The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

THE SEVENTH BOOK. (Book 7)

CHAP. I.

How Towns, or Castles are to be fortified.

Fabr.

YOU must understand that Towns and Castles are strong two ways, by Nature or by Art. They are strong by Nature which are encompassed by Rivers or Fens, (as Mantua, and Ferrara) or seated upon some Rock, or craggy Mountain (as Monaco, and Sanleo) for other places seated upon Mountains, if not difficult of access, are in our days rather weaker than otherwise, in respect of our Artillery and Mines: and therefore at present being to build a City, or erect a Fort that may be strong, we choose to do it in a Plain, and fortifie it artificially with Ramparts and Bastions, and our first care is to make the Walls crooked and retort, with several Vaults and places of receipt, that if the Enemy attempts to approach, he may be opposed and repulsed as well in the flank as the front: If your Walls be made too high, they are too obnoxious to the Cannon; if they be too low, they are easily scaled; if you make a Ditch before the VVall, to make the Scalado more difficult, the Enemy fills it up (which with a great Army is no hard matter) and makes himself Master immediately. My opinion therefore is this, (but with submission to better judgments) that to provide against both inconveniencies the best way will be to make your VVall high, and a Ditch on the inside rather than without; and this is the strongest way that you can build, because it keeps you both from their Artillery and assaults, and gives the Enemy no capacity of filling up the Ditch. Your VVall then is to be of the best height you can contrive; three yards thick at the least to resist their Batteries; it is to have Towers and Bulwarks at the distance of every 200 yards. The Ditch within is to be thirty yards broad at least, and twelve in depth; and all the earth which is taken out of the Ditch is to be thrown towards the

Town, against a Wall which is to be brought for that purpose from the bottom of the Ditch, and carried up a man's height above the ground, which will make the Ditch more deep and secure. Towards the bottom of the Ditch every two hundred yards, I would have a Casemat from whence the Artillery may scour, and play upon any body that shall descend. The great Guns which are used for the defence of a Town, are to be planted behind the Wall on the inside of the Ditch; for to defend the first wall, Falcons and such small Pieces are easier managed, and do as good Execution. If the Enemy comes to scale you, the height of the first Wall defends you easily: If he comes with his Artillery, he must batter down the first Wall, and when he has done that, it being Natural in all Batte∣ries for the Wall and rubbish to fall outward, there being no Ditch without to swallow and receive it, the ruines of the Wall will encrease the Depth of the Ditch, in such manner as that you cannot get forward, being obstructed by the Ruines, hindred by the Ditch, and interrupted by the Enemies great Guns within the Walls that do great slaughter upon you. The only remedy in this case is to fill up the Ditch, which is very hard in respect of its di∣mensions, and the danger in coming to it, the Wall being crooked, and Vaulted, and full of Angles, among which there is no coming without manifest hazard, for the reasons above∣said; and to think to march with Faggots over the ruines, and to fill it up that way is a chimerical thing; so that I conclude a City so fortified is not to be taken.

Battista.

If one should make a Ditch without, besides that within the Wall, would not your Town be the stronger?

Fabr.

Yes, without doubt; but my meaning is, if one Ditch only be to be made, it is better within than without.

Battista.

Would you have Water in your Ditch, or would you rather have it dry?

Fabr.

Opinions are divided in that point; for Ditches with water are more secure against Mines, and Ditches without are harder to be filled up: But upon consideration of the whole, I would have them without water, because they are more secure; for it has been seen, that the freezing of the Ditch in the Winter has been the taking of many a Town, as it hapned at Mirandola when Pope Iulius besieged it: And to prevent Mines, I would carry my Ditch so low, that whoever would think to work under it, should come to the water. Castles I would build (as to my Ditches and Walls) in the same manner, that they might have as much trouble who stormed them. But let me give one caution to any man who defends a City, and it is this, that he makes no redoubts without, at any distance from the Wall, and another to him that builds and fortifies a Castle, and that is, that he makes no works within for retreats in case the first Wall be taken.

The reason that makes me give this Counsel is, because no man ought to do that which may lessen his reputation at first; for the dimunition of that makes all his other orders contemptible, and discourages those who have undertaken his defence. And this that I say will always happen when you make Bastions without, and oblige your self to defend them, they will certainly be lost, for such small things being now adays to contend with the fury of Artillery, 'tis impossible they should hold out, and the loss of them being a lessening to your reputation, the lessening of your reputation will be the loss of the place. When Genoa rebelled against Lewis King of France, he caused certain Bastions to be erected upon the Hills which were about the Walls, which Bastions were no sooner lost (and they were lost presently) but the City was taken.

As to my second advice, I do affirm that there is nothing so pernicious to a Castle as to have those works of retreat; for the hopes that men have of preserving themselves by deserting their Posts, makes them abandon them often, and the loss of their Posts, is afterwards the loss of the Fort. We have a fresh example of this in the taking of the Castle at Furli, when the Countess Catharina defended it against Caesar Borgia, the Son of Alexander VI. who had brought the French Army before it. This Castle was full of those retreats; for first there was a Citadel, then a Fortress, and betwixt both a good Ditch with a draw bridge. The Castle within was divided into three parts, and each part strongly separated from the other with Ditches and Water, and Draw-bridges by which they com∣municated. As soon as the Duke had made his approaches, he with his great Guns bat∣tered one part of the Castle, and laid open a good part of the Wall; whereupon Giovanni da Casale who had the command of that quarter, never stood to make good the breach, but left it to retire into another part, so that the Enemy having entred the first quarter with little difficulty, it was not long before they made themselves Masters of all, by securing the Draw-bridges (in the hurry) which conveyed them one to another: This Castle therefore which was thought inexpugnable was lost by two faults; one was for having so many Re∣doubts, the other was because none of them commanded the Bridges; the ill contrivance therefore of the Fortress, and the imprudence of him that defended it, was a shame

and disappointment of the magnanimous enterprize of the Countess, who had the courage to expect an Army which neither the King of Naples, nor the Duke of Milan had the confidence to attend. Yet though she miscarried in her designs, she reaped the honour which her magnanimity deserved, as appeared by many Epigrams composed in those times in her praise. If then I were to erect a Fort, I would do it with as strong Walls, and with as good Ditches as I have prescribed; and within it, I would build only houses for habitation, and those low and weak, and such as should not hinder the prospect of all the Walls, from those who were in the Piazza; that the Commander might have the advan∣tage to discern with his eye from the main guard, whither he was to direct his supplies, and that every man might understand when the Wall and the Ditch was lost, the Castle was not to be kept. And when I made any redoubts and retrenchments within, I would do it in such manner that they should each of them command the Bridges which should be rais'd upon Pillars in the middle of the Ditch.

Battista.

You have said that small places are not to be defended in our days, and I sup∣pose I have heard quite contrary; that is to say, the lesser a place is, the better it is defensible.

Fabritio.

You were then misinformed, for no place can be now adays strong, where the defenders have not room for new Ramparts and Retrenchments to retire to; for such is the fury of the Artillery, that he who presumes upon the protection of one Wall or one Rampart, will find himself deceived. And because Bastions or Forts (provided they do not exceed their just measure, for in that case they will be rather Castles and Towns) are not made in such manner that there is space to retreat, they must presently be lost. It is wisdom therefore to place these Bastions without, and to fortifie within, especially the entries into the Towns, and to secure the Gates with Ravelins, so as that no body may come in or go out in a direct line, and that from the Ravelin to the Gate there may be a Ditch with a Draw-bridge. The Gates are to be fortified with Portcullisses, to receive their men back again into the Town when they have gone out to engage the Enemy, and when it happens that they are repulsed, and the Enemy pursues, that they may distinguish betwixt their own men and the Enemy, and prevent their entring Pell-mell amongst them. To this purpose Portcullisses (which the Ancients called Cateratte or Pigion-holes) were invented, which being let down excluded the Enemy, and preserved their Friends, whereas without them, neither Bridges nor Gates would be of any use, being possessed by the multitude.

Battista.

I have seen these Portcullisses of which you speak in Germany; and they were made of bars of wood in the fashion of Iron Gates, whereas ours are made of massy Raf∣ters or Girders all of a piece, now I would willingly be informed from whence this diffe∣rence proceeded, and which is most effectual.

Fabr.

I tell you again, that the ways, and customs and orders of War are laid aside all the world over, in respect of what was used among the Ancients, but in Italy they are ut∣terly forgot, and if there be any thing better than other, we have it from the Ultra∣montani, or Northern Nations. You may have heard, and perhaps some of these Gentle∣men may remember how weakly we fortified before the coming of Charles 8. into Italy, in the year 1494. The battlements of our Walls were made but half a yard thick; the Port-holes for our great Guns, and Musquets or small Shot were made narrow without, wide within, with many other defects which I shall forbear to mention, lest I should become tedious; for those thin battlements were quickly beaten down, and our Guns were as easily dismounted.

But now adays we have learn'd of the French to make our Battlements large and thick, and our Port-holes large within, close again in the middle, and wide again without; by which means our Artillery are not so easily dismounted, nor our Soldiers beaten from their Works. Besides these the French have several other good ways, which our Soldiers have not seen, and so have not so much as considered; and among the rest those open Portcullisses like grates is one, and they are much better than ours, for if to defend and fortifie your Gate, you have a close Portcullis, when you let it down to keep out the Enemy, you shut up your selves, and cannot afterwards do him any hurt, so that with Pick-axes, Hatchets, Petards, or Fire, he may do what he please without any interruption. But if your Portcullis be made Lettice-wise and transparent, when it is let down thorough the holes and inter∣vals you may defend it with your Pikes, small Shot, or any other kind of Arms.

Battista.

I have observed in Italy another Northern invention, and that is to make the wheels of your Carriages for your great Guns with spokes crooked or bending towards the Axel-tree, Now I would gladly know the reason of that way, because to me the straight spokes seem stronger.

Fabr.

Do not imagine that things which deviate from common use, are done by accident; or if you fancy they were made in that fashion for beauty, you are mistaken; for where force and strength is required, they never stand upon beauty; but the reason why they were changed, was because these kind of spokes are much more secure and strong; and the rea∣son they are stronger is this; when a Carriage is loaden, it is either equally poiz'd, or hang'd too much on one side. When it is equally poiz'd, the wheels bear equally, and the weight being equally distributed, does not burthen them much: But when it inclines to one side, the weight lies all upon one of the wheels: If the spokes be made straight, they are easily broken, for when ever the wheel bends, the spokes bend with it, as being unable to keep up the weight, so that when the weight is well poiz'd, or is otherwise but mode∣rate, your straight spokes are strong enough, but when your Carriage goes awry, and en∣clines to one side, they are too weak to support it. On the contrary, the spokes of your French Carriages that are made bending, are made so with great reason, for when a Car∣riage enclines to one side, the spokes on that side being made bending, will come to be straight, and will be able to sustain the whole weight better, than when it hangs equal, and (being crooked) bears but half. But to return to our Towns and our Castles. The French, besides what we have mentioned, have another way of securing their Gates, and for the sallying and retiring of their Soldiers during a Siege, than I have yet seen practised in Italy: and it is this, On the outward point of the Draw-bridge they set up two Pillars, and upon each of them they fasten a beam in such manner that one half of it hangs over the Bridge, and the other half without. Then that part which is without the Bridge, they joyn together with Cross bars like a grate, and to the end of each of the beams that hang over the Bridge, they fasten a chain: when therefore they would shut up the Bridge, so as no body should come in from without, they loosen the chains, and let down that part of it that is made with cross bars, which shuts up the Bridge; when they would open the Bridge, they draw the chains, and that part comes up again, and it is to be raised gradu∣ally, so as to receive a man on Foot, and no Horse, or a Horseman as they please, and it is raised or let down with unimaginable dexterity. This way is better than your Portcullisses, because they can hardly be hindred by the Enemy from being let down, not falling in a direct line as your Percullisses do, which are easily stop'd by putting any thing under them. They then who would make a Town strong, are to do it in the same manner as I have pre∣scribed.

Moreover they are to prohibit Cultivation or building within a Mile round; all should be a plain without any Hills, Houses, Banks or Trees to hinder the prospect of the besieged, or give any shelter to the Enemy in his approaches. And you must know that where the Ditch is without the Walls, and there are eminencies above the level of the Country, that Town is but weak; for those eminencies are blinds to the Enemy in their approaches, and when they are possess'd, they are convenient for their Batteries: But let us pass on and come into the Town.

CHAP. II.

What order is to be observed by him who shuts himself up in a Town, with resolution to defend it.

Fabr.

I Will not lose so much time as to shew you how convenient it is (besides what has been said before) to have your Stores of Ammunition and Victuals, because they are things that every body knows cannot be wanted, and without them all other Provisions are vain. Two things then are generally to be observed, you are to secure what you can possibly to your self, and to prevent the Enemy of any Commodity, especially in your own Precincts. Wherefore if there be any Straw, or Corn, or Cattle that you cannot carry off into the Town, you must be sure to destroy it. He who undertakes the defence of a Town is likewise to observe this order, not to suffer any thing to be done tumultuously and dis∣orderly, and to provide that upon every accident, every man may know what he is to do, and the way is by causing the Women, Children, old, lame and infirm to keep within their Houses, and leave the Town to be defended by those who are vigorous and strong, who being armed as is requisite, are to be distributed into all places, some upon the Walls, some at the Gates, some in the principal places of the City, to relieve their Companions upon any distress; another party there should be likewise, not obliged to any particular place, but always ready to succour where necessity is required; and things being thus ordered,

scarce any Sedition can happen to disorder you. Again, there is one thing I will recom∣mend to your memories, both in the besieging and defending of a Town: And that is, that there is nothing animates an Enemy so much, or gives him such hopes of carrying a Town, as when he knows his adversary has not been used to the sight of an Enemy; for many times fear only without any experiment of their strength, has caused a Town to be surrendred: He therefore who comes before a City so qualified is to make all the shows and ostentations of terror that he can; and on the other side, he who is assaulted, is to oppose men of resolution and courage, and such as are not to be terrified with shows, nor any thing but force and violence of Arms; for if the first brunt be sustained, the besieged are encouraged, and the besiegers will have no hopes left but in their reputation and valour.

The Ancients had several instruments of War with which they defended their Towns, as Rams, Scorpions, Bows, Slings, Clubs, &c. Again, they had several Engines which they used in their Leaguers, as Rams, Towers of wood, Vineae; They had also their Falx, their Pluteus, Testudo, and others; instead of which, we now make use of Artillery which is useful both for him that is besieged, as well as him that besieges. But to return.

CHAP. III.

Advertisements for such as are distressed for Provisions within a Town, and for such as besiege them, and would reduce them to that necessity.

Fabr.

HE who takes upon him the defence of a Town, is to see such provision made both of Victuals and Ammunition, that he may be in no danger of losing it, either by Starving or Storm. As to Starving (as is said before) it is necessary before the siege be laid, that you furnish your self well with Victuals; but because such provision cannot be made, but a long siege may exhaust it, you must betake to extraordinary ways, and look out for friends that may relieve you, especially if you have a River running thorow the Town. Thus the Romans did when their friends were besieged by Hanibal in the Castle of Catalino, for not being able to relieve them otherwise, they flung great quantities of Nuts into the River which were carried down by the stream in despight of the Enemy, and gave the Garrison very good relief. Some who have been besieged, to make their Enemy believe that they had plenty of Corn, and render them desperate of carrying them by starving, have thrown bread over their Walls; or else given Corn to some of their Cows, and suffered her afterwards to be taken by the Enemy, that when they kill'd her, they might find Corn in her paunch, and conclude that Corn was as plentiful in the Town as in the Camp. On the other side, wise Generals have used as much Art and Stratagem for the reduction of Towns: Fabius permitted the Campani to sow their ground, that presuming upon it, they might make no other provision, and he came afterwards and utterly destroyed it.

Dionysius having besieged Rhegium, pretended a Treaty, and whilst things were in transaction, he provided himself with Victuals with all possible diligence, but when he had effectually supplyed himself, he brake off the Treaty, block'd them up again, and constrained them to surrender.

Alexander the great being desirous to reduce Lucadia, he took, plundered, and de∣stroyed all the Castles about it, but gave the Garrisons safe Conduct to Lucadia, by which Policy he so throng'd them with men, that their numbers quickly distress'd them, and they were forced to surrender.

CHAP. IV.

Other Advertisements both for the Besiegers and the Besieged.

Fabr.

IN matters of assault, I say, the first thing to be provided against, is the Enemies first Effort; for by that way the Romans gain'd many a Town, assaulting it sud∣denly, and in all places at once, and this they called Aggredi urbem Corona, or to make a general assault, as Scipio did when he took new Carthage in Spain. But if the Besieged can stand the first shock, it gives him such courage, he will hardly be taken afterwards.

And if things should go so far, that a breach should be made, and the enemy enter; yet the Citizens have their remedy if they will stand to one another: for many Armies have been repelled and defeated after they have entered a Town. The remedy is this, that the Inhabitants make good the highest places of the City; and fire upon them from the win∣dows and tops of their houses. But against this the Assailers have made use of two inven∣tions, one was to open the Gates of the City, and give the Inhabitants opportunity to es∣cape; The other is, to make Proclamation, that whoever throws down his Arms, shall have quarter, and none put to the Sword but such as are taken in Arms; and this artifice has been the taking of many a Town. Moreover a Town is taken with more ease, when it is so suddenly attacked, as when an Army keeps at such a distance, as that the Town be∣lieves either you will not at all, or cannot attempt it before they shall have the alarm of your motion, because it is at present so far off. Wherefore if you can come upon them sud∣denly and secretly, not once in twenty times but you will succeed in your design.

I speak very unwillingly of the occurrences of our times, because it must be done with reflection upon me and my friends; and if I should discourse of other people, I should not know what to say. Nevertheless I cannot pass by the example of Caesar Borgia (called Duke Valentino) who being with his Army at Nocera, under pretence of making an in∣road into the Dutchy of Camerin, turned suddenly upon the State of Urbin, and master'd it without any trouble in one day, which another man would not have been able to have effected in a much longer time.

CHAP. V.

A man is not to depend upon the Countenance of the Enemy, but is rather to suspect what even he sees with his eyes.

Fabr.

THose who are besieged, are to be very careful of the tricks and surprizes of the Enemy, and therefore they are not to relye upon the countenance that he car∣ries, but are rather to suspect there is some fraud or deceit that will fall heavily upon them, if they suffer themselves to be deluded.

Domitius Calvinus besieging a Town, made it his custom every day to march round about the Walls with a good part of his Army; The Garrison fancying by degrees that it was only for his recreation, began to slacken their Guards, of which Domitius having notice, fell suddenly upon them, and carried the Town.

Other Generals have had intelligence of relief that was expected in the Town, and having habited a certain number of their Soldisrs, and disposed them under counter∣feit Ensigns, like those which the besieged expected, they were received into the Gates, and possessed themselves of the Town. Cimon an Athenian General having a design to surprize a Town, in the night set fire on a Temple that was without it, and the Inhabi∣tants flocking out to extinguish the fire, they fell into an Ambuscado, and lost their Town. Others having taken some of the Servants, and such people as came forth for forrage, put them to the Sword, and disguising their own Soldiers in their Cloths, have entred the Gates, and made themselves Masters of the Town.

CHAP. VI.

How to disfurnish a Garrison of its men, and to bring a terror upon a Town.

Fabr.

THe Ancients have (besides these) made use of several Stratagems and Artifi∣ces to unfurnish the Enemies Garrisons of their men: When Scipio was in Affrica, being desirous to possess himself of some of the Garrisons, which the Carthagi∣nians had in their custody, he made many offers to besiege them, but pretending fear, he not only drew off on a sudden, but marched away with his Army to a great distance. Hanibal supposing our apprehension real, to follow him with a greater force, drew out his Garrisons, which Scipio understanding sent Massinissa to surprize them, and he did it with success. Pyrrhus making War in Sclavonia; advanced against the chief Town in that Province, in the defence of which Town, several people having got together; he pretended

to despair of carrying it by force, and turning his Arms against other Towns which were not visibly so strong, he prospered so well in his design, that the said Town drawing out a good part of its Garrison in relief to their Neighbours, left it self so weak, as it became a prey to the Enemy. Many have corrupted and defiled the waters, and turned Rivers out of their Channels, to make themselves Masters of a Town, and have miscarried when they have done. It is a way likewise that contributes much to the taking of a Town to affright them with reports, as of some great Victory that you have obtained, some great supplies that you have received, and an obstinate resolution if they do not surrender quickly to put them all to the Sword.

CHAP. VII.

To corrupt a Garrison, and take it by Treachery.

Fabr.

SOme Generals of old have endeavoured to take Towns by treachery, by corrup∣ting some of the Garrison, and they have done it several ways: Some have sent of their own men as fugitives into the Town, thereby to put them into credit and Authority with the Enemy, and give them opportunity to betray them. Some by this means have discovered the strength of the Garrison, and by that discovery have taken the Town. Some under feigned pretences have stopped up the Gates of a Town from shutting, with a Cart, or beam, or such kind of thing, and given their party the convenience of entring. Hani∣bal besieging the Town of Tarentum in Calabria, which was defended by the Romans un∣der the Conduct of Levius, corrupted a person in the Garrison called Eoneus, and ordered him that he should go out a hunting in the night, and pretend he durst not do it in the day for fear of the Enemy. Eoneus observed his directions, went out and in several nights together, and the Guards had not the least suspition; at length Hanibal disguizing some of his men in the habit of Huntsmen, sent them in after him, who killed the Guards, pos∣sessed themselves of the Gates, and let Hanibal into the Town. A Garison is likewise to be cheated by drilling them a good distance out of Town, and pretending to fly when they come to charge you. Many (and Hanibal among the rest) have suffered their Camps to be possessed by the Enemy, that they might have opportunity to clap between with their Army, and get into the Town. Again, they are sometimes deluded by pretending to raise the Siege as Formio the Athenian did, who having plundered and harrassed the Coun∣try of Calcidon, received their Embassadors afterwards with propositions of Peace: He gave them very good words, and sent them back full of security and fair promises, upon which the poor people presuming too much, Formio fell suddenly upon them, and overcame them. Those who are shut up in a Town, are to keep a strict eye upon such as they have any reason to suspect, but they are sometimes to be secured and obliged to you by pre∣ferment as well as by punishment. Marcellus knew that Lucius Baucius the Nolan was a great favourer of Hanibal, yet he carried himself to him with so much kindness and gene∣rosity, that of an Enemy, he made him his intimate Friend.

CHAP. VIII.

Good Guard is to be kept in all places and times.

Fabr.

THose who are in any fear of being besieged, are to keep diligent guard as well when the Enemy is at a distance, as at hand: and they are to have most care of those places where they think themselves most secure; for many Towns have been lost by being assaulted on that side where they thought themselves impregnable; and this mis∣carriage arises from two causes; either because the place is really strong and believed inac∣cessible; or else because of the policy of the Enemy, who with great clamour and noise pre∣tend to storm it on one side, whilst on the other he does it as vigorously, but with all the silence imaginable. And therefore it concerns the besieged to be very careful, and keep good Guards upon the Walls, especially in the night, and that as well with Dogs as with Men, for if they be fierce and watchful, they will give an alarm (if the Enemy approaches) as soon as any thing: And not only Dogs, but Birds have been known to have preserved a Town, as it happen'd to the Romans, when the French besieged the Capitol: when the

Spartans lay before Athens, Alcibiades to discover how his watches were kept, comman∣ded that in the night when ever he held up a light, each of the Guards should hold up another, and great punishment was to be inflicted upon any that neglected it. Is••crates killed a Centinal that he found a-sleep, with this expression, I leave him as I found him.

CHAP. IX.

Ways to write privately to ones Friends.

Fabr.

THose who have been besieged have contrived several ways of conveying intel∣ligence to their friends; not daring to trust their affairs to the tongue of a mes∣senger, they write in cyphers many times, and conceal them several ways. The cyphers are made according to every mans fancy, and the ways of concealing them are divers: some have writ on the in-side of a scabard of a Sword; others have put their Letters up in Paste, baked it, and then given it for sustenance to the messenger that is to carry it: some have hid them in their privities; some in the collar of the messenger's dog.

There is another very useful and ingenious way, and that is by writing an ordinary Letter about your private affairs, and afterwards betwixt every two lines to write your intrigues with a certain kind of water that will never be discovered but by dipping it in∣to other water, or by holding it to the fire; and by so doing the Letters will be visible. And this trick has been very subtilly practised in our times, in which a certain person having a desire to signifie a secret to some of his friends, and not daring to trust it to a messenger, he sent out Letters of Excommunication written very formerly, but interlined as above∣said, and caused them to be fixed to the doors of the Churches, which being known to his friends by some private marks, they understood the whole business: and this is a very good way, for he who carries it may be deceived, and he that writes it is in no great danger.

There are a thousand other ways invented according to every mans fancy and wit. But it is much easier to write to those who are block'd up in a Town, than for those who are besieged to write to their friends abroad, because these Letters cannot be conveyed but by somebody who must pretend to run away out of the Town, which is a hard and a dan∣gerous thing, if the enemy be any thing careful. But 'tis otherwise with Letters to be sent into a Town, for a man has a thousand occasions to come into a Leaguer, where he may watch his opportunity, and slip into the Town.

CHAP. X.

How to repair a breach, and the way to defend it.

Fabr.

BUt let us come now to the present way of beleaguering of Towns: I say, that if you be assaulted in a Town that is not fortified with ditches on the in-side, (as I have mentioned before) that your enemy may not enter at the breaches which the Artil∣lery make, (for against other breaches there is no remedy) it is necessary whilst the Artillery is playing, to cut a new ditch behind the breach of at least thirty yards wide, and to throw all the earth that comes out of it towards the Town, that it may make a good Rampart, and add to the depth of the ditch; and this work is to be carried on with such diligence, that when the wall falls, the ditch may be at least five or six yards deep; and whilst they are at work to make this ditch, it is necessary that they be secured with two Caseniats, that may flank the Enemy in case he should endeavour to disturb them: and if the wall be so strong as to give you time to make your ditch and your casemats; that part which is bat∣tered will be the strongest part about the Town; for that Rampart will be of the same form and model which we proposed for the ditch within: But where the wall is so weak as to allow you no time, then you must show your courage, and present yourself bravely at the breach, your Souldiers well arm'd, and with as much chearfulness as is possible. This way of throwing up new works was observed by the Pisans when you besieged it, and they might do it well enough; for their walls were strong, which gave them time, and the earth good and proper for Ramparts; whereas had they wanted either of those conve∣niences, they must of necessity have been lost. It is wisdom therefore to make these ditches round about the Town before there be any necessity, as we said before; for in that case you may expect the enemy without fear.

CHAP. XI.

Of Mines.

Fabr.

THe ancients took several Towns by mining under ground, and that two ways, either by carrying their mines under ground into the Town, and entring there∣by, (as the Romans did when they took the City of Vejentum) or by undermining only the walls, and so tumbling them down. At present this latter way is more used than the other, and renders those Towns which stand high, weaker then the rest, because more subject to be min'd, and then adding but a good quantity of powder, which takes fire in an instant, you do not only ruine the wall, but you open the very mountain, and cleave the works into pieces. The way to prevent this, is to fortifie in a flat Country, and make the ditch which encompasses your Town so deep, that the enemy may not dig under it with∣out coming to the water, which is the best defence against mines. But if you be to de∣fend a Town upon an eminence, your best way will be to make several deep holes in the wall, that may give vent to the powder when the enemy sets in on fire.

There is another way likewise to prevent them, and that is by countermining, if you find where the enemy mines, but 'tis a hard matter to discover them, especially if you be besieged by a cautious enemy.

CHAP. XII.

Good guards are always to be kept, and your Souldiers not to be divided.

Fabr.

HE who is besieged is to take extraordinary care that he be not surprized in time of repose, as after a storm; after the Guards are set, (which is either at break of day, or at the shutting in of the evening) or especially whilst you are at dinner, in which time many Towns have been taken, and many sallies have been made to the destruction of the besiegers. Wherefore it is necessary to be upon the Guard in all quarters, and your men generally arm'd: and here I cannot omit to tell you that nothing makes a Town or Camp harder to be defended, than the dividing of your forces; for the enemy being able to attack you when he pleases with all his power at once, you must be ready on all sides, and having parted your Forces, you will be forced to defend your self with a part, and to keep the same guards with the remainder when ever the enemy assails you, as you should have done when your whole Garrison was together; which is a great disadvantage, for he can attack you with his whole power, when you have but a part of yours to defend your self.

CHAP. XIII.

That when ones sees himself block'd up on every side, it is good to expose ones self now and then, and of the advantages which have ensued.

Fabr.

IF he who is besieged be beaten considerately, he is certainly lost; but the Besieger can only be repulsed: for which reason many who have been besieged (either in Camp or Town,) though they have been inferior in number, have nevertheless sallied with their whole force at a time, and been two hard for the enemy. Thus Marcellus did at Nola; thus Caesar did in France, when his Camp was encompassed with a vast number of Gauls, for finding he was not able to defend it, because he must divide his men into par∣tles, and distribute them round; and finding also that standing within his stoccado's he could not do so much execution upon the enemy as he desired, he opened his Camp on one side, and issuing out of it with his whole force, charged the enemy with such fury and courage that he put them to the rout. Besides, the obstinacy and resolution of the besieged does many times astonish and terrifie the enemy. Pompey being encamped against Caesar, and Caesar's Army in great distress for provisions, Pompey had presented him a piece of Caesar's bread which was made of herbs, and look'd upon as a very strange thing; Pompey

having viewed it, commanded that it should not be shewn in his Army, lest it should dis∣courage them to consider the obstinacy of their Enemy. Nothing was more honourable to the Romans in their War with Hanibal than their constancy, because in the greatest of their distress, and in the worst of their fortune, they never demanded peace, nor disco∣vered any token of fear: on the contrary, when Hanibal was under their Walls, they sold the ground in which he was encamped, at an higher rate than it would have been sold at another time: and they were so true and firm in their enterprizes, that they would not draw off from Capua to defend their own City, though they had an Army before that, when Hanibal appeared before Rome.

I am sensible that I have told you several things that you understood, and perhaps con∣sidered already; yet I have done it (as I said before) by that means to give you a better comprehension of the quality of this Army; and to satisfie such (if there be any such here) as have not had the opportunity to understand it so well as you. I suppose now there remains nothing but that I give you some general rules which are very obvious and common.

CHAP. XV.

General Rules to be observed in Military Discipline.

Fabr.

THat which is beneficial to you, is prejudicial to your Enemy, and that which is beneficial to him, is prejudicial to you.

He who in War is most vigilant to observe the designs and enterprizes of the Enemy, and takes most pains in exercising and disciplining his Army, shall expose himself to less danger, and have greater probability of victory.

Never bring your men to fight till you have some just confidence in their courage, till you have seen them well arm'd, and well ordered; and never let them engage but when you find them cheerly, and hopeful of success.

It is better to conquer an Enemy by hunger than fighting, in which last victory, for∣tune has more share than virtue or courage.

No resolution is so likely to succeed, as that which is concealed from the Enemy till it comes to be executed.

Nothing is of more importance in the whole art of War, than to know how to take advantage when it is offered.

Nature produces few persons strong; but industry and exercise makes many.

Order and discipline is more available in War, than valour or force.

When any come over to your service from the Enemy, they are of great advantage to you, provided they be faithful; for it is more diminution to the Enemies strength to have Soldiers revolt, than to have so many slain, though the name of a fugitive is suspicious to new friends, and abominable to old.

It is better in the drawing up your Battalions for a Battel, to draw them up with re∣serves, and place such behind the front as may supply it upon occasion; than to enlarge your front, and make as it were but one rank of your whole Army.

He who understands his own Forces and the Enemies too, can hardly miscarry.

The courage of Soldiers is better than their number.

The situation of the place is sometimes more effectual than the courage of your men.

New and unexpected things are an astonishment to some Armies.

Your Soldiers despise things that are common, and are weary of any thing that is te∣dious, I would advise therefore that by pickeering and little skirmishes you acquaint your men with your Enemy before you bring them to a Battel.

He who pursues an Enemy that is disordered, in disorder himself; shall lose the victory he had gained, and perhaps give it to the Enemy.

He who makes not provision of Victuals, will be beaten without a blow.

He who relies more upon his Horse than his Foot, or his Foot than his Horse, must accommodate himself to the place.

If you would know at any time whether you have any spies in your Army, you have no more to do but to command every man to his Tent.

If you find the Enemy has any knowledge of your designs, you must change them.

What you are to do, you may advise with many; what you are resolved to do, com∣municate with few.

When Soldiers are in their quarters, they are to be kept in order by fear and by punish∣ment; when in the field, with hopes and reward.

A good General never comes to a Battel but when necessary requires, or some great ad∣vantage invites him.

You must endeavour that your Enemy may not know how you intend to draw up your Army when you come to fight; and let your figure be what it will, be sure your first Com∣panies be so ordered as that they may fall back into the second, and both into the third.

When you are engaged, never employ any of your Battalia's about any thing but that to which you deputed them at first; if you would avoid putting things into dis∣order.

Sudden accidents are not easily prevented; but those which are foreseen are prevented without difficulty.

Men, Arms, Money and Provisions are the nerves of War; but the first two are most necessary, because Men and Arms will find Money and Victuals; but Money and Victuals can never find Men.

The Rich Man unarm'd, is but a prey to the Soldier.

Use your Soldiers to abominate luxury either in diet or cloths.

This is as much as I can think fit to speak of in general, though I am sensible other things would have fallen in well enough with my Discourse. As how and in what manner the ancients ordered their Squadrons; how they were habited, and how they exercised them in several other things, and I could have added several particulars, which I have not thought necessary at this time, because you may know it your self, and likewise because it was not my intention at first to shew you exactly how the ancient Malitia was constituted, but how it was to be done in our times.

For this reason I have thought unnecessary to speak any farther of those kind of anti∣quities, than what might be serviceable to this introduction. I know likewise I might have inlarged myself more about the exercising of Horse; and come afterwards to discourse of Sea-fights, for to distinguish Militia's, their Armies at Sea, and Armies at Land; Ar∣mies of Foot, and Armies of Horse: but of Sea discipline I shall not presume to say any thing, because I know nothing of it: I shall leave that to be treated of by Genoueses or Venetians, who by their experience in that kind, have done very great things formerly. Nor shall I speak any farther of Horse than what I have said before, because they are not so corrupt and disorderly. For if your Foot (which is the strength of an Army) are well disciplin'd, and in good order, your Cavalry must be good of necessity.

CHAP. XV.

The way to have many Horse in your Country.

Fabr.

I Would however remember him who is desirous to settle and establish a good Mi∣litia in his Country, that to furnish it handsomly with Horse, he should do two things; one is, that he should distribute a certain number of good Stalions up and down, that the Country-men may breed, and drive a Trade with Foles and Colts, as you do in this Country with Calves and young Mules. The other is, that there might not want Chapmen for the Colts, I would oblige every man that keeps a Mule, to keep an Horse; and he that would keep but one thing for his Saddle, should be enjoyned to have it an Horse; besides, I would constrain every man that wore Cloth-clothes, to keep an Horse in his Stable.

This order was taken not long since by a Prince of our times, and succeeded so well, that in a short time he had a most excellent Cavalry. As to other things relating to Hor∣ses, I refer you to what has been said this day, and what has been practised of old.

CHAP. XVI.

A General is to invent of himself, and not follow altogether the practiecs of his Predecessors.

Fabr.

BUt perhaps you would desire to know what parts and qualifications there ought to be in a General; and I will satisfie you in short, for I cannot make choice of a properer man, than he who understands all those things which I have recommended this day; and yet that would not be sufficient, unless he had abilities to invent some thing of his own; for never any man was Master of a Trade, who had no invention of his own; and if invention be honourable in any thing, it is most certainly in this: This is manifest in all Authors who have constantly applauded all sorts of inventions, how slight and inconsiderable soever, as appears by the great Character they bestowed on Alexander the great, for his wisdom in appointing a Cap to be put upon the top of a Launce as a signal for the dislodging of his Army, rather than to do it by sound of Trumpet as for∣merly, because it imported him much that they should remove privately. He was com∣mended likewise for ordering his Soldiers upon a charge to fall down upon their left knee, as an expedient that would make them receive the charge with the more strength and firmness, which invention got him the Victory, and occasioned him so much honour, that all Statues erected afterwards in his honour, were erected in that posture. But because it is time to conclude our discourse, I will leave where I began, to avoid the reproach which is incident to such persons as when once straggled know not how to return.

CHAP. XVII.

The Author returns, and with a short Discourse concludes his Book.

Fabr.

IF you remember (Cosimo) you told me, that you could not imagine the reason why in one place I should commend Antiquity, and blame those which would not imitate it in great things; and yet I have not imitated it my self in my Martial affairs, in which I have taken much pains, and spent a great deal of my time.

To which I answer, That men who are to execute any thing, are first to learn which way it is to be done, that they may be afterwards the more able, when it comes to opera∣tion. Now whether or no I understand how to establish a Militia according to the method of the Ancients, I leave you to judge, who have heard me discourse of it so long; from whence you may imagine how much time has been spent in those thoughts by me; what great desire I have had to bring them to effect, and whether I have already, or ever may have occasion to do it. But to satisfie you farther, and justifie my self, I will give you the reasons, and thereby observe my promise in some measure, by shewing you the convenien∣cies and inconveniencies in such imitations. I say then that no action this day among men is more easily executed according to the method of the Ancients, than Military discipline; but it must be among such Princes as are able to bring together 15 or 20000 of their own Subjects, against an Enemy. On the other side, there is nothing more difficult to such Princes as have not that convenience: And that you may comprehend it the better, you must understand that Generals are commended upon two several accounts some are famous for that with an Army ordered and prepared by their own natural discipline, they have performed great things; so it was with most of the Roman Citizens, and others who had the command of Armies; whose only task was to keep their Soldiers good, and Conduct them securely. Others have been not only to contend with and conquer the Enemy, but they were first to instruct and exercise their Army; and these doubtless were worthy of more praise than they who with their old and well experienced Soldiers performed such Exploits: Of this sort was Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Tullus, Hostilius, Philip of Macedon, Cyrus King of Persia, and Gracchus the Roman: All those were forced to model and disci∣pline their Armies before they ventured them to sight; and all these were able to do it in respect of their own experience, and that they had other persons which were able to exer∣cise their Soldiers as they desired. Nor would it ever have been possible that any of those Generals, how good and excellent soever, could ever have done any great thing in another Province full of corrupt men, unless it had been accustomed to some honest obedience. It

is not sufficient then in Italy to understand how to manage a Veteran Army; but you must first know how to make and prepare it, and then how to govern and conduct it. Again, those who do this, must be such Princes as have great revenues, and many Subjects, in which number I am not to be reckoned, as one who never commanded, nor never can, unless it be foreign Forces under some other Prince, into which foreigners, whether it be possible or not to insuse any of these things of which I have discoursed, I leave you to judge. How could I perswade a Soldier of our days to carry more Arms than he was accustomed, and besides his Arms, two or three daies Provision at his back, and a Spade or Pickaxe at his girdle? How could I prevail with him to work or digg all day; to stand all day to his Arms in counterfeit exercises, that I might rely the more confidently upon him when he came to it in good earnest? How could I work upon him to abstain from play, lasciviousness, blasphemy, and insolence, which is their practice every day? How long would it be before I could reduce them into such order, such discipline, and awe, that if an Apple tree was never so full, and stood in the middle of their Camp, none of them should venture to touch it? as is many times read of the Roman Armies. What is it that I can promise them that may make them either fear me, or love me, when the War being ended, I shall have no farther to do with them? How can I make them sensible of shame who have been born and bread without any? How should they pay me a respect whom they do not know? By what God, by what Saint shall I conjure them? By the Gods which they adore, or by the Gods which they blaspheme? Which it is that they adore I cannot tell, but am sure they blaspheme them all. How can I expect they should keep their pro∣mise, which they do hourly despise? How can they who pay no honour to God, express any to men? What good discipline then are we like to imprint upon so depraved a Mass? If you object that the Swizzers and Spaniards are good Soldiers, I confess them much better than the Italians; but if you consider what I have said, and the manner of proceed∣ing of both those Nations, you will find them come short in many things of the perfection of the Ancients. The Swizzers are become good Soldiers by natural practice of those things which I have recommended; and the Spaniards by necessity; for their Wars lying in Foreign Provinces, where they are constrained either to overcome or dye (because they can never hope to get off by flying) are grown good, and yet their goodness is in many things defective; for their excellence is only to stand and receive the Enemy at push of Pike, and the Swords point; besides, their is not any man among them fit to instruct another in what is necessary, much less if he be not of their own Country. But to return to our Italians, who having wanted wise Princes, have not been capable of good orders; and having wanted that necessity which was incumbent upon the Spaniards, they have not taken it up of themselves, so that now they are the very scorn and contempt of the world, not for any fault in the people, but in their Princes, who thereby have been chastised for their ignorance, and justly punished for losing their Territories so ignominiously, without any considerable resistance. Will you see that what I say is true? Consider what Wars we have had in Italy since the Expedition of Charles 8th. to this day: and although othe•• Wars rendered Soldiers formidable and martial; these Wars by how much they were more great, and more furious, by so much both Officers and Soldiers became more dissolute and cowardly: And this must necessarily proceed from ill orders which are not much better at this day, and the misery is, there was nor is none able to reform them: Do not think that there is any way to recover reputation to the Arms of the Italians, but by this way that I have proposed, and by means of such Princes as have great Territories there; for this form may be imprinted in men that are simple, and plain, and ones own Subjects, much sooner, than in such as are lew'd, and disorderly, and strangers. A good Sculptor never expects to make a good Statue out of a piece of Marble that is mangled and has been ill handled; but he will do well enough if it has never been touched. Our Princes in Italy before they were sensible of their Wars with the Northern Nations, believed it was enough for a Prince to know how to write a civil answer; how to direct a Letter with all its Punctilio's; how to show himself witty and quick in his reparties; how to juggle, and dissemble; how to dress himself handsomly, and dispose of his Jewels to the best advantage; how to eat, and sleep in more state and magnificence than other people; to have a thousand dalliances and pleasures about him; to behave himself haughtily and extort from his Subjects; to live in idleness and ease; to dispose of Military commands to their Parasites; to despise those who proposed any thing of Virtue; to require that their words should be like Oracles, and of as much authority, as if spoken by God himself; to employ such as had no knowledge in affairs; to commit great things to those who durst attempt nothing; to believe every thing immediately without pondering and debating either their words or arguments that spoke them; and several other imperfections which hindered them from seeing that at last

they must become a prey to any that would attack them. These things in the year 1494. were the occasion of those flights, and fears, and depredations by which three of the most potent States in Italy were frequently destroyed. But the worst is, they which remain, continue in the same errors, and live in the same disorder, without any consideration that those who formerly desired to preserve their Dominions, did all that I have prescribed this day; and that their whole study was to accustom themselves both minds and bodies to la∣bour, to trouble, and dispising of danger, And this was the cause that Caesar, and Alexander and all the valiant and brave Princes were always at the head of their Armies, compleatly arm'd and on foot, and rather than lose their states they would lose their lives; so as they lived and dyed with a great deal of honour: And though perhaps some of them might be condemned for their ambition, and exorbitant desire to Reign; yet they could never be accused of effeminacy, or doing any thing that might render them delicate and unmanly. Which passages if they were read and believed by the Princes of our times, it would be im∣possible but they must alter their course of life, and their Provinces their fortune. But be∣cause in the beginning of our discourse you complained of your Militia, I tell you that if you have ordered it according to my abovesaid direction, and it has not answered your ex∣pectation, you have reason to complain; but if it be not ordered and exercised according to my rules, the complaint lyes more properly against you, who has made it rather an abor∣tion, than a perfect production. The Venetians, and the Duke of Ferrara began very well, but they did not persevere, and it was imputable rather to themselves, than their Soldiers. And let me affirm this to you for a truth, and among all the present Princes of Italy, he who takes his way first, and observes these rules and these orders, shall make him∣self greater than any Prince in that Country, and it shall happen to his Subjects as to the Kingdom of Macedon, which falling under the Dominion of King Philip, was improved to that height by this order and exercise (whilst the rest of Greece were idle, and if em∣ployed at all, it was in following Plays and Balls, and such effeminat entertainments) that in a few years time he was able to conquer the whole Country, and leave a foundation to his Son to make himself Monarch of the whole world. He then who despises this Do∣ctrine, if he be a Prince despises his own Principality, and if a Citizen, his own City. And in this I cannot but complain of Nature, who should either have not suffered me to have known these things; or have given me power to have executed them, which is a thing I can never hope for now, as growing old, and towards the end of my days. For this reason I have discoursed the more frankly with you who are young, and so qualified that you may be able (if you be satisfied with what is said) to give the same Council to your own Princes when occasion shall be offered, and I hope with success; and of this I beg you would not dispond; for this Province seems to have a peculiar faculty of reviving things that are dead, as it has done Poetry, and Painting, and Sculpture, though for my own part I cannot expect to see it, as having one foot already in the grave. Certainly had for∣tune indulged me in my young days, so far as to have afforded so much Territory as such an enterprise required, I believe in a short time I would have demonstrated to the world the power and efficacy of the orders of the Ancients, by means of which I should have en∣larged my Dominions with honour, or lost them without shame.