The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

CHAP. XI.

How the inconveniencies. which follow great Armies may be prevented.

Fabritio.

THose who are designed for the Wars, may occasion disorder two ways, either among themselves, or with other people; but the remedy is easie, though their discipline should not prevent it (for as to quarrels and mutinies among themselves, discipline will obviate them) If the Country where your Levies are to be made, be so weak, that they have no Arms among them, or so unanimously united among themselves, that they have no head, this Order and Militia will make them more fierce and couragious against Strangers, without any impediment to their unity, For men who are well disci∣plin'd, are as tender of breaking the Laws when they are Armed, as much as when they are disarmed, nor can they be any ways altred, unless the Officers which you set over them debauch them, and which way that is to be done, I shall shew you presently. But if the Country where your Levies are to be made, are in Arms, and disunited, this way will be sufficient to unite them; for though they had Arms and Officers of their own before, yet they were such Arms as were useless in War, and such Officers as rather bred and provoked mutinies, than prevented or suppress'd them. And the reason is because in those Coun∣tries as soon as a man is offended, he repairs immediately to the head of his party, who to maintain his own reputation, encourages him to revenge; whereas a publick General proceeds quite contrary. So then by this way Seditions are prevented, Unity established, Provinces united (but weak) continue their union, and are freed of their weakness: Pro∣vinces disunited and mutinous, are reconciled and composed, and their ferocity which was employed formerly in disorders, is employed now to the advantage of the publick. As to the provision that is to be made that they injure not other people, it is to be consi∣dered that that is not to be done, but by the fault of their Officers; and to prevent the Officers from oocasioning such disorders, it is necessary that care be taken that they do not usurp too great an authority over their Soldiers, which authority is to be gained two ways either by nature, or accident; the way by nature, is to be prevented by providing that he

who is born in a place, be never put to command the Forces raised in the same place, but be put at the head of such Troops as are raised in other Countries, with whom he has no natural converse. As to the accidental way, things are to be so ordered, that the Com∣manders in chief be changed every year; for the continuation of a command over the same men, contracts such a friendship and intimacy betwixt them, as is many times per∣verted to the prejudice of the Prince. Which changes, how useful they have been to those who have used them, and how much the omission of them have been prejudicial to other people, may be observed by the example of the Kingdom of Assyria; and the Empire of the Romans; for that Kingdom continued a thousand years without Tumult or civil War, which proceeded from the annual changing of the Officers of the Army. And in the Roman Empire, after Iulius Caesar was killed, all the civil Wars; and Conspiracies which hapned betwixt the Officers and the Emperors, proceeded from nothing but holding the Officers continually in command. And if any of the first Emperors, or those who rul'd afterwards with any reputation (as Adrianus, Marcus, Severus and the like) had had the providence to have introduced that custom into their Armies, without doubt their Empire would have been more quiet and durable; for their Generals would not have had so much opportunity to rebel, the Emperors would not have had so much occasion to for, and the Senate (in default of succession) having more authority in the election of a new Emperor, would undoubtedly have chosen better. But ill customs (either thorow the ignorance, or inadvertancy of mankind) are not to be eradicated by examples either good or bad.

Cosimo.

I fear my demands have drawn you from your intended discourse, for from speaking of Levies and Militia's, and such things, we are got clear upon another Subject; so that had I not excused my self before, I should think I deserved reprehension.

Fabritio.

Let not that trouble you, all that we have said is pertinent enough, for being to treat of the way of Militia's (which is condemned by many people) and I to defend it, was convenient that we should begin with the way of Election; and first as to the Cavalry.