The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

THE FOURTH BOOK. (Book 4)

CHAP. I.

The considerations and subtleties to be used in the drawing up an Army to fight.

Luigi.

SEeing the Victory has been so honourably obtained under my Conduct, I think it discretion to tempt fortune no farther, knowing how much she is variable, and inconstant. Wherefore my desire is to resign my Authority, and that Zanobi may take it upon him according to the Order proposed of transferring it to the youngest: and I know he will not refuse that honour, (or rather trouble) both in complacency to me, and as being naturally the more couragious of the two; for he fears not to engage in these kind of conflicts, though there be as much likelihood of his miscarriage as conquest.

Zanobi.

I shall refuse no Office into which you shall put me, though I must needs say, I could more willingly have been an auditor; for your scruples and demands have hitherto given me more satisfaction, than any thing I could have objected my self. But I think, Seignor Fabritio, it would be better if you proceed (provided your patience will serve, and that we do not tire you with our Ceremonies.)

Fabritio.

You rather oblige me Sir, for this variety of Interrogators, gives me to un∣derstand the vanity of your judgments and appetites. But is there any thing behind that you would have added to what has been spoken before?

Zanobi.

There are two things of which I would willingly be satisfied before we pass any farther. One is, whether you have any other way of drawing up an Army: The other is, what reflections or considerations a General is to have, before he comes to a Bat∣tel; and when any accident intervenes, how it is to be avoided.

Fabr.

I shall endeavour to satisfie you, but not by answering distinctly to your de∣mands; for whilst I answer to one, it happens many times that I seem to answer to the other; I have told you how I would have my Army drawn up, that according to that model, any other figure may be taken, as the number of the Enemy, and the nature of your ground does require; for in that case, one is to act according to the condition both of the one and the other.

But take notice of this, That there is no way more dangerous, than to extend the front of your Army too much, unless it be very numerous and strong: Otherwise you are to draw it up close and thick, rather than wide and thin. For when your Forces are few in respect of the Enemy, you must look out for other remedies: as by drawing your Army up, so as it may be fortified by some River, or Fen, that may secure you behind; or forti∣fied in the flanks by some Ditch or Entrenchment, as Caesar's was in France; and this ought to be a general rule to you, that you extend or contract your front according both to your own number, and the number of your Enemy. If the Enemy be not so numerous, and your men as well disciplin'd as they, you are to make choice of an open place, where you may not only encompass the Enemy, but distend your own ranks: For in streight and narrow places, not being able to make use of your orders, you cannot make use of your advantage. For this reason the Romans did most commonly make choice of open and clear places, and avoided such as were difficult and close. But if your Army be small, or your men inexperienced, you must do quite contrary (as I said before) and must find out some place where your few men may defend themselves, or where their inexperience may do you no hurt: In that case you are to choose some hill or eminence from whence you may come down upon the Enemy with more force; yet must you have this caution not to draw up your Army upon any Strand or Sea-coast, nor under the command of any Hill,

of which the Enemy may possess himself, because you will be exposed thereby to the Ene∣mies Cannon without remedy, and be unable to do them mischief with any convenience. In the drawing up an Army for Battel, great regard is likewise to be had to the Sun and the Wind, that neither the one nor the other be in your face, for they are great impedi∣ments to your sight, one with its beams, and the other by raising the dust, and carrying the powder into your eyes; besides, the wind being contrary, is a great disadvantage in rendring the blows which they give the Enemy more languid and weak; and as to the Sun, your must not only take care that it be not in your face, nor does you no prejudice in the beginning of the Fight, but that it does you no injury when it gets up: wherefore the best way is when you draw up your men, to have it if possible on their backs, that many hours may pass before it can come about into their faces.

Hanibal knew this advantage very well, and made use of it in the Battel of Cannas, and Marius did the same against the Cimbrians. If you be weaker in Horse, it is your best way to draw up among the Vines or the Woods, and such other impediments, as in our times the Spaniards did when they beat the French in the Kingdom of Naples near Cirig∣nuola. And it has been many times seen that the same Soldiers which have been worsted and bastled before; by only changing their order, and shifting their ground, have recovered the Victory; Thus it was with the Cartbaginians, who having been many times worsted by Marcus Regulus, were afterwards Victorious by the Conduct of Kantippus the Lacede∣monian, who caused them to come down into the plain, where they might have room for their Horse, and their Elephants, and by so doing they were too hard for the Romans.

According to the practice of the Ancients, I have observed, That all great Generals when they have known which quarter of the Enemy was the strongest, and where they have fortified most; they have not opposed the strongest part of their Army against it; but have chose rather to confront it with the weakest of their divisions, and with their strongest attack the weakest of the Enemies. When afterwards they came to engage, they commanded the strongest of their Squadrons that they should not only stand firm, and receive the charge without making any advance, whilst the weaker parts had orders to suffer themselves to be overcome, and by giving ground gradually, to fall behind the rear of the Army. The Artifice procures two great disorders to the Enemy. The first is, that the strongest part of his Army is environ'd insensibly; the other is, that imagining their Victory certain by the retreat of their Enemy, they fall frequently into disorder, which many times robs them of that Victory of which they thought themselves so certain. Cor∣nelius Scipio being in Spain against the Carthaginians, under the command of Asdrubal; and knowing that Asdrubal understood very well that in the drawing up his Army, he put the Roman Legions (which were the strength and flower of his Army) in the midst, and that Asdrubal in probability would do the like. When they came afterwards to Fight, he changed his order, put his Legions in the Wings, and his light arm'd men in the Body; When the Battel was joyned, he commanded his Body to slacken their march on a sudden, and the Wings to double their pace; so that only the Wings on both sides engaged, and the Bodies on both sides being at a distance one from the other, came not up to one another, and the strongest part of Scipio's Army, fighting better than the weakest of Asdrubal's, he overcame them. In those days that stratagem was well enough; but in our days by reason of our Artillery, it is unpracticable; for the space which would be left betwixt the two Bodies would give opportunity to the Artillery to play, which as we said before, would be very dangerous: So then that way is to be laid aside; and the way which I recommended before is to be used, which is to charge with your whole Army, and let your weakest Squadrons retire. When a General finds his Army stronger than his Enemies, if he would encompass it insensibly, and that the Enemy may not prevent him, let him draw up his Army to an equal front with the Adversary: afterwards in the heat of the Fight let him order by little and little to retire in the front, and let the Wings ad∣vance as gradually, and it will always happen that the Enemy shall be encompassed before he is aware.

When a General would fight, and be sure not to be routed, let him draw up his Army near some place of retreat or security, as either Fens, Mountains, or some strong inexpug∣nable Town; for in that case he may pursue the Enemy, but the Enemy cannot pursue him. Hanibal made use of this cunning when his fortune began to decline, and he began to apprehend the Conduct of Marcellus. Some Generals to disturb the orders of the Ene∣my, have commanded their light armed men to begin the Battel, and when it is once joyned, to retire among the ranks. When afterwards it grows hotter, and both sides are thorowly engaged, they have had orders to draw forth out of the flanks of the Army, and having flanked the Enemy unexpectedly, they have disordered and broke him. If any

one finds himself weaker in Horse, besides the ways proposed before, he may place a Bat∣talia of Pikes behind them, and draw them up in such manner, that in the heat of the Battel they may open, and give way for the Pikes to pass thorow them, and by so doing, he shall be sure to prevail. Several have accustomed their light armed men to fight among their Horse, and they have been found to give the Horse very good assistance.

Of all those who are famous for drawing up Battels, Hanibal and Scipio are the most renowned for the great skill that both of them expressed in their conflict in Africa; but because Hanibals Army was composed of Carthaginians, and Auxiliaries of several Na∣tions, he placed 80 Elephants in his front; behind them he placed his Auxiliaries, next them his Carthaginians, and last of all his Italians, in whom he could not safely conside: and the reason why he ordered them so, was because the Auxiliaries having the Enemy in their faces, and finding themselves closed up with Carthaginians at their backs, should not think of flying, but being under a necessity to fight, he did hope they might either over∣come, or so harrass the Enemy, that when he came up with his fresh men, he might the more easily overthrow them. Against this order Scipio placed his Hastati, Principes, and Triarii in his accustomed manner, so as upon occasion they might be received one into the other.

The front of his Army he made up with great spaces, but that it might appear close and united to the Enemy, he filled them up with his Velites, with order that as soon as the Ele∣phants come upon them, they should retire, and entring among the Legions by the or∣dinary spaces, leave a way open for the Elephants to pass, by which means the fury and execution of the Elephants being evaded, they came presently to handy-blows, and the Carthaginians were overcome.

Zanobi.

In your description of the Fight, you have caused me to remember how Sci∣pio in the Engagement caused not his Hastati to retire into the ranks of the Principes, but divided them, and caused them to retire into the Wings of the Army to give place to the Principes when they were to advance against the Enemy: I would know therefore for what reason he differed from the ordinary custom.

Fabritio.

I will tell you: Hanibal had placed the strength of his Army in the second division; so that Scipio to oppose them with equal courage, united the Principes and the Triarii together, insomuch as the intervals of the Principes being filled up by the Triarii, there was no spaces left for the reception of the Hastati; wherefore he caused the Hastati to open to the right and left, and fall in with the Wings of the Army. But you must observe that this way of dividing the first Squadron, is not to be used but when the other is Superior; for then you may do it conveniently, as Scipio did; but being inferior or under any repulse, it is not to be done without manifest danger, and therefore it is necessary that you have spaces behind in your other Squadrons that may be ready to receive you.

But to return to our discourse. The ancient Asians among other contrivances to mis∣chief their Enemy, made use of certain Chariots with Sythes fastned to the Sides of them, which served not only to open the Squadrons of the Enemy with their force, but to cut and kill them with their Sythes. Against these Chariots, they had three ways to defend them∣selves; either by the closeness of their ranks, or by receiving them into their ranks (as they did the Elephants) or by some other vigorous resistance, as Silla the Roman did against Archelaus, who had store of those Chariots; to repel them Silla caused several stakes to be pitched into the ground before his first Squadron, which putting a stop to the carreer of the said Chariots, prevented the execution which they would otherwise have done. And it is observable the new method that Silla used in ranging his Army; for placing his Velites and light Horse behind; and all his compleat arm'd Soldiers before, he left intervals sufficient to receive them which were behind when they had occasion to march up; so that the Fight being begun, by the assistance of the Horse (who had room to pass thorow the first Squadron to the charge) he obtained the Victory.

CHAP. II.

The Arts which are to be used during the Fight.

Fabr.

TO disturb the Army of the enemy when the Battel is joyned, it is necessary to invent some way or other to affright them, either by spreading a report of supplies that are hard by, or counterfeiting some representation of them that may dismay the enemy, and facilitate their defeat.

Minutius Ruffus, and Acillus Glabrio two of the Roman Consuls were skilful in this art. Caius Sulpitius caused all the boys and refuse of his Army to mount upon mules and other beasts that were unserviceable in fight, and placed them at a distance upon a hill, and drawn up in such order that they appeared like a compleat body of horse, when he was en∣gaged with the French, and the enemies apprehension of that body got Sulpitius the Vi∣ctory. Marius made use of the same stratagem when he fought against the Germans: if then these false alarms and representations are of such use and advantage in time of Bat∣tel, true ones must needs be more efficacious, especially if they fall upon the enemies flank or rear whilst the battel is joyned: which indeed is not easy to be done, unless the nature of the Country contributes; for if it be open and plain, you cannot conceal any part of your Forces, as is necessary to be done in those cases; but in woody or mountainous Coun∣tries you may conceal some of your Troops in such manner as they may fall suddenly and unexpectedly upon the enemy, which will give you a certain Victory. It is many times of great importance to spread a rumour abroad during the Fight, that the enemies Gene∣ral is slain, or that he is beaten in another part of the Army, which (as the other) has many times been the cause of a Victory. The enemies horse are often disordered by the repre∣sentation of strange figures, or the making of some unusual noise, as Croesus did, who op∣posed camels against horse; and Pyrrhus when he confronted their Cavalry with his Ele∣phants; the strangeness of which sight affrighted them so, that nothing was strong enough to keep them from disorder. In our days the Turk defeated the Sophi of Persia, and the Soldan of Syria only with the noise of this Guns, which being unusual to their horse, dis∣ordered them in such manner, that the Turk got the Victory, without any great trouble. The Spaniards to distract the Army of Amilcar, placed in the front of their Army certain Chariots filled with flax, and drawn by oxen, to which flax (when the enemy came up to charge) they put fire, and the oxen running from the fire, rush'd furiously into the Army of Arailcar, and put it to the rout. It is an unusual practice (as we have said before) to surprize and disturb the enemy with ambuscades where the Country is convenient: but where it is open and large, many have made great holes in the ground, and covered them with straw and earth lightly, leaving certain spaces solid and firm for their own retreat; over which having retired cunningly in the heat of the fight, the enemy pursuing, has fallen in, and been ruined. If during the fight any ill accident happens that may discourage your Souldiers, 'tis prudence to dissemble it, and turn it to advantage, as Tullus Hostilius did, and Lucius Sylla who observing in the heat of the Battel a party of his Troops go over to the enemy, to the great disheartening of the rest, caused it to be published quite thorow his Army that it was done by his order, which not only dispelled the apprehension that was among them, but encouraged them in such manner that it got him the Victory. Sylla having commanded out a party upon some enterprize, and all of them being killed in fight of his Army, that the rest might not be terrified, told them he sent them on purpose, because he had found them unfaithful. Sertorius fighting a battel in Spain, flew one of his own men, who brought him news that one of his great Officers was killed, and the rea∣son was, lest telling it to the rest, it might possibly have discouraged them. It is no easy matter to detain and Army, (if it be once tottering and inclining to run) and to bring it to fight again: but you must consider it with this distinction, either it is wholly disordered, and then it is impossible to recover it; or else it is disordered but in part, and there is some remedy. Many of the Roman Generals have stop'd the flight of their Armies, by putting themselves at the head of them, and as it were upbraiding them by their cowardize. Lucius Sylla seeing part of his Troops routed, and pursued by the forces of Mithridates, rode up to the head of them with his sword in his hand, and cryed out to them, If any body ask you where you have left your General, tell him you left him fighting in Boetia. Attilius the Consul opposed those who fought bravely against those who ran away; telling them that if they did not face about, they should be killed by their friends as well as their enemies. Philip King of Macedon understanding that his Souldiers were afraid of the Scythians, placed be∣hind

his Army certain of the faithfullest of his horse, with commission to kill any man that fled; so that his men choosing to die rather fighting than flying, overcame their adversa∣ries. Several of the Roman Generals have wrested an Ensign out of the hands of their Souldiers, and throwing it among the enemy, promised a reward to him who should reco∣ver it; and this they did not so much to hinder the flight of their own men, as to give them occasion of doing some greater exploit upon the enemy.

CHAP. III.

Stratagems after the Fight.

Fabr.

I Do not think it impertinent to add to this discourse such things as happen after the Fight, especially seeing they are but short, and not to be omitted because they are conformable to the matter which we have in hand. But since one of these two things must happen, either that we gain the Victory, or lose it; I say, that when we gain it, we are to pursue it with the greatest diligence we can, and rather imitate Caesar in this case than Hanibal, who for not following his Victory, and pushing it on after he had defeated the Romans at Cannas, lost the whole Empire of the Romans, which fortune had almost thrust into his hands. Caesar on the other side never rested after a Victory, but followed the enemy with greater fury than he attacked them at first. But when the day is lost, a wise General is to consider the best that he can make of it, especially if there be any thing of his Army remaining.

The advantage that may arise, is from the inadvertency of the enemy, who many times transported with his success, grows negligent and remiss, and gives opportunity to the enemy to revenge himself, as Martius the Roman did upon the Carthaginian Army, who having slain the two Scipio's, and routed their forces, not valuing those which remained, were suddenly assaulted and broken; for it is frequently seen, nothing is perpetrable so easily, as what the enemy fancies you can never attempt; for commonly men suffer most, where they are most secure. A General therefore, when he cannot carry the Victory, is to endeavour with all possible industry that his loss may be as little as may be; and to do this, it is necessary to order things so that the enemy may not easily pursue, or be in a ca∣pacity to retard you.

As to the way of hindering the pursuit of the Conqueror; several Generals, as soon as they found their condition, and that it was not possible to continue the Fight, have order∣ed their inferior Commanders to separate, and fly in several parties, and meet again at a place which he assigned; and the enemy not daring to divide his Army for fear of a de∣sign, has let all, or the greatest part of the conquered escape. Others have thrown the best of their goods in the way, that the enemy following might be delayed by the prize, and suffer them to get off. Titus Dimius used no small art to conceal the loss which he had sustained in the fight; for having endured the burnt of the Battel from morning till night with the loss of many of his men; when night came, he caused most of them to be buried privately: the next morning the enemy finding so many of their own men dead, and so few of the Romans, concluded themselves beaten, and fled. And now I suppose (though confusedly) I have in some measure satisfied your demands.

CHAP. IV.

Two other ways of ranging an Army to fight.

Fabr.

'TIs true, as to the form and model of drawing up an Army to fight, it remains that I let you know that sometimes some Generals have drawn them up in the figure of a wedge pointing in the front, supposing it the properest way to pierce, and make an impression upon the enemy. In opposition to this, the way was for the adversary to draw up in the figure of a pair of shears, which being opened, were to receive the point of the wedge, enclose it, and charge it on all sides. And about this, let me recommend to you this General rule, that the best remedy to be used against the design of an enemy, is to do that bravely of your self, to which you perceive he would endeavour to force you: for do∣ing it voluntarily you do it orderly, and to your own profit and advantage; whereas

if you do it by constraint, you do it to your ruine. I will not repeat any thing that I have said before, to confirm my discourse. But this is most certain, if your adversary thinks to open, and as it were cleave your Army with his wedge, if you keep your Army open in the figure of the shears, and receive them in the middle, you cut them to pieces, and they can do you no hurt.

Hanibal placed his Elephants in the front of his Army, thinking thereby to have pierced the Army of Scipio with more ease; but Scipio ranging his men in the form of a pair of shears, and receiving him in an open posture, gain'd the Victory, and Hanibal was lost.

Asdrubal placed the best and strongest of his men in the front of his Army to make the better charge upon the Enemy; Scipio commanding his middle men in the front to re∣treat insensibly, and give place, was so cunningly obeyed, that the Enemy was drawn in, and defeated: so that you see those designs are many times the occasion of his Victory against whom they are designed.

CHAP. V.

Of the constraint and advantage a man may have to Fight.

Fabr.

IF my memory does not fail, it remains yet that I say something touching the things which a wise General is to consider before he comes to an engagement. And the first thing I shall say upon this subject is, that a General is never to come to a Field-fight unless he be constrained, or has some more than ordinary advantage. His advantage may lye in the nature of the Place, in the discipline of his Army, or the number or excellence of his Men. And his necessity consists in finding his condition such, that without fighting he must be certainly destroyed: as where money is wanting, where victuals are defective, and where the Enemy is in expectation of supplies: in these cases a General is always to venture, though he fights upon disadvantage; for 'tis better fighting where fortune may favour you, than not to try her at all, and be certainly ruined; and in this case it would be as great a fault in a General not to fight, as it would be if he had an opportunity of de∣feating his adversary, and was either too ignorant to know it, or too cowardly or delatory to make use of it. The advantages which occur in the conduct of war do many times proceed from the Enemy, and sometimes from your prudence. Many have been sur∣prized and routed in their passage over Rivers, by the dexterity of the Enemy, who having forborn them till half of them were over; have fallen suddenly upon them, and put them to the rout, as Caesar served the Swizzers when he cut off a fourth part of their Army, by reason that they were separated by a River. Sometimes it happens that your Enemy is tired, and weary, having followed you with too much haste and inconsideration; and in that case finding your own Army vigorous and strong, you are not to lose your opportu∣nity. Besides, if your Enemy presents you Battel in the morning betimes, you are not im∣mediately to draw out your Army and fight him, but are rather to protract and spin out the time for some hours, (still offering and pretending to come forth) that their impatience of delay, or standing so long to their Arms, may rebate the fury with which they came; and as soon as you find them cool, and off of their first ardor, then you may come forth, and charge them as smartly as you can. Scipio and Metellus made use of this way in Spain, the one against Asdrubal; the other against Sertorius. If the Enemy has lessened his power by dividing his Army, (as Scipio did in Spain) or by any other occasion, then also a good General may try his fortune with credit.

The greatest part of the gravest Generals have chosen rather to receive than give the charge, because the fury of an Enemy is easily sustained by those who stand firm and close in their station; and being once check'd, it turns into cowardize. Fabius being sent against the Samnites and the Gauls, received their fury with that indiscomposedness and tranquillity, that he conquered them both, but Decius his Colleague not following his example, mis∣carried, and was slain. Some who have been possessed too much of the courage of their Enemy, have chose to begin the Fight in the Evening towards night, that their Army being worsted, might get off, or defend themselves by the benefit of the darkness. Others un∣derstanding the superstition of the Enemy, and that on certain days they devote themselves wholly to Religion, and will not endeavour to fight, have chosen that time to attack them, and have carried the Victory. Caesar made use of this way against Ariovistus in France, and Vespasian did the same in Syria against the Iews, who upon their Sabbath would not so much as defend themselves against the Romans.

CHAP. VI.

Directions for a General.

Fab.

THere is nothing of more importance to the General of an Army, than to have about him persons that are faithful, experienced in war, and prudent in Counsel, with whom he may constantly advise, and confer both about his own Men, and the Enemy; as which is the most numerous, which the best arm'd, which the best mounted, which the best exercised, which the most patient of labour and distress, and whether the Horse or the Foot are to be relied upon most.

The next thing to be considered is the place where he is, whether it be more advanta∣geous for the Enemy than for him; which is most easily supplyed with provisions; whether it be best to fight presently, or protract; and what he may gain or suffer thereby: for many times the Souldiers disgusted at the tediousness of the war, grow lazy and remiss, and coming at length to be weary, they either grow mutinous, or run away. But above all things, I would advise a General to inform himself of the nature and qualification of his adversary the Enemies General, whether he be rash, or wary, and what counsel he has about him. The next thing he is to consider, is, whether he can confide in his Auxiliaries or not: and be sure never to bring his Army to a Battel, if he finds them under any appre∣hension, or with the least distrust of the Victory; for the greatest sign of miscarriage, is despair, and when they think it impossible to prevail. In this case therefore you are to avoid fighting either by following the example of Fabius Maximus, (who encamped his Army in places of such advantage, that Hanibal durst not attack him) or else if you suspect the Enemy will venture upon you in your entrenchments, and that you shall not be able to defend them, your best way will be to remove, divide your Army, and dispose them in parties into several Towns, that the tediousness of a siege, and length of time, which will be required, may discourage the Enemy.

Zanobi.

Is there no other way of avoiding a Battel, but to divide your Troops, and to dispose them into several Towns?

CHAP. VII.

Which way a Battel is to be avoided, though pressed never so earnestly by the Enemy.

Fabr.

IF I be not mistaken I have discoursed to some of you before, how he that is in the field cannot avoid fighting when pressed by an Enemy who will fight upon any terms; and that the best way he can take, is to keep himself at fifty miles distance, that he may have time to remove when he hears of his advance. Fabius Maximus did not refuse fighting with Hanibal, but would fight at his own time, and advantage; and Hanibal was too wise to attack him, where he was sure he could do no good; for had he believed he could have conquered him, Fabius would have been constrained to have fought him, or fled. Philip King of Macedon, Father of Perseus, being at war with the Romans, posted his Army upon an high mountain, that he might not be compelled to fight; but the Romans assaulted, and defeated him. Cingentorix General of the Gauls to avoid fighting with Cae∣sar who had passed a river contrary to his expectation, quitted the Country, and march'd away with his Army. The Venetians in our times, if they had had no mind to have fought the French King, they should not have staid till his Army had passed the Adda, but have removed farther off, as Cingentorix did before them; but they staid so long that they had time neither to draw up handsomely to fight, nor to make their retreat; for the French were so near before the Venetians dislodged, that the French fell upon them, and put them to the rout. So then by what I have said, it is manifest that a Battel cannot be avoided, when the Enemy presses it upon any disadvantage; and let not any body tell me of Fabius, for Hanibal refused to fight in that case as much as he.

CHAP. VIII.

How Souldiers are to be encouraged to fight; and how they are to be cooled and asswaged when their courage is too high.

Fabr.

IT many times happens that your Souldiers are impatient to be fighting, but if you do not find it convenient in respect of the number of your Army, the disadvan∣tage of the place, or some other consideration, you would do well to turn them from that inclination. It happens again that necessity or occasion constrains you to fight when your Souldiers are diffident or adverse: in one case it is necessary that you affright them, in the other that you excite them. In the first case, when remonstrances and exhortations will do not good, the best way is to suffer some of them to be cut off by the enemy, that those who have fought, and those who have not, may believe you another time. What Fabius Maximus did by accident, may be done on purpose, and by art. You know the Army of Fabius was very fierce to be fighting with Hanibal, and his Master of the Horse was of the same mind with the Army: Fabius was of another opinion, and thought it better to protract; and this diversity of opinions occasioned the dividing of the Army: Fabius kept his division in his trenches, the Master of the Horse went out, fought, was worsted, and had certainly been cut off, had not Fabius relieved him; by which example the Master of the Horse, and the whole Army were convinced that their wisest way was to have obeyed the orders of Fabius. As to the other point of animating your Souldiers, and raising their courages to a pitch, it is good to incense them by possessing them of the contumacy and insolence of the enemy: by pretending intelligence among them, and that you have cor∣rupted a considerable party; by posting your Army so near them, that they may see one another, and skirmish with them slightly every day, (for things which are done daily, we easily despise) by counterfeiting your self angry, and in a solemn and grave oration repre∣hending and upbraiding their backwardness, and telling them, that if they leave you, you will charge the enemy alone. But to make your Souldiers bold and couragious, you are by no means to permit any of them to send any thing to their own houses (or to deposit it any where else) till the war be done, that they may know that though in running home they may save their lives, yet it must be with the loss of their prize; the love of which ren∣ders people commonly as valiant as the love of their lives.

Zanobi.

You say that Souldiers may be encouraged, and disposed to fight, by a speech or oration: do you intend it should be delivered to the whole Army, or only to the Officers?

CHAP. IX.

A General ought to be skilful and eloquent to persuade or dissuade as he sees occasion.

Fabr.

IT is an easie matter to persuade or dissuade any thing with a small number of per∣sons, because if words will not do, you have force and authority to back them: but the difficulty is to remove an opinion out of the heads of the multitude when it is con∣trary to your own judgment, or the interest of the publick; for there you can use nothing but words, which must be heard and understood by every body, if you would have every body convinced. For this reason it is requisite an excellent General should be a good Orator, to inflame or asswage the courage of his Souldiers as he has occasion; for unless they can tell how to speak to a whole Army, there is little good to be expected; and yet in our times this way of haranguing them is quite laid aside. Look over the Life of Alexander the Great, and see how often he was put to it to speak in publick to his Army; and had he not done it, he would never have been able to have conducted it (when laden with so much riches and prey) thorow the deserts of Arabia, and in India, where it en∣dured so much misery and distress; for there is scarce a day but something or other hap∣pens that causes confusion and ruine to an Army where the General is either ignorant or careless of speaking to them. The way of making speeches to them takes away their fear, quickens their courage, augments their confidence, discovers their cheats, secures their re∣wards, remonstrates their dangers, and the ways to avoid them. In short, by those kind of Orations a General reprehends, entreats, threatens, encourages, comm••nds, reproaches,

and does every thing that may either enhance, or depress the passions of his men; where∣fore that Prince, or that Commonwealth that should design to establish a new Militia, and give it a reputation, is to accustom his Souldiers to the harangues of their chief Officers, and to chuse such Officers as know how to accost them.

CHAP. X.

Certain considerations which encourage Souldiers, and make them as virtuous as valiant.

Fabritio.

THe worship which the ancients paid to their Gods (though they were false) Religion, and the Oath which was taken before they were listed in the Army, was in those days sufficient to keep their Souldiers to their duty; for upon every misdemea∣nor they were threatned not only with such punishments as they were to expect from their Officers, but such as could be inflicted (as they thought) by nothing but their Gods; which opinion being tempered with other religious ceremonies and superstitions, made all enter∣prises easie to the Generals of those times, and would do so still, were we as careful and ob∣servant of our Religion as they were of theirs. Sertorious knew how to make his advan∣tage that way, pretending conference with a white Hart, which (as he gave out among his Souldiers) came from Heaven to assure him of Victory. Sylla to make his designs the more credible, pretended to discourse with an Image that he had taken out of the Temple of Apollo, which directed him how he was to steer. Others have pretended dreams and vi∣sions that have commanded them to fight: in the days of our Fathers, Charles the Seventh of France during his wars with the English, pretended to be advised by a maid that was sent from Heaven to give him instructions, which maid was called the Pucelle d' Orleans, and gained him many a Victory. There are other ways of making an Enemy contemp∣tible; Agesilaus the Spartan having taken several Persians, strip'd them naked, and shew'd them to his men, to the end that seeing the delicacy and tenderness of their contexture, they might have less occasion to fear them. Some have by design brought their men into extremity, that they might be necessitated to fight, as having taken from them all hopes of preservation, but in Victory; which indeed is the surest and best way to make your Soul∣diers fight, and to infuse courage into them, and then this courage and obstinacy is highly encreased by their confidence in their General, and their love to their Country. Their love to their Country is natural; their confidence in their Captain is more from his expe∣rience and conduct, than from any thing else. There may be many other obligations, but none so strong as that which binds you either to conquer, or dye.