Machivael's [sic] discourses upon the first decade of T. Livius, translated out of the Italian. To which is added his Prince. With some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors. By E.D.

MACHIAVELS DISCOURSES UPON THE First DECADE OF T. LIVIƲS Translated out of Italian. (Book 1)

The Preface.

WHen I consider the esteem which is made of antiqui∣ty, and that many times (letting pass further exam∣ples) a small piece of an ancient statute hath been bought at a great rate, only to have it at hand, to adorn the house withall, and that thereby they may be able to cause others, who take delight in the art, to draw copies thereof, and these likewise endeavour, as lively as they can, to represent it again in all their works and on the other side seeing the most vertuous acti∣ons that histories relate us, to have been ar∣chieved by Kingdomes, ancient Common-wealths, Kings Captains, Citizens and Law-givers, and such others who have under∣gone much for their Countries good; that these, I say, have been rather admired then

follow'd, or rather by every one have been so much avoided, that now the very foot∣steps of that ancient vertue is utterly defac'd, I cannot but both marvaile and grieve: and the rather, because I perceive, that in mat∣ters of process arising in a Commonwealth among citizens, or in criminal causes, re∣course is alwaies made to those judgements and those remedies which formerly have been ordain'd and practis'd by the ancients; for the civil-lawes are nothing else, but the opinions given by ancient Lawyers, which since having been reduc'd to a method, todirect our Doctors of the Law now a daies, in giving of their judgements: yet for all this in the ordering of Commonwealths, in the mainte∣nance of States, in the government of King∣domes, in ordeining of military discipline, in waging of war, in giving judgment upon the subjects, in amplifying of the Empire, there are neither Princes, nor Republiques, Comman∣ders, nor Citizens who ever seek after any of these ancient patternes, which I perswade my self proceeds not so much from that weak∣ness, into which the breeding and customes now a daies have brought the world, or from that evill which idleness accompanied with ambition hath done to many Christian coun∣tries and Cities, as from their want of the true knowledge of histories, in that by reading them, they conceive not that meaning nor re∣lish that tastethey have in them: whence it arises that many who read, take delight to hear the variety of accidents, which are frequent in them, without further regard of imitating them deeming that not only hard, but unpossible, as if the heavens, the sun, the elements,

and men were alter'd from what they were of old, in the••ir motion, order and power. Wherefore being desirous to withdraw men from this errour, I thought fit to write upon these bookes of T: Livius, which have e∣scap'd the malice of the times, what I thought, conformable to moderne and ancient affaires, of purpose for the better understanding of them, that they who shall well peruse these discourses of mine, may there reap that profit for which end the knowledg of historie ought to be sought after. And how∣ever this be a taske of great difficulty, yet by the helpe of those who have incourag'd me to undergoe this burden, I beleeve I shall carry it so far onwards, that there shall be left for him that comes after me, but very little way to bring it to a good end.

CHAP. I.

What were in generall the beginnings of every city, and especially that of Rome.

WHosoever shall reade what beginning the City of Rome had, who were the Lawmakers, and how it was founded, will nothing marvaile that so great vertue was continued so many years in the city, and that from thence afterwards there grew so mighty an Empire, to which that Commonwealth attain'd. And therefore to discourse first of her birth, I say, that all Cities were built either by the Natives of the place they were built in, or by strangers. The first comes to passe when the inhabitants being dispers'd in many and small numbers finde they cannot live safe, each one not

having strength apart, as well by reason of their situation, as their small number to resist the violence of those that would force them; or if they would joyn together for their defence, the enemy comming upon them, they cannot do it in time; and when they should be in one body, they must of ne∣cessity abandon divers of their retreats, & so become a sudden prey to their enemies: Wherefore to escape these dangers, either of themselves, or upon the motion of some one of authority among them, they confine them∣selves to dwell together, in a place chosen as well for their better commodity of living as more facility of defence. Of this sort among many others were Athens & Venice. The first under the command of Theseus, was upon the like occasions built by the scattered inhabi∣tants: the other, much people being retired into certain little Ilands at the point of the Adriatique Sea (to avoid those wars which then were beginning in Italy by reason of those huge and continual inundations of Bar∣barians upon the declining of the Roman Empire) began among themselves with∣out the authority of any particular Prince, to live under those lawes they thought most proper for their preservation: which prov'd luckily to them, for the long quiet their situation gave them, that Sea having no outlet, and those people which then afflicted Italy, not having ships to annoy them, so that every little beginning was sufficient to give them that greatness they now have. The second sort is, when a City is built by strangers which are either absolute of themselves, or depend upon others, & such

are colonies which are sent out either by a Commonwealth or Prince to disburden their Towns of inhabitants, or for the de∣fence of some country which of late they have gotten, and would safely keep without much expence; of which sort the Romans built many througouht all their dominions; o∣thers were built by some Prince, not to make his seate there, but for his glory; and so was Alexandria by Alexander: and because these cities have not their beginning free, they sel∣dome attain to that greatness, as to be esteem∣ed the head cities of Kingdomes. The like be∣ginning had Florence (whither it was built by Syllaes Souldiers, or by chance by the in∣habitants of the mountains of Fiesola; who taking heart upon that long peace the world enjoyed under Octavian, came down & dwelt in the plain upon the Arne) for it was built under the Romau government, neither could it in the beginning make greater increase, then what the Princes favour allow'd it. The founders of Cities are then said to be absolute and free, when any people either led by a Prince, or of themselves, are forc'd by conta∣gion, famine, or war to abandon their native Soyle, and seek a new dwelling and these are are content to inhabite the Cities in the Country they have conquered, as Moses did, or build new, as did Aeneas. In this case appeares the ability of the founder, and the fortune of the City founded, the which is more or less admirable, as he who gave thereto the beginning was of greater or or less abilities: which is seen in two kindes; the first in choyce of the situation, the second in making the lawes. And because men

act some things upon necessity, others by their own election, and the greater vertue is there seen where election hath the least power; it is to be consider'd, whether it were better to chuse barren places to build Cities in, to the end men being forc'd to la∣bor for their sustenance, might live the better in agreement, the poverty of their Country giving less occasion of discord, as it was in Raugia: and in many other Cities built in like places, which choyce without doubt would be wiselier made and more profitable, of men were content to live of their own, and not seek to rule over others, but seeing it not possible for men to live in security with∣out force, it is necessary to avoid a barren soyle, and to plant themselves in fruitful places, where they may be enabled by the plenty of their seat to enlarge and desend their territories against those that would assault them, and over-master all that would oppose their greatness. And to the end the riches of the country occasion not too much the ease of the people, it would be fit to pro∣vide that the laws oblige them to take these paines, the situation doth not, and to imitate those who have liv'd in pleasant and fruitfull countries, and apt to breed men given to Luxury, loth to use that in∣dustry vertue requires, and yet were so wise as to prevent those harmes the plenty of the soyle, and so consequently the peoples idleness might cause: having impos'd such a necessity of labour upon those they brought up to be Souldiers, as by means of their strict discipline, they far surpassed others who be∣cause of their rough and barren countries

were borne fierce; such was the Kingdome of the Aegyptians that notwithstanding the countries delicacies, the laws strictness pre∣vail'd so far, as there were bred by them many great personages: and if time had not worne out their names, it would ap∣peare they had deserv'd as much praise, as did Great Alexauder, and many others whose memories stories continue fresh amongst us: and whosoever had considered the Soldans Kingdome, and the Mamalucks order, with their military discipline, before they were ruin'd by Selimus the great Turke, would have seen in that how the Souldiers were train'd up in continuall exercises, and there∣in have known how much they fear'd that case to which the goodness of their Country invited them, unless it had been oppos'd with severe lawes. I avow therefore the choyce better in a fertile place, when that good government takes order for a moderate use of the abundance. When Alexander the great had a purpose to build a City for his glory, Dinocrates the Architect came to him and shewed him, how it might be built upon Mount Athos, which place, besides that it would be strong, he could so order, that the City should be made in forme of a man: which would be a wonder worthy his great∣ness: and being askd again by Alexander whereupon the inhabitants should live, an∣swerd he had not well advis'd of that point yet: whereat having laught, he left the moun∣tain alone, & built Alexandria so, that people might resort thither, as well for the far∣ness of the soyle, as the commodity of of the sea, and the River Nilus. Who∣ever

then shall examine the beginning of Rome, if Aeneas be taken for the first foun∣der, it must be numberd among the cities that were built by strangers; If Romulus, among those that were built by the Natives; And in what manner soever It were, it will appear it had a beginning free of it self with∣out dependence of any; and moreover that the Laws made by Romulus, Numa, and others, kept it under in an exact obedience (as here∣after shall be said:) so that neither the fruit∣fulness of the country, the commodity of the Sea, the osten victories, nor the vastness of the Empire, could in many ages corrupt it; but maintained it so eminent for vertue, that never any commonwealth came near it. And because those exploits she did, and are re∣cited by T. Livius, were acted upon publique or private Counsel, and either within or without the city, I will begin my discourse upon those things passed within land done upon publique advice, which I shall think worthy of remarke, adding likewise all the dependences thereupon; with which the first book or first part shall end.

CHAP. II.

How many kinds of Commonwealths there are; and what was that of Rome.

I Will sorbear to discourse of those cities which have had their beginnings in sub∣jection under others, and speak of such only as were free in their births from forrain ser∣vi••ude, having had instantly the raines of their own government in their own hands,

either as a Commonwealth, or as a Principa∣lity which have had. as divers beginnings, so likewise sundry lawes and ordinances: for some either in their beginning, or not long after receiv'd their laws from one alone, and that at once, as the Spartans did theirs from Lycurgus: others had theirs casually and at several times, and upon occasion, as Rome: so that it is a great happiness for a Common-wealth to light upon a man of such wisdome so to order the State, as without need of alteration it may continue in security under them: as we see that Sparta kept the same without change or any dangerous tumult a∣bove eight hundred years. And on the con∣trary, that City may in some degree be termd unhappy, which having not met with a judi∣cious founder, is forc'd to give it self a new frame: and of these the more unlucky is that which is the more amiss: and such is that which together with all its own new ordi∣nances, hath much mistaken the right way to perfection: for it is almost impossible for those of this degree to be setled again by any accident: those others although their order be not exact, yet the beginning they have taken being good, and like enough to prove better, have a good possibility, as may fall out, to become perfect: but sure it is, 'will never be without danger: for the multitude seldome agrees to a new law, if it touch any change of government in the City, unless the necessity of doing it be shew'd them by some extremity, which never coming without danger, it is like enough the Commonwealth may be sooner ruin••d, then brought into good order. Of which that of Florence gives sufficient

proof, which upon that accident of Arezo in the second year was anew orderd, and by that of Pirato in the twelfth inbroyld again. Intending then to treate what were the or∣dinances of the City of Rome, and the acci∣dents that brought it to perfection, I say, that some, who have writ of Commonwealths, will have it that there was one of these three kinds of States term'd by them a Principality, another an Aristocracy, and a third a Popular government: and that they who lay the first grounds of rule and order in a City, ought most to have regard to some one of these, as it seems fittest to their purpose. Some others (and that following the opinion of many more wise) think that there be six sorts of governments; of which three are bad in ex∣tremity, and three good in themselves, but so easie to be corrupted, that even they become pernicious. Those which are good, are the three aforesaid; the bad are the other three which depend on these, and every one of them in such sort resemble that which it ap•• preaches, that they change suddenly from one into the other: for the Principality easily becomes Tyranny; that of the Nobility falls into the hands of some few; and the Popular will as easily become tumultuous: so that if he that lays the foundation of a Commonwealth, ordaines in a City one of these three sorts, it is but for a small conti∣nuance: for it is beyond the power of any remedy to hinder that it slip not into its contrary, for the resemblances which in this case there is between the vertue and the vice. These differences of governments grew by chance among men; for in the beginning of

the World, when the inhabitants were thin, they were scatter'd abroad for a time like wild beasts; afterwards man kind increasing, they gather'd together, and that they might be able better to defend themselves, they be∣gan to cast their eyes upon him who had the most strength and courage among them, and made him their head and obeyed him. Here∣upon began the discerning of things good and honest from bad and hurtful: for seeing that if any one hurt his benefactour, it caused ha∣tred and pitty among men, blaming the un∣grateful, and honouring the thankful; and thinking withal that the same injuries might as well be done to themselves; to avoid the like evil, they betook them to make laws and to make punishments against the offenders: Hence came the knowledge of justice, which was the occasion that when they were to chuse a Prince, they sought not after him that was the lustiest, but the wisest and justest. But afterwards when they had their Prince by succession, and not by election, suddenly the heirs began to degenerate from their ance∣stors; and forsaking vertuous actions, they thought that Princes had nothing to do but to exceed others in luxurie and wantonness, and in what belong'd to their pleasure: so that the Prince beginning to be hated, and because he was hated to fear, and passing on beyond this fear to hurt, hereon grew Ty∣ranny. Thence afterwards grew those vio∣lences, conspiracies and treasons against Princes, which were not undertaken by those that were fearful or weak; but if any sur∣passed others in courage, valour, wealth, and birth, those were the actors, not being able

to indure the shameful life of that Prince. The multitude then following the authority of those great ones, took armes against the Prince; and he being down, they yeelded obedience to these as to their deliverers: and they hating the name of one head alone, fram'd a government of themselves, and in the beginning (in regard of the tyranny past) carried themselves fairly according to the laws they had made, preferring the publique good before their own advantage, and in summe, rul'd and maintain'd the state with exceeding diligence. This government after∣wards falling into the hands of their chil∣dren, who never knew the change of fortune, nor had the experience of adversity, not be∣ing content to live in a civil equality, but abandoning themselves to covetousness, am∣bition, and ravishing of women, so carried it, that they ingross'd in the hands of some few the government that belong'd to the whole Nobility, without any regard of the state, in so much that it befell to them quick∣ly as to the Tyrant. For the multitude loathing their government, serv'd it self of any one that had any design against these go∣vernours, and so some there were quickly found that made head against them, who with the aid of the people put them down. And the remembrance of the Prince being yet fresh, and of the wrongs they suffered under him, having taken away this govern∣ment of few, and being unwilling to restore that of a Prince, they chose the Popular, which they so ordain'd, that neither a few that were mighty, nor one Prince alone should have any power there. And because

all states in the beginning are venerable, this Popular state subsisted a while but not long, especially when that generation was out that ordain'd it: for suddenly they grew licenti∣ous, not fearing private men, nor publick Ministers, so that every one living as he listed, they daily did one another divers outrages, and at length wereforc'd by necessity, or by the perswasion of some good man, for to a∣void such insolency, to change a new into a Principality, and so from thence by degrees, they grew exorbitant in their behaviour, and upon the occasions aforesaid: And this is the circle, in which all states turning about have been and are governed: but seldome do they returne into the self same govern∣ments: for hardly any Commonwealth can be of so long durance as to undergoe so many changes, and yet stand afoot: but rather it comes to pass, the state while it is in tumult, counsell and force then alwaies failing, be∣comes subject to some neighbouring govern∣ment which is better order'd then it self: but were it not for this, a state were always capable of revolution into these sorts of go∣vernment: I say then, that all these kinds are pernicious for the short continuance of the three which are good; and the malig∣nity of the other three which are bad: Whereupon the sage Law-givers having per∣ceived this defect, avoiding each one by it self, chose one that might partake of all, esteeming that more sound and firme: for the one guards the other, being that in one and the same City, there was the Principa∣lity, Nobility, and Commonalty as parts

of the governments. Among those, who by such like ordinances have deserv'd most com∣mendations, is Lycurgus, who made his laws after such a manner in Sparta, that giving the King the Nobility, and the people their shares, he compos'd a government that lasted above eight hundred yeares, to his great credit and that Cities quiet. The contrary be∣fell Solon, who made the laws in Athens, which because it was a popular state, prov'd but short liv'd, and he before he died saw the Tyranny of Pisistratus begun: and though after forty years his heires were driven from thence, and Athens recover'd its liberty (because it took again a popular government according to Solons institutions) it maintain'd it not above a hundred years, notwithstand∣ing that to hold it, there were many lawes made by which the insolences of the great men were restrain'd and the licentiousness of all in general: which were never provided for by Solon: yet because he compounded not this with the authority of the Principality as also of the Nobility, Athens continu'd but a short time in respect of Sparta. But let us come to Rome, which though it had not a Ly∣curgus to put it so in order that it might long subsist free, yet such were the accidents that chanc'd in it, by reason of the disunion of the Commonalty and the Senate, that what their founder had not provided for, chance did: for if Rome lit not upon the best fortune, it lit up∣on the next to the best; for though the first ordinances were defective, yet they aim'd not amiss at the true perfection: because Romulus and all the Kings made many and good laws and these agreeing to the maintenance of

liberty. But because their design was to lay the foundations of a kingdome, and not of a Commonwealth, when the City became free, there wanted many things which were fit to be instituted in favour of liberty, but were ne∣ver ordain'd by those Kings. And albeit their Kings lost rule upon the occasion and by the means alledged, yet they that expel'd them presently setting up two Consuls who should stand in the Kings stead, chas'd out of Rome the Regal title only, & not the Regal power; so that there being in that Commonwealth the Consuls and the Senate, it was compos'd only of two of these forenamed qualities, that is to say, of the Principality & Nobility. There remain'd only to give the Commonalty a place in the government, whereupon the Roman Nobility being grown insolent, upon the occasions (which shall be hereafter told) the people rose up against them, so that ra∣ther then to lose all, they were constrain'd to allow the people their part; & on the other side, the Senate & the Consuls were likewise to continue with so great authority as they might well maintain their degree in that Commonwealth: & so began the creation of the Tribuns of the people, after which the state of that Commonwealth became more firme, all the three kinds of governments ha∣ving their shares. And fortune did so much favour them, that though they proceeded from the rule of a King, & of the Nobility, to that of the people, by the same degrees, and for the same reasons set down before; yet to give power to the Nobility, they never took away all the authority from the Royalty; nor was the power of the Nobility quite dimi∣nish'd,

to give it to the people: but being ming∣led, it made an exact Commonwealth, to which perfection it came by the departing of the Commonalty from the Senate, as it shall be shewed at length in the two next following Chapters.

CHAP. III.

Vpon what occasions the Tribuns of the people were created in Rome: whereby the Com∣monwealth became more perfect.

ACcording as it is shewed by all those that reason of civil government, and so every History is full of examples to that purpose, it is necessary that he who frames a Com∣mon-wealth, and ordaines Laws in it, should presuppose that all men are bent to mischief, and that they have a will to put in practice the wickedness of their minds, so oft as oc∣casion shall serve: and that when any mis∣chief lies covert for a time, it proceeds from an occasion unknown, which is not come to light, because trial of the contrary hath not yet been made, but time afterwards dis∣covers it, which they say is Father of the truth. It seem'd that there was in Rome a perfect union of the People and Senate, when the Tarquins were banisht, and that the Nobility having laid by their Pride, were become of a popular disposition, and supportable to every one even of the meanest ranke. This deceit lay hid, nor was the occasion thereof known as long as the Tarquins liv'd, of whom the Nobility being

afraid, and doubting that upon their ill treating of the people, they might side with them, behav'd themselves with good re∣spect towards them: But no sooner were the Tarquins dead, and the Nobility delivered of that feare, but they began to spit against the people the poison that all this while had lurked in their breasts, and in all sorts possi∣ble to vex and molest them: which thing confirmes what I said before, that men never do good, unless inforc'd thereto: but where choice is abundant, and liberty at pleasure, confusion and disorder suddenly take place. Wherefore it is said, that hunger and poverty make men laborious, and Laws make them good. But where one thing alone by it self without a Law does good, there, is no need of the Law: but when that good custom failes, the Law becomes necessary forthwith. Yet the Tarquins being foil'd, who with feare of them kept the Nobility in awe, it was fit to think out a new way which should work the same effect the Tarquins did, when they were alive. And so at length after many broyles, tumults, and hazards of breaches between the people and the Nobility, at length for the peoples assurance, the Tribuns were created, and they bore such sway and had such credit, that they could alwaies after mediate between the people and the Senate, and stop the Nobilities insolency.

CHAP. IV.

That the disagreement of the People and the Senate of Rome, made the Commonwealth both free and mighty.

I Must not fail to discourse upon these tu∣mults, which were in Rome from the Tar∣quins death till the creation of the Tribuns; and afterwards upon some other things a∣gainst the opinion of many, who say that Rome was a very disorderly commonwealth, and full of such confusion, that if good for∣tune and military vertue had not supplyed their defects, it would have been inferiour to any. I cannot deny that fortune and war∣like discipline were causes of the Roman Em∣pire: but methinks they do not consider, that where good discipline is, it is likely too that there is good order, and seldom also happens it but that there is good fortune. But let us come to the other particulars of that City. I say that they who condemne the troubles between the Nobility and the people, to me seem to blame those things which were the first occasion of Romes liber∣ty: and that they think more of the stirs and noises which arose from those tumults, then they regard the good effects they brought forth: and that they consider not, how there are two severall humours in every Re∣publique, that of the Commons, and the o∣ther of the great-ones; and how all the laws that are made in favor of liberty, spring first from their disagreement, as easily we may perceive it follow'd in Rome. For from the

Tarquins to the Gracchies more then 300. years, the tumults of Rome seldome times caus'd banishment, and very seldome blood: Insomuch as no man can well deem these stirres hurtful, nor say the Commonwealth was divided, which in so long a time through her discord, banish'd not above eight or ten Citizens, and put very few to death, nor yet condemn'd many in sums of money. Neither can that be term'd with reason in any sort a disorderly Commonwealth, whence we have so many rare examples of vertue: for good examples proceed from good education & a good education from good laws, & good laws from those tumults which many unadvised∣ly do condemn: for whosoever shall examin the end thereof, shall not find that they pro∣duc'd any banishment or violence in hinde∣rance of the common good, but laws & ordi∣nances in benefit of the publick liberty. And if any man should alledge that the means were extravagant, & in a manner outragions. To see the people together cry out against the Senate, and the Senate against the people, to run tumultuously through the streers, to shut up their shops, and the whole people of Rome to quit the town, all which things fright even those that read them. I say that every city ought to have its own waies whereby the people may vent their ambition, & especi∣ally those cities that in matters of importance wil availe themselves of their people; among which Rome had this way, that when the peo∣ple would have a law made, either they did some of the things forenamed, or re∣fus'd to have their names inrolled for the warres, so that to quiet them, there was a

necessity in some sort to give them satisfaction. And it is but seldom seen, that the desires of free people tend to the hurt of liberty; for they arise either from their oppression, or from their suspicion they are falling into it. And in case these opinions were false, yet is there a meanes to rectifie them, if some dis∣creet Oratour in their assemblies perswade them of their error; and the people (as Tully says) though of themselves ignorant, yet are they of capacity to conceive the truth, being told them by any man worthy of cre∣dit, and do easily submit. Wherefore we ought more sparingly to blame the Roman Government, and consider the good effects issued from that Commonwealth, which ne∣ver proceeded but from good causes. And for creating the Tribuns, they deserve ex∣ceeding great praise; for besides the giving to the people their share of Government, they were ordain'd as guardians of the Roman liberty, as it shall appear in the Chapter following.

CHAP. V.

Whether the people or the nebiliry are the better Guardians of liberty; and which have greater occasions of being tzmvltuous; either they that strive to enlarge the state, or they than endeavour but to maintain it.

THey who have judiciously laid the foundations of a Commonwealth, have, among other principal things or∣dain'd by them, provided a safegard for li∣berty, which as it is rightly plac'd, so is it of long or shorter durance. And because in every Republick there are the Nobility and the Commons, question is made to which of these two more safely may be intrusted the Guard of liberty. And among the Lacedemo∣nians, and in our times among the Venetians it hath been given to the Nobility; but a∣mong the Romans it was committed to the peoples trust; and therefore is it necessary to examine which of these two Common-wealths made the better choyce. And if a man list to argue the case, there want not arguments on both parts: butif we look to the issue they had, we should yeeld it to the Nobility, because Sparta and Venice enjoy'd either of them their freedome, longer then Rome. And comming to argument I say (first taking part with the Romans) that they ought rather to be intrusted as guardians of any thing, who are least desirous to usurpe it, & without doubt considering the designes of the nobility & of the people, we must needs confess they are very ambitious of rule, these only desire not to be oppress'd, and con∣sequently affect the continuance of their freedome, having less hope to usurpe it, then the Nobility; so•• that the people be∣ing set as guardians of the Common liberty,

it is probable, they are more careful of it; and being themselves out of hope of it, will never suffer that it fall into others hands. On the other side, he that argues for the Spartan and Venetian customes, sayes, that they who intrust it with them that are powerful, doe two good things at once; the one, that they rather give a satisfaction to their ambition, that having a greater part in the Common-wealth, by holding this staffe in their hand they have greater reason to be contented: the other is, that they free the peoples un∣quiet minds from such a kinde of authority which is the occasion of infinite discords and offences in the Commonwealth, and like e∣nough to bring the Nobility to some despe∣ration, which in time may do much mischief: and they give us Rome it self for an example hereof, that when the Tribuns of the people had this authority in their hands, they were not content to have one Consul to be a Ple∣beyan, but would have both, and thereupon they would have the Censor and the Pre∣tour, and all other dignities in the rule of the City: nor was this enough, but led on still with the same rage, they began in after times to adore those men whom they saw fit to curbe the Nobility, whereupon grew the power of Marius and the ruine of Rome: and, truly whosoever should sift this matter throughly, the one and the other, would much doubt which he should make choyce of for the guardians of liberty, not knowing which sort of men is more hurt∣sull in a Commonwealth, either that which desires to gain the honour it hath not, or the other which endeavours to maintain what

they have already got; and at last, whosoever shall examin the whole throughly, will make this conclusion; Either you reason of a Re∣publick that aymes at such a dominion as Rome had, or of one which seeks no farther then her own preservation. In the fir•• case, it is best to doe as Rome did, and follow her footsteps. In the second, he may follow Venice and Sparta for those occasions, as it shall be said in the Chapter following. But to return to the point, what kind of men are the more hurtful in a Republick? either they that would enlarge the State, or those that are wary not to lose what they have already gotten; I say that Marcus Menenius being made Dictatour, and Marcus Follius Gene∣ral of the horse, both Plebeyans, to inquire after certain conspiracies, which were made in Capua against Rome, authority was also given from the people to find out those that in Rome by ambition or any extraordinary way did strive to gain the Consu••ship, and the other great honours of the City; where∣upon the Nobility thinking this authority granted to the Dictatour as against them, they reported all about Rome that they were not the Nobles that ambituously sought after dig∣nities by unlawful means, but the Plebeyans who not confident of their births nor worths, sought by extravagant wayes to attain to those degrees, and particularly accused the Dictatonr; and so powerfull was the accusa∣tion, that Menenius in a publick assembly, where he complain'd of the calumnies the Nobility had laid on him, quit the Dictatour∣ship, and submitted himself to the tryal, which was made before the People, and after his

cause was heard, he was absolved: where it was argued, whether savour'd more of am∣bition, either he that would maintain, or he that would gain; for the one and the other appetite may occasion very great tumults. Yet notwithstanding most commonly are they caus'd by him who already hath the possession, because the feare of losing doth breed in them the same desires which are in those who aime at conquest: because men think they hold not surely what they have, unless they make a new addition of some∣what else; and besides this, the larger ter∣ritories they are Master of, the greater force and power they are able to imploy in bring∣ing their designs to effect; and this also may we adde, that their unlimited and ambitious behaviours kindle in the breasts of those that have not, a desire to have, or to be re∣veng'd on those that despoyle them, or else to become Lords themselves of that wealth and those honours, which they see others use ill.

CHAP. VI.

Whether in Rome there could have been ••uch a State founded, as would quite ha•••• taken away the hatreds between the People and the Senate.

WEE have discours'd upon the effects, which the differences, betwixt the People and the Senate, made. Now they continuing till the Gracchies, where they oc∣casion'd the ruine of the common liberty, some man would wish, that Rome could have atchieved these glorious acts she did, with∣out those jarres in her. Yet it seems worthy the consideration, to see, if it were possible, so to frame a State in Rome, as could void all differences••; and if a man would examin this, he should have recourse to those Repub∣liques, which, without so many fallings out and bickerings, have been long free, and see, what kind of State theirs was, and whe∣ther Rome were capable of it. An example among the ancients is Sparta, among the modernes Venice, both by me formerly named. Sparta made it self a King with a little Senate to govern it. Venice divided not the government with the names, but in one general tearm, all those that had a hand in it were call'd Gentlemen, which chance rather cast on them, then the deliberation of their founder: for many inhabitants be∣ing met together upon those rocks, where now stands that City upon the occasions fore∣told, when they were grown to such a number, that for them to live together it

was necessary for them to ordain Lawes they appointed a forme of government, and meeting also together in Counsel to advise touching the City, when they found them∣selves of sufficient number to make up a body politick, they excluded all others who afterwards in process of time should come to dwell there, from all power in State affaires. And in success of time, find∣ing there were many inhabitants in the place out of the Government, to give them reputation that govern'd, they call'd them Gentlemen, and the others Plebeyans. So that this order might well be begun and con∣tinued without the dislike of any: for when it was first made, every one that dwelt at Venice, did equally partake of the Govern∣ment, so that none could complain: they, who afterwards came to inhabit there, find∣ing the State setled and limited, had neither occasion nor meanes to make any tumult: there was no occasion, because nothing was taken from them: and the meanes they had not, because they that govern'd kept them in subjection, nor trusted them so far with any imployment that they could take autho∣rity upon them. Add hereunto, that they who afterwards came to inhabit Venice, were not many, nor of so great a number, that there was disproportion between the Go∣vernors and those that were governed; for the number of the Gentlemen was either e∣qual to them, or greater then they were: so that for these reasons Venice could well begin such a State and maintain it in unity. Sparta, as I said, was govern'd by a King and a strict Senate, and might well maintain

it self so a long time; because there being in Sparta but few inhabitants, and they having seis'd upon the Government in prevention of those that should afterwards come to in∣habit there, and with reputation living in observance of Lycurgus Lawes, took away quite all occasion of discord, so that they might easily continue together in a long a∣greement; for Lycurgus by his Laws ordain'd in Sparta more equality of estates, and less of dignities; for here poverty was to all alike; and the Plebeyans less ambitious: for the Magistracies of the City were commu∣nicable only to some few Citizens, and were held apart from the People, neither did the Nobility ever with their harsh usage make them covetous of them. This eame from the Spartan Kings, who being plac'd in that Principality, and set in the midst of that Nobility, had no surer means to main∣tain their dignity stedfast, then to defend the People from injurious oppressions: which made the People, that it neither feared nor affected the Government, and not having the rule nor fearing it, the con∣tention they might have with the Nobility was quite avoided, and all occasion of tu∣mults: and in this sort they might live in peace a long time. But two principal things caus'd this agreement; because the inhabitants of Sparta were few, and therefore might be govern'd by few: the other, because not accepting of strangers into their Republick, they had not occasion, either of being cor∣rupted, or making great increase, so as to become insupportable to those few that go∣vern'd them. Wherefore considering these

things, it appears; that the founders of Rome were to have us'd one of these two ex∣pedients, if they desir'd to maintain it quicker, like one of these Commonwealths we have spoken of: either not to imploy the common people in War, as the Vene∣tians; or not admit strangers into the City, as the Spartans: both of which they did, which gave the people force and increase, and sundry occasions of tumults. So that if the Roman State grew more quiet, this inconvenient follow'd, that it was also weaker; because it disabled it self of the means to come to the greatness it attain'd. And therefore, if Rome would take away the occasions of disagreements, it took away the means of amplifying the State. And in all humane affaires it is plain, who∣soever does throughly examin it, that upon the cutting off one inconvenient, another will streight arise: therefore if thou wouldst make a numerous and a warlike people to inlarge far the bounds of the Empire, thou mak'st them of such a temper, that they shall never be maneggiable at thy will; a•• if thou keptst them weake and disarmed to have them at command: but if they get the rule into their hand, thou shalt not be able to bridle them; or else become so base, that thou shalt be made a prey to what enemy so e're assaults thee. And for this cause in all our deliberations wee ought to advise, where least inconvenients are, and to take that for the best course: for there is non•• absolutely free from hazard and suspicion Rome then, like Sparta, could have made 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••rince for life, and a small Senate, but could

nor then, as shee, not increase the number of her Citizens, having a desire to extend her dominions: which was the cause that a King for terme of life, and the little num∣ber of Senators, touching their agreement, would have nothing availd. Whereupon if a man were anew to lay grounds of a Re∣publick, he should first resolve, whether hee would have it extend its power and rule, as Rome: or confine it self to small limits. In the first case then, hee must order it, as Rome, and give place to tumults and general differences, the best he may; for without great number of men, and those warlike, could never any Commonwealth increase, or if it increase, continue. In the second case thou maist so order it, as Sparta or Venice. But by reason that ambition to extend the dominions, is the poison of such like Commonwealths, their founder ought, as much as may be, in all those waies for∣bid them to inlarge themselves; for all such gaines grounded upon a weake Common-wealth, do quite ruine it, as it befell Sparta and Venice: whereof the first, having sub∣dued as it were all Greece, upon a very small accident, discover'd its own weak founda∣tion: for the Rebellion of Thebes following, caus'd by Pelopidas, with other Cities imita∣ting, utterly ruin'd that Republick. In like manner Venice, having possest her self of a great part of Italy, and the greatest not by force, but by mony, and craft, when it came to make trial of its force, lost all in a day. I should well beleeve, that the way to frame a Commonwealth of long continuance, were to order it within as Sparta or Venice,

to place it in a strong situation, and make it of such resistance, that no man can hope to subdue it on a sudden; and on the otherside, that it be not so great, to become a terror to the neighbors, and so likely it may long enjoy its State. For upon two occasions ordi∣narily men make War against a Republick; the one, to become master of it, the other for fear it become master of them. And this way I have spoken of, takes quite away these two causes; for if it be hard to overcome, as I presuppose it, being well furnish'd for defence, it will seldome, or never chance that any can make a design to conquer it: and if it containes it self within its own limits, and it be manifest by experience, that in it there is no ambition, it shall never come to pass, that any for feare in∣terrupt its quiet. And this would the ra∣ther be, if in it were made a Law or order to forbid the amplifying of the State. And without doubt I beleeve, that the bringing of things to consist in these termes and in this equality of temper, were the true civil Go∣vernment, and the perfect quiet of a City. But being that all humane things are in continual motion, and nothing stands firm, they must ever be rising or falling. And to many things that reason doth not per∣swade thee, necessity bindes thee; so that having settled a Commonwealth able to maintain it self, not augmenting; and ne∣cessity should force it to inlarge it self, it would manifestly loosen its own founda∣tions, and suddenly bring it self to ruine. On the otherside, if the heavens should prove so favourable, as to blow away all clouds

and tempests of War, thence would arise that sloth and idleness would either divide them, or make them effeminate. Which two things together, or either by it self, would occasion their ruine And therefore, being impossible (as I think) to poise all things so justly by the balance, or reduce them to this perfection of temper, it is properest, in founding the Republick, to provide for the most honorable part, and so to order it, that when necessity shall inforce its inlarging, it may be able to keep what it hath gotten. And to return to our first discourse, I think it necessary to follow the Roman Ordinances, and not those of other Common wealths; for to find a mediocrity between the one and the other, I think it not possible. And those enmities, which should grow betwixt the people and the Senate, ought to be tolerated, taking them for a necessary inconvenient, to attain to Romes greatness. For besides other reasons alledged, where the authority of the Tribunes is prov'd necessary for the preserva∣tion of liberty, it manifestly appears what great benefit they make in Commonwealths of the power of accusing, which among other things was committed to the Tribunes, as in the Chapter following shall be declar'd.

CHAP. VII.

How useful accusations are in a Republike for the maintenance of Liberty.

THere cannot be a more profitable or ne∣cessary power given to those that in a city are appointed as guardians of the liberty, then is that of accusing the Citizens to the people, or before any Magistrate, or any councel, whensoever they offend in any thing against the free State. This order workes two very useful effects in a Republick. The first is, that the Citizens for feare of being accused, attempt nothing against the State; and in case they do, forthwith without any respect given them, are suppres'd. The other is, that it gives a way to vent the humours that grow in the Cities, in any manner a∣gainst any Citizens. And when these hu∣mours have not ordinary vents, they burst out extraordinary waies, and so are the ruine of a Commonwealth. And there is not any thing renders a Republick more setled and stedfast, then to ordain it in such a manner, that the alteration of these humours that stir it, have some out-let, appointed by the Lawes; which may be shew'd by divers exam∣ples, and especially by that of Coriolanus, which Titus Livius reports: where he saies, that the Nobility of Rome being angry with the people, as thinking them to have too much Authority, by creation of the Tribunes, who protected them; and Rome (as some time it chances) being in great want of pro∣visions, and thereupon the Senate sent for

Corne into Sicily, Coriolanus an Enemy of the popular faction advis'd, that now the time was come, they had power to chastise the people, and to take away that Authority which they had laid hold on in prejudice of the Nobility, by keeping them in hunger and want, distributing the Corn to them. Which opinion of his they hearing of, took such distast against Coriolanus, that had not the Tribunes cited him to appear to defend his cause, the people had slain him in a tumult as he came out of the Senate. Upon which accident, we note that which before was said, how fit and usefull it is, that the Com∣monwealths with their Lawes give meanes to vent the choler, which the universality hath conceiv'd against any one Citizen. For when they have not these ordinary meanes, they have recourse to extraordinary; and out of question these are of worse effect then those. For if by an orderly course one Citizen be ssuppres'd, although it were wrongfully done, yet follwes thereupon little or no dis∣order in the Republick, because the execution is done without any private mans power, or assistance of forrein forces, which are those, that take away the common liberty; but by the publick and lawful power, which have their particular bounds, nor any way pass so far as to endammage, the Commonwealth. And to confirm this opinion with examples, this of Coriolanus from the ancients shall suffice me; upon which let every one consider, what mischief thereby had faln on the Common-wealth of Rome, if in a tumult he had been flain; for thereupon had grown offences be∣tween particular men; offences cause feare,

feare seekes defence, for defence men make partisans, and thus parties grow in Cities, and from them the ruine of Cities. But the matter being order'd by publick authority, they took away all those mischiefes which might have happen'd, had it been carried by private power; we have seen in our daies what innovations it hath brought on the Florentine Republick, in that the multitude had no legal meanes to vent their displeasure against a single Citizen: as it befel in the time of Franciscus Valorus, who was as it were Prince of the City, and being by many thought ambitious, and a man that by his in∣solent and high stomack would not content himself to live within a civil Government, and there being no way in the Commonwealth to resist him, unless with some faction opposite to his, thence it came, that he not doubting other then some extraordinary meanes, began to seek favourers of his party, to defend him. On the other side, they that oppos'd him, having no ready way to suppress him, devis'd some extraordinary waies: insomuch as they came at length to fight, and where (if by an ordinary course he could have been re∣strain'd:) his power had sunk with his own loss onely a now having to use extraordina∣ry meanes in breaking it, there ensued not only his, but the ruine of many other Noble Citizens. There might also be alledged, to confirm our former conclusion, the accident chanc'd in Florence, upon the occasion of Peter Soderinus, which wholly proceeded from the want of meanes in that Republick, to accuse the ambition of some powerful Citi∣zens; for, it was not enough to accuse a

mighty man, before eight Judges in a Com∣monwealth. The Judges ought to be in great number; for a few do after the manner of two or three; so that if such courses were taken, either the Citizens would have accus'd him living ill, and thereby, without calling the Spanish Army to aid, would have wreak'd their anger on him; or not beha∣ving himself ill, they durst not have ventur'd to seek his ruine, for feare themselves of in∣curring danger. And so on all sides had ceas'd that ravenous cruelty, which was the cheif occasion of offence. Whereupon we may conclude this, that so oft as we see forrein forces call'd upon by any party of Citizens, we may well beleeve that in that City there is lack of good, Ordinances: even lack of that ordinary meanes to vent without extraordi∣nary waies the maligne humors which grow in men; whereunto it is sufficiently remedi∣ed, by allowing of accusations before many Judges, and withall countenancing them. Which courses were so well order'd in Rome, that in so many quarrels between the people and the Senate, neither the one nor the other, nor any particular Citizen ever intended to availe themselves by any forreign strength; because they having a remedy at home, were not necessitated to go seek it abroad. And though the examples above written are suffi∣cient to prove this, yet I will alledg another, related by Titus Livius in his History: who reports, that in Clusia, the Noblest City in those daies in all Tuscany, by one Lucumon Aruns was ravished, and he, not being able to work his revenge by reason of the ravishers might, went and found out the French-men

who then raign'd in that place we now call Lombardy and encourag'd them to bring an Army to Clusia, showing them that with their gain they might revenge him of the in∣jury done him: and if Aruns had seen possi∣bility to have been righted by any means in the City, he never would have inquir'd after any barbarous power. But as these accusati∣ons are profitable in a Commonwealth: so are calumnies unprofitable and hurtful, as it shall appear by our discourse in the next Chapter.

CHAP. VIII.

Accusations are not more beneficial to Common-wealths, then Calumnies pernitious.

NOtwithstanding, that the virtue of Fu∣rius Camillus, after he had freed the City of Rome from the siege and oppression of the Frenchmen, had brought to pass, that none of the Citizens of Rome thought it took any way from their credit or degree, to give him place: yet Manlius Capitolinus could not endure that so much honor and renown should be ascribed to him. Being of opinion, that touching the safety of Rome, in that he, had defended the Capitol from the Enemies he deserv'd as much as Camillus; and in re∣gard of other warlike glories, he was no way second to him. So that overburden'd with envy, nor being able to take rest for this mans honor, and perceiving he could sow no dis∣cord among the Fathers, he made his address to the people, scattering among them divers

sinister opinions. And among other things, he said this also, that the treasure which was collected for the Frenchmen, and after not given them, was usurp'd by some private Citizens; and if it were had again, it might be turn'd to the publick good, easing the people of their tributes, or some private debts. These words were of force with the people, so that they began to run together, and as they listed to raise many tumults in the City: Which thing much displeasing the Senat, and they taking it for a matter of great moment, and dangerous, created a Dictatour, that he might examin the case, and bridle the violence of Manlius. Whereupon the Dicta∣tor cited him, and they met in publick one against the other, the Dictator environ'd with the Nobility, Manlius with the People, Manlius was demanded, who had the treasure he spoke of, for the Senate was as desirous to understand as the people. Whereunto Manlius answer'd not particularly, but as by excuses, said there was no need to tell them what they already knew, so that the Dictator caus'd him to be put in prison. Hereupon may we observe, how extreamly pernicious and damageable are calumnies, as well in free Cities, as in any other kind of Government; and therefore to repress them ought not any Law or Ordinance be spar'd, that may serve to the purpose. Neither can there be found any better expedient to ex∣tinguish them, then to open many waies to accusations; for as they do much help a Republick, so calumnies hurt it: and ••on the other part, there is this difference, that calumnies have no need of Testimonies, nor

of any particular incounter to prove them; so that every one may be caluminated, but not accus'd; accusations being tied to certain particulars and circumstances, to udemon∣strate their truth. Men are accus'd before Ma∣gistrates, the People and Councells; slan∣der'd they are by calumnies, as well in private as in publick. And there slander is most in use, where accusations are nor accustomed, and where the Cities are loth to receive them. Therefore every founder of a Repub∣lick ought so to order it, that therein any Citizen may be accused without feare or suspect. And this done and well observ'd, he ought sharply to punish the slanderers, who have no reason to complain when they are punish'd, there being publick places to heare his accusations, whom they in private would have slandered. And where this part is not well order'd, there alwaies follows much confusion; for calumnies do provoke and not chastise the Citizens; and those that are provok'd, think to availe themselves ra∣ther by hating, then fearing the things that are said against them. This part (as it is said) was well order'd at Rome, and al∣waies ill in our City of Florence. And as at Rome this order did much good, so at Florence this disorder did much harme: And whoso∣ever reades the stories of this City, shall see, how many slanders have from time to time been devis'd against those Citizens, who have been imployed in the most important affairs of it. Of one they said, he rob'd the common: Treasury; of another, he fail'd of such an attempt, being corrupted; and of a third, he ran, into this or that inconvenient

through ambition. From whence proceeded, that on every side grew hatred; whereupon came division, from division they came to factions, from factions to ruine. But had there been a meanes in Florence to accuse the Citizens, and punish slanderers, that infi∣nite number of calumnies, that afterward grew, had never followed; for those Citizens either condemned or assoild that they had been, could never have hurt the City, and would have been less accused, then they were slander'd; every one (as I have said) being not so readily able to accuse as to slander. And among other things, some Citizens have serv'd themselves of these calumnies, as steps and helps to their ambitious ends; who having to incounter powerful men opposed themselves as they listed, and left nothing undone to work their intent; for taking part with the people, and confirming them in their evil opinion, already conceived of these, have made the people their own friends. And though I could bring examples enough, I will be content with this one. The Floren∣tine Army was in the field at Lucca comman∣ded by John Guicchiard an able Captain. Either his Government was so ill, or the success prov'd so unlucky, that he faild in taking the Town. So that howsoever the case stood, John was blam'd for it, saying, he had been bribed by the Luccheses: which slander being favour'd by his Enemies, brought John to extream despair. And though to justifie himself he offer'd his sub∣mission to trial and imprisonment, yet could he never wipe away that blur, because in that Commonwealth there were not the

meanes to do it, whereupon grew much distast between Johns friends, who were the greater part of the potent men, and his Ad∣versaries, who were some that desir'd to make innovations in Florence. Which matter, upon these and otherlike occasions, increased so, that thereupon ensued the ruine of that Republique. M. Capitolinus therefore was a slanderer, and not an accuser, and the Romans shewed directly in this case, how slanderers ought to be punish'd. For they ought to make them become accusers: and when the accusation proves true, either re∣ward them, or at least not punish them; and when false, punish them, as Manlius.

CHAP. IX.

How needful it is, that he who frames anew the Laws, and laies new foundations of a Common wealth, be alone without Com∣panion or Competitor.

ANd perchance some will think, that I have run too far within the Roman History, not having made any mention yet, of the founders of that Republick, nor of the Laws which belong'd, either to their Reli∣gion, or their military discipline. And there∣fore not willing to hold them longer in sus∣pence, who are desirous to understand some∣what in this case, I say, that many perad∣venture will think this a matter of evil example, that the ordainer of a civil Go∣vernment, as was Romulus, should first * 1.1

have taken his bro∣thers life from him, and after have consen∣ted to T. Tacius the Sabines death, chosen by him his compani∣on in the Kingdom; judging hereby that his own Citizens might by Authority taken from their Prince for ambition, or desire to rule, en∣damage those that should oppose their power. Whose opi∣nion we should ac∣knowledg true, if we consider nor the end which induc'd him to commit this homicide. And we may take this for a general rule, that ne∣ver or seldom it chan∣ces, that any Repub∣lick or Kingdom is from the beginning well ordein'd or throughly new refor∣med of its old customs, unless the disposing of it depend absolute∣ly upon the will of one. Nay rather there is a necessity of it, that that one be ab∣solute,

that appoints the manner how, and by whose understand∣ing all such ordination is regulated. Where∣fore a wise founder of a Republick, who seeks not his own ad∣vantage, but the pub∣lick good; not to strengthen his own succession, but seeks his Countries profit, ought indeavor to get the power wholly in∣to his own hands: neither will any man of good judgment ever blame any ex∣traordinary action he shall put in practice, for the setling of a good Government in a Kingdom, or fra∣ming sure foundations in a Commonwealth. It holds well together, though the act accuse him, that the effect excuse him; and when that is good, as it prov'd to Romulus, it will alwaies excuse him; for he that uses violence to waste, is blameable, not he that uses it for redress and order. And therefore ought he be so wise and virtuous, that the Authority he hath possest himself of, he leave not to de∣scend hereditarily on another. For men being more inclined to ill then good, his successor may turne that to ambition which he ma∣nag'd vertuously. Besides this, though one

be fit to ordein a thing, yet its not so or∣dein'd to last long, when it rests upon the shoulders of one man; well may it indure, being committed to the care of many, to whom it belongs to maintain it. For even so, as many are not proper for the framing of one thing, because all of them hit not on the true good of it, by reason of their seve∣ral opinions among them so; after they have known it, neither agree they to let it pro∣ceed to its advantage. And that Romulus was one of those, who for the death of his bro∣ther and companion, might be excus'd: and that what he did was for the common good, and not for his own ambition, it ap∣pears, in that he forth with ordain'd a Se∣nate, with whom he might take counsell, and by their opinions be advis'd. And he, who considers well the Authority Romulus re∣serv'd himself, will perceive it was no more than to command the Armies, when they had resolv'd on War; and to assemble the Senate; which was apparent afterwards, when Rome became free upon the banish∣ment of the Tarquins: whereupon the Ro∣mans were never brought in any new order, unless that in lieu of a King during life, they made two Consuls yearly: Which confirms, that all the first ordinances of that City were more agreeable to a civil and free Govern∣ment, then to one absolute and Monarchical. To verifie the thing abovesaid, we might bring many examples, as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of Kingdomes and Commonwealths, who could well, having an absolute power in their hands, ordain laws for the common good; but I will let

them pass, as well know. I shall alleadg only one, not so famous, but well worthy their consideration, who desire to be good Law-makers: which is, That Agis King of Sparta advising to reduce the Spartans with∣in those bounds the Laws of Licurgus had included them; thinking that, because they had broken out of that strictness, his City had lost very much of the ancient vertue, and by consequent of force and government, was in the beginning of his attempts slain by the Spartan Ephores, as one, that aim'd to possess himself of the Tyranny. But Cleomenes after∣wards succeeding him in the Kingdom, upon his reading of Agis Records and Writings, which fell into his hands, he understood his intention, and grew desirous himself, to bring the same thing to pass; but found it was impossible to do that good to his Coun∣try, unless he became absolute of authority, it seeming to him, by reason of mens ambition, that he was unable to do good to many, a∣gainst the will of a few. And taking a fit opportunity, at length hee brought in all the Ephores, and every one else that could with∣stand him, and afterwards restor'd into force Licurgus his Lawes: Which delibera∣tion had bin able to have a new reviv'd Sparta, and gain'd Cleomenes the reputation Licur∣gus had, if then the Macedons power had not grown so vast, and the other Grecian Re∣publick been so weake. For after such order given, being set upon by the Macedons, and finding himself single too weak to deale with them, there being none could give him assistance, was overcome; and his project (though just and commendable) became

unperfect. Wheresore, upon the weighing of all these things together, I conclude, it ne∣cessary that a founder of a Republiek ought alone to have an absolute authority; and that Romulus, for the death of Remus and Tatius, deserves rather excuse than blame.

CHAP. X.

As the Founders of a Commonwealth or King∣dom are exceedingly praise-worthy, so the beginners of a Tyranny deserve much infamy.

AMongst all commendable men, those de∣serve esteem in the first place, who have taken care in laying the grounds of divine worship, and true Religion: the next be∣longs to them who have been the founders of Commonwealths or Kingdoms. After those are they famous that commanding over Ar∣mies have inlarg'd either their Kingdom or Country. To these wee may adjoyn learned men. And because they are of different dig∣nities, every one of them are valued accor∣ding to their degree. And to all other men, whose number is infinite, wee use to give that share of commendations, which their Art and Skill deserves. On the contrary, infamous are they and execrable, that are the perver∣ters of Religion, the dissipatours of Kingdoms and Republicks, enemies of vertue and lear∣ning, and of any other art, that brings pro∣fit, and renown to mankind; as also are the irreligious, the mad-braind, the ignorant, the slothful, and base. And there will never be

any so foolish, or so wise, so mischievous or so good, that the choice of the two qualities of men being made him, will not commend that which is commendable, and blame the blameable. Notwithstanding seeing that the most part, as it were, beguiled by counter∣feit good, and vain glory, suffer themselves either voluntarily or ignorantly to be counted in the number with those that merit more blame then praise•• And having meanes with their perpetual honor to frame a Republick or Kingdom, yet affect they a Tyranny; neither are they advis'd by this course, what reputation, what glory, what honor, security, quiet, and satisfaction of mind they flie from, and into what infamy, dispraise, blame, dan∣ger, and unquietness they plunge themselves: And it is impossible, that, they that live pri∣vate men in a Common-wealth, or that by fortune, or by their vertues become Princes, if they read the histories, or make any ac∣count of antiquities therein related, that those private men, I say, had not rather be Scipioes in their native Country, than Cesars; and those that are Princes, rather Agesilaus, Timoleon, or Dion, than Nabis, Phalaris, or Dionysius: for they would perceive these execedingly in all mens hatred, and, these as much beloved. They would see also how Timoleon and those of his like had no lefs power in their Country, then had Dionysius or Phalaris; but they would find also they had far more security. Nor let any be de∣eeived by Cesars glory, seeing his memory much celebrated by writers: for they that Praise him, were corrupted by his fortune, and frighted by the continuance of the Em∣pire,

which being govern'd under that name, gave not writers leave to speak freely of him. But he that would know what free writers would say of him, let him look upon that they say of Cataline: and Cesar is so much the more to be disprais'd, in that he executed the ill, the other did but intend. Let him see also how much they praise Brutus; so that not daring to blame the other, because of his power, they attributed much honor to his Enemy. Let him consider also him that is be∣come Prince in a Republick, what praises, after Rome was made an Empire, those Em∣perors rather deserv'd, that liv'd under the Laws, as good Princes, than they that went a contrary course to them; and he shall find, that Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Adrian, and Anto∣nius and Marcus had no need of Praetorian soldiers, nor a multitude of the legions to guard them; for their own vertues, the good will of the people, and the love of the Se∣nate did defend them. Moreover he shall see, that the Eastern and Western Armies were not enough to save Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and the other wicked Emperors from their Enemies, whom their vile conditions and damned lives had procured them. And if their Story were well read over, it might serve to give good instruction to any Prince, to shew him the way of glory and of disgrace, the way of security, and of distrust. Fot of 26 Emperors, that were from Cesar to Maxi∣minus, 16 were slain, 10. only died natural deaths. And if any of those that were slain were good, as Galba and Pertinax, it proceed∣ed from the corruption the predecessor had left among the soldiers. And if among those,

those that died natural deaths, any were wicked or lewd, as Severus, it was caus'd by his great fortune and valonr, which two accompany very few. Hee shall see also by reading this Story, how a man may order a good King∣dome: for all those Emperours that suc∣ceeded in the Empire by inheritance, except Titus, were mischievous; those that were adopted, were all good, as were those five from Nerva to Marcus. And as the Empire fell upon the heyres, it return'd alwaies to its destruction. Let a Prince be put in mind of the times from Nerva to Marcus, and compare them with those that went before them, and that follow'd them; let him choose in which he would have been borne, or over whether he would have had command. For in those that were govern'd by the good, he shall see a Prince live in security in the midst of his secure Citizens, the world replenish'd with peace and justice, the Senate enjoying their authority, the Magistrates their honours, and the wealthy Citizens their estates, nobi∣lity and vertue exalted, and with these all rest and good. And on the other side all ran∣cour, dissoluteness, corruption, and ambition extinguished, he shall see a returne of the gol∣den age, where every one may keep and de∣fend what reputation he pleases, and in the end shall see the world triumph, the Prince reverenc'd and honour'd, and the people in agreement and security If afterwards he consider severally the times of the other Em∣perours, he shall find the warres made them terrible, and seditions full of discord; as well in peace as in war cruell; so many Princes slain with the sword, so many civil, so many

forrain warres, Italy afflicted, and full of new misfortunes, the Cities thereof having been sackt and ruin'd; he shall see Rome burnt, the Capitol by her own Citizens de∣fac'd and spoyl'd, the antient temples desola∣ted, and their ceremonies neglected, the cities repleate with adulteries, the sea full of ba∣nishments, and the rocks besmeard with blood. He shall see follow in Rome a numberless number of cruelties; and Nobility, wealth, honours, and above all, vertue reputed as a most capital crime. He shall see accusers re∣warded, servants corrupted against their masters, children against their parents, and they, who had not enemies, oppressed by their friends, and then he shall know very well, how much Rome, Italy, and the world was beholding to Caesar. And without doubt, if he be borne of mankind, he will be frighted from imitating those wicked times, and inflam'd with zeale to trace the good. And truly a Prince ayming at glory, would with to be Lord of a disorder'd City, not to ruine it wholly, as did Caesar, but to recom∣pose and restore it, as Romulus. And be∣leeve me, the heavens cannot give men greater occasion of glory, nor men desire it. And if to renew and restore the frame of a City, there were necessity for a man to depose his Principality, the man that did not set it in order because he would not fall from his dignity, should yet deserve excuse. But when he could hold his Principality, and yet restore the government, he is no way excusa∣ble. And in sum, let them be well advis'd, to whom the heavens present such opportu∣nity, that either of these two wales be pro∣pounded

them, the one that gives them secu∣rity in life, and makes them glorious after death; the other that causes them to live in continual troubles, and leave behind them in everlasting infamy.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Romans Religion.

THough Romulus were Romes first founder, and she was to acknowledge from him her birth and bringing up; notwithstanding the heavens judging that Romulus his lawes were not sufficient for such an Empire, put it into the Roman Senat's mindes to elect Numa Pompilius to succeed Romulus, that what he left unfinished, the other might supply. Who finding a very fierce people, and being desi∣rous to reduce them into civil obedience by peaceable waies, applied himself to Religion, as a thing wholly necessary to preserve civi∣lity; and ordain'd it in such a sort, that for many ages there was not such a feare of God, as in that Commonwealth. Which facilita∣ted much any enterprise, whatsoever either the Senate, or those brave Roman courages did undertake. And whosoever shall dis∣course of the innumerable actions of the people of Rome jointly, and of many of the Romans by themselves in severall, shal per∣ceive that those Citizens fear'd more to break an oath, than the lawes; as they that made more account of the power of God, than of man; as it appears manifestly, by the exam∣ples

of Scipio and Manlius Torquatus: for after that Hannibal had given the Romans an over∣throw at Canna, many Citizens assembled to∣gether, and being affrighted resolv'd to quit the country, and go into Sieily; which Scipio understanding went and found them out, and with his sword drawn in his hand compelled them to sweare, they would ne∣ver forsake their native country. Lucius Man∣lius, that was afterwards call'd Torquatus, was accus'd by Marcus Pomponius Tribune of the people, and before the judgment day came, Titus went to find Marcus, and threat∣ning to kill him if he swore not to take the accusation off from his father, bound him by his oath: and he though by feare compell'd to sweare, yet took the accusation off: and so those Citizens, whom neither the love to their country, nor the lawes thereof could retain in Italy, were kept by force of an oath they were constrained to take: and that Tribune laid aside the hatred he bore to the father, the injury he receiv'd of the son, and his own reputation, to keep the oath he took: which proceeded of nothing else, but the Religion Numa brought in among them. And it is manifest, if a man consider well the Roman histories, of how much availe their Re∣ligion was for the commanding of armies, to reconcile the common people, to preserve good men, and to shame the lewd. So that if we were to dispute, to whether Prince Rome were more oblig'd, Romulus or Numa; I beleeve Numa would be prefer'd; for where Religion is, military discipline is easily brought in; and where they are already warlike, and have no Religion, this hardly followes.

And it is plain, that Romulus to order the Se∣nate, and frame certain other civil and mi∣litary ordinances, had no need of the autho∣rity of a God, which to Numa was necessary, who feign'd to have familiar conversation with a Nymph, who instructed him where∣with continually to advise the people. And all sprung from this, because he desiring to settle new orders, and unaccustomed in that City, doubted that his own authority was not of full force. And truly never was there yet any maker of extraordinary laws in a nation, that had not his recourse to God; for other. wise the laws had not been accepted. For many several goods are known by a wise man, which have not such evident reasons in them∣selves, that he by perswasion can quickly make others conceive them. Therefore the wise men, that would free themselves of this difficulty, have recourse to a God: so did Lycurgus, so Solon, so many others, whose de∣sign was the same with theirs. Thereupon the people of Rome admiring his goodness and wisdom yeelded to all his purposes. But it is true, because those times were then full of Religion, and those men rude and gross, on whom he spent his pains, this much faci∣litated his designs, being thereby able to mould them into a new forme. And without question, if any one in these daies would frame a Republick, he should find it easier to deale with rude mountainers, who had never known any civility, than with those who had been accustomed to live in Cities, where the government's corrupted: and a carver shall easier cut a saire Statue out of a rough marble, than out of one that hath been bungl'd

upon by another. Wherefore having well considered all, I conclude, that the Religion introduc'd by Nutna was one of the prin∣cipal occasions of that cities happiness; for that caus'd good orders, good orders brought good fortune, and from their good fortunes grew all the happy successes of their enterpri∣ses: and as the observance of divine worship occasions the greatness of a Commonwealth; so the contempt of it destroys it. For where the feare of God is wanting, it must needs be that either that Kingdom goes to ruine, or that it be supported by the awe it stands in of the Prince, who may supply the defects of Re∣ligion: and because Princes are but short-liv'd, that Kingdom must needs have an end quickly, according as the vertue thereof failes: from whence it comes, that governments which depend upon the vertue of one man, abide but a while, because that vertue ends with his life; and it seldome chances that it is renew'd by succession, as well saies the Poet Dante.

Rade volte discende per li rami L'humana probitate & questo vuole, Quel, che lada, per∣che da lui si chia∣mi. * 1.2

Therefore the safety of a commonwealth or kingdom consists not wholly in a Prince that governs wisely while he lives, but in one that so orders it, that he dying, it can pre∣serve it self. And although it be easier to

work rude and untaught people to a new course and frame, yet argues it not therefore an impossibility to prevaile with men that have liv'd in a civill government, and presume somewhat to understand themselves. The Flo∣rentines think not themselves either ignorant or rude, yet were they perswaded by Frier Jerom Savanarola, that he talked with GOD. I will not judge whether it were true or not, because we ought not to speak of such a great personage, but with reverence. But truly I say, that very many beleev'd him, not ha∣ving seen any great matter to perswede them thereto: for his life, doctrine, and the sub∣ject he took, were sufficient to make them credit him. Wherefore let no man be dis∣couraged, as if he could not reach to what another hath heretofore attaind; for men, as we said in our preface, were born, liv'd and died, under the same laws of nature.

CHAP. XII.

Of what importance it is to hold a worthy esteem of Religion, and that Italy for having fail'd therein, by means of the Church of Rome, hath gone to wrack.

THose Princes or those Republicks which would keep themselves from ruine, are above all other things, to preserve the cere∣monies of their Religion incorrupted, and maintain it alwaies venerable. For there is no greater sign of a countries going to de∣struction, then to see in it the contempt of divine worship. And this is easie to be under∣stood,

it being once known upon what ground the Religion is built where a man is born. For every Religion hath the founda∣tion of its being upon some principal thing. The life of the Gentiles Religion subsisted upon the answers of the oracles, and upon the sect of the conjecturers and soothsayers: all the other ceremonies, sacrifices, and rites de∣pended on these. Because they easily believ'd, that that God that could foretell thee thy future good or evill, could also send it thee. From hence came the Temples, the Sacrifices and supplications, and all other ceremonies in their veneration: for the Oracle of Delos, the Temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other famous Oracles held the world in devotion and admiration. As they afterwards began to speak in imperious manner, and their fals∣hood was discover'd among the people, men began to be incredulous, and apt to disturb all good orders, Therefore the Princes of a Republick or Kingdom should maintain the grounds of the Religion they hold; and this being done, they shall easily keep their Com∣monwealth religious, and eonsequently ver∣tuous and united. They ought also to favour and increase all those things that advantage it, howsoever that they think them false; and the rather should they do it, the wiser they * 1.3 are and understand the causes of natural things. And because this course hath been taken by many wise men, hence grew the opinion of miracles

which are celebrated even in false Religions; for wise men augment them what beginning so ever they have, and their authority after∣wards gives them cre∣dit. Of these mira∣cles there was great quantity at Rome: and among others there was this one; the Roman soldiers sacking the Vejentes City, some of them went into the Tem∣ple of Juno, and com∣ming to her image ask'd her, wilt thou go to Rome? some thought she nodded, another thought she said, yes. For those men being very reli∣gious (which T. Li∣vius shews, for that entry into the Tem∣ple was without tu mult) all devout and full of reverence, imagined they heard that answer, which p••radventure they presuppos'd before ••and would be made them; this opinion and belief was altogether favour'd and aug∣mented

by Camillus and the other principal men of the City. Which Religion if it were maintained among the Princes of the Christian Republick according as by the institutor there∣of it was ordain'd, the Christian States and Republicks would be far more in unity, and enjoy more happiness far then now they do: nor does any thing give us so shrewd a con∣jecture of the declining of it, as to see, that those people that are neerest neighbours to the Church of Rome, head of our Religion, are the most inreligious. And whosoever would well consider the original grounds thereof, and look upon the present use how much this differs from those, without question he would judge the ruine or scourge thereof were near at hand. And because some are of opinion, that the welfare of Italy depends upon the Church of Rome, yet the contrary might ra∣ther be proved, considering those that in the Church of Rome observe not the precepts they ought, but rather adulterate the holy and Catholick Ordinances which were wont to be kept. Moreover this comes to pass, because the Church hath alwaies held, and still holds this Country divided: and truly never was any Province either united or happy, unless it were wholly reduc'd to the obedience of one Commonwealth, or Prince; as it befel France and Spain. And the cause that Italy is not in the same terms, nor hath not one Republick or one Prince to govern it, is only the Church; for having inhabited there and held the ••e••••∣mporal Government, it hath never been so po∣tent, nor of such prowess, that it could get the rest of Italy into its hands, and become Lords thereof. And on the other side, it was

never so weak, that for fear of losing the tem∣poral dominion it could not call in a power∣full friend to defend it against him that were grown too puissant in Italy; as anciently it hath been seen by sundry experiences, when by means of Charles the Great it drove out the Lombards, who had as it were the absolute power of all Italy; and when in our daies it took the Venetians power from them by the Frenchmens ayd, and afterwards chased away the French by help of the Swisses. Therefore the Church being not powerfull to subdue all Italy it self, nor yet suffering any other to master it, hath been the cause, that it could never be brought to have but one head; but hath alwaies been under more Princes and Lords; whereupon is grown such a disunion, and so much weakness, that Italy hath been made asprey not only of powerfull Barbarians, but of any the next assaylant. For which we and other Italians are beholding to the Church & none else. And whosoever would readily see the truth by certain experience, it were need∣full he were of such power, as to send the Court of Rome, with the authority it hath in Italy, to dwell in the Switzers Country, who at this day are the only people that live, for their Religion and military discipline, as their ancestors did: and he should find that in a short time the ill orders and customs of that Court would breed more disorder in that Country, then any accident else could, that should evergrow there.

CHAP. XIII.

In what manner the Romans avail'd themselves of their Religion, in ordering the City, in un∣dertaking their designes, and in stopping of tu∣mulis.

I Think it not out of purpose, to bring some example, where in the Romans serv'd them∣selves of their Religion, for the ordering of their City, and the following of their enterpri∣ses. And though many there are in T. Livius, yet I will content my self with these. The people of Rome having created their Tribunes of Consular power, and except one, all Plebei∣ans, and it falling out that year, that there was pestilence and famine, and certain other prodigies, the Nobility of Rome took hold of this occasion, at the Tribunes new creation, to say that the Gods were angry, because Rome had abus'd the Majesty of their Empire, and that they had no other means to appease them, then to reduce the election of the Tri∣bunes to the former course. Whence it came, that the people frighted by this superstition made the Tribunes all of the Nobility. The like was also in their Conquest of the Vejentes City, that the Commanders of their Armies did serve themselves of the Religion, to keep them in heart for any enterprise: for that year the Albanilak being miraculously sweld, and the Roman Soldiers weari••d with the long siege, and intending to ••return to Rome, the Romans found, that Apollo and certain other Oracles told them, that that year the Vej••ntes City

should be taken, that the water of the Alban∣lake should be pour'd out: which thing made the soldiers endure the tediousnes, of the war and the siege, perswaded by the hope they had to take the Town, and were contented to con∣tinue the enterprise; so that Camillus be∣ing made Dictatour subdued the City after ten years siege. And so the accustomed Re∣ligion help'd well, both for the taking in of that Town, and for the restitution of the Tribunship to the Nobility; for without the ayde thereof, the one or the other had hardly had their success. And this other example I must also add to this purpose. There were in Rome a great many tumults rais'd upon the occasion of Terentillus a Tribune, he desiring to make a law, for causes which hereafter we shall declare in their place. Among the first remedies which the Nobility serv'd themselves of, was the Religion, whereof they made use two waies: In the first, they made the Sibill's books be searcht, and answer as it were to the City, that by means of civill discord they should hazzard the loss of their liberty that year: which thing, though the Tribunes had herein discover'd their subtilty, yet it so frigh∣ted the people, that it quite took off their eagerness in the pursuit. The other way was, that when Appius Herdonius with a great num∣ber of outlaws, and slaves, near upon four thousand men, having possess'd themselves by right of the Capitoll, so that it might be fear'd that if the Aequi or Volsci, the Romans sworn enemies, had approacht the Town, they might have taken it: the Tribunes not forbearing for all this to continue in their obstinacy, and to enact the law made by Terentillus, saying

this assault of their; feigned, and not true, one Puhlius Valerius a grave citizen, and of good authority, went out of the Se∣nate, and told them partly in friendly termes, and partly in threatning, the dangers in which the City stood, and the unseasonableness of their demand, and thereby brought the people to swear, they would not forsake the Consuls command. Whereupon the people being return'd to obedience, recover'd the Capitoll by force. But the Consul Publius Valerius being slain in this conflict, there was forthwith another Consul made, one Titus Quintius, who to keep the people from idle∣ness, and to give no space to think again of Terentillus his law, commanded them to go forth of Rome with him against the Volsci, say∣ing that by the oath they had taken not to a∣bandon the Consul, they were bound to follow him; whereunto the Tribunes oppos'd, saying, that oath was made to the Consul now slain, not to him. Yet Titus Livius shews that the people in awfulness to their Reli∣gion world rather obey the Consul•• than beleeve the Tribunes, saying these words in favour of the ancient Religion: Men did not then adaies so little reverence the Gods, as now; nor people * 1.4 wrest their oaths, nor the laws, to their own ends. Whereby, the Tribunes doubting then to lose their whole dignity, agreed with the Consul to submit to his obe∣dience, and that for a whole year they would treat no more of Terentillus his law, and the Consuls for a year should not draw the people out to war; and thus the Religion gave the

Senate means to overcome that difficulty, which, without it, they could never have master'd.

CHAP. XIV.

The Romans interpreted their Auspices, as ne∣cessity requir'd, and with discretion made a shew to observe their Religion, yet upon oc∣casion they neglected it; but if any did rashly contemn it, they punisht them.

THe Soothsayings were not only (as before we have discours'd) for the most part, the ground of the Gentiles ancient Religion, but they were also the occasions of the Roman Republiques welfare. Whereupon the Ro∣mans had more regard of them, than of any order else, and made use of them in their Consular assemblies, in the beginning of their enterprises, in drawing forth their armies into the field, in fighting of pitcht battells, and in any other action of theirs of importance ei∣ther civill or military. Nor ever would they have undertaken any expedition, till first they had perswaded the soldiers, the Gods had promis'd them the Victory. And among the other orders of Soothsayers, they had some in their Armies, they call'd Pollarij. And whensoever they intended to fights battell with the Enemy, they would have the Pollarij to make their conjectures: and when the Chickens peckt, they went to fight with good Auspaces; and not pecking, they forbare to fight. Notwithstanding when ••ason shew'd something was to be done, hough the divi∣nation, were averse, yet were they not scarr'd

from it: but, they turn'd and woond it with such terms and fashions so properly, that it appear'd, they did it not with an contempt of Religion. Which course was us'd once in a fight, by Papirius the Consull, which he had (of great importance) with the Samnites, after which they were much worn and broken. For Papirius encountring with the Samnites, and perceiving in the skirmish that the victory was sure, had a mind hereupon to fight a full battell, and therefore commanded the Pollarij, they should make their conjectures; but the Chickens not Pecking, and the chief soothsayer seeing the forwardness of the army to fight, and the opinion the General and all the soldi∣ers had of the victory, that he might not take away the occasion of well doing from the army sent back to the Consull, that the soothsayers answer'd well; so that while Papirius was ordering his squadrons, some of the Pollarij having told certain soldiers, that the Chickens had not peckt, they told it to Spurius Papirius the Consulls nephew, and he again to the Consul; whereto he suddenly reply'd, that he should take a care to perform his own duty well, and that for himself and the army the conjectures were faire; and if the Soothsayer had told lyes, it would turn to his own loss: and that in effect it should succeed according to his prognostication, he commanded the L••vetenants to place the Pollarij in the fore∣front of the battell. Whereupon it chanc't that going forward against their enemies, one of the Roman Soldiers threw a dart, and as it hap'd, slew a principal Soothsayer: which being come to the Consuls eare, he said that all things went forward luckily, and with the

Gods favour, for the Army by the death of that lyer was purg'd of all crime, and excus'd of the wrath conceiv'd against them. And thus by knowing how to accommodate his designs to the divinations, he chose to fight, the Army never perceiving that he had any whit neg∣lected the rites of their Religion. Appius Pul∣cher went a contrary course to this, in Sicily, in the first Carthaginian wars; who desirous to fight with the enemy, caus'd the Pollarij to make their divinations; and they answering that the Chickens did not feed, he said, let us see then if they will drink, and so made them be thrown into the sea, and then fighting, lost the day. And thereupon he was afterwards condemn'd at Rome, and Papirius honour'd; not so much, the one for having won, and the other for having lost, as the one for having crost the soothsayers with much discretion, the other very rashly. Nor was there any other end of this manner of soothsaying, then to incou∣rage the soldiers to fight, for boldness always wins the victory: which thing was not only in use with the Romans, but with forrainers also; whereof I have a purpose to bring an example in the Chapter following.

CHAP. XV.

The Samnites, for the extream remedy to their broken State, have recourse to Religion.

THE Samnites having been sundry times routed by the Romans, and at last over∣thrown in Tuscany, their Armies and their Captains slain, and their confederates over∣come, who were the Tuscans, French, and Um∣brians: They could not suhsist, neither by their own, nor their * 1.5 friends forces, yet they would not quit the war, not regard∣ing though they had but ill suc∣cess in the defence of their li∣berty; but had rather be over∣come, then forbear to trie if they could get the victory. Whereupon they put it to the last proof. And because they knew the obstinacy of the soldiers minds would help the victory well forward, and to induce them hereto, there was no better means then Religion, they advis'd to renew an old sacrifice of theirs by the help of Ovius Pattius their Priest: which they order'd in this manner; the folemn sa∣crifice being made, and amidst the slain beasts, and the altars set on fire, having caus'd the chief of the Army to swear never to forsake the fight, they cal'd the soldiers one by one, and in the midst of those altars enclos'd by many Centurions with their fwords drawn, first they made them swear, they should not disclose any thing they either heard or saw: afterwards with words of execration, and

verses full of horrour made them vow and pro∣mise to the Gods, to be ready in whatsoever their General should command, never to a∣bandon the fight, and kill whomsoever they saw fly; which if they fail'd in, might it light upon their family and kindred. And some of them being amaz'd, and refusing to swear, were presently slain by their Centurions, so that the rest that followed them, frighted by the sierceness of the spectacle, swore all. And to augment the magnificence of their meeting, being sixty thousand men, half of them were clad with white cloth, with plumes and sea∣thers upon their helmets, and thus arrai'd they incamp'd themselves at Aquilonia. Against these came Papirius, who in his speech to incourage his soldiers, said, Surely their plumes could make no wounds, * 1.6 nor their painted and golden shields defend the blows of the Roman Pikes. And to take away the doubt his soldiers had of their enemies because of the oath taken, said, it was rather a discouragement to them then other∣wise; for they were afraid of their own people, the Gods, and their enemies. And when they came to the fight, the Samnites were over∣thrown, for the Roman vertue, and the feare conceiv'd by reason of their former losses, overcame what ever obstinacy they could have resolv'd on by force of their Religion or oath taken. Yet it is plain, how they thought they could have no other refuge, nor try other remedy, that could give them hope to recover their lost vertue. Which fully shewes, how great confidence Religion well us'd can give. And though haply this

part would be fit rather to have place among the extrinsecall matters, yet depending upon one of the most important ordinances of the Roman Republick, I thought better to insert it in this place, that I might not be driven to interrupt my discourse, and have need to re∣turn hereunto many times.

CHAP. XVI.

People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident they become free, have much a∣doe to maintain their liberty.

HOW hard it is for a people, us'd to live, in subjection to a Prince, afterwards to maintain their liberty, if by any accident they get it, as Rome did upon the Tarquins banish∣ment, very many examples shew us, which we read in the memorialls of ancient histories. And not without good reason: for the people is nothing different from a brute beast, which (though fierce of nature and wilde) hath been bred alwaies in a den and under com∣mand; and though by ehance it hath got loose into the fields, yet not being used to seek the sood, nor being acquainted with the coverts, where to hide itself, becomes the prey of the first that seeks to take it, The self-same thing befalls a people used to live under the govern∣ment of others; the which not having know∣ledg to treat of publick desences or offences, not knowing the neighbour Princes, nor yet known by them, quickly returns under the yoke, which oftentimes is heavier, then that which before was taken from their neck;

and they come to fall into these difficulties, though as yet there be not entred among them much disorder. For a people that is quite de∣bauch'd cannot for a little while, no not a whit, enjoy their liberty, as it shall after appear. And therefore our speeches are not of those people, where corruption is overgrown, but where there is more good then naught. To this former we may add another difficulty, which is, that the State that becomes free, pro∣cures enemies that side against it, and not friends to side with it. Those hold together as ene∣mies, who got advantages by the tyrannical government, feeding upon the Princes riches whereby they used to help themselves, which being now taken from them, they cannot rest content, but every one is necessitated to try if he can again recall the Royalty, that so they may recover their former advancements. They get not, as I have said, friends to side with them; for the free government propounds honours and rewards upon some worthy and determinated occasions, otherwise it rewards none, nor honours none. And when a man hath received those honours and those advan∣tages, which he thinks, he deserv'd; he ac∣knowledges no obligation to them that reward him. Moreover, that common good which men reap of free government, is not known by any, while it is possest; which is, to injoy freely ones own without suspicion, not to doubt of his wives or daughters honours, not to be in fear for his sons, or for himself. For no man thinks himself beholding to one that offends him not. And therefore if they come to have a free State, as it is above mentioned, there arise those that will be partisans against

them, and not side with them: and to pre∣scribe a remedy for these inconvenients and disorders, which these difficulties might bring us, there is none more potent, nor sove∣raign, nor necessary, than to kill Brutus his sonns, who as the Story shews, were in∣duc'd together with other young Romans, to conspire against their native country, for no other reason, than because they could not so extraordinarily advantage themselves under the Consuls, as under the Kings; so that they thought the peoples liberty was become their slavery. And he that undertakes to govern a multitude either by way of liberty, or by way of Principality, and assures not himself of those that are enemies to his new State, is not like to continue long. True it is, that I judge those Princes very unfortunate, who to secure their dominions are to go extravagant waies, having the vast multitude for their enemies: for he that hath but few enemies, easily and without many offences secures himself; but he that hath the universality against him, is never out of jealousie; and the more cruelty he uses, the weaker becomes his power. So that the greatest remedy he hath, is to make the people friendly. And though this discourse be diffe∣rent from the former, treating here of an ex∣ceeding good Prince, and there of a Republick, yet that I may not return here often upon this occasion, I shall say somewhat of it, but briefly. And therefore if a Prince would gain the good will of a people, that was enemy to him (speaking of those Princes, that are become Tyrants of their native coun∣try) I say, he ought to examine first, what the people desire; and he shall alwaies find, that

they desire two things; the one, to be re∣veng'd of him that occasion'd their slavery; the other, to have their liberty restor'd. To the first, the Prince can satisfie in whole, to the second in part. As for the first, there is an exam∣ple to the point. Clearchus a Tyrant of Heraclea being in banishment, it happen'd that upon a difference risen between the people and the nobility of Heraclea, that the nobility, finding themselves too weak, turn'd to favour Clearchus, and conspiring with him, against the will of the people, let him into the Town, and took away the peoples liberty; so that Clearchus being in a streight between the insolence of the nobility, whom he could not any way content, nor rectify, and the rage of the people, that could not indure thus to have lost their liberty, resolv'd in one, to free himself of the importunity of the Nobles, and withall to gain the people. And to this purpose having taken a convenient opportunity, cut in pieces all the Nobility, to the peoples great satis∣faction, And thus he satlsfy'd one of the de∣sires the people have, that is, to be reveng'd. But as for the peoples other desire, to recover their liberty, if the Prince cannot satisfy them, let him examine, what are the reasons make them desire sreedom, and he shall find, there is but a small number of them would be free, to command. But all the rest, which are the many, desire liberty to life securely. For in all Republicks of what manner soever or∣dered, not above forty or fifty Citizens at∣tain to the degrees of authority: and because these are but few, it is an easie thing to be sure of them, either by taking them out of the way, or by letting them share of

such honours, as agree to their conditions, which they may very well be contented with. Those others, whom it suffices, If they can live securely, are easily satisfied by making ordinances and laws, wherewith together with his power, he may comprehend their safety in general. And when a Prince does this, and that the people perceive it, that by no accident he breaks those laws, they will begin in a short time to live secure and content. Wee have an example of the Kingdom of France, which continues not in quiet by other means, than that their Kings are tyed to many laws, where∣in the security of all his people is containd. And he that was the founder of that State, or∣dain'd, that the Kings should dispose of the wars and the moneys at their pleasures, but with all other matters they had nothing to do, but they were at the laws appointment. That Prince therefore or Republick, which secures not themselves at their entrance into the government, ought at least take hold of the first occasion, as the Romans did. He that lets that pass, repents himself too late, of not having done what he should. The people of Rome be∣ing not as yet debauch't, when they recovered their liberty, might well maintain it, when Brutus his sonnes were slain, and the Tarquins dead, by those remedies, and orders, which we have at several times recounted. But had the people been corrupted, neither in Rome, nor any where else, could they have found means strong enough to preserve it, as in the Chapter sollowing we shall shew.

CHAP. XVII.

A disorderly people, getting their liberty, cannot keep themselves free without very great diffi∣culties.

I think it necessarily true, that either the Kings were to be expelled out of Rome, or else Rome it self would have grown feeble and of no worth; for considering how ex∣ceedingly the Kings were corrupted, if after that rate two or three successions had follow∣ed, and that corruption that was in them had distended it self throughout the members, so that they likewise had received of the cor∣ruption, it had been impossible ever to have re∣formed it. But losing the head when the body was sound, it might easily be reduced to a free and orderly government. And this should be presupposed for certain, that a de∣baucht City living under a Prince, though that Prince with all his stock be rooted out, yet can it not become free, but rather fall still into the hands of new Lords, who continually make an end one of another. And without the creati∣on of some new Prince, they shall never have an end, unless he by his goodness and valour main∣tain them free. But their liberty is of no longer conyinuance than his life, as was that o•• Syracusa for Dions and Timoelons lives: whose vertues in several times, while they liv'd kept that City free; so soon as they were dead, it fell into the former servitude, We find not a braver example then that of Rome, which upon the Tarquins banishments, could presently

lay hold off, and maintaine that liberty. But Caesar being slain, C. Caligula, Nero, and the whole race of the Caesars blotted out, it could not, not onely keep, no not so much as give a beginning to their liberty. Neither did so great variety of accidents in one and the same citie proceed from other, than that, when the Tarquins were expell'd, the people of Rome were not toucht with this corruption, and in these latter times they were throughly infected. For then to settle their mindes in a resolution against Kings, it was enough to take an oath of them, that never any King should raigne at Rome. But in the after ages, the au∣thority and severity of Brutus, with all the Ori∣entall Regions, were not of force to hold them in disposition to maintain that Liberty, which he like the first Brutus had restored them. Which sprung from that corruption, which Marius his faction spread among the people; whereof Caesar coming to be the Chiefe, could so blind that multitude, that they could not per∣ceive the yoke, which he himself put on their neck. And though this example of Rome be better than any other, yet will I alleadge to this purpose, some people known in our dayes. And therefore I say, that no meanes could ever bring Milan or Naples to their free∣dome, by reason of the infection of all their members. Which appeared after the death of Philip Visconti, when Milan desiring to recover her liberty, neither was able, nor knew how to keepe it. Yet that of Rome was a great hap∣piness, that their Kings grow naught suddenly, that they were banisht, and that before the in∣fection was gone down into the bowels of that Citie, which was the occasion that those

many tumults, which were raised in Rome (men doing it to a good end) did not hurt, but help the Commonwealth. And we may make this conclusion, that where the matter is cor∣rupted, lawes, though well made, profit little, unless they have such a maker, that with strong hand forces obedience to them, till the matter become good: which, whether it hath ever happened, I know not, or whether it be pos∣sible it can happen: for it is plain, as a little before I said, that a City declining by corrup∣tion of matter, if ever it chances to rise again, it is meerly by the vertue of one man, who is then living, and not by the vertue of the ge∣nerality, that keepes the good lawes in force: and suddenly when that man is dead, it re∣turnes to the old guise, as it came to pass at Thebes, which, by the vertue of Epaminondas while he liv'd, could subsist in forme of a Re∣publique and government, but he being gone, it fell into the former disorders. The reason is, because a man cannot live so long a time as is sufficient to disaccustome them to the ill, and accustome them throughly to the good. And if one man of a very long life, or two ver∣tuous Governors successively continued, do not dispose of them to good, when one of them failes, as I have said before, they are presently ruined, unless the other with many dangers, and much bloudshed recover them out of destruction. For that corruption and unfit∣ness for freedome, arises from an inequality, that is in the City: and if a man would reduce it to equality, he must use many ex∣traordinary wayes, which few know or will serve themselves of, as other where more par∣ticularly shall be said.

CHAP. XVIII.

In what manner in a corrupted City a free state may be maintained, being gotten; or how when they have it not, it may be gotten, and well order'd.

I Thinke, it will not be out of the way, nor dis∣agreeing to the former discourse, to consider whether in a City disordered, a free State can be preserv'd, that being there a soot already; or not being there, how it may be attain'd, and then re∣duc'd to good order. Whereupon, I say, that it is very hard to do the one or the other: and though it be almost impossible to give a strict rule thereof (because we should necessarily proceed according to the degrees of the cor∣ruption) yet it not being unfit to reason of every thing, I shall not let this pass. And I presup∣pose a city corrupted in extremity, from whence I shall come more to augment such a difficulty, because there are no lawes nor ordi∣nances sufficient to bridle a universall corrup∣tion. For as there is need of lawes, to preserve good customes; so, to have the lawes well ob∣serv'd, there is need of good customes. Besides this, the ordinances and lawes made in a Re∣publique at birth thereof, when men were good, serve not to purpose afterwards, when once they are growne vicious. And if the lawes vary being accommodated according to the accidents, seldome or never vary the old orders of the city: which makes that the

new lawes suffice nor, because the orders that continue in force do corrupt. And to lay this part more plain to the understanding, I say, that in Rome there was the order of govern∣ment, or rather of the states, and the lawes afterwards which together with the Magistrates did bridle the Citizens. The order of the state was the authority of the people, of the Senate, of the Tribuns, and of the Consuls the manner of demanding or creating of Magistrates and the manner of making lawes. These orders little or nothing did they vary among the Citi∣zens; the lawes varied which bridled the citi∣zens, as did that law against adulteries, against expences, against ambition, and many others, according as by degrees the citizens grew cor∣rupted. But the orders of state standing sted. fast, which in the time of corruption were no longer good, those lawes which were renew'd again, were not of force to keep men good, but would have been well helpt, if when the lawes were renew'd, the orders also had bin chang'd. And that it is true that such orders in a corrupted city were not good, it is ex∣presly seen in two principal heads. As for the creation of Magistrates, and making lawes, he people of Rome gave the Consulate and the o∣ther Prime degrees of the city, onely to those that sued for them. This order was in the be∣ginning good, because none stood for them, but those citizens that esteem'd themselves worthy of them, and to receive the repulse was a shame; so that to be thought worthy, every one did well. But this way afterwards in a corrupted City proov'd very hurtfull; for not the best deserving men, but the most power∣full, sued for the magistracy, and those of

small power (howsoever vertuous) forbore to demand them for fear.

It came not to this inconvenient, at once, but by degrees, as men fall into all other inconve∣nients. For the Romans having brought under Affrica, and Asia, and reduc'd well nigh all Greece to their obedience, doubted no way of their liberty, and thought they had no more enemies could scare them. Thus farre their security, and the weakness of their enemies workt, that the people of Rome in bestowing the Consulate, regarded not vertue so much as favour, raising to that dignity those that could make most friends, not those that knew best how to subdue their enemies. After, from those that had most favour, they fell to give them to those that had most power. So that the good, by reason of the defect of this order, were quite excluded. A Tribun of the people and any other Citizen might propound a law to the people, and thereupon every Citizen had the liberty to speak either in favour of it, or a∣gainst it, before it were determin'd of. This order was commendable, while the integrity of the Citizens held: for it was alwayes well, that every one may give his opinion thereupon, that the people, having heard every one, may after make choyce of the best. But the Citizens being grown mischievous, this order became naught; for those that were powerfull onely propounded lawes, not for the common good, but to advance their own powers, and against those dar'd none to speak, for fear of these. So that the people was brought either by falshood or force to determine their own ruine. There∣fore it was necessary, to the end that Rome in her corrupted age should maintaine her liberty,

that as in the progress of her life she had made new lawes, so should she have made new or∣ders: for other orders and other manners of living ought to be ordain'd in a good subject, and others in a bad; nor can the forme be like, where the matter is quite contrarily dispos'd. But these orders are either to be renewed all of a sudden when they are discovered to be no longer good, or else by little and little, when their defaults be taken notice of by every one: I say, that either the one or the other of these two things are almost impossible. For to re∣new them by degrees, it is fit a very wise man should be the cause of it, who should foresee this inconvenient afarre off: and when any of these arise, it is a very likely thing that none of these men step forth; and when they should they would never be able to perswade another what they eonceiv'd; because men accustomed alwaies to live in one manner, will not alter it; and the rather not seeing that evill present, which is to be shew'd by conjectures. Touch∣ing the innovation of these orders on a sudden when every one knowes they are not good; I say, that this unprofitableness, which is easi∣ly knowne, is hard to correct; for to effect this ordinary meanes serve not, they being rather hurtfull; but of necessity extraordinary re∣medies are to be put in practise, as violence and war; and in any case ought a man strive to become prince of that city that he may have power to order it at his pleasure. And because the restoring of a city to a politique and a civil government, presupposes a good man; and by violence to become Prince of a Commonwealth presupposes an evil man, for this cause it shall very seldome come to pass, that a good man will

ever strive to make himself Prince by mifchie∣vous wayes, although his ends therein be all good; nor will a wicked man by wicked meanes attaining to be Prince, do good; nor ever comes it into his heart to use that authority well, which by evil meanes he came to. From all these things above written arises the diffi∣culty or impossibility, that is in corrupted cities, theree to maintaine a Republique, or to create one anew. And when it were to be created or maintained, it were fittest to reduce it rather towards a popular state; to the end that those men, who by reason of their insolence cannot be amended by the lawes, might in some man∣ner be restrained as it were by a regall power. And to constraine them by any other way to become good, would either be a most cruel attempt, or altogether impossible: As I said before, that Cleomenes did, who that he might command alone flew the Ephores; and if Ro∣mulus for the same reasons slew his brother, and Titus Tatius the Sabine, but afterwards excer∣cised very vertuously their authority: yet it is to be noted that neither the one nor the other of them had the subject staind with that cor∣ruption, whereof we have discoursed in this Chapter: and therefore they might intend well; and when they did not, give colour to a bad designe with a good success.

CHAP. XIX.

A very mean Prince may easily subsist, succeeding a brave and valourous Prince: but a mean one following a mean, brings a State into great hazzard.

WHen we consider the valour, and the manner of Romulus, Numa, and Tullus proceedings, the first Roman Kings, we shall find, that Rome hit upon a very great fortune, having the first King fierce and warlick, the second peaceable and religious, the third of like courage to Romulus, and a lover of war rather then peace. For in Rome it was ne∣cessary, that in her infancy there should arise some one to order her in the eourse of civill government; but in like manner it was after∣wards needfull that the other Kings should be∣take themselves again to Romulus his valour, otherwise that City would have become effe∣minate, and been prey'd on by her neighbours. Whence we may observe, that the successor, though not of so great valour as the prede∣cessour, is able to maintain a State by the va∣lour of him that hath govern'd it before, and enjoy the fruits of his labour: but if it come to pass, either that he be of long life or that after him there follows no other of like valour as the first, of necessity that kingdom must go to ruine. So on the contrary, if two of great valour successively follow one the other, it is often seen, they effect mighty things, and eternize their names. David was a man for armes, for learning and judgement excellent:

and such was his valour, that having over∣come and subdued his neighbours, he left his son Solomen a peaceable Kingdom, which he might well maintain by peacefull meanes, without any war, and happily possess the fruits of his fathers vertue. But he could not leave it now to Roboam his sonn, who not re∣sembling his Grandfather in vertue, nor ha∣ving the like good hap his father had, with much adoe remain'd heire to the sixth part of the Kingdom. Bajazet the Turkish Sultan, although he gave himself rather to peace then war, yet could he also enjoy his father Mahomets labors; who having as David beaten all his neighbours left him a setled Kingdom, easie to be continued by peace: but if his sonn Selimus, now raigning, had resembled the Father and not the Grand∣father, that Kingdom had gone to wrack. But we see this man like to outgoe his Grandfathers glory. Whereupon I agree with these ex∣amples, that after an excellent Prince a feeble one may subsist, but after one feeble one a Kingdom cannot stand with another, unless it be such a one as France, which subsists by force of her ancient ordinances. And those are weak Princes, that are not in the exercise of war. And therefore I conclude with this dis∣course, that such was Romulus his valour, that it could give space to Numa Pompilius for many years by peacefull means to govern Rome. But him followed Tullus, who by his courage recover'd Romu'us reputation: after him came Ancus, so endowed by nature, that he knew how to use peace, and support war. And first he addrest himself in a peaceable way; but presently when he knew that his neigh∣bours, thinking him esseminate, undervalu'd

him, he consider'd that to maintain Rome, he was to apply himself to the warres, and rather follow Romulus his steps, than Numas. Hence let all Princes, that hold a State, take ex∣ample, that he that resembles Numa, shall either keep it or lose it, as the times prove, and for∣tunes wheele turns; but he that takes after Romulus, arm'd as he with wisdom and force, shall hold it in any case, unless by an obstinate and overmighty power it be wrested from him. And certainly we may well think, if Rome had light upon a man, for her third King, who knew not how by armes to recover her repu∣tation, she could never afterwards, or not with∣out much adoe, have taken root, or attain'd that grow'th she after grew to. And thus whiles she liv'd under the Kings, she ran the hazzard of ruining under a weake or naughty King.

CHAP. XX.

Two continued successions of vertuous Princes worke great effects; and Commonwealths well ordered of necessity have vertuous suc∣cession: And therefore are their gains and increases great.

AFter Rome had banisht her Kings, she was deliver'd of those dangers which, as is before said, she hazzarded, a feeble or naughty King succeeding in her. For the sum of the Empire was reduc'd unto Consuls, who came not to the government, by inheritance, or treachery, or by extream ambition, but by the voices of the Citizens; and they were al∣waies very worthy men, whose vertue and for∣tune

Rome enjoying, could from time to time at∣tain to her vastest greatness, in but so many more years, as she had been under her Kings. For we see, that two continued successions of brave Princes are of force enough to conquer the whole world, as was Philip of Macedon, and Alexander the great. Which so much the ra∣ther ought a Republick do, having the means to choose not only two successions, but an infi∣nite number of valorous Princes, who fol∣low one the other; which valourous succession may alwaies be in every well order'd Common-wealth.

CHAP. XXI.

What blame that Prince or Republick deserves, that wants soldiers of his own subjects.

THE Princes of these times, and the mo∣dern Republicks, who for defences or offen∣ces want soldiers of their own, may be a∣shamed of themselves, and consider by the ex∣ample of Tullus, that this defect is not for want of men fit for war, but by their fault, who had not the understanding to make their men sol∣diers. For Tullus, Rome having been forty years in peace, found not (when he succeeded in the Kingdom) a man that had been ere at war. Yet he intending to make war, serv'd not himself either of the Samnites or Tascans, nor of others train'd up in armes, but advis'd as a very prudent man, to make use of his own people. And such was his vertue, that on a sudden with his discipline he made them very good soldiers. Truer it is than any other

truth, if where men are, there want soldiers, it is the Princes fault, not any other defect either of scituation or nature. Whereof we have a very late example: For every one knows, how of late daies the King of England assayl'd the Kingdom of France, and took no other soldiers than his own people. And by reason that Kingdom had not been at war a∣bove thirty years before, it had neither soldier nor Captain that ever had been at war; yet he nothing doubted with those to set upon a Kingdom furnisht with Captains and good Armies, who had continually born armes in the warrs of Italy. All this proceeded from that this King was a very wise man, and that Kingdom well govern'd; which in time of peace neglected not military discipline. Pelo∣pidas and Epaminondas, Thebans, after they had set Thebes at liberty, and drawn her out of bon∣dage of the Spartan government, perceiving well they were in a City accustomed to servi∣tude, and in the midst of esseminate people, yet made no difficulty (such was their vertue) to train them up in arms, and with those to go and meet the Spartan Armies in the field, and over∣come them. And he that makes relation of it, saies, that these two prov'd in short time, that not only in Lacedemon soldiers were bred, but in any other place where men are bred, if they found any could train them in the exercise. As it appears that Tullus knew how to train them to the war. And Virgill could not better express this opinion, nor with other words come near it, where he saies:

———Resides{que} movebit Tullus in arma viros————

People with peace grown dull, that nere us'd armes. Tullus shall soldiers make————

CHAP. XXII.

What we may observe in the case of the three Horatij Romans, and the three Curiatij Al∣bans.

TULLUS the Roman King and Metius the Alban made an agreement, that that people should be Lord of the other, whose three, above mentioned, champions vanquisht the others. All the Curiatij, Albans, were slain; there remain'd alive onely one of the Horatij, Romans; and by this, Metius King of the Albans with his people became subject to the Romans. And this Horatius the Conque∣rour returning into Rome, and meeting one of his own sisters, who had been married to one of the three dead Curiatij, that lamented the death of her husband, slew her. Where∣upon that Horatius was brought into judge∣ment, and after many disputes freed, rather at his Fathers suite, than for his own merits, Where three things are to be considered. One, that the whole fortune of the State ought ne∣ver be hazzarded with a part of the forces. The other, that in a City well govern'd faults be never made amends for with deserts: The third, that matches were never wisely made, where a man-ought or can doubt the performance will not follow. For so much imports it a City to become subject, that a

man ought not beleeve, that any of those Kings or people would rest content, that three of their fellow citizens should have brought them to this yoke; of which mind we saw Me∣tius was: who, though presently after the Romans victory, he acknowleg'd himself vanquisht, and promis'd obedience to Tullus, yet in the first expedition they were to meet against the Vejentes, it appear'd, how he sought to deceive him; as he, that was too late aware of his rashness in the bargain he made. And because we have spoken enough of this third thing to be noted, we shall speak onely of the other two, in the two following Chapters.

CHAP. XXIII.

That the whole fortune ought not be laid at stake, where the whole forces try not for it: and for this cause it is often hurtfull to guard the passages.

NEver was he thought good gamester, that would hazzard his whole ••••st, upon less then the strength of his whole game: And this is done divers waies. One is, doing as Tullus and Metius did, when they com∣mitted the whole fortune of their countrey, and the valour of so many men as the one and the other had in their armies, to the va∣four and fortune of three of their citizens, which were but a very small part of either of their for∣ces. Nor did they consider, how by this adventure all the toyle their ancestors had taken in ordering the Commonwealth

so, that it might long continue free, and to make the citizens defenders of their liberty, was all in vain, it being left in the hands of so few to lose it. Which thing those Kings could not have known how more to have undervalued. And for the most part they like∣wise fall into the same inconvenient, who (upon the enemies approach) intend to keep the hard places and guard the passages. For this resolution will alwayes be hurtfull, un∣less in that hard passage thou canst bring to∣gether all thy whole forces. And in such case, this course may be well taken. But the place being rough, and it not being possible to hold all thy forces there, there is loss in it. And to judge thus I am perswaded by the example I finde of those, that when they are assaul∣ted by a powerfull enemy, their country being environed with mountaines and rocky places, have never endeavoured to fight with the ene∣my upon the passages or mountaines, but have gone beyond to encounter them: or when they would not do this, they have expected them among the mountains, in plain and easy places and not mountainous; and the reason thereof hath been given before. For it is not possible to bring many men together to the guard of mountainous places, because provisions for long time cannot easily be furnish'd, and be∣cause the passages are streight and capable of few, and therefore not possible to withstand an enemy pressing on with the gross of his army. And it is an easy thing for the enemy to come on with his gross; because his intention is but to pass on, and not to stay. And it is im∣possible for him that awaits him, to await in gross, having to lodge there for a lon∣ger

time, not knowing when the enemy wiil pass in places (as I said) streight and barren. Loosing therefore that passage which thou hadst intended to keep, and wherein thy people and thy army repos'd some trust, most com∣monly there enters such a terror into the rest of thy people, that without any means to make trial of their valor, thou art left the loser, and with part of thy forces thou hast lost all thy fortunes. Every one knows with what difficul∣ty Anniball past the Alpes, which divides Lom∣bardy from France, and those, which divide Lombardy from Tuscany; yet the Romans first ex∣pected him upon the Tesin, and afterwards up∣on the plain of Arezo; and would rather have their army wasted by their enemies, in places where they might overcome, then bring it up∣on the Alpes, where likely it would have been destroyed by the malignity of the place. And whosoever shall with discretion read histories, shall find that very few expert Commanders have assayd to keep the like passages, for these reasons we have said; and because they cannot all divide themselves, the mountains being as open fields, and not having only ordinary and accustomed, but many by-waies, though not known to strangers, yet to the inhabitants, by whose help thou shalt be guided any way in despight of the opposers. Whereof we can alleadg a very late example. In the year 1515 when Francis the first King of France intended to pass into Italy, to recover the State of Lom∣bardy, the greatest ground they had that disswa∣ded his enterprise, was, that the Swisses would step his passage on the mountains, And as after experience shew'd it, this ground of theirs was slight. For that King having

left aside two or three places kept by them, came from thence by another way unknown, and was sooner in Italy then any were aware of him, So that herewith being daunted, they retir'd into Milan, and all the people of Lombardy took the French party, having fail'd in the opinion they had, that the French men would be stop'd on the top of the mountains.

CHAP. XXIIII.

Commonwealths well order'd appoint rewards and punishments for their people, and never recom∣pence the one with the other.

THE deserts of Horatius had been exceed∣ing great, having by his valour vanquish'd the Curiatij. His offence was horrible, having slain his sister. Notwithstanding such a kind of homicide so much displeas'd the Romans that it brought them to dispute, whether they should grant him his life, though his merits were so great and so fresh: Which thing, to him that looks but superficially on it, would seem an example of popular ingratitude. Yet he that shall examin better, and with more consideration inquire, what the orders of Com∣monwealths ought to be, shall rather blame that people for having absolv'd him, then for having had a mind to condemn him. And this is the reason, For never any Republick in good ordrr, eancell'd the faults of their citizens with their deserts. But having ordain'd rewards for good service, and punishments for desservice, and having rewarded one when he had done well, if afterwards he commit any offence, they chastise him without any re∣gard

to his former merits. And when these or∣ders are strictly observ'd, a city continues long free, otherwise it would soone go to ruine. For if a man growne into great reputation for some notable peece of service done to the state, should take upon him the confidence that he could without danger of punishment commit any offence, in a short time would he become so unreasonably insolent, that the civill state could no longer consist. It is very necessary, if we would have punishment for offences fear'd, al∣wayes to reward good deserts, as it appeares they did at Rome. And though the Republique be but poore, and can bestow but little, yet may the subject well content himselfe with that little; for so even a small gift bestowd on any one, for requitall of a good, though great, shall finde with him that receives it an honourable and thankfull acceptance. The story of Horatius Cocles is very well knowne, and that also of Mutius Scevola; how the one bore up the enemies upon a bridge, till it was cut off behinde him; the other burnt his owne hand, for having mistaken, when he meant to have killed Porsena the Tuscan King. To these for two such notable acts was given by the publilick two acres of ground to each of them. And marke also the story of Manlius Capitolinus. To him for having deli∣vered the Capitoll from the French, which were encamp'd before it, they who together with him were within besieg'd gave him a small measure of flour, which reward (according to the then present fortune of Rome) was large, and of such a quality too, that afterwards Manlius, either moov'd by envy, or his owne ill nature, occasion'd a sedition in Rome, and

seeking to get the people of his faction, was, without any regard had of his good deserts, thrown headlong downe from that Capitoll which he, to his great renowne, had former∣ly deliver'd.

CHAP. XXV.

Whosoever would reforme an ancient state in a free city, let him retain at least the shadow of the old customes.

HE that hath a minde to reforme the state of a City, to bring it into liking, and the better with every ones satisfaction to main∣taine it, is forc'd to keep the forme or shadow of the ancient customes, to the end the people perceive not the change of them, though in∣deed they are quite new, & farr different from the fore-past. For they generally satisfy them∣selves as well with that that seemes to be, as that that is. Nay rather are they many times more mov'd with appearances, then truthes. And for this cause, the Romans knowing this necessity, when first they lived free, having in change of one King created two Consuls, would not suffer them to have more then twelve Lictors, because they should not outgo the number of those that attend on the King. Moreover, when the yearly sacrifice was made in Rome, which could not be done without the presence of the King, and the Romans willing that the people, by the absence of a King, should not find a lacke of any of the old ceremonies, created a head of the said sacrifice, whom they call'd the King Priest; who yet was lower in

degree, then the high Priest. So that this way the people was satisfied of that sacrifice, and never had any occasion by any default in it, to wish their Kings again restored. And this they all ought to observe, that would cancell the old manner of living in a city, and reduce it to a new and free course. For being these novelties somewhat moove mens mindes, there∣fore thou shouldst do well to call thy wits a∣bout thee, and work these alterations in the old mould, as much as might be. And if the ma∣gistrates, both in number, and authority, and durance, differ from the ancient, at least let them keep the same name: And this (as I have said) rather ought he to observe, who meanes to take upon him an absolute authority, which is call'd a Tyranny, for he is to innovate every thing.

CHAP. XXVI.

A new Prince in a city or Province taken by him, should make innovations in every thing.

WHosoever becomes Prince of a city or state, and the rather, when his forces are but weake to keep it, and means not to hold it neither as a Kingdome, nor as a regular Republique, the best expedient he can find, for the maintenance of that Principality, is, that he (himself being a new Prince) make every thing new in the state, as it is ordinary in the cities to make new governments with new names, with new jurisdictions, with new men, and to enrich the poore, as David did, when he came to the crowne. That filled the hungry

with good things, and the rich sent empty away. To build moreover new cities, and to pull down some that are built, to remove the in∣habitants * 1.7 from one place to another, and in some to leave nothing untoucht in that Pro∣vince, that there be neither degree, order, nor state, nor wealth, but he that possesses it, ac∣knowledges it from these. And to take for pa∣terne Philip of Macedon Alexanders father, who by these means became of a little King, Prince of all Greece. And he that writes of him sayes, that he chang'd his people from Province to Province, as herds-men change their herds from pasture to pasture. These courses are very cruel, and against all Christian and humane manner of living. And every man ought refuse to be a King, and desire rather to live a private man, then reigne, so much to the ruine of mankind. Yet he that will not use that first way of good, if he will preserve himself, must enter into this of evil. But men take to certain middle wayes, which are very naught; for they know not how to be all good, nor all evil: as shall be shewed for example in the next chapter.

CHAP. XXVII.

It is very seldom, that men know how to be alto∣gether mischievous, or altogether good.

POpe Julius the second going in the year 1505 to Bolonia to chase out of that state the house of the Benticogli, which had held the Principallity of that city a hundred years, had a minde also to draw Iohn Pagolus Baglioni out of Perugia, whereof he was a Tyrant, as he that had conspired against all Tyrants, that

were seised of any of the Churches lands: and being come near Perugia, with this reso∣lution knowne to every one, stayed not to en∣ter the City with his Army to guard him, but went in without a guard, notwithstanding that Iohn Pagolus was therein with much people, which he had got together for his defence. So that carried forward by that rage wherewith he governed all things, with his ordinary guard he put himself in his enemies hands, whom af∣terwards he led away with him, leaving a governor in that city, to keep it for the Church. By the wise men, that were with the Pope, was noted the rashness of the Pope, and the base cowardise of John Pagolus; nor could they conceit, whence it came, that he did not to his perpetual renown suppress then at once his enemy, and enrich himself with the prey, all the Cardinalls being then with the Pope, who had the best of all their Jewels with them. Neither could any man think that he abstain'd either for goodness or conscience sake, that withheld him. For into the heart of a wicked man, that incestuously convers'd with his sister, and that had slain his cousins and ne∣phewes, to rule, there could never enter any religious respect. Whereupon every one con∣cluded, that men know not how to be honou∣rably mischievous, nor perfectly good. And where a mischief hath in it greatness, and is generous in some part, they know not how to enter into it. So Iohn Pagolus, who made no account of being an incestuous and publique paricide, knew not (or to say better) had not the courage, though upon just occasion, to do an exploit that every one should have admir'd him for, and he left of himself an everlasting

memory; being the first that had shew'd the Prelats what a thing it is to set at naught, him that lives, and reignes, as they did; and so had done an act, whose greatness had surpast all infamy, and what ever danger could depend on it.

CHAP. XXVIII.

For what reason the Romans were less ungratefull to their citizens, than the Athenians.

WHosoever reades the actions of Repub∣liques, shall find in all of them some kinde of ingratitude towards their citizens, but less in Rome, than in Athens, or perad∣venture than in any Commonwealth else. And if we would enquire after the reason thereof, speaking of Rome and Athens, I think it hap∣pen'd, because the Romans had less occasion to suspect their citizens, than had the Athenians. For at Rome, considering her from the banishment of her Kings till Sylla, and Ma∣rius, her liberty was never taken away by any of her citizens, so that she had no great reason to suspect them, or by consequence suddenly to offend them. The contrary befell Athens; for her liberty being taken from her in her most flourishing time, and under colour of doing her some good, so soon as she became free, remembring the wrong she had receiv'd, and the slavery she had indur'd, became a sharp revengeress, not only of her citizens faults, but of the shadow of their faults.

From hence came the banishment and the death of so many rare men. From hence the order of the Osteacisme, and all other violence,

which in several times by her was done to the prime of her citizens, And that is very true which those that write of civil government say, that the people bit•• more siercely, after they have recover'd their liberty, than while they have continually maintain'd it. Whoso∣ever then considers what is said, will neither in this blame Athes, nor commend Rome: but will ••ccuse onely the necessity, because of the diversity of accidents which did arise in this city For he shall see, if narrowly he look into affairs, if Romes liberty had been taken a∣way, as was that of Athens, Rome would not have been more pitifull to her citizens, than was Athens. Whereof one may make a very good guess, by that which chanc't, after the banishment of the Kings, against Collatine, and Publius Valerius: whereof the first (al∣though he had his hand in the setting of Rome at liberty) was banisht, for no other occasion, than that he was sirnamed Tarquin. The other having onely given suspicion of himself, by building a house upon the hill Celius, was like to have bin banisht. So that we may well think (seeing how suspicious and severe Rome was in these two things) that she would have bin as ungratefull, as Athens, if, as she in her infancy and before her growth, had bin so much wrong'd. And that I need not turn again to this subject of ingratitude, I shall speak further of it in the Chapter following.

CHAP. XXIX.

Whether of two be the more ungratefull, a people, or a Prince.

ME thinks it is not out of the purpose of our former matter, to discourse, whe∣ther a Prince or people give us greater exam∣ples of ingratitude. ••nd the better to argue this part, I say, this vice of ingratitude growes either of covereousness or suspicion. For when a people or Prince have sent out a Commander of theirs, in any expedition of importance, where that Commander overcoming hath gain'd a great deale of glory, that Prince or people is in like manner bound to reward him: and if in F••w of reward he disgraces him, or wrongs him, incited thereunto by avarice, not willing by reason of this coveteousness, to satis∣fie him, he commits an errour, without excuse, and drawes upon himself everlasting infamy. Yet are there many Princes, who offend in this kind. And Cornelius Tacitus declares in this Sentence * 1.8 the occasion. It is more pleasing to revenge an inju∣ry, then to requite a courtesy: for thanks is thought a burden, but revenge a gain. But when he rewards him not, but rather hur••s him, not through avarice, but upon suspicion, then the people or Prince deserves some excuse. And of these ingratitudes practis'd for such cause we read many; for that Commander who valorously hath gain'd his Lord a Kingdom, by conque∣ring his enemies, replenishing himself with glo∣ry, and his souldiers with riches, of force gets such reputation with his own soldiers, with

his enemies, and his Kings own subjects, that that victory can no wayes sayour well to his Lord that put him in the imployment. And because mens natures are ambitious, and full of suspicion, and know not how to set limits to their fortune, it is impossible, but that sus∣picion which grows in the Prince after that Commanders victory, shall by himself be in∣creas'd upon some way or terme insolently us'd; so that the Prince cannot advise himself o∣therwise, than to provide for his own safety. And to this end, thinks either to put him to death, or to take away his reputation, which he hath gotten in his army, or among his peo∣ple, and withall diligence to shew, that his valour got not the victory, but rather it came by chance, or by the enemies cowardise, or by the direction of the other Captaines, who were together with him in that imployment. After that Vespasian, being in Judea, was by his army declar'd Emperor, Antonius Primus, who was then with another army in Illiria, took his part, and came thence into Italy against Vitel∣lius, who commanded at Rome, and valorously conquer'd two Vitellian armies, and made himself, Master of Rome; so that Mutianus sent by Vespanian found all already gotten by Antonius his valor, and all difficulties surpassed. The reward Antonius gain'd hereby, was, that Mutianus took away his command of the army, and by little and little made him of no authority in Rome; whereupon Antonius went away to Vespasian, who was yet in Asia, by whom he was so coldly receiv'd, that in a short time depriv'd of all dignity he dyed in despaire. And of these examples stories are full. In our daies, every one living knows,

with what industry and valour Gonsalvus Ferdi∣nand, warring in the Kingdom of Naples a∣gainst the Frenchmen for Ferdinand King of Ar∣ragon, brought that Kingdom under his obe∣dience; and how he had for reward of his conquest, that Ferdinand parted from Arragon, and came to Naples, and first discharged him of his command of soldiers, afterwards took from him the fortresses, and then brought him away with him into Spain, where a while after he dyed in disgrace. Therefore this suspicion is so natural in Princes, that they cannot escape it; and it is impossible they prove thankfull to those, who by victory have under their banners made great con∣quests. And from that which a Prince is not free, 'tis no marvaile, nor a thing wor∣thy of greater note, that a people is not free. For a city living free hath two ends, the one to gain, the other to keep it self free; and it cannot be, but in the one or the other by excess of love it may erre. Touching the er∣rors in getting, they shall be spoken of in their place: as for the errors in maintaining their liberty, there are these among others, to hurt those citizens they should reward, and to suspect those they should repose upon. And though these wayes in a Republique come to corruption, cause great evils, and that many times they hasten it to a Tyranny, as at Rome it befell Caesar, who by strong hand took away that, which unthankfulness denied him: yet in a Commonwealth not corrupted, are they causes of great good, and make it live more free, keeping men for fear of punishment more ver∣tuous and less ambitious. It is true, that of all people that ever reign'd, upon the

causes above alleadg'd, Rome was the least ungratefull; for of her ingratitude we may say, there is no other example, but that of Scipio; for Coriolanus and Camillus were banisht for the injury, the one and the other had done the people. But the one was not pardoned, because he alwaies continued his malicious mind against the people; the other was not only recall'd, but all his lifetime after, ador'd as a Prince. But the ingratitude us'd towards Scipio, grew from a suspicion the citizens began to have of him, which was never conceived of the others; which arose first from the greatness of the enemy Scipio had overcome; from the re∣putation that the conquest of so long and per∣rilous a war had given him; from the quick dispatch of it: from those favours which youth, wisdome, and other his memorable vertues had gotten him. Which things were so great, that the Magistrates of Rome fear'd his authori∣ty, more than any thing Which displeas'd the grave men, as a matter not accustomed in Rome. And his manner of living was thought so ex∣traordinary, that Priscus Cato, reputed a man of great integrity, was the first that stir'd against him, and said, that a city could not be called free, where the Magistrates stood in fear of one citizen. So if the people of Rome in this case followed Cato's opinion, they deserve that ex∣cuse, which I said before, those Princes and people merit, who through suspicion prove unthankfull. Wherefore concluding this dis∣course, I say, that whether this vice be used either through suspicion or covetousness, it shall appear that the people never put it in practise upon covetousness, and upon suspicion less than Princes, having less cause to be suspici∣ous, as quickly it shall be declared.

CHAP. XXX.

What means a Prince or Republique should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude: or what A Commander or Citizen, to be free from their danger.

A Prince to avoyd this necessity of living with suspicion, or being ungratefull, ought personally go to the warrs, as in the begin∣ning did those Roman Emperors, and in our daies the Turk does; and as those that are valorous have done, and yet do. For o∣vercoming, the glory and the gain is all their own. And when they are not there in person, (the glory of the action belonging to another) they think, they cannot well make that conquest their own, unlefs they put out that glory in another which they themselves knew not how to get, and so become un∣gratefull, and unjust. And without doubt greater is their loss, than their gain; but when either through negligence, for lack of judgment they stay idle at home, and send out a Com∣mander, I have no other precept to give them, than what they know of themselves. But I advise that Commander, because, as I think, he can hardly escape the nips of unthankful∣ness, that he betake himself to one of these two expedients; either presently upon his victory let him leave his army, and put himself into his Princes hands, abstaining from any action sa∣vouring of insolence or ambition, that so he having no occasion given of suspicion may have reason to reward him, or at

least not hurt him: Or when he likes not to do thus, let him resolutely take part against him, and use all those means whereby he may think to hold from his Prince what he hath gotten, procuring the soldiers and the subjects good wills; let him make friendship with his neighbors, possess with his men the strong places, corrupt the Chief of his army, and assure himself of those he cannot; and this way endeavor to punish his Lord for the in∣gratitude he would have us'd towards him. Otherwaies there are not; but (as it was said before) men know not how to be wholly vi∣cious, nor wholly good. And alwaies it comes to pass, that presently after the victory, they will not part with their army; behave them∣selves with modesty they cannot, and to stand upon defyance in some honorable termes they know not how. So that being irresolute which way to take, between delay and doubt they are suppressed. But to a Republique which would avoyd this vice of ingratitude, we can∣not apply the same remedy, we may to a Prince; that is, that she go herself, and not send out in her imployments, being necessitated to make use of some one of her citizens. It sutes well therefore, that for her best remedy, she take the same course the Commonwealth of Rome took, to be less unthankfull then all others. Which grew from her manner of government; for the whole city, both Nobles and Plebeians being train'd up to war, there arose alwaies in Rome in all ages men of such valour, expe∣rience, and reputation, that there was no oc∣casion to doubt of any one of them, they being many who kept one another in or∣der. And so long they continued ••iu in∣tegrity,

and with regard not to make others jealous of their ambition, nor give occasion to the people to do them harme, taking them for ambitious persons; for if any one were made Dictator, he got most honor by it, that laid down his Dictatorship soonest. And so such like way not being sufficient to raise suspect, could not breed ingratitude. So that a Repub∣lique that would not have cause given her to be unthankfull, should governe her self in the same manner Rome did. And a citizen that would be free from all their despights, should follow the same steps the citizens of Rome went.

CHAP. XXXI.

That the Roman Commanders were never ex∣traordinarily punish'd for any error commit∣ted; nor at all punish'd, when either by their ignorance, or upon some unlucky resolution taken by them the Commonwealth suffer'd loss.

THE Romans, as formerly we have dis∣cours'd, were not only less ungrateful, than other Commonwealths, but also were more pitifull, and more advised in the punishment of the Generalls of their ar∣mies, than any else. For if their fault procee∣ded from malice, yet they gently chastis'd them; but if it was through ignorance, they were so far from punishing them, that they re∣warded and honour'd them. This manner of proceeding was well consider'd by them;

for they judg'd it a matter of great importance to those that commanded their armies, to have their mind free, without any clog upon it, and without any outwards respects to restrain them in their resolutions; because they would not add new difficulties and danger to a thing by it self hard and dangerous: advising well that with these hindrances a man cannot brave∣ly execute his designs. For example, when they sent an army into Greece, against Philip of Macedon, or into Italy against Anniball, or against those people they first overcame; That Commander to whom the imployment was committed had the vexation of all those cares that follow such charges which are of weight and importance. Now if to such cares, this were added, that many examples of the Romans were recorded, where they had cru∣cifyed or otherwise put to death those that had lost any battels, it was impossible, that that Cap∣tain among so many suspicions cou'd resolve any thing couragiously. Therefore they deeming these sufficiently punish'd with the shame of their loss, they were not willing to startle them with any more grievous punishment Here is one example, of a fault committed, and not through ignorance. Sergius and Ʋerginius were incamp'd against the Veyans, each of them commanding a part of the army: Sergius was to incounter the Tuscans, and Verginius was to set upon the other side: It chanc'd, that Sergius being assaulted by the Falisci, and other people, endur'd ra∣ther to be quite rout'd and put to flight, be∣fore he would send for ayd to Verginius. And on the other side, Verginius, staying til til he should humble himself, would rather see

the dishonour of his country, and the ruine of the army, than succour him. A case indeed very exemplary, and of much malice; neither would it have bin for the Common-wealth of Romes reputation, to have let the one or the other pass without censure. True it is, that where another Republique would have punish'd them with death, this punish'd them only in a sum of money. The cause hereof was, not that their offences deserv'd not greater punish∣ment, but because the Romans would in this case, for the reasons already alleadged, con∣tinue their ancient customes. And touching errors of ignorance, we have no better ex∣ample, than that of Maro; through whose rash∣ness the Romans having bin broken at Canne by Hanniball, where the Republique came indan∣ger to lose her liberty, yet because it was igno∣rance, and not malice, they not only did not chas∣ise him; but honor'd him, and the whole order of the Senat••rs m••thim upon the way in his re∣turn to Rome; and because they could not thank him for the battel fought, they thankt him yet that he was return'd to Rome, and had not de∣spair'd of the Roman State. When Papirius Cur∣sor would have put Fabius to death, for having contrary to his command fought with the Samnites, among other reasons which Fabius his Father brought against the Dictators obsti∣nacy was this, that the people of Rome, in any loss that ever her Captains had made, had never done that which Papirius in a vict∣ory would have done.

CHAP. XXXII.

A Republique or Prince should not defer to do good unto men, until their necessity requires it.

ALthough it succeeded happily to the Ro∣mans, to have us'd liberality towards the people upon occasion of a sudden danger, when Porsenna made war against Rome, to restore the Tarquins, where the Senate doubting of the people, lest they would sooner accept of the Kings, than endure out the war; to make themselves sure of them, they took off from them the taxes of salt, and every kind of grievance, saying, the poor contributed e∣nough to the common good, if they did but nourish their children; and thereupon in re∣gard of this benefit, the people expos'd them∣selves to indure the siege, the famine, and the war. Yet let none, presuming upon this ex∣ample, delay to gain the good will of the people til the times of danger; for it will never prove so well to them, as it did to the Romans; for the generality will think they have not this good from thee, but from thy adversaries; and being to fear, that, when that necessity is past, thou wilt withhold from them that good which of force thou didst them, they will not think themselves any way beholding to thee. And the reason why this business succeeded well to the Romans, was, because the State was new, and not well setled yet; and that people also had seen, that formerly laws had bin made for their advantage,

as that of appeal to the people; so that they might well perswade themselves, that the good they had, was done them, not so muth upon occasion of their enemies coming, as from the good disposition of the Senate to∣wards them. Moreover, the Kings were yet fresh in their memory, by whom they had bin many waies scorn'd, and abus'd. And because such like occasions seldom fall out, it seldom also comes to pass, that the like remedies are of use: whosoever therefore sit at the helme in a state, be it either a Commonwealth, or a Prince, should consider before hand, what contrary times may come upon them, and what men in their troubles they may stand in need of; and therefore should live with them alwaies in such a manner, that upon any acci∣dent chancing, they may find them ready and willing to serve their occasions. And he that governs otherwise, either Prince, or Repub∣lique, but especially a Prince, and afterwards upon the exigent, when danger is at hand, thinks with any benefits to recover or oblige∣men to him, is much deceiv'd; for he does not onely not secure himself, but hastens his own destruction.

CHAP. XXXIII.

When an inconvenient is much grown, either in a state, or against a state, it is better to beare with it for a while, then presently to struggle with it.

WHen the commonwealth of Rome grew in reputation, force, and rule, the neighboring people, who at first were not aware of the harme this new Republique might do them, began, though late, to know their fault; and desiring to remedy that which at first they had neglected, nigh fourty several people were joyned together a••ainst Rome; whereupon the Romans, among the remedies they were wont to make use of in their extreamest dangers, betook them to create a Dictatour, that is, to give power to one man, that without calling any Coun∣cil he might resolve, and without any appeal, he might execute his resolutions. Which reme∣dy, as then it serv'd to purpose, and was the occasion they overcame those eminent dan∣gers: so it was alwaies exceeding profitable in all those occasions, which in the grow'th of the Empire at any time did rise against the Repub∣lique. Upon which accident we are first to discourse, how that, when an inconvenient that rises either in a Commonwealth or against a Commonwealth, caus'd by an inward or an outward cause, is become so great, that it begins to make every one afraid, the safer course is, to temporise with it, then strive forth∣with to extinguish it. For most commonly it proves, that they who indeavor to quench it

kindle it much more, and suddenly pluck down that mischief upon their heads, which was then but fear'd from thence. And of such like accidents many arise in the Commonwealth, oftner upon inward oceasions then outward. Where oftentimes, either a citizen is suffered to lay hold of more forces then is reasonable; or else some law begins to be corrupted, which is the very nerve and life of liberty. And this error is suffer'd to pass on so far, that there is more danger in the remedy, then in the evil. And so much the harder is it to know these in∣convenients at their birth, by how much more it seems to agree with mens natures, alwaies to favor things in their beginnings: and these favors are of more force, rather then in any thing else, in those works that seem to have somewhat of vertue in them, and are done by young men. For if in a republique any young noble man put forward himself, having in him extraordinary vertue, all the citizens begin to cast their eyes on him, and agree together without any consideration to honor him; so that if he hath any touch of Ambition, meeting with those favors nature affords him, and this accident coming suddenly in place, before the Citizens perceive the errors they are in, it falls out that they have small means to help themselves. And when these, that have the remedies in their powers, would put them in practise, they do but with haste augment his authority. Hereof we might alleadge sundry examples; but I will give onely one out of our own city. Cosmus of Medici, from whom the house of Medici in this city took the beginning of their greatness, came into such reputation, through the favor that his

own wisdom and the other citizens ignorance gave him, that he began to make the state somewhat afraid of him, so that some citizens held it very dangerous to offend him, and others as dangerous to let him alone. But Nicholas of Ʋizzano living at the same time, who was esteem'd a very expert man in civil affairs; and being that the first error was made is not knowing the dangers that might arise upon Cosmus his reputation, while he liv'd, would never suffer, that they should make the second, which was, that they should indeavor to put him down; judging that such an assay would be altogether the ruine of their state, as in effect it came to pass, which was after his death. For those citizens that were left, not following this advice, made themselves strong against Cosmus, and chas'd him out of Florence. Whereupon it follow'd that his faction resenting the injury, a while after recall'd him, and made him Prince of the Commonwealth; to which step he could never have climb'd, without that manifest opposition. The selfsame befell Rome with Caesar, whose vertue being favor'd by Pompey and others, at length came to change their favor into fear, whereof Cic••ro witnesses, saying, that Pompey had late begun to fear Cae∣sar. Which fear caus'd them to think upon the remedies, and the remedies they us'd ha∣sten'd the ruine of their Commonwealth. I say then, that seeing it is a hard thing to know these evils when they arise, this diffi∣culty being occasion'd by a deceit, where∣with most things in their beginning do de∣ceive, the wiser way is to dissemble them, when they are knowne, then to oppose them. For temporizing with, them they either

are extinguish'd of themselves, or at least the evill is put off for a longer time. And in all af∣faires Princes ought to be well advis'd, who in∣tend either to suppresse evills, or to oppose their forces and their invasions, that in liew of hurt they do them not good; and thinking to thrust on forward a businesse, they draw it not after them; or instead of choaking a plant, they water is not. And they should well consider, wherein the greatest force consists, and when they find their powers sufficient to heale what is a∣miffe, they should then apply their strongest re∣medies; or otherwise, let it alone, nor in any case meddle with it; for it would fall out as before hath bin said, and as it befel the neighbours of Rome; for whom it had bin better, after that Rome was so growne in strength, with treaties of peace to indeavour to quiet it and so yet keep it backward, rather then by making a strong warre against it, to force it to new courses, and new defences. For to what other purpose serv'd their conspiracy, then to make them more lively, and to thinke upon new wayes, whereby in a farre shorter time they much inlarg'd their power? Among which, was the creation of a Dictatour, by which, new order they not onely overcame the dangers that hung over their heads, but it was an occasion to stop very many misischiefes, which without that remedy the commonwealth must needs have incurr'd.

CHAP. XXXIIII.

The Dictatours authority did good, and not harme, to the Commonwealth of Rome; and how authori∣ties which the citizens take upon them of them∣selves, and not those that are given them by the peoples free voices, are hurtfull to the civill government.

THose Romans are by some writer condem∣ned, that found out in that city the way to create a Dictatour, as a thing that in time might occasion the Roman Tyranny; alleadging, that the first tyrant that was in that city, command∣ed it under the title of a Dictatour, saying, that if this had not bin, Caesar could never with any publque title have given any honest colour to his tyranny. Which matter was never well examined by him that holds this opinion, but beleev'd without ground. For it was not the name, not the degree of the Dictatour, that brought Rome into bondage, but it was the au∣thority the Citizens tooke upon themselves through the long continuance of their rule. And if in Rome there had bin wanting the title of a Dictatour, they would have taken another: for forces will easily gaine titles, but not titles forces. And we see it, that the Dictatour, while he was made according to the publique orders, and not by his owne authority, alwayes did good to the city. For those magistrates that are created, and those authorities that are given by extraordinary courses wrong the Repub∣liques, and not those that come the rodinary way As it appeares it followed in so long a processe of time, that never any Dictatour did otherwise,

then good to the Commonwealth. Whereof there are very evident proofes. First because to put a citizen in case that he can do hurt, and take extaordinary authority upon him, we must suppose him to have many conditions, which in a Republique not corrupted he can never have; for he must be very rich, and have many adherents and partisans, which he can∣not have, if the lawes be strictly observ'd; and in case they had, such kind of men are so doubted, that the citizens free votes seldome meete in them. Moreover, the Dictarous was created onely for a time, and not for ever, and onely to remedy the present necessity; for which he was created. And by his authority he had power to resolve by him what courses to take against urgent danger, and to execute any thing without calling a counsell, and to punish any one without appeale. Yet could he do nothing, tending to the diminution of the state, as it would have bin•• to take away the Senates authority, or the peoples, to disanull the old ordinances of the city, and to make new; so that, the short time of his Dictatourship meeting with his authority, which was limited to him, and the people of Rome not corrupted, it was unpossible he should exceed his bounds, and hurt the city: and, we finde by experience, that he evermore advantag'd it. And indeed among other Roman ordinances, this is one deserves consideration, and worthy to be rec∣koned among those which contributed to the inlargement of that Empire: for without such like course taken, cities could hardly escape out of such extravagant michiefes; for the wayes ordinarily us'd in Republiques. which more slowly (being that no counsell, nor magistrate

hath power of himselfe to go through with any matter, but in many things nave neede of of one another, because there goes time in get∣ting together their consents) their remedies are very dangerous, when they are to cure that which cannot stay for time: and therefore Commonwealths among their orders should have some such like way; and the Republique of Venice (which is excellent among these modernes) hath reserv'd the authority to a few citizens, that in occurrences of importance, without more advice, all of them joyntly of accord may resolve; for when in a Republique there wants such an expedient, it must needs by keeping the old customes go to ruine, or to escape it, break them. And in a Commonwealth, it were to be desir'd, that nothing should chance, which might call in the use of extraordinary courses. For though that extraordinary way at that time did good, yet the example prooves of ill consequence: for the custome is brought in, to breake the old orders at first for good, which afterwards under that colour are broken to ill intent. So that a Republique can never be perfect, unlesse with her lawes she hath pro∣vided for all things, and for every mischance ordain'd the remedy, and tract out the way of her government: and therefore concluding I say, that those Republiques which in their dan∣gers have not recourse to a Dictatour, or such like authorities, will alwayes in those heavy accidents fall to ruine. And, in this new ordin∣ance the manner of making the choice is to be noted, how judiciously it was provided for by the Romans; for the creation of the Dictatour being some what a disgrace to the Consulls, the heads of the City being as well to come under

obedience, as others; and presupposing, that some distaste hereof might arise among the citizens, they ordein'd the power of making this choice should be in the Consuls; thinking, that when the occasion came, that Rome should stand in need of this Royall power, they would do it with a good will, and that they doing it themselves, it would lesse grieve them: For the hurts, or any evil that a man brings voluntarily upon himself, and of his owne choyce, are farre lesse troublesome, then those that are done him by another: although that afterwards in the latter times, the Romans us'd in liew of a * 1.9 Dictatour, to give such authority to the Consull in these words, Let the Consull takecare the Commonwealth receive no dammage. And to re∣turne to our matter, I conclude, that the neighibouring inhabitants of Rome by seeking to suppresse them, made them not onely provide for their defence, but also gave them the way how they might with more force, better ad∣vice, and greater authority offend them.

CHAP. XXXV.

The reason, why in Rome the creation of the Decemvirate was hurtfull to the liberty of that Republique, notwitstanding that it was made by publique and free voices.

AND it seemes contrary to that which was said before, that the authority which is seis'd on by violence, not that which is given by suffrages, is hurtfull to Commonweales, as the election of the ten Citizens created by the people of Rome to make lawes therin, who in time became tyrants in it, and without any re∣spect laid hold on the liberty thereof. Where we

ought well consider the manner of giving the authority, and the time for which it is given: and when an absolute authority is given for a long time (calling a yeare or somewhat more a long time) it will alwayes be dangerous, and will produce either good or bad effects, accor∣ding as the persons to whom it shall be intrust∣ed shall proove good or bad: and if we looke into the authority the ten had, and that which the Dictatours had, we shall find that of the ten farre to outreach the other. For when the Dictatour was created, the Tribuns, the Consuls, and the Senate remain'd still in their authority, nor could the Dictatour take it from them And if he could deprive one of the Con∣sulship, and remove another from the Senate, yet could he not disanull the whole order of Senatours, and make new lawes: so that the Senate, the Consuls, and the Tribuns continu∣ing with their authority, came to be as a guard upon him, to keepe him from swerving out of he right way. But in the creation of the ten there fell out the cleane contrary; for they cashierd the Consuls and Tribuns and gave authority of themselves to make lawes and every thing else, as absolutly as the people of Rome. So that being absolute of themselves without Consuls, without Tribuns, without appeale to the people, and hereby having none to looke into their courses, the second yeare they had the meanes, especially moov'd by the ambition of Appius, to become insolent. And hereupon it is to be noted, that when it is said, that a power given by free suffrages, never hurt any Commonwealth, we must presuppose, that the people suffer not themselves to be induc'd to give it, unlesse with due circumstances, and at

due seasons. But when, either being deceiv'd, or upon some other occasion leading them blindsold, they are brought to give it undis∣creetly, and in that kind as the people of Rome gave it to the ten, it will befall them alwayes, as it did to these. Which is easily proov'd, con∣sidering the causes that held the Dictatours in goodnesse, and those that gave the ten occasion of becomming evill. And advising also how those Republiques have done, that have bin thought well governed, in the giving of autho∣rity for a long time, as the Sparitans gave their Kings, and the Venetians their Duke; for a man may preceive that in one or other sort they had their guards upon them, that they who were ill dispos'd could not at their plea∣sures abuse that authority. Nor availes it in this case, that the matter is not corrupted; for an absolute authority corrupts the matter in a very short time, gathers friends, and makes partisans, neither is poverty or want of good kindred a let; for wealth, and every other advantage presently runnes after them, as par∣ticularly in the ereation of the ten we shall treate.

CHAP. XXXVI.

The citizens who have possessed the greatest char∣ges in the Commonwealth, ought not to disdaine the lesse, as unworthy of them.

THe Romans had made Marcus Fabius, and Caius Manlius Consuls, and gain'd a very glorious battell of the Veyentes and the Etrus∣cans, where in Quintus Fabius was slaine. the Consuls brother, who had bin consul the yeare before. Where we should well consider, how

proper the lawes of that citie were for her ad∣vancement. and how much those other Repub∣lique that trace not herfoote steps, decevie them∣selves. For though the Romans were zealous lovers of glory, yet never did they esteeme it dishonourable at one time to obey, where other whiles they had commanded; and to serve in that army whereof they had bin Commanders. which custome is contrary to the opinion, lawes, and courses of the citizens of our times. And in Ʋenice yet is this errour, that a citizen having borne a great office, esteemes it a disgrace to accept of a lesse, and the citie allowes him to refuse it. Which thing though it were honoura∣ble for the private, yet is it wholly unprofitable for the publi{que} For a Commonwealth may expect better performance from, and repose more trust in that citizen, who descends from a greater charge to undertake a lesse, then in him that from a lesse arises to the command of a greater. Because they cannot with good reason trust him with their weighty affayres, unlesse they see men about him of such reverence and vertue that his inexperience may be guided and directed by their vertue and authority. And if in Rome there had bin that custome which is in Ʋenice, and other Republi{que} and moderne Kingdomes, that he who had once bin Consull would never goe to the warr afterwards, but as Consul, many things very prejudiciall to the free government of the state would have growne therupon; and through the errours com∣mitted by these new men, and by their ambiti∣on, which they might have us'd with more free∣dome, not having those grave men about them, by whose presence they might be so kept in awe, that they should not dare to step aside:

and so they would have become dissolute; which would all have turn'd to the publique losse.

CHAP. XXXVII.

VVhat distaste the Agrarian law gave in Rome, and that it is very offensive to make a law in a Commonwealth, that lookes far backwards, and yet goes directly against an ancient custome of the Citie.

IT is an opinion of the ancient writers, that men are wont to vex themselves in their crosses, and glut and cloy themselves in their prosperi∣ty; and that from the one and the other of these two passions proceede the same affects: for at what time soever men are freed from fighting for necessity, they are presently together by the ears through ambition; which is so powerfull in mens hearts, that to what degree fo••ver they arise, it never abandons them. The reason is, because nature hath created men in such a sort, that they can desire every thing, but not attaine to it. So that the desire of getting being grea∣ter then the power to get, thence growes the dislike of what a man injoyes, and the small satisfaction a man hath thereof. Hereupon arises the change of their states, for some men desir∣ing to have more, and others fearing to lose what have they already, they procede to enmities and warre, from whence comes the destruction of one country, and the advantage of another. This discourse I have made, because it suffis'd not the Commons of Rome, to secure them∣selves from the Nobility by creating the Tri∣buns, to which desire they were forc'd by ne∣necessity;

but that they suddenly, upon the obteining thereof began to contend out of ambition, and thinke to share equally with the nobility both in honours and fortunes, as the things that are in most value with men. Where∣upon grew that disease that brought forth the quarrell touching the Agrarian law. And in conclusion, caus'd the destruction of the Ro∣man Republique. And because Commonwealths well ordered are to maintain the publique wealthy, and the particulars poore, it is likely there was in Rome some defect in this law, which either was not so exactly fram'd at the beginning, but that every day it had need of some revising and amending; or that the making of it was so long put off, that it became scandalous to look so farre backwards; or that being well instituted at first, in time it grew by use corrupt. So in what manner soever it were, that law was never mention'd in Rome, but that the whole city was in a tumult. This law had two principall heads. By one they order'd that no citizen could possesse more then so many acres of ground: by the other, that the lands which they tooke from their enemies should be divided among the people of Rome. It came therefore to thwart the Nobility two manner of wayes; because they that had the greatest states in pos∣sessio, were not permitted by thelaw who were the greater part of the Nobility; and there upon ought not to injoy it: and when the enemies goods should be divided among the common people, they tooke from the Nobility the meanes to grow rich. These quarrells then being taken up against potent persons, and they by their resistance thinking to defend the publique, whensoever (as it is said) mention

was made of this law, the whole city was in an uproare; and the Nobility wrought it out with patience and with diligence, either by drawing an army forth into the field, or by opposing another Tribune against him that propounded it, or sometimes by yeelding a part, or else by sending a Colony into that place which was to be divided, as it befell them of the Country of Antium, for which upon a dispute touching this law, there was a Colony drawne out of Rome and sent into this place, unto whom the said County was consign'd. Where Titus Livius uses a notable kind of speech, saying, that with much adoe they found any one in Rome, that would give in their names to go to the said Colony, the people being rather desirous of these ad∣vantages in Rome, then to go and injoy them in Antium. And the quarrell touching this law continued a good while, till the Romans tran∣sported their armes into the uttermost parts of Italy, and likewise out of Italy. After which, as it seemes, it ceas'd: which so fell out, because the fields, which the enemies of Rome posses∣sed, were farre apart from the peoples sight, and in a place where it was not safe to come to cultivate them, and therefore grew they lesse desirous of them, and the Romans also did lesse use to punish their enemies in that manner. And when they did dispossess any towne of the territory, they there distributed Colonies, so that upon such reasons this law was laid asleepe till the Gracchies time, by whom it being after∣wards awaked, quite ruin'd the Roman liberty. For they found their adversaries strength doubled; and hereupon kindled such a hatred betweene the people, and the Senate, that they came to blowes and to bloud without civill

meane, or order. So that the publique magistrates having no power to give remedy hereto, nor either of the factions relying on them, they sought private helpes, each party thinking to make a head should defend them. In this quar∣rell, and disorder, the people chose Marius, and made him foure times Consull; and so long he continued his Consulship, with small interva's, that he had power of his owne selfe to make himselfe thrice more Consul. Against which pestilence the Nobility having no other reme∣dy, began to favour Sylla; and having made him head of their faction, they came to civill warres, and after much bloodshed and change of chance, the Nobility remain'd conquerer These quarrells were anew reviv'd in Caesar and Pompeyes time; for Caesar being made head of Marius his party, and Pompey of Syllaes, coming to fight, Caesar remain'd victour; who was the first tyrant in Rome, (so that that city never after injoy'd her liberty, such beginning then, and end had the Agrarian law. And although we shew'd other where, how the discords of Rome between the Senat and the People preserv'd Romes liberty, because they sprung from those lawes in favor of liberty, and therefore the end of this Agrarian law may seeme disagreeing to such a conclusion; yet I say, that upon this I no way change my opinion; for so great is the Nobilities ambition, that if by divers wayes and sundry meanes it were not abated in a city, it would suddenly bring that city to destruction: so that if the strife touching the Agrarian law had much adoe in three hundred yeares to in∣thrall Rome; it is like enough it would have bin brought much sooner into servitude, when the people both with this law, and also with their

other humours, had not alwayes bridled the Nobilities ambition. We see by this also, how much men esteeme wealth rather then honours, because the Nobility of Rome, if it toucht mat∣ter of honour, ever gave way to the people with∣out any extraordinary distasts: but when it concern'd their wealth, so obstinatly did they defend it, that the people to vent their hum∣our had their recourse to those extravagant wayes that are above discours'd of. The Au∣thors of which disorder were the Gracchi, whose intention ought to be commended, rather then their discretion. For to take away a disorder grown in a Commonwealth, and hereupon to make a law that lookes faire backwards, is a course ill advis'd of; and (as formely it hath been said at large) it doth nothing else but hasten that evill to which the disorder guides thee; but giving way to the time some what, either the mischiefe comes slower, or of it selfe at length before it comes to the upshot) goes out

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Weake Commonwealths are hardly drawne to a certaine resolution, and know not how to deter∣mine: and the course they ordinarily take, they are rather forc'd to, then choose of them selves.

THere being in Rome a very grievous pesti∣lence, and thereupon the Volsci and the Equi thinking a fit time presented to bring the city of Rome into subjection, these two people having got a very great army together, set upon the Latini and the Hernici, and wasted their country: this the Latini and Hernici were

constrain'd to give notice of at Rome, and intreat, that the Romans would undertake their defence: to whom the Romans, excee∣dingly afflicted by the plague, answer'd that they should take a course to defend themselves with their owne forces, because they were not then able to do it. Wherein appeares the mag∣nanimity and wisdome of that Senate, that even in all fortunes they would reigne and give law to those deliberations their vassalls should make; nor were they asham'd to resolve any thing, when necessity press'd them to it, though contrary to their manner of living, and the resolutions usually made by them. This I say, because at other times the same Senate had forbidden the said people to arme and defend themselves; and therefore to a Senat, whose judgment had bin weaker then was theirs, it would have seem'd an abatement of reputation, to have granted them such a defence. But they alwayes weighed businesses in their due ba∣lance, and ever chose the lesser ill in lieu of the greater good: for it agreed ill with them; to see themselves unable to defend their sub∣jects; and they were as little content, that they should arme without them, for the reasons al∣leadged, and others also that are evident. Yet knowing, that in any case upon necessity they were to take armes, having the enemy upon their backes, they tooke the more ho∣nourable part, and would rather, that what they were to do, they should do it with their leave, to the end that having disobeyed upon necessity, they should not be accustomed to disobey voluntarily. And though this may well appeare a course fit for every Re∣publique to take, the weake and ill advised

Common wealths cannot do the like, nor know not how to stand upon termes of honour in the like niceties. The Duke Valentine had taken Faeuza, and made Bologna yeeld to his conditions; afterwards desiring to returne from thence to Rome through Tuscany, sent a con∣fident of his into Florence to aske passage for himselfe with his army. Hereupon they con∣sulted at Florence, how to manage this businesse, nor did any one advise them to grant it him. Wherein they followed not the course the Ro∣mans tooke: for the Duke being exceedingly well armed, and the Florentines in a manner disarmed, that they could not hinder his passage, it had bin much more for their honour, if it had seem'd that he had passd with their licence, rather then by force; for there it was wholly their disgrace, which had bin in part lesse, if they had carried it otherwise. But the worst con∣dition these weak Republiques have, is to take to no resolution, so that what party soever they take, they take it perforce; and if any good be done them, it is forc'd upon them, for which they owe no thankes to their owne wis∣dome. I will give two other examples, that hap∣pen'd in our dayes in the state of our city, In the yeare 1500, when Lewi the 12 of France had recover'd Milan, being desirous to put Pisa into our hands, for the summe of 50000 ducats, which the Florentines had promis'd him, after such restitution, he sent his army commanded by the Lord Beaumont towards Pisa, in whom, (although he were a French man) yet the Florentines repos'd much trust. This army and Captaine came on betweene Cascina and Pisa, to assaile the walls, where staying some daies to give order for the siege, there came some

Deputies of Pisa to Beavmont, who offer'd to yeeld up the city to the French army with these conditions, that upon the Kings word he should promise, not to give them into the Flo∣rentines hands, till after foure monthes, which termes were utterly resus'd by the Florentines, whereupon ensued, that after a while they left the siege with disgrace. Nor was that accord refus'd for other reason, then because they doubted of the Kings word; although (such was the weaknes of their counsell) that they were forc'd to put themselves into his protection, though they trusted him not: nor in the meane while did they consider, that the King could easier deliver Pisa into their hands, having gotten possession of it, than promise hee would deliver that which hee had not yet in his power: wherein if hee had fayl'd, it had bin easy to discover the Kings intention, and so have spar'd their cost. In such sort that it had bin a great deal more to their advantage, had they agreed, that Beaumont should have taken it upon any promise; as it was seene afterwards by experience in the yeare 1502. when up∣on the rebellion of Arezzo, the Lord Jubalt was sent by the King of France with succours to the Florentines. Who being come neare to Arezzo, began to treate agreement with the towne, which upon certaine termes would have yeelded, as before the Pisans, but were againe refused by the Florentines. Which Jubalt perceiving, and thinking that the Florentines did little understand themselves, hee began to practise an agreement with them by himself, without admitting the commissaries into the party, so that hee concluded a peace of his owne head, and thereupon entred Arezzo with his

owne people, shewing the Florentines, they were fooles, and understood not the affaires of the world; and if they desir'd to have Arezzo in their hands, they should let the King know of it, who could more easily deliver it them, having his people already in the towne, then if they were without before the walls. In Florence they forbare not to rayle upon, and blame the said Jubalt, till they understood, that if Beaumont had bin like Jubalt, they should have had Pisa as well as Arezzo. And thus to returne to our purpose, Republiques which will not come to resolution, seldome make any party much to their advantage, unlesse they are forc't thereupon: because their weaknesse will never suffer them to determine, where there is any doubt: and unlesse that doubt bee cancell'd by a neessitie that violently thrusts them forward, they remaine always in suspence.

CHAP. XXXIX.

The same accidents are seene to befall severall peoples.

THIS is easily knowne by any one that considers things present and things long past, that in all Cities and all peoples there are now the same desires and the same humours, there were alwayes; So that it is very easy for him that examines with diligence the things that are past, to foresee the future in any Commonwealth, and to serve himself of those remedies, which were in use among the auncients; or not finding of those which were us'd, to devise new, for the resemblance these

accidents have with the auncient. But because these considerations are neglected, or not under∣stood by the Reader; or if understood, not knowne to him that governs, it followes, that continually in all successions of ages the same offeeces happen. The Citie of Florence after 94 yeares having lost a part of their dominions, as Pisa and other Townes, was forc't to make warre against those that held them. And because hee that had them in his hands, was of great power, it came it passe, that they were at great expence in the warrs, without good successe. From these great expences they proceeded with impositions to grieve the people, and from those grievances came the peoples murmurings and complaints. And for that this warre was order'd by a Magistracie of tenne Citizens, who were call'd the Councell of tenne for the warre, they were malic't by the whole body of the Citie, as the Authours of the warre, and the expences of the same; and they began to p••rswade themselves, that by taking away that Magistracie, they should end their wars; so that having to make new, they would not supply the places, but rather suffering that Magistracie to expire, they referr'd their imployments all to the Senate: Which resolution was so hurtfull, that not onely it ended not the warre, (as the generality was perswaded) but those men being put out of the imployment, who guided it with understanding, there followed such confusion, that besides Pisa, they lost Arezzo, and many other places, in so much that the people per∣ceiving their errour, and that the feaver oc∣casion'd the mischiefe, and not the Physitian, they created anew the Magistracie of tenne. The selfe same humour grew up in Rome

against the name of the Consuls; for the people seeing one warre arise from another, giving them no rest, where they ought to have attributed it wholly to their neighbours am∣bition, who d••sir'd to suppresse them, they imputed it rather to the ambition of the no∣bilitie; who not being able in Rome to chastise the people protected by the, Tribunitiall power, indeavour'd to draw them our of Rome under the Consuls, and there to oppresse them, where they had no assistance. And hereupon they thought it necessary to take away the Consuls, or so to limit their power, that they should have no authority over the people neither at home nor abroad. The first that assa••d to put that law in practise, was one Terentillus a Tribun, who propounded they should create five men, to consider the Consuls power, and moderate it. Which thing much angred the nobility, giving them to thinke, that the Majestic of the Empire was wholly declined; and that there was not left to the Nobilitie any dignity more in the Commonwealth. Yet such was the Tribuns obstinacie, that the Consuls name was quite put out, and in the conclusion they were contented after some other order taken, rather to create Tribuns with Consulan power, than the Consuls; in such hatred had they their name and their authority. And so they proceeded a long time, till at length, having knowne their errous, as the Florentins return'd to the Counsell of tenne, so they anew created their Consuls.

CHAP. XL.

The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what the rein is to be noted; where among many other things is consider'd, how by the like accident a Republique may be preserv'd, or sup∣pressed.

HAving a purpose to discourse particularly of the accidents that happen'd at Rome upon the creation of the Decemvirate, me∣thinks it is not much out of the way first to re∣late summarily the story of that creation; and afterwards to sift out the parts that are in those notable actions; which are many and of good consideration, as well for those that endeavor to maintain a Republique free, as for them that intend to bring it under the yoke; for in this discourse there will appear many errors com∣mitted by the Senate, and by the people, in pre∣judice of the Common liberty, and many faults made by Appius Chiefe of the Decemvirate, lam∣mageable to that tyrannie which he had pre∣supposed already founded in Rome. After ma∣ny disputes and strifes past between the people and the Nobility, about the framing of new lawes in Rome, whereby they might firmly e∣stablish the liberty of that State, with one ac∣cord they sent Spurius Posthumius with two o∣ther Citizens to Athens, for the copies of those lawes which Solon gave to that City, that thereupon they might found the Roman Ordi∣nances. After their returne, they came to ap∣point the men that were to examine and frame the said lawes. And they ordained ten Citizens

for a year, of which Appius Claudius was one, a cunning and a turbulent man. And that they might without any respect make such lawes, they took away the power of all other Magi∣strates in Rome, espeaially of the, Tribuns and Consuls. They took away also all appeal to the people; so that these new officers became abso∣lute Princes of Rome. Afterwards Appius gain'd the authority of all his other companions, by means of the favors the people did him, for he was grown so popular in his behaviour, that it seem'd a mervail, how so suddenly he had chang'd his nature and disposition, having al∣waies before this time bin thought a cruel per∣secutor of the common people. These ten governed themselves very moderately, not ha∣ving above twelve Lictors, who always went before him that was Chiese among them. And although they had the absolute authority, yet when they were to punish any Citizen of Rome for homicide, they cited him in presence of the people, and made them judge him. They writ their laws in ten Tables; and before they confirm'd them, published them to the general view, that every man might read and under∣stand them, whereby it might be known if there were any fault in them, which before their confirmation should be amended. After this Appius caus'd a rumour to be spread throughout Rome that if to these ten Tables an addition of twoothers were made, they would be perfect So that the conceithereof gave the people occa∣sion to make the Councell of tenne againe for another yeare, whereunto the people consented willingly, as well because they would not have the Consuls anew ••created, as for that they hop'd they might well subsist without Tribuns,

these being judges of the causes, as is aforesaid: It being then agreed to make a new election, the whole nobility betook themselves to sue for these honors, and Appius was amongst the formost of them, and behav'd himself in his suit with so much courtesie towards the people, that all his competitors were jealous of it. * 1.10 They did not beleeve, that he being so proud a man, used all this courtesie for nought. And being in doubt publiquely to oppose him, they resolved to do it cunningly, and so though he were the youngest of them all, they gave him the authority to propound to the people the ten that were to be elected, think∣ing he would use the same terms others did, not to name himself, being a thing unusual and dis∣gracefull in Rome. But he took this im∣pediment * 1.11 for an opportunity: And na∣med himself among the first, to the ad∣miration, and displeasure of all the Nobility; and after named nine others to his own pur∣pose. Which new creation made for another yeer, began to shew the people and the No∣bility their error; for suddenly, Appius made an end of dissembling to be what he * 1.12 was not: and began to show his inbred pride: and infected his companions with his own evil conditions: and to fright the peo∣ple and the Senate, in exchange of twelve Lictors, they made a hundred and twenty. The fear was equall in all, for a while; but they began afterwards to give respect to the Se∣nate, and rudely to handle the Commons. If any one being wrong'd by one of these Iudges did appeal to another, he was worse abused in his appeal, than in his first tryal. So that the people having perceived their er∣ror,

began to look the Nobility in the face with a great deal of sorrow; And thence they took occasion to seek after their liberty, * 1.13 from whence by fearing their bondage, they had brought the Commonwealth into that misery. And the Nobility was wel plea∣sed with this their affliction: That be∣ing weary of their present condition, they might desire to have their Consuls restored. The dayes came at length that ended the year: the two Tables of the lawes were finished but not published. The ten here∣upon tooke occasion to continue on their Magistracie, and hold the State by violence, and make the young Nobilitie their guard, on whom they bestowed the goods of those they con∣demned. With which gifts the youth * 1.14 being corrupted, lov'd rather their own licentious life, than the common liberty. It fell out about this time, that the Sabini and the Volsci made war against the Romans. Upon which fear the ten began to see the weakness of their own estate: for without the Senate they could not take order for the war; and assembling the Senate together they thought they lost their authority: yet upon meer necessity they took this last course; and having gotten the Senators together, many of them spake against the pride of the tenn, and in particular Valerius and Horatius; and their authority had bin quite abolished, but that the Senate, of meer envy to the Common people, would not shew their au∣thority, thinking, that if the ten should vo∣luntarily depose their Magistracy, the making of Tribuns of the people might perhaps be

left. The war was then resolved of, and two armies were led forth commanded by part of the ten: and Appius staid at home to govern the City. Whereupon it happen'd, that he fell in love with Virginia; and when he would have taken her by force, her Father Virginius to free her, slew her; whereupon ensued di∣vers tumults at Rome, and in the armies, which being brought back again and joyn'd with the remainder of the people at Rome, went apart thence to the holy mount: where they staid, til the ten had deposed their Ma∣gistracy, and that the Tribuns and Consuls being created, Rome was restor'd to the ancient forme of liberty. It is noted then by the text, that the inconvenient of setting up a Tyranny grew first upon the same occasions, that the greater part of Tyrannies ordinarily use to arise upon in Cities, and this is from the overmuch desire the people have of liberty, and the exces∣sive ambition the Nobility have to command. And when they agree not to make a law in fa¦vor of liberty, and either party betakes it self to favour some one, then suddenly starts up a tyranny. The people and the Nobility of Rome consented to create the ten; and to create them with so great authority, as they did for the de∣sire they both had, the one to extinguish the memory of the consuls, the other of the Tri∣buns. When they were created, the people thinking that Appius was become of the popular faction, and rudely handled the Nobility, the people betook themselves to favour him. And when a people is led into such an error, as to give reputation to any one, because he creates

those evil that they hate, if he hath wit, it will alwaies come to pass, that he shall make himself Lord of that City; for he will wait his op∣portunity together with the peoples favor to extinguish the Nobility, and will never en∣deavor to oppress the people, till he hath quite supprest the Nobles; at which time when the people shall perceive themselves to be in bon∣dage, they shall not know whether to have recourse for help. This course have they all held, that have laid the foundations of a Tyrannie in any Commonwealth. Which if Appius had likewise held, his tyrannie would have bin of longer durance, and not have fail'd so quickly; but he went the clean con∣trary way; nor could a man have done more undiscreetly, than he, who to maintain a ty∣rannie, made those his enemies that bestowed it first upon him, and could still make it good, and fought to gain those to be his friends, who neither agreed to give it him, nor could main∣tain it to him, and so lost those that were his friends, and strove to make those his friends, that could not be so: For though the nobility desire to tyrannize, yet that part of the nobility that hath not a share in the tyrannie, is alwaies enemy to the tyrant; nor is it possible ever to gain them all to his side, by reason of the nobilities exceeding ambition and excessive a∣varice, seeing that the tyrant cannot have so great wealth, nor so many honors, as to satis∣fie them all. And thus Appius, forsaking the people, and cleaving to the nobility, committed a most evident error, and so for other reasons abovesaid; and because, if a man will hold any thing by violence, he that forces must needs

be stronger than he that is forced. From whence it comes, that those Tyrarts who have the generality to friend, and the great ones their enemies, are in the more safety, because, their violence is supported with greater forces, than that which is favored by the No∣bility, and hated by the people: for with the peoples favor the Forces within are sufficient to maintain themselves, as they were to Na∣bis Tyrant of Sparta, when all Greece and the people of Rome assaulted him, having made himself sure of some few of the Nobility, and alwaies having the people his friend, where∣with he defended himself: which he could not have done, if they had bin otherwise. In that other degree, to have but few friends at home, the forces within suffice nor, but must be sought after abread: and they are to be of three kinds, the one to have a guard of strangers, to assure thy person; the other, to have an ar∣my in the country, which may serve the same turn the people could; the third, to hold correspondence and friendship with thy put issant neighbours, who may defend thee. And whosoever takes these courses, and observes them rightly, though the people be his enemy, yet in some sort may he save himself. But Appius could not by any army make himself master of the Country, the country there and Rome be∣ing one and the same thing; and what he could do, he knew not how to do, and so perish'd in his beginning. The Senate also and the peo∣ple in the creation of the Decemvira••e com∣mitted very great errors. For, though it be formerly said in the discourse touching a Dicta∣tor, that those Magistrates, who are made of themselves, not those that are chosen by the

people, endammage the liberty, yet the people ought, when they make their Magistrates, take such order in their making, that they re∣strain them by some regards from growing wicked. And where they should set a guard over them, to keep them good, the Romans took it away, creating that the sole Magistracy in Rome, nullifying all the rest, for the ex∣cessive desire (as we before said) The Senate had to suppress the Tribuns, and the Common people the Consuls: which blinded them both so, that they concur'd in this disorder: for men (as King Ferdinand said) do oftentimes like certain lesser birds of prey, who so ea∣gerly pursue the prey, whereunto they have a natural provocation, that they perceive not a greater bird over their heads with like eagerness ready to seize on them. The people of Romes error then is made plain by this discourse, as I propounded it in the be∣ginning, in going to save their liberty; as Ap∣pius his errors also in going to seize upon the Tyranny.

CHAP. XLI.

Of humble to become, proud, of•• mercifull cruel, without passing through the due means between these extreams, argues indiscretion, and turns nothing to advantage.

AMong other termsill us'd by Appius, to maintain his tyranny, it was not of small moment, to leap too suddenly from one qua∣lity to another: for his craft in deceiving the people, by dissembling popularity, was used to good purpose. The terms likewise he held to cause a new creation of the ten, were well us'd: As also his boldness in creating himself one of them, contrary to the nobilities opinion It was a course rightly taken, to chuse his col∣legues to his own turn: but it was not advisedly done, presently upon this (according as I sayd above) to change his disposition at an instant, of a friend to shew himself enemy to the peo∣ple, of curteous to become insolent, of mild harsh, and to do this so suddenly, that without any excuse he discovers to all the falshood of his heart. For he that hath seem'd good for a while, and would, to serve his own turn, be∣come wicked, should come to it by the due de∣grees; and in such sort goeon with his occasions, that before the different disposition deprive him of his ancient favors, it may have given him so many new, that his authority be no way di∣minished: otherwise being found unmask'd and without friends, he perishes.

CHAP. XLII.

How easily men may be corrupted.

IT is remarkable also in this matter touching the Decemvirate, how easily men are cor∣rupted, so that they make themselves become of aquite contrary nature, though at first good, and well brought up: considering how that youth, which Appius had taken near to him for guard of his person, began to favor the ty∣ranny, for a very small profit which they made thereof. And how Quintus Fabisu, one of the second ten that were chosen, being an excellent man; blinded with a little ambition, and per∣swaded by the malignity of Appius, chang'd all his good conditions into very bad, and be∣came like him; which being throughly exa∣min'd, shall cause those that institute the lawes of Republiques or Kingdoms to be more exact∣in bridling humane desires, and in taking from them all hope of escaping scot-free when∣soever they offend.

CHAP. XLIII.

They that fight for their own glory, are the good and faithfull soldiers.

IT is considerable also upon the above written treaty, what difference there is between an army satisfied and contented in it self, fighting for its own glory, and that which is ill dispos'd, fighting for other mens ambition; for where

the Roman armies were alwaies wont under the Consuls to be victorious, under the Decem. virate they were alwaies losers. From this ex∣ample may we know in part the reasons why mercenary soldiers are unprofitable, who have no other obligation to make them stand true to thee, but some small stipend thou bestowest on them. Which cannot be a motive so suf∣ficient, or of such weight, as to gain thee their truth and love so far, as to die in thy be∣half. For in those armies, wherein there is not that affection towards him for whom they fight, which makes them become his partisans where can never be so much valor, as to sub∣due or resist an enemy that hath never so little vertue or courage. And because neither this affection, nor contention can grow in others, more then in thy natural subject, it is necessary in the maintaining of a state, whether it be Commonwealth or Kingdom, to arme the native subjects, as we see all they have done, who with their armies have made any great conquests. The Roman armies under the De∣cemvirates were valorous as formerly: but be∣cause the same disposition was not in them, they atchiev'd not the like exploits. But so soon as the Decemvirate had an end, and they, as free men, began to war, they took to them a∣gain their former courages, and by conse∣quence their undertakings prov'd successfull, according to their ancient wont.

CHAP. XLIIII.

A multitude without a head is unprofitable: and a man should not first threaten; and after∣ward demand the power.

THe Common people of Rome, upon the oc∣casion of Ʋerginius being gone apart armed into the Holy Mount, the Senate deputed some unto them to demand, by what authority they had forsaken their Captains and retired into the mountain; and such was the esteem of the Senates authority, that the people having no head of their multitude, no man durst make answer. And Titus Livius sayes, they wanted not what to answer, but they wanted who should answer: Which thing does punctually shew the unprofitableness of a multitude with∣out a head, and therefore Verginius perceiving the disorder, sound the expedient of creating twenty Tribuns of war who should be their head to answer, and confer with the Senate. And having demanded, that Valenius and Horatius should be sent them, to whom they would declare their mindes, these refused to go, til the ten had deposed their magistracy: and being come to the mountain where the people was, the demands were, that they would have the Triburs of the people created again, and that they might appeal to the people from every magistrate, and that all the ten should be deliver'd into their hands, and they would burn them quick: Valerius and Hora∣tius commended their first demands: and

blam'd their latter, as Impious, saying, * 1.15 You condemn cruelty, and yet you use it your selves. And they were advis'd to leave making mention of the ten, and at∣tend onely to lay hold of their authority and power, and afterwards they should not want means of satisfaction; where plainly it ap∣pears, how much it savors of folly, and little of wisdome, to demand a thing, and before∣hand to say, I will do ill with it. For a man ought not herein discover his intention, but first in any case indeavor to be master of what he desires. For it is enough to ask a man his weapons, without saying to him, I will kill thee with them, being thou hast power, when thou art possest of them, to do as thou list.

CHAP. XLV.

It is a matter of very evil example, when he that makes a law neglects the observing of it: and it is very dangerous in a state, to make a continuall practise of cruel executions.

THe agreement being made and Rome re∣duc'd to her ancient forme, Verginius cited Appius before the people, to defend his own cause: whom appearing accompanied with many of the Nobility, Verginius commanded to be cast into prison. Appius began to cry out, and appeal to the people. Verginius said, he was not worthy to be allow'd that appeal which himself had destroy'd, or have the peo∣ple defend him, who had so much endammag'd them. Appius replied, that they ought not to violate that appeal, which they with such earnest

desire had ordain'd. For all this he was im∣prison'd, and before the day of giving judg∣ment, he slew himself. And though Appius his lewd life deserv'd any punishment, yet savor'd it but little of eivil government, to violate the lawes, and especially that which was but then made. For I beleeve not, there is any thing of worse example in a Republique, then to make a law, and not observe it; and the more, when he that makes it breaks it. Florence after the ninty fourth year having its state reestablish'd by the aid of Frier Ierom Savanarola, whose writings shew his learning, wisdome, and vertue, and having among other ordinances to assure the citizens, caus'd a law to be made, that a man might appeal to the people from the sentences, which for matter of state, the Eight, or the Seignory should give: which law he long perswaded, and with much a do at length obtain'd. It happen'd that a while after the confirmation of it, five citizens were condemn'd to death by the Seignory for some offence touch∣ing the state; and they desiring to appeal, were not suffer'd, and so the law not observ'd. Which more wrong'd the reputation of that Frier, then any other accident. For if that appeal was profitable, he should have caus'd it to be observ'd, if otherwise, he should never have so urg'd the making of it. And so much more remarkable was this accident, in that the Fri∣er in those many sermons which he made, af∣ter the breach of this law, never either con∣demned him that broke it, or excus'd the breach, as he that would not condemn any thing that serv'd to his purpose; and excuse it he could not. Which having discover'd his am∣bitious and sactious mind, took much from his

credit, and charg'd him with blame enough. It is a very great fault also in a state, every day in the citizens mindes to renew the memory of old wrongs done to this or that man with new punishments, as it befell at Rome after the Decemvirate. For all the ten, and other citizens at sundry times were accus'd, and con∣demn'd, so that all the Nobility were exceed∣ingly affrighted, thinking they would never leave condemning them, til they had destroyed the whole Nobility. And certainly it had pro∣duc'd some inconvenient in the city, if Marcus Duellius the Tribun had not taken order for it. Who made a decree, that for a whole year it should not be lawfull for any man to cite or accuse any citizen of Rome, which assur'd all the Nobility. Where we see, how great a hurt it is to a Republique or Prince, to hold their sub∣jects minds in suspicion and fear with continual persecutions and punishments: and without doubt a worse course cannot be taken. For men that begin to doubt of mischief, in any case provide for themselves in their dangers, and grow bolder, and less respectfull how they venture on novelties. Wherefore it is necessary either never to hurt any, or the hurt that is to be done to do at once, and afterwards let men injoy some assurance, that may give them cause to quiet and settle their minds.

CHAP. XLVI.

Men arise by degrees from one ambition to another: and first they aime no further, then that they themselves suffer no hurt of others, afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others.

THe people of Rome having recovered their liberty, and being return'd into their for∣mer state, or rather greater, insomuch as they had made new laws, which were as new foun∣dations laid to establish their power, it seem'd probable, that Rome for some while would have bin at quiet; yet by experience the contra∣ry was seen, for every day there sprung up new tumults and new disagreements. And be∣cause Titus Livius very judiciously gives the rea∣son from whence they grew, methinks it is not out of purpose, punctually to relate his words where he sayes, that alwaies either the people or the Nobility waxed proud, when the other grew humble; and when the Commons con∣taind themselves modestly within their bounds, then began the youth of the Nobility to pro∣voke them with all manner of injuries; nor could the Tribuns much remedy this, for they also had their shares in the sufferance. The No∣bility on the other side, although well they wot that their youth was too insolent, yet being that insolency was to be committed by one side, they wished rather their own should be the act∣ors, then the commonalty. And thus the desire of maintaining the liberty caused each to proceed so far til they oppressed the other.

And the order of these accidents is, that while men endeavor to be out of fear themselves, they begin to put others in fear; and that in∣jury which they chase from themselves, they thrust upon another, as if there were a necessity either to hurt or to be hurt. Hereby is seen in what manner among other things Common-wealths come to dissolution, and men rise from one ambition to another. And as that sentence of Salust put in Caesars mouth, was very true; That all evil examples first * 1.16 spring from good beginnings. The first thing that those citizens (as is above said) endeavor, who behave themselves ambi∣tiously in a Republick, is, not onely to be out of the reach of private mens wrongs, but out of the Magistrates power. To attain hereto, they seek after friendships, which they gain by means, in appearance honest, either by sup∣plying their want of moneys, or by protecting them from those that are too mighty for them. And because this seems worthy and noble, eve∣ry one is easily deceived, and thereupon no body seeks to remedy it, till he presevering in the same course without let, becomes such a one, that the private Citizens stand in aw of him, and the Magistrates bear him respect. And when he is grown to this height, and no order first taken for restraint of his greatness, he comes to be in such termes, that it proves ve∣ry dangerous to justle with him, for the cau∣ses I have formerly alleadged, of the danger there is to strive with an inconvenient, which is already come to some growth in a ci∣ty, because then it is brought to such an exigent, that there is a necessity to seek either to extin∣guish it with danger of sudden ruine: or letting

it alone, to submit to the yoke of bondage, un∣less death or some other accident prevent it. For being once come to the terms above writ∣ten, that both citizens and Magistrates stand in fear to offend him, and his, without much a∣doe after will they understand their own strength, and hurt at their own pleasure. Whereupon a Republique among her wayes of government ought to use this, to watch carefully over her citizens, that they have not power under the colour of good to do mis∣chief: and that their reputation be such as may advantage the Commonwealth, and not wrong it, as in its own place we shall argue it.

CHAP. XLVII.

Men, though they are deceiv'd in generalities, yet are they not so easily beguiled in particulars.

THE people of Rome (as is abovesaid) ha∣ving taken in distaste the very name of Consuls, & being desirous that Plebeyans might be made Consuls, or their authority limited, the Nobility, that the Consular authority might as well be chosen out of the Commons as the Nobility; The people were herewith conten∣ted, thinking to abolish the Consulate, and to have their share in this highest dignity Hence grew a notable accident, that when they came to create these Tribuns, which they could have made all Plebeyans, the people chose * 1.17 them all out of the Nobility; whereupon Titus Livius uses these words: The event of these

assemblies, or Councils, shewed, that mindes differ much, when contention is made for liberty or honour, and when all strife being appeas'd, the judgments rest clear. And examining from whence this proceeds, I beleeve it is from thence that men are more deceiv'd in generalities, than in particularities. The Common people of Rome thought generally, they deserv'd the Consulate, because they were the greatest part of the City, because they underwent the grea∣ter dangers in the wars, because they were they, by force of whose armes Rome main∣tain'd her liberty, and became mighty. And thinking (as is said) this their desire reasonable, they would have this authority in any case. But when they came to pass their judgments in particular upon their own men, they per∣ceiv'd their weakness, and judg'd that no one of them deserv'd that, which raking them all together, they thought they had bin worthy of. So that being asham'd of them, they had recourse to those that were of merit: At which resolution Titus Livius worthily marvailing, sayes thus; This modesty, uprightness, and greatness of mind, where shall * 1.18 you now adayes find it in one man, which then was in whole people? In confirmation hereof, another no∣table example may be brought which hap∣pen'd in Capua, after that Hanniball had bro∣ken the Roman army at Cannae: upon which occasion all Italy being in an uproar, Capua was ready to rise too, for the hatred there was between the people and the Senate. And at that time Pacuvius Calanus being the principal Magistrate, and perceiving the great hazzard they went to be slain by them, and the city

yielded up to Hanniball, now that the State of Rome was in distress. Afterwards he added, that if they would let him order the business, he would provide so, that they should be both friends; but he would shut them all up in the Pa∣lace, and by giving the people power over them to chastise them, save them. The Senators yielded to his advice, and he call'd the people together, having the whole Senate shut up in the Palace, and said, that the time was come wherein they might take down the Nobilities pride, and re∣venge themselves on them for the injuryes they had received at their hands, he holding them all prisoners in his keeping: but because he thought they liked not their City should be without go∣vernment, it was fit (being they intended to kill the old Senators) to create new ones first. And therefore he had put the names of all the Senators in a bag, and so would begin to draw them forth one by one before them; and so put them to death presently, as soon as they should have made choice of a Successor. And having begun to take out one, when he was nam'd, there was a great noise made, calling him a proud, cruell, and arrogant man. And Pacu〈…〉〈…〉∣vius requiring that they should make an ex∣change of him, the whole multitudestood silent. And after a little while one of the Commons was named: whereat one began to whistle, another to laugh, some to speak in one sort, some in another. And so followed all the rest one after another as they were nam'd, being thought unworthy to be made Senators, so that Pacuvius hereupon taking occasion, sayd' seeing that you judge that this City must needs be in ill case without a Senate, and you are not agreed to change your old Senators, I

think it would be well that ye were made friends; for this fright wherein the Sena∣tors have bin put will so humble them, that the courtesie which ye sought otherwhere, ye shall find with them. And hereunto being a∣greed, there followed the union; and it was plain, how they were deceived, when they were forc'd to come to particulars. Besides, people in judging generally of affairs and their accidents are beguil'd, which they afterwards understand in particular, and perceive the de∣ceit. After the year 1494. the Principal men of the City being chac't out of Florence, and there being not any orderly government, but rather an ambitious licentiousness, so that things went from bad to worse, many of the popular faction perceiving the destruction of the City, and understanding no other cause thereof, they blam'd the ambition of some powerfull man, that nourish'd these disorders, to the end he might make of it a State to his own purpose, and take away the liberty; and these men were al∣wayes in the publique places of meeting, speaking evil of many Citizens, and threat∣ning them, that if ever they came to the go∣vernment of the State, they would discover this their treachery and chastise it. It happen'd of∣tentimes, that some of these or the like were prefer'd to the Principal Magistracy, and when they were once in the place, and saw things nearer, they knew well the disorders from whence they grew, and the dangers that hung over them, and the difficulty to remedy them. And having seen how the times and not the men caus'd the disorder, became forthwith of another mind, and chang'd their opinion. For the knowledg of things in particular took

away that deceit, which when they conside∣red generally, was presupposed in them: so that they that had first, when they were pri∣vate men, heard them speak, and saw them af∣terwards being prefer'd to the chief Magistracy stand quiet, thought it came not from an ex∣acter knowledge of things, but because they had bin carried away, and corrupted by the great ones. And this befalling many men many times, it came to a Proverb, that said, these are of one mind in the piazza, and of another in the palace. Considering therefore this whole discourse, we see, how a man may quickly open the peoples eyes, for seeing that a generality deceives them, it is expedient to bring them to descend to particulars, as Pacuvius did in Capua, and the Senate in Rome. I think also, this may pass for a conclusion, that no wise man ought to avoyd the peoples judgment in particular things, about the distributions of degrees and dignities: for onely in this the people are not deceived; or if sometime they are deceived, it is very seldom; but a few men are oftentimes deceived, when they are to make the like distribution: Nor do I take it to be su∣perfluous, to shew, in the next Chapter, the order the Senate held to clear the peoples judgments in these distributions.

CHAP. XLVIII.

He that would not have a Magistracy given to one that is base and lewd, let him cause it to be de∣manded either by one that is very base and lewd, or by one that is noble and very good.

WHen the Senate was afraid that the Tribuns with Consular authority would be chosen out of the Plebeyans, they held one of these two courses to prevent it: either they made some of the best reputed men of Rome stand for the magistracy, or they used fit means to corrupt some forbid Plebeyan and of the basest condition, who crept in to be competitor with the Plebeyans that usually of the best quality stood for it. This last way made the people asham'd to bestow it, and the first asham'd to refuse it, all which turnes to the purpose of our former discourse: where its shewed, though the people be de∣ceived in generals, yet is it not in particulars.

CHAP. XLIX.

If those cities that have had their beginning free, as Rome, have found difficulty to make lawes that can maintain them; so those that have had their beginning immediatly servile, find almost an impossibility of it.

How hard a thing it is, in the ordering of a Republique to make provision of all such

laws as may keep it free, the proceedings of the Roman Republique does well shew; Where notwithstanding that many lawes were made first by R••mulus, after by Numa, Tullus Ho∣stilius, and Servius, and last by the ten Citizens created for the like work, nevertheless alwaies in the managing of that city new necessities were discover'd, and it was needfull to make new laws: as it befell when they created the Censours, which was one of those orders that help'd to keep Rome free at that time when she liv'd in liberty: for being made Arbiters of the fashions and manners of Rome, they were a special occasion that Rome held off so long from being corrupted. Indeed in the beginning of that Magistracy they committed one error creating it for five years: but not long after wards it was amended by the wisdome of Ma∣mercus the Dictator, who, by a new law he made, reduc'd the said magistracy to the terms of eighteen moneths. Which the Censour, that were then in office took so much a miss that they put Mamercus out of the Senate' which thing was much blam'd both by the peo∣ple and the fathers. And because the story shews not any where, that Mamercus could de∣fend himself, it must needs be, that either the historian was defective, or the laws of Rome in this part not perfect: for it is not well, that in a Commonwealth it should so be ordein'd, that a citizen for publishing a law agreeable to the liberty they liv'd in, should be wrong'd without any remedy, But returning to the be∣ginning of this discourse; I say, that a man ought to consider by the creation of this new magistrate, that if those cities that have had their beginnings free, and were under their

own government, as Rome, with much adoe can find out good laws to maintain them free, it is no marvel, that those cities which have had their beginnings immediatly servile, have not found not onely difficulty, but impossibi∣ty ever so to order themselves, that they can quietly come to a civil government, as appears it befell the city of Florence, because her be∣ginning was in Subjection to the Roman Em∣pire, and having gotten leisure to breathe, be∣gan to make her own laws, which having bin mingled with the ancient, that were naught, could not work any good effect, and thus she proceeded in a government for 200 years (as we have by certain relations) without ever at∣taining to such a condition, that she could truly be term'd a Republique: and these difficulties which she hath had, have those Cities alwaies had whose beginnings have bin like hers And though many times by publique and free voi∣ces ample authority hath bin given to some few Citizens to reforme this, yet never have they order'd it to the advantage of the pub∣lique, but to serve the turn of their own facti∣on, which hath caus'd more disorder, then or∣der in the City. And to come to some parti∣cular example, I say, among other things which he that ordains a Republique should consider, is, that he well advise to what men he gives the power of life and death over his Ci∣tizens. This was well provided for in Rome; for by ordinary course they might appeal to the people: yet if there were any occasion of importance, where, to delay execution, by means of the appeal, was dangerous, they had the help of a Dictator, who had power immediatly to execute; which remedy they

never us'd, but upon necessity. But Florence and other Cities beginning as she did, that is servile, had this authority committed alwaies to a stranger, who was sent by the Prince, to this purpose. When afterwards they be∣came free, they continued this authority in a stranger, whom they called their Captain. Which thing, because he might easily be cor∣rupted by the potent Citizens, was very per∣nicious. But afterwards this order chagning upon the alteration of the states, they ordai∣ned eight Citizens, to supply the Captains place. Which order of evil became very evil, for the reasons we have otherwhere alleadged, that a few are alwaies servants of a few, and especially of the most wealthy: from which the City of Veuice is well guarded, which hath ten citizens, who have power to punish any Citizen without appeal: and because they would not be of sufficient force to punish those that are potent, though they have the authority they have ordained the Quarantie, or council of forty: and besides, they have taken care, that the council of the Pregai, which is the chiefer council, may punish them: so that, where there is no want of an accuser, they are never destitute of a Judge, to restrain the great mens insolency. There is then no marvail (see∣ing that in Rome order'd by it self, and by so many sage persons, there grew every day new occasions, whereupon new lawes were to be made in favor of the Common liberty) if in other Cities which have had their beginnings more disordered, there arise such difficulties that put them quite past all recovery.

CHAP. L.

The power of stopping the publique actions of the city, should not be given into the hands of one council, or one magistracy.

TItus Quincius Cincinnatus; and Cneus Iulius Mentus were Consuls together in Rome, who upon a quarrel arisen between them two, made a stay in all the actions belonging to the Republique: which the Senate seeing, per∣swaded them to create a Dictator, to the end that might be done, which, by reason of their discord, was hindred. But the Consuls disa∣greeing in every thing else, in this alone were of accord both of them, not to make a Dicta∣tor: so that the Senate finding no other help, desir'd assistance from the Tribuns, who with the Senates authority forc'd the Consuls to o∣bey. Where the profitable use of the Tribunate is in the first place remarkable, which serv'd to good purpose to bridle the great mens am∣bitions exercis'd not onely against the Common people, but also among themselves: in the next place, that it should never be so ordain'd in a city, that a few should resolve of those things that are the ordinary maintenance of a Common-wealth. For example, if thou givest the power to one Consul to make a distribution of honors and profits, or to a Magistrate to dispatch some busi∣ness to be done, it is fit to impose a necessity on him, that he do it in any case, or so provide that another might and should do it: otherwise the order would be defective, and perilous, as we see it was in Rome, unless they could have oppos'd the Consuls obstinacy with the Tribuns authori∣ty. In the Commonwealth of Venice the great council bestows both the honors and the profits.

It sometime chanc't, that the universality upon some disdaine conceiv'd, or by reason of some false suggestion did not make choice of any successours to the Magistrates of their Cities, nor to their Ministers of State abroad, which was a very great disorder; for all at once, their Townes and Cities wanted their lawfull Iudges; nor could any thing be obtained while the universality were appeased, or were no longer deceived. And this inconvenient would have brought those Cities to ill termes, had not some discreet Citizens otherwise taken order for them. Who having layd hold of a fit occasion, made a law, that all the Magistrates within or without the Citie should continue still in their offices, till new choice were made, and their successours appointed. And thus they tooke away from that counsell all opportunity of enabling them, with the Commonwealths danger, to stop the publique actions.

CHAP. LI.

A Commonwealth or Prince should make a shew to doe that of a free mind, which indeed meere necessitie compells them to doe.

WIse men gaine themselves alwayes the thanks of every thing in their actions, although in truth meere necessitie constraines them in any case to doe them. This discretion was well made use of by the Romane Senate, when they resolv'd to ad a dayly stipend out of the Common treasury to those that served in the warres; it being then of custome there to serve as their own proper charges. But the Senate

ceiving, that after that manner they could not long make warre; and hereupon neither could they besiege townes, nor lead their armies farre off; and judging it needfull they should doe the one and the other, they determined to allow the sayd stipends, which they did in such a way, that they got themselves thanks for that, to which they were bound by necessitie. And this present was so acceptable to the people, that all Rome seem'd overjoyd with it, they thinking it to be a great benefit, which they never had hopes of, nor of themselves had ever sought after. And though the Tribuns did their best to blot out these thanks, by shewing it was a matter of grievance and not of case to the people, seeing of necessitie they were to impose greater taxes on them, wherewith to pay these stipends, yet could they not prevayle so much, but that the people tooke it very thankfully. Which also the Senate augmented by the course they tooke in ordering of the tributes. For the greatest and heaviest were those they layd upon the Nobilitie, and so were those that were first payd.

CHAP. LII.

To stay the insolence of one that growes powerfull in a Commonwealth, there is no way more secure, and lesse offensive, than to seike before hand, and so prevent him of those wayes by which he attains to that power.

WEe see by the above written discourse, how great credit the Nobility got with the people, upon the demonstrations make for

their advantage, as well by the stipend appoin∣ed, as also by the course they tooke in imposing the taxes: in which way if the Nobilitie had continued, they had wholly avoyded all manner of tumult in that Citie, and they had taken from the Tribuns the credit they had with the people, and by consequence their authority. And truly it is not possible in a Commonwealth, especially in those that are corrupted, by any better way, lesse hurtfull, and more easy to oppose the ambition of any Citizen, than to prepossesse those wayes, by which a man perceives he takes his course, to attaine that dignitie hee aymes at. Which meanes if they had put in practise against Cosmus of Medici, his adversaries had gotten more by the bar∣gaine, than by chasing him from Florence: For if those Citizens that were at brabble with him had taken the course to favour the people, they had without any imbroyle or violence taken out of his hands those weapons which were to him of greatest advantage. Peter Soderini gain'd himself credit with this onely in the Citie of Florence, that he favou'd the universality. Which universality gave him the repute, to be a lover of the Cities libertie. And surely for those Citizens that envyed his greatnesse, it was much easier, and had bin a businesse of fairer carriage, of lesse danger and dammage to the Commonwealth, to lay hold before hand of those wayes by which he became great, than by offering to oppose him, lest that in ruining him, the whole remainder of the Common-wealth also should have fallen to ruine. For if they could have taken out of his hands the for∣ces whereby hee became strong, which they might easily have done, they could in all their

publique counsells and resolutions have oppos'd him without suspicion or regard. And if any man should reply, that if the Citizens that hated Peter committed an orrour in not prepossessing the wayes wherby he gain'd upon the people: Peter also came to com∣mit an errour in not laying hold beforehand of those wayes by which his adversaries fright∣ed him: I answer, that Peter deserves excuse, as well because it was hard for him to doe it, as because the meanes were not fit for him to use. For the wayes by which he was hurt, were to favour the house of Medici, by which favours they overmaster'd him, and at last ruin'd him. Yet Peter could not fairely take his part, because hee could not with any good repute destroy that libertie, over which hee was appoin∣ted as guardian; and seeing these favors could not passe in private, they were suddenly exceed∣ing dangerous to Peter: for what way soever it had bin that he had bin discover'd to be a friend of the Medici, he had fallen into the jealousie, and incurr'd the hatred of the people. Where∣upon his enemyes had had greater power to suppresse him, then formerly they had. There∣fore men ought in every resolution, consider the defects and dangers thereunto belonging, and not fasten on any one of them, when they carry with them more danger then profit, notwithstanding that they seeme well to tend to the end propounded: for being otherwise, in this case it would befall them, as it befell Tullius, who by going about to diminish Marc Antonius his power, increas'd it. For Marc Antonius being judged an enemy of the Senate, and he having got together a great army, good part whereof had followed Caesars faction,

Tullius to take these souldiers from him, perswa∣ded the Senate to set up the reputation of Octavianus, and seng him accompanied with the Consuls, and an armie against Marc Antonius; alleadging, that so soone as ere the souldiers that followed Marc Antonius should heare the name of Octavianus, Caesars nephew, and that would be call'd Caesar too, they would forsake the other, and follow this. So that Marc Antonius being dispossest of his advantages would easily be suppressed. Which fell out cleane con∣trary. For Marc Antonius got Octavianus to his part, who leaving 〈…〉〈…〉lius and the Senate joyned forces with him. Which thing proov'd wholly the ruine of those great mens party. Which also it was easy to have conjectur'd: nor was that credible which Tullius perswaded himselfe; but he should rather have made account, that neither that name that with so great glory had exterminated his enemies, and gain'd himself the principality in Rome, nor yet his heirs, or adherents, would ever suffer them quietly to injoy their libertie.

CHAP. LIII.

The people deceiv'd by a false shew of good often∣times seek their owne ruine; and that great hope and large promises doe easily move them.

WHen the ••yentes Citie was taken, the people of Rome were possess'd of an opinion, that it would be profitable for them to send halfe the Romans to dwell at Veyum: and because that Citie had a plentifull country about it, frequent with buildings, and neare neighbouring to Rome, halfe of the Romane Citizens might thereby be enrich't, without giving any disturbance to the civill government

by reason of their neare scituation. Which thing the Senate and the graver Romans thought so unprofitable or rather so hurtfull, that they freely profess'd, they would rather suffer death, then agree to any such matter: so that the businesse coming to dispute, did so iorage the people against the Senate, that they had come to blowes and to bloud, had not some of the graver and reverenter Citizens oppos'd themselves against their furie; whose regard bridled the people so, that they pro∣ceeded not in their insolencie. Here two things are to be noted, the first, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 people many times deceived by an imaginary good, cover their owne ruine; and unlesse they be given to understand, which is the evill, and which the good, by some man they trust, the Republiques ordinarily run much hazzard. And when it so falls out, that the people hath no great con∣fidence in any one, as sometimes it comes to passe, having bin of late deceived either by things, or men, of necessitie they goe to ruine. And Dante, to this purpose, sayes, in his discourse of a Monarchie:

A populo molte volte grida, Viva la sua morte amocoia lavita The vulgar oftimes their own ruine chuse And life for death ignorantly refuse.

From this increduliti〈…〉〈…〉ises, that some∣times in Commonwealths good courses are not taken, as formerly it was sayd touching the Venetians, when being set upon by so many enemyes, they could not resolve till they were quite ruin'd, to gain any of them againe, by re∣stitution of what they had wrongfully taken Whereupon warre was made against them, and a conspiracie of the Princes. Wherefore

when we consider here, that which is easy, and that which is hard to perswade a people to, this distinction is to be made. Either, that which thou art to perswade them to, represents at the first view gaine or losse; or is a course that car∣ryes somwhat in it of courage or cowardise, And when in things that are propounded to the people, there appears advantage, though cover ly therebe disadvantage in it; and when it seemes couragious, though underneath there be covertly hid the destruction of the Republi∣que, it will alwayes be very easy to draw the multitude thereto. And so likewise it will bee alwayes very difficult to perswade them to those courses, where there appears either cow∣ardise or losse, though when it is better weigh'd and advis'd upon, therin is contein'd both safety and advantage. And what I have said is con∣firmed with very many examples of the Ro∣mans, as also with those from abroad, both moderne and ancient. For from hence grew the evill opinion which was rais'd in Rome of Fab Max. who could not perswade the people of Rome, that it was profitable for that com∣monwealth to proceed slowly in that war, & to susteine and beare up against Hanniballs violence without fighting: for the people deem'd it a base course, nor had they judgement to dis∣cerne the advantage there was to be gotten by it: nor had Fab. reasons sufficient to make it plaine by demonstrations: & ordinarily the peo∣ple are so much blinded in these opinions of courage, that though they of Rome had com∣mitted that error to give power to him that was Commander of the horse under Fab. to fight with Hannib. whether F. would or no, & that by reason thereof the Roman army had like to

have bin broken, if F. had not succourd it, yet this experience serv'd them not, but that they afterwards made Varro C. not for any other worth of his, but because in al meetings & publi{que} places of Rome, he had bragg'd he would dis∣comfit Han. whensoever he had power given him to do it: whence came the battell & discomfiture at Cannae, & near upon the ruine of Rome. I will alleadge one other Ro. example. Hanniball had bin in Italy 8. or 10. yeares, & had fill'd the whole country full of bloudy slaughters of the Romans, when there came into the Senate one M. Centenius Penula, a very base fellow, yet he had had some place of charge in the armie; And offer'd, that if they would give him authoritie to leavy an armie of voluntaries, in what place so∣ever it were in Italie, hee would in a short time deliver into their hands Hanniball, either priso∣ner or dead. The Senate thought his demand very rash, yet they considering that if it were denied him, and afterwards his motion were made knowne to the people, that some trouble might arise thereupon, and so the evill will and envy thereof light upon the Senate, they yielded to him, being content rather to suffer the hazzard of all those that went out with him, then to give any occasion of raising new dis∣contents among the people, considering how likely this course was to be acceptable, and how hard to be disswaded. He went then with this inordinate and rude multitude to seek out Hanniball, with whom he no sooner met, but he and all his troops were either slaine or routed. In Greece in the city of Athens, Nicias a very grave and discreet man, could never perswade the people that it was not for their good to go and undertake an expedition against Sicily, so

that they having resolved thereupon, contrary to the wise mens likeings, there ensued the whole ruine of Athens. Scipio when he was made Consull, and that he desir'd the pro∣vince of Affricke, promising the utter ruine of Carthage, whereunto the Senate not agreeing by the advice of Fabius Maximus, threatened to propound it to the people, as he that well knew how such like resolutions pleas'd them. We could also to this purpose lay downe some ex∣amples of our owne city, as was that of Hercules Betivogli, commander for the Florentines, to∣gether with Antoni Giacomini; after they had routed Bartolomeus Alvianus at Saint Vincenti, they went to incampe before Pisa, which enterprise was resolv'd on by the people upon the brave promises Hercules made them; though many discreet citizens did no way like of it, yet they could not hinder it, thrust on by the generall desire, which was grounded on the commanders large promises. I say therefore, that there is not an easier way to inlarge a Commonwealth, where the people hath the authority, then to put them into brave undertakings. For where the people is of any worth or valour, those will be alwayes well lik'd of, and if any man be of different opinion, he shall not be of force to perswade it. But if hereupon comes the destruction of the city, thence proceeds also, and most ordinarily the particular ruine of those citizens who are made the commanders of such like under∣takings; for the people having presupposed the victory, when they go by the losse, never impute it to their General's evill fortune or want of sufficient forces, but blame him rather of treason or ignorance, and so either

put him to death, imprison or confine him, as it befell very many Carthaginian Captains, and Athenians. Nor shall any of the former victo∣ries gloriously gotten, afterwards shelter them, for the present mishap cancels the records of all good past: as it befell Antoni Giacomini our countrey man here, who not having overcome the Pisans, as the people presupposed, and he had promised, fell into such disgrace with the people, that for all his many good services past, he lived rather by the courtesy of those that having power with the people, protected him, then by any assurance else was given him.

CHAP. LIV.

What authority the presence of great and worthy personages hath to appease and quiet the rage of a multitude.

THe second thing remarkable upon the text alleadged in the former Chapter is, that nothing so readily restrains the fury of a multi∣tude inraged, as the reverence of some grave man comming among them, as Virgil sayes to the same purpose, and not without reason.

Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem Conspexere, silent, ar∣rectisque auribus a∣stant. * 1.19

And therefore that man of worth and me∣rit, that either hath the command of an army,

or that abides in a city where a tumult arises, ought represent himself upon the occasion, with the greatest grace, and in as honorable termes as may be, cladding himself with the ornaments belonging to his degree and quality, to gain him the more reverence. A few years agoe, Florence was divided into two factions, of the Frateschi and Arrabiati, for so they were called: and comming to blowes, the Frateschi were over∣come, among whom was Paul Antonius Sodo∣rini, a citizen of great esteem in those dayes: and the people in the time of those tumults go∣ing in armes to sack his house, Franciscus his brother then Bishop of Ʋalterra, and now Cardinal, was by chance in his house, who pre∣sently having perceived the stir, and seen the multitude comming, clad himself with his most honorable vestments and thereupon his episco∣pal rochet, and so met these armed people, where by the awfulness of his person and good words he staid them: Which thing throughout the City for many dayes was much noted and celebrated. I conclude then that there is not a more setled nor more necessary remedy to stop the fury of a multitude, then the presence of such a man, who in his aspect and worth brings an awful reverence with him. And thereupon we see (to return to the text formerly allead∣ged) with what obstinacy the Commons of Rome accepted the party, to go to Veium, thinking it advantagious to them, but never considering the mischief therein involved; and how being there arose divers tumults upon the occasion, there would have bin harme done, had not the Senate accompanied with many grave and reverent personages restrained their fury.

CHAP. LV.

How easily things are ordered in a city where the people is not corrupted: and that where a parity is there is no place for a Principallity; and where that is not, a Republique cannot be.

ALthough that heretofore we have suffici∣ently treated, what is to be feared and what to be hoped for of Cities that are cor∣rupted: yet methinks it is not out of purpose to consider a resolution the Senate took, touch∣ing the vow Camillus made, to give the tenth part of the prey they took from the Ʋeientes, to Apollo. Which prey being fallen into the peoples hands, seeing they could no otherwise ever see any account of it, the Senate made an edict, that every one should publiquely pro∣duce the tenth part of what he had gotten in the spoil of Ʋeium. And though this resolution took not place, the Senate having afterwards found out another expedient, and by other means given satisfaction to Apollo for the peo∣ple, yet we perceive by these determinations, how much the Senate trusted in the peoples goodness and how they judg'd, that there was not one of them but wou'd punctually bring forth what he was commanded by the edict. And on the other side, how the people thought not in any part to deceive the edict, by giving less then was due, but rather to free themselves therefrom, by shewing their open distaste at

such course taken. This example with many others, above alleadged, give very good evi∣dence of the great goodness and religion was in that people, and what might be hop'd for of them. And truly where this goodness is not, little can be hop'd for: as we can hope for no∣thing in those countreys, which in these daies we see corrupted, as in Italy above others, so France and Spain retain a part of the same cor∣ruption: and if in those countreys we see not so great disorders as every day arise in Italy, it proceeds not so much from the peoples goodness (which is very much fail'd) as from that they are under one King who keeps them together in union, not onely by his vertue, but by the ordinary course of government in those Kingdomes, which is not yet quite perverted. This goodness is yet seen in Germany, and this kind of conscience is also of great force with those people, which is the occasion that many Republiques continue free, and do so strictly observe their own laws, that no forrain enemy abroad, nor ambitious man at home, dares offer to seize on them. And to proove this true, that in those countreys there remain still the marks of that ancient goodness, I will give ano∣ther example, like to that abovesaid of the Se∣nate and of the people of Rome. Those Repub∣liques use, when they chance to have need of any money they lay out for the common good, that the Magistrates, or the Consuls, having, authority, should taxe the inhabitants of the city one or two in the hundred, of that which every man is worth. And such a resolution be∣ing made according to the order of the town, every man comes besore thereceivers of that tax, and having first taken an oath to pay a

convenient sum, he throws into a chest, ap∣pointed to that purpose, what in his conscience he thinks he should pay. Of which payment there is no other witness, but he that payes. Whereby we may well guess at the great good and religion there is yet left among those men. And we may well think, that every one payes the due sum; for if it were not paid, the im∣position would not yeeld that quantity, as those of old time were wont to do: which fai∣ling, the deceipt would appear: whereupon they would seek some other means to leavy their moneys, then this. Which goodness is so much the more to be admir'd in these times, because it is very rare, or rather remains onely in this countrey. Which proceeds from two things, the one, because they have not had much commerce with their neighbors; for neither have these gone into their countreys, nor they come to visit these, because they have bin contented with those goods, to feed on those victuals, and to be clad with those wools, which the countrey affords; whereby is taken away the occasion of all conversation, and the beginning of all corruption. For so they could not learn the French, Spanish, or Italian man∣ners, which nations together corrupt the whole world. The other reason is, because those Re∣publiques where the common liberty is pre∣serv'd, and uncorrupted, do not permit that any citizen of theirs should live after the manner of a gentleman, but rather maintain among them an equality; and those that live in that countrey are cruel enemies to the Lords and Gentlemen. And if by chance they fall in∣to their hands, they put them to death, as the principal authors of corruption, and occa∣sions

of scandal. And to make plain this name of gentlemen what it is, I say, that those are call'd gentlemen, that live in idleness, yet deli∣ciously, of the profits of their estates, without having any care to cultivate their lands, or to take any other pains necessary to the mainte∣nance of mans life. These kind of men are very hurtfull in every Commonwealth, and countrey; but worse are they, that, besides the foresaid fortunes, hold strong Castles, and have vassals that obey them. With these two sorts of men the Kingdom of Naples abounds. the countrey about Rome, Romagna, and Lombardia. This is the cause, that in those countreys there hath never bin any Repub∣lique nor any civil government: for such kinds of men are enemies to all civil government. And if a man had a minde to bring into such countreys the forme of a Commonwealth, he would find it impossible; but to bring them un∣der some order, if any man had the power, he could take no other course, then reduce them to a Royalty. The reason is this, because where the matter is so extreamly corrupted, that the laws are not able to restrain it, it is needfull to ordain together with them a great∣er power, which is the authority of a King, who by his absolute and extraordinary power may be of force to bridle the excessive ambi∣tion and corruption of the mighty. This rea∣son is verified in the example of Tuscany: where we see that in a small space of countrey three Republiques have long consisted, Flo∣rence, Siena, and Lucca; and that the other cities of that countrey serve in such a kind, that they have their dispositions and their or∣ders much like them, and that they would wil∣lingly

maintain the common liberty, all this a∣rises from hence, because there are no lords of Castles in those countreys, and never a one, or very few Gentlemen; but such equality, that an understanding man that hath appli'd himself to the knowledg of the ancient civil governments, might easily reduce them to a free state. But their misfortune hath bin so great, that as yet they have not lit upon any man that had either the power or knowledg to put it in execution. This conclusion then I draw from hence, that he that strives to frame a Re∣publique where there are many gentlemen, cannot do it, unless he first dspatch them all out of the way: and he that would erect a Monarchy or a Principallity where there is much equality, shall never effect it, unless he drawes out of that equality many of ambiti∣ous and turbulent mindes, and makes them rather gentlemen in effect, then in title, en∣riching them with Castles, and possessions, al∣lowing them the favor of wealth and men, to the end that he being plac'd in the midst of them, by their means may maintain his power, and they by his favor preserve their ambition, and the rest be constrain'd to bear that yoke which force and nothing else can make them endure. And there being by this way a pro∣portion from him that forces, to him that is forced, thereby men continue setled every one in their order. And because to bring a countrey to be a Republique which is fit to be a King∣dom, and of one fit to be a Republique to make a Kingdome, is a subject worthy of a man of extraordinary judgment and authority; ma∣ny there have bin that have endeavor'd it, but few have bin able to go through with it: because

the weight and consequence thereof partly frights them, and partly so overbears them, that they fail in their first beginnings. I think the experience we have of the Republique of Venice will seem a little to contrary my o∣pinion, that where there are gentlemen, a Re∣publique cannot be instituted: for there none can partake of the dignities, unless they be gentlemen. The answer hereto is, that this ex∣ample makes no opposition against us; for the gentlemen in that Republique are rather in name, then in effect: for they have not great revenues out of possessions, and lands, but their great wealth is founded upon merchan∣dise, and moveable goods; and moreover none of them hold any Castles, or have any juris∣diction over men: but the name of gentleman among them is a name of honor and credit, not being grounded upon any of those things that caus'd those in other cities to be call'd gentlemen. And as other Republiques have all their divisions under several names, so Venice is divided into the Gentility, and the Commo∣nalty; and their order is, that those are capa∣ble of all honors, these not. Which is not any cause of imbroile among them, for the reasons we have other where said. Let a Common-wealth then be there ordain'd, where allthings are reduc'd to an equality; and contrariwise, let a Prince be made, where great inequality is; otherwise shall there be neither proportion nor continuance.

CHAP. LVI.

Before strange accidents and changes befall a City or a countrey, usually there are some prodigies which forerun them, or men that foretell them.

FRom whence this proceeds I know not, but it is evident as well by ancient as modern examples, that no very heavy accident ever befell any countrey or City, that hath not bin foretold either by some Diviners, or by some revelations, or prodigies, or signes from hea∣ven. And not to goe too far from home to fetch the proof hereof, every one knows how long be¦fore the coming of Charles the eighth of France into Italy was foretold by Fryer Jerome Savanarola: and how besides this, it was said throughout all Tuscany, that there were heard in the aire, and seen over Arrezzo, many men in armes skirmishing together. Moreover we all know here that before Laurens of Medici the old mans death the Duemo or principal Church was fir'd with lightning on the top, even to the ru∣ine thereof. Nor is any man here ignorant how a little before that Peter Soderini, who had bin made the Florentines chief Standard-bearer for life, was banish'd and depriv'd of his dig∣nities, the Palace was in the same manner burnt with lightning. A man might alleadge other examples beside these, but I leave them rather to avoyd tediousness. I shall relate that onely which Titus Livius speaks of, before the the Frenchmens coming to Rome, and that is, how one Marcus Ceditius a Plebeyan told the Senate, that he had heard at midnight, as

he past by the new way, a voyce greater than any mans, which warn'd him to tel the Magi∣strates that the Frenchmen were coming to Rome. The reason hereof I think fit to be discours'd upon, and treated of by some man well versed in the knowledge of natural and supernatural things, which I profess not. Yet it may be, as some Philosophers will have it, that the ayre being full of spirits, who by their natural knowledge foreseeing things to come take compassion upon men, and ad∣vertise them by such like signes, to the end they should prepare themselves for their defence. But however it is, we may find it true, that alwaies after such strange accidents, new and extraordinary chances befall countreys.

CHAP. LVII.

The Common people united are strong and vigorous, but taken apart and separated, vile and con∣temptible.

MAny Romans (the countrey all about be∣ing much ruined and wasted upon the Frenchmens passage to Rome) were gone to dwell at Veyum, contrary to the appointment and order of the Senate; who, to remedy this disorder, commanded by their publique edicts, that every one within a set time, under a certain penalty, should return to inhabite at Rome. At which edicts at first, they against whom they were directed, scoffed; but after∣wards, when the time drew near that they were to obey, they all yielded their obedi∣ence. And Titus Livius uses * 1.20 these words: Of fierce that

they were all in general, each one out of his par∣ticular fear became obedient. And truly the nature of a multitude in this parti∣cular cannot better be laid open, than here in this Text it is shewed: for the multitude is many times very insolent in their speeches a∣gainst their Princes decrees. Afterwards when they see their punishment near and certain, not trusting to one another, they hasten all to obe∣dience; so that it plainly appears, that a man ought to have regard to the good or ill dispo∣sition of the people towards him; if it be good, to take such order that it may still continue; if ill, to provide so that it cannot hurt him. This is meant for those ill dispositions which the people have bred in them upon any other oc∣casion, than for the loss of their liberty, or for the love of their Prince, who is yet living. For the evil humors that arise from these causes are terrible beyond measure, and have need of great remedies to restrain them. Their other indispositions will be easy, when they have not made choyce of any heads, to whom they may have their recourse: for on oneside, there is not a more dreadfull thing, than a dissolute multitude, and without a head: and on the other side, there is nothing weaker then it; for though they have their weapons in their hands, yet will it be easy to reduce them, provided that thou canst avoyd the first shock of their furie: for when their rage is a little appeas'd and every one considers that he is to return again to his home, they begin then a little to doubt of themselves, and to take a care for their safety, either by flight or agreement. Therefore a multitude up in armes, desiring to escape these dangers, is to make ehoyce of

a head out of themselves who may direct them, keep them united, and provide for their de∣fence, as did the common people of Rome, when after the death of Verginia, they depar∣ted from Rome, and for their own preserva∣tions, they chose 20 Tribuns from among themselves: which if they do not, there all∣waies befalls them that which Titus Livius saies in his above written discourse, that joyntly together they are of strength and vigor; but when each one afterwards begins to advise of his own danger, they become weak and con∣temptible.

CHAP. LVIII.

The multitude is more wise and constant, then a Prince.

THat nothing is more vain or inconstant than the multitude, as well our Author Titus Livius, as all other Historians do affirm: for we find it often in the relations of mens actions, that the multitude hath condemned some man to death, whom afterwards they have grieved for and exceedingly wish'd for a∣gain: as we see the people of Rome did for Manlius Capitolinus, whom after they had condemn'd to death, they much desir'd a∣gain. And these are the words of the Au∣thor. The people, after that by * 1.21 his death they perceiv'd them∣selves free from danger, wished him alive again. And in another place, when he shewes the accidents that followed in 〈…〉〈…〉∣cusa after the death of Hieronymus, Hie〈…〉〈…〉

nephew, he sayes, This is the * 1.22 nature of the multitude, that they are either slavish in their obedience, or insolent in their auihority. I know not, whether herein I undertake not too hard a task, so full of difficulties, that I must either give it over with shame, or continue it with blame, having a desire to defend that, which, as I have said, is accused by all writers. But however it be, I do not judge it, nor ever will, a defect to defend some opinions with their reasons, without any intention to use either authority or force. Therefore I say, that of that defect whereof those writers accuse the multitude, all men in particular are guilty, and especially Princes: for every one that is not regulated by the lawes would commit the same errors which the loose multitude does. And this we may easily know, for there are and have bin many evil Princes; and vertuous and discreet ones but a few. I speak of Prin∣ces, that have bin able to break the bridle that could check them; among whom we reckon not those that were in Egypt, when in that very ancientest antiquity that countrey was go∣verned by the lawes; nor those of Spavta, nor those that in our daies are in France, which Kingdom is order'd more by the laws, than any other which in these times we have knowlege of. And these Kings which grow up under such constitutions are not to be accounted in that number, from whence we are to consider the nature of every man by himself, and discerne if he be like the multitude: for in parallell with them, we should set down a multitude in like manner regulated by the lawes, as they are, and therein shall be found the same goodness

that is in them: and we shall see they neither insolently domineere, nor slavishly serve, as the people of Rome, which whilest the Re∣publique continued uncorrupted, never serv'd basely, nor rul'd proudly, but with their own customes, and Magistrates held their own de∣gree honorably. And when it was necessary to rise up against one that were powerfull, they did it, as it appear'd in the example of Man∣lius, and in that of the ten, and others, who went about to oppress them. And when it was requisite they should obey the Dictators, and the Consuls, for the common safety, they did it likewise: and if the people of Rome desired again Manlius Capitolinus being dead, it is no marvail; for they desired his vertues, which had bin such, that the remembrance of them mov'd every one to compassion, and might be of force likewise to work the same effect in a Prince: for it is the opinion of all writers, that vertue is commended even in ones ene∣mies. And if Manlius, in the midst of that great desire had bin reviv'd, the people of Rome would have given the same judgement upon him that they had done when they drew him out of prison, and condemn'd him to death. In like manner we see there were some Princes esteem'd wise too, that have put some men to death, whom afterwards they have much desired again; as Alexander did Clitus, and others of his friends, and Herod Mari∣amme. But that which our Historian speaks touching the nature of the multitude, belongs not to that which is regulated by the lawes, as was that of the Romans, but to that which is loose, as was that of the Syracusians, which committed those errors that men inraged and

dissolute fall into, as did Alexander the Great, and Herod, in the cases aforesaid. There∣fore the nature of the multitude is not more blame-worthy, than that of Princes: for all equally do erre, when all without respect have power to erre. Whereof, besides this I have alleadged, there are examples enough, as well among the Roman Emperors, as other Kings and Princes, where we may see such unconstancy and variation of life, as never was yet seen in any multitude. I con∣clude then, beyond the common opinion, which sayes, that the people when they have the Principallity in their hands, are various, mutable, unthankfull, affirming that these faul••s are no otherwise in them, than they are in particular Princes. And if a man blamed both peoples and Princes together, he might say true; but exempting Princes, he is deceiv'd. For a people that rules, and is well in order, will be constant, prudent and gratefull, as well as a Prince, or better, though esteem'd wise. And on the other side, a Prince loosen'd from the law will be unthankfull, various, and im∣prudent, more than the people: and the diversitie of their proceeding arises not from the diversity of their dispositions (because in all of them it is much after one manner, and if there be any advantage on either side, it is on the peoples part) but rather that the one hath more regard to the lawes under which they live, than the other. And he that considers the people of Rome, shall find that for four hundred years the name of a King was hatefull to them, and yet were they zealous for the glory, and common good of their countrey: and he shall see ma∣ny

examples among them that witness the one thing, and the other of them And if any man al∣leadge to mee the unthankfulnesse they used towards Scipio, I answer that which formerly at large was sayd in this matter, where it was made plaine, that people are lesse ungratefull than Princes. But as touching wisedome, and settled stayednesse, I say that a people is wiser and more stayd, and of more exact judgment than a Prince. And therefore not without cause the peoples voyce is likened to Gods voyce; for wee see that the universall opinions bring to passe rare effects in their presages, so that it seemes by their secret vertues they foresee their owne good or evill. And touching their judge∣ment in things, it is seldome seene, that when they heare two Oratours, pleading each of them a contrary part, when they are both of equall worth, but that they follow the better opinion, and are very capable of the truth they heare. And if in matters of courage, or in things that appeare profitable (as it was abovesayd) they erre, many times also does a Prince erre, drawne aside by his owne passions, which are greater in them then in the people. We see likewise in their choosing of Officers, they make a farre better choice then does a Prince. Nor will a people ever be perswaded to advance to dignity a man infamous and of a corrupt life, to which a Prince may easily and diverse wayes be brought. We see a people begin to hate some one thing, and continue many ages in the same opinion, which we see not it a Prince. And of the one and the other of these two things, the people of Rome shall serve me for witnesse, which in so many hundreds of yeares, in so many electio〈…〉〈…〉 of Consulls and Tribuns,

never made foure choices, whereof they had cause to repent them. And they hated so much (as I said) the name of a King, that no citizen of theirs could ever so farre oblige them, that if once he affected the Royalty, they would par∣don his due punishment. Moreover we see, that in those cities where the Principality is in the people, in a short time exceeding great in∣creases are made, and farre greater then those that have bin made under the government of a Prince, as Rome did after the banishment of her Kings, and Athens after she freed her selfe from Pisistratue; which proceeds from nothing else, but that the peoples governments are better then Princes. Nor will we agree to this, that all that our Historian sayes in the text before alleadged, or any where else, opposes this our opinion; for if we shall run over all the disorders of peoples, & the disorders of Princes, and all the glorious actions of people, as those also of Princes, we shall see the people farre surmount the Princes in vertue and in glory. And if Princes exceede the people in ordaining of Lawes, in framing a civill government, in making of statutes and new institutions, yet in the maintenance and preservation hereof the people go so farre beyond them, that they at∣taine to the glory of their founders. And in summe, to conclude this matter, I say, that as Princes states have lasted long, so likewise have those of Republiques; and the one and the other have had need to be regulated by the lawes: for a Prince that hath the power to doe what he list, commits divers follies; and a people that can do what they will, seldome give great proofes of their wisdome. If then the argu∣ment be touching a Prince and a people tied

and chained to their lawes, a man shall see more vertue in the People, then in the Prince: but if the reasoning be of the one and the other loose from the lawes, fewer errours will ap∣peare in the people then in the Prince; and those lesse, and which are capable of greater remedies: for a good man may easily have the meanes to perswade with a licentious and tu∣multuous people, and so reduce them to reason. But to a mischievous Prince no man can speake, nor is there any other remedy but the sword. * 1.23 Whereupon a man may guess at the im∣portance of one and the others evill: for if words are of Where he cut off the lappet of Sauls garment, and therefore was checkt by his owne con∣science. And that in the Psalm, 140. Touch not mine anointed, &c. Nor doe the heathen writers any thing give way hereunto; wherefore Tacitus sayes, Ferenda regum ingenia, neque usui crebras mutationes. Ann. 12. and Quomodo sterilitatem & caetera naturae mala, ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerate: Vitia erunt donec homi∣nes, sed neque haec continua, & meliorum in∣terventu pensantur. Hist. 4. I neede not alleadge others: The troubles that fell upon the Roman Empire when they began to murder their Princes, however bad, may argue their part: which was when Nero, Otho, Galba, Vitellius successively were slaine, Tacitus speaking of the story he writ

of it, sayes it was, Opus plenum magnis casi∣bus, arroxpraelijs, discors seditioni bus, ipsa etiam pace saevum, Hist. 1. For they are much deceived who promise themselves quiet by meanes of a Tyrants death: for as Iulius Caesar said, Kingdomes never change them without great combustions, and states suffer worser michiefes, by not enduring insolent princes. For howbeit both particulars, and the publique also smarts because of this disorder, yet the life of the Prince is the very soule and bond of the Republique: Rege incolumi mens omnibus una est, Amisso rapere fidem, sayes the Poet. This case hath bin argued by diverse at large, and the onely remedy is thus concluded on. The treacle of this venim is prayer and not vengeance: the people oppressed shal lift up their heart to God, as did the Israelites, when tyrannis'd over by Pharaoh; for the cruelties of bad Princes come not to passe by chance; and therefore is it necessary to have our recourse to God, who sometimes for chastise∣ment sometimes for try all permits them. force to cure the peoples evill, when as that of Kings requires the sword; there is no man that will not say, but that where the medicines mustbe stronger, the more dangerous are the evills. When a people is risen in tumult, the follies which they commit are not so perillous, nor is there such feare to be had of the present evill, as of that which may befall, it being pos∣sible some Tyrant may grow up in the midst of that confusion. But during the time of mis∣chievous Princes the contrary happens; for the greatest feare is of the present evill; and of the time to come there is hope, men easily perswading themselves, that his evill life may produce their liberty. So that a man may see

the difference between the one and the other; the desperate feare of the one, is, of the present state; of the other, of the state into which it may fall. The multitudes cruelties are exercis'd against those that they feare, lest they should seize upon the common good. The Princes against those that they feare, lest they should seeke to recover their owne againe. But the opinion against the people growes dayly, for every one may freely speake evill of the people without feare, even while they have the govern∣ment in their hands. A man speakes not evill of Princes, but with many fears and jealousies. Nor is it much out of purpose (seeing the matter drawes me to it) to argue in the Chapter follo∣wing, what Confederacies a man may best trust to, either those that be made with a Re∣publique, or that are made with a Prince.

CHAP. LIX.

What Confederation or league is rather to be trusted, either that which is made with a Re∣publique, or that is made with a Prince.

BEcause every day we have it, that one Prince with another, or one Republique with another make leagues, and joyne friendship together, and in like manner also confederacies are drawne and agreements made betweene a Republique and a Prince. I thinke to examine, which is the firmest league, whereof a man should make surest account of; either of that with a Republique, or the other with a Prince. And examining the whole, I beleeve that in many cases they are alike, and in some there is some difference: and therefore, that

accords made by force shall not be truly kept thee neither by Prince nor commonwealth. And I thinke that when feare comes upon them touching their state, as well the one as the other, rather then perish, will breake their faith with thee, and requite thee with unthankfulnesse. De∣metrius, he that was ever termed the taker of cities, had done exceeding much good to the Athenians; it chanc'd afterwards, that being routed by his enemies, and seeking refuge in Athens as in a city that was his friend, and much ingag'd to him, he was not admitted into it. Which griev'd him much more then the losse of his souldiers and army had done. Pompey when his army was routed by Caesar in Thessaly, fled into Egypt to Ptolomy, who formerly had bin restor'd by him into his kingdome, and was put to death by him. Which things we see had the same occasions: yet more humanity and lesse injury was us'd by the Republique, then by the Prince. Therefore where there is fear, a man shal finde in effect the same faith. And if there be any Commonwealth or Prince who to keepe their faith with thee, expect while they ruine, it may proceed also from the same occasion. And as for a Prince, it may well chance, that he is allied to some powerfull Prince, who though he then hath not the oppor∣tunity to defend him, yet may he well hope, that in time he may restore him into his state, or else that having taken side with him as partisan, he thinkes he cannot obtaine a faith∣full and fair accord with his enemy. Of this sort were those Princes of the Kingdome of Naples, that tooke part with the French. And for Republiques, of this sort was Saguntum in Spaine, which till it was ruin'd tooke part

with the Romans; and so was Florence for si∣ding with the French in the yeare one thousand five hundred and twelve. And I believe, having summ'd up every thing, that in these cases, where the danger is urgent, there is more assurance rather in the Republiques, then in the Princes: for though the Republiques were of the same minde and had the same intention as Princes had, yet for that they move but slowly, it will cause them to stay longer in resolving themselves, then a Prince will; and thereupon they will be longer a breaking their faith then he. Confederacies are broken for profit, Wherein Commonwealths are farre stricter in their observance of accords, then Princes. And we might bring many examples, where even for a very small gaine a Prince hath broken his faith; and where exceeding great advantages could not one whit move a Commonwealth, as was the party Themistocles propounded to the Athenians, to whom in an oration made them he said, that he could advise them so, that their country should gaine much advantage by it, but them he might not tell it, for feare of discovering it, for by the discovery the oppor∣tunity of doing it would be taken away. Whereupon the Athenians chose Aristides, to whom he should communicate this secret, and together with him consult upon it: whom The∣mistocles shew'd how the whole navall army of all Greece was in their hands under their pro∣tection, though intrusted them upon their faith, so that it was in their power by the ruine there∣of to make themselves Lords of all Greece. Whereupon Aristides told the people that Themistocles advice was exceeding profitable, but very dishonest. For which cause the people

wholly resus'd it, which Philip of Macedon would not have done, nor those other Princes who seeke their owne gaine rather, and have made more advantage by breaking their faith, than by any way else. Touching the breaking of agreements, upon the not observance of some particulars therein, I meane not to meddle with them, being ordinary matters; but I speak of those that breake upon extraordinary and maine points. Wherein, by what we have said, I beleeve the people are lesse faulty than the Princes, and therefore may better bee trusted than they.

CHAP. LX.

How the Consulship and every other Magistracie in Rome was given without respect of age.

IT appeares by order of the Story, that the Commonwealth of Rome, after that the Consulship came among the people, bestowed it upon their Citizens, without regard of yeares or bloud: and indeed they never had respect to age, but altogether aimed at vertue, whether it were in young, or old. Which wee perceive by the testimonie of Valerius Corvinus, who at 23. yeares of age was made Consul. And the same Valerius, speaking to his souldiers, sayd, That the Consulship was the reward of vertuc, and not of bloud. Which thing, * 1.24 whether it were advisedly sayd or no, might require much dispute. And touch∣ing bloud, this was yeelded to upon necessitie, and this necessitie that was in Rome might be in every Citie that would doe the same things Rome did, as otherwhere is sayd: for toyle,

and labour cannot be imposed on men without reward; nor can their hopes of obtaining re∣ward bee taken from them, without danger. And therefore it was fit timely to give them hope of the Consulship, and by this hope were they a while fed without having it; at length that hope served not, but there was a necessity to come to performance with them. But the Citie that imployes not their people in any glorious action may treate the mafter their owne manner, as other where it was argued. But that which will take the same course Rome tooke, must make this distinction. And grant that it be so, for that of time there is no reply: nay rather it is necessary; for in the choosing of a young man into a degree which hath need of the discretion of an old man, it is likely (the people being to make the choyce) that some very worthy and noble action of his preferres him thereto. And when a young man becomes endowed with such vertues that hee hath made himself famous by his heroicke actions, it were a very great wrong, that that Citie might not serve her selfe of him then, but should be put off to expect, till that vigour and quicknesse of spirit were grown old and dull, whereof in that age his country might have made good use, as Rome did of Valerius Corvinus, of Scipio, and Pompey, and many others, that triumphed very young.

Notes

• * 1.1

  * Without question the end was ambition, Royalty admitting no companion. Of whom to free himself, it seems that Romulus stood not much upon how lawful meanes he used, for Cain-like he slew his brother, and con∣sented to Titus Tatius his death, without doubt, for venturing to take part in the Autho∣rity. And touching this, it may be Machiavel will speak truer neare the latter end of his 18. Chapt. Where hee saies, Because the restoring of a City to a civil and politick Govern∣ment presupposes a good man, and by vio∣lence to become a Prince of a Common-wealth presupposes an evil man, for this cause it shall very seldome come to pass, that a good man will ever strive to make himself Prince by mischievous waies, although his ends therein be all good; nor will a wicked man, by wicked meanes, at∣taining to be Prince do good, nor ever comes it into his heart to use that Authority well, which by evil meanes he came to. And so at the very end of the same 18. Chap. he concludes, that though the intent were not good, there might be a faire co∣lour set upon it by a good success. Where∣by our Polititian, how∣ever he windes and turns, comes at length to discover his evil ground he took, that Jus reg∣nandi gratia violan∣dum est; aliis in rebus pietatem colas, as is that of Euripides.
• * 1.2

  Vertues continue seldome by descent. And this to shew their spring, the government. And that his gifts best term'd, and by him sent.
• * 1.3

  * Ammiratus taxes him, saying, it was rather the opinion of a cunning and crafty man, then of one that had either any religi∣on or morality in him, whose plain and sim∣ple conditions ought to be free from all fraud and falshood; and however the Romans were deceiv'd herein, which cannot be de∣ny'd, yet without doubt they never did this, thinking to de∣ceive themselves, or with intention to de∣ceive others. Thus Ammi. And indeed it savours of Atheisme, bringing the mistress to serve the hand-maid, religion to serve policy; as if the seasons of the year ought to accommo∣date themselves to men, rather then men ac∣commodate themselves to the seasons; not con∣sidering that Religion propounds to a man a further end then policy points at. A Prince therefore should be well aware of such evill de∣vices, beleeving con∣stantly that the Re∣ligion hath no need of helpe from falshood, nor can gain any strength by lies.
• * 1.4

  Nondum haec quae nunc tenet seculum negligentia Deum venerat, nec inter∣pretando sibi quisque jus jurandum & leges apras faciebat.
• * 1.5

  Nec suls nec externis viribus jam stare potcrant, tamen bello non abstine∣bant adeo ne infeliciter quidem de fensae libertatis taedebat, & vinci quam non tentare victoriam malebant.
• * 1.6

  Non enim cristas vulnera facere, & picta atque aura∣ta scuta transire Romanum palum.
• * 1.7

  Qui e∣su••ien∣re im∣p〈…〉〈…〉 it b〈…〉〈…〉 & 〈…〉〈…〉∣vites 〈…〉〈…〉isit inanes.
• * 1.8

  Pro∣clivius est in∣juriae quod benefi∣cio vi∣cem exsol∣vere, quia gratia oneri, ultio quaestui habe∣tur.
• * 1.9

  Videat Consul ne Resp∣quid detri∣menti capiat.
• * 1.10

  Credebant e∣nim haud gratuitam in tanta super∣bia comite∣tem fore.
• * 1.11

  Illeverò impedi∣mentum pro oc∣casione arripuit.
• * 1.12

  Appius finem fecit ferendae alienae persc∣〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.13

  Et inde liber∣tatis captare auram, unde ser vitutem ti∣mendo in eum statum Remp. adduxerát. Vt ipsi taedio praesentium consules desi∣derarent.
• * 1.14

  Quibus donis ju∣ventus corrum pebatur, & male∣bat licentiam su∣am, quam om∣nium libertatem.
• * 1.15

  Crudelitatem damnatis, crude∣litatem initis.
• * 1.16

  Quod omnia ma∣la exempla bonis initiis orta sunt.
• * 1.17

  Quo∣rum co••i∣••orum eventus docuit, alios animos in contentione libertatis & honoris alios secundum deposita certamina incorrup to judicio esse.
• * 1.18

  Hanc modestiam equitatem{que} Realitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quae tunc populi universi fuit.
• * 1.19

  If then by chance some reverent man they spie, They all grow silent, and their ears ap〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.20

  Ex ferocibus universis singt, metu suo obedientes fuere.
• * 1.21

  Populus brevi, poste ••quam ab eo periculum 〈…〉〈…〉∣rat, desiderium 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.22

  Haec natura multitudinis est; aut humiliter servit aut superbe dominatur.
• * 1.23

  ☞ But this is such a re∣medy as hath no warrant from divine or humane lawes, especially when that a Tyrant is the true and law∣full Prince of the country, however that by his evill government and administration of the affaires he deservedly be term'd a Tyrant. That of David none is ignorant of, Sam. 1. 24. and 5.
• * 1.24

  Erat praemium virtutis, non sanguinis.