himself before it can touch thee: or if it be on either side of thee, it cannot so gall thee, but that thou mayest come up close to it; whereupon will follow the effect we have said. Nor needs there much dispute upon this: for we have seen it by the example of the Switzers, who at Navarra in the year 1513. without arrillery or horse assail'd the French army within their fortifications being guarded with artillery, and yet routed them be∣ing no way hinder'd thereby: and the reason is, (besides the things formerly alledged) because the artillery hath need to be guarded, if we would it should make any good execution, ei∣ther by some wall, or trenches or some kind of fortifications, and when it fails of these defences it becomes a prey to the enemy, & so is made un∣profitable, as it comes to pass when it is defen∣ded onely by men, or as it may be in field bat∣tels, it cannot be plac'd on the flank, unless it be on that manner, that the ancients used their in∣struments of war, when they plac'd them with∣out their squadrers, because they should play from without the ranks; and whensoever they

were put at, either by the horse or others they retired behind the legions: whose ever accounts otherwise of them, does not well understand the use of them, and trusts'upon that, which may easily deceive him, and if the Turk by the help of his artillery, have gaind any victory of the Sophy and the So'dan, it was not occasi¦on'd by other vertue of it, then by the affright the unusual noise thereof put the horse in∣to. Therefore I conclude, comming to the end of this discourse, that the artillery is prossitable in an army, where there is a mingle of the anci¦ent valour, without which it avails little against a couragious army.

CHAP. XVIII.

How by authority taken from the Romans, and from the use of the ancient military discipline, the foot is more to be esteemd, than the horse.

WEE can plainly sshew it by many rea∣sons and examples, how much the Ro∣mans in all military actions did prefer the in∣fantry before the cavalry, and thereupon groun∣ded the assurance of all their executions, as it appears by many examples, and among others, when they sought with the Latins near the lake of Regillum, where the Roman Army giving ground a little, for their succours, the horse-men were commanded to light and serve a soct whereby they made good the fight and gaind the victory. Where it is manifest, the Romans had more confidence in them being a foot, than a horseback, They us'd the same termes in ma∣ny other fights, and sound it alwaies a pre∣sent help in their dangers. Nor let Hanni∣bals

opinion counterballance this, who seeing in the battel at Canna that the Consuls made their horsemen light and serve afoot, scoffing at the course they took, said, I * 1.14 had rather indeed they should be delivered bound into my hands. Which opinion however that it was utterd by a very able man, yet if we are to follow authorities, we may rather give credit to a Roman Commonwealth, and so many excellent Captains, that flouri∣shed in it, than to one Hanniball alone, though without this authority the reasons are evi∣dent: for a man on foot can go in many places, where a horseback he cannot: he may be able to instruct them, how to keep their ranks, and being somewhat confus'd, how they may be restored again. It is very hard to make the horse keep their ranks, and when once they are in disorder, it is impossible to recover them. Be∣sides this, as we see it among men, so is it a∣mong horses; some there are which have but small courage, others again exceeding coura∣gious. And many times it falls out, that a brave horse is back'd by a cowardly fellow, and some∣times a timerous jade is mounted by a stout Souldier; and there which way soever it is that this disparitie follows, arises uprofitable∣ness and disorder. The infantry well united in their ranks are easily able to rout the horse, and very hardly can they be routed by them: Which opinion is confirmed (besides many an∣cient moderne examples) by their authorities who have left us the records of ancient Repub∣liques, where they shew us, how that at first they began to make war a horseback, be∣cause they understood neither the order nor the use of the foot, which when they once had

the knowledge of, they quickly conceiv'd how much more profitable they were than the horse. But hereupon it follows not that the horse are not necessary in armies, to discover, and to forrage and prey about in the Countrey, and to pursue the enemies in their slight, and in part also to oppose all the attempts of the the adversaries horse. But the ground-worke, and the very nerves of the army, and whereof most account is to be made, is the Infantry. And among the Italian Princes faults, which have euthral'd Italy to strangers, there is none greater than that they made no account of this order, and turn'd all their regard towards the service of horsemen: Which disorder procee∣ded from the evil disposition of the Captains, and their ignorance that govern'd the State: by reason that for these twenty-five years last past all the military affairs in Italy were in the hands of men that had no setled estates, but were Captains adventurers, serving where they could have pay, who presently devised how they could maintain their reputation, they con∣tinuing in armes when the Princes were un∣armed. And because they could not continu∣ally get pay for a good number of foot, nor had any subjects whereof to serve them∣selves, and a small number got them no credit, they be took themselves to horse: for a Captain having pay for 200 or 300 horse, subsisted there∣by in good repute, and the payment was not such, but that those that rul'd the State could easily satisfie it. And to the end this should come on more easily, and to keep themselves the better in esteem, they took all respect and re∣putation from the foot, and reserred all to their cavallery; And so far increas'd they this disor∣der,

that in the greatest Armie they levyed, the least part of them was foot. Which custom, to∣gether with many other disorders intermixt with it, hath much weakned the Italian Soldie∣ry, so that this Country hath easily bin trodden under foot by all strangers. This error, of e∣steeming the horse more than the foot, is laid open yet more plainly, by another example of the Romans. The Romans were incamp∣ed at Sora; and a troop of horse having made a sally out of the town to assualt the Camp, a Captain of the Roman horse went to incoun∣ter them with his Cavalry, whereupon the first shock, meeting brest to brest, it chanc'd that the Commander of each troop was slain, and the residue being left without government, and the skirmish still continuing, the Romans that they might the better vanquish their enemies, light from their horses, and forc't their enemies (if they would defend themselves) to do the like, wherewith the Romans carried away the victory. This example could not serve better to the purpose, in shewing of how much value the infantry is, above the horse: for if in other occasions the Consuls made the horsemen to dismount, it was to succour the foot that were in distress, and had need of ayd. But in this place they light not to assist the foot, nor to fight with their enemies foot, but fighting a horseback with horsemen, they thought that though they were not able to master them on horseback, that a∣lightning they could more easily vanquish them: I will therefore conclude, that a body of foot in good order and array cannot without much dif∣ficulty be overcome by another body of foot. Crassus and Marchus Antonius both Romans, made an introde of many daies journeys into the Parthians Kingdome, with a very few horse

and a good number of foot, where they incoun∣tred with numberless troops of the Parthian horse. Crassus was left there dead with part of the Army; Marcus Antonius valorously sav'd himself. Nevertheless, in these Roman losses it appears, how much the Infantry exceeded the horse: for being in an open Country, where there are few mountains, and very few rivers, and the Sea-coast far off, and remote from all conveniency, yet for all this did Marcus Anto∣nius even in the opinion of the Parthians them∣selves, very valourously escape, nor ever durst the whole Parthian Cavalry venture to break into the ranks of his Army. If Crassus perish'd there, whosoever well reads his actions, shall find, that he was rather treacherously beguild, than forc'd, nor ever in all his disorders, durst the Parthians set upon him, but alwaies went along by him, to keep in his soldiers from strag∣ling, and getting of provisions, and by promi∣sing fairly, but observing nothing, brought him at length unto extream distress. I should think I were to take much pains in perswading that the valour of the infantry does much excel that of the horse, but that there are many modern examples which give us a very satisfactory testi∣mony. And tis well known that 9000 Swisses at Navarra, formerly alleaged by us, went to en∣counter 10000 horse and as many more foot, & vanquish'd them: for the horse could no way harm them, and the foot being for the most part Gascoignes and ill ordered, they made small ac∣count of. We see likewise that afterwards 36000 Swisses, went to find Francis the French King about Milan, who had an army of 20000 horse and 40000 foot, and a 100 tire of Ord∣nance; and though they gaind not the battel at

at Navarra, yet they fought bravely two dayes together, and when at length they were broken the moity of them escap'd. Marcus Regulus Attilius presum'd with his infantry to incoun∣ter not onely the enemies horse, but their Ele∣phants; and though his purpose came not to effect, yet was it not so, but that the valour of his infantry was such, that he had very good reason to hope he might well overcome that difficulty. And therefore I answer, that he that would overcome a body of foot in good array, must oppose them with another body of foot in better order than they; otherwise he sustains an evident loss. In the dayes dayes of Philip Visconti Duke of Milan, there came down into Lombardy some 16000 Swisses, whereupon the Duke Carmignuola being then his Gene∣ral, sent him with neare upon a thousand horse and some few foot to incounter them: Who not knowing the manner of their fighting, went to meet them with his horse, not doubting but that he could presently rout them. But find∣ing them to stand firm, and having lost many Souldiers, retir'd; yet being a very able man, and knowing in new accidents how to try new wayes, having repaird his broken troupes, he went again to meet them, where he made all his armed men a light, and serve on foot, and so by them having made a head to those of his infantry, he invested the Swisses, who found no way to help themselves: for Carmignuolaes horsemen bring lighted, who were wel arm'd, were able with facilitie to enter into the Swisses ranks without much hurt: which when they had pierc'd, they could easily harme; so that of their whole number there was left onely that part alive, that was by Carmignuolaes curtesie

preserv'd. I beleeve well that many know this difference of valour that is between the one and the other of these orders, but so unhappy are these times, that neither the ancient nor modern examples, nor the acknowledgement of the error is of force to prevail with modern Princes to readvise themselves and consider, that to recover the reputation of the Souldiery of a Countrey or State, it is necessary to revive a∣gain these orders and entertain them near their persons, to encourage them and allow them means to live, to the end they may restore to them both life and reputation. But as we use to forsake these customs, so we leave other or∣ders also formerly spoken of; whereupon it comes to pass, that the very conquests we make turne to our losses, and not to the advancement of a State, as hereafter we shall say.

CHAP. XIX.

That Conquests in Republiques not well govern'd, and which proceed not according to the Roman vertue, prove rather their ruine, than ad∣vancement.

THese opinions contrary to the truth, and grounded on evil precedents, which have bin introduced by these our corrupt ages, cause men not to stand much upon straying from old wonted uses. Some thirty years agoe, an I∣talian would never have bin perswaded, that ten thousand foot in a plain had ever bin able to assault ten thousand horse and so many more foot, and not only fight with them, but van∣quish them too, as it is plain by the example of the battel at Navarra; by us sundry times al∣leag'd.

And however that Stories are full of them, yet would they not have given us credit: and if they had beleeved us, they would have said, that in these dayes men are better arm'd, and that a squadron of men at armes would have bin of force to have shock'd with a rock, and not only with a body of foot, and thus with these false excuses they corrupted their judgments. Nor would they have taken into consideration, that Lucullus with a few foot routed a 150000 horse that Tigranes led, and yet among those horsemen there was a sort of them very like our men at armes. And so this fallacy was discover'd by the example of forrain Nati∣ons. And as thereby it proves true, touching the infantry, which is related in Story, so ought it be beleev'd that all the rest of the ancient or∣ders are true and usefull. And when this we re once credited, Republiques and Princes would fail less, and be of more strength to resist any force should come upon them, nor hope so much in the flight; and those that should have in their hands the government of State, would be better able to guide it, either by way of ampli∣fication or by way of preservation, and would think that to increase the number of their Citi∣zens, and make them as their associates and not vassals, to send forth Colonies to keep the coun∣tries gained, to make a general stock out of the booties taken, to tame the enemy with incursi∣ons, & by set battels, & not long sieges, to main∣tain the publique state in wealth, & the private in scarcity, and to be industrious in keeping the armies in good discipline, are the means to in∣large a Commonwealth & gain an Empire. And when this way of amplification should not like them, then should they think that all addition to

their state are the ruine of Commonwealths, and therefore should restrain all ambition, re∣gulating their City according to their lawes and customs, forbidding all inlargments, only ayming at defenee of what they have, and keeping them under good government, as the Republicks of Germany do, and so have liv'd free a good while. Notwithstanding (as otherwhere I have said, when I discours'd touching the diffe∣rence there was in the ordering of a State to become fit to conquer; and the ordering of one to be able to maintain it self) it is impossible, that a Republick should have the hap to stand quiet, and enjoy her own liberty, with her small Territories: for though she molest not o∣thers yet she shall be molested her self: she may also have some mind or some necessity in some part to extend her bounds: and in case she have no enemy abroad, yet may she find some one at home, as it must needs be alwaies that such be found among a great many potent citizens, and if those Republicks of Germany can subsist in that manner, & have been able to continue for a time it arises from some conditions, that are in that Country, & which are no where else sound, nor could they maintain such a manner of govern∣ment without them. This part of Germany, whereof I speak, was subject to the Roman Em∣pire, as were France & Spain; but when the Em∣pire began to decline, & the title of the Empire was brought into that Country, the most potent of those Cities began (according to the baseness or the necessity of those Emperors) to set them∣selves at liberty, buying themselves out from the Empire, and reserving thereunto only a a certain annual rent. Insomuch as by little and little, all those Cities, which he••d

immediatly of the Emperor, and were no way in subjection to any Prince, in such like man∣ner set themselves free. It happened in the same times, when these Cities bought out their li∣berties, that certain communalties of the Duke of Austria's subjects, rebell'd agianst him, a∣mong which were Tilibourg, the Swisses and others, who prospering in the beginning, by little and little came to such growth, that they not only shook off the Austrian yoke, but even became a terror to all their neighbours, and these are those they call Swisses. This Country therefore is divided into the Swisses, Republcks, which they call-free Townes, Princes, and the Emperor. And the reason why among such va∣riety of governments there arise no warres, or if any do, why they continue not, is that re∣verence they yeeld to the Emperor, who albeit he hath no great forces, yet is held in such esteem among them, that he alwaies reconciles them, & with his authority interposing himself as Mediator, takes away all discontents: & the greatest & longest warrs that have been there, were those that follow'd between the Swisses & the Duke of Austria; and though now for these many years the Emperor and the Duke of Au∣stria have been one and the same thing, yet was he never so powerful as to tame the Swisses in∣solence, where there was never any means of accord, unless it were by force; nor hath the re∣sidue of Germany ever given him much assistance: partly because those communalties cannot find in their hearts to hurt those that desire to live under a civil government, as they themselves do and partly because those Princes are not able, being poor, or will not, by reason that they envy too great puissance. Those commo∣nalties therfore may live contented with

their small dominions, because they have no occasion (in regard of the Imperial Authority) to wish it greater. They may live the better in union within their owne walls, because they have the enemy near at hand, who would willingly take any opportunity to lay hold on them, whensoever they should fall in∣to discord: but if that country were otherwise conditioned, it were fit for them to seeke the inlargement of their State, & so interrupt their owne rest: and because otherwhere there are not the like termes, this manner of living can∣not be followed, and there is a necessity either to strengthen the State by way of leagues, or to amplifie it as the Romans did. And whosoever undertake any other course of government, seeke not their owne life, but ruine and de∣sttruction: for many wayes, and for many reasons are conquests hurtfull: for it is very possible to gaine dominion, and not strength; and he that does increase his dominions, & yet growes not in strength, must needs go to wrack. They cannot grow strong, that grow poore in the wars, although they prove vict∣orious, because their conquests cost them more then they get by them, as the Venetians & the Florentins did, who have bin much weaker, when the one commanded all Lombardy, and the other Tuscany, then when the one was con∣tented with the seaonley and the other with six miles round of territories: for al this preceeded from their desire to conquer, & their ignorance to take the right course: and they deserve the more blame, in that they have very little excuse having seene the ways the Romanes went, because they might have followed their exam∣ple, being that the Romanes without any pat∣terne

to follow, by their own judgment, found out a fit way to go. Moreover sometimes such gains gotten do no smal harm to a well govern'd Commonwealth, when either such a city or country is conquer'd that abounds with pleasures, where by conversation with them, their manners are learned, as it happen'd to Rome at first in the conquest of Capua, & after∣wards to Hannibal. And had Capua been of fur∣ther distance from the City, that the soldiers er∣ror had not had the remedy near hand, or that Rome had been in some part corrupted, without question that conquest had prov'd the Roman Republicks ruine. And T. Livius witnesses the same in these words: Even then was Capua little good for the military dis∣cipline, * 1.15 which being the instrument of all sorts of pleasures, besotted the soldiers minds so, that they forgot their native Countries. And truly such like Cities sufficiently avenge themselves on their Conquerors without fight, or loss of blood; for by infecting them with their contagious vi∣ces, they expose them to the conquest of who∣ever assailes them. And Juvenal could not bet∣ter have expressed this, then where in his Sa∣tyres he saies, that by their conquests of forrain nations, their minds were possessed with forrain vices, in exchange of parsimony, & other excel∣lent vertues; Glutrony and luxury making their habitation there, revenged the * 1.16 worlds Conquest on them. If therefore these gettings were likely to have been dangerous to the Romans, in the times that they proceeded with such wisdome and vertue, how will they prove to those who go on

in much different waies from them? and who besides the other errors they run into (whereof we have formerly spoken enough) serve them∣selves of either mercenary or auxiliary soldiers? whereupon those mischiefs often befall them, which we shall mention in the following chap.

CHAP. XX.

What hazzard that Prince or Commonwealth runs, which is serv'd by auxiliary and merce∣nary soldiers.

IF in another work of mine I had not trea∣ted at large of mercenary and auxiliary sol∣diers how unprofitable they are, and how very profitable the native soldiers of the Country are, I would much more have inlarged my self in this discourse, than now I purpose; but having otherwhere discours'd hereupon at length, I shall now only point at it. Not yet did I think fit wholly to pass it over, having found in Titus Livius so large an example be∣longing to those soldiers: for auxiliary soldiers are those that a Prince or Commonwealth sends with their Captains and pay ready fur∣nish'd in thy aid. And comming to the text of T. Livius, I say, that the Romans having in seve∣rall places broken two armies of the Samnites with their forces, which they sent to succor the Capuans, and thereby freed them from that warr the Samnites made against them, purpo∣sing to return to Rome, to the end the Capuans dispoyl'd of ayd should not a new becom a prey to the Samnites, left behind them in the country about Capua two legions to defend them. Which legions growing corrupt through idleness,

began to be insnar'd with the delicacies thereof So that having for gotten their owne country, and the reverence they ought to the Senate, they resolved to take armes, and make them∣selves Lords of that Country, which they by their valours had defended, thinking those in∣habitants not worthy to injoy those goods, which they knew not how to defend. Which thing, the Romanes having had some inkling of it before, was stopped, and punished by them, as, where we speak of conspiracies, it shall be show'd at large. Therefore I say again, that of all kindes of souldiers the auxiliaries are the most dangerous; Because among those, that Prince or Republique that uses them for ayd, hath no authority, but onely he that sends them: for auxiliary souldiers are those that are sent th••e by a Prince, as I have sayd, under the command of his own Captaines, under his own en∣signes and pay also, as this army was, which the Romanes sent to Capua. These kinds of soul∣diers, when they have vanquished, most com∣monly pillage as well them that have hir'd them, as the enemy against whom they have hi∣red them; and this they do, either through the maligne disposition of their Prince that sends them, or through their owne ambition And however the Romanes had no intention to vi∣olate the agreement and conventions made with the Capuans, yet the facility wherewith those souldiers thought themselves able to take their towne, was such that it might have been of force to perswade them to think of taking the town and State from the Capuans: Many examples to this purpose may be alledg'd; but this, and that of the inhabitants of Rhegium shall suffice me, from whom both lives & town

were taken by one legion of soldiers, which the Romans had there left in garrison. There∣fore a Prince or a Republick should rather take any other course, than seek to bring auxi∣liary soldiers into his Country, principally when he is most to rely upon them: for any accord or agreement (though very hard) to which he shall yeeld with his enemy, shall be more tolerable than this. And if things past were well call'd to mind, and those that are present well consider'd on, for one that hath had good success in such a business, a man shall find exceeding many who have been abus'd. And a Prince, or an ambitious Republick can never have a fitter opportunity to seise on a Town or Country, than when they are re∣quir'd to send their armies for defence thereof. Wherefore he that is so ambitious, that not only for his own defence, but for offence to a∣nother, calls in such like aids, seeks to gain that he cannot hold, and which also he that gets it for him, can at his pleasure take from him, But so great is mans ambition, that if he can ful∣fill his desire for the present, he is never aware of that evill, which shortly after may thence re∣dound to him. Nor do the ancient examples avail any thing with him, as well in this, as in other things we have treated of: for were men hereby mov'd, they would perceive that the more freely and fairly they dealt with their neighbours, and the farther of they were from making themselves masters of them, the more readily would they offer to cast themselves into their armes, as hereafter shall appear by exam∣ple of the Capuans.

CHAP. XXI.

The first Pretour that the Romans ever sent to any place, was to Capua, four hundred years after they began to make war.

HOw much the Romans in their manner of proceeding in their Conquests did differ from those, who now a daies inlarge their do∣minions, we have formerly discours'd enough, and how they suffer'd those Towns which they did not utterly race, to live with their own laws, as well those that yeelded to them as sub∣jects, as those that came under their protecti∣on as associates. And in them they left no marks of the Roman Empire, but tied them to some certain conditions, which whiles they observ'd, they still maintain'd them in their state and dignity. And we know that these courses were continued till they began to Conquer abroad out of Italy, and that they re∣duc'd Kingdomes and States into Provinces. Whereof the example is very clear; for the first place that ever they sent any Preror to was Capua, whether they sent him not through their own ambition, but upon the Capuans in∣treaty, who (being they were at discord one with another) judg'd it necessary to have a Citizen of Rome amongst them, that might put them in order again and reunite them. The An∣tiates also mov'd by their example, and con∣strain'd by the same necessity requir'd to have a Prefect sent them. And T. Livius saies upon this occasion, and upon this new way of ruling; That now not only the Ro∣man * 1.17 armes, but their lawes

also were in great repute. We see therefore how much this course taken, further'd the Ro∣mans advancement: for those Cities especially that are accustomed to live free, or to be go∣vern'd by their own Citizens, are well enough contented to live in another manner of quiet under a rule they see not (though it may bring some burden with it too) rather than under that which they having every day in their view, continually reproaches them with their slavery. Besides this; the Prince gains hereby another advantage, that his Officers having not in their hands these judicatures and magistracies, whereby they were to regulate those Cities, there can no imputation or asper∣sion be cast upon the Prince. And hereby many occasions of calumny and hatred against him are taken away. And that this is true, be∣sides ancient examples, which we could al∣ledge, we have one of late memory in Italy: for as it is well known (Geneva having been several times possessed by the French) that King did alwaies (except at this present time) send them a French Governor, who under him should govern them. For this present only, but upon any intention of the Kings; but it seem'd necessity so order'd it, he hath suffered them to be governed by their own lawes, and to have a Genowes for their Magistrate. And I make no question but that he that inquires which of these two waies most secures the King for his rule over them, & gives the people most satisfaction, would the rather alow of this latter. Moreover men cast themselves the more freely into thy armes, the further off they think thee from being desirous to rule; & so much the less do they fear thee in regard of their liberty, by

how much the more curteous and familiar thou art with them. This familiarity and free man∣ner of behaviour made the Capuans hasty to aske a Prerour of the Romans: but had the Romans of themselves made but the least shew they would have sent one thicher, they would pre∣sently have been in jealousie of them, and star∣ted from them. But what need we go to Capua and Rome for examples, having store enough at Florence and in Tuscany? It is well known how long since it is that Pistotia willingly yeel∣ded it self to the government of Florence. It is as well known also, what enmity hath been between the Florentines and the Pisans, the Luckeses and the Seneses; and this difference of diposition proceeds not from thence, that the Pistoyeses value not their liberty, as well as o∣thers do, but because the Florentines us'd these with that respect they do their own brothers, but the others they treated as enemies. This was the occasion made the Pistoyeses offer themselves freely to be govern'd by them; and the others struggle with all might and main, as yet they do also, not to come under them. And doubtless, had the Florentines either by way of alliances or succours grown familiar with their neighbours, and not have alwaies scar'd them, they had at this instant been Lords of all Tuscany. But hereupon I advise not, that armes and force are not to be us'd, but that they are to be reserv'd for the last place, where and when other meanes will not serve.

CHAP. XXII.

How erroneous many times the opinions of men are, when they give their judgements touch∣ing great affaires.

HOw false oftentimes mens opinions are, they well see, who are eye-witnesses of their deliberations, which many times unless they be determined of by able men, are con∣trary to all truth. And because that excel∣lent men in corrupted Commonwealths (especially in peaceable times) both for envy and occasions of ambition are maligned, such ad∣wise is follow'd, as by reason of a common er∣ror is well approv'd of, or such as is put for∣ward by men that aime rather at grace and fa∣vour then the general good. This error after∣ward is discover'd in times of adversity, and of force recourse is had to those that in times of peace were utterly forgotten, as in its own place in this part it shall fully be spoken of. There are also certain accedents where men are very easily beguiled, if not well experienced in affaires, the present accident having in it self many likelihoods fit to make that credible, whereof in such a case men are perswaded. These words are spoken upon that which Nu∣micius the Pretour (after that the Latins were defeated by the Romans) perswaded them; and upon that which few years since, many be∣leeved, when Francis the first, King of France came to the Conquest of Milan, which was de∣fended by the Swissers. Therefore I say, that Lewis the Twelfth being dead, and Francis of Angoulesme succeeding in the Kingdome of

France, and desiring to restore the Duchy of Milan to the Kingdome whereof the Switzers had of late possessed themselves, by means of Pope Julius the seconds encouragement, desired to have some aid in Italy, which might further his undertakings, so that besides the Venetians, whom King Lewis had gain'd, he tried the Flo∣rentines, and Pope Leo the tenth, thinking his enterprise much facilitated, by having them to side with him, because the King of Spains soldi∣ers were in Lombardy, and some of the Empe∣rors forces in Verona. Pope Leo yeelded not to the Kings desire, but by those that counselled him, he was perswaded (as it was said) to stand neuter, showing him that herein consisted certain victory: for it was nothing at all for the Churches good, to have either mighty in Italy, the King or the Swissers. But if he desired to restore it to the ancient liberty, it was fit to free it from the one and the other. And because it was not possible to varquish the one or the other, divided or united, it was not ami's to let them overcome one another, and that after∣wards the Church with her allies should assaile the conqueror, and it was impossible to find a better occasion then the present, both being in∣camped: and so the Pope having his forces in order, whereby he might be able to present himself upon the confines of Lombardy, near the two armies under colour of guarding his own state, should there abide till they had fought their battell: which in all probability (each army being very valorous) could not but prove bloody to them both and leave the Con∣queror so feeble, that the Pope might easily assaile and break him, and thereby he should attain to become Lord of Lombardy, and

only arbitrator of all Italy. And how errone∣ous this opinion was, appear'd by the event of the matter: for the Swissers being vanquish'd after a long fight, the Popes and the Spanish soldiers were so far from assailing the Con∣querors, that they prepared themselves with what haste they could for flight; which also would have little avail'd them had it not been for the Kings humanity or coldness in their pursuit, who sought not after a second victory, but was contented to make agreement with the Church. This opinion hath some arguments for it, which carry a colour of truth, but in∣deed are far from it: for it seldome comes to pass, that the Conqueror loses many of his soldiers; for of them, there are some only slai in the battel, and not in the flight: and during the heat of the combat, whiles men stand face to face one with another, few of them fall, especially because for the most part this continues but a small while. And in case it should last long, and many of the Conquerors should fall; yet such is the reputation, and ter∣ror also, that victory draws with it, that it far exceeds the dammage, that by the death of those soldiers can be suffer'd. So that an Army, which upon the opinion, that such a one were weakned, going to assaile it, would be much deceived, unless it were such an Army that at all times, before and after the victory, were able to deale with it. In this case the assailing Army may be able according to the fortune and valor it hath to win or lose: but that which had formerly fought, & vanquish'd, would have some advantage of the other: Which appears plainly by the experience the Latins gave us, and the fallacy by

which Numicius the Pretour was abus'd, as also by the dammage which those people brought upon themselves by beleeving him, who (when the Romans had vanquish'd the Latins) cried out through all Latium, that then was it time to assaile the Romans, who were weakned with the late fight they had with the Latines; that the Romans had carried away only the name of the victory, but had suffered all other sorts of dammages, even as much as if they had been overcome, and that any small force, if now a fresh it should assaile them, were enough to dispatch them. Whereupon those people that gave credit to him, levied a new army, and were presently defeated, and so suffered that loss, which others shall that hold the like o∣pinion.

CHAP. XXIII.

How much the Romans in giving judgement upon their subjects, whensoever occasion was offer'd, that constrain'd them thereunto, avoided the mid way, and rather betook themselves to one of the extreames.

THe Latins were now reduc'd * 1.18 to such termes, that they could neither endure peace, nor maintain War. Of all unhappy conditions this is the worst, unto which a Prince or Republick can be brought, that they can neither accept of peace, nor support the War; unto which those are reduc'd, who are overmuch offended at the conditions of peace, and on the other side, if they have a

mind to make war, either they must cast them∣selves as a prey into the hands of those that ayd them, or become a prey to their enemy. And into these mischances men fall by evil advices and evil courses, by not having well weighed their own forces, as before it was said: for that Republique or Prince, that should well weigh them, very hardly would ever be brought to those termes the Latines came, who when they should not have made accord with the Romans, made it, and when, they should not have broke peace with them brake it. Whereby they brought it so to pass that their agreement and disagreement with the Ro∣mans did equally endammage them. The Latins then were overcome and much broken at first by Manlus Torquatus, and afterwards by Ca∣millus; who having forc't them to yeeld and render themselves to the Romans, and put Gar∣risons in all the I owns in Latium, and taken hostages of them all, when he came back to Rome, related to the Senate, that all Latium was in the people of Romes hands. And be∣cause this judgement is remarkable, and de∣serves note, to the end it may be follow'd, when Princes have the like occasions given them, I will produce the very words, that Livie put in Camillus his mouth, which did testifie both of the manner the Romans held in amplifying the State, and that in their judgements touching the State, they alwaies avoided the middle way, and turn'd to the extreams: for a go∣vernment is nothing else, but to have such a tye upon the subjects, that they either cannot, or will not hurt thee. This is done either by making thy self fully sure of them, in taking a∣way from them all means to hurt thee, or by

doing them so much good, that it is not pro∣bable they will wish to change their state: all which is there comprehended; first by the pro∣position Camillus made, and afterwards by the judgement the Senate gave thereupon. His words were these, In this consultation, the immortal Gods have given you so much power, that it is wholly in your hands to chuse, whether Latium shall continue still a Nation or no. And * 1.19 therefore now may ye for ever procure your selves repose and security from thence, either by rigor and punishment, or by clemency and pardon; chuse ye whether. Are ye minded to proceed by way of cruelty against those that have yeelded, and are vanquish'd? ye may indeed blot out the very name of Latium; But will ye, as your ancestors have done before you, enlarge the Roman Empire, by receiving into your City those whom ye have con∣quer'd? Then have ye here means to grow mighty to your great glory. Certes that government is of all other most sure, where the subjects take joy in their obedience. And therfore it is behoovefull, whiles their mindes are in suspence between fear and hope, to prevent them either with speedy punishment or benefit. To this purpose followed the Senates deliberation, which was according to the Consuls words; for calling them Town by Town, before them, those that were of any moment, they ei∣ther

much benefited, or quite ruined them, granting divers exemptions and priviled∣ges to those they would do good to, freely making them Citizens, and giving them security every way. They dismantled the other strong Towns, and sent Colonies thither, and brought the people from thence into Rome, and so dispersed them, that nei∣ther with their arms nor counsel they could do any more harm: Nor ever did they make use of any neutral way, in things (as I have said) of moment. Princes should imitate this judgment given; and hereunto the Florentines should have intended, when in the year 1502. Arezzo and the valley of Chiana rebelled; which had they done, they had secured their Government, and much amplified the City of Florence, and likewise might have given them those fields they wanted for their sustenance: But they made use rather of that middle way, which is the most pernicious, in giving judgment upon men, so that part of the Aretins they confined, part they condem∣ned, and took from all of them their ho∣nors, and ancient degrees in the City, and yet left the City whole and untouch∣ed: And if any Citizen in their Consul∣tations advised that Arezzo should be dismantelled, and razed, they who seemed to be of the wiser sort, said it would be a disgrace to the Florentines to raze it; because it would be thought then that Florence wanted forces to hold them; which are some of those Reasons that seem to be, but are not true: For by the same reason a patricide were not to be put to death, not a∣ny

vile or scandalous person, it being a shame for that Prince to shew that he is not able to bridle such a man alone: and these kind of men having such opinions, perceive not, how men in particular, and sometimes a whole City to∣gether too, do wrong a State: so that for o∣thers example, and his own safeguard, a Prince hath no other remedy, but uterly to raze it. And indeed the honor consists in the knowledg and power to chastise, and not in being able to hold a City under stil with many dangers: for the Prince that punishes not him that of∣fends, so that he cannot offend more, is esteemd ignorant and unworthy. This sentence which the Romans gave, is confirm'd by the judge∣ment they gave upon the Privernates. Where by the Text in Livie two things may be obser∣ved: the one, which is formerly spoken of, that subjects are either to be oblig'd by good done them, or else to be quite extingnish'd; the other is, how much avails the generous con∣rage of the minde, and true speaking in the presence of sage and discreet men. The Senate of Rome was assembled to give their sentence upon the Privernates, who having been in Re∣bellion, were by force reduc'd to the Roman obedience. Many Citizens were sent from the Privernates to crave pardon of the Senate, who * 1.20 being come before them, were thus ask'd by one of the Senators, What Punishment

he should censure the Privernates worthy of? Whereunto one of the Privernates reply'd, The same that they deserve, who think themselves worthy of liberty. Whereunto the Consul an∣swerd, What if we remit you your punishment, what peace shall we hope for with you? To which he said again, If it be good you give us, you shall have it faithfully and perpetually observ'd, if ill, not long. Whereupon the wises of those of the Senate, howbeit many were angry thereat, said, That they had heard a stout and a free man speak; neither was it credible that any Nation, or any man indeed, would continue any longer, than he must needs, in such a condition, where∣of he repents himself; and there onely was it likely a peace would be inviolably kept, where it was made of their own good wills and freely; but it was in no case to be hop'd for there, where they were brought into bondage and servitude. and upon these words they decreed, that the Privernates should be made Citizens of Rome, and honoured them with all the priviledges of their Bourgessie, saying, That they finally were worthy to be Citizens of Rome, who valu'd no∣thing else in comparison of their liberty. So much were these generous spirits taken with this stout and free answer: for, an answer else would have been false and cowardly. And those that think otherwise of men (e∣specially such as are us'd to be free, or to their thinking are free) are much deceiv'd, and by this deceit are they feduc'd to take wrong cour∣ses for themselves, and of little satisfaction to others: from whence arise the often rebellions and ruines of States. But to return to our discourse, I conclude as well by this, as by that judgement given upon

the Latins, when sentence is to pass upon puissant Cities, and that have been accustomed to enjoy their liberties, it is necessary either utterly to raze them, or by benefiting of them to oblige them; otherwise it is all to no purpose; for the middle way here in is ab∣solutely to be avoided, which is dangerous, as it prov'd to the Samnites, having inclos'd the Romans at the gallows of Gaudium, when they would not follow that old mans counsell that advis'd them, either to let them go with all courtesie and love, or put them all to the sword. But they taking that neutral way, disarming them, and putting them all to pass under the gallows, let them go with shame and disdain so that a while after they found by their own dammage how advantageous that old mans advice had been, and how hurtfull their own resolution was, as we shall discourse thereof more at large in its own place.

CHAP. XXIV.

Fortresses in general do more harm then good.

PEradventure it may seem to the wise men of our times a matter not well advised on, that the Romans, when they would make them∣selves sure of the people of Latium, and of the City of Privernum, never thought upon the building of some Fortress which might serve for a bridle to hold them in obedience, especially being it passes for a Proverb in Flo∣rence, alledg'd by our States men, that Pisa and other such like Cities should be kept with Citradells. And truely had the Romans been like them, they would have provided for the

building of them: but because they were of another kind of courage, and judgement, and had another manner of power, therefore they never built any. and whiles Rome liv'd free, and observ'd her own ordinances, & in∣stitutions, for the propagation of vertue, she never built any one to keep under Cities or Provinces, though it may be, she preserv'd some of them she found already built. Whereupon having seen the manner of the Romans pro∣ceedings herein, and that of the Princes of our times, I think to take it into consideration, whether it be good to build Fortresses, & whe∣ther they advantage or wrong him that builds them. We must consider then, that Fortresses are built either for resistance against the enemy, or for defence against any tumult of the sub∣jects. In the first case they are unnecessary, in the second hurtfull. And to give a reason, wherefore in the second case they are hurtfull, I say, that that Prince or Republick that is afraid of his own subjects, and their rebellion, must needs have his fear arising from the hatred his own subjects bear him; and that hatred from his own evill carriages, which evill car∣riages proceed from thence, either that he be∣leeves he is able to keep them under by force, or from the Princes small discretion: and one of the causes that makes him think himself able to rule them by force, is the having built these Citradels, over them: for evill treatings, which are the causes of hatred, for the most part are deriv'd from thence, that that Prince or Republick hath Cittadels upon them; which (when this is true) are far more hurtful, than profitable: for first (as it is said) they make thee bolder and more rough among thy subjects,

being that thou hast thy security within them: for all these forces and violences which are in use to bridle a people withall, are of no value, but these two; either that thou hast alwaies a good Army ready to send into the field, as the Romans had, or that thou doest disperse, ex∣tinguish, disorder, and disunite them so, that in no case they can make such a body as can hurt thee: for be it that thou doest impoverish them, They that are despoil'd of their * 1.21 goods, have weapons left them. If thou disarmst them, Even rage will find them weapons. If thou destroyest their heads, and proceedest still to injure the rest, there will grow up again new heads, as fast as those of Hydra. If thou buildest Cittadels, they are quite unprofitable in time of peace, because they encourage thee to wrong them; but in time of war they are of least use; for then are they assaulted by the enemy, and thy subjects too; nor is it possible they can resist them both. And if ever they were unprofitable, they are now a dayes so, in regard of the Artillery, by reasons of whose fury and violence, it is un∣possible to defend small fortresses, and where there is no place for retiring with new re∣trenchments, as formerly hath been shew'd. But I will dispute this matter more plainly yet. Wilt thou O Prince with these Cittadels curb thy Citizens? or wilt thou whether Prince or Commonwealth that thou art, bridle a Ci∣ty thou hast taken by war? I will address my self to the Prince, and tel him, that such a Fortress to curb his Citizens cannot be more unprofitable, for the reasons above alleadgd: because it makes thee prompter, and less careful how thou doest oppress them, which

oppression makes them desperate in attemp∣ting thy ruine, and so inrages them, that that Fortress, which is the cause thereof, can no way preserve thee; so that a sage and good Prince, to keep himself still good, and that he may not give occasion to, nor imbolden his children to become bad, will never build for∣tress, to the end they relie not upon the Cit∣tadels, but rather upon the hearts of men. And if Count Francis Storce that came to be Duke of Milan was reputed wise, and yet in Milan he built a Cittadel, I say, that herein he little shewd his wisdome, as appeard by the effect, seeing that Fortress proved rather a disadvantage and loss, then any safeguard to his heirs: for thinking that by means there∣of they might pass their time in security, and yet injure their Citizens and subjects, they for∣bare not any kind of violence; whereupon be∣ing grown very odious, they lost the state, so soon as they were assail'd by their enemy. Nor could that fortress defend them, nor did it any way advantage them in the war, and in time of peace it had done them much harme; for if there had been no such citradel, and they for want of discretion onely had sharply handled some of their subjects, they might sooner have discover'd the danger, and with∣drawn themselves from it, and so afterwards they would have bin able with more courage to have resisted the French fury, having their subjects to freind without any fortress, then having them become thine enemies with thy fortress, which gives thee no help at all. For either it is lost by the treachery of him that guards it, or is forced by the assailant, or else by famine. And if thou wouldest that these

should avail thee, and help the to recover a state lost, where only the fortress holds for thee, thou must have an army, wherewith thou maist assault him that chased the from thence. And whensoever thou hast this army, thou couldest not in any wise faile of recovering the State, howsoever there were no fortress at all; and that the more easily, by how much the Inhabitants would be more thy friends, then if thou hadst ill-treated them through pre∣sumption upon thy fortress. And it hath been proved by experience, how that this Cittadell of Milan hath little availed either the forces or the French party in the adversity of the one or other, but hath rather brought upon them many ruins and mischiefes, having never advi∣sed, by means thereof, upon any fair way to keep that state. Guido Ʋbaldo Duke of Ʋrbin, son to Frederick, who in his daies was esteemed a great Captain, being driven out of his state by Caesar Borgia son to Pope Alexander the sixt, when afterwards upon a new grown occasion he returned thither again, he caused all the fortresses to be demolished that were in the Country, thinking they did more harme then good: for he having gained mens hearts to him, for their sakes would not abide them; and in regard of enemies, he saw they were not able to defend him, it being needfull to have a good army in the field to preserve them withall, so that he resolved to raze them all. Pope Julius, having driven the Bentivogli out of Bolonia, built a Cittadell there, and caused a governor of his to ransacke them shrewdly, insomuch that the people rebelled, and he suddenly lost the Cittadel, so that it served him to little purpose, or rather wronged him as much, as carrying

himself otherwise it could have helped him. Nicolas of Castello father of the Ʋitelli, return∣ing into his Country from whence he had been banished, forthwith demolished two several fortresses, which Pope Sextus the fourth had built there, deeming that not the fortress, but the peoples good wills were more likely to continue him in his State. But of all other examples, the freshest and of most remarke in every point, and that which is fittest to shew the incommodity of building them, and the fruit of razing them, is that of Genua which fell out in these latter times. It is well known how that Genua in the yeare 1507. rebelled against Lewis the Twelfth, King of France, who came in person, and with all his strength to regain it: which being done, he caused an exceeding strong Cittadel to be built there, surpassing in strength all others that are now adaies known: for in regard of the scituation, and the other circumstances be∣longing thereto, it was impregnable, being placed upon the very point of a hill, which stretched it self out into the sea, called by the Genueses, Godefa. And hereby the whole port, and a great part of the Town of Genua was subject to its battery: It happend afterwards in the year of our Lord God 1512. when the French were driven out of Italy, for all the fortress, Genua rebelled and Octavian Fregoso re∣covered the State thereof, who by his industry in the terme of 16 moneths took it by famine, and as every one beleeved, so he was advi∣sed by many, to reserve it for his refuge in any accident. But he, as he was exceeding wise, knowing that they were not fortresses, but mens good wills that preserved Princes

in their state, razed it to the ground, And so without laying the foundation of his dominion upon the fortress, but rather upon his own valour and judgement, he hath continually held it, and holds it yet. And whereas a thou∣sand foot were formerly of force to charge the state of Genua, his adversaries have since assailed it with ten thousand, and have not been able to hurt him. By this therefore it appears, how the demolishing of the fortress hurt not Octavian at all, nor did the building of it advantage the King of France: for when he was able to come into Italy bringing an ar∣my with him, he might recover Genua, though he had no fortress there; but when he could bring no army with him into Italy, neither could he keep the Genueses in obedience, though he had a fortress there. It was therefore an ex∣pence to the King to build it, and a shame to lose it, and to Octavian a glory to regain it. But let us come to those Republiques that raise up fortresses, not in their native countries, but in those they have conquered. And to shew this fallacy, if that example of France and Genua suffice not, this of Florence and Pisa may, where the Florentines had built a cittadel, to keep that town in subjection: And never ad∣vised themselves, that a City which had alwaies been a prosessed enemy to the Florentines, having lived free, which hath a recourse to li∣berty for a colour of Rebellion, it was necessary (being desirous to keep her) to use that manner the Romans had, either to take her as a com∣panion into the state, or to deface and ruine her: for of what value cittadels are, we saw in King Charles his comming into Italy, to whom they were yeelded, either through the treachery

or cowardise of their governors. Whereas if they had not been, the Florentines would never have grounded their ability of keeping Pisa stil upon them, nor would the King have been of power that way to have bereaved the Floren∣tines of that City; and those means, whereby untill that time it had been maintained, would peradventure have been of force to preserve it. And without doubt they could not have made a worse triall, then that of the fortresses. I conclude therefore, that for the safety of ones native Country, a strong hold is but hurtfull; & to keep under Towns that are conquered, cittadels availe little. And hereunto the Autho∣rity of the Romans shall suffice me, who disman∣telled the Towns they intended to hold by force, & never built up their walls; and if any one against this opinion should alledge me the example of Tarentum in ancient times, and in these modern that of Brescia, which places, by means of the cittadells, were recovered from the subjects rebellion: I answer, that at the years end Fabius Maximus was sent with the whole Army to recover Tarentum, who would have been able to recover that, though thete had been no cittadell there. And though Fabius put those means in practise, yet had they never been, he would have us'd some o∣ther, which would have produced the same effect. And I know not what advantage a cittadell yeelds, that to regain thee the Town, requires a Consular Army, and a Fabius Maximus for commander, before it can be done. And that the Romans in any case had recover'd it plainly, appears by the exam∣ple of Capua, where there was no cittadell, but they got it by the soldiers valor. But to

that of Brescia, I say, that seldome chances which befell in that rebellion, that the for∣tress which is possessed still by thy forces (the Town being fallen into rebellion) should have a great army to friend and near hand, as was that of the French: for the Lord De Fois the Kings General being with his army at Bo∣lonia, when he understood the loss of Brescia, by means of the Fortress indeed recover'd the Towne. Therefore that Fortress yet stood in need (to do any good) of such a one as was the Lord of Fois, and a French army, that in three daies might relieve them; so that this example against those on the contrary side is of small weight: for many fortresses have been taken in the wars in our daies, and recover'd by the same fortune that the field hath been taken, and recovered again, not only in Lom∣bardy, but in Romania, in the Kingdom of Naples, and in all parts of Italy. But touch∣ing the building of sortresses for defence against forrain enemies, I say, they are not usefull to those people, nor Kingdoms, who have good armies on foot; they are rather unprofitable, because that good armies without fortresses are of force to keep them: but fortresses without good armies cannot defend thee. And this we see by experience of those who have been held excellent in matters of state and government and other things, as we know the Romans and Spartans were: for if the Romans built no fortresses, the Spartans did not only forbear from them, but suffered none of their Cities to be wall'd in neither, because they would have no other guard but a mans own valor, to defend him. Whereupon when a Spartan was asked by an Athenian, whether the walls a∣bout

Athens were not very faire, he answer∣ed him, yes, if all the inhabitants of the Town were women. To that Prince then that hath good armies, when upon the mari∣time frontiers of his state he hath a fortress, that for some few daies he is able to sustain the enemy, till things are somewhat order'd, it would sometimes be of small avail, but of no necessity. But when a Prince hath no strong army, fortresses either in the heart of his State, or at his frontiers, are hurtfull, or unprofitable: hurtfull, because he easily loses them, and being lost they make war upon him; or put case they are so strong, that the enemy cannot take them, they are left be∣hind by the enemies army, and so they be∣come of no service. For good armies, if they meet not with very sharp encounters, enter far into their enemies Countries, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thout regard either of Town or fortress they leave behind them: As it was evident in the ancient Stories, and as we see Francis Maria did, who in these latter times without any regard of them, left ten of the enemies Cities behind him, to assayl that of Vrbin, That Prince then that can raise a good army, can do well enough, without ha∣ving any strong holds: but he that cannot have an army ready, should never build any: well may he fortifie the City of his abode, and keep it in good strength, and the Citizens thereof well disposed, whereby he may be able to support the enemies violence, till either some accord, or some forrain aid come to his re∣lief. All other designes are expensive in time of peace, and unfruitfull in time of war. And whosoever shall well weigh all this that I have said, shall perceive that the Romans

as they were in all other their affairs very judi∣cious, so were they very well advised in this judgement they gave upon the Latins, and the Privernates, where taking no care at all for citadels, they assur'd themselves of them by wiser and better waies.

CHAP. XXV.

It is a wrong course to assayle a City fallen into discord, thinking by means thereof, to master it.

IN the Roman Republick the people and the Nobility were so far fallen asunder, that the Veyentes together with the Eburans by means of their disagreement, thought they might be able quite to root out the Romans: and having levied an Army, and forrag'd all the Country of Rome, the Senate armed out Cneus Manilius and M. Fabius against them, who having brought their Army near to that of the Veyntes, they forbear not with all insolences and re∣proaches to revile them, and disgrace the Ro∣man name, and such was their fool-hardiness and presumptions that the Romans though then they were ar••ods one with another, came to agreement, and so comming to the combat, broke and vanquish'd them. We see therefore how much men deceive themselves (as formerly we have treated) in the courses they take, and that many times where they think to get, they lose. The Veyentes beleev'd, that by getting upon the Romans that were at variance one with another, they should overcome them, but it prov'd the occasion of reconcilement

to the Romans, but of ruine to themselves: for the causes of discord in Republicks, is most commonly idleness and peace; and the cause of union and concord is fear and war. Where∣fore had the Veyentes been wise, the more at variance they had perceived Rome to have been, so much the more should they have for∣born from war against them, and with devi∣ces of Peace cast about how to master them. The way is, to endeavour to be reputed a confident friend of that City, which is in discord: and whiles they come not to armes, to carry him∣self as an Umpire between both parties. And when they do come to armes, to afford some slow favours to the weaker party, as well to keep them still at war, and consume them, as to hinder them from doubting that with thy great forces thou meanest to suppress them, and become their Prince. And when this part is well plaid, it cannot fail ordinarily, but that it will directly have the success thou lookest for. The City of Pistoya (as in another discourse and to another purpose I said) came to the Florentines Republick, by no other trick than this: for it being divided in factions, the Floren∣tines now favouring the one, and then the other without any imputation of blame from either, brought them to such terms, that being tir'd with their tumultuous living, they came wil∣lingly to cast themselves into the Florentines armes. The City of Siena never changed her State upon the Florentines favour, but when their courtesies came but thin and small: for when they were frequent and strong, they uni∣ted them rather for the defence of the State in which they liv'd. I will adde to these aforesaid

one other example. Philp Visconti Duke of Milan, several times made war against the Florentines, grounding much upon their dis∣agreements, and alwaies came off a loser. Whereupon he was wont to say, when he complained of the evill success of his under∣takings, that the Florentines follies had made him spend two millions of gold to no purpose. Therefore (as it was said before) the Veyentes and the Etruscans deceived them∣selves by this conceit of theirs, and were at last in a set battell vanquish'd by the Romans. And thus will others find themselves deceiv'd, whoever shall seek by the like course, and upon the same occasion to subdu any nation or people.

CHAP. XXVI.

Contempt and contumely begets a hatred against those that use it, without any returne of ad∣vantage to them.

I Eeleeve it is one of the greatest parts of wis∣dome in men, to abstain from threatning or injuring of any one in words; for neither the one nor other bereave the enemy of any part of his strength; but the one makes him more wary of thee, and the other bear more deadly hatred against thee, and devise by all manner of waies he can to hurt thee. This is plain by the example of the Veyentes, whereof we spake in the former Chapter: who to the wrong of making war against the Romans, added the reproach of words, from which every prudent Commander ought to re∣strain his soldiers: so that they are things that incense and provoke the enemy to re∣venge, and are no defence (as it is said) a∣gainst

the hurt he does, insomuch that they are all weapons thrown from thee, which returne againe upon thee, Whereof there followed a notable example a good while since in Asia, where Gabades a Com∣mander of the Persians, having a long while lien incamped before Amida, and deter∣mined upon the tediousness of the siege to depart, and therefore to that purpose rising with his campe, those of the Town being come all upon the walls, and grown insolent upon their victory, forbore no kind of outrage, disgracing, blaming and reproaching the ene∣my with his baseness and cowardise: where∣upon Gabades being incensed, alter'd his pur∣pose, and return'd to the siege, where such was their indignation at the contumely, that in a few daies they took and sack'd the Town. In the same manner it befell the Veyentes, who were not content (as is said) to make war a∣gainst the Romans, but they rayl'd on them in vile termes, going even to their very tren∣ches to reproach them, so that they incensed them more with their words then blowes: and those soldiers which were hardly drawn to fight, constrein'd the Consul to begin to fight, so that the Veyentes suffer'd, as the others we spoke of before, for their in∣solence. Wherefore every good Commander of armies, and good Governor of Commonwealths is to practice all possible remedies, that these injuries or reproaches be not us'd either in the city or the army, neither one among ano∣ther, nor against the enemy: for being practi∣sed against the enemy, there arise from thence the aforesaid inconvenients: and among themselves they would do worse, when

there is no reparation made, which wise and judicious men have alwaies awarded. When the Roman legions left at Capua conspired a∣gainst the Capuans, as in its place shall be re∣lated, and a sedition was there occasioned by this conspiracy, (which was afterwards quieted by Valerius Corvinus) among other constitutions which were made in the agree∣ment, they ordained very grievous punish∣ments for those that should ever reproach any of those soldiers with that sedition. Tiberius Gracchus, who during the warrs with Han∣nibal was made a Captain over some certain number of slaves, whom the Romans for want of men had put into armes, ordained specially a capital punishment for any that should object to any of them their servitude: so hurtful a matter (as it is said) was it thought by the Romans to set men at nought, and reproach them with any disgrace; for there is nothing so much incenses men to rage or breeds more hatred in them, whether it be spoken in earnest or in jeast. Bitter taunts when they have too * 1.22 great a mingle of truth with them, leave behind them a very distastfull remembrance.

CHAP. XXVII.

Prudent Princes and Commonwealths ought to be contented with the victory: for oftentimes when that suffices them not, they lose it.

THE using of disgracefull words against the enemy, proceeds most commonly from an insolencie, which either the victory or a false hope of victory incites thee to: which false hope causes men to erre not only in their sayings, but in their doings also: for this hope when it enters into mens breasts, makes them go beyond the point, and many times lose the opportunity of having a certain good, hoping to attain unto a better uncertain good: and because this is a matter worthy considera∣tion, men often deceiving themselves, to the dammage of their State, I am of advice to shew it particularly by ancient examples and mo∣dern, being it cannot so distinctly be prov'd by reasons. Hannibal, after he had defeated the Romans at Canna, sent his Agents to Car∣thage, to give them notice of the victory, and to demand new supplies. It was argued in the Senate, what was fit to be done. Hanno an old man and a discreet Citizen of Carthage advised, to use this victory wisely, and make peace with the Romans, being that now they might have it upon reasonable termes, ha∣ving gained a battell; and that they should not go about to seek for it after a battell lost: for it should be the Carthaginians design to shew the Romans, that they were able to deal with them, and having gotten a victory, they

should take a care not to lose it for hope of a greater. This course was not taken, but afterwards the Senate of Carthage under∣stood that this was very good counsell, when the occasion was lost. When Alexander the Great had conquer'd all the Levant, the Com∣monwealth of Tyre, famous in those daies, and puissant, by reason that their City was seated in the water, as Venice is, seeing Alexanders greatness, sent Ambassadors to him to tell him, that they would become his faithfull ser∣vans, and yeeld him what obedience he should desire, but that they would not admit either him or his soldiers into their Town. Whereat Alexander disdaining, that any one City should shut her gates against him, seeing he had forc'd all others open throughout the whole world, would not accept their condi∣tions, but rejected them, and forthwith sent his army thither. That Town stood in the wa∣ter, and was well provided with victualls, and other munition fit for defence, so that Alex∣ander after four moneths spent, considering that one City took away all that time from his glory, which many other great con∣quests never did, and therefore determined to try an agreement, and to grant what they of themselves had asked. But they of Tyre be∣ing grown insolent hereupon, not only refused the conditions, but slew those that came to treat with them. Whereupon Alexander all enraged at this affront, so stronly assaulted the Town, that he took it, destroy'd it, and slew or made slaves all the men therein. A Spanish Army came upon the Floren∣tines Territories, to restore the Medici into Florence, and to lay some taxes upon the

Town, being hired hereunto by some Citi∣zens inhabiting therein, who put them in hopes that as soon as they should set foot in their Country, they would take armes in favour of them; they comming into the plain, and none of these discovering them∣selves to be for them, because they had want of victualls, tryed to make an agree∣ment, whereupon the Florentines grown proud, would not accept of any, upon which occasion followed the loss of Prato, and the ruine of that State. Therefore Princes can∣not commit a greater error when they are assail'd (in case the assailants are far more puissant then they) then to refuse all termes of agreement, especially when they are proffer'd them: for never will such poor ones be offerd, wherein is not in a good measure comprised his good that accepts them, and some part of his victory. Wherefore the Tyrians should have satisfied themselves, that Alexander accepted those conditions he had formerly refused: and their victory had been great enough, when with their armes in hand, they had made so mighty a Prince as he to yeeld to their demands. It should have sufficed the Florentines also, and they had gotten a good victory too, if the Spanish army gave way to any of their desires, though they had not fulfilled all of them; for that armies design was to change the State of Florence, to take away her devotion to France, and to draw some mo∣nies from her. When of these three the people had yeelded to two, which were the last, and had gotten themselves but one, which was the preservation of their state, they within had each of them gained some honour and satisfaction,

nor should the people have troubled them∣selves for the other two things, one remain∣ing to them; nor should they have offered, s∣ing they had been sure of a certain victory to hazard it at fortunes discretion, trying even the extremity thereof, which never any wise man will endanger himself in, unless it be upon necessity. Hanniball being departed out of Italy, where he had been very glorious for sixteen years, recalled by his own country men the Carthaginians, to releive his native Country, found Asdruball and Siphax defea∣ted, the Kingdome of Numidia lost, and Carthage restrain'd within the compass of her own walls, which had no other refuge but him and his army: and knowing that was his Countries last hopes, he would not hazard it, till he had first made trial of all other remedies: nor was he asham'd to ask peace, judging, that if there was any way to save his Country, it was by that, and not by war, which being re∣fused him, though he had been sure to lose, he would not faile to fight, thinking that it might fall out so, that possible it was for him to over∣come, and if lose, it he must lose it gloriously. And if Hanniball, who was so valorous a cap∣tain, and had his army intire, did require peace, before he would hazard the battell, when he perceived that in losing it, his country would be subdued, what should another of less valor and experience then he do? But men run into this error, by not knowing how to limit their hopes, so that grounded on their own vast con∣ceits, without weighing their strengths, they are utterly ruin'd.

CHAP. XXVIII.

How dangerous a thing it is for a Republick or Prince not to revenge an injury done against a publick State, or against a private per∣son.

WHat, indignation may cause men to do, is easily known, by that which be∣fell the Romans, when they sent the three Fabij for Ambassadours to the French, who came to invade Tuscany, and in particular Clusium: for the people of Clusium, having sent to require aide at Rome, the Romans sent their Ambassadors to the French, to let them know they were to forbear from ma∣king warr against the Tuscans, which am∣bassadours being upon the place, and fitter to play the Soldiers part, then the Ambassa∣dors, the French and the Tuscans comming to fight, they rank'd themselves amongst the foremost to combat the French, whence it came, that being known by them, they converted all the hatred they bore the Tuscans against the Romans, which hatred became greater: for the French by their Ambassadors having complained to the Senate of this injury, and required in satisfaction of the dammage, that the aforementioned Fabij should be given into their hands, they were not only not given them, or in any other manner punished, but when the time of their Assemblies came, they were made Tribuns with Consular power: insomuch that the French perceiving those to be honored, that should have been puni∣punished,

took all this as done in despight and disgrace to them: and thus incensed with rage and disdain they came to assaile Rome, which they took, the Capitoll excepted. Which de∣struction fell upon the Romans, only for their inobservance of justice: for their Ambassa∣dors having offended against the law of na∣tions, when they should have been punished, were honored. Therefore it is worthy consi∣deration, how much every Republick or Prince should beware of doing the like wrong, not only against a nation, but also against any par∣ticular man: for if a man be exceedingly offen∣ded either by the publick, or by any private man, and hath had no reparation made him to his content: if he lives in a Commonwealth, he will seek even with the utter ruine thereof to avenge himself: if he lives under a Prince, and be a man of any courage, he will never rest, till in some kind or other he be revenged on him, however that he knows he draws thereby his own destruction on his head. And to verify this, there is not a fitter nor truer ex∣ample, then that of Philip of Macedon Alex∣anders Father. In his Court there was a very handsome young noble man named Pausanias, and of him one Attalus, one of the cheifest men, that was neer about Philip, was inamourd; who having several times tryed if he would yeeld to him, and finding him far off from con∣senting to any such thing, determined to gain that by a trick and by force, which no way else he saw he could attain to. And having made a solemn invitation, whereat Pausanias and many other noble men met, after that every one had liberally eate and drinke, caus'd Pausanias to be taken and brought to some by-cham∣ber,

were not only by force he satisfied his beastly lust upon him, but the more to dis∣grace him, he made him be so used by many others in the like manner. Of which injury Pausanias several times made his complaint to Philip, who having held him a long time in hope of revenging him, instead thereof made Attalus governour of a Province in Greece; whereupon Pausanias seeing his enemy hono∣red, and not punished, converted his indigna∣tion not against him that had injured him, but against Philip that had not aveng'd him. And on a morning when Philips daughter was so∣lemnly married to Alexander of Epirus, as Philip went to the Temple to celebrate the espousals, he slew him between the two Alex∣anders, the son, and the son in law. Which example is much like that of the Romans, and is remarkeable for all those that rule, who should never value any man at so low a rate, as to think (that by heaping injury upon injury) he that is thus wrong'd will not devise some way to be reveng'd, though it be with his own utter loss and destruction.

CHAP. XXIX.

Fortune blinds mens minds, when she will not suffer them to prevent her designes.

IF we consider well the course of humane affaires, wee shall many times see things come to pass, and chances happen which the heavens altogether would not, that order should be taken to prevent. And in as much as this, which I speak of, befell Rome,

where there was so much valor, so much Re∣ligion and good order, it is no marvail if the same thing often fall out in a City or Country that wants the said things: and because this place is very remarkable to shew the power heaven hath over human things, T. Livius at large and with words of very great efficacy represses it, saying, that the heavens would for some end, that the Romans should know their power; and therefore caus'd those Fabij to erre, that were sent Ambassadors to the French, and by their means provokt them to make war against Rome. And afterwards or∣daind, that for the suppressing of that war, there was nothing done in Rome worthy of the Romans, having first ordain'd, that Camillus, who only was able to remedy so great a mischief should then be banished to Ardea. And then the French comming towards Rome, they who to resist the fury of the Volsci and many their neighbouring enemies, had several times crea∣ted a Dictatour; now upon the approach of the French never created any. Moreover, for their choyce of Soldiers, it was very weake, and without any extraordinary diligence: & they were so slow in taking of arms, that they were hardly time enough to incounter the French at the river Allia, ten miles from Rome. Here the Tribuns pitcht their campe without any ordi∣nary diligence: not viewing the ground first, neither incompassing it with trench or pali••ado, making use neither of human nor divine helps. And in ranging of their battell, they left their ranks so thin and weak, that as well the Soldiers as the Captains did nothing worthy of the Roman discipline. They fought afterwards without any effusion of blood,

for they fled before they were assayl'd: the greater part went thence to Veium, the other retir'd to Rome, who never going into their own houses, went unto the Capitoll: so that the Senate taking no care to defend Rome, did not so much as shut the gates, and part of them fled from thence, and part got into the Capi∣toll; yet in defence thereof, they had not such disorder; for they did not cloy it with unusual people, they furnished it with all the Corne they could possibly get, that it might endure out the siege: and the greater part of the un∣profitable multitude of old men, women, and children, fled unto the neighbouring Towns about, the rest staid at Rome for a prey to the French. So that whoever should have read of the brave atchievements of that people many years before, and afterwards of these times following them, would have much a do to be∣leeve it were the same people. And T. Livius having reckon'd up the aforesaid disorders, con∣cludes thus, So much does fortune * 1.23 blind mens eyes, when shee would not have her force withstood. Nor can this conclusion be more true. Whereupon men that are alwaies under hard crosses deserve the less blame, as they that enjoy continuall prosperity also merit less prayse; for we shall many times see those led to their destruction, and these advanc'd to an extraordinory great∣ness by some occasion the heavens have presen∣ted in their furtherances hereto, giving means to the one to behave himself vertuously, & quite bereaving the other of them. And we may well say fortune does this, for she makes choyce of a man (when she purposes to bring great mat∣ters to pass) of such judgement and spirit, that

knows how to make use of those occasions she presents him. So in like manner, when shee would bring horrible destructions upon any Place, she there preferrs men to that purpose, that they may help to draw on that ruine. And in case there be any that may prevent these mischiefes, shee either brings him to his end, or else deprives him of all abilities to do any goood. This we very well know by our Au∣thors discourse, how that fortune for to am∣plify Rome, and to bring it to that greatness it attain'd to, deemd it necessary to scourge it, as we shall discourse at large in the beginning of the next book following, but yet would not wholly ruin it. And this appears, in as much as shee banished Camillus, but put him not to death: shee made Rome be taken, but not the Capitoll: shee ordein'd that the Romaus should not think out any thing of avayle to save Rome; yet for defence of the Capitoll, they wanted of no good advice. To the end Rome should be taken, she causd the greater part of those Soldi∣ers, that were routed at Allia, to go to Vejum. And as for defence of the City of Rome, she cut off all the waies to order it, so shee prepar'd every thing ready to recover it again, having conducted an intire Roman Army to Vejum, and Camillus to Ardea, whereby they might be able to make a strong head under the command of a Captain never blemished with any disgrace of loss yet, & throughly whole in his reputation, for the recovery of his Country. Wee might here produce some modern example to confirm what wee have said: but because I think it un∣necessary, being this may well suffice, I shall omit it. I avow therefore this to be very true, as by many histories wee may see it, that

men may well follow fortune, but not oppose it; they may well weave her webs, but not break them. Wherefore let men never aban∣don themselves, being they know not what shall become of them in the end, the passages of their fortunes being through crooked and unknown waies; they should ever hope, and so hoping put on still, and never give over in despaire, whatsoever chance or trouble they be faln into.

CHAP. XXX.

Republicks and Princes, that really are mighty, seek not by monies to make alliance with others, but by their valour, and repute of their Forces.

THe Romans were straightly besiegd in the Capitoll, and however they lookt for ayd from Vejum, and from Camillus, being forc't by famine, they came to termes of agreement with the French, to redeem themselves for a certain sum of money, upon which agree∣ment, as they were weighing the gold, Ca∣millus, arriv'd with his Army, which fortune brought to pass (saies our Historian) to the end that the Romans should not live * 1.24 redeemd by gold. Which thing is not only remarkable in this part, but in the procese of this Commonwealths actions, where it is evident, that they never vanquished Towns with moneys, nor ever bought peace by mony, but by prowesse in the warres. Which I think never befell any other Republick; and among other signes by which a man dis∣cerns

the power of a State, he is to marke in what manner it lives with the neighbouring States. And when it is so orderd, that they become tributaries thereunto, to keep friend∣ship with it, there is an assured sign, that that State is powerfull. But when the said neigh∣bours, though inferious to it, draw money from thence, there is then a great evidence of the weakness thereof. Read all the Roman Stories, and ye shall see how the Massilians, the Aeduans, the Rhodians, Hiero, the Siracusan, Enmenes, and Massinissa Kings joyning upon the confines of the Roman Empire, to have friendship with it, concur'd in expences and tribute at all times that need was, seeking after no other requitall thereof, but to be protected by it. Wee shall see the contrary in poor and feeble States; and so beginning at ours of Flo∣rence in the times past, even when the reputati∣on thereof was at the greatest, there was never a great Lord in Romania, that had not some allowance from thence, and besides she gave to those of Perugia, and Castella, & to all the rest of her neighbours. For had this City been warlick and strong, the contrary would have followd; for all those to have been under the protection of it, would have given money, and have sought to buy its friendship, and not to sell their own. Neither have the Florentines alone liv'd in this baseness, but the Venetians, and the King of France, who, though a Prince of great Dominions, lives tributary to the Swisses, and the King of Engl. The cause whereof is, in that he disarmes his subjects, and because that King and those other afore-named had rather enjoy a present profit to rack their people and squeese them, and avoid rather an imaginary than a

real danger, than do such expedients as would secure and for ever make their States happy. Which disorder, though some while it may produce quiet, yet in time it proves the cause of want, losses, and unrecoverable ruine. And it would be too long to relate, how many times the Florentines, the Venetians, and this Kingdome, have redeemd themselves even in the warrs, and how many times they have subjected themselves to disgrace, which the Romans were only once like to have done. It would be tedious to tell, how many Towns the Florentines and Venetians have bought, whereof afterwards the inconvenience hath been found, and how that those things that are bought with gold, men know not how to de∣send with the sword. The Romans observd this brave way and manner of living, while they were free; but after they came under their Emperors governments, and that those Empe∣rors grow naught, and lov'd the shade, and could not endure any toyle in the Sun, they began also to redeem themselves, somtimes from the Parthians, somtimes from the Ger∣mans, and now and then also from some others of their neighbours, which was the beginning of that great Empires ruine. Whereupon arose the like inconvenients from their having dis∣arm'd their people, from whence also proceeds another greater, that the nearer thy enemy comes to thee, the weaker he finds thee; for whosoever lives after that manner we have spoken of above, treats evill those subjects he hath within his dominions, because his men are not so well disciplin'd in the wars, as to keep the enemy from entring into the heart of their Country Whence it proceeds, that to keep

the enemy off: he allows some provision of moneys to those Princes or people that border upon his Country. And thereupon, those States make some resistance upon the confines only, which when the enemy hath past, they have no kind of remedy left: and they per∣ceive not, that this their manner of proceed∣ing, is quite contrary to all good order: for the heart and the vital parts of a body are to be arm'd, and not the extremities thereof; for it can live without those, but if these be hurt it dyes: but these States keep the heart dis∣arm'd, and arme their hands and feet. What this disorder hath done at Florence, hath been and is daily seen: for when any Army posses the frontiers, and enters near to the heart of the Country, there is no further remedy. Wee saw not long since the same proof of the Vene∣tians; and had not their. City been begirt by the waters, we should have seen an end of it. Wee have not so often seen this tryal in France, because it is so great a Kingdom, that it hath few enemies mightier than it: nevertheless. when the English invaded that Country in the year 1513. the whole Country quak'd, and the King himself, and every one thought, that one defeat alone would have been sufficient to lose him the State. The contraty befell the Romans; for the nearer the enemy approached to Rome, the more able he found the City to make resistance. And it was evident, when Hannibal came into Italy, that after three defeats, and the slaughters of so many Captains and soldiers, they were not only able to sustain the enemy, but to vanquish him. All this proceeded from that they had well armd the heart, and made small account of the ex∣tremities;

for the foundation of their State was the people of Rome; and the Latins, and the other Townes their allyes in Italy, and their Colonies, from whence they drew so many Soldiers, that with them they were able to fight with and keep in awe the whole world. And that this is true, it appears by the questi∣on Hanno the Carthaginian put to Hannibals agents, after that great overthrow at Canna, who having exceedingly magnified Hannibals great acts, were asked by Hanno, whether any of the Komans were yet come to demand peace, or if any Town of the Latins, or any of their Colonies had yet rebelld against the Roman; and they denying the one and the other, Hanno reply'd, Then is the warr yet as intire as it was at first. We see therefore by this discourse, and what wee have otherwhere said, what diffe∣rence there is between the proceedings of Re∣publicks now adayes, and those of the ancients. Wee see also hereupon every day exceeding great losses, and wonderfull great conquests: for where men are but of small valour and re∣solution, fortune shews much power: and be∣cause shee is alwaies various, therefore do Common-wealths and States change often, and will alwaies change, till at length some one stand up, who is so much a lover of antiquitie, as to regulate her, that she take not occasion to shew at every turne of the Sun, how great her power is.

CHAP. XXXI.

How dangerons a thing it is, to give credit to men that are banished out of their Country.

MEthinks it is not out of purpose, to treat among these other discourses, how dan∣gerous a thing it is to trust those that are banished out of their Country, these being matters that every day are practis'd by those that are Rulers of States; especially seeing it may be prov'd by a memorable example out of T. Livius in his history, though this thing be out of his purpose quite. When Alexander the Great passed into Asia with his Army, Alexander of Epirus his kinsman & uncle, came with certain troopes into Italy, being cald upon by some outlawd Lucans, who put him in hope, that by their means he might become master of that whole Country. Whereupon it came to pass, that he being come into Italy upon their word and assurance, was slain by them; their Citizens, having promisd them their return into their Country, if they slew him. Therefore should it be consider'd, how vain their words and promises are, who are banished their Countries; for, in regard of their word, it is to be thought, that whensoever by other means than thine, they can be restord to their Coun∣try, they will forsake thee, and cleave to others, notwithstanding all the promises they have made thee. And this is the reason why there is no hold to their word, because so extream is their desire to return to to their native homes, that naturally they beleeve many things that

are false, and some things out of their own cunning they adde; so that between what they think, and what they say they think, they put thee in such hopes, that grounding thereupon, thou art brought to a vain expence, or to un∣dertake somwhat that proves thy destruction. I will satisfie my self with the aforesaid exam∣ple of Alexander, and only this other of The∣mistocles the Athenian, who being outlawd, fled to Darius in Asia, where he promised him so much, when he should invade Greece, that Da∣rius undertook the enterprise. But Themistocles not being able to make good his promises, either for shame or fear of punishment, poisoned himself. And if Themistocles a rare man com∣mitted this error, what should we think but that they do much more erre, who because of their less vertue will suffer themselves to be more violently drawn by their own passions and desires. And therefore a Prince ought to proceed very slowly in undertakings upon the relation of exil'd men; for otherwise he suffers either great shame, or dammage by them And because it seldom comes to pass, that Towns and Countries are taken by stealth, or by in∣telligence that any one hath in them; methinks it is not much out of purpose to treate thereof in the Chapter following, adding thereunto by how many waies the Romans got them.

CHAP. XXXII.

How many waies the Romans used to make them∣selves masters of townes.

THe Romans applying themselves all to the war, did evermore make it with all ad∣vantage possible, as well for the expence, as for every thing else belonging thereto. From hence it proceeded, that they were alwaies aware of taking of townes by long sieges, thinking it a matter of great charges, and in∣commodity, that surpasses far the profit their conquest thereof can bring. And for this cause they though it more for their own advantage, to take a town any way else then by siege. Whereupon in such great and so many wars, we have very few examples of sieges made by them. The waies then whereby they got their townes, were either by conquest or yeil∣ding. And this conquest was either by force or open violence, or by force mingled with fraud. Open violence was either by assault, without beating the walls, which was to beleagure a town round with an ar∣my: * 1.25 for they environd it, and combatted it on all parts, and many times it prov'd so luckily to them, that in one assault they took a town, though a very vast one, as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain. Or when this assault served not, they betook them to break down the walls with their rams, and oher their

warlike engines, or else by some mine or vault they made, whereby they enter'd the City, by which way the took the City of Veium; or to make themselves equal in height with those that defended the walls, they made towres of wood, or cast up mountains of earth, which leaned upon the wall on the outside, whereby they might get to the hight of it. Against these assaults, they that defended the towns, in the first case in regard of their being besing'd round, rannne a more sudden hazard, and had more doubtfull remedies: for having need in every place of many defendants, perchance either those that they had, were not so many as could supply every place, or change often to refresh them: or if they could, they were not all of equal courage to make resistance: and in case the skirmish had inclin'd in any part, all had bin lost. Therefore it came to pass (as I said) that this way lit many times on good suc∣cess. But when it succeeded not at first, they did not much more try that way, because it was dangerous for the army: for the City be∣ing able for so long a space to defend it self, the army could not but grow weak, and hardly be able to withstand any fally of the enemies from within, and besides the soldiers disorder'd and wearied themselves hereby, yet notwith∣standing for once, and that on the sudden, they assayld that way) As for the breaking down of the walls, they made resistance as they do now adayes with new reparations, and against their mines, they made countermines, and thereby they oppos'd their enemies either with their armes in hand, or with other engines, & among others this was one, they fill'd divers vessels with feathers, and set fire on them, which be∣ing

thus kindled they put into the Mine, so that by the smoke and stink thereof, the enemy was hindred of entring thereinto: and if they assail••d them with towers of wood, they sought to fire them. And for the mounts of earth, they commonly broke open the wall underneath, whereupon the mount did lean, drawing thence the earth into the town, whereby they without did raise their mount, so that how∣ever they brought the earth without, being that they within carried it away, the mount came to no great matter. These waies of assai∣ling cannot be continued long: for they must either rise from the siege, and seek by other means to make an end of the war, as Seipio did when being entred into Affricke he assaulted Vtica, but could not take it, he rose thence with his whole camp, and sought how to o∣verthrow the Carthaginian armies; or else they must turne again to the siege, as they did at Veium, Capua, Carthage, and Ierusalem, and other like townes, which they took by siege. As for conquest by force and fraud, as it befel Palepolis, it chanced that the Romans, by treating with the inhabitants took some towne. But by his assailing the Romans and o∣thers, tried many, but prevail'd in few: the reason is, because every small impediment breakes the designe, and impediments easily happen: for either the conspiracie is discover'd before it takes effect; and without much diffi∣cultie it is discovered, as well through their infidelity, to whom it is communicated, as by the difficulty to put it in practise, being they are to agreee with enemies with whom they cannot parly, but under some other colour. But in case the conspiracy be not disclosed in

the ordering of it, there arise multitudes of difficulties in putting it in execution: for if either thou commest before the time appointed, or after, all is spoiled, if any false alarme be given, as was that of the geese in the Capitol; if any usual order be broken, every little error, or affright taken, spoiles the designe. Hereunto may be added the darkness of the night which often puts in fear the rather those that under∣take such perilous things. And the greater part of those men that are brought upon such enterprises, being unexperienced in the scitu∣ation, the countrey, and the places, whether they areled, become astonished, disheartned, and confused upon every small accident shall happen; And every shadow is of force to make them run away. Nor ever was there any more happy in thefe fraudulent night plots, then A∣ratus Sicioneus, who was as base and coward∣ly in any action by day, as he was of worth and spirit in these by night. Which we may well think was rather through some hidden vertue wherewith he was endowed, then because there was naturally required in them the more good luck. Many of these waies are put in practice, few of them come to trial, and very few take effect. Touching the gaining of townes by yeelding, they yeeld either of good will or by force: this willingness arises either upon some forrain necessity, which compels them to fly unto thy protection, as Capua did unto the Romans, or through a desire to be wel gover∣ned, being allur'd by the good government that Prince holds among them that have given themselves into his hands: as the Rodians, the Massilians, and other like cities did, that gave themselves unto the Romans. Touching

surrendring up upon force, proceeds either from a long siege, as is formerly said, or from a continual oppression of incursions, pillagings, and other hard usages, which when a city de∣sires to be freed from she yeelds her self. Of all those said ways the Romans practised this last more then foure hundred and fifty years to weary out their neighbors with routs and in∣cursions, and by gaining credit with them, by gaining credit with them, by means of agree∣ments made, as we have said otherwhere; and upon that way they alwaies grounded, though they tryd all, but in the other they found things either dangerous or unprofitable. For in a siege, there is length of time and expences: in forcible assault, doubt and danger: and in conspiracies, uncertainty. And they saw, that by the defeat of an enemies army, sometimes they got a Kingdom in one day, and to take by siege a town that was obstinate, it cost them many years.

CHAP. XXXIII.

How the Romans gave the Commanders of their armies free and large Commissions.

I Think it fit for him (that by reading of Li∣vies story would make advantage thereof) wel to consider all the waies of the people and Senate of Romes proceedings: and among other things that merite consideration, his is one, to see with what authority they sent forth their Con∣suls, Dictators, & Commanders of armies, which we see was very great, and the Senate reserved

thing else to themselves, but a power to make new wars, and to confirme peace, but they referred every thing else to the arbitrement and power of the Consul: for when the people and the Senate had once resolved on the war, (as for example sake against the Latines) they left all the rest to the Consuls discretion, who had free power either to fight a batttel, or to leave it, and to besiege either this, or any o∣ther town else as he pleas'd. Which things by many examples are verified, and especially by that which fell out in an expedition against the Tuscans: for Fabius the Consul having over∣come them near unto Sutrium, and intending with his army to pass the wood Cimina, and go into Tuscany, he did not onely not advise with the Senate, but gave them no notice at all of it, though he was to make the war in a new countrey full of doubts and dangers: which is witnessed by a resolution of the Se∣nate taken directly against this very course; who having understood of the victory Fabius had gotten, and doubting he would venture to pass the said woods into Tuscany, thinking it would be well not to try that war, nor ruin that hazzard, sent two Deputies unto Fabius, to give him notice, they would not have him pass into Tuscany: who came thither, when he had already past, and gotten the victory, and in liew of hindring the war, they returned Ambassadors of his conquest and victory gotten. And whosoever considers these termes, will find them discreetly used: for if the Senate would have had the Consull to proceed on forwards in the war, onely as they gave him order, they had made him less circumspect,

and slower in his actions: for he would have thought, that the glory of the victory had not bin wholly his, but that the Senate had parti∣cipated with him, by whose counse he had bin governed. Besides this, the Senate then obliged themselves to advise in things they could not have the means to understand. For, notwithstanding than among them there were men exceedingly well experienced in the wars, yet being they were not upon the place, and therefore ignorant of very many particu∣lars, which are needfull for him to know that will advise well, by interposing their Coun∣cell, they would have committed many errors. And for this cause they suffered the Consul to do all of himself, and that the glory thereof should be entirely his, the love of which they thought would provoke and encourage him to do well. I have the more willingly marked this place, because I see that the Republiques now adayes, as the Venetian and the Floren∣tine, understand it not so: and if their Com∣manders, Proveditours, and Commissioners are to plant any battery, they will know it first, and advise thereupon. Which course deserves the same praise the others do, which altoge∣ther have brought them into those miseries they now suffer.

Notes

• * 1.1

  * How this will hold with the general and most received te∣nent, I cannot see; being that the Prince and the people are said to make onely one politique body; and the welfare of the part cannot be separated from the good of the whole. Famous is that fable of Aesops, which Menenius Agrippa made use of, to reconcile the Commons of Rome, upon distaste against the Senate, gone a part in the holy mount: On a time that in man all things accorded well together, each particular member advis'd, and complaind that by their care and pains all things necessary were sought after, and provided for the belly, and that the belly onely remaind idle amongst them, injoying, those delicates which their labor had pre∣par'd: and thereupon conspir'd together that the hands should not put meat to the mouth, nor the mouth receive it, nor the teeth chaw it: but thus while in this choler they thought by famine to subdue the belly, the whole body fainted. Whereby it came to appear that the belly af∣forded its service too, and as well gave as receiv'd nourishment, distributing by the veins, through∣out the whole body, out of this meat which it had disgested, the blood well concocted, whereby each part was nourish'd. Who is it that feels not, when any part fails, the whole is in disorder? and who sees not likewise, when any part of the body drawes unto it more then its proportionable nutriture, that the whole

  

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  pines thereupon? as from the swelling of the spleen, the health of the whole body is disturb'd, and therefore by some Politiques not unfitly compared to a Princes exchequer, which when it excessively abounds beggers the whole countrey. And it is a folly to think (saith a Spauish author) that the poverty of the Comminalty will not redound to the breaking of private patrimonies, nor can great revenues continue there, where the Commonwealth is rack'd to the very bones. All these things serve to argue the mutual sympathy, as between the head and the members, so between the Prince and his subjects; and to divide the interest of the Prince from that of the people, cannot agree with good policy; for as in the natural body it breeds diseases, so in the politique it pro∣duces disorder and destruction.
• * 1.2

  * Here Machia. falsely imputes the cause of mens cowardlinesse to Christian Religion. I need not alleadge any battells fought by the Christi∣ans, to proove him a lyar; histories fre∣quently affoard us examples, as well ancient as moderne, where they have bin as resolutely fought by the Christians, as ever were any by the Pagans: nay our owne memories may well supply us with some if we want. If we marke from whence Machiavell takes his argument, it is from that the Pagans slew a multitude of sacrifices, the sight of which being terrible made men of thesame dispo∣sition. By the same reason must it follow that our butchers and surgeons are more valiant then other men, as who customarily have their hands imbrued in bloud: I may well allow them to be more cruell, and therefore our lawes exclude them from being of the Iury of life and death: but of being more valiant I never heard they had the reputation.
• * 1.3

  Creseit in terea Roma Albae ruinis
• * 1.4

  Crescit in terea Roma Albae ruinis.
• * 1.5

  * This is all calumny; for we find not that any have preserv'd the records of lear∣ning more than the Christians, however much intermixt with Paganisine. I take it that that these memorials were last in the vast deluges of the Vandals, Goths, and Hunns, who themselves being barbarous and ignorant, envyed others learning; and therefore destroyd all the registers of antiquity they could find: which our Author injuriously imputes to the Christians, being that they time out of minde, have caus'd those books to be taught the youth in their schools and we find that the most esteemd Fathers in the Church were adorn'd with that learning, which they are raxed to have persecuted; which serves also very necessarily for the better understanding and illu∣strating of Theology, and affords good arguments many times to our Divines for the conviction of the Gentiles out of their own writers. Nor do I find there was any other restraint in those studies, than that men were advis'd to apply themselves soberly thereunto, as not being studies to dwell in, but tending rather to the service of Theology.
• * 1.6

  Terna jugera & sep∣tunnces viritim divi∣se••ant
• * 1.7

  Nos Maurusij, qui fu∣gimus a facie Iesu la∣tronis filij Navae.
• * 1.8

  Campani magis no∣men in auxilium si∣diciorum, quam vires ad praesidium attulerunt.
• * 1.9

  * Because this whole Chapter tends to shew how necessary for a Princes advantage guile is, and it is again re∣commended by precept in Machiavels Treaty of a Prince, I cannot but take notice that here he is blameable. Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requir it, is not meant De dolo Malo: supposed by Machiavel in his Prince Chap. 19. where he perswades a Prince to use the Lyons force, and the Foxes craft. To be able in all Military stratagems and slights to circumvent the enemy, is one of the most requisite and not able parts in a Commander: pro∣vided there be no breach of Faith, nor Oath vio∣lated: for as Tully sayes, Est jusjurandum affirmatio Religiosa: quod autem affirmate, quasi Deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est. It is much unworthy of a Prince (sayes a worthy late Author) to falsifie his word, either to enemy or subject that it be; and the more villanie is it to use covert fraud, than open violence, be∣cause the enemy lies more open by gi∣ving credit to his faith: And fraus distringit, non dissolvit perjurium. And with how much more solemnity Princes Oaths are ordinarily taken, mee thinks, so much the more sincerity ought they to carry with them, having drawn together many eyes & ears as witnesses of their truth or falshood. I shall conclude then with Tacitus, in the 4. of his An∣nal. Caereris mortalibus in constant confilia quod sibi conducere putant; principum diversa sors est, quibus praecipua rerum ad samam dirigenda.
• * 1.10

  Nam si etiam nunc sub umbra faederis aequi servi∣tutem pati possumus, &c.
• * 1.11

  Ten∣tastis patien∣tiam, negando militem; quis dubitat exarsisse eos? Pertulerunt tamen hunc doloren; exercitus nos parare adversus Samnites faeri∣tos suos audierunt nec moy erunt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ab•• urbe; unde laec illi•• nan∣ra modestia nisi conscientia virium & nostrarum & suarum?
• * 1.12

  Ad summa rerum nostra∣rum pertinere arbitror, ut cogitetis magis quid agendum nobis quam quid loquendum sit; facile erit explicatis consillis, ac∣commodate ••ebs verba.
• * 1.13

  Res redacta est ad Triatios.
• * 1.14

  Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites.
• * 1.15

  Jam tunc minime sal bris militari disciplinae Capua, instrun entum omnium voluptatum, delinitos mi∣litum animos avertit a memoria patriae.
• * 1.16

  Gula & Luxuris incubuit, ••ictunique ulci〈…〉〈…〉 orbem.
• * 1.17

  Quod jam non solum arma, sed jura Romana pollebant.
• * 1.18

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 Jam Latio is status erat rerum, ut neque pecem, neque bellum pati pos∣sent.
• * 1.19

  Dij mor∣tales ita vos poten∣tes hu∣jus consilit fece∣runt, ut, sit Lati∣um, an non fit, in vestra manu posue∣rint. I∣ta{que} pacem vobis (quò ad La∣tinos atti∣net) parere in perpetuum, vel saeviendo vel ignoscendo potestis. Vultis crudelius consulere in deditos victosque, licet delere nomen Latinum. Vultis exemplo majorum augere re••n Romanam, victos in civitatem accipiendo, materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppeditat. Certe id firmissimum imperium est, quo obedientes gaudent. Illorum igitur animos, dum expecta∣tione stupent, seu paena seu beneficio praeoccupari opor∣cet.
• * 1.20

  Quam poe∣nam meri∣tos Privernates censeret. Eas inquam merentur, qui se liberta∣te dignos censent. Quid si poenam remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vobis cum habituros•• spere mus? Si ••onam dederitis, & fidelem & perpetuam; sin malam, haud diuturnam. Se audivisse vocem & liberi & viri, nec credi posse ullum populum, aut hominem deni{que} in ea conditione, cu∣••us eum poenite at diutius quam necesse sit mansurum; ibi pacem; isse fidam, ubi voluntarij pacatisint, ne{que} eo loco, ubi servitu∣tem esse velint, fidem sperandam esse. Eos demum, qui nihil prae∣serquam del ibertate cogitant, dignos; esse qui Romanifiant.
• * 1.21

  Spoliatis arma supersunt. ••••∣••or arma mini∣strat.
• * 1.22

  Facetiae asperae quae nimium ex vero traxerunt, acrem sui memoriam re∣liquunt.
• * 1.23

  Adeò obcaecat animos fortuna, cum vim suam refringi non vult.
• * 1.24

  Ut Romani auro re∣dempti non viverent
• * 1.25

  Agred urbem coronâ