Machivael's [sic] discourses upon the first decade of T. Livius, translated out of the Italian. To which is added his Prince. With some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors. By E.D.

CHAP. LV.

How easily things are ordered in a city where the people is not corrupted: and that where a parity is there is no place for a Principallity; and where that is not, a Republique cannot be.

ALthough that heretofore we have suffici∣ently treated, what is to be feared and what to be hoped for of Cities that are cor∣rupted: yet methinks it is not out of purpose to consider a resolution the Senate took, touch∣ing the vow Camillus made, to give the tenth part of the prey they took from the Ʋeientes, to Apollo. Which prey being fallen into the peoples hands, seeing they could no otherwise ever see any account of it, the Senate made an edict, that every one should publiquely pro∣duce the tenth part of what he had gotten in the spoil of Ʋeium. And though this resolution took not place, the Senate having afterwards found out another expedient, and by other means given satisfaction to Apollo for the peo∣ple, yet we perceive by these determinations, how much the Senate trusted in the peoples goodness and how they judg'd, that there was not one of them but wou'd punctually bring forth what he was commanded by the edict. And on the other side, how the people thought not in any part to deceive the edict, by giving less then was due, but rather to free themselves therefrom, by shewing their open distaste at

such course taken. This example with many others, above alleadged, give very good evi∣dence of the great goodness and religion was in that people, and what might be hop'd for of them. And truly where this goodness is not, little can be hop'd for: as we can hope for no∣thing in those countreys, which in these daies we see corrupted, as in Italy above others, so France and Spain retain a part of the same cor∣ruption: and if in those countreys we see not so great disorders as every day arise in Italy, it proceeds not so much from the peoples goodness (which is very much fail'd) as from that they are under one King who keeps them together in union, not onely by his vertue, but by the ordinary course of government in those Kingdomes, which is not yet quite perverted. This goodness is yet seen in Germany, and this kind of conscience is also of great force with those people, which is the occasion that many Republiques continue free, and do so strictly observe their own laws, that no forrain enemy abroad, nor ambitious man at home, dares offer to seize on them. And to proove this true, that in those countreys there remain still the marks of that ancient goodness, I will give ano∣ther example, like to that abovesaid of the Se∣nate and of the people of Rome. Those Repub∣liques use, when they chance to have need of any money they lay out for the common good, that the Magistrates, or the Consuls, having, authority, should taxe the inhabitants of the city one or two in the hundred, of that which every man is worth. And such a resolution be∣ing made according to the order of the town, every man comes besore thereceivers of that tax, and having first taken an oath to pay a

convenient sum, he throws into a chest, ap∣pointed to that purpose, what in his conscience he thinks he should pay. Of which payment there is no other witness, but he that payes. Whereby we may well guess at the great good and religion there is yet left among those men. And we may well think, that every one payes the due sum; for if it were not paid, the im∣position would not yeeld that quantity, as those of old time were wont to do: which fai∣ling, the deceipt would appear: whereupon they would seek some other means to leavy their moneys, then this. Which goodness is so much the more to be admir'd in these times, because it is very rare, or rather remains onely in this countrey. Which proceeds from two things, the one, because they have not had much commerce with their neighbors; for neither have these gone into their countreys, nor they come to visit these, because they have bin contented with those goods, to feed on those victuals, and to be clad with those wools, which the countrey affords; whereby is taken away the occasion of all conversation, and the beginning of all corruption. For so they could not learn the French, Spanish, or Italian man∣ners, which nations together corrupt the whole world. The other reason is, because those Re∣publiques where the common liberty is pre∣serv'd, and uncorrupted, do not permit that any citizen of theirs should live after the manner of a gentleman, but rather maintain among them an equality; and those that live in that countrey are cruel enemies to the Lords and Gentlemen. And if by chance they fall in∣to their hands, they put them to death, as the principal authors of corruption, and occa∣sions

of scandal. And to make plain this name of gentlemen what it is, I say, that those are call'd gentlemen, that live in idleness, yet deli∣ciously, of the profits of their estates, without having any care to cultivate their lands, or to take any other pains necessary to the mainte∣nance of mans life. These kind of men are very hurtfull in every Commonwealth, and countrey; but worse are they, that, besides the foresaid fortunes, hold strong Castles, and have vassals that obey them. With these two sorts of men the Kingdom of Naples abounds. the countrey about Rome, Romagna, and Lombardia. This is the cause, that in those countreys there hath never bin any Repub∣lique nor any civil government: for such kinds of men are enemies to all civil government. And if a man had a minde to bring into such countreys the forme of a Commonwealth, he would find it impossible; but to bring them un∣der some order, if any man had the power, he could take no other course, then reduce them to a Royalty. The reason is this, because where the matter is so extreamly corrupted, that the laws are not able to restrain it, it is needfull to ordain together with them a great∣er power, which is the authority of a King, who by his absolute and extraordinary power may be of force to bridle the excessive ambi∣tion and corruption of the mighty. This rea∣son is verified in the example of Tuscany: where we see that in a small space of countrey three Republiques have long consisted, Flo∣rence, Siena, and Lucca; and that the other cities of that countrey serve in such a kind, that they have their dispositions and their or∣ders much like them, and that they would wil∣lingly

maintain the common liberty, all this a∣rises from hence, because there are no lords of Castles in those countreys, and never a one, or very few Gentlemen; but such equality, that an understanding man that hath appli'd himself to the knowledg of the ancient civil governments, might easily reduce them to a free state. But their misfortune hath bin so great, that as yet they have not lit upon any man that had either the power or knowledg to put it in execution. This conclusion then I draw from hence, that he that strives to frame a Re∣publique where there are many gentlemen, cannot do it, unless he first dspatch them all out of the way: and he that would erect a Monarchy or a Principallity where there is much equality, shall never effect it, unless he drawes out of that equality many of ambiti∣ous and turbulent mindes, and makes them rather gentlemen in effect, then in title, en∣riching them with Castles, and possessions, al∣lowing them the favor of wealth and men, to the end that he being plac'd in the midst of them, by their means may maintain his power, and they by his favor preserve their ambition, and the rest be constrain'd to bear that yoke which force and nothing else can make them endure. And there being by this way a pro∣portion from him that forces, to him that is forced, thereby men continue setled every one in their order. And because to bring a countrey to be a Republique which is fit to be a King∣dom, and of one fit to be a Republique to make a Kingdome, is a subject worthy of a man of extraordinary judgment and authority; ma∣ny there have bin that have endeavor'd it, but few have bin able to go through with it: because

the weight and consequence thereof partly frights them, and partly so overbears them, that they fail in their first beginnings. I think the experience we have of the Republique of Venice will seem a little to contrary my o∣pinion, that where there are gentlemen, a Re∣publique cannot be instituted: for there none can partake of the dignities, unless they be gentlemen. The answer hereto is, that this ex∣ample makes no opposition against us; for the gentlemen in that Republique are rather in name, then in effect: for they have not great revenues out of possessions, and lands, but their great wealth is founded upon merchan∣dise, and moveable goods; and moreover none of them hold any Castles, or have any juris∣diction over men: but the name of gentleman among them is a name of honor and credit, not being grounded upon any of those things that caus'd those in other cities to be call'd gentlemen. And as other Republiques have all their divisions under several names, so Venice is divided into the Gentility, and the Commo∣nalty; and their order is, that those are capa∣ble of all honors, these not. Which is not any cause of imbroile among them, for the reasons we have other where said. Let a Common-wealth then be there ordain'd, where allthings are reduc'd to an equality; and contrariwise, let a Prince be made, where great inequality is; otherwise shall there be neither proportion nor continuance.