The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

THE ART of WAR, IN SEVEN BOOKS. (Book 1)

LIBER I. (Book 1)

CHAP. I.

How the Seigneur Fabritio Colonna being refreshing himself one evening with some other Gentlemen in a beautiful Garden, took occasion to enter upon this discourse of War.

SEeing I am of opinion, that after a man is dead, it is lawful for any body to com∣mend him without danger of reproof, (because there can be no occasion nor suspicion of flattery) I shall make no difficulty to speak something in praise of our renowned and true friend Cosimo Rucellia, whose name I cannot remember without tears in my eyes, having known in him all the good qualities, which one good Friend or good Citizen would desire in another; for I know not any thing so dear to him, that he would not have sacrificed for his friend; nor any thing so dreadful, that he would not have undertaken for his Country: and I confess freely among all with whom I have had any acquaintance and conversion, I do not know any man whose heart was more disposed to great and magnificent things. At his death nothing troubled him so much (as he complained often to his friends) as that he should die young, and in his own house without honour, or the satisfaction of having been serviceable to any man as he desired, for he was sensible that no more could be said of him than that he died a good friend. However it follows not but we who were acquainted with him, may bear testimony of his virtues and good qua∣lities, seeing their is nothing left of his works or actions to recommend him to the World: and yet fortune was not so much his enemy but she suffered him to leave a short monu∣ment of the dexterity of his wit, which appears in certain Sonnets, and amorous Verses of his composition; in which way (though he was not amorous) he entertained himself at idle times in his youth, till his Stars had conducted him to higher thoughts, by which Verses it may easily be discerned with what comeliness and felicity he could have expressed his conceptions, and how honourable he would have made himself by his Poetry, had he made it his business. But fortune having deprived us of such a friend, it seems to me that no better remedy can be applyed, than for us (as far as is possible) to make as much of his memory as we can, and recollect such of his sayings, or arguments, as were either witty or solid. And because there is nothing of him more fresh than the discourse which he had lately with Fabritio Colonna in his Garden, (where the said Fabritio gave a large account of all the mysteries of War one the one side, and Cosimo proposed, and objected, and argued with as much gravity one the other) being then present by accident with other of our friends, I have thought fit to put in writing, that by reading it, such of Cosimo's friends as were there may, renew the memory of his Virtues; such as were not there, may be

troubled for their absence, and learn several things profitable not only for military, but civil conversation.

I say then Fabritio Colonna returning from Lombardy, where for a long time he had done very honorable service for the King of Spain, passing by Florence to repose himself some time in that City, visit the Duke, and enjoy the company of certain Gentlemen with whom he had had a former acquaintance, Cosimo held himself obliged to invite him to his Gardens▪ not so much to shew his own liberality and magnificence, as to have larger opportunity of discoursing with him, and informing himself of such things as might be expected from a person of his experience, and spending a whole day in discoursing of what might be to the satisfaction of his mind. Fabritio accepted his invitation, came to his house, and was en∣tertained very nobly by Cosimo, with several other of his more particular friends as Zanobi Buondelmonti, Battista dalla Palla, Luigi Alamanni and others, all of them young Gentle∣men, his intimate friends, and ardently studious of the same things, of whose qualifica∣tions I shall say nothing in this place, because being still living, their own actions do re∣commend them every hour of the day.

Fabritio was regall'd with as much pomp and magnificence as were consistent with the time and the place: but dinner being ended, the tables taken way, and all the formalities of the Feast over, which among persons of great minds, whose thoughts are employed upon more honourable things, are not so tedious as with other people) the day being long, and heat excessive, Cosimo thought it convenient for the better satisfaction of his designs, under pretence of avoiding the heat, to carry Fabritio into a close and shady Arbour in the Garden, where they might discourse with more leisure and privacy; and having brought him and the rest of the Company to the place, some of them disposed themselves upon the grass, (which was very pleasant and green) and others upon seats under the shadow of those lofty trees; Fabritio began to applaud the delightsomness of the place, and then look∣ing particularly upon the trees, and not knowing of some of them, he stood still, as it were in suspence, which being observed by Cosimo, he told him, 'tis possible, Sir, you may not be acquainted with those trees, but 'tis no wonder, for some of them were in more request with our fore-Fathers than they are with us, and having told him their names, and what delight Seignor Bernardo his Grand-father took in planting, Fabritio replyed, I thought they were as you say; but the pleasantness of this place, and the innocence of that em∣ployment puts me in mind of some Princes in the Kingdom of Naples who delighted themselves exceedingly in those kind of diversions, and would plant, and make delicate Arbours to keep themselves from the heat; and thereupon breaking off short in his discourse, he stood still for a while, as in some serious suspence, but presently he told them if I thought I should not misbehave my self, (which among my friends I suppose is not easy) I would give you my opinion of it, not to traduce or calumniate them, but for discourse sake, and to pass away the time; for doubtless those Princes (under correction) had done much better to have imitated their Ancestors in great and heroick, rather than in soft and effeminate things; to have followed their examples in the heat of the Sun, ra∣ther than to have retir'd and withdrawn themselves into the coolness of a shade; and ra∣ther to have personated their fore-Fathers in what was solid and perfect, than in what was delicate, and corrupt; for since these kind of entertainments have been pleasing to our Country-men, our Country has gone to ruine, and all things declined.

Cosimo.

You have opened a way to a discourse which I desire exceedingly, and there∣fore I beg of you that you would speak of it frankly, without respect to any body, seeing I intend to interrogate you with the same freedom, and if in my demands or replies I ex∣cuse, or accuse any man, it will not be barely to excuse or accuse him, but to understand the truth.

Fabritio.

I shall be well pleased to inform you of anything I know, and shall leave it to your discretion to judge whether what I say be true or false, expecting to learn as much from your demands, as you will do from my answers; for a wise question makes a man consider many things which perhaps he regarded not before; and understand others, which without interrogation he had never understood.

Cosimo.

I will return to what you said first, that my Grand-father, and your fore-Fathers would have done more prudently to have imitated their Ancestors in difficult and generous things, rather than in what was delicate and soft; and in this I will excuse my part, and leave the other to be defended by you. I am of opinion that there was not a man in his time who detested all kind of effeminacy more than he, and who was a greater lover of that kind of activity and vigour which you so much commend, nevertheless he found that he could not make use of it either in his own person, or in the persons of his Children, being born in so corrupt an age, that a man who should have deviated from the

common practice of those times, would have made himself contemptible to every body. For if a man in the heat of Summer should have lien basking upon the sands; or in the midst of Winter should have taken up his quarters in the snow, (as Diogenes did) he would have been thought a fool, or a mad-man: should a man have followed the Spartan way, brought up his children in some cottage, taught them to sleep in the fields; to run about bare-foot and bare-headed; wash in cold water to inure them to hardship, and by making them less fond of life, to make them less sensible of death, he would have been despised for his pains; and have been thought rather a bruit than a man. Again should a man have been observed to starve his own carkass, and to live only upon beans and pease, and such kind of pulse, and have made as small account of mony as Fabritius did of what was offer∣ed him by the Samnites, 'tis possible he might have been commended by some few, but he should have been followed by no body: being discouraged therefore by the practice of the present age, he followed not the example of his Ancestors exactly, but followed them as much as he could, with as little notice and admiration to the World.

Fabritio.

You have excused your Grand-father very handsomly on that particular, and what you have said is doubtlesly true; but I did not speak so much of that hard and rustick way of living, as of other ways that are more soft and effeminate; have greater confor∣mity and correspondence with our present times, and are (in my judgment) easily to be introduced by any man who has the government of affairs: and in my discourse of this matter I shall not need to straggle into other Countries for examples, for the Romans (my own Country-men) will furnish me abundantly; whose Practices, and order of Govern∣ment, if well considered, will not be found so impossible to be introduced in any other City where there is but the least spark of virtue and goodness.

Cosimo.

What are those things that you would introduce according to the example of our Ancestors?

Fabritio.

To honour and reward virtue; not to dispise poverty; to value order and discipline of war; to constrain Citizens to love one another; to live without factions; to postpone all private interest to the publick; and several other things that may easily ac∣commodate with our times; and these things are not difficult to be introduced, provided it be done deliberately and by right means, because in them the truth is so manifest and ap∣parent, that the commonest capacity may apprehend it. He therefore who orders his af∣fairs in this manner, plants himself trees which will afford him a happier and more plea∣sant shelter and protection than these,

Cosimo.

I will not reply to what you have said, but referring it to the discretion of the company, (who can easily judge of it) I shall address my discourse to you, who seems to find fault with all those who in their great and weighty affairs do not follow the examples of our Ancestors, supposing thereby I may be more easily satisfied in my intention. I would know therefore how it comes to pass that, on one side you condemn all those who do not imitate the practice of our Ancestors; and yet on the other, in your wars (which is your profession, and excellence) it does not appear that you have made use of any thing of the ancient method and discipline, or done any thing that resembled it.

Fabritio.

You are now come to the point where I expected you, and indeed my discourse deserved, and I my self desired no other demand. And though I might save my self the labour, with a very plausible excuse, yet I will satisfie both your desire and my own, and that the more largely, because both time and place concurs to our convenience. Men who are desirous to do any great action, are first to prepare themselves with all dili∣gence and industry, that when occasion is offered, they may be ready to execute and com∣pleat it. And because where those preparations are made cautiously, they are not to be discovered; no man is to be accused of negligence, unless occasion discovers him first, to which if he be remiss, and makes not use of his time to execute his design, it gives us to un∣derstand, that either he has not prepar'd as he ought to have been, or that he had not thought of it at all: and therefore no occasion having presented it self to me to discover the preparations which I had made to reduce our Militia into the form of the ancients; if I have not yet reduced it, I conceive I cannot justly be condemned, either by you, or any body else: and this I think is a sufficient answer to your accusation.

Cosimo.

It would be sufficient indeed, could I be assured that you never had any occa∣sion.

Fabritio.

But because I find you may doubt whether ever such occasion were offered or not, I am content to discourse more largely (upon condition you will have the patience to hear me) what preparations are necessary to be made; what occasion is necessary to be had; what difficulties obstruct our preparatives, and hinder our occasion; and how this is easie and hard to fall out at the same time, which seems a contradiction.

Cosimo.

You cannot do me and the whole company a greater favour; and if it will be no trouble to you to enlarge, it will be none to us to attend: but because the discourse is like to be long, I desire I may have the assistance of my friends, yet with your licence and permission; wherefore they and I do make it our request, that you would not take it a miss if we interrupt you sometimes with some importunate demand.

Fabritio.

I am very well contented, that you (Cosimo) and these young Gentlemen your friends, ask any thing of me, because I believe the heat of your youth makes you in∣clinable to arms, and by consequence more apt to give credit to what I shall say: and these other Gentlemen shall have the same liberty, because their grey heads, and their cold blood, makes them commonly enemies to warfare, and incorrigible, as people possessed with an opinion that it is the times, not the ill customs which constrains men to live at that rate. Question me then freely, as you please; 'tis the thing I desire, because I shall there∣by have some respit, and repose; and withal, the satisfaction of clearing your doubts, and leaving nothing unanswered in your minds.

CHAP. II.

A person of honour and condition is not to make War his profession.

Fabritio.

I Will begin my discourse with what you said, that in matter of War (which is my profession) I never made use of any thing of the ancients, To which I answer, that War being a profession by which men cannot live honourable at all times, it is not to be taken up as a trade, unless it be by a Commonwealth, or a Kingdom, and if they be well constituted, they will neither of them suffer any of their Citizens or Subjects, or any other good man to make it his business; for he will never be thought a good man who takes upon him an employment, by which if he would reap any profit at any time, he is obliged to be false, and rapacious, and cruel, and to entertain several other qualities that are not consistent in a good man; nor can any man (great or small) who makes war his profession, be otherwise than vitious; because that that trade being not to be followed in time of peace, they are necessitated either to prevent or obstruct peace; or in time of war to provide so for themselves, that they may subsist in time of peace; and neither of those two ways are practicable to an honest man; for from the desire of providing for themselves against the evil day, when the wars should be ended, proceed the robberies, and thefts, and murders which are committed daily by such kind of people, and that upon their friends as well as enemies. And from the desire of obstructing the peace, proceed all the frauds and jugling which the Officers use with those who pay them, and all to continue the war; but if by accident peace be concluded contrary to their endeavours and design, it is to be feared that the Officers finding themselves destitute of pay, and their old liberty and licentiousness, will get together such Soldiers of fortune as have nothing to subsist upon, and falling into some Province, plunder and rifle it without any compassion. Do you not remember that here in Italy we had several of these disbanded Souldiers, which got together when the wars were done, called themselves the Companies, and went up and down ransacking Towns, and pillaging the Country, and all without remedy? Have you not read how after the first Carthaginian War, disbanded Souldiers united under the command of Matho and Spendius, (two of their Officers) and in a tumultuous manner made a more dangerous War upon the Carthaginians than that which they had had with the Romans; In the days of our Predecessors Francis Sforza not only betraid the Milanois who had made him their General, but usurped upon their liberty, and made himself their Prince, and for what, but that he might live in the same splendor when the Peace was con∣cluded. And all the rest of the great Officers in Italy were like him, (especially if War was their profession) and though de facto they did not all make themselves Dukes of Milan by their treachery, they were the more to be blamed, because without the temptation of so great advantage their lives and exorbitances were as bad. The Father of Francis Sforza being in the service of Queen Iane, constrained her to cast her self into the protection of the King of Arragon, having deserted her on a sudden, and left her disarm'd in the midst of her enemies, and all to satiate his ambition, to satisfy his revenge, or to have got her Kingdom for himself. Braccio with the same industry endeavoured to possess himself of the Kingdom of Naples, and had he not been defeated and slain at Aquila, he had certainly effected it; and these confusions proceeded from nothing else but from the employing of such men as were mercenary, and had nothing to subsist upon but their pay? Have you

not a Proverb which confirms what I say, and tells us, that War makes Thieves, and Peace brings them to the Gallows; the reason is, for that those persons who have no other way of livelihood, nor so much temper and ingenuity as to take to any other course that may ho∣nestly sustain them, are forced by necessity to rob upon the high-ways, and then justice is forced to dispatch them,

Cosimo.

You have represented this trade and profession of a Souldier so vile and con∣temptible, that to me it seems now to be worse than none at all, whereas before I thought it one of the most noble and excellent things in the World: so that unless you satisfie me better, I shall never be contented; for if it be so as you say, I cannot imagin how it should come to pass that Caesar, and Pompey, and Scipio, and Marcellus, and so many other great Captains of the Romans should become so famous as to be worshipped like Gods.

Fabritio.

I have not yet thorowly examined those two things which I proposed in the beginning; one is, that a good man cannot take up that calling as his profession: the other is, that no well constituted Government (whether Commonwealth or Kingdom) will suffer its Subjects or Citizens to make War their whole business. To the first I have spoke what I thought fit; it remains now that I speak to the second, in which I shall have occasion to reply to your last demand.

CHAP. III.

How a Commonwealth ought not (in prudence) to permit any of its Citizens to make War their profession.

Fabritio.

TOuching the Romans which you mentioned, it is true Pompey and Caesar, and most of the great Captains who were at Rome after the last Carthaginian War, arrived at great reputation, but it was rather as brave and generous, than good and virtuous men; whereas those who were before them, were famous as much for their vir∣tue as conduct, and the reason was, because these made not War their profession, and the others did.

Whilst the Roman Commonwealth was incorrupt and immaculate, there never was any Citizen who presumed by means of this profession to make his own fortune or party in time of Peace; by breaking the Laws, exacting upon the provinces, usurping and tyran∣nizing over his Country, and using all means to make himself rich. No man of inferior condition ever thought of violating his Oaths; maintaining of Parties; disrespecting the Senate; or promoting of tumults or any tyrannical sedition with design of making him∣self a fortune by the profession of Arms. But those who had the command of their Armies, contented with their triumphs, returned joyfully to their private affairs; and the Officers who were under them laid down their Arms with more alacrity than they had taken them up; every man returning to his former course of life, without any hopes of advancing himself by plunder and rapine. And of this we have strong and evident cause of conjecture from the example of Regulus Attilius, who being General of the Roman Armies in Africa, and having in a manner conquered the Carthaginians, desired leave of the Senate to return, that he might look to a Farm of his in the Country which his servants had neglected. From whence it is as clear as the day, that had he made War his profession, or designed to have raised his own fortune out of the ruins of other people having so many Provinces at his mercy, he would never have been so careful of the im∣provement of a Cottage, when every day would have brought him in more than his whole Patrimony was worth. But because good men, and such as are not desirous to make a trade of War, are unwilling to reap any other fruit therefrom but labour, and danger, and glory; when they are arrived at a sufficient proportion of the later, 'tis their ambition to return quietly to their houses, and live upon their old professions in Peace. As to the common and private Soldiers, it's clear they were of the same humour, and declin'd any such pro∣fession; for though when they were at home, they desired many of them to be in the wars, yet when they were in the wars, they were as willing to be dismissed. This is ma∣nifest by several arguments, but especially by the priviledg which the Romans granted to their Citizens, that none of them should be constrained to the wars against his own in∣clination. So that Rome whilst it was well governed (which was till the time of the Gracchi) had never any Souldier who made it his profession to be so, by which means few of them were dissolute, and those who were, were punished severely. A City then well

constituted and governed is to take care that this Art of War be used in time of Peace only as an exercise, and in time of War only for necessity, and the acquisition of glory; leaving the constant practice and profession of it to the State, as the Romans did anciently to the Commonwealth of Rome. That Citizen who has any other design in the profession of Arms, let him be what he will, is no honest man; and that City which is governed any other way, is as much in the wrong.

Cosimo.

I am very well satisfied with what you have said hitherto, and do acquiesce in your conclusion as far as it relates to a Commonwealth, but as to Kings I am apt to dissent because I am apt to think it convenient a King should have those about him who made Arms their profession.

CHAP. IV.

That a King ought not to permit his Subjects to make Arms their profession, for the mischiefs which do frequently ensue.

Fabritio.

A Kingdom well govern'd ought the more carefully avoid people of that con∣dition, because it is they who debauch their King by being the only Mini∣sters of his Tyranny. And do not object to me any of our present Kingdoms; for I shall deny absolutely that they are as well governed as formerly, when Kings had no Soveraignty, nor absolute power, but in the Armies, because there (and no where else) there is a necessity of speedy resolutions; and that such a power should be reposed in a single person; in other cases they ought to do nothing without their Counsel, and it is to be the particular care of all that are of Counsel to a Prince, to keep off such persons from about him as pro∣mote War in time of Peace, because they cannot frame themselves to any other way of subsistance. But I will discourse something more largely of this matter, not standing so much upon a Kingdom that is perfectly good according to the model of the Ancients, but supposing such a one as is like the Kingdoms of our days; in which likewise a King ought to be fearful of such as live wholly by War, because the Nerves and strength of all Armies lyes certainly in the Infantry.

Wherefore if a King orders his matters so ill, that his foot be not content to return to their several callings in time of Peace, and live as formerly by their labour, he must neces∣sarily be ruined; for of all the Soldiers in the world none are so dangerous as those who make War their profession; and the reason is, because you must be always at War, or keep them always in pay; otherwise you will run a great hazard of being turn'd out of your Kingdom; and because it is impossible either to maintain War perpetually, or keep them in continual pay, you will be in great danger of being driven out of your Kingdom. My Country-men the Romans (as I said before) whilst they were wise, and honest, never suf∣fered their Citizens to make that exercise their calling, though in respect of their perpetual Wars, they were able to have pay'd them perpetually: But to avoid the inconveniencies which might follow thereupon, seeing the condition of their times did not alter, they altered their Men, ordering their affairs in such manner, that every fifteen years their Le∣gions were renewed, and filled up again with young men in the flower of their age; that is to say, betwixt eighteen and thirty five years of age; during which time their legs their hands, and their eyes do correspond one with the other, and are in the same disposi∣tion; for they did not keep them till their strength and vigour decayed, and their froward∣ness, and insolence increased, as they did afterwards when the times were more corrupt.

For Octavian first, and afterwards Tiberius (preferring their private power before the profit of the publick) began to disarm the people (that thereby they might have them more easily at command) and to keep standing Armies upon the Frontiers of their Em∣pire. But because they thought them insufficient to curb the people, and awe the Senate of Rome; they established another Army (which they called the Pretorian) which was quartered always about the City, and intended as a guard. But when afterwards the Em∣perors permitted them who were listed in those Bands, to lay aside all other professions, and devote themselves to War, they grew insolent immediately, and became not only ter∣rible to the Senate, but pernicious to the Emperor, insomuch that many of them were put to death by the fury and insolence of those Soldiers, who created, and disposed their Emperors as they pleased; and sometimes it fell out that at the same time several Empe∣rors were created by the several Armies, which occasioned the division first, and by degrees the destruction of the Empire. Those Kings therefore who are desirous to live in safety

and peace, ought to have their Armies composed of such persons, as when there is a neces∣sity of War, will take up Arms freely for the defence of their Country; and when Peace is concluded, will as readily acquiesce, and return to their old habitations and callings; which may easily be done; if they make their Levies of such men as have professions before: A King is likewise (upon the publication of Peace) to command his Generals and great Officers to their respective charges and governments elsewhere; the Reformades and Gen∣tlemen to their own Houses and Estates; and the common Soldiers to their Original Trades and Occupations. And by the election of such men, they will fight stoutly to procure Peace, but never disturb Peace to create a War.

Cosimo.

I must confess your discourse to me seems very considerable; yet being so con∣trary to what I fancied before, my mind is not so well satisfied but there remains some doubt behind which is still to be cleer'd: for I observe several Lords and Gentlemen who in time of Peace maintain themselves wholly by the profession of Arms; as several great Commanders of your acquaintance and quality, who are in pay under several Princes and States; besides most of the men at Arms are continued in pay for the guard and security of such Cities and Castles as are requisite to be kept; so that in my judgment there is employ∣ment enough for them all in time of Peace.

Fabritio.

I do not believe that you can think that in time of Peace there is entertainment for them all; for if no other reason was to be alledged, the smallness of the numbers re∣quir'd to the furnishing the Garrisons, would be sufficient to refute it. What proportion is there betwixt the Bodies of foot which are to be raised for carrying on a War, and those which are required for supplying the Garrisons in time of Peace: for those Cities and Castles which in time of Peace are kept with a few men, are reinforced with great num∣bers in time of War; besides which, great Levies are made for the Field Armies, which upon the conclusion of Peace are constantly disbanded. And as to such as are retained in the nature of Guards to the State, Pope Iulius and you, have demonstrated how much those are to be apprehended who will not entertain any other vocation but War; having turned them out of your Guards for their insolence, and entertained Swizzers in their places, as people born and brought up under Laws, and chosen by the Communalty by a more regular election; so that tell me no more there is employment for them all in times of Peace. As to the men at Arms, and their being continued in pay in times of peace, the answer I confess is more difficult; yet upon closer examination it will not be found impossible, because this custom of keeping men at Arms in pay is corrupt, and in∣convenient; the reason is, for that they are people who having no other Vocations, are occasions of daily disorders in the State, especially where their numbers are great; but where they are not so numerous as to make an Army of themselves, the danger of them is so much the less. Yet many times they have done mischief enough, as I have said before in the cases of Francis Sforza, his Father and Braccio da Perug••a. So that I cannot approve this Custom of keeping men at Arms in constant pay, having seen so much experience of their corruptions, and the inconvenience which has followed thereupon.

Cosimo.

Would you have no such Forces in pay at all? or if you would have them; how would you have them entertained?

Fabritio.

Not as the men at Arms in France, for they are as dangerous and insolent as ours, but rather according to the method of the ancients, who raised their Cavalry out of their own Subjects, whom they sent home again to their houses when Peace was concluded to follow their old Callings, as shall be shown more largely before we end our discourse; so that if these kind of Soldiers do now (even in times of Peace) receive pay, and live under that profession, it proceeds from corruption in their customs. And as to the Pensions which I, and my fellow Officers receive, I say that that also is a corrupt custom; for a wise, and well ordered Government ought not to entertain any such Pensioners, but is rather to em∣ploy their own Citizens for Generals in time of War, and when that is done, dismiss them to their own private affairs. And with a wise King it is the same; he is either to give no such Pensions at all, or if he does, it ought to be in recompence of some signal ex∣ploit, or to oblige some excellent person in time of Peace as well as War. And because you have instanced in me, I am content to stand for an example; and therefore I say I never made War my profession. My business is to govern my subjects, to defend them, to pre∣fer Peace, but yet to know how to manage my self in War; and if I have received honour or reward from the King, it is not for my understanding of experience in War, so much as for my integrity and counsel in times of Peace. A wise Prince ought not therefore to have any about him, but such as are so constituted; for if they be too zealous either for Peace or for War, they will draw him into inconvenience. This (according to my proposition at first) I could not but say as to the first point; if it be insufficient, you must apply your

self elsewhere for farther satisfaction. But by what is said, you may perceive the difficulty of reviving the customs of the Ancients in our present Wars: What preparations are requi∣site to be made by any man that is wise, and what opportunities are to be expected to bring them to perfection; But you will understand them ••etter if your patience will give me leave to discourse them from point to point, and compare all the customs of the an∣cients, with the particular practices of our times.

Cosimo.

If we desired at first to hear you discourse of these things, certainly what you have discoursed already, has much encreased our desire; wherefore as we give you thanks for what you have done, so we do earnestly beg of you that you would proceed to the remainder

CHAP. V.

In what Countries the best Soldiers are to be raised.

Fabritio.

SEeing you are hitherto so well pleased, I will deduce my discourse of this mat∣ter from the fountain, that thereby you may comprehend it the better, and I be enabled to demonstrate it more copiously. When War is resolved, every man's chief business is to put himself into a condition of giving the Enemy Battel, and fighting him fairly in the field. To enable himself for this, it is necessary to raise an Army; to raise an Army, there is a necessity of men, of arming them, disciplining them, exercising them, (and that in great as well as small bodies) of teaching them to encamp, and ac∣quainting them with the Enemy by degrees, either by frequent facing or confronting him, or by encamping somewhere near his march, where they may have the prospect of his Army as he passes by. In this the whole address and industry of a Campania, or field War con∣sists, which doubtless is more necessary and honorable than any other; and he who under∣stands well how to draw up an Army, and present his Enemy Battel, may be excused for all his other errors in the management of the War; but if he be ignorant or defective in that, though in other things he be sufficient enough; yet he shall never bring his War to any honourable conclusion. For win a Battel, and you cancel all your former miscarriages; lose one, and all that ever you did well before evaporates, and comes to nothing.

It being so necessary then to find men, the first thing to be done, is to know how to make our choice (which the ancients called Delectus, and we Levies) of which I shall give you some light.

They who have given us rules of the management of War, have recommended to us to make our Levies in temperate regions, that our Soldiers may be both valiant, and cunning For hot Countries are observed to produce wise and subtle people, but not couragious; cold Countries on the other side do afford stout men, and hardy, but then they are seldom dis∣creet. This Rule was proper enough for a Prince that was Monarch of the whole world, and might make his Levies where he pleas'd: But to give a rule that all may follow, I must needs say that all Commonwealths, or Kingdoms, are to make their Levies in their own Countries, whether hot or cold, or temperate, it's the same thing; because by ancient ex∣perience we find that in any Country, Exercise and Discipline makes good Soldiers; for where Nature is defective, industry will supply; and in this case it's the better of the two. And indeed to raise men in other Countries cannot be call'd properly a delectus, for delectum habere is to pick and cull the best men in a Province, and to have power to choose those who are unwilling as well as those who are willing to the War; which kind of delectus cannot be made exactly but in your own dominion; for in Countries belonging to another Prince, you must be contented with such as are willing, it being not to be expected that you should have liberty to choose as you please.

Cosimo.

Yet among those who are willing, you may pick and choose, take and leave what you think good, and therefore it is not so improper to call that a delectus.

Fabritio.

You are in the right as to one way; but if you consider the secret defects of such an Election, you will find that in strictness it is not an Election; and that for these following reasons. First, those who are not your Subjects, but are willing to the Wars, are none of the best, but generally the lewdest and most dissolute persons in the Province; for if any be scandalous, idle, incorrigible, irreligious, disobedient to their Parents, Blas∣phemers, Cheats, and altogether ill bred, they are those who are most likely to list them∣selves for the War, and there is nothing so contrary to good and true discipline, as such kind of humors: When of such kind of Cattle you have more offer themselves, than the number you design to entertain, you may take your choice indeed, but the whole mass be∣ing

bad, your choice can never be good. But many times it falls out, that there being not so many of them as you have occasion to employ, you are glad to take all, and in that case you cannot not be said habere delectum so properly, as milites conscribere: And of such kind of disorderly people, the Armies of Italy and most other places do consist at this day; only in Germany it is otherwise, because there, no man is press'd or listed barely upon the Emperor's command, but as he stands willing and disposed to the Wars himself; you may judge then what part of the ancient discipline of the Romans can be introduced into an Army made up of such a medly of wickedness.

Cosimo.

What way is to be taken?

Fabritio.

That which I recommended before, which is to choose out of your own Sub∣jects, and to exercise your authority in your choice.

Cosimo.

If your election be made in that manner, can any ancient form be intro∣duced?

Fabritio.

You know it may, if it be in a Kingdom, and he who command be their Prince, or lawful Soveraign; and if in a Commonwealth it is the same, so he be a great Citizen, and made General for that time, otherwise it is no easie matter to do any thing that shall succeed.

Cosimo.

Why Sir?

Fabritio.

I shall tell you that hereafter, at present this may suffice, that no good is to be done any other way

Cosimo.

Well then, these Levies being to be made in your own Territory, is it best to make them in the Cities or Country?

CHAP. VI.

Whether it be best to choose you men out of the Cities, or Country.

Fabritio.

THose Authors who have writ any thing of this Nature, do agree unanimously that the best choice is in the Country where they are inur'd to difficulty and labour; acquainted more with the Sun than the shade, accustomed to the Spade and the Plough, and to carry burdens, without any shifting, or mutiny. But Because our Armies do consist of Horse as well as Foot, my advice is, that the Horse be raised in the Cities, and the Foot in the Country.

Cosimo.

Of what age would you choose them?

Fabritio.

Were I to raise a new Army, I would choose them betwixt seventeen, and forty; were I only to recruit an old one, I would have them always of seventeen.

Cosimo.

I do not well understand your distinction.

Fabritio.

I will tell you, were I to raise an Army, or settle a Militia where there was none before, it would be necessary to make choice of the most apt and experienced that I could find (provided their age was sutable to the War) to instruct them as I shall direct. But if I were to raise men to recruit and reinforce an Army that was grown weak, I would take none above seventeen, because those who are there already will be able to teach them.

Cosimo.

You would order your Militia then, as ours is ordered with us.

Fabritio.

You say well but I would Arm, and Officer, and exercise, and Order them in a way I know not whether you be acquainted with in your Country.

Cosimo.

Then you are for Train'd Souldiers.

Fabritio.

Why would you have me blame them?

Cosimo.

Because several wise men have always condemn'd them.

Fabritio.

I think you are in a mistake to say a wise man can be against training of Soul∣diers: a man may be thought wise, ('tis possible) and be no such thing.

Cosimo.

The ill success which those Trained-bands have always had, is a great argument of the truth of that opinion.

Fabritio.

Have a care the fault was not more in you, than in them; of which perhaps you may be convinced before I have done my discourse.

Cosimo.

You will do us a very great favour. But I will tell you first, in what it is this Militia is condemn'd, that you may afterwards justifie it the better.

CHAP. VII.

Of the inconvenience, and convenience of Trained-Bands or a settled Militia.

Cosimo.

IT is objected that either they are experienced and useless, and then to rely upon them is to ruine the State. Or else they are ready and skilful, and strong, and then, he who has the command of them may do what he pleases. They instance in the Romans, who lost their liberty by these kind of men. They instance likewise in the Vene¦tian, and the King of France; the first of which makes use only of foreign Arms, lest some time or other, they should fall under the subjection of some of their Citizens: and the latter has disarmed his Subjects, with the more ease to keep them under command. But those who are against these Trained-Bands, are more fearful when they are raw, and inexpe∣rienced than otherwise, and to this purpose they give two considerable reasons. One is, because they are unskilful, the other is, because they are unwilling, and they say, that people any thing in years, never learn any thing well; and a man never does good when he is forced to the Wars.

Fabritio.

The reasons which you have alledged, are produced only by persons who understand things at a distance, as I shall demonstrate plainly. And first as to their unser∣viceableness, I say, there are no Souldiers more useful than ones own Subjects, and no Sub∣jects can be ordered a better way. And this being clear, and indisputable, I will not spend time in proving it farther, because I have the concurrence of all ancient History to confirm it. As to the inexperience and force wherewith they are charged, I say (and it is true) that, inexperience makes a man cowardly, and force makes a man Mutinous; but courage and experience both are infused into them by arming, and exercising, and accommodating them well, as shall be shown in my following discourse. But as to the point of force, you must know that such persons as are raised by the command of a Prince, are neither to be altogether press'd, nor altogether Voluntiers; because to have them altogether Voluntiers, would be to incur the inconveniences which I have mentioned before; it would not be a fair election, and there would be very few go a long with you, and wholly to force them, would be as dangerous on the other side: therefore a middle way is to be taken, neither too forcible on the one side, nor too frank on the other, but such a one as may tempt them to the War out of their respect to their Prince, whose displeasure they fear above all other punishments; such a course as this, tempered so cunningly betwixt fair means and foul, cannot be dangerous, nor produce that discontent and mutiny which occasions so much mis∣chief. I do not say that an army so chosen and exercised, is absolutely invincible, for the Roman Armies were many times overcome; and Hannibal's Army was defeated; wherefore an Army cannot be so ordered and disciplin'd, that one may promise himself it shall never be broken. The wise men therefore of whom you speak, are not to calculate the uselesness of an Army, from the loss of one Battle, but are rather to believe that having miscarried once, they will be more cautious afterwards, and do something (as occasion offers) to ex∣piate their disgrace: and if the business should be thorowly examined, it would not be found to be the defect of the form so much, as want of perfection in their Order▪ And this (as I said before) is to be provided against, not by blaming, or exploding the way of train'd men, but by improving and correcting it where it shall be found amiss; and how that is done, I will show you particularly. As to your doubt that such an order of Souldiers, meeting with an Officer equally disposed, may usurp upon you, and turn you out of your Government; I answer, that Arms put orderly and legally into the hands of Citizens or Subjects never did, nor will do any harm. And Cities are kept longer innocent and in∣corrupt with those, than any other forces, nay than they are commonly without them. Rome had its Citizens in Arms four hundred years together, and yet kept its liberty intire; Sparta preserved its liberty 800 years in the same posture; several Cities have been dis∣armed, and kept their liberties: but how long? Not forty years any of them, and the reason is, because great Cities have occasion for Soldiers, and when they have none of their own, they are forced to entertain Strangers which commonly do much more mischief than their own, for they are more easily debauched, and a popular Citizen may more easily corrupt and employ them as Instruments of Usurpation and Tyranny, when they have nothing but naked, and unarmed people to destroy. Besides, a City ought in reason to be more fearful of two Enemies than one. For in entertaining of Strangers, a City is to have an eye over her Mercenaries and her Natives; and to prove that this jealousie is natural and reasonable,

remember what I said before of Francis Sforza; whereas a City which employs only her own inhabitants, fears nobody else. But to use one reason for all, let me tell you, no man ever established a Commonwealth, or Kingdom, who did not believe that the inhabitants (if arm'd) would be willing to defend it.

And had the Venetians been as wise in this, as other Counsels, they would have set up a new Monarchy in the World; and they are the more inexcusable that have not, be∣cause their first Legislators put arms into their hands, and gave them ability to defend themselves. But their territory being little at land, they employed their arms only at Sea, where they performed many great things, to the enlargement of their Country. But in process of time, being forced to take arms by land for the relief of vicenza, they enter∣tained the Marquess of Mantoua into their service, and made him their General, whereas they should rather have committed that charge to one of their own Citizens, and sent him to have engaged the enemy at land. This unhappy resolution was that which clip'd the wings of their success, and kept them from extending their Empire; if they did it out of an opinion that their experience was not so great in Land as in Sea affairs, their diffidence was imprudent; for a Sea Captain accustomed to the conflicts of the Winds and the Water, and the elements, and the enemy, shall sooner make a good Land-Officer, where he has nothing to fight with but men; than a Land-Officer shall make a good Captain at Sea. My Country-men the Romans who were so knowing at Land, being at wars with the Carthaginian that was so potent at Sea; never troubled themselves to enter∣tain either Grecian or Spaniard into their service, though they were both so good Souldiers at Sea, but they committed that charge to their Land-Officers, who fought the Carthagi∣nians, and beat them. If the Venetians did it to prevent the usurpation of any of their fellow Citizens, I think it was an unnecessary fear; for (besides the reasons aforesaid) if a Citizen with his Sea-forces never made himself Master of any Sea Town, he could have done it much less with any Land-force. So that hence it may be seen that is is not putting the Citizens in arms, that is the cause of tyranny; but ill order, and ill management in the Government; for whilst good order is preserved, there is no danger of their being arm'd, wherefore their resolution in that point being imprudent, has rob'd them of much reputation and happiness. And as to the King of France's error in not keeping his sub∣jects in discipline, and prepared for the Wars, which is by you urged for an example, there is no body (laying aside his private passion) but must conclude that single neglect to be a great weakness to his Kingdom.

But my digression has been too great, and perhaps beyond my design, yet I have done it the more willingly to demonstrate to you that foreign force is not to be relied upon so much as ones own subjects; nor can ones own subjects be prepared and adapted for the Wars any way so well, as by training and exercise. Nor can there be any better way of forming an army, or establishing a Militia in any place than that which I have prescribed. If you have read the orders of the first Roman Kings, especially of Servius Tulli••s, you will find his orders like ours, and driving at nothing more than putting the Citizens into such a posture, that upon any emergence they might be brought suddenly together, and form'd into an army for the defence of the City.

CHAP. VIII.

Of what sort of people an army is to be composed.

Fabritio.

BUt to return to our levies, I say again, that being to recruit and old Army, I would choose my men of about seventeen; but to raise a new one that might be made fit for service in a short time, I would take in any betwixt seventeen and forty.

Cosimo

Would you in your election make any difference of their trades?

Fabritio.

Many Authors which have written on that subject, have made a difference of their trades, and will not allow of Faulconers, Fowlers, Fishers, Ruffians, or any per∣sons who make sports their profession, or are in any manner subservient to pleasure: those who they recommend to be chosen, are Labourers, Husband-men, Smiths, Farriers, Car∣penters, Butchers, Huntsmen, and the like. But for my own part, I should not so much consider the quality of the profession, as the goodness of the man, and which way he may be employed with most advantage. For this reason I think your Plough-men, and Day-labourers in the Country are more useful Generally than any other; for they take more

pains, and do more service in an Army than all the rest. After them are your Smiths, Farriers, Carpenters, Joyners, and such people to be chosen; of which sort it is conveni∣ent to have good store, because their arts are usefull in an Army upon several occasions: and 'tis a good thing to have Souldiers who have two strings to theri bow, and yield you double advantage.

Cosimo,

How are those who are fit, or unfit for the Wars, to be distinguished and known?

Fabritio

I shall speak of the manner of choosing a Militia to form it afterwards into an Army, because we shall have occasion again of speaking of the election to be made up∣on the recruiting of an old Army. I say therefore that the fitness of a person to be cho∣sen for the Wars, is to be known by experience, (in some great atchievment) or by conje∣cture.

This proof and tryal of their courage is not to be found among new raised men, it is necessary therefore where this experience is not to be had, to have recourse to conjecture, which is to be deduced from their age, arts, and stature. Of the two first we have spoken before; it remains that we speak now of the third, and tell you, that some persons (as Pyrrhus) have been altogether for large and tall men. Others (as Caesar) would have them strong, well knit, and vigorous, which is to be judged by the composition of their members, and the quickness of their aspect. Wherefore those who treat of that subject, have recommended a lively and quick eye, a nervous neck, a large breast, a musculous arm, a long finger, a small belly, round and firm thighs, and thin feet, this kind of contexture does always import activity and strength, which in a Souldier are two things principally to be desired. But above all respect is to be had to their manners and that they be indued with honesty, and modesty, otherwise you choose an instrument of scandal, and a begin∣ning of corruption; for no body can expect, that with brutishness and dishonesty, any laudable virtue should consist. Upon this occasion it seems to me not impertinent (for your better understanding the importance of this way of election) to let you know the man∣ner in which the Roman Consuls in the begining of their Magistracy made their elections for the Roman Legions. In which levies (by reason of their continual Wars) being mix'd of new and Veteran Souldiers, they could proceed in the Veterans by experience, and by conjecture in the new. You must know then, these levies were made either for present service, or to exercise them first, and employ them afterwards as occasion was offered. And although I have spoken already of what is to be observed in the election of such as are to be disciplin'd and employed afterwards, yet my intention being to shew how an Ar∣my may be ordered in a Country where there is no military discipline, and where men are not to be raised for immediate service, I shall speak of it further. But in those Countries where it is the custom to raise Forces by the Princes command, there they may have them always ready for present service, as it was anciently in Rome, and is among the Swizzars at this day. For if in these kind of levies there be new Souldiers, there are many which are old and experienced, which mingled with the new, will make a good Army. Notwith∣standing this, the Emperors (after they began to keep standing Forces and Garisons upon the Frontiers) appointed Masters for the training and instructing their new men whom they called Tyrones, as may be seen in the life of Maximus the Emperor. Which custom was not practised in the Armies whilst Rome enjoyed her liberty, but only in the City in which those military exercises being much used by the youth, it came to pass, that being drawn out for the Wars, they were so well versed and experienced in that counterfeit disci∣pline, that when afterwards they came to it in earnest, they behaved themselves very well. But when by degrees the Emperors disused or abolished that custom of training, they were constrained to these ways which I have shewn you before.

CHAP. IX

How the Romans raised their Legions.

TO proceed therefore to the manner of the election of the Roman Legions, I say, that after the Roman Consuls (in whose hands the administration of the war was wholly deposited) had taken upon them the Magistracy, being to raise an Army accord∣ing to custom, which gave to each Consul two Legions of the Best men, (who were esteemed the strength and flower of their Army) they created four and twenty military Tribunes, (six for each Legion) and invested them with the same authority as we do our Captains. Af∣ter

this they assembled all the Romans who were able to bear arms, and place the Tri∣bunes of each Legion a part; after which they drew lots in which Tribe they should be∣gin their election, and where the lot fell, out of that Tribe they chose four of the best, and out of them four, and one was chosen by the Tribunes of the first Legion; and out of the other three, one was chosen by the second Legion; and out of the remaining two, another was chosen by the third Legion; and the fourth person belonged to the fourth Legion: these four being disposed in this manner, they proceeded to the election of four more, the first of which was chosen by the Tribunes of the second Legion; the second by the Tri∣bunes of the third; the third by the fourth, and the fourth by the first Legion. After which they had a third election; the first chose the third; the second the fourth; the third the first; and the fourth the second: and in this manner they varied their elections, till at length all the legions became perfect and equal, and were then united. As we said before, the Romans had the convenience of making this election for present service, because a good part of such as were chosen, were old Souldiers, well experienced in their trade, and all of them well disciplin'd and train'd; so that their elections were made by experience, and conjecture both; but where an Army is to be new raised, and chosen, not so much for present as future service; the election in that case is to be made by conjecture only, and that from the age and person of the man.

Cosimo.

I believe what you have said to be true; but before you pass to another discourse, I would be satisfied in a thing of which you put me in mind, by saying that levies to be made of such persons as have not been trained up in the wars, are to be made by con∣jecture; and of this I am the more curious, because I have observed in many places our Militia's to be condemned, and especially as to our numbers; for many are of opinion a less number were better, in respect that the fewer there were, the better they would be taught, and by consequence the elections would be better, the confusion less, and they would be more capable of reward, (which is that which keeps them content) and to be sure be under better command. I would know therefore your opinion, whether you are for a great number or a small, and what measures you would take in your elections both of the one and the other.

CHAP. X.

Whether it is best for a Militia to consist of a great number or a small.

Fabr.

SEeing it is your desire to be satisfied, which is best, a great number or a small; with∣out doubt a great number is best, and not only more necessary, but (to keep frank∣ly) a compleat & perfect Militia is not to be had in any place where there is not great plenty of men; and as to your observation in other places, it is easily refused. For first, the smal∣ness of your number does not better your souldiers, (where plenty is to be had, as in Tuscany) nor mend your election; because men being to judge by experience, in that Coun∣try few people would be found whose experience would recommend them; forasmuch as few of them have been actually in the wars; and of those few, fewer have given such te∣stimony of themselves as to deserve to be chosen before the rest; so that he who makes his election in such places, is to lay aside his experience, and to choose by way of conje∣cture. Other people therefore being in this perplexity, I would know, if twenty young persons of good aspects were brought before me, by what rules or method I was to choose or reject. I do not doubt but every man would confess the best way, to take, and arm, and exercise them all, (it being impossible to judge till then which will be the best) and to reserve your election, till having all had the same exercise, and instruction, it be easie to discern which is most vigorous, and likely to do service: so that upon the whole, to desire but few in this case, that your election may be better, is without question an error. As to the ob∣jection of being less inconvenience to the Country, and to the people, I answer that a Militia (be it as little or imperfect as it may) is no prejudice to either. Because it takes away no man from his employments; obliges no man from his business; for to appear on∣ly on idle days to exercise, is rather a recreation to the People, and advantage to the Coun∣try, than otherwise. Whereas if they had no such divertisement, and young men would be apt on those days to run out into some debauchery, or extravagance, which would be much worse than those innocent recreations, which being a handsome spectacle, gives great entertainments to young people.

Whereas it is alledged that a less number is easier paid, and by consequence kept in bet∣ter order and obedience; I answer, That no Levies can be made of so few, as that they will be paid always to their satisfaction. For example, a Militia is to be established of five thousand foot: To pay them to their content would require at least 10000 Ducats a month. First, 5000 Foot is not a competent Army, and 10000 Ducats a month would be insupportable to a State, and yet insufficient to satisfie them, or to oblige them to any extraordinary enterprize. So that in so doing, your expence would be great, your force but small, and unable to defend you, much less to make any vigorous attack. If you en∣crease their pay, or their number, it would be the more impossible to pay them: if you gave them less, or listed less, they would be so much the more dissatisfied, and unserviceable.

They therefore who talk of raising Soldiers, and paying them whilst they are not in service, talk ridiculously, and of things either impossible or useless. 'Tis true, when they are to be raised for immediate Service, they are always to be paid; yet if in times of Peace they be the occasion of any disorder or inconvenience, (which I cannot believe) the advan∣tages of a well disciplin'd and ready Militia does abundantly recompence it; for where there is no such force, there is nothing secure.

I conclude then, That he who would have a small number, to pay them the better, or for any other of your reasons, is mightily ignorant. for though it agrees with my opi∣nion, that let your number be what it will, it will lessen upon your hands, (by the many accidents that are not possible to be avoided) yet a small number would quickly dwindle to nothing: Besides, a great number is of more real service and reputation. To this it may be added, That if in order to the exercising, you select a few persons in Countries where plenty is to be had; they are so remote, and at such distance from on another, that you cannot bring them to a Rendezvouz without great inconvenience; and without exercising, Militia's are useless, as shall be shown in due place.

Cosimo.

You have satisfied me as to my former demand, but I desire you would resolve me another doubt? and that is whether such great numbers do not produce more confusion and disorder in the Country.

Fabritio.

That opinion is as idle as the other, and for the reasons I shall give.

CHAP. XI.

How the inconveniencies. which follow great Armies may be prevented.

Fabritio.

THose who are designed for the Wars, may occasion disorder two ways, either among themselves, or with other people; but the remedy is easie, though their discipline should not prevent it (for as to quarrels and mutinies among themselves, discipline will obviate them) If the Country where your Levies are to be made, be so weak, that they have no Arms among them, or so unanimously united among themselves, that they have no head, this Order and Militia will make them more fierce and couragious against Strangers, without any impediment to their unity, For men who are well disci∣plin'd, are as tender of breaking the Laws when they are Armed, as much as when they are disarmed, nor can they be any ways altred, unless the Officers which you set over them debauch them, and which way that is to be done, I shall shew you presently. But if the Country where your Levies are to be made, are in Arms, and disunited, this way will be sufficient to unite them; for though they had Arms and Officers of their own before, yet they were such Arms as were useless in War, and such Officers as rather bred and provoked mutinies, than prevented or suppress'd them. And the reason is because in those Coun∣tries as soon as a man is offended, he repairs immediately to the head of his party, who to maintain his own reputation, encourages him to revenge; whereas a publick General proceeds quite contrary. So then by this way Seditions are prevented, Unity established, Provinces united (but weak) continue their union, and are freed of their weakness: Pro∣vinces disunited and mutinous, are reconciled and composed, and their ferocity which was employed formerly in disorders, is employed now to the advantage of the publick. As to the provision that is to be made that they injure not other people, it is to be consi∣dered that that is not to be done, but by the fault of their Officers; and to prevent the Officers from oocasioning such disorders, it is necessary that care be taken that they do not usurp too great an authority over their Soldiers, which authority is to be gained two ways either by nature, or accident; the way by nature, is to be prevented by providing that he

who is born in a place, be never put to command the Forces raised in the same place, but be put at the head of such Troops as are raised in other Countries, with whom he has no natural converse. As to the accidental way, things are to be so ordered, that the Com∣manders in chief be changed every year; for the continuation of a command over the same men, contracts such a friendship and intimacy betwixt them, as is many times per∣verted to the prejudice of the Prince. Which changes, how useful they have been to those who have used them, and how much the omission of them have been prejudicial to other people, may be observed by the example of the Kingdom of Assyria; and the Empire of the Romans; for that Kingdom continued a thousand years without Tumult or civil War, which proceeded from the annual changing of the Officers of the Army. And in the Roman Empire, after Iulius Caesar was killed, all the civil Wars; and Conspiracies which hapned betwixt the Officers and the Emperors, proceeded from nothing but holding the Officers continually in command. And if any of the first Emperors, or those who rul'd afterwards with any reputation (as Adrianus, Marcus, Severus and the like) had had the providence to have introduced that custom into their Armies, without doubt their Empire would have been more quiet and durable; for their Generals would not have had so much opportunity to rebel, the Emperors would not have had so much occasion to for, and the Senate (in default of succession) having more authority in the election of a new Emperor, would undoubtedly have chosen better. But ill customs (either thorow the ignorance, or inadvertancy of mankind) are not to be eradicated by examples either good or bad.

Cosimo.

I fear my demands have drawn you from your intended discourse, for from speaking of Levies and Militia's, and such things, we are got clear upon another Subject; so that had I not excused my self before, I should think I deserved reprehension.

Fabritio.

Let not that trouble you, all that we have said is pertinent enough, for being to treat of the way of Militia's (which is condemned by many people) and I to defend it, was convenient that we should begin with the way of Election; and first as to the Cavalry.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Cavalry:

Fab.

THe Cavalry anciently was raised out of the richest and most considerable of the City, but with respect to the age, and quality of the person. Of these there were only three hundred to a Legion; so that in each Consular Army, the Romans had never above six hundred Horse.

Cosimo.

Would you have a standing Militia of Horse to exercise them at home, and employ them afterwards in the War?

Fab.

To do well▪ you cannot do otherwise, if you would have Soldiers of your own and not rely wholly upon such as make War their profession.

Cosimo.

How would you choose them?

Fab.

I would imitate the Romans, choose them out of the wealthiest, give Officers as they do at this day, and see them well armed, and well exercised.

Cosimo.

Would it be well to allow them any pay?

Fab.

Yes truly it would, yet it should be no more than would keep their Horse; for otherwise lying continually upon them, they would become grievous to the Subject, and give them occasion to complain of you.

Cosimo.

What numbers would you have, and how would you Arm them?

Fab.

You are too quick, and pass from one thing to another; I'll answer you to that in another place, when I have told you how the Foot are to be Armed, and prepared for a field Battel.