The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

THE DISCOURSES OF Nicholas Machiavel, CITIZEN and SECRETARY OF FLORENCE, Upon The First Decade of TITVS LIVIVS TO ZANOBIVS BONDE MONTVS AND COSIMVS RVCELLAIVS.

LIBER. I.

COnsidering with my self what honour is given to Antiquity, and how many times (passing by variety of instances) the fragment of an old Statue has been pur∣chased at an high rate by many people, out of curiosity to keep it by them, as an ornament to their house, or as a pattern for the imitation of such as delight in that art; and with what industry and pains they endeavour afterwards to have it repre∣sented in all their buildings. On the other side, observing the most honourable and heroick actions (describ'd in History, perform'd by Kingdoms and ancient Common-wealths; by Kings, great Captains, Citizens, Legislators, and others, which have not only tired, but spent themselves in the service of their Country) are rather admir'd than imitated, and in∣deed so far shun'd and declin'd, in all places, there is scarce any impression or shadow to be seen in this age of the virtue of our ancestors; I could not at the same time but admire, and lament it; and the more, by how much I observed in all civil and personal controversies, in all diseases incident to mankind, recourse is continually had to such judgments and re∣medies as have been derived to us by our predecessors; for to speak truth, the Civil Law is nothing but the sentence and determination of their fore-Fathers, which reduc'd into order, do shew and instruct our present Lawyers which way to decide; nor is the art of the Physitian any thing more than ancient experience handed down to our times, upon which the Practiser of our age founds all his method and doctrine. Nevertheless, in the ordering of Commonwealths, in the conservation of their several members, in the Government of

Kingdoms, in the regiment of armies, in the management of War, in the administration of Justice, in the enlargement and propagation of Empire, there is not to be found either Prince, Republick, great Captain or Citizen, which repairs to Antiquity for example; which persuaded me it proceeded not so much from niceness and effeminacy our present Edu∣cation has introduced upon the world, nor from the mischief which turbulent and sedi∣tious idleness has brought forth in many Provinces and Cities in Christendom, as from our ignorance or inadvertency in History not taking the sense of what we read, or not minding the relish and poinancy with which it is many times impregnated; from whence it comes to pass, that many who read are much pleased and delighted with the variety of accidents contained in History, but never think them intended for their imitation, that being a thing, in their judgments, not only difficult, but impossible; as if the Heaven, the Sun, the Ele∣ments and Mankind were altered and dispossessed of the motion, order and power with which they were primitively invested. Being desirous to reduce such as shall fall into this error, I have Judged it necessary to write upon all those Books of Titus Livius, (which, by the malignity of time, have not been intercepted) what I (according to ancient and mo∣dern opinion) shall think useful for their further explanation; to the end, that they which shall peruse these my discourses, may extract such advantage and document as is necessary for their proficiency and improvement by History; and though my enterprize appears to be difficult, yet by the assistance of those who put me upon it, I do not despair but to dis∣charge my self so, as to leave the way much more easie and short to any man that shall de∣sire to come after me.

CHAP. I.

What have been generally the principles of all Cities, and particularly of Rome

THose who shall read the Original of the City of Rome, by what Legislators advanced and by what Government ordered, will not wonder it shall remain firm and entire for so many ages, afterwards so vast an Empire spring out of it as that Common∣wealth arrived to. Being to discourse first of its Original, it is convenient to premise, that all Cities are built either by natives born in the Country where they were erected, or by stran∣gers. The first happens when, to the Inhabitants dispersed in many and little parties, it appears their habitation is insecure, not being able apart (by reason of their distance, or smalness of their numbers) to resist an invasion, (if any Enemy should fall upon them) or to unite suddenly for their defence, without leaving their Houses and Families exposed, which by consequence would be certain prey to the enemy. Whereupon, to evade those dangers, moved either by their own impulse, or the suggestions of some person among them of more than ordinary authority, they oblige themselves to live together in some place to be chosen by them for convenience of provision, and easiness of defence. Of this sort, among many others, Athens and Venice were two: the first that built under the autho∣rity of Theseus, upon occasion of the like distance and dispersion of the natives. The other (there being many people driven together into certain little Islands in that point of the Adriatick Sea, to avoid the War which every day, by the access and irruption of new Armies of Barbarians after the declension of the Roman Empire grew intolerable in Italy) began by degrees among themselves, without the assistance or encouragement of any Prince, to treat and submit to such Laws as appeared most likely to preserve them: and it succeeded to their desire by the long respite and tranquillity their situation afforded them; that Sea having no passage at that end, and the Barbarians no ships to disturb them; so that the least beginning imaginable was sufficient to exalt them to their present authority and gran∣deur.

The second case, when a City is raised by strangers, it is done by people that are free, or depending (as Colonies) or else by some Prince or Republick to ease and disburthen themselves of their exuberance, or to defend some Territory, which being newly acquir'd, they desire with more safety and less expence to maintain (of which sort several were by the people of Rome all over their Empire) otherwise they are sometimes erected by some Prince, not for his residence so much as for his glory and renown (as Alexandria by Alexander the great). But these Cities not being free in their Original, do seldom arise to any extraordinary height more than to be reckoned the heads or chief of some Kingdom. Of this sort was Florence, for (whether built by the Souldiers of Silla, or perchance by the

Inhabitants of the Mountain di Fiesole, who presuming upon, and being encouraged by the long Peace under the Reign of Augustus, descended from their Mountain to inhabit the plain upon the River Arms) it was built under the Roman Empire, and could not upon those principles exalt it self higher than the courtesie of the Prince would permit. The Founders of Cities are free, when by themselves, or the Command of their Soveraign they are constrained upon occasion of sickness, famine, or war, to abandon their own, inquest of new Countries: and these do either possess themselves of such Towns as they find ready▪ built in their Conquests, (as Moses did), or they build them de novo, as Aeneas. In this case the power of the builder, and the fortune of the building is conspicuous and honoura∣ble, according as the cause from whence it derives its Original is more or less eminent. His virtue and prudence is discernible two ways, by the election of the Seat, and institution of the Laws; and because men build as often by necessity as choice, and the judgment and wisdom of the builder is greater where there is less room and latitude for his election; it is worthy our consideration whether it is more advantagious building in barren and un∣fruitful places, to the end that the people being constrained to be industrious, and less ob∣noxious to idleness, might live in more unity, the poverty of the soil giving them less op∣portunity of dissention. Thus it fell out in Raugia and several other Cities built in such places; and that kind of election would doubtless be most prudent and profitable, if men could be content to live quietly of what they had, without an ambitious desire of Com∣mand. But there being no security against that, but power, it is necessary to avoid that sterility, and build in the fruitfullest places can be found, where their numbers encreasing by the plentifulness of the soil, they may be able not only to defend themselves against an as∣sault, but repel any opposition shall be made to their grandeur; and as to that idleness to which the richness of the situation disposes, it may be provided against by Laws and con∣venient exercise enjoyn'd, according to the example of several wise men, who having in∣habited Countries, pleasant, fruitful, and apt to produce such lazy people improper for ser∣vice, to prevent the inconvenience which might follow thereupon, enjoyned such a necessity of exercise to such as were intended for the Wars, that by degrees they became better Soul∣diers than those Countries which were mountainous and barren could any where produce. Among whom may be reckoned the Kingdom of Egypt, which, notwithstanding that it was extreamly pleasant and plentiful, by the virtue and efficacy of its Laws produced excellent men, and perhaps such as, had not their names been extinguished with time, might have de∣served as much honour as Alexander the Great, and many other great Captains, whose me∣mories are so fresh, and so venerable among us. An who-ever would consider the Govern∣ment of the Soldan, the discipline of the Mamalukes, and the rest of their Militia before they were extirpated by Selimus the Turk, might find their great prudence and caution in exercising their Souldiers, and preventing that softness and effeminacy to which the felicity of their soil did so naturally incline them.

For these reasons I conceive best to build in a fruitful place, if the ill consequences of that fertility be averted by convenient Laws. Alexander the Great being desirous to build a City to perpetuate his name Dinocrates an Architect came to him, and undertook to build him one upon the Mountain Athos, and to recommend and inforce his proposal, (besides the goodness of the soil) he persuaded him it should be made in the shape and figure of a man (a thing which would be new, wonderful, and sutable to his greatness). But when Alexander enquired whence it was to be supplyed, the Architect replyed; he had not con∣sidered of that; at which answer Alexander laugh'd very heartily, and leaving him and his mountain to themselves, he built Alexandria, where people might be tempted to plant by the richness of the Soil, the nearness of the Sea, and convenience of the River Nile. Again, if we examine the Original of Rome, and admit Aeneas for the first Founder, it will fall in the number of those Cities built by foreigners: if Romulus, among such as were erected by the natives; either way it was originally free, without any dependance. It will appear likewise (as shall be shewn more particularly hereafter) by what Laws Romulus, Numa and others fortified and secur'd it; insomuch that neither the fertility of the Soil, the commodity of the Sea, the frequency of their Victories, nor the largeness of its Em∣pire were able to debauch or corrupt it; but it remained for several ages for piety and vir∣tue more exemplary than any other Commonwealth either since or before it. And because the great things acted under that Government, and transmitted to us by Titus Livius, were performed by publick or private Counsel within or without the City, I shall begin with what occur'd in the Town, and was managed by publick debate, (as judging that most wor∣thy our annotation) super-adding what-ever depended thereupon; and with these discourses I intend this first Book (or rather Part) shall conclude.

CHAP. II.

The several kinds of Commonwealths and under which kind the Roman is comprehended.

WAving the discourse of those Cities which in their beginning have been dependant, I shall speak of such as were originally free, and governed themselves according to their own fancies, Commonwealths or Principalities, as their own inclinations lead them. Of these (according to the diversity of their principles) their Laws and Orders were divers. Some of them at their first foundation received their Laws at one time from a single person, as the Spartans from Lycurgus. Others received them by chance, at several times, upon variety of accidents, as Rome; and that Commonwealth is doubtlesly happy, whose good fortune it is to have a person so wise as to constitute and dispose its Laws in such manner at first, that it may subsist safely and securely by them, without necessity of new modelling or cor∣rection. Of this sort was Sparta, which for more than 800 years was observed to remain entire and incorrupt, without any dangerous commotion. On the other side, that City must needs be in some measure unhappy, which, not having submitted to, or complyed with the prudence of a single founder, is necessitated of it selt to remodel and reform••, Of these kinds, that is most unhappy whose principles were at first remote and devious from the right way which might have conducted to perfection; and indeed those Common∣wealths which are in this degree, are almost impossible to be established by any accident whatsoever. But others (whose Commencements are good, and capable of improvement, though perhaps not exquisitely perfect) may become perfect afterwards by the concurrence of accidents, yet not without danger forasmuch as most men are averse, and will not easily admit of any new Law which introduces new Orders and Customs into a City, without great appearance of necessity, and that necessity arising necessarily from some danger im∣pending, it many times falls out the Commonwealth perishes before remedy can be ap∣plyed. Of this the Commonwealth of Florence is instance sufficient, which in the com∣motion of Aretz was the IIth. time reformed, and the 12.th time confounded by the se∣dition of Prato.

But being now to discourse of the State of the Roman Commonwealth, and what were the accidents and orders which advanced it to that perfection, it is convenient to premise (what has been asserted by several Authors) that there are but three sorts of Governments Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, to either of which who-ever intends to erect a Go∣vernment, may apply as he pleases. Other (of no less reputation) are of opinion the forms of Government are six, of which three are bad, and three good of themselves, but so easily corrupted, even they become fatal and pernicious. Those which are good are the three before mentioned, those which are evil are three others depending upon the three former; and carrying so near a resemblance, they many times interfere, and fall one into the other, as Monarchy into tyranny, Aristocracy into Oligarchy, and Democracy into Anarchy and Con∣fusion: insomuch, that who-ever forms his Government of one of the three former, forms it for no long time, because no care nor remedy can prevent, but it will degenerate into its contrary, by reason of the similitude betwixt virtue and vice: and these changes and va∣riations of Government happened by accident amongst men; for at the beginning of the World the Inhabitants being few, they lived dispersed after the manner of beasts: after∣wards, as they multiplyed, they began to unite and, for their better defence, to look out for such as were more strong, robust, and valiant, that they might choose one out of them to make him their head, and pay him obedience; from hence the first distinction betwixt honest and dishonest did arise: for observing that if any injur'd his Benefactor, it imme∣diately created an hatred and compassion among the rest, all people abhorring him that was ungrateful, and commiserating him that was injur'd; lest the same injustice might hap∣pen to themselves, they began to make Laws, and ordain punishments for offenders; and this was the first appearance of justice in the World; after which, being to make Election of their Prince, they did not so much respect the ability of his body as the qualifications of his mind, choosing him that was most prudent and just; but by degrees their Government coming to be Hereditary, and not by Election, according to their former way, those which inherited degenerated from their Ancestors, and neglecting all virtuous actions, began to be∣lieve that Princes were exalted for no other end but to discriminate themselvcs from their subjects by their pomp, luxury, and all other effeminate qualities, by which means they fell into the hatred of the people, and by consequence became afraid of them, and that fear en∣creasing,

they began to meditate revenge, oppressing some, and disobliging others, till in∣sensibly the Government altered, and fell into Tyranny. And these were the first grounds of ruine, the first occasion of Conjuration and Conspiracy against Princes, not so much in the pusillanimous and poor, as in those whose generosity, spirit and riches would not suffer them to submit to so dishonourable administrations. The multitude following the autho∣rity of the Nobles, took up Arms against their Prince, and having conquered and extirpa∣ted that Government, they subjected themselves to the Nobility which had freed them; and detesting the name of a single person, they took the Government upon themselves, and at first (reflecting upon the late Tyranny) governed according to new Laws devised by themselves, postponing particular profit to publick advantage, so that both the one and the other were preserved and managed with great diligence and exactness. But their autho∣rity afterwards descending upon their Sons, (who being ignorant of the variations of for∣tune, as not having experimented her inconstancy) and not contenting themselves with a civil equality, but falling into rapine, oppression, ambition, and adulteries, they changed the Government again, and brought it from an Optimacy to be governed by few, without any respect or consideration of Justice or Civility; so that in a short time it hapned to them as to the Tyrant; for the multitude being weary of their Government, were ready to assist any body that would attempt to remove it, by which means in a short time it was extinguished.

And forasmuch as the tyranny of their Prince, and the insolence of their Nobles were fresh in their memory, they resolved to restore neither the one nor the other, but conclude upon a popular State, which was regulated so as neither Prince nor Noble should have any authority: and there being no States but are reverenced at first, this Populacy continued for some time, but not long, (especially after its Founders) for it fell immediately into an irresistible licentiousness, contemning all authority both publick and private; and every man living after his own mind, a thousand injuries were daily committed, so that forc'd by necessity, by the suggestions of some good ma•• or for avoiding the like enormities, they returned to their primitive Kingship, and from thence by degrees relapsed again in the manner, and upon the occasions aforesaid. And this is the Sphear and Circle in which all Republicks have, and do move; but it seldom or never happens that they return to the same circumstances of Government again, because it is scarce possible for any of them to be so long liv'd, as to pass many times thorow the same mutations and remain upon its legs. It sometimes comes to pass likewise, that in the conflicts and troubles of a State, being de∣stitute both of counsel and force, it becomes a prey to some neighbouring Commonwealth that is better governed than it: but admitting that could not be, Governments would fall from one to another, and make an infinite circulation. For these reasons all the foresaid forms of Government are in my judgment infirm and unstable; the three good ones from the shortness of man's life and the three bad ones from their proper imperfections. Where∣upon, the wisest Legislators finding this defect, and avoiding every one of those kinds, they fram'd a Government which should consist of them all, believing it to be more permanent and stable, because, Prince, Nobles and People living in the same City, and Communicating in the same Government, they would be all of them in sight of one another, and more ca∣pable of correction. The person which in this kind has merited most praise was Lycurgus, who ordered his Laws in Sparta in such manner that giving King Nobility and People each of them their portion, he erected a Government that continued for more than eight hundred years, to his great honour, and that Cities repose.

To Solon it hapned clear otherwise, (who was the Athenian Legislator) whose aiming only at a popular Government, was the cause it was so short lived, that before he died he saw the tyranny of Pisistrates spring out of it; and though forty years after the Tyrant's Heirs were expelled, and Athens restored to its liberty, yet resuming the old model which Solon had recommended, it could not continue above an hundred years, notwithstanding many new laws were super-added to restrain the insolence of the Nobility, and the loose∣ness of the Commons. But there being no mixture and temperament of Principality and Optimacy with the other, in respect of Sparta, Athens was but of little duration. But to return to Rome, though it had not a Lycurgus to obstetricate at its birth, and supply it with such Laws as might preserve its freedom so long.

Nevertheless, the accidents which hapned upon the dissention betwixt the people and the Senate produced that in some measure which was defective at its foundation; for though in its beginning its Laws and Orders were imperfect, yet it did not altogether deflect from the right way which was to conduct it to perfection, Romulus, Numa, and all the rest of its Kings making many good laws conformable to its freedom. But their ultimate design being to perpetuate their Monarchy, though that City remained free, there were many things omit∣ted

by those Princes which were necessary for its conservation. And though it fell out their Kings lost their Dominion upon the abovesaid occasions, yet those who expulsed them, creating two Consuls in their stead, they rather drove the name than the authority of King∣ship out of the City. After which, the Government residing in the Consuls and Senate, it consisted only of two of the three sorts, Monarchy and Aristocracy: it remained now to give place only to a popular Government, and the Roman Nobility being grown insolent upon occasions which shall be mentioned hereafter, the people tumultuated, took up Arms against them, and prevailed so far, that (lest otherwise they might lose all) it was consented the people should have their share, and yet the Senate and Consuls on the other hand retain so much of their former authority as to keep up their degrees as before: and this was the beginning of the Tribunes of the people, after the creation of which, that State became better established, every one of the three sorts having a share in the Government, and for∣tune was very favourable, that though it suffered many mutations and passed from a Mo∣narchy to an Aristocracy, and from that to the people by the same gradations, and the same occasions I have mentioned; nevertheless the power was not taken from their Kings to transfer it upon the Nobles, nor from the Nobility to give it wholly to the people; but remaining mixt and compounded of all three, that Republick grew in time to be perfect, to which perfection the difference and jealousies betwixt the Senate and people contributed exceedingly, as shall be largely demonstrated in the two following Chapters.

CHAP. III.

Vpon what accidents and tumults in Rome the Tribune of the people was created, by which the Commonwealth became more perfect.

ACcording to the judgment of all Authors who have written of Civil Government, and the examples of all History, it is necessary to who-ever would establish a Govern∣ment and perscribe Laws to it, to presuppose all men naturally bad and that they will shew and exert that natural malignity as often as they have occasion to do it securely, for though it may possibly lie concealed for some time, it is for some secret reason which want of pre∣sident and experience renders invisible; but time discovers it afterwards, and is therefore justly called the Father of truth.

After the expulsion of the Tarquins there appeared in Rome a very great union betwixt the Senate and people; the Senate seemed to have deposited their old arrogance, and taken up a gentleness and humility that rendred them grateful even to the meanest mecha∣nick: in this manner they curb'd and constrained their evil designs as having no hopes of success while the Tarquins were living, who were formidable to the Nobility of themselves and would be much more, if the people by any ill usage should be animated to joyn with them, and this was the true ground of their hypocrisie. But no sooner were the Tarquins dead, and the Nobility discharged of their fear, but they began to expectorate, and spit out the venome had lain so long in their stomachs against the people using them with all ima∣ginable injury and contempt, which carriage of theirs gives good testimony to my asser∣tion, that man is naturally wicked, never does well but upon necessity; and when at any time it is at his choice, and he may follow his own genius with freedom, all things run im∣mediately into disorder and confusion; and that saying is not without reason, That Reputa∣tion and poverty make men industrious, but it is Laws which make them good: otherwise, if people did well of themselves, Laws would be useless; but where that is not to be expe∣cted, Laws become necessary. No sooner were the Tarquins removed, and the authority and terror where-with they kept the Senate in awe, but it was thought fit to find out some new invention that might restrain the Nobility, and keep them in the same circles of hu∣manity and justice as the Tarquins had done whilst they were alive: at length, after many squables and contentions betwixt the people and them, all was accommodated by the crea∣tion of a Tribune for the security of the people, which Tribune was to be invested with such authority and priviledge as might enable him to become afterwards an Arbitor betwixt them, and a stop for the future to the insolence of the Nobility.

CHAP IV.

The dissentions betwixt the Senate and the people of Rome, were the occasion that Commonwealth beame so powerful and free.

I Cannot in silence passover the tumults and commotions which hapned in Rome betwixt the death of the Tarquins, and the creation of those Tribunes. Nor can I forbear say∣ing something against the opinion of many who will needs have Rome to have been a tu∣multuous Republick, so full of mutiny and confusion, that had not its good fortune and va∣lour supplyed for its defects, it would have been inferior to any other Commonwealth whatsoever. I cannot deny but fortune and valour were the occasions of the Roman Em∣pire; but, in my judgment, they do not consider, that where the Souldier is good, the disci∣pline is good; and where the discipline is good, there is commonly good fortune: but to return to the other particulars in that City, I say, those who object against the tumults be∣twixt the Nobles and the people, do in my opinion condemn those very things which were the first occasion of its freedom, regarding the noise and clamours which do usually follow such commotions, more than the good effects they do commonly produce, not con∣sidering that in all Commonwealths there are two opposite humours, one of the People, the other of the Nobles; and that all Laws which are made in favour of liberty, proceed from the differences betwixt them, as may easily be seen in the revolutions of Rome: for from the time of the Tarquins to the Gracchi, (which was more than three hundred years) in all the tumults in Rome seldom any body was banished, and seldomer put to death: so that it is not reasonable to esteem those popular tumults so dangerous and horrible, nor to pronounce that a seditious and bloody Commonwealth, which in so long time, among all their heats and animosities sent not above eight or ten persons into banishment, executed but few, and condemned not many to any pecuniary Mulct. Nor can it be called reasona∣bly disorderly and irregular, which produced so many examples of all sorts of virtue; for good examples proceed from good Education, and good Education from good Laws, and good Laws from those tumults, which many people do so inconsiderately condemn, and who-ever examines their success, will not find they have produced any Laws or Violence to the prejudice of the Common interest, but rather on the contrary. And if any should ob∣ject their ways were wild and unusual, to heat the people roaring against the Senate, and the Senate railing against the people. To see them running tumultuously about the streets, shutting up their shops, and leaving the Town, I answer, that all Cities ought to be allowed some ways of vent and evacuation for their passions, and especially those who expect as∣sistance from their people in time of exigence and danger; in which number the City of Rome was one, and had this custom, that when the Commons had a mind to a new Law, they either committed some of the aforesaid outrages, or else refused to list themselves for the Wars, so that to appease, it was in some measure necessary to comply with them, and the desires of a free people are seldom or never destructive or prejudicial to liberty, because they commonly spring from actual oppression, or an apprehension of it; and if perhaps that apprehension should be vain, and ill grounded, there is the remedy of Conventions, in which some honest man or good Orator may remonstrate their mistake: and the people, though (as Tully says) they may be ignorant, yet they are capable enough of the truth, and do easily submit to it, when delivered to them by any person they think credible, and to be belived. So that it is an obligation upon us to judge more moderately of the Roman Government, and to consider that so many good effects as proceeded from that Republick, could not have been produced but from sutable causes: and if their tumults were the oc∣casion of the creation of the Tribunes, they were more laudable than otherwise; for be∣sides that they secured a share of the Government to the people, they were constituted as Guardians and Conservators of the Roman liberty, as shall be shewn in the Chapter ensuing.

CHAP V.

Where the Guardianship of liberty may be most securely deposited, whether among the people or Nobility: and which has greater occasion to tumultuate, he that would acquire more, or he that would defend and keep what he has.

THey who have given us the wisest and most judicious scheme of a Commonwealth, have laid down the conservation of liberty as a necessary fundamental, and according as that is more or less secured, the Government is like to be more or less durable. But for∣asmuch as all Commonwealths consist of Nobility and Populacy, the question arises, In whose hands that liberty is deposited most safely. In old times among the Lacedemonians, and in our times among the Venetians, it was intrusted with the Nobility; but among the Romans with the common people; for which reason it is to be examined which of them made the better elections.

If we look back to their Originals, there are arguments on both sides; but if we regard only their fate and conclusion, the Nobility must carry it, in respect that the liberty of the Spartans and Venetians have been much longer lived. But on the other side, (to justifie the Romans) freedom is (I conceive) most properly committed to their custody who have least appetite to usurp. And doubtless, if the ends and designs both of the Nobility and Com∣mons be considered, it will be found the Nobility are ambitious of Dominion, while the Commons have no other thoughts but to defend themselves against it; and, by consequence, having less hopes to usurp, they have more inclination to live free: so that the conservation of their liberty being committed to the people, it is but reasonable to believe they will be more careful to preserve it; and by how much they are less likely to usurp upon it them∣selves, with the more vigilance will they secure it against the incroachments of others. On the other side, he that defends the Spartan and Venetian constitution, alledges, that by put∣ting that power into the hands of the Nobility, two excellent things are performed. One is, that thereby they satisfie their ambition who have the greatest interest in the Common∣wealth. The other, that they take from the people all opportunity of exerting their na∣tural turbulency and unquietness, which has not only been the occasion of infinite dissen∣tions, but is apt likewise to enforce the Nobility upon such desperate courses as may in time produce unremediable effects. Of this, Rome it self is proposed as an example, where the Tribunes being invested with that authority, it was not sufficient to have one Plebeian Consul, but the people must have both, and not content with that neither, they would have the Censor, Praetor, and the other great Magistrates of the City chosen out of the people. Nor was this enough, but carried on with the same exorbitant fury, they began by degrees to adore such men as they saw likely to confront and beard the Nobility, which humour was the rise of Marius his greatness, and his greatness the destruction of Rome. All this considered, it is no easie matter, upon impartial deliberation on both sides, to pronounce which of the two is most safely to be trusted with the liberty, because it is no less difficult to determine which is most pernicious to a Commonwealth, he that (not satisfied with what he has) is ambitious of more, or he that is content, and would secure what he has got. He that shall examine it critically, will conclude thus; Either you argue for a Repub∣lick, whose aim is to extend and propagate its Empire, as Rome; Or one whose designs reach no further than to preserve what they have got. In the first case 'tis necessary in all things to follow the example of Rome; in the second, Venice and Sparta are rather to be imitated for the reasons aforesaid, which shall be reinforc'd in the following Chapter. But to return from whence we have stragled, and discourse of what men are most nocent in a Commonwealth, they that are impatient to get, or they that are only fearful to lose; I say, that when Marcus Menenius was made Dictator, and Marcus Fulvius Master of the Horse, (both of them Plebeians) to inquire into certain Conspiracies that were entred into at Capua, against the City of Rome, authority was given them at the same time to examine and take cognisance of such persons as, by bribery, or any other unlawful means, design'd upon the Consulship, or any other of the great offices in Rome: by which the Nobility be∣ing highly provoked, (as suspecting it to be done in opposition to them) caused it to be spread abroad, that the Nobility did not by any ambitious or irregular ways affect or de∣sign upon those great places; but the Commons, who not daring to trust their preferment to their extraction or virtue, took all extraordinary courses to advance themselves to them. In particular they accused the Dictator, and that with so much vehemence and success, he was glad to call a Council, and (having complained very much of the calumniations of

the Nobility) to lay down his Dictatorship, and submit himself to the judgment of the people, by whom the Cause being heard, he was fairly acquitted. There it was disputed very hard which was most ambitious; He that would get, or He that would preserve; for a violent appetite either in the one, or the other may be the occasion of great disturbances, which in my judgment are oftner caused by them that are in possession, because the appre∣hension of losing what they have got, produces the same eagerness and passion, as desire of acquisition does in the other, forasmuch as they seldom think themselves safe in what they have, but by new accumulation; besides, the more wealth or Territory they have, the more power or capacity they have to Usurp as they see occasion: to which may be added that their incorrigible and ambitious deportments, do provoke and kindle a desire in such as have not those dignities, to compass them if they can, and that for two reasons, to revenge themselves upon them, by stripping them of all, and to enrich themselves into the bargain by the wealth and honour which they see others manage so ill.

CHAP. VI.

Whether in Rome such a form of Government could be established, as should take away the animosities betwixt the Senate and the People.

WHat the continued jealousies betwixt the Senate and the People did produce, we have already discoursed; but because the effects of them remained till the time of the Gracchi, and were the occasion of the destruction of their liberty, it may be demanded whether Rome might not have attained that height of Authority and Grandeur under ano∣ther form of Government that might have prevented those animosities. To resolve this Question, it is necessary to look back upon those Republicks whose Fortune it has been to retain their liberty a long time without those inconveniencies, to examine what was their form, and whether it was practicable in Rome. As Examples, we may produce Sparta and Venice, the first Ancient, the latter more modern, both mentioned before Sparta was governed by a King, and a small Senate; Venice did not divide the Government into distinct Names; but all who were admitted to the administration were called Gentlemen under one common appellation; and that, more by accident, than any prudence in the Le∣gislator; for when to those Rocks upon which that City is now seated, many people did repair for the reasons abovesaid, in process of time their number encreasing so fast, that they could not live peaceably without Laws, they resolved to put themselves under some form, and meeting often together to deliberate upon that, when they found they were numerous enough to subsist by themselves, they made a Law to praeclude all new comers from the Government: and hinding afterwards their numbers encrease, and that there were multitudes of Inhabitants incapable of publick administration; in honours to the Governors they called them Gentlemen of Venice, and the others but Citizens; and this distinction might not only be instituted, but continued without tumult, because when first introduced, all the Inhabitants participating of the Government, no body could complain, and they who came after, finding it firm and established, had no reason, nor opportunity to disturb it; They had no reason, because no injury was done them; they had no opportunity, because the Government restrained them, and they were not employed in any thing that might furnish them with authority; besides those who came after were not in number disproportionable to the Governors, the latter being equally, if not more numerous than they; for which rea∣sons the Venetians were able not only to erect, but maintain their Government a long time without any revolution.

Sparta being (as I said before) governed by a King and a small Senate, might likewise preserve its Model a long time, by reason the Inhabitants were but few, strangers excluded and the Laws of Lycurgus established with great veneration, so that living by those Laws, all occasion of tumult was taken away, and they might continue united a long time; for though the Offices and Commands were conferred upon a few, yet the revenue of the Country being equally distributed, the people were not Seditious, though they were kept at a distance; nor did the Nobility provoke them by any insolence or oppression; and this proceeded from the condition of their Kings, who being environed by the Nobility, had no safer way to secure their dignity, than by protecting the people from injustice and vio∣lence, by which means the fear, and the desire of Command being taken from the people, the Emulations betwixt them and the Nobility and the occasion of tumultuating ceased, so that it was not hard for them to enjoy their tranquillity several Ages; Of the length of

their tranquillity, there were two principal causes; First, The number of the Spartans being small, there was no necessity that their Governors should be many; and next no strangers being admitted, they were not liable to be corrupted, nor to encrease to such a number, as might grow insupportable to those few who were under their Government. These things being considered, it is plain that the Roman Legislators could not have insti∣tuted a Commonwealth that should be free from Sedition and Mutiny, any other way, than by imitating the Venetians and Spartans, that is by not employing the people in their Wars, like the Venetians, nor entertaining Foreiners into their City, as the Spartans. But the Roman Legislators transgressing in both, the people grew strong, and by consequence tumultuous; and if any way the Government were to be rendered more quiet, this in con∣venience would follow, it would be rendered also more weak, and all means be taken away that might conduct it to that height of grandeur and authority, at which afterwards it arrived; so that those applications which prevented the tumults in Rome, prevented also its enlargement, and the extent of its Empire, as it happens in most humane affairs, the removal of one inconvenience is the contracting of another. For if you arm, and adapt a numerous people for the War, by their means to enlarge your Territory; you put them into a conditon of being unmanageable afterwards, and not to be kept down to your Disci∣pline and Government; whereas if you keep them disarmed, and their number but few, though you may make your self Arbitrary, you can never continue it, for your Subjects will grow so poor spirited and vile, you will become a pre to the first man that invades you. In all deliberations therefore, the inconveniences are to be considered, and that reso∣lution prefer'd, in which their are fewest; for none can be taken that are absolutely free The Romans then in imitation of the Spartans, might have set up a King for his life, and appointed a little Senate; but by so doing, they could never have laid the foundation of so vast an Empire, for an Elective King, and a small Senate would have contributed but little to their unity and peace. He then who would set up a new Commonwealth, should con∣sider whether he would have it (like Rome) extend its Dominion and Soveraignty; or keep it self within its own bounds without any dilatation. In the first case it is necessary to imitate the Romans, and give way to the tumults and publick dissentions as well as he can; for without his Citizens be numerous, and well disciplin'd and arm'd, he can never extend his Dominion; and if he could, it would be impossible to keep it. In the second, he is to frame to the Model of the Spartans, and Venetians; but because augmentation of Empire, is commonly the destruction of such Commonwealths, he is by all possible means to prohibit new acquisitions, because depending upon weak Commonwealths, they are always destructive and pernicious, as experience has shown in the Examples of Sparta and Venice. The first having subdued most part of Greece, discovered, upon a slight accident, the weakness of its foundation, for the Thebans revolting at the instigation of Pelopidas, gave opportunity to other Cities, and quite ruined the Government. In like manner Ve∣nice having conquer'd the greatest part of Italy, more by their Mony and Artifice, than Arms, presuming too much upon their force, and coming to a Battel, they were worsted, and in one day lost all which they had got. I should think therefore a Commonwealth that would stand a long time, should model it self within according to the Example of Sparta and like Venice, seat it self in so strong and inexpugnable a place, that it might not appre∣hend any sudden insult; nor make it self so great on the other side as to become formidable to its Neighbors; For the common Motives that excite people to make War upon a Com∣monwealth, are two; either to conquer it themselves, or to secure themselves against it, and by the aforesaid expedient, those two ways are totally frustrated; for if it be hard of access, and well-disposed to defend it self, it will seldom or never happen that any Body will attempt it. If it keeps within its own bounds, and by experience be found free from ambition, no body will fear it, nor will any body offend it; and questionless it would be the more safe, if by the Laws and Constitutions it was forbidden to extend, for I am clearly of opinion, that keeping things in this balance and Equilibrium, the Government would be more civil, and the peace of the City more certain. But the affairs of man being muta∣ble, and nothing in them that is durable and firm; there is a necessity that they either encrease or diminish, and that necessity does many times constrain us, to what in reason we should rather decline. Whence it happens, That if a Government be erected apt to defend it self in peace and security without extending its bounds, and necessity enforces it to en∣large, That enlargement takes away its foundation, and ruines it the sooner. So on the other side, when the Stars are so benign to a Commonwealth, as to place it in peace, without any occasion of War, that peace begets idlness, and idlness effeminacy or faction, which two things (and indeed either of them alone) will be sufficient to subvert it. Where∣fore, it being impossible, as I conceive, to keep things in this balance and mediocrity; in

the constitution of all republicks, particular care is to be had to what is most honorable; and things are to be so ordered, that if necessity should compel them to inlarge, they might do it in such manner as to be sure to keep it. But to return, a Commonwealth, in my judgment, is better fram'd to the example of Rome, than either to the Venetian or Spartan, it being so hard to hit the exact way between the one and the other; and for the emula∣tions betwixt the Nobility and the People they are to be born as inconveniences, but such as are necessary for a people that would rise to the Grandeur of the Romans; against which nevertheless (as I have shewn before) the authority of the Tribunes will be some remedy, if invested with the power of impeaching, which was given to the Tribunes in other States, as I shall shew in my next Chapter.

CHAP. VII.

How necessary it is for the conservation of a State, that any Citizen be securely accused.

THere is nothing of more importance to the safety of a State, than that permission be given to such as are set up for the conservation of its liberty, to accuse such persons to the People, the Senate, or other Magistrates, as shall any way offend against the Constitutions thereof; and this practice has two effects very profitable for the Commonwealth: the first is, the Citizens, for fear of being accused, do not attempt any thing to the prejudice of the State; and if they do, they are easily and readily suppress'd: the other is, that thereby a way is opened for the evacuation of such humours as are too frequent among the Citizens of every great City; which humours, without some legal vent, do usually recur to extra∣ordinary ways that are absolutely pernicious: wherefore there is nothing renders a Com∣monwealth more stable and firm, than the provision of some legal course for the evapora∣tion of those humors which indanger it. This may be demonstrated by several exam∣ples, but especially by that which is mentioned by Titus Livius in his discourse of Coriola∣nus. He tells us, that the Nobility of Rome being exasperated against the people, for that they thought their authority too much encreased upon the creation of their Tribunes; and it hapning at that time, that in respect of the great scarcity of provisions, the State had sent into Sicily for supplies; Coriolanus being a great adversary to the popular Faction, ad∣vised that this was a fair time to chastise the licentiousness of the people, and to take from them that power which they had assumed to the prejudice of the Nobility, to which purpose he persuaded the Senate against distributing the corn. This counsel coming to the ears of the people, they were so highly incensed, that they set upon him tumultuously as he came out of the Senate, and had certainly killed him, had not the Tribunes interposed, and cited him to appear before them in order to his defence. By which accident it is plain how much it is for the interest of a Commonwealth, that a legal way be provided to discharge the choller of the people, which otherwise will be apt to fly to extraordinary courses, and without doubt produce more mischievous effects: for if a single Citizen be cut off, (though possible unjustly) it begets little or no disorder in the Commonwealth, because execution is done without private force, or foreign assistance, (which are mortal things to a free State) and what is done by course of Law, and publick authority, is neither destructive nor dangerous. And as to ancient examples, I think this of Coriolanus sufficient; from whence every man may gather what mischief would have resulted to the Commonwealth of Rome, had he been cut in pieces by the fury of the people; it would have created private disgusts; those disgusts jealousies, those jealousies provision of defence; that combina∣tions; combinations parties; and parties destruction: but by the interposition of pub∣lick authority, all these evils were prevented. We have seen in our time what inconveni∣encies followed in Florence, because the multitude had not a legal way of spending their in∣dignations against one of their Citizens. Francesco Valori was Prince of that City, suspe∣cted by many people, as if he designed to make himself absolute, and by his haughtiness and pride to exceed those limits which the Laws had prescribed: there being in that Com∣monwealth no way to prevent it, but by setting up a faction in opposition to his, he began to look out himself, and to make a party that might defend him. The people on the other side having no legal way to suppress them, betook themselves to their Arms. And whereas, if any ordinary way had been open to have opposed him, his designs had been obviated by his single destruction; being forced upon an extraordinary, it was effected not only by his, bu•• by the ruine of many other eminent Citizens. To confirm what we have said, another

instance might be produced in the City in the case of Peter Soderini, which happened for want of a Law whereby they might impeachany Citizen that aspir'd to the Government. There were eight judges only in that commonwealth, which are not enough to administer justice against a powerful man: in States that are well constituted, 'tis necessary there be more; for where they are so few, their dispatch is but small, and they are corrupted with more ease than where they are many. If therefore there had been any such way allowed, upon his ill Government, the Citizens would have formally impeached him, without calling in an Army of Spaniards; and if his Government had been well, they durst not have ac∣cused him, lest he should have accused them again; and by that means that emulation would have been prevented which was the cause of so much mischief: from whence it may be concluded, when ever foreign assistance is called in by any party in a City, that it proceeds from the ill constitution of that Government, and that there is no legal way of purging those humours which are so natural to men; against all which, no remedy is more properly applicable, than by authorizing several persons of quality and interest to receive informa∣tions: which practice was so well followed in Rome, that in all dissentions betwixt the Se∣nate and the people, it was never known that either Senate, or people, or any private Citi∣zen what-ever had recourse to foreign assistance; for having justice at home, what need of fetching it from abroad? To these Examples aforesaid, we may add another out of Titus Livius, who tells us, that in Clusia the chief City of the Tuscans, Lucamon having vitiated a Sister of one Aruns, and Aruns being unable to vindicate her, by reason of the power of the delinquent, he addressed to the French, who at that time had the Government of Lom∣bardy, and possessing them with the profitableness of the Expedition, he prevailed with them to bring an Army to revege him of that outrage and injury which his Sister had received: and doubtless he would never have betaken himself to the relief of a foreigner, could he have hoped for reparation at home. But as liberty of just accusation is great security to a State, so toleration of calumny is as dangerous on the other side, which we shall evince in the following Chapter.

CHAP VIII.

Vnjust calumnies are no less pernicious to a Commonwealth, than legal accusa∣tions are profitable and good.

THough the valour of Furius Camillus (after he had raised their Siege, and driven the French from their Leaguer before Rome) was so universally venerable, that none of the Romans thought it diminution either to their reputation or dignity to give him prece∣dence; yet Manlius Capitolinus could not brook that so much honour should be given him, seeing, in his judgment, he had done as much towards the preservation of the City, and deserved as well, in saving the Capital, as Camillus had done in the other; and in military experience he thought himself no way inferior: so that full of envy, and unable to bear the greatness of his Competitor, finding he could make no impression upon the Senators, he turned himself to the people, and spread abroad several false reports against him. Among other things, he puts it into their heads, that the Treasure which was arised for payment of the French had not been given, but was continued in the hands of private Ci∣tizens; which mony, if reassumed, might be applyed to publick use, and either lessen the duties, or discharge the debts of the people. These pretences had great influence upon the people, insomuch as they began to talk, to murmur, to meet, to post themselves tumul∣tuously in many places in the City, which being observed, and thought very dangerous by the Senate, they created a Dictator to take cognisance of the business, and restrain the fury of Manlius. The dictator cited Manlius, and appointed him a day; Manlius appeared, and being environed by the people as the Dictator was by the Senate, silence being made, the Dictator asked Manlius in whose hands that great Treasure he spake of was detained, for he did assure him the Senators were as desirous to discover it as the people: to which Manlius made no positive answer, but by way of evasion, replyed it was unnecessary (he thought) to tell them what they knew already as well as he; upon which insolence, the Dictator commanded him to prison; from whence it may be observed how detestable such calumniations ought to be, not only in every free City, but in every civil Society, and with what care and severity they are to be suppressed; and that is done most commodiously, by allowing freedom of accusation; for as calumny is pernicious, information is beneficial to a State.

Accusation and calumny differ in this point, that any man may calumniate another where and when he pleases, without bringing testimony, or any other circumstance to prove it: but in case of accusation 'tis quite another thing, a man must bring his proofs, his wit∣nesses, and other circumstances to make good his charge. People are legally accused no where but before the Senates, the Magistrates, or the People: but they are calumniated every where, within doors and without, in the streets and the market-place, and there most where there is least accusation, and the Cities least disposed to receive them. Wherefore he who would lay the foundation State, ought principally to provide that all persons might have liberty to inform against any one, without suspicion or fear; which being solemnly provided, and faithfully observed, his next business is to secure them against scandals, and the calumniator can have no reason to complain if he be punished, when there are publick places appointed to receive the accusations of such as are abused; and if in these things particular care be not taken, great mischiefs will follow; for these kind of aspersions do not correct, but provoke their fellow Citizens, and those who are accused are not so much apt to fear the disgrace, as to hate the authors of the reports. In these cases the Romans had very good Laws, and they stood them in good stead; but we in Florence having neglected them, have suffered much by it, and he who peruses the History of our City, will see how subject to calum∣niations in all times those Citizens have been, who have employed in its most important affairs. One is charged with embezling the publick treasure; another for being corrupted, and betraying some publick enterprize; a third for ambition, and commiting one insolence or another, from whence feuds and animosities do arise on hands; and from thence divisions; from divisions parties; and from parties destruction. Whereas, if in Florence authority had been allowed for the accusation of Citizens, many mischiefs had been prevented, which followed for want of it; for those Citizens who were accused (whether condemned or ab∣solved) would have not been able to have molested the State; and the impeachments would have been fewer than the calumniations, because more people would have been calumniated than accused, in respect that the first was so much the more easie (as is said hefore) than the other. And these calumnies have advanced some Citizens to great dignity; for having great adversaries that opposed their designs, they joyned themselves with the people, and making them their friends, confirm'd the ill opinion which they had of their adversaries before. Several examples might be produced to this purpose, but I shall only instance in one.

The Florentine Army was encamped before Lucca under the Command of Giovanni Guiccardini their Commissary. By his ill fortune or conduct the Town was not taken; which of the two soever it was, Giovanni was aspersed, as having been brib'd by the Luc∣cheses, which calumny being propagated by his enemies, netled Giovanni, and almost brought him to despair; and though, in order to his justification, he offered to put himself into the hands of the Captain, yet all was to no purpose; for in that Commonwealth there was no body qualified to clear him: from hence arose great contentions betwixt Guic∣cardin's friends, (who were the greatest part of the Grandees in that City) and those who studied novelty, which contentions, and others of the like nature, encreasing daily upon their hands, brought that poor Commonwealth into a most deplorable condition. Manlius therefore spreading these false reports of the Senators about Rome, was a calumniator, not an accuser; and the Romans in his case gave manifest instruction how such people are to be punished, that is, that they be obliged publickly to accuse, and when their charge is made good, that they be rewarded or encouraged; but when it cannot be proved, that they be punished like Manlius.

CHAP. IX.

How much a single person is necessary for the establishment of a new common∣wealth, or the reformation of an old.

IT may seem to some, that I have run too far into the Roman History, having made no mention of the Founders of that Commonwealth, nor of the Orders which they ob∣served either in matters of Religion, or War. To ease them therefore of their suspence, who are desirous to hear something to that purpose, I say, that many perhaps may think it of ill example for the Founder of a State, as Romulus was, to kill his own Brother, and af∣terwards consent to the death of Titus Tatius Sabinus, who was chosen his companion in the Government, supposing that according to that president, any of his Citizens that were

ambitious of Command, might make away their adversaries or competitors, and remove any obstucle that opposed them; and it were reasonable enough, were it not to be considered to what end, and upon what motives that murder was committed.

This is to be taken for a maxim, and general rule, that it is impossible for any Govern∣ment either to be well founded at first, or will reformed afterwards, unless by a single per∣son, by whose direction all Orders, all Laws are to be made and promulged. He therefore who is the founder of a Common-wealth, if he be an honest man, and aims not at his own interest, and the raising of his Family, more than the advancement of his Country, must endeavour to get the power into his single hands, nor will any wise man ever accuse him for any action extraordinary that he shall do in order thereunto; or if the fact be to be blamed, the effect will excuse it, especially if be good, as it was in Romulus his case, for it is destructive and pernicious violence that is to be reprehended, not that which tends to set∣tlement and reformation. He is also to be so prudent and vertuous, as not to leave the authority which he assumed in inheritance to another, because men being more prone to evil than good, his success or may employ that power to the prejudice of the State, which he in his wisdom made use of to its benefit and advantage.

Moreover, though one be fittest to make Laws, yet when once made, they cannot hold long, if left upon the shoulders of a single person, but when the care and execution of them is transfer'd upon many, and many are concerned to maintain them, it is much better; for though many be not so proper in laying the foundations of a Government, because their diversity of opinions keeps them from discerning what is absolutely for its good; yet when things are once setled, and they have found it, that very diversity will be a means to preserve it. And that Romulus was excusable for what he did to his Brother and Com∣panion, and that what he did was more for the common good than his own private ambi∣tion or revenge, appears by this; that he had no sooner made them away but, he constitu∣ted a Senate, by whose advice he acted in every thing, reserving to himself only the power of calling them together, and commanding the Armies when they should resolve of a War: and of this we cannot have better evidence than that which followed after the expulsion of the Tarquins, there being nothing innovated or altered by the Romans, only in stead of one perpetual King, they created two annual Consuls; which shews that Romulus in his first Institutions aimed rather at the election of a civil and a free, than an absolute and tyrannical State. Many more examples might be produced to fortifie what is said, as those of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other Founders of Kingdoms and Commonwealths, who, by assuming a Monarchical authority, were able to frame and impose such Laws as were for the bene∣fit of the publick; but being so well known, it would be superfluous. I shall add only one, not so famous perhaps, yet worthy to be considered by those who are desirous to be good Legislators; and it is this, Agls King of Sparta observing his Citizens had lost much of their ancient virtue, and by consequence were decayed both in their power and Empire, imputing it in part to their deviation from the Laws of Lycurgus, desired very earnestly to reduce them again, but before he could bring it to perfection he was slain by the Spartan Ephori, as one who designed to make himself absolute; but Cleomenes succeeding him in the Government, having the same inclination, and perceiving by some Records and Writings which Agis had left behind, what was his intention, he found that he could not do his Country that service any way, but by making himself absolute: for by the ambition of some persons, he found that he could not do the good which he designed to the generality, by reason of the malevolence of a few, wherefore he caused the Ephori, and who-ever else he thought likely to obstruct him, to be killed, and revived the Laws of Lycurgus, which noble act might have recovered that State, and have made Cleomenes as venerable as Lycurgus himself, had it not been for the power of Macedon, and the weakness of other Commonwealths; for not long after that reformation, being invaded by the Macedonians, it proved unable to defend it self, and having no body to sustain it, was over∣come; and that just and honourable design was unhappily laid aside. Considering therefore what has been said, I conclude, that a single person is best for the institution or regulating of any sort of Government, and that for the death of Remus and Tatius, Romulus was not to be blamed.

CHAP. X.

As they are to be praised who lay the foundations of any Republick or Kingdom, so they are to be condemn'd who set up a Tyranny.

AMong all Excellent and Illustrious men, they are most praise worthy who have been the chief establishers of Religion and Divine Worship: In the second place are they who have laid the foundations of any Kingdom or Commonwealth; In the third, those who having the Command of great Armies have enlarged their own, or the Dominion of their Country; In the next, Learned Men of all Sciences according to their several studies and degrees; and last of all (as being infinitely the greatest number) come the Artificers and Mechanicks; all to be commended as they are ingenious or skilful in their Professions. On the other side, they are infamous and detestable, who are contemners of Religion, sub∣verters of Governments, Enemies of Virtue, of Learning, of Art, and in short of every thing that is useful and honourable to mankind; and of this sort, are the prophane, the se∣ditious, the ignorant, the idle, the debauched, and the vile. And although Nature has so ordered it, that their is neither wise man nor fool, nor good man, nor bad, who if it were proposed to him which he would choose of these two sorts of people, would not pre∣fer that which was to be preferred, and condemn the other; yet the generality of Mankind deluded by a false impression of good, and a vain notion of glory, leaving those ways which are excellent and commendable, either wilfully or ignorantly wander into those paths which will lead them to dishonour; and whereas to their immortal honour they might establish a Commonwealth or Kingdom as they please, they run head-long into a Tyranny, not considering what fame, what glory, what affection, what security, what quiet and satisfaction of mind they part with, nor what reproach, scandal, hatred, danger and disquiet they incur. It is impossible but all people, (whether of private condition in the Commonwealth, or such as by their Fortune or Virtue have arrived to be Princes) if they have any knowledge in History, and the passages of old, would rather choose (if private persons) to be Scipio's than Caesar's; and (if Princes) to be Agesilaus, Timolion and Dion, than Nabis, Phalaris, or Dionysius; because they must find the one highly cele∣brated and admired, and the other as much abhor'd and condemn'd; they must find Ti∣moleon, and the rest to have as much interest and authority in their Countries, as Dionysius or Phalaris had in theirs, and much more security. Nor let any man deceive himself with Caesar's reputation, finding him so exceedingly eminent in History, for those who have cryed him up, were either corrupted by his fortune, or terrified by his power, for whil'st the Empire continued, it was never permitted that any man should speak any thing against him, and doubtless had Writers had their liberty, they could have said as much of him as of Cataline, and Caesar is so much the worst of the two, by how much it is worse to effect and perpetrate an ill thing, than to designe it; and this they might judge by what is said of his adversary Brutus, for not daring to speak downright of Caesar, by reason of his power, by kind of reverse, they magnified his Enemy: After Rome also was grown to be an Empire, and the Government in the hands of a single person, it may be observed how much more happy and secure those Emperors were who lived like good Princes, according to the dictate of the Laws, than those who lived otherwise; for Titus, Nerva, Trajanus, Adrianus, Antoninus, and Marcus, had no need of Praetorian bands, nor multitude of Legions to defend them, their own excellent deportment, the benevolence of the people, and the affection of the Senate, saved them that charge: It will appear likewise how to Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and several other Tyrannical Emperors; their Eastern and Western Armies were not sufficient to secure them against the Enemies, which their irre∣gularity and ill manners had contracted; The History of which persons, if well considered, would enable any Prince to distinguish betwixt the ways of Honour and Infamy, of Security and Fear: For of XXVI Emperors betwixt Caesar and Maximinus, XVI were murdered, and but X died in their beds; and though some of those who were slain might possibly be good, (as Pertinax, and Galba) yet they were murdered by reason of the corruption and ill discipline which their Predecessors had left in the Army; and if among those who died naturally, there were any Tyrannical, (as Severus) it is to be imputed to his great Courage and Fortune, which are two things very seldom Concomitant in one man, it is legible likewise in the same History upon what Basis and foundation a Monarchy must be built, to make it solid, and permanent; for all those Emperors who succeeded by here∣ditary right were ill men, except Titus only, and those who came in by Election were

good, as Nerva and the four which succeeded him; but when the Empire became wholly Hereditary, it ran furiously to destruction. Let the times therefore from Nerva to Marcus be displayed before your Prince, and let him compare them which went before with those which came after, and then make his choice when they would have been born, or when he would have been Soveraign; He will find when good men were at the Helm, the Prince safe in the security of his Subjects; Peace and Justice flourishing in the world; The Senate in Authority; The Magistrates in Esteem; Rich men enjoying their Estates; Nobility and Virtue Exalted; and all things quiet and well; No rancour; No licentiousness; No cor∣ruption; No ambition to be found; the times were golden; Every man enjoyed his opinion, and defended it as he pleased; In a word, He will find the world triumphing in felicity, The Prince happy in the reverence and affection of the people; and the people safe in the generosity of their Prince. If then the Reigns of the other Emperors be con∣templated, they will appear full of commotion, discord, and sedition, assassinations in Peace; Cruelty in War; Many Princes murther'd; many Foreign, many domestick embroilments; All Italy afflicted; and all its Cities destroyed; Rome burnt; The Capitol by its own Inhabi∣tants demolished; The ancient Temples desolate; Religious Ceremonies prophaned; and the whole Citie full of Adulteries; The Sea covered with Exiles, and the Rocks with blood; Infinite Cruelties and Barbaris••••s committed daily in the City; And Nobility, Riches, Honour, and especially Virtue, grown to be Capital offences. Informers and Calumnia∣tors will be found to be rewarded; Servants instigated against their Masters; Children against their Parents; and those few who were so unhappy as to have no Enemies; to be destroyed by their Friends; Then it will appear what mighty obligations Rome, and Italy, and the whole world had to Caesar; and doubtless if the Prince be endued with the lest spark of humanity or good nature, he will detest the imitation of the bad, and be inflamed with an ardent propensity to the good. All which things considered, that Prince certainly which aims at glory, and reputation in the world should desire a Government, where the manners of his Subjects are corrupted and depraved, not to subvert and destroy it like Caesar, but to rectifie and restore it like Romulus, than which the Heavens, cannot confer, nor man propose to himself greater honour. And if a Prince who would regulate and re∣form a City, cannot do it, without depositing his Authority; In that case he is excu∣sable in some measure, if he dispenses; but where he can retain the one, and accomplish the other, he is altogether unpardonable; they therefore to whom the Heavens are so propitious as to present such an opportunity, are to consider that they have two ways before them, one leading to security whil'st they live, and an honourable memory when they are dead, the other to continual troubles here, and perpetual infamy here∣after.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Religion and Ceremonies of the Romans.

THough Rome should have been founded by Romulus, and owe him (as his Daughter) for her Birth, and Education; yet the Heavens foreseeing that the Constitutions of Romulus would not be sufficient for so great an Empire, put it into the heart of the Roman Senate, to create Numa Pompilius for his Successor, to the end that what was left defective by the first, might be compleated by the latter. Numa finding the people martial and fierce, and being desirous by the Arts of Peace to reduce them to civil obedience, he betook himself to Religion, as a thing absolutely necessary to the maintenance of civil policy; and he ordered things, so that for many ages together never was the fear of God so eminently conspicuous as in that Commonwealth, which was a great promotion to whatever was designed either by the Senate or Princes. And he who shall peruse the infinite actions of that City collectively, or of several Romans in particular will find those Citizens more tender of falsifying an Oath, than of violating the Laws, judging an offence against God more hainous, than an offence against Men, and God more able to punish it: Of this we have manifest Evidence in the Examples of Scipio, and Manlius Torquatus, for after the defeat which Hanibal had given the Romans at Cannas, the people tumultuating, and many of them assembling in great fear to consider of their condition; They resolved among them∣selves to leave Italy, and transplant into Sicily. Scipio having notice, repaired to them immediately, and coming in suddenly among them with his Sword drawn, he forced them to

recant, and take a peremptory Oath not to abandon their Country. Lucius Manlius Fa∣ther to Titus Manlius (who was afterwards called Torquatus) was impeached by Marcus Pomponius a Tribune of the people. Before the day arrived for the hearing of the Father, the Son coming to the Tribune and threatning to kill him, unless he would swear to with∣draw his accusation, he forced him to his Oath, and he performed as he had sworn; and so those Citizens who could not be retained by either the love of their Country, or Laws; were kept at home by an Oath which they took upon force: and the Tribune laid by his hatred to the Father, passed by the insolence of the Son, and neglected the reflection it would have upon his own honour, to be punctual in his Oath; which proceeded from no∣thing but those principles of Religion which Nama had distused. And surely it will be found by whoever considers the Roman History, how useful a thing Religion was to the governing of Armies, to the uniting of the people, to the keeping men good, and to the deterring them from being bad; so that should it fall into dispute whether Rome was most obliged to Romulus or Numa, I am of opinion, Numa would have the preheminence, be∣cause where Religion is fixed Military Discipline is easily introduced; but where Religion is wanting, Discipline may be brought in with difficulty, but never in perfection. It is to be seen likewise that for the constituting a Senate, and establishing of Laws both Mili∣tary and Civil, Romulus had no need to pretend Divine Authority; but with Numa it was otherwise, he was of necessity to pretend to it, and thereupon gave out that he had private Conference with a Nymph, who dictated to him what he was to prescribe to the people, and all was, because he had a mind to introduce new Laws and Customs into that City, which he thought his own private authority would never effect. And certainly never any man brought in new Laws, or set up any Doctrine extraordinary, but with pretence of Religion; because otherwise they would never have been admitted; for a man may be wise and know many things are good, and yet want reasons and arguments to convince other people; wherefore to remove that difficulty, prudent men do make that always their pre∣tence, and Solon, Lycurgus, and several others who had the same design, practised the same. The people (then) admiring the goodness and wisdom of Numa, submitted in all things; True it is the devotion of the age, and ignorance of the people contributed much, for thereby he was able to impress them with what new form he thought good; and questionless, he that would establish a Commonwealth at this day, would find it more easie among the rude people of the Mountains who have not been acquainted with Civility, than among such as have been educated in Cities, where their civility was corrupted; like rude unpolished Marble which is more readily carv'd into a Statue, than what has been mangled already by some bungling workman. So that all things considered, I conclude, That the Religion introduced by Numa, was one of the first causes of that Cities felicity, because Religion produced good Laws, good Laws good Fortune, and good Fortune a good End in whatever they undertook. And as strictness in Divine Worship, and Con∣science of Oaths, are great helps to the advancement of a State so contempt of the one, and neglect of the other are great means of its destruction. Take away Religion, and take away the foundation of Government; for though perhaps the goodness and fear of their Prince may sustain it for some time, and supply the want of Religion in his subjects; yet because he is mortal, and possibly but very short lived, that Kingdom can hardly out-live the virtue of its Governor: Wherefore those States which depend only upon the piety of their Princes, are of little duration, for commonly one dyes with the other, and the virtue of the Father seldom revives in the Son, as Dante has said very wisely,

Rade volte discende per li rami L' tunn ana probitate, et questo vuole Quel che la da, perche da lai si chiami.

Virtue's but seldom to the branches spread, He who bestows't, has in his wisdom said, Let him that wants, come to the fountain-head.

Things being thus, it is not sufficient for a Commonweal thor Kingdom to have a Prince who Governs it wisely whil'st he lives, but he must lay his foundation so, as it may out∣live him, and flourish when he is in his grave; and though rude, and uncultivated people are more susceptible of new Laws, or new Doctrines; yet men that are civil, and presume more upon their Education are not altogether impenatrable. The people of Florence thought themselves no fools, and they had a good opinion of their breeding; nevertheless they suffered themselves to be deluded by Frier Girolamo Savonarola into persuasion that he

had Conference with God. A person of his gravity is not to be mentioned but with reve∣rence, and therefore whether true, or not true, I will not determine, only this I shall say, many believed him, who never saw any thing extraordinary to induce them; his Life, his Doctrine, the subject of his discoursing being in their thoughts enough to convince them. Let no man therefore despair of what another man has attained, for men (as I said in my Preface) are born, live, and dye, in the same method as formerly.

CHAP. XII.

How necessary for the preservation of a State it is, that Religion be in esteem, and how much Italy has suffered for want of it, by means of the Church of Rome.

THose Princes and Commonwealths who would keep their Governments entire and incorrupt, are above all things to have a care of Religion and its Ceremonies, and preserve them in due veneration, for in the whole world there is not a greater sign of immi∣nent ruine, than when God and his Worship are despised. This is easily understood by observing upon what foundation the Religion is placed where every man is born. The Religion of the Gentiles ran much upon the answers of Oracles, upon Divinations, and Soothsaying, upon which all the rest of their Sacrifices, Rights, and Ceremonies did de∣pend; for they did not doubt but the same thing that could presage your fortune (be it good, or be it bad) could as easily confer it; and therefore they built their Temples, they made their Sacrifices, they offered up their prayers, and used all other Ceremonies that might signifie their veneration; for the Oracles of Delos, ••he Temple of Iupiter Ammon, and such other things had a strange influence upon people, and kept them in most wonder∣full devotion; but afterwards when they began to speak according to the interest or dire∣ctions of great persons, and their partiality began to be discovered; the people grew incre∣dulous, and prone to all kind of disturbance: A Prince therefore or Commonwealth ought most accurately to regard, that his Religion be well founded, and then his Govern∣ment will last, for there is no surer way than to keep that good and united. Whatever therefore occurs that may any way be extended to the advantage and reputation of the Religion which they design to establish (how uncertain or frivolous soever it may seem to themselves) yet by all means they are to be propagated and encouraged, and the wiser the Prince, the more sure it is to be done; This course having been observed by wise men, has produced the opinion of Miracles, which are celebrated even in those Religions which are false; for let their Original be as idle as they please, a wise Prince will be sure to set them forward, and the Princes authority recommends them to every body else. Of these miracles, there were many in Rome, as at the sacking of Urii, some of the Roman Soldiers entring into the Temple of Iuno, accosting her Image, and asking it Vis venire Roman, will you come to Rome; To some of them she seemed to beckon by way of consent, and, others fancied she said Yes; For those men being more than ordinary religious (as Titus Livius infers from the devotion, and reverence, and quietness wherewith they entred) they fancied they heard that answer, which 'tis possible they expected before; and Camillus and the other Magistrates of the City promoted their belief: And if this diligent care in Divine Worship were regarded by Christian Princes according to the Precepts and Instru∣ctions of him that gave it at first, the States and Commonwealths of Christendom would be much more happy and firm: Nor can any thing portend the ruine of our Church with more certainty, than that those who are nearest the Church of Rome, (which is the head of our Religion) should have less Religion than other people: and he who should consider the present practice, with the primitive foundation, would find that either utter destru∣ction, or some great judgment was hanging over our heads. And for as much as some are of opinion, that the felicity and welfare of Italy depends upon the Church of Rome, I shall set down some few reasons to the contrary, which I have fram'd to my self, two of which are in my judgment unanswerable: One is that by the corrupt example of that Court, that Province has lost all its Religion, and all its Devotion, which has been followed by many inconveniences, and disorders; for as the Religiousness of the people presuppose all well, so where they are wicked, it betokens the contrary; so then, we Italians have this Obli∣gation to the Church and its Ministers, that by their means we are become Heathenish and Irreligious; besides another (little less pernicious) and that is, that we are grown divided and factious, which must of necessity be our ruine, because never was any Province happy

or united, unless under the obedience of one Commonwealth, or one Prince, as France and Spain at this time: and the reason is, because Italy is not upon the same terms, as having no one Republick or Commonwealth to govern it, but the Church, and though the Pope has assumed a Temporal as well as Spiritual jurisdiction, yet he was never so couragious or powerful as to possess himself of all, and make himself Prince; nor was he ever so weak, but upon any apprehension of losing his Temporal Dominion, he could call in some Foreign Potentate to defend him against any man who was grown too formidable; and this has been seen anciently in many Examples, as when by assistance of Charles the Great, he repelled the Lombards who in a manner hacd made themselves Masters of all Italy; and when again in our days he retrenched the power of the Venetians by the help of the French, after which he drove out the French by the succour of the Swizzers. The Church therefore being neither so strong as to conquer all Italy, nor so weak as to suffer it to be over-run by any body else, has been the occasion that it never fell into the hands of one person, but has been cantonized into several Principalities, by which means it has been so weak and disunited, that it has been not only exposed as a prey to the power of the Barbarians, but to every one that thought good to invade it which is an unhappiness we Italians owe only to the Church: If any man suspects what is said, and would be expe∣rience inform himself of the truth, it would be necessary he should be so potent as to trans∣plant the Court of Rome and all its Authority in Italy into the Territories of the Swizzers, who are the only people at this day which live either as to their Ecclesiastical or Military, Discipline, according to the Model of the Ancients, and then he would quickly find that the wickedness and depravity of that Court, would produce more confusion and disorder in that Country than ever befell it by any accident before.

CHAP. XXIII.

How the Romans pretended Religion many times to regulate their City, to prosecute their Wars, and to pacifie their tumults.

ANd I hold it not extravagant to produce two or three Examples in which the Romans made use of their Religion both in the regulation of their City, and the prosecution of their Wars; and although in Titus Livius they be very frequent, yet I shall content my self with these.

After the people of Rome, had created their Tribunes with consular power and all of them (except one) from among the Plebeans; there hapning that year, a furious Plague, a desperate Famine, and other Prodigies besides, the Nobility in the next creation of Tri∣bunes took advantage of that occasion, and pretended that the Gods were incensed against the people, for that they had debased the Majesty of the Empire, and that there was no remedy to appease them but to reduce the Election of the Tribunes to its primitive insti∣tution; upon which the people were so frighted, they chose all their Tribunes that year, out of the Patricii. It was the same case in the taking of Veii The Romans had been before it ten years, and no great lekelihood of carrying it; but the Tenth, the Lake of Albin being miraculously swell'd; so as to drown a good part of the Country, the great Officers of the Army observing their Soldiers weary of the Siege, and impatient to be at home; feigning to have consulted the Oracles, they pretended that they had received this answer, That Veii should be taken that year that Albin overflowed; which answer reflecting upon their Devotion, the Soldiers reassumed their Courage, continued the Siege, and (Camillus being chosen Dictator) carried the Town; and thus you may see how the Romans made use of their Religion to encourage their Army against the fatigues and dangers of a tedious Leaguer, and to fright the people from entrenching upon the pri∣viledges of the Nobility in the Election of their Tribunes; without which pretence it would have been a hard matter to have persuaded either the one or the other. There was another example to the same purpose, Terentillus, a Tribune of the people, would needs make a Law (which was called Lex Terentilla, and shall be mentioned hereafter) contrary to the interest, and inclination of the Senate. The Senate resolved to oppose it, and the best means they could think of, was pretence of Religion; of which they made use two ways; they ordered the Books of the Sybils to be look'd over, and this answer to be returned, That that very year the City would be in great danger of losing its liberty, unless civil Sedi∣tion was prevented; which artifice, (notwithstanding it was discovered by the Tribunes) put the people into such a fright, they grew cool in the business, and refused to stand by them. After this, they made use of the same pretence another time; Appius Herdonius

having got together of Slaves and Exiles to the number of Four thousand men, seized upon the Capitol in the night, and brought such a terror upon the City, it might very well be feared if the Aequi and the Volsci (perpetual Enemies to the Romans) had taken their op∣portunity and marched to Rome, they would have gone near to have master'd it: However the Tribunes persisted, and nothing could serve their turns, but the Lex Terentilla must be promulged; for they affirmed the Stories of being invaded, were but suggestions and fal∣lacies, and not one word of them true: Hereupon one Publius Rubetius (a grave Citizen, and of good authority among them) came forth of the Senate, and partly by fair words and partly by foul, remonstrating the danger of the City, and the unseasonableness of their de∣mands, he play'd his part so well, that the Constrained the people to take an Oath of fidelity ••o the Consul; and in testimony of their integrity, the people ran to their Arms, and reco∣vered the Capital from Herdonius; but Publius Valerius their Consul being slain in the Conflict, Titus Quintius was chosen immediately in his place; who to keep the populace employed, and leave them no time to think of their Law Terentilla, Commanded them out of Town forthwith against the Volsci, alledging that the Oath which they had taken to be true to the Consul, obliged them to follow him; and though the Tribunes opposed it, and objected that that Oath extended no further than to the Consul that was dead; nevertheless Livy tell us, that such was the peoples tenderness and veneration for Religion, that they chose rather to follow the Consul, than to strain and presume upon their Consciences, giving this reason for it.

Nondum haec, quae nunc tenet seculum, negligentia deûm venerat, nec, interpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum, & leges aptas faciebat.

The neglect of the Gods, which has overspread this Age, was not then come to that height, nor did everyman interpret his Oaths, and accommodate his Laws, to his own interest and advantage.

Upon which the Tribunes perceiving their danger and that if they persist, they should run a hazard of being utterly extinguished; they came to an agreement with the Consul, received his Orders, obliged themselves not to insist upon the Lex Terentilla for a Twelve-month, in case the Consuls for the same time would forbear drawing out the people. And thus you see how by pretence of Religion, the Senate overcame a difficulty, which without it, it could never have done.

CHAP. XIV.

The Romans were wont to interpret their Auspices with accommodation to their own pleasures and designs; and when at any time they were forced to transgress they managed it wisely, and pretended to be very precise; and if any body rashly despised them, he was sure to be punished.

AMong the Gentiles, Auguries were a great part of their Religion (as I have said else∣where) and they contributed not a little to the well being of the Roman Common∣wealth; for which reason the Romans had them in particular care, above any other Ordi∣nance, and made use of them in the creation of Consuls, in the undertaking of Enterprizes, in drawing out their Armies, in their Battels and Engagements, and in every other business of importance, whether Military or Civil; nor would they ever begin an Expedition, till they had possessed the Soldiers that the Gods had promised them success; Among the several Orders of Auspices, they had one called the Pullarii, who were to give their presages before ever they fought with their Enemy: If the pullen, over which they had inspection, Eat, it was a good Omen, and they might with confidence engage; if they did not Eat, It was an ill sign, and they were obliged to forbear: Nevertheless, when reason told them their Enter∣prizes were practicable, they went roundly about them, though perhaps their Auspices were averse, but acted with great nicety and cunning, that it might not seem done in defiance of Religion: This was practised by Papirius the Consul before his Battel with the Samnites after which they never recovered. For being drawn up with his Army against the Samnites, with all visible advantage, and being willing to fall on, he commanded the Pullarii to try their Experiment; the Chickens refusing to peck, was a great trouble to the chief of the Pullarii, who observed the great alacrity of the Soldiers, and the great confidence of the Ge∣neral; that an occasion therefore of so signal a Victory might not be taken from the Army, he return'd answer to the Consul that the Omen was good; Papirius put his Men immedi∣ately into Battalia, and advanced against the Enemy; but some of the Pullarii having told it up and down among the Soldiers, that the Pullets did not eat, it came to the ears of Spurius

Papirius, Nephew to the Consul, who in great hast advertising his Unckle, received this answer, Spurius be you diligent, and observe your Orders; to my self and my Army the Auspi∣cia are good; if the Pullarius has told me false, the misfortune will be to him; and that the event night correspond to his Prognostick, he commanded the Pullarii to be placed in the front of the Battel; His Commands being executed, it hapned by accident as they were advancing to the fight, the chief of the Pullaru was killed by a dart from one of the Roman Soldiers, which being told to the Consul, Now (said he) all will be well, the Gods are ap∣peased, and the blood of the Author has atton'd for his lye; and so by a discreet accommoda∣tion of his designs to the Auspices, he went on to the Combat, his Army taking no notice that he had violated their Religion. Had Appius Pulcher been so ingenious in Sicily in the first Punick War, it had fared better with him when he came home, but being to fight the Carthaginian Army, he consulted the Pullarii, who informing him that the Pullen would not eat, We will see then (said he) if they will drink, and caused them to be thrown into the Sea: and coming afterwards to an Engagement, his Army was defeated, himself con∣demn'd at his return, and Papirius advanced, not so much because one had prevailed, and the the other was beaten, as because one had prudently evaded the Omen, and the other rashly defyed it: and these Auguries were invented for no other end, but that the Soldiers might go to the fight with more confidence and alacrity; for their alacrity was observed to contri∣bute much to their success; and this practice was so fortunate to the Romans, that foreign Governments began to make use of it; as I shall show by one Example in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XV.

How the Samnites in the extremity of their affairs, as their last refuge, had recourse to Religion.

THe Samnites had long War with the Romans, fought several Battels with them, and in the last fight in Tuscany, were so utterly broken, that their Army was destroyed, their chief Officers slain, and the Tuscans, Gauls, and Umbri, (their allies) uncapable of giving them any further assistance; so that Livy tells us, Nec suis, nec externis viribus jam stare poterant, tamen bello non abstinebant, adeo ne infeliciter quidem defensae libertatis taoedebat & vinci, quam non tent are victoriam Malebant. That though they were reduced to such a condition, That they could neither support themselves by their own strength, nor the supplies of their Friends, yet they continued the War; so that the unhappiness of their defence could not discourage them, but they chose rather to be conquered, than not to try for the Victory. Hereupon knowing that no Victory is to be expected, where the Soldier is diffident; and that nothing enhanses them like a Religious opinion; as their last effort, they concluded (by the Ministery of Ovius Paccius their Priest) to revive an old Ceremony, which they did in this manner; Altars being erected, and solemn Sacrifice made, betwixt the flaming Altar, and the bones of the Victims, the Officers having first sworn never upon any distress whatsoever to abandon the fight; the Soldiers were called over one by one, and in the same place (before several Centurions with their naked Swords in their hands appointed to that purpose) required to swear, first, that they would not deride any thing that they should either hear or see; after which, with execrable words, and Verses full of horror, they caused them to take their Oaths to be ready at the Command of their Generals, never to fly, and to kill any of their fellows that offer'd to turn his back: and if ever they broke them, they imprecated a judgment upon themselves, and their race. Some of them being scrupulous, and unwilling to swear, were killed upon the place, which struck such terror into the rest, that none of them refused. And that this Ceremony might be performed with more magnificence, there being 40000 Men in the field, half of them were clothed in white, with Plumes of feathers upon their Helmets, in which posture they encamped not far from Aquilonia; Papirius was sent against them, and in his Speech to his Soldiers, he had this Expression, Non enim Crist as vulnera facere, & picta, at▪ aurata scuta, transire Romanum pilum. For their feathers made no wounds, nor could the paint or glittering of their Shields protect them against the darts of the Romans. And to take off the opinion from his Soldiers, that the solemnity and Nature of their Oath, might make the Enemy despe∣rate; he told them, That that would be rather a terror, than an encouragement to them when they came to consider that by their own folly they had brought themselves in danger of the Gods, the Romans, and their Comerades. In short the Samnites wear beaten, the

Roman virtue, and the memory of their own frequent misfortunes prevailing against all the forc'd courage which either their Oath or their Religion could give them. Nevertheless their sence of it was visible, seeing they made use of it as their last remedy, when they had no other hopes to recover their spirits.

This might possibly have been better brought in among my forein discourses, but depend∣ing upon one of the ancientest and most important Ceremonies of the Roman Common∣wealth, lest I should divide my matter, and give too much occasion to look back, I thought it not improper to insert it in this place.

CHAP. XVI.

A people accustomed to the dominion of a Prince, though by accident they may acquire their liberty, yet it is with great difficulty, if they maintain it.

IF the Records of ancient History will serve our turn, it is manifest by many examples, that a people born and bred up in subjection to a Prince, cannot without great difficulty pre∣serve its liberty, if by any accident it attains it, as the Romans did upon the expulsion of the Tarquins & not without reason; for the people is like a wild beast, (which, though naturally fierce, disposed to live in the woods, and to find out dens and converts to conceal it self) yet hav∣ing been always brought up as it were in prison & servitude, if by accident it breaks its bonds and escapes out into the field, it is in a maze, knows not whither to run, where to sustain, or where to conceal it self, as having been accustomed to bondage and confinement; by which means, if worth the looking after, it is easily recovered. It is the same with a people which has lived always in subjection, who, understanding nothing of publick offence or defence, and knowing as little of Princes as Princes do of them, are with the greatest ease imagina∣ble reduced to a yoke which is commonly more grievous than what they escaped from be∣fore; and this happens to them where they are not totally debauched (for where the Mass is corrupted, they cannot subsist a moment): I speak now of those where the malignity is not so diffused, but that there are still left more good men than bad; in which case another difficulty does likewise occur, and that is, when-ever the yoke of tyrranny is shaken off, and liberty set up, it follows continually that many enemies are created, whose interest it is to subvert it, and no friends made that shall have any advantage by supporting it. By ene∣mies I mean all those privado's and favourites of Princes who have enjoyed the perferments and wealth of their Master, and cannot but be disgusted to find themselves dispossessed; wherefore they are constantly ready to take any occasion of restoring their old Prince, that they themselves might be restored to their authority and employment. And for friends whose interest it is that (upon the shaking off their Tyrant) their liberty should be preser∣ved, they are not to be expected, because in free States, honours and offices are confer'd upon such as by their virtue, some great atcheivment for the benefit of the Common∣wealth, or some other honourable action have seemed to deserve them; and when a man receives no more than what he thinks he has deserved, he ascribes it to his own merits ra∣ther than to the liberality of the State, and holds himself not obliged. Besides, the com∣mon utility resulting from a free State, though it be in their power, it is not at all in their knowledg; for who is it that considers, or takes care that every man enjoys quietly what God has given him; that their wives be not dishonoured, their children abused, nor their fellows oppressed? For who is it that will think himself bound to any man for doing him no wrong? and things being so, a free State newly acquired, never creates such friends as will be half so solicitous for its conservation, as those enemies who have been dispossessed of their fortunes and preferment▪ will be to undermine it, and restore their old Master again: and if it be enquired what course is to be taken against the inconveniences and disorders which follow thereupon; there is not a more efficacious, safer, and more necessary remedy, than to kill the Sons of Brutus, who (as History tells us) entred into a conspiracy against the State, with other young Gentlemen of Rome, for no other reason but because they could not be so loose and licentious under the Consuls as under the Kings; as if their freedoms were incompatible, and the liberty of the people was servitude to them: where∣fore he who proposes to govern a people, whether by the way of Monarchy or Republick and does not secure himself of those who are adverse to the change, must never think to effect, or at least to enjoy it long: and on the other side, it is convenient he should know the infelicity of those Princes who cannot secure their Dominion without murder and blood; by which means the multitude is incensed, and become mortally their enemies: he

who has but few enemies may secure it the better; but where the multitude is provoked, no security is to be had; and the more cruelty is used, the weaker the Government; so that when all's done the surest remedy is to indulge the people, and make them your friends. And now (though I may seem something confused and immethodical in speaking sometimes of a Prince, and then of a Republick) I shall take the liberty to do it here briefly, that I may have no occasion hereafter. A Prince therefore who, by usurping upon the liberties of the people, has made them his enemies, (if he desires to reconcile himself) is above all things to consider what the people affect, and he shall find it to consist principally in two things; one is, revenge upon those who have been instrumental in their slavery; and the other is restitution of their liberty. In the first the Prince may gratifie them fully, in the second but in part. Of the first we have an exact instance. Clearchus Governour of He∣raclia being banished for his tyranny, a controversie betwixt the Nobility and the Commons hapning afterwards in that Town, it fell out, that the Nobility finding themselves the weaker, addressed to Clearchus, and having entred into confederacy with him, they gave him admission and overcoming the people, he took away their liberties. But Clearchus perceiving himself in the clutches of the Nobility, and not only subject to their insolence, (which was neither to be satiated nor corrected) but to the rage and fury of the multitude, which could by no means digest his encroachments upon their liberty, he resolved at one blow to rid himself of his Grandees, and reconcile himself to the people, and taking his opportunity, he cut off all his Nobility with great satisfaction to the rest. The other thing which they desire with so much favour is restitution of their liberty in which the Prince cannot totally comply without degrading himself: he is therefore to examine upon what grounds the people are so fond of it, and he will find that some few indeed are zea∣lous for their liberty, in hopes of office and preferment; but the greatest part desire it only to be secure against oppression, and to live comfortably, and at ease. For in all Governments, whether Republick or Monarchical, forty or fifty men go away with all the commands and offices of importance, which number being small, it is no hard matter for a Prince to secure himself against them, by cutting them off, or by such addition to their former advantages as may in some measure oblige them.

The rest, whose aim is only to live quietly, are easily satisfied by constituting such Laws and Ordinances as may make the power of the Prince consistant with the security of the people. If a Prince does this, and be observed upon no accident what-ever to violate their Laws, the people will quickly be contented, and believe themselves safe. And of this the Kingdom of France is an example; being quiet, and at peace, because the Kings are bound by innumerable Laws, which comprehend the security of the Subject; for by the first in∣stitution of that Monarchy, the Kings have the disposition of their Revenue, and the ma∣nagement of their Armies, but in every thing else they are circumscribed by the Laws. That Prince therefore, or Commonwealth, which at its first erection secures not it self, is obliged to do it at the first opportunity, as the Romans did when they murdered the Sons of Brutus, and he that slips it will repent when 'tis too late: for the people of Rome (not yet entirely corrupted) having recovered their liberty, it was sufficient to maintain it, that they made away the Bruti, and extinguished the Tarquins, which otherwise was not to have been done, had the whole mass and body of the people been debauched, as I shall shew in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

A people wholly corrupted in their manners, may possibly recover their liberty, but they will find insuperable difficulty to maintain it.

HAd not Kings been expelled as they were in Rome, that City, in my opinion, must of necessity have declined, and its ancient virtue & the authority been lost; for if the cor∣ruption of those Kings be considered, had it been propagated but to the third succession▪ it would easily have diffused it self among the people; and that being infected, nothing could have preserved the City, much less have restored it to its former vigour and reputation; but the trunk being entire, and the distemper only in the head; by taking off that, the members were capable of being preserved. and their liberty recovered. And this may be laid down as a positive truth, that a City accustomed to the dominion of a Prince (if the manners of the people be corrupted) can never make it self free, though the Prince and his whole race be extinguished; for some new Lord or other will always spring up, unless

by accident the courage and fortune of some good Citizen concurs to its preservation; and even then its liberty will be continued no longer than the life of that person; as it hapned in Syracuse, which remained free during the lives of Dion and Timoleon, (though in different times) but when they were dead, it relapsed, and fell under the same tyranny as before: but the most evident example of all was in Rome which City having turned out the Tar∣quins, found out a way of setting up, and maintaining their liberty a long time; yet when Coesar was slain, and Caligula, Nero: and the whole race of the Caesars extirpated; the Ro∣mans were so far from maintaining it, that they could not so much as introduce the least form or appearance of liberty; and the reason of that diversity in the same City was no other, but because in the time of the Tarquins the people were not generally so vitious as afterwards in the reign of Caligula and Nero: for at the expulsion of the Tarquins, to possess the people then against tyranny, it was sufficient to tender them an oath, by which they en∣gaged never to admit single person again in Rome: whereas afterwards, upon the death of Cae∣sar and the rest, neither the authority nor rigour of Brutus, with all his Legions in the East was able to dispose the people to the assertion of that liberty which so happily had been set up by the first of Brutus his name. So strangely had the Faction of Marius diffused their poison among the Commons, of which Caesar being head, he had opportunity of blinding the people, and coaxing them into servitude so slily, they could not perceive the yoke into which they were thrusting their necks. Though this example of the Romans be pregnant enough, yet it is not brought in for any want in our own times. For in Naples and Milan the manners of the people being totally debauched, nothing could do, no opportunity could restore them to a condition of liberty. 'Tis true, upon the death of Philip Visc••nti, the Milaneses attempted, but they could never effect it. For which reason it was very happy for the Romans that their Kings discovered their depravity so soon; for by that means they were driven out before their wickedness could dilate, and spread it self among the people; which if it had done, the troubles and tumults which succeeded thereupon had never had so good end, as to make rather for the advantage than prejudice of the City: from whence it may be infer'd, that where the multitude is not corrupt, tumults and disorders do no very great mischief; where it is corrupt, Laws may be well constituted and provided, and ye do no good; unless executed by some person so severely, that the people are compelled to observe them, and by strict observation to become good; which is a thing I can neither say has hapned hitherto, or promise it ever will. For it is clear, (as I said before) that a City declining, upon the corruption of the Mass, can never recover, unless it be by the virtue and magnanimity of some active Citizen, who takes the administration of Justice into his own hands, and sees every thing faithfully performed, and even then, that good man is no sooner in his grave, but the people are in their old servitude again. Thus it fell out with the Thebans; Epaminondas, by his virtue and conduct, enabled them to keep up a form of a Common wealth whilst he was alive, but, alas, at his death it was quickly dissolved; the reason is, because no man is sufficiently long lived, to reclaim a City that has been long accustomed to licentiousness, and to reduce it to be good. So that though it happens to have such a good man among them, and he lives a long time; nay though there be two successions of good men, if the third (as I said before) be defective, all goes to wrack, it must necessarily be ruined, unless by many dangers, and great effusion of blood it happens to be preserved; because that corruption which renders it so unapt and indisposed to a free life, proceeds from the great inequality in that City and to reduce things to an equality, extraordinary ways must be used which few people know, and fewer will take, as shall be shewn more particularly in another place.

CHAP. XVIII.

A corrupt City having made it self free, how its liberty may be maintained; and not having made it self, how its liberty may be procured.

I Think I shall not be extravagant, if to what has been said already, I add another quaery Whether, in a corrupt City, a free State may be maintained (if by any accident it be set up); or, if there be no such thing already, how it is to be obtained? I answer, both of them are hard; and though a certain rule cannot be prescribed, (unless we knew the degrees of its corruption); nevertheless, it being good that every thing be fairly discust, this que∣stion shall not be suffered to pass.

I shall presuppose, that the City of which I speak is corrupt in extremity, and in that case the difficulty encreases with proportion; for no Laws nor Customs can restrain an uni∣versal depravity; because, as good Customs cannot subsist without good Laws, so good Laws cannot be executed without good Customs: besides, the Laws which are made in the minority and innocence of a Commonwealth, are not sutable or efficacious when it is grown wicked and robust; for the Laws of a City do vary upon several accidents and emer∣gencies, but the Statutes and fundamental Orders are seldom or never changed, for which reason new Laws are not so necessary afterwards, as good Statutes at first: but to illustrate it farther. By ancient Statute and Custom time out of mind, the Commonwealth of Rome was divided betwixt the Senate and the People, and all authority was derived either from the People, or Senate, or Tribunes, or Consuls; as also their creation of Magistrates, and enacting of Laws: these Customs were little (if at all) changed in all the revolutions of that State; but the Laws for punishing malefactors, and regulating enormities, were enacted or repealed as the exorbitance of the people did fluctuate and require, as the sump∣tuary Laws, the Law against adultery, ambition, and several others, instituted from time to time, as the Citizens grew corrupter. But the old customs of State being retained, (though tainted, and sharing in the corruption of the people) the reviving of old Laws, or intro∣ducing of new, was not sufficient to keep the Citizens good, but it would have contributed much, had the old Customs been reform'd when those new Laws were introduced, and a new form of Government set up: for that those ancient Customs are of no use or advan∣tage where a City is overflown with such a deluge of corruption, is apparent by their me∣thods in the creation of Magistrates, and the exhibition of Laws. The Consulship, nor any other office or dignity was never confer'd by the people of Rome upon any body but by formal application, which Custom was originally very good, because none sought for them who was conscious of being unfit; forasmuch as to be repulsed was a dishonourable thing, and to make himself sit, every man chose to be virtuous. But afterwards the manners of the people growing so fatally corrupt, this Custom lost its primitive convenience, and became not only useless but pernitious; for they who had most power, not they who had most virtue and capacity, pretended to the Magistracy; the poor and the virtuous not da∣ring to appear for fear of an ignominious repulse: but this inconvenience (like the City it self) was not the product of a day, it stole into the Commonwealth, lay concealed, en∣creased, and exerted it self by degrees, as all other inconveniencies do. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 having con∣quered Africa and Asia, and reduced the greatest part of Greece, the Romans began to hug themselves in their liberty, as not knowing any enemy they ought in reason to fear: this security and unhappy scarcity of enemies was the occasion that in their creation of Consuls the people of Rome began to regard riches and favour more than ability and virtue; prefer∣ring such persons as could entertain and treat people handsomely, before such as were grave, and could only conquer their enemies; afterwards, from those who were most plausible, they came down, and created such as were most powerful; so that persons of virtue and capacity were totally excluded. In the making of Laws, a Tribune and any one Citizen had power to propose any thing to the people which they thought of importance to the publick; before whom it was canvas'd and discuss'd, every man having free liberty to ob∣ject, or promote it (as his judgment directed) before it could pass.

And this Custom was good likewise whilst the Citizens were so too; for it was always, and is still convenient, that if any man be wiser than the rest, and can contrive any thing for the security or benefit of the publick, that he have liberty to propose it; and it is as use∣ful on the other side, every man have the same freedom to ventilate and examine it; that all being well argued, and every mans opinion heard, the best may be chosen. But as the Citizens grew corrupt, this Custom grew incommodious: none but great men proposed any thing to the people, and what they did was not for the common, but their own private interest, and which was worse, no man had the liberty to dispute it; so that the people were either circumvented, or forced to consent to their own ruine and destruction. So then, to have maintained Rome free in such an age of corruption, it was necessary, as they altered their Laws according to the prevalence of each vice, so they should have altered their fun∣damentals, in the making of Laws, and creation of Magistrates; for the same Customs are not equally convenient where the people are not equally good, no more than the forms can be alike where the matter is contrary. But 'tis worth our inquity whether these Customs be to be reform'd at a blow, as soon as their inconvenience is descried, or by degrees, before every body observes them. I say both of them are almost impossible: for to alter them by degrees, requires some wise and sagacious Citizen, that can foresee the dangers at a distance, and trace them to their first causes; but of such persons perhaps a City may never see one, or if it does, how hard is it for him to persuade other people: for people accustomed to a

way are not easily got out of it, especially when the mischief is rather in probability than prospect. And when these old Customs are to be reformed, (as appearing unprofitable and dangerous for the Commonwealth) though they be easily discovered, they are hard to be removed, especially at once; because the common mass being infected, common ways are too weak; and recourse must be had to extraordinary, as violence and arms; for before the fabrick of the Government can be changed and modelled to your desire, 'tis necessary above all things to make your self Master of the City, and to be able to dispose of it at your pleasure: and because to reform a State, and reduce it to a Civil Regiment, presup∣poses a good man; and to usurp, and make ones self Prince by violence, presupposes an ill; therefore it seldom falls out that a good man makes himself Prince by unjust means, be his ends never so good; nor will an ill man, who has made himself Prince, ever do good▪ it never falls into his thoughts to imploy that authority well which he has unjustly acquir'd. From the causes aforesaid therefore arises the difficulty (or rather impossibility) in a cor∣rupt City, to maintain a free State, much less to erect one; and if there should be any way found out to effect it, it would (in my judgment) be necessary to frame it rather according to a Regal than a Popular State; that those persons whose insolence is incorrigible by the Laws, may be bridled and restrained by some supreme Magistrate in the nature of a King; and to attempt any other way, must be either vain and temerarious, or exorbitantly cruel. For though Cleomenes (being a single person) killed the Ephori, (as is said before) and Ro∣mulus, his Brother, and Titus Tatius, and afterwards imployed their authority to the ad∣vantage of the publick; yet it is to be considered, that the subjects neither of the one or the other were so vitious or depraved as those of whom we have treated in this Chapter, and therefore they were able to do what they pleased, and excuse it when it was done.

CHAP. XIX.

Though a weak Prince succeeds an excellent, the Government may stand; but if one weak Prince succeeds another, 'tis impossible.

IF the virtue and conduct of Romulus, Numa, and Tullius (the three first Kings of Rome) be considered, it will be found to have been much for the advantage of that City to have its first King martial, and fierce; the second King, quiet and religious; and the third (like the first) active, and war-like again. For, as after the first institution, it was necessary there should be some-body to dispose the people to ways of Religion, and civil conversa∣tion; so it was necessary again after that, that the next King should reassume the vigour and magnanimity of their predecessor; otherwise the minds of the Citizens would have grown effeminate, and the City have become a prey to any of its neighbours. Wherefore it is to be considered, that a Prince not altogether so valiant and enterprizing, may main∣tain the Government upon the score of his Predecessor, and injoy the fruits of his courage and labour; but if it happens he be long lived, and that he is not succeeded by a martial Prince to revive the activity of the Founder, the Government must necessarily be ruined. On the other side, if two Princes immediately succeeding, are martial and heroick, they are observed to do great things, and to advance the Government exceedingly: David, without doubt, was a person no less excellent in military experience than in learning and wisdom; and so great was his courage, that he left his Kingdom to his Son Solomon in quiet and peace, who by arts of peace rather than war injoyed it happily his time upon account of his Father; but he could not leave it to Rehoboam as he had received it of his Father: for Rehoboam being neither like his Grand-father in courage, nor his Father in wisdom, succeeded scarcely to the sixt part of his Empire. Bajazet the Turkish Scholar, though more studious of peace than of war, injoyed the labours of Mahomet his Father, who having (like Da∣vid) subdued all his neighbours, left him a Kingdom entire, that might be peaceably main∣tained; but had (Bazjazet's Son) Selimus now reigning, taken after his Father, and not his Grand-father, that Empire had been ruined; but he out-goes the glory of his Grand∣father.

From hence may be observed, that after an excellent & magnificent Prince, a pusillanimous may succeed, and the Government stand; but if one poor-spirited Prince succeeds another immediately, 'tis impossible it should subsist, unless (like France) it be supported by its old Cu∣stoms and Laws: I call those Princes weak and pusillanimous, who are not conversant, nor addicted to the exercise of Arms, and do conclude, that the tranquillity of Numas's Reign (which continued for many years) was to be attributed to the courage and activity of Ro∣mulus,

which was revived again in Tullus the third King, after whom followed Ancus, a Prince of so excellent a temper, that he knew how to comport as well in the calms of peace as the tempests of war. His first practice was gentle, and by methods of peace, but finding he was look'd upon as effeminate, and grew contemptible to his neighbours, he perceived the way to preserve his dignity, was, to betake himself to martial courses, and manage his affairs rather like Romulus than Numa. From hence an useful example for all Princes may be taken, and it may be observed, that whoever is in the possession of a State, and follows the example of Numa, may either keep it, or lose it, according to the different circum∣stances of fortune, or time. But he who imitates Romulus, and is arm'd with wisdom and prowess, shall be sure to keep it, unless some extraordinary and irresistible power intervenes to supplant him. And 'tis in probability to be thought, that had not the third King of Rome prov'd a martial Prince, and one who knew by his Arms to recover his declining re∣putation, he could never (or with great difficulty) have regained it, or performed those exploits which he did afterwards: so that whilst Rome was a Monarchy, and under the Government of Kings, it was under a double danger of destruction, either by the mildness; or the tyranny of its Prince.

CHAP. XX.

Two good Princes, immediately succeeding, may do great things; and well-grounded Common-wealths having always a virtuous succession, their Con∣quests and Acquisitions must of necessity be according.

WHen Monarchy was banished by the Romans, their dangers were banished with them, and they lay under no fear of either weak Prince or Tyrant; for the com∣mand of the Empire was put into the hands of the Consuls, who came to that authority, not by inheritance, or any indirect or violent ambition, but by the suffrage of the people, and were always excellent persons. The City of Rome enjoying from time to time the benefit of their fortune and virtue, might without much difficulty arrive at the highest top of greatness and dignity, (as it did) in the same number of years as it was under the Govern∣ment of Kings. For we see in the examples of Philip of Macedon, and his Son Alexander the great, that a succession of two martial Princes (without a peaceable interposed) is sufficient to conquer the World. And if it were possible in a Monarchy, 'tis easie in a Commonwealth, in whose power it is to elect, not only two, but an infinite and continu∣ed succession of virtuous persons; so that in a well-ordered Commonwealth, the succession is constantly good.

CHAP. XXI.

How much that Prince or Commonwealth is to be condemned, which neglects to train up Souldiers of its own.

THE Princes and Commonwealths of our times, if to defend themselves, or offend their enemy, (as occasion serves) they be unable to bring Souldiers of their own into the Field, they may thank themselves, and acknowledge (with Tullus) that 'tis not so much want of capacity in their subjects, as want of wisdom in them for neglecting to train them For when Tullus came to the Crown, Rome had been forty years together in peace, (during all Numa's Reign) and there was not a man to be found who had ever seen the face of an enemy, nevertheless his own designs being martial, he resolved to make no use of the Sam∣nites or Tuscans, or any other Mercenary, but as a wise Prince, to discipline his own; and his art and experience was such, that in a short time he made them excellent Souldiers; and there is nothing more certain, than that where men are unapt for war, the fault is not in the situation or nature of the place, but in the carelesness or defect of the Magistrate; of which we have a fresh and memorable example. There is scarce any body ignorant, that of late years the English invaded France, and entertained no Souldiers but their own; and yet, though England had had no wars of thirty years before, and had neither Officer nor Souldier who had ever seen a Battel, they ventured to attack a Kingdom where the Officers were excellent, the Souldiers very good, having been trained up for several years together in the

Italian wars. This proceeded from the prudence of the Prince, and the excellence of that Government, in which (though in times of peace) the exercise of Arms is not intermitted; Pelopidas and Epaminondas having relieved Thebes, and rescued it from the tyranny of the Spartans, finding themselves in the middle of a servile and effeminate people, they so or∣dered it by their virtue and discipline, that they brought them to the use of Arms, took the field with them against the Spartans, and overthrew them. From whence that Historian infers, that there are Souldiers not only in Lacedemon, but where-ever there are men, if there be any body to exercise and train them; which Tullus performed most exquisitely among the Romans, and is most excellently expressed by Virgil, in these words.

—Desidesque movebit Tullus in arma viros.

No soft unactive people Tullus knows, But trains up all promiscuously to blows.

CHAP. XXII.

What is to be observed from the Combat betwixt the three Roman Horatii, and the three Alban Curiatii.

BY Articles betwixt Tullus King of Rome, and Metius King of Alba, it was agreed, that whichsoever of the two sides should overcome, that King should have the do∣minion of the other. The Curiatii were all killed; but one of the Horatii being left, Metius and his Albans fell into subjection to the Romans.

Horatius returning in great triumph into the City, and meeting a Sister of his (who was married to one of the Curiatii) lamenting the loss of her Husband, in a great passion he killed her; for which inhumanity being brought to his trial, he was, after many argu∣ments, discharged, but more upon his Fathers intercession than his own merits. In which accident there were three things considerable; that we are never to venture our whole for∣tune upon the success of a Party; another is, that offences and deserts are not equally re∣warded a well-ordered City; the third, that no compact is well made, where the per∣formance is or ought to be suspected. For to become servile, and in subjection to another City, is a thing of such moment and importance, that it is not to be believed that any Prince or State whatsoever should be content that their liberty should be exposed to the success or courage of three of their Citizens; and this was evident in Metius; for though upon the Victory of the Romans he seemed to acquiesce, and promised obedience, as by Articles was agreed, yet in the first Expedition the Romans undertook against the Veientes, 'tis manifest he would have deceived Tullus, as one who repented of the covenants which he had made: but because of the third we have spoken largely already, in the next two Chapters we shall speak only of the other two.

CHAP. XXIII.

That our whole fortune is not to be ventured upon part of our force, and that for that reason the keeping of passes is many times dangerous.

IT was never thought discretion to put your whole fortune in danger, unless your whole force was ready to defend it. This error is committed several ways; one is when, like Tullus and Metius, they commit the fortune and virtue of so many men as either of them had in their Army, to the fortune and virtue of three particular persons, which was but a pitiful part of either of their strength, not considering how, by that agreement, all the pains which their Predecessors had taken to establish their liberty, and enable their fellow Citizens to defend it, was rendred vain and ineffectual, by putting it into the power of three persons to destroy it; than which (in my judgment) those two Kings could not have done worse. Another great error is, when, upon the approach of an enemy, we trust all to the keeping of an avenue, or the defence of a pass, unless it may be done with our whole force: in that case indeed the resolution is good; but if the passage be narrow, and not

room enough for your whole power, it is uncertain and dangerous; and that which per∣suades me to be of that opinion, is the example of such as having been invaded by a potent Enemy, though their Country was environed with Mountains and Rocks, yet they would not attend, and engage the Enemy upon the passes or Mountains, but marched out of their holds to encounter him; or else (which is as bad) they forsook their advantages, and expected him in some plain or convenient place within: And the reason is (as aforesaid) because many men cannot be brought to defend such places as are Rocky, for want of sub∣sistance; and the passage being streight, it can receive but few people, and by consequence is not able to sustain the insult of a very great Army, and the Enemy may bring as may as he pleases to attack it, because his business is not to fix there, but to pass thorow and be gone: whereas he who is to defend it, cannot be in any considerable Body, being (by reason of the uncertainty of the Enemies approach) to lie there continually, though (as I said be∣fore) the places are both barren and streight. Having lost therefore that pass which you imagined to keep, and upon which your Army and People did wholly rely, the remainder of your Army, and Subjects are possessed with such a fear, that you can have no farther trial of their courage, but all goes to wrack, and your whole fortune lost, but with part of your Army. With what difficulty Hannibal passed the Alps betwixt France and Lombardy, and betwixt Lombardy and Tuscany, there is no body ignorant; nevertheless the Romans chose rather to attend him upon the Tesin, and afterwards in the plain of Arezzo, where the danger was equal both to the Enemy and them; than to carry their Army up into the clouds upon the Rocks and the Snow, to be consumed by the incommodity of the place, before the Enemy came at them. And whosoever shall read History deliberately, shall find few great Captains that would coop themselves up in such passes and streights, not only for the reasons abovesaid, but because all of them cannot be stop'd the Mountains in that respect being like the fields, having not only their Roads and High-ways, but by-paths and passages, which though not observed by Strangers, are well enough known to the In∣habitants, who will be always ready to conduct the Enemy, to remove them farther off who lie constantly upon them. Of this a late Example may be brought, in the year 1515, when Francis King of France design'd to pass into Italy for the recovery of Lombardy, the great objection by those who were against the Expedition, was, That the Swizzers would obstruct his passage over the Mountains, which argument was found idle after∣wards, for the Kings of France waving two or three places which they had guarded, passed by a private and unknown way, and was upon their backs in Italy, before they perceiv'd him; so that being mightily surprized, the Enemy quitted his Posts, and retired into Italy, and all the Lombards submitted to the French; they being deceived in their opinion, who thought the French were with more Ease and Convenience to be obstructed in the Moun∣tains.

CHAP. XXIV.

In well Ordered Governments, offence and desert are never set one against the other, but he who does well, is rewarded, and he who does otherwise, is punished.

THE merits of Horatius were very great, having by his own single valor and conduct, overcome the Curiatii; after which he committed a most abominable act, in killing his own Sister: which Murther was so hainous in the Eyes of the Romans, that he was brought to a Trial for his life, though his deserts were so fresh and considerable; which at first sight seem ingrateful in the people; but he who examins it strictly, and weighs how necessary and sacred a thing Justice ought to be in every Common-wealth, will find them more blameable for discharging, than they would have been for condemning him; and the reason is, because in a well constituted State no man's good actions should indemnisie him for doing ill; for punishment being as due to ill actions, as rewards are to good, having rewarded in a man for doing well, he is satisfied for what he did, and the obligation dischar∣ged; so as if afterwards he commits a Crime, he is to be punished severely according to the Nature of his offence; by the observation of which Orders, a City may continue free a long time, which otherwise will quickly go to ruine. For if a Citizen having perform'd any great Exploit for his Country, should expect not only honor and reward for what he has done, but priviledge, and impunity for any mischief he should do afterwards, his insolence would in a short time grow insupportable, and inconsistent with Civil Government. So

then it is very necessary for discouragement from ill actions, to recompense good, which was the practice in Rome, and though where a Common-wealth is poor, her t••wards can∣not be great; yet even out of that small stock, she is to be punctually grateful, for a thing (how little soever) given in acknowledgment of ones good Service (let it be never so great) is look'd upon as Honorable, and received as a Magnificent reward. The Stories of Hora∣tius Cocles, and Mutius Scaevola are generally famous. Coles with incomp••rable courage maintained fight against a great body of the Enemy upon the Bridge over Tiber, till it was cut behind him, and their passage obstructed: The other designing against the life of Por∣senna King of Tuscany, and killing his Secretary by mistake, being apprehended and brought before the King, to show the courage and constancy of the Romans, he thrust his own hand into the fire, and burnt it off before his face; and how were they gratified? marry each of them had two Staiora's, which is as much ground as can be sown with two Bushels of Corn. The History of Manlius Capitolinus is no less remarkable: Having relieved the Ca∣pitol (which the French had surprized in the night) and beaten them out again, his Come∣rades in requital gave him a certain measure of Flower, which (as times went then) was a mighty reward, and esteemed so adequate to the Service, that Manlius afterwards either out of ambition or ill nature, causing a tumult in Rome, and endeavouring to debauch the peo∣ple, (his former exploits being as they thought amply rewarded) without farther regard to him, they threw him headlong down that Capitol, which he had so gloriously preserved.

CHAP. XXV.

Though it is many times convenient to reform the old Fundamental Customs of a free City, yet it is convenient still to retain some shadow and appearance of their ancient ways.

HE who desires to set up a new form of Government in a Common-wealth, that shall be lasting, and acceptable to the people, is with great caution to preserve at least some shadow and resemblance of the old, That the people may (if possible) be insensible of the innovation; for the generality of Mankind do not penetrate so far into things, but that outward appearance, is as acceptable to them as verity it self. For this cause the Ro∣mans at the beginning of their liberty, when their Kings were expelled, thought it expe∣dient to create two Consuls instead of one King, assigning them only XII Lictors, that their number might not exceed what attended upon the King. Besides this, there was an anniversary Sacrifice in Rome, in which the Ministry of the King was of necessity required: To salve that defect, the Romans created a chief of the said Sacrifice with the Title of Royal Priest (but with subordination to the High Priest) by which Artifice the people were satisfied with their Sacrifice, and took no occasion to complain for the expulsion of their King. He therefore who desires to reform the policy of a State, and to introduce a new, is to disguise it to the people by the retention (at least in appearance) of some part of the ancient Customs, that may keep them from discerning it; and if at any time by accident there be a necessity of changing the power, the number and duration of the Magi∣strates, it will be convenient to continue the Name. This (as I said before) is to be ob∣served by any one who would establish an absolute power either in a Republick; or Monarchical way, but he who would erect such an absolute power, as by Authors is called Tyrannies must unravel the whole bottom, and innovate all.

CHAP. XXVI.

A new Prince in a new Conquest, is to make every thing new.

WHoever makes himself Lord of a City or State (and especially if he finds himself weak, and suspects his ability to keep it) if he intends not to continue the Go∣vernment in the old way, either by Kingship or Common-wealth, the best course he can take is to subvert all, to turn every thing topsie turvy; and make all things as new as him∣self. To alter the Magistracy, create new Titles, elect new persons, confer new Autho∣rities, advance the Poor, and impoverish the Rich, that what is said of David, may be said of him, Esurientes implevit bonis, & divites dimisit inanes. He filled the hungry with

good things, and the rich he sent empty away. Besides it is his interest to build new Cities, to erect new Corporations; to demolish and uncharter the old; to shift the Inhabitants from one place to another; in a word, so to toss and transpose every thing, that there be no honor, nor wealth, nor preferment in the whole Province, but what is ownable to him. And for this he need go no farther than Philip of Macedon (Father to Alexander the Great) for his pattern, who by this practice, of a small Prince, made himself Monarch of all Greece, of whom it is said, That he removed his people, as a Shepheard did his fold. Those ways are cruel, and contrary not only to all civil, but to all Christian, and indeed human con∣versation; for which reason they are to be rejected by every body, for certainly 'tis better to remain a private person, than to make ones self King, by the calamity and destruction of his people. Nevertheless, he who neglects to take the first good way, if he will pre∣serve himself, must make use of this bad; for though many Princes take a middle way betwixt both, yet they find it extream difficult and dangerous; for being neither good nor bad, they are neither fear'd nor belov'd, and so unlikely to prosper.

CHAP. XXVII.

Men are as seldom perfectly bad, as they are perfectly good.

IN the year 1505. Pope Iulius II. marched his Army into Bologna to drive the Family of the Bentivogli out of that State, where they had commanded with Supremacy a hundred years. In the same Expedition he resolved to remove Iohn Pogolo Baglione out of Perugia (where he had Usurped) and in a word, all such Tyrants as had got any Church Lands into their possession. Coming to the Town with the desire and resolution aforesaid, he attended not till he could march in with his Army; but enter'd as it were naked and disarmed (though Iohn Pagolo was in person in the City, and many of his party which were got together to defend him) so that transported with the usual vehemence where∣with he managed all his affairs, he put himself (with his bare guards) into the hands of his Enemy; yet he succeeded so well, that he carried Pagolo off with him, and put in another Governor in behalf of the Church. Wise men who were then about his Holiness, admiring the temerity of the one, as much as the pusillanimity of the other, could not ima∣gine how it should come to pass, that Pagolo having his Enemy as it were naked in his hands, and by consequence an opportunity (with perpetual glory to himself) to have se∣cured him, and pillaged his Equipage (for all the Cardinals were then with him, with the most precious of their Jewels) should so strangely neglect it; especially when they consi∣dered that it was neither Conscience nor good nature which restrained him; for neither of those were to be supposed in a man who had been nought with his own Sister, and mur∣ther'd several of his Relations, to make his way to the Government; wherefore it was concluded to happen, because it is so provided by providence, that no man can be exqui∣sitely wicked, no more than good in perfection; for where there is any thing great and magnificent in a mischief, they know not how to commit it: So Iohn Pagolo who made no bones of either Parricide or Incest, could not (or to speak more properly) durst not make use of his opportunity to perpetrate a thing, which would have filled the world with admi∣ration of his courage, and made his memory venerable to posterity; for he would have been the first who had given his Cardinals to understand how little it is to their reputation to Lord it, and luxuriate as they do; and the greatness of the Fact would have lessened the Scandal, and prevented any danger that might ensue.

CHAP. XXVIII.

For what reasons the Romans were less ingrateful to their Citizens, than the Athenians.

WHoever reads and observes the passages in Commonwealths, will find a touch of ingratitude towards their Citizens in them all, but less in Rome than in Athens; and perhaps in any other Republick whatever. The reason (I suppose) was, because Rome had not that occasion of Jealousie as Athens had: For in Rome, from the expulsion of the Kings, to the time of Silla and Marius, the liberty of the City was never disturbed by any

man within it; so that there being no reason to apprehend, there was no reason to perse∣cute. In Athens it was otherwise; for their liberty being invaded and taken away by Pi∣sistratus when it was most flourishing, and compleat; and that by a pretence of advancing it; They no sooner recover'd it; but remembring the injuries which they had received, and their passed servitude, they flew out into such an exorbitancy of revenge, that they punished not only the faults of their fellow Citizens, but the least umbrage, and appearances of them, from whence followed the Banishment, and Execution of so many excellent persons; Hence came the Ostracism Laws, and all the rest of the outrages committed after∣wards upon the chief of their City, for as ye Writers of Politicks observe very well, the people are more cruel and vindicative who have lost and recovered their liberty, than they who have preserved it, as it was left them by their Fathers. He therefore who considers what is said, will neither condemn Athens, nor magnifie Rome; but impute all to necessity upon the diversity of accidents which hapned in each City. And certainly, if it be seriously considered, it will appear, that if the liberty of the Romans had been oppressed, as the liberty of the Athenians was, Rome would have been no better natur'd, or shown more compassion to its fellow Citizens, than Athens did: And this may be infallibly deduced by what hapned (after the expulsion of the Kings) against Collatinus and P. Val••rius; for Collatinus (though he had been very active in asserting their liberty) was banished for bearing only the Name of Tarquin; and the other had like to have ran the same destiny, for building a house only, upon the top of Mount Celius, which they suspected was to com∣mand the City. So that it may probably be presumed (by its suspicion and severity in the two cases aforesaid) that Rome would have exercised the same ingratitude, had it been injured in its minority, as Athens had been. And that I may have no occasion to discourse of ingratitude hereafter; I shall speak of it more largely in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XXIX.

Whether the Prince, or the People, is most subject to be ingrateful.

ANd because we have undertaken to enlarge upon this subject, I think it not amiss to examine which are most frequently guilty of ingratitude, the Prince, or the People: For better explication, I say, That men are ingrateful, either out of suspicion, or avarice. For if a Prince, or Republick send out any of their great Captains upon some important Expedition, which the said Captain atchieves, and gains honor to himself, and reputation to his Master, in this case the Prince, or State, is obliged to reward him; but if instead of rewarding, they casheer, or disgrace him, or out of a covetous principle, deny him his pay, the ingratitude is inexcusable: and leaves a scandal behind it that can never be worn out, and yet many Princes are too guilty of it; Cornelius Tacitus gives us the reason in this Sentence, Proclivius est injuriae, quam beneficio vicem exolvere, quia gratia oneri, ultio in quaestu habetur. 'Tis more natural to return an injury, than a courtesie, because courtesies are burthensom, but revenge is sweet. But if this ingratitude either in Prince or People, pro∣ceeds not so much from avarice, as suspicion, in that case it is somewhat excusable, and of that kind we read of good store, as when a General has conquered a Province or Empire for his Master, when he has exterminated his Enemies, enriched his Army, and gain'd himself a great Name, 'tis impossible but he must be so acceptable to his own Sol∣diers, and so dreadful to his Enemies, as must beget a jealousie in the Prince; for the Nature of man being jealous and ambitious, and not to be confined within the bounds of his fortune, it cannot be but if the Prince has taken a fancy that the glory of his General, is a diminution to his, the General must by some vain-glorious, or discontented action, establish and confirm it; and then what has the Prince to do? but to secure himself either by causing him to be murthered, by taking away his Command, lessening his reputation with the Soldiers and People, and by all ways of industry possessing them, that the Victory was not obtained by any Conduct of his, but by the kindness of Fortune, vileness of the Enemy, or prudence and good management of the rest of the Officers.

After Vespasian (being in Iudea) was declared Emperor by his Army, Antonius Primus being at the same time in Illyria with another Army, declared for the Emperor, and marched into Italy against Vitellius who was then Paramount in Rome; and having beaten him in two pitch'd Battels, he enter'd the City in the Name of Vespasian: So that Mutianus being sent against Vitellius by Vespasian, he found the Enemy broken, the Town taken,

and all things done by Antonius to his hand. And how was he requited? Why Mutianus took away his Commission, removed him from the Army, and by degrees so lessened his Authority in Rome, that Antonius going into Asia to make his Complaints to Vespasian, was received so coldly, that in a short time he was stript of all kind of authority, and died very miserable: and of this Nature examples are very frequent in History; every body knows how in our times Gonsalvo Ferrante, being the King of Arragon's General in the Kingdom of Naples against the French, behaved himself so well, that by his singular Conduct he conquered it, and put it wholly under the obedience of his Master, who coming afterwards to Naples himself, took from him the Command of his Army, dispossessed him of many strong places which he held in that Country, and carried him with him into Spain, where not long after, he died in obscurity. But there is no remedy; these kind of jealousies are so natural to Princes, that it is almost impossible for them to be grate∣ful to any man, who has performed any great thing for them. And if it be so with Kings, no wonder if it be so with the people, for in a free State, they have always two principal ends, one is to enlarge their Dominions, the other to keep what they have got, and their eagerness to both these, makes them so often guilty of ingratitude. As to the first point, we shall speak elsewhere; the errors in preserving their liberty; to disgust such persons as ought to be rewarded, and to suspect such as ought to be trusted; and though such practices are the occasion of great mischiefs in a corrupt Commonwealth, and Tyranny does many times ensue (as in Rome by Caesar, who took that by force, which the ingrati∣tude of the people denied to his merits,) yet in a Town that is entire, and incorrupt, they do very well, and add much to the duration of their liberty, to enforce great and ambitious men for fear of punishment to comport themselves better. In my judgment of all the Commonwealths that ever had Empire, Rome was the least ingratful for the reasons abovesaid, there being never an Example of its ingratitude but in the case of Scipio: For Coriolanus and Camillus were banished for their injuries to the people, and though one of them remaining obstinate, was never recalled; yet the other was not only recalled, but so restored to the affections of the people, that all his life after, they adored him as a Prince. But their jealousie of Scipio was of such a sort, as had never been known before, proceeding from the Ornaments of his body, and the endowments of his mind; His youth, his wis∣dom, his excellent qualifications had render'd him too admirable; the powerfulness of his Enemy, the danger and tediousness of the War (which he had concluded in a very short time) his deliberation in resolving, and his quickness in Execution, had gained him a greater reputation, than was ever got by any General before him, insomuch as the Senators, Pretors, and all the chief Magistrates in the City began to fear and respect him. This was no pleasing sight to the graver sort, because it had not been formerly the Custom in Rome; whereupon Cato (a man of great esteem for his piety and justice) took up the Cudgels against him, and complained publickly that the City could not be called free, whil'st the Magistrates were in awe of any particular Citizen; if then in a thing so nearly importing their liberty, the people followed the opinion of Cato, in my judgment they were in some measure to be excused. In short, my opinion is, as I said before, that it is avarice and suspicion which makes men ingrateful: To the first of which the people are not naturally addicted; and to the last, with much less propensity than Princes, as having less occasion, which shall be proved hereafter.

CHAP. XXX.

What rules are to be observed by a Prince or Commonwealth to avoid this Vice of ingratitude, and how a General or great Citizen is to demean him∣self to elude it.

TO avoid the necessity of living always in suspicion, and being ingrateful to his Mi∣nisters, a Prince ought to go personally with his Armies, as was done at first by the Emperors of Rome, as the great Turk does now, and as all they do and have done that are valiant and couragious; for in so doing, the honor and profit of their Victories accrews to themselves; but where they are not present at their Conquests themselves, the honor re∣dounds upon their Officers, and they have not any compleat enjoyment of their successes, till they have eclipsed, if not extinguished that glory in other people, which they durst not venture for themselves; so that their ingratitude, and injustice to their Officers, does them more mischief, than their Conquests do them good. But when out of negligence, or

imprudence, they lie at home idle themselves, and send their Generals in their stead, know no better precept to give them, than what they know already themselves. As to the General, if he finds that jealousie inevitable, he has his choice of two things. As soon as the War is ended, he is voluntarily to lay down his Commission; and to pre∣sent it to his Master, before he has occasion to demand it, using great care that none of his actions discover him to be either insolent or ambitious, that his Prince having no cause to suspect him, may have the greater obligation to reward him. If this way does not please, the other is quite contrary; and that is, to declare himself boldly, and try always to set up for himself, cajoling and sweetning his Soldiers and Subjects, making new alliances with his Neighbours, seizing upon the strong Towns, corrupting the Officers, and where they will not be corrupted, securing them some other way, and by doing thus, he shall be even with his Lord, for his ingratitude designed: And besides these two ways, there is none that I know. But (as I said before) because men can neither be good nor bad in extremity, it happens that great men are unwilling to quit their Commands, and retire after the gaining of a Victory; behave themselves modestly they cannot: and to use rigour in an honourable way is impossible. So that whil'st they are in suspence, and uncertain which course to steer, they are many times destroyed. As to a Commonwealth that would preserve and exempt it self from this detestable vice of ingratitude, the same remedy can∣not be prescribed, as was prescribed to a Prince; for not being able to manage its Wars in Person as a Prince may do, the command of their Forces must of necessity be committed to some of their Subjects. The best way they can take, is to follow the Example of Rome, and that will render them less ingrateful than their Neighbors. In the wars of the Ro∣mans, by ancient Custom all people were employed, as well Nobles as others, and from thence it came that they were always well furnished with Generals and Officers of all sorts, which kept them from being jealous of any one, having so many of equal merit to oppose him: Besides which, there were express Laws against ambition, and all people so narrowly observed, that no man durst discover the least design or inclination that way; and in the creation, of Dictators, he was commonly prefer'd, who debas'd himself most, or disco∣vered least desire to obtain it; by which means preventing the occasion of suspicion, they prevented the ingratitude. That State therefore which would avoid the guilt of ingrati∣tude, is to imitate Rome, and that person who would avoid the effects, must observe how the Romans defended themselves.

CHAP. XXXI.

That the Romans used no extraordinary punishments towards their great Cap∣tains, when they committed an Error of ignorance, or malice, provided the Government was not damnified by it.

THe Romans (as I said before) were not only less unthankful, than their Neighbors but they were more human and gentle in the punishment of their Generals, than any other State; if their miscarriage was malicious, they punished it not severely; but if it was by ignorance or mistake, instead of revenging, they did many times reward it; and this they did upon very grave consideration, for the Romans understood the charge of an Army to be so great a care, and of such transcendant importance, that whoever undertook it, ought to have his mind free and indisturbed by any other respects or troubles whatso∣ever, for his thoughts being with his troubles, he would never mind his Army, nor take any advantage. For Example, an Army is sent into Greece against Philip of Macedon, or into Italy against Hanibal, or those people upon the Frontiers, which had been conquered before, and the Captain who has the General Command, is loaden with all the cares which do commonly attend great and extraordinary Enterprizes. Now if to those necessary cares for his Army, there should be superadded a fear, and apprehension of being punished at his return (if things went otherwise than well) and perpetual reflexion upon those who have been abused and put to death upon the same score, it must needs disturb the tranquilli∣ty of his mind, and make him unfit for any great action. The wise Romans thought the infamy and dishonour of losing a Battel, punishment enough, without heaping one affli∣ction upon another. And as to those whose errors proceed rather from malice than igno∣rance, we have another Example. Sargius, and Virginius had each of them an Army, and were encamped before Veii: Sargius was posted against the Tuscans, and Virginius on the other side against any body else. It hapned the Falisci having joyned with several

of their neighbors, came to fall upon Sergius. Sergius had notice, and found himself too weak; yet rather than send to his Companion for supplies, he chose to be routed; and Virginius on the other side, though he knew his distress, would by no means relieve him, unless he desired it; so that that Roman Army was cut off by the ambition and emulation of their Generals; a thing of very ill example, had it been suffered to pass without punish∣ment.

Nevertheless, whereas other States would have punished them with death, Rome inflicted only a pecuniary mulct, but their crime deserved sharper correction, but the Romans were unwilling to do any thing against custom, which (as is said before) is very sacred with them. As to the errors of ignorance, we have another example in Varro, by whose folly and rashness the Romans having lost the Battel of Cannas against Hanibal, and brought their whole Government in danger, had Hanibal known how to use, as well as gain a Vi∣ctory; yet his offence having in it more of ignorance than malice, when he came back, the Senate went out to meet him in their Formalities, and not being able to congratulate his suc∣cess, they gave him thanks for his return, and that De salute reipublicae non desperasset, That he did not despair of their affairs, When Papirius Cursor the Dictator would needs put Fabius to death, because contrary to orders he had fought with the Samnites among other reasons which the Father of Fabius urged against that sentence, this was one, that the people of Rome had till that time never been so severe upon any of their Commanders for the loss of a Battel, as Papirius would now be upon the Victor for gaining one.

CHAP. XXXII.

A Commonwealth or Prince is not to defer his beneficence till the necessity of the object requires it.

THE liberality of the Romans to the people succeeded very well when Prosenna inva∣ded Rome in behalf of the Tarquins; for the Senate apprehending the people might be brought to restore the Kings rather than endure the war, to oblige them, releast their gabels upon salt, and all their other duties, declaring the people were sufficent bene∣factors to the publick; in providing, and bringing up their children: all which was done to cajole them into such an humour as might make them endure the siege, and swallow the ca∣lamities of the War: but let no man rely upon this example, and defer his indulgence to the people, till the enemy be upon his back; for it shall never succeed so well to him as it did to the Romans, because the multitude will think themselves more obliged to the enemy than to him, and believe, that when the necessity is over, they shall be as bad as before. The reason why this way succeeded so happily to the Romans, was, because their State was but new, and scarce setled, and the People were sensible that several Laws were made before for their advantage and reputation; as particularly the Law of appeal to the people: so as they were able to satisfy themselves that the benefits which were confer'd upon them by the Se∣nate, proceeded rather from a disposition in the Senate to do them good, than from any apprehension of the enemy: besides, the injuries and outrages of their Kings lay fresh and heavy upon their memories. But these cases hapning very seldom, 'tis but very seldom that such remedies succeed; wherefore it is better for any Commonwealth or Prince to consider the worst before-hand, and what people he is most like to have need of in time of adversity; and to live so with them in time of prosperity, as that they may be encouraged to relieve him upon any distress. And he who acts otherwise, whether Prince or Commonwealth, (but especially a Prince) and presumes, when the danger is hanging over his head, that it is time enough to favour the people, will find himself mistaken, and the people readier to contribute to his ruine than defence.

CHAP. XXXIII.

If an inconvenience increases either within a State, or against it; it is better to temporize and comply, than to endeavour to remove it by violence.

THe Roman Commonwealth increasing in Empire, Reputation and Force, their neigh∣bours not having considered it, nor what damage that greatness might pull down up∣on them, began now (when too late) to discover their error; and being willing to do that now which had been more easie before, forty little States of them confederated against Rome. The Romans, among their usual provisions in case of imminent danger, created a Dictator, who, without any mans advice, might resolve as he pleased, and execute his resolutions without being called to an account. This Magistrate was not only the occasion of over∣coming their enemies at that time, but was very useful upon all accidents afterwards when their dominion increased. Which may teach us, that when either at home within, or abroad against a Commonwealth, an inconvenience arises, (whether from an inward or an outward cause it is not material) 'tis better counsel to comply and temporize, than to en∣deavour furiously to suppress it; for to resist, is to augment it, and to pull down upon our heads what we were but afraid of before. And these kind of accidents fall out in a Com∣monwealth oftner from intrinsick than extrinsick causes, where the power and authority of some Citizen is permitted to increase too fast, and more than is convenient for the ho∣nour or benefit of the State; or when such Laws are abrogated or neglected as were most for the interest of their State; which error, if suffered to run on, will be more dangerous to oppose than to comply with; for it is so much the harder to find out these inconvenien∣cies in the beginning, by how much 'tis natural for all people to favour every thing that is new, especially if introduced by a young man, with the least shew or pretence of advan∣tage: for if a young Gentleman appears in a Commonwealth endued with more than or∣dinary qualities, the eyes of the whole City are immediately upon him, they run unani∣mously to respect him, and pay him all the honour that can be imagined; so that if he has the least spark of ambition or vain-glory, he is presently puffed up, and inflamed with the contemplation of his own worth, and the affection of the people: and when he is arrived at such an height, as to be as visible as their error, then 'tis too late; there are but few re∣medies in the case; and when most of them are applyed, they do but magnifie his power. Many examples might be brought to this purpose, but I shall only instance in one.

Cosimo di Medicis (from whom the famous Family of the Medici in our City had their first grandeur) was in such reputation for his wisdom; and his fellow Citizens were so ig∣norant, that he began to be formidable to the State, and the Magistrates began to think it difficult to take him down, but destructive to let him stand. There was at that time in Florence a person of great experience in matters of State, called Nicolo da Uzano, who be∣ing well advised of the first fault which he had committed in not considering in time the inconveniencies which might follow upon Cosimo's reputation, resolved to obviate the se∣cond; that is, that no force should be used to oppress him, as knowing that course would be the ruine of the State; and so it proved not long after his death. For the Citizens which remained, not following his counsel, began to combine, and fortifie against Cosimo, and indeed forc'd him out of Rome. Whereupon, his party being increased, in a short time called him home again, and made him their Prince, to which dignity he could never have arrived, but by the opposition of his enemies.

The same hapned to Iulius Caesar, whose great virtue and excellent qualifications re∣commended him so highly to the favour of Pompey and the people, that by degrees he be∣came terrible, and their favour was turned into fear; of which Cicero complains, when he says that Pompey began to fear him too late; for when his fear prompted him to look out for a remedy, that remedy hastned the ruine of the State. I say then (when this case hap∣pens) it is incomparably better to temporize, than to endeavour to repel the mischief which threatens by violence and force. For many times, by that means, it passes as it came, and goes out of it self, or else the damage it brings is the longer a coming. In these cases Princes ought to be very vigilant, lest going about to retrench and lessen the great power of a neighbour, they give him opportunity to increase it, and bring themselves into greater danger: you are therefore to compare your own strength, and your enemies; and if you find your self the stronger, to attaque him couragiously; but if weaker, you had better be quiet, lest it happens to you as it did to those little States who confederated against Rome, to whom (as appeared by the event) it had been much better to have sate still, and endea∣voured

their friendship, than to have irritated the great power of the Romans, and forc'd them to a war; for the Romans had never got to that height, if that confederacy had not given them occasion of trying all experiments for their defence, and put them among the rest, upon the creation of Dictators, by which new invention they not only mastered all dangers that threatned them, but prevented a thousand mischiefs into which (without that remedy) the Commonwealth would most certainly have fallen.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The Dictatorship was useful, not hurtful to the Commonwealth of Rome; and how that Power which is usurp'd, and illegally assumed, is pernitious to a State, not that which is conferred legally by the suffrage of the people.

THere are those to be found who have said that the Dictatorship was the ruine and de∣struction of that Commonwealth, alledging that the first Tyrant that was ever in that City, set himself up, under the title of Dictator, and affirming that Caesar could not un∣der any other name have justified his Tyranny.

Those who maintain that opinion did not examine it thorowly, and are not for that rea∣son to be believed. For it was not the name or dignity of the Dictator which brought Rome into slavery, but the authority assumed by the Citizens upon the perpetuation of that office; and if there had been no such thing as Dictator, Caesar had taken some other Title upon him to compass his designs; for when ones power is absolute, he can assume what name he pleases; but 'tis not a great Title that gives any man power. Whilst the Dicta∣torship was disposed by publick suffrage, it was very beneficial; those who attained it by ways extraordinary, abused it exceedingly; the rest were never known to have done any injury to the Commonwealth thorow all the Dictatorships: the reason is probable, because a man must be endued with many good qualities before he can usurp such an authority. He must be abundantly rich; he must know how to insinuate with every body; he must have a great party, and make every man his friend, which is not practicable where the Laws are in force; and if he had all those qualifications, they would render him so formi∣dable, that the free voices would ever concur in his election: besides, the Dictator was not perpetual, but created only upon particular exigence, and with limited power, extending no farther than the present danger, during which he had power to dispose of all things at his pleasure, and punish as he thought good without any appeal; but he could do nothing in diminution to the Government, he could not intrench upon the authority of the Senate or People, abrogate their old Laws, or institute new: so that the shortness of his Dictatorship, the limitation of his authority, and the incorruption of the people, made it impossible for him to transgress, and do any mischief to the City; and on the contrary, that Office has been always beneficial, and, in my judgment, the principal in Rome, and has contributed more than all the rest to make it Mistress of the World; for without that, that City had never been able to have obviated so many dangers, nor gone thorow so many difficulties, against which their accustomed and ordinary means would have been of little validity, as being too tedious, and slow; (no one Counsel or Magistrate being able to do all things alone but being in a mutual necessity the one of the other) for in cases which require immediate remedy, time passes away, and is often lost whilst they are in their counsels, and when they come to a resolution, 'tis too late, and their remedies dangerous.

Wherefore I think it convenient that a Commonwealth have a certain way to be used only in case urgent necessity, as the Seignory of Venice, (which at this day is the best re∣gulated Commonwealth in the World) that State in time of imminent danger has a re∣served power to confer authority upon some few of their Citizens, by virtue of which they may order all as they please, without the consultation of the rest, for when a Common∣wealth is destitute of some such custom, it must of necessity be ruined by sticking to their old, or break them to preserve it self; and it were to be wish'd that nothing might happen in a Commonwealth that might give occasion for these extraordinary ways; for though those extraordinary ways may sometimes be good, yet the example is ill, and introduces a custom of breaking old orders for good, which afterwards, under that pretence, will be broken for ill: wherefore that Commonwealth can never be perfect, that by its Laws has not provided against every thing, prepared remedies for every accident, and appointed in what manner they shall be managed; which is to be done no better way than by a Dicta∣tor, or some such Magistrate to be created upon extraordinary occasion; for without them

they must certainly be ruined: and one thing very remarkable in this order, is, the wisdom of the Romans in the formality of its election: for the Dictators being introduced with some diminution to the Consuls, (who being from heads of the City brought down to obedience like other people, might possibly resent it, and in time be the occasion of dissen∣tion in the City) they committed their election into the hands of the Consuls, to the end that upon any extraordinary emergence, when Rome should have occasion of so extraor∣dinary a Magistrate, the Consuls should comply the more willingly, because they had the making them themselves; for the wounds which a man gives himself spontaneously, and of his own election, are not so grievous as what he is forced for to bear. But towards the latter end of their Empire, the Romans, instead of a Dictator, invested their Consul with an equivalent authority in these words, Videat Consul, ne Respublica quid detrimenti capiat; Let it be the Consuls care that the Commonwealth receives no prejudice. So that to return to our matter, I conclude, that the neighbouring States conspiring against the Romans, and endeavouring to oppress them, made them contrive better, not only for their defence, but to put themselves into a posture, with more vigour, and counsel, and authority to repel their invasion, and turn their force upon them.

CHAP. XXXV.

How it came to pass that the Creation of the Decem-virat was prejudicial to the liberty of that State, though it was done freely, and by publick suffrage.

IN the last Chapter we have shewn that a power legally conferred, and by the suffrage of the people, is not dangerous to the State; but that which is usurped, and gotten by force, to which the election of the Decem-viri may seem to be contrary, who were chosen by the people of Rome to make their Laws, and reform extravagancies in the Commonwealth, which Decem-viri by degrees encroached upon their liberties, and made themselves Ty∣rants. Wherefore we are to consider what is said, with limitation and restraint; and respect both the manner in which such power is confer'd, as likewise the time it is to continue, whe∣ther for longer or shorter: for an absolute power (though granted but for a year) is very dangerous, and produces such effects as are sutable to the mind of the person to whom it is granted. And the power of the Decem-viri (if examined) will be found much greater than the power of the Dictators. For notwithstanding the creation of the Dictator, the majesty of the Consuls and Senate remained, together with the authority of the Tribunes, which were as bounds to restrain and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the Dictator; and although the Dictator had power to remove any one out of the Consulship, or take from him his Tribunitial authority; yet he could not vacat or abolish the whole Orders of Senators, Consuls, and Tribunes, make new Laws, nor introduce a new form of Government. So that their eyes being always upon him, he was forced (as it were) to intend only such things as were for the benefit of the Commonwealth. But in the creation of the Decem-viri it was otherwise; for the whole power of the people was transfer'd to them, the Con∣suls and Senate being cashiered, and the power of the Tribunes of the people almost quite laid aside; so that standing alone in the Government, without Consuls, or Tribunes, or ap∣peal to the people, or any other Magistrate to correct or controul them; it was no strange thing that the very next year after their creation, they should become intolerable and inso∣lent, especially being instigated by the ambition of Appius, And for this reason it is to be observed, that when it is said, a Power conferred legally, and by the suffrage of the people, is never prejudicial to the State; it is to be supposed to be confer'd with due circumstances, and for a certain time; but when the people is cheated, and gives it imprudently and rashly, as in this case of the Decem-viri, things never go better, which is easily proved by consider∣ing what it was that kept the Dictators so good, and made the Decem-viri so wicked: and weighing withal the manner which other Republicks that were reputed well ordered, observed, in conferring their authority for a long time, as the Spartans to their Kings, and the Venetians to their Dukes: both of them prescribing them rules and limits that they were not to exceed, and appointing such guards upon them as should be able (though they were never so ill disposed of themselves) to keep them from employing their power to the detriment of the State.

Nor is it sufficient if this Power be confer'd upon good men; for men are frail, and easily corrupted, and then in a short time he that is absolute may easily corrupt the people, contract friendships, make parties, heap up riches, and commit a thousand extravagancies; nor can

the poverty of their persons, or the want of relations prevent it, for wealth, and honour, and every thing follows them which are absolute, as we shall show particularly when we speak of the creation of the Decem-viri.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Citizens who have executed the greatest Offices, ought not afterwards. to disdain or scruple the less.

MArcus Fabius and Cais Manlius being Consuls, the Romans obtained a glorious Vi∣ctory over the Veientes, and the Etrusci, in which was slain Quintus Fabius Brother to the Consul, who was chosen the year before. From whence occasion is offered of ad∣miring the excellence of the Roman constitution; and observing how well it was accom∣modated for the enlargement of their Empire, from whose Model the more the Common∣wealths of our days do recede, the more do they wander and deviate from the best. For though the Romans affected glory and command as much as other people, they did not disdain notwithstanding to obey in their Armies, the same persons whom they had for∣merly commanded; and serve as private Soldiers, where they had formerly been Generals. This is a practice contrary to the opinion and genius of our age so much, that in Venice it is provided by a publick Law, that a Citizen who has had a greater command, may refuse to accept of a less (and the City allows it) which Law though it may be convenient for pri∣vate persons, must needs be prejudicial to the publick; because the publick may with more confidence commit an inferior command to a great Officer, than prefer an inferior Officer to a great command: For to a young Soldier, those places of importance are not safely entrusted, unless persons of experience and wisdom be placed about him, by whose Coun∣sel he may be directed: And if the Romans had done then, what the Venetians and other Commonwealths do now, and not suffered any man who had ever been Consul, to serve in any other quality, many things had befallen them that would have endangered their liberty; and again, if any young Officers had been admitted to the supreme commands, and no body placed about them to manage and direct them, they would have grown dissolute and careless, and many things have hapned that might have ruined the State.

CHAP. XXXVII.

What troubles and offence was created in Rome by the Agrarian Law; and how dangerous it is to make a new Law opposite to an old Custom, with too much retrospection.

IT is observed by most ancient Writers, that as men are afflicted in adversity, so they are satiated in prosperity; and that joy and grief have the same effects: For when men are not necessitated to fight, they fight for ambition, which is so powerful in our minds, that let us arrive at what height of good fortune we can, we are never contented, but are still labouring for more; and this happens to us, because we are naturally capable of desiring many things, which we are unable to compass; and therefore our desire being greater than our power to acquire, our minds are never at rest with what we enjoy. And this is the occasion of all our varieties of fortune, for when we are always driving at more, and fearful of losing what is already in our possession, we are apt to fall into suspicions, from thence into quarrels, and from thence into Wars, which do usually bring after them the ruine of our Country. This we have discoursed, to give you a better contemplation of the People of Rome, which by a kind of necessity was forced by their Tribunitial power to fortifie themselves against the oppressions of the Patricii; but when they had obtained what indeed necessity impelled them to desire, being instigated by their ambition, they went on further, and contended with the Patricii both for Honor, and Estate; which was the occasion of the Seditions about the Agrarian Law, and by degrees the destruction of the Common-wealth. And because it is necessary in every well order'd State, that respect be had rather to the enrichment of the Publick, than particular Citizens, the people of Rome could not (in what belong'd to this Law) but erre against the Funda∣mentals

of their Government, if they were so constituted, that process of time could give no occasion of difference, unless we will rather affirm that at first all things were so well, that it was beyond the power of time to disorder them: Be it which way it will, it is certain this Law was never mentioned in Rome, but with great controversie, and tu∣mult. This Law consisted principally in two heads. One was, That no Citizen of Rome should be permitted to possess more than a certain proportion of Land. The other, that what Land should be taken from the Enemy, should be divided equally among the people; both of which Articles were against the interest of the Nobility; for most of them ha∣ving more Land than was allowed by this Law, their fortunes by it were to be confiscated, and half of them taken away; and then by the distribution of what they should take from the Enemy, they should lose all opportunity of enriching themselves for the future; which being certainly true, and this Law so perfectly pernicious to the interest of the Nobility, it was never mentioned by the Tribunes, but the Patricii opposed it, and with all the ea∣gerness imaginable; yet not always by force, but sometimes by evasion, either com∣manding out their Armies upon some pretended design, or by setting up another Tribune in opposition to him who proposed the Law, that thereby they might dissolve it, or else by sending new Colonies. And so it hapned when the Colony was sent to Antium at the time when the difference was so high betwixt the Patricii and the Agrarians, that no other expedient could be found to keep them from blood. Livy tells us, That there were very few that would list themselves upon that accompt, to fill up the number of that Colony, so much more did the people prefer an alotment about Rome, than in any other place. But afterwards the quarrel grew higher, and to appease their Seditions, the Romans were glad to send their Armies sometimes to the extreamest parts of Italy, and sometimes be∣yond them. But afterwards it falling out that the Lands which they took from the Ene∣my were remote, at great distance from Rome, and not to be cultivated with any conve∣nience, the people grew weary, and insisted not so fiercely on their Agrarian Law: They began also to be more moderate in those kind of confiscations, but when any Country was seized, they sent Colonies to plant them: With these Arts they skin'd over their animosities till the time of the Gracchi, who reviving them again, gave occasion to the ruine of their Government: for the Nobility having encreased their strength, the quarrel advanced so far, that they came to blows, and the Magistrate being unable to restrain them, th•• fury of the Faction encreasing, each party began to look out for a head. The people chose Marius, and made him four times Consul, (with some little interval) which authority he managed so well to his own advantage, that by the power and interest which he had got in that time, he made himself thrice Consul afterwards. The Nobility having no other remedy against so growing a Plague, applyed themselves to Sylla, and having made him their chief, they fell to down right Wars, which were carried on with much blood and variety of fortune, till at last the Nobility prevailed. The same faction re∣vived again in the days of Caesar and Pompey, and was attended by the destruction of the State: For Caesar espousing the Marian party, and Pompey the Syllan; Caesar overcame, and was the first that set up a Tyranny in Rome; after whose time that City could never recover its liberty. This was the beginning, and this was the end of the Agrarian Law, which may seem to contradict what we have said elsewhere. That the discords and enmity betwixt the people and Senate of Rome conduced to the enlargement of their Empire, and the conservation of their liberty, by giving opportunity for the making of such Laws, as were great corroboration to their liberties and freedom; but I answer, That the effects of the Agrarian Law, does not hinder, but that what we have said may be true; for so great was the ambition of the Nobility, that had it not been curb'd and check'd several ways, it would have usurped upon the City, and got the whole power into its hands. And if we observe that the Agrarian dispute was three hundred years together in Rome, before it could subvert it, we may easily imagine, the ambition of the Patricii would have done it much sooner, had it not been ballanced and depressed by the people with their Agrarian Laws, and some other inventions. From whence likewise we may observe that wealth is more estimable among men, than honor; for when the Patricii were in contro∣versie with the people about Titles and Honor, they never went so high as to give them any extraordinary disgust: But when their Estates and Fortunes were at stake, they defended them with such zeal, that they chose rather to put the whole Commonwealth into a flame, than to part with them quickly. The great authors of that Conflagration were the Gracchi, whose good will and intentions towards the people, was much more to be commended than their wisdom. For to remove an inveterated inconvenience, and to that purpose to make a Law with too much retrospection, is ill Counsel (as I said before) and hastens that ruine which it was designed to prevent; but with Patience and

Compliance, the mischief is either delayed, or spends it self in time, before it does any great hurt.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Weak Commonwealths are generally irresolute, and ill advised, taking their measures more from Necessity, than Election.

THe Volsci, and the Equi understanding that Rome was sadly visited with a Contagion, concluded it a fair opportunity to conquer it, and having betwixt them raised a powerful Army, they invaded the Latini, and Hernici; over-ran most of their Country, and forced them to send to Rome for assistance. The Romans returned answer, that they should put themselves in Arms, and make as good defence as they could; for the Sickness was so raging, they could give them no relief. which shows the generosity and wisdom of that Senate, That in all conditions, and under the greatest of their Calamities never receded from its Majesty and Grandeur; but at all times would have the disposal of the affairs of its Subjects, and when necessity required, made no scruple to command things contrary to their old ways of proceeding. This I say, because formerly the Senate had forbidden them to arm, upon any occasion whatever; and perhaps another Council would have thought it derogatory to their Grandeur, to permit them to defend them∣selves: But this Senate was endued with admirable prudence, understood how things were to be taken, and rejected; and of two evils, how to make choice of the least. It troubled them much that they were not in condition to protect them; and it troubled them no less, That they would be forced to defend themselves, upon their own score without suc∣cours from Rome; yet finding there was a necessity of it, the enemy being at their Gates, and threatning them with death, they retained their authority, and with great gravity sent them word to defend themselves and raise what forces they could. This may seem but a common resolution, and what any other Commonwealths would have taken as well as that; but weak and ill ordered Commonwealths cannot come off with so much honour. Duke Valentine having taken Faenza, and overrun most part of Bologna, demanded pas∣sage of the Florentines to march his Army to Rome. The Florentine Council met, and consulted, and there was not one man who thought it convenient to grant it. This was not according to the discretion of the Romans; for the Duke being very strong, and the Florentines but weak, it had been more for their honour to have granted him passage, when they could not obstruct it; that what they could not resist, might have been imputed to their courtesie. But there is no remedy, 'tis the property of weak States to do every thing amiss, and never to do well but in spight of their teeths, for there is no such thing as prudence amongst them. And this Florence has verified in two other cases.

In the year 1500. when Lewis XII. had repossessed himself of Milan, he had an incli∣nation to restore Pisa to the Florentines upon the payment of 50000 Florens: To this purpose he sent thither his Army under the Command of Mounsieur de Beaumont in whom (though a French man) the Florentines had great confidence. Beaumont came up with his Army betwixt Cassina and Pisa, and lodged it conveniently for the battering the Town: having been two or three days before, it and all things ready for the assault, Commissio∣ners came out, and offered to surrender to the French, upon condition that he would en∣gage upon the honor of his Master that it should not in four months time be delivered to the Florentine; to which the Florentines not consenting, the Commissioners returned. The cause why the Florentines refused it, was their jealousie of the King, though they had put themselves under his protection. They did not consider that the King could better have put the Town into their hands when he was Master of it himself (and if he had refused it, it would have discover'd him) than promise to do it when he was not in possession, and yet they be forced to purchase that promise at a very great rate. Two years after, Arezzo revolted, and the King sent Seigneur Iubalt with supplies to the Florentines, who had besieged the Town. Iubalt was no sooner arrived, but the Inha∣bitants of Arezzo made him the same proffer, and the Florentines could not be brought to consent: Iubalt resented it, and knowing it to be a great fault, he practised privately with the Aretines, without Communicating with the Florentine Commissaries: An agreement was clap'd up betwixt them, by virtue of which Iubalt entred the Town, and re∣proached the Florentines by their indiscretion, as people wholly inexperienced in the

affairs of the world. He told them, if they desired to have it, they should signifie it to the King, who would be better able to gratifie them in the Town, than without. The Florentines were highly offended, and spake very hardly of Iubalt, till they con∣sidered that of Beaumont had done the same at Pisa, they had both as well as one I say therefore, that weak and irresolute States, do seldom take good Counsels, unless they be forced; for their weakness suffers them not to deliberate, where any thing is doubtful; and if that doubt be not removed by a violent necessity, they never come to a resolution, but are always in suspence.

CHAP. XXXIX.

Divers People have many times the same Accidents.

WHoever compares past things with the present, will find that in all Ages men have had the same humours and appetites as now. So that 'tis an easie matter by consulting what is pass'd, not only (in all common-wealths) to see what will follow, but to provide such remedies as their Predecessors did apply; or if there be no Presidents, to invent new remedies according to the similitude of the acci∣dents. But because these considerations are neglected, History not read, or not under∣stood at least by him who governs, it comes to pass that all Ages have their miscarriages and troubles. The City of Florence after the Government had stood 94 years, having lost a good part of its Territory, as Pisa, and other Towns, was forced to make War upon those who possessed them; and the Inhabitants being strong, and unwilling to restore them, much was spent in the War; to very little purpose. Their great expence, occa∣sioned great Taxes, and their impositions upon the people, made them mutinous, and unquiet. These affairs were administred by a Magistracy of ten Citizens, who were called the Dieci della Guerra: The people began to repine and to complain that the said Counsel was the cause of the War, and that they embezled their Money. That the best way would be to remove them from that Office or when their time was expired to choose no more, but let the Government fall back into its old channel again. These grave Persons who had the superintendancy of the War, were no sooner discharged, but things grew worse and worse, and instead of recovering Pisa, and the rest of the Towns in dispute, they lost Arezzo, and several other places. The people finding their mistake, and that their ma∣lady was rather from the Feaver, than the Physitian, they restored the ten Commissaries, which before they had cashier'd. The people of Rome had the same fancy against the Consuls, and would not believe but they were the causes of all their distractions, and that to settle all things, and preserve themselves in peace, the best way would be to remove them entirely, and provide that there should never be any more, or else to restrain and limit their authority in such manner, that they should have no power over them, either within the City or without. They believed that all proceeded from the ambition of the Nobility, who not being able to chastise the people in the City, because they were protected by their Tribunes, contrived to carry them out of Town under the command of their Consuls, to correct them where they should not be capable of any redress. The first man who had the confidence to propose it, was Terentillus a Tribune, who moved that it might be committed to five persons to consider the power of the Consuls, and to appoint limi∣tations. The Nobility opposed it, and (it is probable) employed all their interest against it, for it was no less than to debase the Majesty of the Government, and leave themselves no dignity in the commonwealth. Nevertheless the obstinacy of the Tribunes was such, that the Name of Consul was laid aside, and after several experiments, the people chose rather to create their Tribunes with Consular power, than to create new Consuls again, showing thereby that their quarrel was not so much against the authority, as Name: But they found their error at length, and restored their Consuls, as the Florentines did their Council of ten.

CHAP. XL.

The creation of the Decem-virat in Rome; what things are most remarkable in it; and how far such a Constitution may be useful or pernicious to a Common∣wealth.

BEfore we discourse of the troubles and commotions which hapned in Rome by means of the Decem-virat, it will not be amiss to give a short history of its Creation, in which there are many things well worthy our remark, as well for the preservation as de∣struction of a State; and this discourse will remonstrate the errors both of the Senate and People in prejudice to the liberty, and of Appius (chief of the Decem-viri) against that tyranny which he design'd to erect. The Romans therefore after a long debate betwixt the Nobility and People about the Constitution of such Laws as might settle and establish the liberty of their State, by common consent, sent to Athens Spurius Posthumus, with two other persons, for exemplifications of such Laws as Solon had made there, that thereby they might model their own. As soon as they were returned they chose certain learned and grave men to peruse the said Laws, and select such as they thought convenient for the Ro∣mans. The persons created for this office were ten of the principal Citizens (with Com∣mission for a year) among whom, Appius Claudius was one, a witty, but a turbulent man. And that they might act freely, without any awe or impediment in their affairs, they laid aside all the other Magistrates, (in particular the Tribunes and Consuls) and forbad all appeal to the people; so that this Magistracy were compleat Soveraigns in Rome. Not long after Appius assumed the whole authority of the ten, his Companions paying a reverence, as their Superior, by reason of his interest with the people; for he had made himself so popular on a sudden, it was almost a miracle to consider how soon his nature was changed, and he of their only cruel and fierce adversary become their greatest Courtier and Favourite.

The first year all went very well, and he who presided marched only with twelve Li∣ctors before him; when any Citizen was to be tried for murder, they framed the Process, but appointing a day, left it to be judged by the people, though their jurisdiction was So∣veraign, and without any appeal. They writ their Laws in ten Tables, but before they were ratified they exposed them to the people that every man might see them at his plea∣sure, and approve or object as he saw occasion. When Appius perceived the end of his Commission approaching, he caused it to be rumoured among the people, that to compleat all, and give perfection to their designs, it would be convenient to add two Tables more to their Ten, in order to which the common people consented that the Decem-virat should be continued for a year; and they did it with the more readiness, that neither the Consuls nor Tribunes might be restored, but Causes be left to their own judgment, as is said before. A day being appointed for a new creation, 'tis not to be imagined how all the Nobility stickled, and endeavoured to gain that honour which they had so stifly impugned by their applica∣tions to the people, whom they had so highly provoked. But among them all, none was so solicitous for the continuation of the Decem-virat, as Appius Claudius who pressed it of the people with so much instance and humanity, that he began to be suspected by his asso∣ciates, Credebant enim haud gratuitam in tanta superbia Comitatem fore; They could not imagine a person of his pride would stoop to such flatterry without some great design: that they might defeat neatly, and with cunning, what they could not do by force; though he was the youngest of them all, they committed the nomination of the next ten to him, suppo∣sing he would have observed ancient rules, and not named himself, which was a practice of no use nor reputation in Rome, Ille verb impedimentum, pro occasione arripuit he spoil'd their Plot made advantage of their impediment, and named himself among the foremost, to the amazement and displeasure of all the Nobility.

This Creation was no sooner over, but both Nobility and People began to be sensible of their error; for, as was said of him, Finem fecit ferendae alienae personae, Appius began to shew himself, and lay aside the disguise he had put on: he began to act according to his own natural pride, and in a little time had made his Collegues as bad as himself. To terrifie the Senate and people both, the first day of their Magistracy they multiplied their Lictors to 120, whereas formerly they had but 12, which were carried before every one of them by turns, but now every one of them had as many. This terror for some time was equally diffused, but afterwards they began to favour the Nobility, and insult upon the people only; and if any of the people that had been injured by any of the Decem-viri, and had no right done him by the first, to whom he addressed, if he appeal'd to another, he was sure to be worse;

insomuch as the people finding their error, began in their affliction to look upon the No∣bility; Et inde libertatis captari auram, unde servitutem timendo, in eum statum rempub∣licam adduxerant; and from thence hope for their liberty, from where their apprehension of servitude had brought their Commonwealth into the condition in which it was.

And this affliction in the people was no little satisfaction to the Nobility, Ut ipsi taedio praesentium, Consules desiderarent; that the tediousness of their sufferings might make them restore their Consuls. By this time their years was expired, and the two Tables to be added to the ten, both ready, and wanted nothing but publication; the Decem-viri had no mind to lay down, but began to think of continuing their authority by force, to which end they raised themselves Guards out of the young Nobility, and paid them out of the Estates of those who were condemned. Quibus donis juventus corrumpebatur, & malebat licentiam su∣am, quam omnium libertatem; by which preferment the youth were debauched, and chose rather to be licentious themselves than that their Country should be free.

Whilst things were in this posture, the Sabini and the Volsci made War upon the Romans and invaded them with a great Army. The Romans were in great consternation and the Decem-viri began to find the weakness of their Government, for without a Senate they were at a loss to manage their War; and with it their authority would be supplanted. But being necessitated at last, they came to a resolution, and resembled the Senate. Many speeches were made against the Decem-viri, in particular by Valerius and Horatius; and doubtless their authority had been utterly exploded, but that the Senate; in spight to the people, chose rather to continue them, lest, if they were deposed, the people should set up their Tribunes, and the Consuls be quite laid aside; whereas, if afterwards the Decem-viri could be brought fairly to lay down, by degrees the Consuls might be restored, and the Tri∣bunes be cashiered. Hereupon the Senate silently, without further prosecution of them, prepared for the War, and sent forth two Armies under the Command of several of the Ten, but Appius Claudius was left behind for the Government of the City. Whilst his Collegues were abroad, it was his fortune to fall in love with a Plebeian's daughter called Virginia, and not being able to persuade, he would take her away by force; Virginius the Father of the Virgin was willing to defend the chastity of his Daughter, and knowing no other way to secure it, he got Appius to be imprisoned: whereupon great tumults suc∣ceeding in Rome, and in the Army, the Souldiers returned, and joyning with the people they encamped upon the holy Mountain, where they resolved to continue till the Ten had resigned, Tribunes and Consuls were restored, and the Commonwealth had recovered its old liberty and freedom. This is the story of the Decem-virat, as shortly related as could be, in which it may be observed, that the people of Rome fell into subjection and servitude upon the same causes as other Commonwealths very frequently do; that is, by the too great desire of the people to be free, and the too great ambition in the Nobility of Com∣mand: when these two Factions cannot agree, they are forced to refer all to some third person in whom they confide; and then begins the Tyranny. The Decem-virat was ere∣cted in Rome by consent both of the Nobility and People, and invested with so much pow∣er, out of a hatred which the Nobility bare to the Tribunitial, and the people to the Con∣sular authority: as soon as the Decem-viri were chosen, Appius pretended highly for the people, and promised to be their Champion, whereupon they favoured him exceedingly. And (be it in what City it will) whenever the people are brought to extol and applaud a person, for no other reason, but because it is in his power to punish their enemies; if that person be cunning and industrious, their liberty is lost, and he can usurp when he pleases; for by the assistance of the people he may master the Nobility; and when they are down, it will be no hard matter to subdue the people, who will have no body to fly to, nor no body to support them: but before the Nobility be suppressed, he is by no means to meddle with the people. And this has been the method of all those who have laid the foundation of Tyranny in any Commonwealth; which if Appius had followed, he had not lost his ill∣got authority so soon: but he went quite contrary, and with as much imprudence as was possible, ran himself into the displeasure of the same persons which advanced him; and ingratiated with those who were against his preferment, and were no way able to sustain him, whereby he lost his old friends who were powerful, and endeavoured to get new that could do him no good. For though the Nobility have naturally no aversion to Tyranny; yet that part of the Nobility which shares not in the profits is always an enemy to the Ty∣rant, and their ambition and avarice is so great, all the riches and honours in the Tyrants disposal are too little to take them off. Hence it is that the aggressor in any enterprize is of necessity to be stronger than his adversary; and he who in the establishment of a Ty∣ranny makes the people rather than the Nobility his friends, will be stronger and more se∣cure than he who goes the other way, cajoles with the Nobility, and disobliges the People:

for the people being always stronger in the City, by their friendship, a Tyrant may subsist without any foreign supplies. This was visible in the case of Nabis the Tyrant of Sparta, who having the affections of the people, and secured himself of some of the Nobility, defended himself against all Greece, and the whole power of the Romans, which without the hearts of the people he could never have done. But he who makes his interest with the Nobility, cannot maintain himself without foreign assistance; for he will want Guards for th•• security of his person, Souldiers to do the Office of the Militia in the Country, and Confederates and Allies to succour him in his distress; whereas if he could be supplyed in these three defects, it might be possible for him to subsist without the friendship of the people. But Appius failing in these, miscarried in the very beginning of his Ty∣ranny.

In the creation of the Decem-virat the Senate and the People were guilty of very great error; for though in our discourse of Dictators we have said before, that those Magistrates only are pernitious to the publick liberty, who set up themselves by force, not they who are legally chosen and by the suffrage of the people; yet the people are to take special care in the election of their Magistrates, that they may not easily usurp. But the Romans instead of placing Guards about their Decem-viri that might have kept them in order, they not only took their Guards away, but displaced all the rest of their Magistrates, and made them absolute for that year, and all out of a design to countermine one another; the Nobility to suppress the Tribunes, and the people the Consuls. So that it hapned to them, as Fer∣dinand King of Arragon was wont to say it hapned to men that hated one another; that is, that they acted like birds of prey, all of them pursuing the quarry with equal rapacity; but the little birds not regarding the greater over their heads, are easily interrupted, and made prey themselves. But we have said enough to demonstrate the ill Counsel of the Romans in thinking to preserve their liberty by the creation of the Decem-virat, and the errors of Appius in driving at the Soveraignty, and miscarrying so soon.

CHAP. XLI.

For a mean man to grow immediately insolent, or a meek man immediately cruel, without just steps of gradation, is both imprudent and unprofitable.

AMong the rest of Appius his faults in the management of his Tyranny, it was of no little ill consequence that he changed his humour so suddenly: his cunning in cajoling the people, and pretending to be of their party, was good: his invention to renew the creation of the Ten was no worse; his boldness in presenting himself contrary to the ex∣pectation of the Nobility was well enough, and his creating Collegues for his turn was not amiss. But having gone thus far, (as is said before) to change his nature in a moment; of a friend, to become an enemy to the people; of an humble and affable man, to shew himself proud; of a mild man, to become difficult and perverse; and all this with so little circumstance, that the whole World might see it was either the falsness or levity of his tem∣per, was high indiscretion: for he that has ever pretended to be good, and is willing for his advantage to become otherwise, must not do it at a leap, but by degrees, and upon oc∣casion, that before the diversity of his deportment deprives him of his old friends, he may have gained himself new, without diminution to his authority; otherwise being discovered and deserted, he is certainly ruined.

CHAP. XLII.

How easily mens manners are corrupted.

IT is remarkable likewise in the passages of the Decem-viri, that men are easily corrupted, and become wicked, be their education never so good. The youth which Appius de∣bauched, and took for his Guards, is sufficient to prove it; who, though of honourable ex∣traction, and brought up with all possible advantage, suffered themselves to be corrupted by their preferments, became favourers of tyranny, and perfer'd their own licentiousness be∣fore the liberty of their Country. Quintus Fabius did the same, who, though an excellent person at first, and one of the Decem-viri of the second creation, blinded with ambition

and enveigled by the cunning of Appius, changed his good humour into bad, and grew as intolerable as he; which things, if seriously considered, should make all Legislators (either in Commonwealths or Kingdom) the more careful and diligent to restrain the ambition of mankind, and take from them all hopes of impunity when they offend in that kind.

CHAP. XLIII.

Those Souldiers which fight for their own honour are the best, and most to be trusted

FRom the same History it may be observed how much it imports the prosperity or adver∣sity of affairs to have the minds of the Souldiers quiet, and ready to engage upon a prin∣ciple of honour, rather than to have them turbulent, and disposed to fight upon every mans ambition: for whereas the Roman Armies were always Victorious under the conduct of the Consuls; under the Decem-viri they were always unfortunate: from hence likewise it may be collected how unsafe it is to commit the defence of our affairs to a mercenary Army who have nothing to encourage or oblige them but their pitiful pay, which is not con∣siderable enough to make them so faithful as to lay down their lives in your quarrel, For in an Army where the Souldier is not bound to the person for whom he fights by some par∣ticular obligation, or the expectation, of more than ordinary advantage by the Victory if the enemy be strong, they will make but little resistance; and this kindness and affection of the Souldiers to the General cannot be but where they are subjects fighting under a good Prince or a lawful Magistrate in defence of their Posterity and Religion: so that it is necessary for every King or Commonwealth who desires to defend himself well, to train up his own Subjects in Military Discipline, that he may safely depend upon them in time of distress; and it has been the practice of all those who have done any great things. The Roman Armies under the Decem-viri had doubtless the same courage as under the Con∣suls: but not being so well affected towards the one as the other, they would not put it forth, nor give such testimonies as formerly: but when the tyranny of the Decem-virat ex∣tinguished, and their liberty was recovered, having then the same tenderness and affection to their Country, they fought as well as before, and their enterprizes had the same happy success.

CHAP. XLIV.

A multitude without an head is altogether unserviceable; nor is any man to threaten that has any thing to desire.

UPon the accident of Virginius, the people having taken Arms, and retir'd to the holy-Mount, the Senate sent to them to know upon what account they had abandoned their Officers, and betaken themselves to that Mount: and the authority of the Senate was so venerable among the people, that having no head among them, there was no body durst return an answer: Titus Livius tells us, Non defuit quid responderetur, deerat qui responsum daret; They wanted not what to say, but who to deliver it. For having no certain Comman∣der, every private person was unwilling to expose himself to their displeasure. From whence we may understand how useless a thing the multitude is without a head, which be∣ing observed by Virginius, he caused twenty Military Tribunes to be made, with power to treat and expostulate with the Senate instead of a Head.

The people insisting to have Valerius and Horatius sent to them, to whom they would communicate their grievances, Valerius and Horatius refused to go till the Decemviri had laid down their authority; which being at length obtained with much concertation; Va∣lerius and Horatius repaired to the people, and understood that they would have new Tri∣bunes to be chosen; they would have appeals from every Magistrate to the people; and they would have the Decem-viri to be delivered up into their hands, that they might burn them alive: the Embassadors liked the first of their demands, but refused to consent to the last as impious, telling them, Crudelitatem damnatis, in crudelitatem ruitis: You condemn cruelty, and practise it your selves: and before you will be free, you will tyrannize over your

adversaries; advising them to lay that Article by, and mention the Decemviri no farther, but to address themselves to the reassumption of their power and authority, after which they would not want ways of receiving satisfaction; for then every man's life and fortune would be at their disposing. Hence we may learn how weak and imprudent it is to desire a thing, and before we receive it, declare to what ill use we intend it, especially if we mean to do mischief, 'tis just as you should say, pray give me your Sword, that I may run you thorow, 'Tis sufficient to borrow the Sword, and when you have it, you may do as you please.

CHAP. XLV.

'Tis a thing of ill Example to break a new Law, especially for the Maker: and 'tis no less dangerous to the Governor of a State, to multiply injuries, and repeat them every day.

THe Commotions about the Tyranny of the Decem-viri being composed, and Rome restored to its old form of Government again; Virginius cited Appius before the the people to answer what he had attempted upon his Daughter. Appius appeared with his Nobility about him; Virginius commanded him to Prison: Appius cryed out, he appealed to the people: Virginius replyed, That he who had taken away those appeals from the people, ought not to have any benefit by them, nor be permitted to implore their protection, whose Laws and Liberties could receive no protection from him. Appius insisted, that they ought not to violate a thing which they had urged with that eagerness, and ordained with that zeal. And though indeed the life of Appius was wicked enough, and there was no punishment that he did not deserve; yet it was inhospitable and contrary to all civil Society, to violate their own Laws, which were but newly made, and passed with so much importunity: for in my judgment there is nothing so indecorous, nor of so ill example in a Commonwealth, as the infraction of a new Law, by the Le∣gislator himself.

When in the year 1494. the State of Florence was restored by the assistance of a Frier called Hieronimo Savonarolo (whose writings give sufficient testimony of his Learning and integrity) having among other things for the security of the Citizens, obtained a Law for appeals to the people in matters of State, both from the Senate and the Council of Eight (which Law he had a long time solicited, and got with much difficulty at last) It hapned that not long after, there were five persons condemned to death by the Senate, which persons endeavouring very earnestly to appeal to the people, they were denyed that liber∣ty, and could not have the benefit of that Law; which was greater diminution to the reputation of the Frier, than any thing that had ever hapned before: For if that Law was of such importance as he had pretended, it ought to have been observed; if nor, why was it solicited so earnestly? And it was the more remarkable in the Frier, because in his many Sermons and Discourses afterwards to the people, he neither blamed the breaking of that Law, nor went about to excuse it, for being to his purpose, he would not condemn it, and excuse it he could not, having nothing to say; which action having discovered the ambition and partiality of his mind, took much off from his repute, and loaded him with scandal. It is of great inconvenience likewise in a State, to revive, and ferment the hu∣mours in the minds of the Citizens, by a daily renovation of their injuries upon one per∣son or other, as it hapned in Rome after the Decem-virat, was dissolved, and the Tribuni∣tial authority re-established by the people: For all the Decem-viri, and several other considerable Citizens were Accused, and Condemned, in so much as there was a General consternation among the Nobility, who thought there would be no end of their condemnation, till they were utterly extinct: Which proceeding and apprehension, would doubtless have produced great troubles in the State, had not they been prevented by Marcus Duellius the Tribune, who published an Edict, That for a twelve-month it should not be lawful either to cite or accuse any man that was Citizen of Rome; by which act of Mode∣ration, he secured the Nobility. From whence we may discern how unsafe it is for any Prince or Commonwealth to keep the minds of their Subjects in perpetual fear and sus∣pence; and without doubt nothing can be more pernicious; for men being insecure, and jealous of being questioned for some Capital offence, will look out for protection, and not only so, but are provoked to more boldness, and become less scrupulous of doing great mischiefs. If therefore such Commotions happen, it is better if possible to compose them

without blood, but if Example must be made, it is to be done at once, that afterwards the people may be reassured, and recover their old security, and tranquility of mind.

CHAP. XLVI.

How men leap from one passion to another, and how they who at first aim at nothing but self-preservation, when secured of that, grow oppressors of other People.

AFter the people of Rome had recovered their liberty, and had by so much impro∣ved their former condition, by how much they had made many new Laws to for∣tifie their power, one would have expected they should have been quiet, and after so much trouble and embroilment, enjoyed some time of repose; but it fell out quite contrary, they were more perplexed than before, every day producing some new Sedition or Di∣sturbance: Of which, Livy giving the reasons so clearly, I do not think it amiss to in∣sert them in this place. These two Orders (says he) were in perpetual opposition; when the people were humble, the Nobility was proud, when the populace was quiet, and content with their bounds, the young Nobility took their time to be insolent; and when the Tribunes interposed in their behalf, they made little progress at first, and at length were as much injur'd themselves. The graver sort of the Nobility on the other side, though they thought their own youth to be too furious and insolent, yet they had rather if one side must transgress, that it should be their own, than the peoples: So that their immoderate desire of preserving their priviledge, was the cause that when either party was prevalent, it employed its whole power in oppressing the other. It is common among men, when they would secure themselves, to injure other people; they begin first to do mischief, to revile, or to beat, or what other outrage they are able, as if the injury they would avoid themselves, was to be thrown upon their Neighbour, and there was no Me∣dium betwixt doing, and suffering of wrong. From hence we may see after what man∣ner (among other things) Commonwealths are dissolved, and how suddenly men pass from one ambition to another, according to that true saying which Salust put into the mouth of Caesar. Omnia mala exempla, bonis initiis Orta sunt. All disorders and abuses, are good in their beginnings. The first thing an ambitious Citizen endeavours, is so to fortifie, that he may defend himself not only against his private adversary, but against the publick Magistrate, if at any time he would offend him; to which end he makes what friends he can, by furnishing them with Mony or supporting them against their Oppres∣sors; and this seeming very honest in appearance, people are easily deluded, and no body goes about to prevent it; so that no obstacle being given, he grows insensibly so great, that not only the private Citizens, but the Magistrate begins to apprehend him; and then there is no resisting him without manifest danger, for the reasons (which I have mention'd before) of the dangerous contending with inconvenience that has got that growth and maturity in a City. What is then to be done? Let him alone in his prosperity, and he enslaves you for ever, unless death or some other kind accident delivers you: If you think to remove him on a sudden, you do but add to his power and hasten your own ruine; for finding himself in such a posture that his Friends, his Enemies, the Magistrates, and all people are afraid of him, he will then begin to domineer, and dispose of all things ac∣cording to his own judgment and pleasure; If there be any way to prevent it, it is by watching in time, by having a diligent eye over your Citizens, that under colour of doing good, they may not be able to do mischief; and that they may have as much reputation as may serve, not ruine their liberty: but of this more hereafter.

CHAP. XLVII.

Though the people, in things that are discours'd in general, are many times mistaken, yet when they are reduced to particulars, they are more sensible and judicious.

THe Name of consul (as we said before) being grown odious to the people of Rome they resolved to have them created for the future out of the Populace; or else to limit and circumscribe their authority with such rulers as they should think fit. The Nobility, to prevent both inconveniences, took a way betwixt both, and was contented that they should create four Tribunes with consular authority, to be chosen indifferently out of the people, and Senate. The people were well enough satisfied, as thinking by that means the Consulship would extinguish, and that they should have a share of the supream dignity themselves. But observe what followed when they came to the creation of their Tribunes, and it was not only in their power, but expected, that they should have been all made out of the people, they chose them all out of the Nobility, which gave occasion to Livy to say, Quorum Comitiorum eventus docuit, alios animos in Contentione libertatis & honoris, alios secundum deposita Certamina in incorrupto judicio esse. The success of that Election did show, That when their honour and liberty were in controversie, the people were of one mind; when they were secure and free, they were of another. Con∣sidering with my self what might be the reason, I suppose it is because men are more apt to be mistaken in generals, than in particulars. The people thought themselves more worthy of the Cousulship than the Nobility, because they had the greatest interest in the City; They underwent the greatest difficulty in the Wars, and it was their Arms which defended its liberty, and propagated the Empire of Rome: according to which argument, their desires seeming but reasonable, they resolved they would have them in spight of all opposition: But when they came to particulars, and to examine their own private Ca∣pacities for Government, they found themselves so weak and defective, that though alto∣gether they thought themselves able enough, yet they could not find one man they judged proper for the employment; ashamed therefore of their incapacity, they gave their voices for such as they found were more really worthy; which Titus Livius admiring, has these words, Hanc modestiam, aequitatem{que} & altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quae tunc populi universi fuit? Where will you find now-a-days, that Modesty, that Equity, that Magnanimity in one man, that was then obvious in the whole body of the people? To the same purpose there hapned another notable Example in Capua, after Hanibal had defeated the Romans at the Battel of Cannas. After that defeat, the Inhabitants of Capua began to mutiny against the Government (as indeed all Italy did at that time) the grounds of their discontent, was an old pique betwixt the people and Senate, which the first thought then to improve to the destruction of the other. Pacuvius Calanus being a very wise man, and at the Helm at that time, considering with himself of what dangerous conse∣quence a tumult might prove in so populous a City, resolved to find out some way to accommodate their difference. To this end, he assembled the Senate, and in few words remonstrated to them the implacable hatred which the people had to them; That they were in great danger of being murthered by them, and the City delivered up to Hanibal, by reason that the condition of Rome was become so deplorable; and at length he con∣cluded, that if they would commit the whole matter to him, he would find out an expe∣dient to unite them, and his expedient was to lock up the Senate in the Palace, and by putting them into the peoples power, to preserve them. The Senate submitted, were lock'd up in the Castle, and having assembled the people, he told them, That the hour was now come for redeeming their liberty, and chastising the insolence of their Nobility, who had so often abused them. He told them he had them all lock'd up in his Custody, to be disposed of as they pleased; but because he could not think it was their desire to leave the City without a Government, before they proceeded to the execution of the ancient Sena∣tors, it would be necessary, as he conceived, to think of creating a new one; to that purpose he had brought the Names of the old Senators in a Purse, would draw them out one by one, and as they resolved upon another to succeed in each place, he would see the old one delivered out to execution. The people were content, and Pacuvius drew one, and nam'd him aloud, upon which a great noise was raised, some said he was cruel, others he was proud, and others that he was arrogant: Then says Pacuvius, he is unfit to be continued, pray will you make choice of another in his stead. Silence was commanded, and one of the people was named; He was named no sooner, but some began to hum,

others to laugh, and all to revile, and so proceeding from one to another, they were all concluded unfit for so honourable a degree. Paccucius taking the occasion, told them, since you are sensible it is unfit that the City should be without a Senate; and since you cannot agree about the Election of a new; it would be expedient in my judgment, that you pro∣pose some way of reconciliation; for doubtless the fear in which the Senators have been, must of necessity have so humbled them, that that gentleness and humanity which you have sought for elsewhere, may now be found in them. The people began then to discover in particular, the fault which they had committed in judging in general, and declared they were ready for any reasonable reconciliation. And in this manner it is that most people deceive themselves in judging generally of things and their accidents, which upon parti∣cular examination they do easily discover.

After the year 1414. the chief of the Florentines being driven out of the City, it was left wholly without order or government, over-whelm'd with licentiousness and ambition, and the interest of the publick running headlong to ruine. Many of the popular party foreseeing the inevitable destruction of the City, and not knowing to what else to impute it, they charged it upon the ambition of some persons among the Nobility, which (as they pretended) formented their disorders, to take away their liberty, and model the State according to their own fancies, and designs. And these Mutineers were in all places; in the Streets, in the Houses, in the palaces, declaring publickly, and threatning that if ever they came to the government, they would look farther into the business, and punish all those which they should find conscious of it. It hapned afterwards that some of these Citizens were advanced as they desired; but when they were at that height, and saw things nearer than before, they became sensible of their error, and found that it was not the am∣bition of the Nobility, but the malignity of the times, which was the occasion of all their trouble and commotion; so as they became new men, and exercised a new way of administration; Insomuch that those who had heard them complain and threaten when they were in private capacity, seeing them now at the helm, and performing nothing that they had promised, did not look upon it as conviction of their judgment, so much as corruption of their minds. Which thing being frequent among them, gave occasion to the Proverb, Costoro hanno un animo in Piazza, et uno in Palazzo. They are of one mind in the Town, and another in the Throne. Thus, by serious consideration of what has been said we may see how to open the eyes of the people, and reduce them to a sence of their errors, if we take them from their general and abstracted notions, and fix them upon par∣ticulars, as in the case of Paccucius in Capua, and the Senate in Rome. Again, I am of opinion that no wise man is to decline the judgment of the people in the distribution of Offices and Honours, and such particular affairs; for in those things they are almost infallible, and when they do mistake, it is rather to be attributed to the obstinacy of some few, to whom that business is referred, than to the ignorance of the whole body; which being certainly so, I think it not superfluous to shew in my next Chapter the Order which the Senate observed to over-reach the people in those kinds of distributions.

CHAP. XLVIII.

To prevent the advancement of mean people to the Magistracy, it is particularly to be contrived that the competition be, betwixt the best and most Noble, and the wickedest and most abject.

WHen the Senate began to apprehend, that the Tribunes wnuld be chosen out of the people, and invested with Consular power; they had two ways, one of which they constantly made use of. They put the best and most honorable persons to stand, or else by their Mony they foisted in some sordid and ignoble Plebeian, among those of the better sort which pretended to the Magistracy, and demanded it for him: The last way made the people ashamed to confer it: the first made them ashamed to remove it; which reinforces what I have said so often before, that though in generals the people may be mi∣staken, in particulars they are provident enough.

CHAP. XLIX.

If those Cities which have been free from their foundation (as Rome) have found it difficult to contrive such Laws as might maintain them so. Those which have been always servile, will find it almost impossible.

THe Government of Rome, and its affairs abroad and at home, do sufficiently show how hard it is to establish such Laws in a Commonwealth as my preserve it always in a good and quiet Estate. It had first Romulus, then Numa, Tullus Hostilius, Servius, and others, who employed their industry and capacity to regulate it well, and prescribe good Laws; after which, ten Citizens were created on purpose, and yet new difficulties arose every day, which required new remedies: One of their great expedients (which indeed contributed much to the incorruption of that City) was the creation of the Censors, to correct the exorbitances, splendor, and ill husbandry of the Citizens; and although in the beginning it was with some inconsideration decreed that those Officers should be created for five years, yet by the prudence of Mamercus the Dictator, that error was afterwards re∣ctifyed, and the time of their continuance reduced to 18 months, which disgusted the then Censors so highly, that they found means to turn Mamercus out of the Senate, to the great regret, both of the Senators and people. And because the History does not show how Mamercus defended himself, it must needs be the neglect of the Historian, or the defect of the Laws; for it is not to be thought that in a perfect Commonwealth, a Citi∣zen should be so ill treated for promu••ging a Law so much for the security of their liberty, and his innocence left without sanctuary or protection. But to return to my design, I say, it is not to be admired if Cities conceived, and born, and brought up all along in servitude, find so much difficulty to regulate, and preserve themselves in tranquility and peace (as was to be seen in Florence) when Rome and other States (which have been free from the beginning) have scarce been able to do it. Florence was in Subjection to the Roman Em∣pire, and governed by other people, so long that it had searce any hopes of ever being free. Afterwards having time to breath, it began to look up, and make Laws for it self, but mingling them with their old Laws, which were bad, they did them no good. For two hundred years together their Government was in this manner, so that it was scarce wor∣thy the name of a Commonwealth. And the same inconveniencies have been incident to all Cities whose beginnings have been servile like that. And though the Florentines did many times by publick and free suffrage transfer an Authority upon a few of their princi∣pal Citizens, to examine and reform all things; yet those few regarded not so much the common enterest and liberty, as their own private design and advantage in the whole man∣ner of their proceedings; which was so far from producing any order or settlement as was intended, that it augmented the disorder, and made things worse than before. To pass by other things which are likewise to be observed, I say that in every Commonwealth it is particularly to be considered in whose hands the Cognizance of Capital offences is placed, and who has the execution of the Sanguinary Laws: This was well ordered in Rome, an appeal lying to the people from all the courts and Magistrates of the City; and if at any time by that appeal, the delay of execution became dangerous to the State, they had recourse to the Dictator, who commanded execution immediately; but they never made use of their refuge, but in extream necessity.

But Florence, and other Cities born in servitude and Subjection, had not the benefit of such an Officer, but were governed by strangers upon whom the Prince had transferred his Authority; which Custom they kept up, after they had made themselves free, and con∣tinued the same Authority in a Foreigner, whom they called their Captain, which was a dangerous thing, considering how easily he might be corrupted by the better sort of the Citizens: Afterwards the Custom changed with the revolutions of State; and eight Citizens were created to do the Office of the Captain, which alteration proved much for the worse, for (as I said before) a few men prefer'd to the government, are always liable to be caressed and cajoled by the Nobility, to the prejudice of the people. Against which inconvenience, Venice provided very well, where there is a Council of Ten, which can punish any Citizen whatever without any appeal; yet for fear they should not be sufficient (though they have authority enough) for the punishment of persons of more than ordi∣nary quality, they have constituted the Quarantie to assist them, and the Council of Pregui besides, which is the highest Council of that City; so that if any man will accuse, there are judges enough ready to hear him. If therefore in Rome which was originally free, and

model'd and govern'd by the Counsels of so many wise men, new faults were daily disco∣vered, and fresh occasions for new Laws, to be made for the preservation of their liberty; it is not to be admir'd, if in other Cities it was worse, where their Original was not so free, nor so many wise men to model, and instruct them.

CHAP. L.

No Magistrate or Council ought to have power to check or controul the publick acts of the City.

TItus Quintius Cincimatus, and Cneus Iulius Mentus being Consuls together in Rome, but at perpetual odds, the affairs of that State was at a stand, their Laws were not executed, their Wars were not prosecuted, nor any thing managed as it should be. The Senate observing it, persuaded them to make a Dictator, by whom the State might be reformed, and their differences composed, which had hitherto hindered the reformation: But the Consuls, how contrary so ever in other things, consented not to do it, the Senate having no other remedy, addressed to the Tribunes, who by the Authority of the Senate required, and compelled the Consuls to the Creation of a Dictator: In which place it is remarkable how beneficial the assistance of the Tribunitial power was, not only to defend the people against the insolence of the Nobility, but to controul and restrain the emulation and difference among themselves. And here it is carefully to be provided in the settlement of a Commonwealth, that it be not in the power of a few persons to whom the Govern∣ment is entrusted, to quash or obstruct any Customs or Acts that are necessary to its subsi∣stance: For Example, If you authorize a Council, or any other persons to distribute Honours, dispose of Offices, or execute any other of your commands, you must either lay a strict injunction or necessity upon them to do as you appoint, or provide, so that if it be neglected by them, it may be done by some body else; otherwise things are ill managed, and the order is defective, as is manifest by that example in Rome, it the perversness of the Consuls had not been opposed by the Authority of the Tribunes. In the Republick of Venice, the grand Council (or Senate) has the distribution of Honours, and the Election of Magistrates, both abroad and at home; and it hapning one time, that the Senate either upon some disgust, or false suggestion omitted to creat Successors to the Magistrates at home, or to their Officers abroad, there followed great disorders immediately; the Ter∣ritory and City wanting their lawful judges, could have no justice in any thing, till the Senate was appeased. And this inconvenience would in time have brought the City into an ill condition, had it not been prevented by the wisdom of some Citizens, who taking the opportunity obtained a Law, That there should be no vacancy of Offices, either within the City or without, but the old Offices should be continued till their Successors were chosen, by which Law they deprived that great Council of a power to interrupt the course of Ju∣stice, which could not have been suffered without hazard to the State

CHAP. LI.

A Prince or Commonwealth that is constrained to do a thing, is to seem to do it frankly, and without any compulsion.

A Wise man orders his affairs so, that whatever he does, seems rather voluntary and gracious, than done by force and compulsion, be his necessity of doing it never so great, which point of wisdom being well observed by the Romans, got them great reputa∣tion among the people, especially when they decreed stipends to the Soldiers out of the publick Treasury, who before were obliged to serve at their own proper charges; for seeing their Wars were like to be tedious, and their Armies to be carried into far Countries, before they could be finished, they found neither the first could be continued, nor the latter per∣form'd but at the publick expence, wherefore the Senate was forced and necessitated to pay the Soldiers out of the publick stock; yet they did it so slyly, and with that artifice, that though compelled by necessity, it was received as a grace, and gain'd them exceed∣ingly the affections of the people, who had never so much as mention'd it by their Tri∣bunes, or thought of it themselves: So that never any thing was received with more

demonstration of joy. But the Tribunes were not so well satisfied, but endeavoured to possess the people that it was not an act of that grace as they imagined; and that if they looked closely into it, it would appear rather a grievance, than a benevolence; for how was this Mony to be rais'd, but by Taxes and Impositions upon the people? so that if the Senators were bountiful, it was out of other mens purses. But all would not do, let the Tribunes say as they pleased, the people believed themselves highly obliged; and then the manner of raising the Mony made it much the more grateful, for it was done with more than ordinary equity, the greatest part of it being levyed upon the greatest men, and the poor favoured as much as was possible.

CHAP. LII.

The best and most secure way to repress the insolence of an ambitious and power∣ful State, is to preclude and stop up those ways by which he would come to his greatness.

BY what has been said before, it appears what affection the Senate conciliated among the people, not only by the frankness of their bounty, but by their kindness in collecting it; which order, if continued to the people, would have prevented all the tumults which hapned afterward in that City, and deprived the Tribunes of their great credit and autho∣rity. And indeed there is not a better or more secure way to suppress the insolence, or cross-bite the designs of an ambitious Citizen, than to take the same ways to prevent, which he takes to advance them; which course, if it had been followed by the adversaries of Co∣simo de Medici would have been much more for their advantage than to have forced him out of the Town. For had they applyed themselves to caressing and insinuating with the people, (which was the way he took to fortifie himself) they had disarm'd him without any tumult or violence, and taken from him the only arms upon which he depended for his defence. About the same time Piero Soderini by his extraordinary beneficence got him self a great interest and reputation among the people, and was publickly esteemed the great Champion and Protector of their liberties: and doubtless his adversaries, who began to grow jealous of his greatness, had done much more wisely, and honourably, and safely, to have gone the same way to work, and countermined him by their indulgence to the people, than to oppose themselves downright, and ruine him and their whole Country together; for could they by any art or insinuation have gained the affections of the City, they had taken from him the only thing upon which he relyed, without noise or confusion, and they might have opposed in all his counsels, without fear of the people: if he be urged here, that if the Citizens which were enemies to Piero committed an error, in not taking the same course to retain as he had done to debauch the people, Peter committed the same fault by not making use of the same instruments which his adversaries employed against him; it is answered, that Soderini indeed might have tryed, but he could have done it neither with honour or case; for the way that his adversaries took was to set up the Medici, by whose assistance they bearded him exceedingly, and ruined him at last; and it had been dishonourable for Soderini to have deserted the liberties of the people, which he had un∣dertaken to defend, and gone over to the party of the Medici; nor could he have done it so secretly or suddenly, but the people would have smelt it, and have turned the violence of their affection into as furious and hatred, which would have made his destruction much more easy to his enemies, for who-ever was but suspected to be a favourer of the Medici, was thought, ipso facto, an adversary to the people. It is necessary therefore in all deliberations to weigh all things, to consider what danger and what advantage every thing will yield, and make choice of what is least dangerous: otherwise it will happen to you as it did to Mar∣cus Tullius, who raised and augmented the greatness of Mark Anthony by the same way which he intended for his destruction; for when Mark Anthony was declared an enemy by the Senate, having a great Army attending him, and most of them of Caesar's old Soldiers, Cicero to draw them off from him, persuaded the Senate to put Octavius at the head of their Army, and sent him (with the Consuls) against Antonius, pretending that the very name of Octavius (being Nephew to Caesar) would bring over all his Unckles party to him, whereby Antonius would be so weakned it would be no hard matter to reduce him. But it hapned quite contrary; for Antonius having gained Octavius to his side, they joyned their Forces against Tully and his Senate, and ruined their whole Party. Which might have been easily foreseen; nor ought Cicero so imprudently to have reviv'd the name of Caesar, by

whom the whole world was brought into servitude, and especially Rome; nor have per∣suaded himself that a Tyrant or any of his race would ever restore that liberty which his Predecessor had suppressed.

CHAP. LIII.

The people (deceived with a false appearance of good) do many times desire that which turns to their destruction: and how great hopes and large promises do easily debauch them.

AFter the taking of Veii by the Romans, a report being spread of the convenience and pleasantness of the Town, and richness of the Country about it, the people of Rome began to fancy that it would be much for their advantage to transplant one half of their City, aud send them thither to inhabit, for there were many fair houses to receive them; and it could be no weakning or diminution to Rome, seeing the distance betwixt the two Cities was so small; Veii would be taken rather for a member of Rome, than a distinct and particular City. The Senate and graver sort of Citizens had so little inclination to this design, that they resolved to die before ever they would consent to it. The people were so mad upon it on the other side, that when it came to a debat, and it was to be resolved what was to be done, the dispute was so hot, they had proceeded to blows, and the whole Town been engaged in blood, had not the Senate interposed certain ancient and eminent men, who by their interest and veneration among the people defended the blow, and appeased them for that time. In which passage there are two things considerable: the first, that the people being deceived with a false imagination of good, do many times solicit their own ruine, and run the Commonwealth upon infinite dangers and difficulties, unless some per∣son in whom they have great confidence strikes in to instruct them which is the good, and which is the evil; and when by accident it falls out that the people (having been formerly deceived either by persons or things) cannot repose that confidence in any one, then of ne∣cessity all goes to wrack, and nothing can prevent it: to this purpose Dante in his discourse about Monarchy, tells us,

Il popolo molte volte grida Vivala sua morte, & muoia la sua vita.

The enraged multitude do often crie Give us our death, our life we do defie

This incredulity is many times the occasion that good counsels are neglected, as it hapned to the Venetians when invaded by several enemies at one time, they could not take off any one of them, by restoring what they had taken wrongfully from other people; which was the occasion of the war, and almost of their ruine. From whence we may consider the easiness and difficulty of persuading the people, and make this distinction, if the affair proposed be in appearance either magnanimous, or profitable, though at the bottom it be never so distructive, the people are always easie to be persuaded: on the other side, if any thing be offered (how honourable, how useful soever) with the least shew or glance of cowardize or inconvenience, they are never, or with great difficulty to be wrought to it. To confirm this, we have many examples both modern and ancient in Rome and other places. From hence sprang their jealousies against Fabius Maximus, who could never beat it into the heads of that City, that it was better for their Common wealth to protract, and spin out the war, than to push things on, and bring all to the hazard of a Battel; for the people looking upon it as cowardly and base coun∣sel, and not discerning the utility at the bottom, would by no means admit it; and Fa∣bius wanted rhetorick to enforce it upon them: and so strangely are they blinded sometimes with their bravery and courage, that though the Romans had committed the same error once before, and given authority to Fabius his Master of the Horse to fight when he saw occasion whether Fabius would or not; (which authority had like to have ruined the whole Army, had not Fabius with his prudence prevented it) yet that experiment doing no good, they were guilty again▪ and invested Varro with the same power, upon no other ac∣count, but because he had swagger'd up and down the Town, that when-ever they qualified

him with such a Commission, he would fight Hanibal, cut him to pieces; they believe what he said, give him authority; and what followed? Why they were beaten at Cannas; the Roman Army cut off; and the Roman Empire almost extinguished. And not unlike this was the example of Marcus Centenius Penula, (a mean person, and considerable for nothing but some small command in the Army) who presented himself one day to the Se∣nate, and offered if they would give him power to raise an Army of Voluntiers where he pleased all over Italy, he would undertake in a short time to beat Hanibal out of it. The Senate was sensible the proposition was rash, yet (considering withal that if they should deny him, and report should come of it afterwards to the people, it might dissatisfie them; beget some tumult in the City; and be the occasion of envy and animosity to themselves) they granted his request, choosing rather to expose all those who were so ill advised as to follow him, than run the hazard of new dissentions at home. Having got his Commis∣sion, and afterwards his Men, with a confused and disorderly Army he marches against Hanibal, and fought him, but he failed of his promise, for he was killed himself, and most of his Forces. In Greece in the City of Athens, Nicias, a grave and wise Citizen, could never persuade the people against an Expedition into Sicily; but persuing it against all sober advise, they miscarried, and their own Country was ruined. Scipio, when he was made Consul, desired that he might have Africk for his province, and he would undertake to demolish Carthage but the Senate being averse upon the judgment of Fabius Maximus, Scipio threatned to propose it to the people, as knowing very well how gratf••ul it would be to them, We might produce examples of the same nature out of our own City of Florence, as when Hercules Bentivogli General of the Florentine Army, with Antonio Gia∣comini, having defeated the Forces of Bertolomeo at San Vincenti, they went to besiege Pisa, which enterprize was debated and concluded by the people, upon the great promises which Hercules had made, though indeed the wiser sort of Citizens were against it; but the mul∣titude were possessed with great matters that would be done, and nothing could dissuade them. I say then, there is not an easier way to ruine a State where the authority is in the people, than to put them upon some gallant, but desperate enterprize; for where there is any thing of magnanimity in their nature, it is sure to be embraced, and it is not in the wit of men to dissuade them: but as this is many times the ruine of the State, so it is more often and more certainly the destruction of those Citizens which promoted and comman∣ded it, for the people full of expectations of victory, when they find they have miscarried, never impute it to an ill accident or fortune, but throw all upon the ignorance or treachery of their Commanders, which seldom escape without being banished, imprisoned, or killed; as has hapned to several of the Carthaginian and Athenian Captains. Nor does it avail that they have been victorious before; for their present misfortune drowns all, as it fell out to Antonio Giacomini our General, who not taking Pisa as he promised, and the people ex∣pected, fell into so great disgrace with them, that notwithstanding the many great things which he had done, he was permitted to live, more by the favour and humanity of the Go∣vernors, than by gratitude or good nature of the people.

CHAP. LIV.

How great the authority of a grave man is, to asswage the tumultuousness of the people.

THe second thing remarkable, that was mentioned in my last Chapter, is, that their is nothing more certain to appease a popular tumult, and reduce the people to reason, than the interposition of some wise person of authority among them; as Virgil has told us with very good reason.

Tum pietate gravem, ac meritis si forte virum quem Conspexere, silent, arrectis{que} auribus adstant.

If in their tumults, a grave man appears, All's whist, and nothing stirring but their ears.

He therefore who commands in a mutinous Army, or in a seditious City, and desires to appease either the one or the other, is in my judgment to present himself with the most grace and advantage that he can; adorned with all the ornaments of his dignity, and what-ever

else may make him venerable to the people. Not many years since Florence was divided into Factions, the Frateschi and the Arabiati; and their animosity was so great, they came to blows, and the Frateschi were overthrown, and Pagolantonio Soderini slain among the rest, who was as eminent a Citizen as most of his time; upon the strength of this Victory the people ran in a tumult to his house, with intention to plunder it; but his Brother Fran∣cesco (then Bishop of Volterra, and Cardinal now) being accidently there, as soon as he understood how things were, and perceived the rabble to encrease, he called for the richest of his Robes, and having put them on, and his Episcopal Rochet over them, he marched out into the croud, and by the Majesty of his person, and the efficacy of his language, pre∣vailed with them to forbear, and to return peaceably to their houses; which action was so grateful to the City, that it was celebrated publickly many daies after. I conclude there∣fore that there is not a surer, nor more necessary way to compose the distractions of the people, than the appearance of some grave person in such a posture as may make him vene∣rable to them. To return therefore to what we said before, it may be seen from hence, with what obstinacy the Romans accepted of that proposition for transplanting to Veii, be∣cause they thought it profitable, and did not perceive the inconvenience that was in it; for as there hapned many tumults thereupon, so much more mischief had followed, had not the Senate and some other grave persons interposed, and by good fortune restrain'd them.

CHAP. LV.

How easily things are managed in a City where the Commons are incorrupt; how hard it is to erect a principality where there is an equality; and where it is not, a Commonwealth is impossible.

THough we have declared before what we thought was to be expected from a City whose inhabitants were totally corrupt; yet that will not hinder us from considering the subtilty of the Senate in relation to a vow which Camillus had made to consecrate the tenth part of the spoils of the Veientes to Apollo; which spoils being fallen into the clutches of the Common people, the Senate had no way but to publish an Edict, requiring all of them at a certain time and place to bring in the tenth part of their gains. 'Tis true, that Proclamation had no great effect, because another expedient was found out to satisfie the vow; yet it is remarkable, the confidence the Senate had in the good nature and comply∣ance of the people; and the great opinion that they would punctually bring in what-ever they were commanded. On the other side it is observable, that the people went not about to shuffle or defraud the Edict by bringing in less than their due; but declared frankly against it, as a thing illegally required. Which example, with many other which I have mentioned before, are brought to shew the probity and religion wherewith that people was endued, and what good might be expected from them: and certainly where there is not that submission and conformity, no confidence is to be had; as in those Provinces which are corrupted at this day, in Italy above all the rest, and I may say in France and in Spain, which are likewise in some measure under the same corruption; for tho they are not perhaps subject to so many, and so dangerous disorders as we are in Italy; yet it proceeds not from the meliority of the people, but from the excellence of their constitution, being governed by a Monarchy, which keeps them united, not only by the virtue and example of their Prince, but by the Laws and Customs of each Kingdom, which are preserved to this day. Germany is the place of the whole World where the footsteps of the old Romans virtue and fidelity is conspicuous; and that fidelity is the cause why so many Cities live happily in li∣berty; for they are so careful and studious of their Laws, that that very one thing keeps them from servitude, and being over-run by their enemies; and if any instance be desired of this more than ordinary probity in the Germans, I shall produce one, not unlike that be∣fore, betwixt the Senate and the people of Rome. It is the custom in those States when they have occasion for mony upon the publick account, for the councils and Magistrates in authority to lay a tax of one or two per cent. upon all the inhabitants under their jurisdi∣ction, according to their respective Estates; at the day and place appointed for payment, every man appears with his mony, and having taken his oath first that the sum he pays is according to the full of his Estate, he throws it into a chest provided for that purpose, and no notice taken what it is he throws in; from whence we may conclude that there is still some sparks left in that people of their old ingenuity and religion: nor is it to be doubted but every man pays his due, for otherwise the sum would not amount to the imposition, nor

to what they formerly paid; whereby the fraud would be discovered, and they become lia∣ble to a new tax: which integrity and justice is the more admirable in our days, because it is to be found no where but in Germany, and the reason (as I conceive) is twofold; one, be∣cause they have had little or no commerce with their neighbours, neither trading into foreign parts, nor admitting foreigners into theirs; contenting themselves with their own diet, and clothes, and commodities, and thereby preventing all occasion of evil conversation, which is the corruption of good manners, especially among the French, the Spaniards and Italians, which are wicked enough to debauch the whole World. The other reason is, be∣cause those Commonwealths who have preserved their liberties, and kept themselves in∣corrupt, do not suffer any of their Citizens to live high, and at the rate of a Gentleman; but they live all in an equality and parity, as those few Noblemen or Gentlemen who are there are very odious to the people; and when-ever any of them fall by accident into their hands, they die without mercy, as those who are the fountain of all their luxury, and the oc∣casion of their scandal. I call those Gentlemen who live idly and plentifully upon their Estates without any care or employment, and they are very pernicious where-ever they are; but above all, they are most dangerous, who, besides their great revenues, have their Castellanies, their Jurisdictions, and their Vassels, which pay them fealty and homage: of these two sorts the Kingdom of Naples, the Territories of Rome, Romagna and Lombardy are full; for which reason there is no such thing as a free State in all those Countries, be∣cause the Gentry are mortal enemies to those constitutions, and it would be impossible to erect a Republick where they had the dominion; if any alteration be to be wrought, it is by reducing them into a Monarchy; for the matter being so corrupt, that the Laws are be∣come ineffectual to restrain them, there is a necessity that force be applyed, and that by a regal power the licentiousness and ambition of the Grandees be reduced into order: this may be illustrated by the example of Tuscany, which is a small Territory, and yet has three considerable Commonwealths in it, as Florence; Siena and Lucca; and the rest of the Ci∣ties of that Province, though they depend upon them, yet their minds and their laws shew a strange propensity to freedom; all which proceeds from the scarcity of Gentry in those parts, especially with such power and jurisdiction as aforesaid. On the contrary, there is so great an equality among them, that if a prudent and publick man should happen among them, who had any knowledg of that kind of Government, he might easily form them in∣to a solid Commonwealth: but hitherto it has been their misfortune to have no such man: I conclude therefore, that he who would establish a Commonwealth, where the Country con∣sists most of Gentlemen, will find it impossible, unless he ruines them first; and on the other side, he who would set up a Monarchy or Principality where the equality is great, must se∣lect the most considerable and unquiet amongst them; give them Castles, and Lands, and Preferments, and any thing that may oblige them to his side: by which means they shall not only maintain the power of their Prince, but their own insolence and ambition, and the people be forced to submit to a yoke, to which nothing else could compel them: for whilst there is a due proportion betwixt the Prince and the Subject, all things go well, and every man enjoys his Estate: but to settle a Republick in a Country disposed to Monar∣chy, or to erect a Monarchy where the condition of the people have a tendency to a Com∣monwealth, requires a person of more than ordinary authority and brain: Many have tried it, but very few have succeeded; the greatness and difficulty of the enterprize confoun∣ding them so at first, that they know not where they are, and give over as soon as they have begun. But it may be objected, that the constitution of the Venetian Government con∣futes my position, That no Commonwealth can be established where the Gentry are considerable; for under that State no man is admitted to any office but those who are Gentlemen. I an∣swer, that the Venetian Gentry are nothing but name; for their Lands and Possessions are very few, the principal part of their Estates lying in their merchandize and goods: besides, none of them have any Seigneuries or Jurisdiction over the people, so that a Gentleman among them, is but a title of honour and preheminence, founded upon none of those things which in other places make them so considerable. For as in other Commonwealths the Citizens are distinguished into several Orders, so Venice is entirely divided into two, the Populace and the Gentry, the Gentry having, or being capable of all honours and employ∣ments, from which the Populace are utterly excluded; which for the reasons abovesaid, it has produced no disturbance in that State. These things being considered, let him who desires to erect a Government, settle a Commonwealth where there is a parity among the inhabitants; and a Monarchy where there are many great men, and the Gentry numerous. Otherwise his Government will be incongruous, and of little duration.

CHAP. LVI.

Great accidents, before they happen to any City or Province, are commonly pro∣gnosticated by some sign, or predicted by some men.

HOw it comes to pass, I know not; but by ancient and modern example it is evident, that no great accident befalls a City or Province, but it is presaged by Divination, or Prodigy, or Astrology, or some way or other; and that I may not go far for my proof, every one knows what was foretold by Frier Girolamo Savonarola before the Expedition of Charles viii into Italy; besides which it was reported all over Tuscany, that there were arm'd men seen fighting in the air over the Town of Arezzo, and that the clashing of their arms in the conflict was heard by the people.

It is generally known in Florence, that before the death of the old Laurence de Medici the Duomo or chief Church in that City was struck with lightning, and the people destroyed: and before Piero Sodermi (who was made Gonfaloniere for his life by the people) was ba∣nished and degraded, the Palace was burn'd by lightning likewise: many other instances might be produced, which I omit for brevity sake: I shall only add one which is mentioned by Livy before the coming of the French to Rome. Marcus Ceditius a Plebeian acquainted the Senate, that passing one night about twelve a clock thorow the Via-nova, he heard a voice (bigger than a mans) which advised him to let the Senate know, the French were up∣on their march to Rome. How these things could be, it is to be discoursed by persons well versed in the causes of natural and supernatural events; for my part I will not pretend to understand them, unless (according to the opinion of some Philosophers) we may believe, that the air being full of intelligences and spirits, who foreseeing future events, and com∣miserating the condition of mankind, gives them warning by these kind of intimations, that they may the more timely provide and defend themselves against their calamities. But what-ever is the cause, experience assures us, that after such denuntiations, some extra∣ordinary thing or other does constantly happen.

CHAP. LVII.

The multitude united, is formidable and strong, but separated, is weak and inconsiderable.

THe Romans being overthrown, and their Country much wasted, upon the coming of the French; many of them (contrary to an express Order and Edict of the Senate) transplanted to Veii, and left Rome. Whereupon, by a new Proclamation, the Se∣nate commanded, that by a precise day, and upon a certain penalty, they should return to their old habitations: when the news of this Proclamation was first brought to Veii, it was despised and laugh'd at by every body; but when the day appointed for their return arri∣ved, there was not a man but pack'd up his goods, and came back as was required, and as Li∣vy says in the case, Ex ferocibus universis, singuli metu suo obedientes; Not one of them who were so contumacious together, but apart began to fear, and that fear made him obedient. And certainly nothing can give us a more lively description of the nature of a multitude than this case. They are bold, and will speak liberally against the decrees of their Prince; and afterwards when they see their punishment before their faces, every one grows fearful of his neighbour, slips his neck out of the coller, and returns to his obedience. So that it is not much to be considered what the people say, either of their Princes good management or bad, so they be strong enough to keep them in their good humour when they are well disposed, and provide (which they are ill) that they do them no hurt. But this ill disposi∣tion of the people, I mean all ill dispositions but what arise either from the loss of their liberty, or the loss of some excellent Prince still living, upon whom they had setled their affections.

For the evil dispositions proceeding from these causes are transcendently dreadful, and strong remedies are to be applyed to restrain them.

In other cases their anger is nothing, especially having no body to head them; for as there is nothing so terrible as their fury in one case, so there is nothing so vain and incon∣siderable in the other, because, though they have betaken themselves to their Arms, they

are easily reduced, if you can but avoid the first heat of their fury; for by degrees they will cool, and every man considering it is his duty to return, will begin to suspect himself, and think of his security, either by making his peace, or escape. Whenever therefore the multitude is in a mutiny, their best way is immediately to choose themselves a Head, who may correct, keep them united, and contrive for their defence, as the Romans did when leaving Rome upon the death of Virginia; for their protection and security, They created twenty Tribunes from among themselves: and if this course be neglected, it happens to them as Livy presaged in the foregoing Sentence, That as nothing is more couragious than the multitude united, so nothing is more abject when they are separate and divided.

CHAP. LVIII.

That the multitude is wiser, and more constant than a Prince.

THat nothing is more vain and inconstant than the multitude, Titus Livius and all other Historians do agree. You shall many times find them condemning a man to death, and lamenting him when he is dead, and wishing for him again. This hapned in the case of Manlius Capitolinus, who being suspected to design against their liberty, was by the people thrown headlong down the rock, and in a short time exceedingly regretted. The words of our Author are these. Populum brevi, posteaquam ab eo periculum nullum erat, desiderium ejus tenuit. When their fear of him was over, their affection revived. And in another place where he shows the accidents which hapned in Syracuse after the death of Girolamo Nephew to Hierone, he says, Haec natura multitudinis est, aut humiliter servit, aut superbe dominatur. The nature of the Multitude is, to be servilly obedient, or insolently Tyrannical.

Things being thus, I know not whether I shall not seem too bold; to undertake the de∣fence of a thing, which all the world opposes; and run my self upon a necessity of either quitting it with disgrace, or pursuing it with scandal; yet methinks, being to maintain it with arguments not force, it should not be so criminal. I say then in behalf of the multitude; that what they are charged withal by most Authors, may be charged upon all private persons in the world, and especially upon Princes; for whoever lives irregularly, and is not restrained by the Law, is subject to the same exorbitancies, and will commit as bad faults as the most dissolute multitude in the world: And this may be easily known, if it be considered how many Princes there have been, and how few of them good, I mean of such Princes as have despised, and broke thorow those Laws which were intended to restrain them. The Kings in Egypt were not anciently of this sort, for they were govern'd by Laws in those Provinces from the very beginning; and the Kings of Sparta were the same: Nor need we look back so far for examples; we have the Kings of France in our own days, whose Kingdom in my judgment, is at this time the most regular, and best govern'd in the world. Those Princes therefore who are born under such Laws and Con∣stitutions, and obliged to live by them, are not to be reckoned or compared with the disso∣lute and mutinous multitude; but they are to be considered with a multitude under the same Laws and restrictions; As the people of Rome were whilst their Commonwealth was incorrupt, and they were found neither to be insolent in authority, nor slavish in their subjection; but by their Laws, and their Magistrates, they kept up their dignity with honour: And if at any time necessity required that they should appear against the power of any particular person; they did it effectually, as in the cases of Manlius, the Decem-viri, and others who designed to enslave them. On the other side, when it was for the interest of the Publick, they were as obsequious and dutiful to the Dictators and Consuls, as they had been obstinate before. Nor was their regret for Manlius when he was dead, at all to be admired; it was the memory of his virtues that caused it, which are commendable even among Enemies. The same thing might have hapned to the best of Princes; for all wri∣ters agree, that virtue is laudable wheresoever it is to be found. And I am of opinion, that could Manlius have been raised again, and presented to them in the height of their sadness, they would have served him as before, discharged him of his imprisonment, but condemned him to death. Nor are Princes (and those held very wise) exempt from this kind of inconstancy. They have put many to death, and lamented them afterwards; as Alexander for Clito, and other of his friends, and Herod for Mariamnes. But what Titus Livius says of this subject, is not intended of a multitude regulated by Laws, as the Romans were; but a loose and disorderly multitude, like the people of Syracuse, who behaved them∣selves

like mad-men, and committed the same faults that Herod and Alexander had com∣mitted before them. The multitude therefore is no more to be accused of fury and incon∣stancy, than a Prince; for they are both subject to extravagance, when they have no Laws, nor no rules to restrain them. And of this (besides what I have said) there are many examples, not only among the Roman Emperors, but among other Princes and Tyrants, which have been guilty of more giddiness and inconstancy, than any multitude whatever. I conclude therefore against the common opinion, that the people are no more light, in∣grateful, nor changeable than Princes; but that both of them are equally faulty, and he that should go about to excuse the Princes, would be in a very great error; for a people which governs by Law, and is well ordered, shall be as stable, as wise, and as grateful as a Prince, and perhaps more, though he be never so wise: And on the other side, a dissolute and irregular Prince shall be more mutable, imprudent, and ingrateful, than any multitude whatever, and that not so much from any diversity in his Nature (for they are much at one, and if there be any excellence, 'tis on the side of the people) as from their greater or lesser respect to the Laws under which they are to live: And he who shall consider the people of Rome, will find that for 400 years together, they hated the very name of a King, were ambitious of honour, and studious exceedingly for the good of their Country, as may be justified by many examples. If it be objected that the Romans were ingrateful to Sci∣pio, I refer them to what I proved so largely before, that the people are less ingrateful than Princes. And as to prudence, and constancy, I affirm, They have much the advantage, and are more wise, more steddy, and more judicious than Princes; for which reason the voice of the people, is resembled to the voice of God, because by some occult and singular quality it does often presage things that are wonderful, and relating to their own welfare or calamity. In giving their judgment about dubious things, you shall seldom find them mistake, if at any time two eminent Orators equally excellent in their profession, do con∣trovert and discourse a thing pro and con before them, they will assuredly take the most rational side; which shows they are no less capable of truth, than other people. And if in matters of honour, or enterprize which carry an appearance of publick utility, they be sometimes mistaken, (as is said before) the Princes are more, by reason of their passions, and perturbations of mind, to which they are much more obnoxious than the people. In the election of Magistrats they are more dexterous, and judicious than Princes, nor, shall the people be ever persuaded to advance a corrupt, and infamous man, which among Princes is easie and common. If it takes a disgust or abhorrency to any thing, 'tis not readily removed, but sticks by them for several ages, which among Princes is not so; both which points may be evicted by the people of Rome, who in so many hundred years, and so many elections of Consuls, and Tribunes, never made four elections that they repented of afterwards, and for the name of a King they abhorred it so perfectly, that no virtue, no former Service to his Country could excuse any man whom they suspected to aspire to it. It is evident likewise that those Cities which are governed by the people, have enlarged their Territories in a short time, and extended their Empire farther, than those who have been subject to Princes; as Rome after the expulsion of Kings, and Athens after they had rescued themselves from the tyranny of Pisistrates; which can proceed from nothing, but that the Government by a free State is intrinsically better, than the Government by a Prince: Nor can Livy's expression about the levity of the Syracusans oppose my opinion; for let all the good and ill qualities of the Prince and people be compared, and it will be found, That the people are less extravagant, and more honourable of the two. And if in the instituting of good Laws, the ordaining of new Statutes, and the making new Or∣ders for civil conversation and Society, Princes have the better, yet the people preserving, and executing them better than they, are doubtless as worthy of praise, as the Founders themselves. To be short, Principalities and Republicks have both of them subsisted several years, and both of them had occasion to be regulated and reformed; for a Prince that is licentious, and does what he has a mind to; has a mind to that which does him hurt, and is a weak man for his pains; and the people which takes the same liberty, is as mad on the other side. And if the comparison be made betwixt mix'd Principalities, that are cir∣cumscribed, and bounded by Laws, and popular Governments under the same tyes and restrictions; the people will be found more virtuous than the Princes; but if it be betwixt loose and dissolute Governments both of the one kind, and the other, the errors on the side of the Princes will appear more great, more numerous, and more incapable of redress; for in popular tumults, a sober man may interpose, and by fair words reduce them to rea∣son; but to an enraged Prince, who dares intercede; or what remedy is there to repair to, but violence, and the Sword? From whence we may judge and distinguish betwixt the inconvenience of the one and the other: The people are appeased with gentleness, and

good words; and the Prince not to be prevailed upon, but by violence and force; and if it be so, who is it that will deny, That the Disease is more dangerous, where the Cure is most difficult? Moreover when the people tumultuate, there is not so much fear of any present mischief that they are likely to commit, as of the consequences of it, and that it may end in a tyranny. But with ill Princes it is quite contrary, the present misery is the most dread∣ful, because they hope when he dyes, their liberty may be recovered. You see then the difference betwixt them; one is more dangerous at present, and the other for the future; the cruelty of the people extends only to such as (in their opinion) conspire against the common good. The severity of the Prince, is more against them who design against his particular interest. But this opinion of the people goes daily down the wind; for every man has liberty to speak what he pleases against them (though even the Government be popular:) But against a Prince no man can talk without a thousand apprehensions, and dangers. Nor will it seem to me incongruous (the matter having drawn me thus far) in my next Chapter to discourse what Confederacies are most safe, those which are made with Princes, or those which are made with Commonwealths.

CHAP. LIX.

What Leagues or Confederacies are most to be trusted; Those which are made with Princes, or those which are made with free States.

BEcause Princes with Princes, and free States among themselves, and many times with Princes do enter into leagues of friendship and confederacy, I thought it not amiss to enquire in this place, whose faith is the most firm, and in whose amity the greatest confi∣dence is to be reposed. Having considered it diligently with my self, it seems to me that in many cases they are alike, and in some they differ. And first, when necessity of State requires, and there is any visible danger of losing the Government, neither the one nor the other are so precise, but they will make bold with their engagements, and behave them∣selves ingratefully: Demetrius Poliorcetes had obliged the Athenians by many good Offices; but his Army being aftewards defeated, and himself flying to them for refuge, as to his Confederates, and Friends, he was repulsed, and not admitted into the City, which trou∣bled him more than the loss of his Army. Pompey being beaten in Thessalia by Caesar fled likewise into Egypt to Ptolomy, whom he had formerly restored to his Kingdom, and was murthered by him for his confidence. In both these Examples the ingratitude seems to be the same; yet the inhumanity was greater on the Princes side, than on the Common∣wealths; but be it as it will, when the State is in danger, they are neither of them scru∣pulous. And if there be any Prince or Commonwealth so punctual as to preserve their league, though with destruction to themselves; it may proceed from the same causes. It may very well happen that a Prince may confederate with some other great Potentate, (who though unable to defend him at that time; may give him hopes notwithstanding of restoring him some other) and persevere in his Confederacy, as thinking that by having made himself of that Princes party, he has rendered his accommodation with the adver∣sary imposible. This was the case of all the Neopolitan Princes who sided with the French in their Expedition unto those parts: And as to the free States, they suffered of old some∣thing in this Nature, as Saguntum in Spain, which City chose rather to expose its self to direption, and all the Calamities of War, than forsake its confederacy with the Romans, and in the year 1512. Florence did almost the same to continue its amity with the French. So that computing every thing, and considering what both parties have done upon such imminent and irresistable danger, I believe there is more constancy and firm friendship to be found among Commonwealths than among Princes; for though perhaps they may have the same sentiments and inclinations as Princes; yet their motions, and resolutions being slower, they are longer before they violate their faith. But when their leagues and confederacies are to be broken, upon the bare prospect of advantage; in that case your Commonwealths are much more religious and severe; and examples may be brought where a small gain has tempted a Prince, when a great one could not move a Common∣wealth. Themistocles in an Oration to the Athenians, told them, That he had something to advise that would be infinitely to their advantage, but durst not communicate it in pub∣lick, because to publish it, would hinder the Execution; whereupon the people deputed Aristides to receive it; and act in it afterwards as he should think convenient. Themi∣stocles acquainted him, That the whole Grecian Fleet (though under their passport and

parole) were in a place where they might be all taken or destroyed, which would make the Athenians absolute Masters in those Seas; and Aristides reported to the people, That the Council of Themistocles was profitable, but would be a great dishonour to their State; upon which it was unanimously rejected. But had the same occasion been offered to Philip of Macedon, or some other Princes, they would not have been so tender; for it was a practice among them (and especially with Philip) who got more by breaking his faith, than by all his other designs. As to the breaches upon the non-observance of Arti∣cles, they are ordinary things, and I have nothing to say of them: I speak only of extra∣ordinary occasions, and am of opinion from what I have said, That the people do trans∣gress less in that Nature, than Princes, and may therefore with more confidence be trusted.

CHAP. LX.

How the Consulship, and other Dignities in Rome were conferred without respect of age.

IT is manifest in the History of the Roman Commonwealth, that after the people were made capable of the Consulship, the Citizens were promiscuously prefer'd with∣out respect either of age or extraction; but any man was advanced for his Virtue, whe∣ther he was a young man, or an old: and this was evident in Valerius Corvinus, who was created Consul in the 23 year of his age; upon which consideration in one of his Speeches to the Army, he told them that the Consulship was, Praemium Virtutis, non Sanguinis. The reward, not of Nobility, but Virtue. Whether this was prudently done, or not, may admit of dispute: But as to the receiving all sorts of persons to that dignity without consideration of their blood; there was a necessity of that, and the same necessi∣ty that was in Rome, may happen in any other City that desires to do the same great things which were done in Rome, of which we have spoken elsewhere. For men are not to be persuaded to suffer, but in hopes of reward; and that hope cannot be taken away, with∣out manifest danger. It was but equitable therefore that the people should be capable of the Consulship, that being nourished a while with only the hopes, they might at length be so happy as to have it in effect. A City that employs not its people in any great affair, may order them as it pleases; but if it designs to extend its Empire, and do as the Romans did, there must be no distinction. And that no regard ought to be had of any man's age, appears by this, That in the election of a young man to a degree, in which the wisdom of an old man is requisite, the multitude being to elect, it is necessary that the young man be recommended by some extraordinary Exploit; and when a young man is so happy, as to have made himself conspicuous in the City by some honourable Atchievement, it were not only hard, but inconvenient if the said City might not receive the benefit of his vir∣tue immediately, but be forced to attend till his mind as well as body was super-annuated, and all that vigour and promptitude lost, which at that time might have been so serviceable to his Country: at which age Valerius Corvinus, Scipio, Pompey, and many others did great things, and were permitted to triumph for their pains.

THE DISCOURSES OF Nicholas Machiavel, CITIZEN and SECRETARY OF FLORENCE, Upon The First Decade of LIVY TO ZANOBI BVONDELMONTI, AND COSIMO RVCELLAI.

LIBER II.

The Preface.

IT is the common practice of Mankind, to commend the ancient, and condemn the pre∣sent times; but in my judgment not always with reason; for so studiously are they de∣voted to things of antiquity, that they do not only admire what is transmitted by old Authors, but applaud and cry up when they are old, the passages and occurrences in their youth. But my opinion is, This their way of computation is many times false, and that upon several accompts. First, because of such very ancient things we can have no absolute knowledge; for most commonly in the Narrative of affairs, what is infamous, or ill done, is pretermitted in silence, whilst what is well done, and honourable, is related with all the Arts, and amplifications of Rhetorick; for so much are Historians accustomed to attribute to the fortune of the Conqueror, that to encrease his praise, they do not only exspatiate upon his Conduct, and Exploits, but they do likewise so magnifie and illustrate the very actions of the Enemy, That they who come after beholding things at a great di∣stance, have reason to admire those times, and those men, and by consequence to love them. Besides it being envy or fear which disposes people to hatred; neither of those passions ex∣tending to what cannot possibly hurt them, two great causes are wanting of finding fault with Antiquity; for as things so long passed cannot any way prejudice, so they cannot

provoke to envy or discontent: But present things which are obvious to our own sence, are universally known, and no circumstance that passes (whether good or bad) that can be totally conceal'd; from whence it proceeds, that observing with the excellence and vir∣tue of our present affairs, whatever is concomitant of imprudence or vice, we are in a man∣ner compelled to postpone them to things of antiquity, where the good only is displayed, and the bad passed by, though perhaps the present things are more worthily glorious. I do not intend any thing hereby of the Arts and Sciences of our predecessors, so highly im∣proved and illustrated, that 'tis not in the power of time either to add any thing, or sub∣stract. I only speak of the manners and civil conversations of men; in which indeed we have not so many virtuous examples, as were to be found among our Ancestors: So that it is not altogether unjustly if antiquity be prefer'd; yet are not our present transactions to be always condemn'd as worse than the former, as if antiquity had no errors at all. Hu∣mane affairs are in perpetual fluctuation, and have their times of decrease, as well as ad∣vancement. A City or Province founded by some excellent person upon good Principles and Laws, not only stands, but flourishes and increases a long time in honour, authority, and wealth; and those persons whose happiness it is to be born under those governments whilst they are glorious, and powerful, are apt to prefer their old Customs, to the disparage∣ment of the new; yet they are in an error, and for the reasons abovesaid. But those who are born when the State is in its declension, do not so much transgress when they commend what is pass'd, and decry what is present; which things (having seriously considered with my self) I conceive to be caused, because the world has been always the same, and made up promiscuously of good things and bad; yet these good and bad things have varied some∣times, and as it were transmigrated from one City, and one Province to another; so that in those places where virtue has been a long time predominant, vice has stoln in by degrees, and supplanted it; which is evident by the revolutions of Kingdoms and Empires, where virtue and justice has had its time, and been transfused afterwards into other Countries. However the world was the same, though its virtue and magnanimity was unstable, remo∣ving and shifting from the Assyrians first, to the Medes, from the Medes to the Persians, and from them to the Romans; and if after the Roman Empire, there has been no go∣vernment so great as to comprehend and ingross the virtue of the whole world; yet the same virtue that was of old among the Romans is not extinct, but dispersed and branched out into several Kingdoms and Provinces, as the Kingdom of France, the Kingdom of the Turks, the Kingdom of the Soldan, the Empire of the Germans, and the Sect of the Sa∣racins, which conquered so many Provinces, and committed such devastations, as were the ruine of the Empire of the East. In these Kingdoms rent and divided from the Empire of the Romans, the old Roman virtue is diffused, and retains still something of its pristine lustre, so that it may without injustice be admired in some places: Which being so, he who is born in those Provinces where the Roman virtue and discipline is still in being (but declining) if he applauds his old Country-men, and blames his Contemporaries, his error is not great: But he that is born in Italy, and is not in his heart a Tramontan, or in Greece, and is not a Turk, must needs bewail his own times, and cry up his Predecessors, in which he will find many things well worthy his admiration; whereas in these there is nothing but wickedness and obloquy, no Religion, no Laws, no Discipline, but all things impure and brutish, and they are the more detestable and deplorable, by how much the same persons who would be imitated, and are set aloft to command all, and correct those that are vitious, are most dissolute, and most vitious themselves.

But to return to our discourse, I say, That though humane judgment is frail, and may be mistaken in its Character of such things as by reason of their antiquity, cannot fall so perfectly under ones Cognizance; yet that will not excuse old men for preferring the tran∣sactions in their youth, because both the one and the other were equally liable to their knowledge; nor would they be of that opinion, if men had the same sentiment and appe∣tite as long as they lived; but our affection altering, and our rational Soul being otherwise disposed than formerly, we judge otherwise of things, though the times be the same; for how is it possible the same things should please in our youth and old age, when their Stu∣dies, and delights are so different and remote? For (to say no more) as the quickness and vigour of the body decreases in old men, so their judgment and prudence increase propor∣tionably; and thence it follows that the same things which seemed tolerable in their youth grow insupportable when they are old; so that the fault is more in their judgment, than the age, for supposing those things to be good, which, being wiser, by experience, they find to be otherwise. To which it may be added, that the desires of mankind are immense, and unsatiable; that naturally we are covetous of every thing, whereas fortune allows us but little; That from thence it happens that no ••an is contented, every man despises what he

is already possessed of, commends what is passed, condemns what is present, and longs for what is to come, though induced by no reasonable occasion. Things being thus, I cannot resolve my self whether ever I may not be of that number, who in these my discourses have so highly magnified the old times and exploits of the Romans, to the diminution of our own: and truly, were not the vertue of that age as clear as the Sun, and the wicked∣ness of ours as manifest as that, I should have been more moderate, and feared to have run into the same error which I have condemned in other people.

But things being so evident, I may with boldness deliver my opinion of both times, to the end that the minds of such young persons, as shall peruse my conceptions, may be ad∣monished to avoid those vices which are so prevalent now, and prepared to imitate the vir∣tue of our Ancestors, when-ever occasion shall be offered. For it is the office of a good man to recommend that to other people which he thinks for the interest and honour of his Country, though perhaps the adversity of his fortune, and the malignity of the times will not suffer him to practise it himself; that by his instructions so many, at least some one may be so fortunate as to be able to follow him.

Wherefore having in may first Book done with what I proposed about the original in∣stitution of Government, and what was in my judgment necessary to preserve them: I shall now in this second, discourse of what the Romans did abroad for the inlargement and augmentation of their Empire.

CHAP. I.

Whether the vertue or fortune of the Romans was the occasion of the greatness of their Empire.

MAny have thought, and Plutarch (a grave Author) among the rest, that the people of Rome where more beholding to their fortune than virtue, in the acquisition of their Empire; and among other reasons, he infers it from their own silent confession, in having erected more Temples to Fortune than to any of their Gods. Livy seems to be likewise of the same opinion; for he seldom introduces a Roman speaking any thing of virtue, but immediately it is followed with fortune, with which nevertheless I can by no means comply, nor believe it will hold water; for though no Commonwealth be to be found that has made such progress as the Roman, why should it be rather imputed to their good Fortune than the solid constitution of their Laws? the courage of their Armies, and the excellent conduct of their Emperors, extended their Empire; and then their own just measures, and the wise institutions of their first Legislator preserved what they got, as we shall hereafter more largely discover. it is objected, that the Romans were never at one time involved in two considerable wars, (which is imputed rather to their fortune than wisdom) for they had no quarrel with the Latins till they had subdued the Samnites, and were forced to make war in their defence; they had no controversie with the Tuscans till they had beaten the Latins, and with their frequent victories almost extinguished the Sa∣bines, whereas if two of these States had confederated, and joyned their powerful Armies against them, no doubt but the affairs of the Romans would have been in very great dan∣ger. But be it as it will, this is most certain, they never had two great wars upon their hands at a time; but they began one when they ended the other, or the end of the first was the beginning of the second; and this may be observed in the series of their wars, for (to pass by their quarrels before Rome was taken by the French) whilst the Aequi and Volsci were powerful and strong, they had no enemies but they; when they were conquer∣ed, their war broke out with the Samnites; and though before that was perfectly conclu∣ded, the Latins rebelled; yet before it could be brought to a war, the Samnites had made their peace, and joyned their Army with the Romans, to reduce the Latini. That war be∣ing finished, the war with the Samnites revived, and was the occasion of much mischief to the Samnites; after which, the Romans began with the Tuscans, and that being composed, the Samnites broke out again upon the passage of Pyrrhus into Italy, who being repulsed in∣to Greece, they had opportunity for their wars with the Carthaginians, and their first war with that State was no sooner determined, but the French, and the inhabitants on this and the other side of the Alps conspired so effectually against them, that betwixt Popolonia and Pisa (where the Tower of St. Vincent is at this day to be seen) the confederates were routed with a very great slaughter.

This war being concluded, for twenty years together they had no considerable war, for they had no body to fight with but the Ligures, and the resicts of those French who were remaining in Lombardy. In this posture they continued till the second Punick war, which lasted 16 years, and perplexed them exceedingly. That war being ended with a great deal of honour, their next enterprize was against the Macedonians; after which their war hap∣pened with Antiochus in Asia, and when he was overcome, there was not a Prince or State in the whole World, which by it self, or conjunction with the rest, was able to contend with the Romans. But before this last victory, who-ever considers the method of their wars, and their manner of proceeding, shall find great virtue and wisdom intermixed with their good fortune, so that the reason of their good fortune is easily discovered; for this is most certain, when a Prince or Commonwealth arrives at that height of reputation that no neighbour-Prince or people dares venture to invade him, (unless compelled by in∣dispensible necessity) he may do what he pleases, 'tis in his Election with whom he will make war, and with whom he will be at peace; for his neighbours being afraid of his power, are glad to be his friends; and those Potentates who are farthest off, and have no commerce with them, look on as unconcern'd, as if the consequence could have no re∣flexion on them; and in this error they do many times continue till the calamities be brought home to their own dores; and then, when 'tis too late, they have nothing but their own private force to oppose, which is too weak when the enemy is grown so strong. I will not enlarge upon the Samnites, nor recount how they stood still, and look'd on, while the Romans conquered the Aequi and the Volsci; but to avoid prolixity, I shall pass to the Carthaginians, who were of great power and authority when the Romans were at war both with the Somnites and Tuscans; they had the command of all Africk, and were supreme in Sicily, Sardinia, and great part of Spain. Blinded with their power, and (as they thought) secure in their distance, it never, came into their heads to invade them at that time, or to give any assistance to the Samnites or Tuscans; but (according to the practice of the World with things that are new, and encreasing) they rather sided with them, and desired their friendship, not so much as perceiving their error, till the Romans had conquered all the intermediate States, and began to contend with them for the Em∣pire of Sicily and Spain. And what hapned to the Carthaginians, hapned likewise to the French, to Philip of Macedon, and to Antiochus; each of them believing (whilst the Ro∣mans were employed in their wars with other people) that they would either be overcome, or that they themselves should have time enough to make peace or war with them, as they saw it most for their advantage: so that considering what is good, I am of opinion that the same fortune and prosperity may be expected by any Prince or State which exercises the same virtue and industry as the Romans have done before them. And here we might very properly discourse of the Roman method in the invasion of other Provinces, but we have done that at large in our Treatise called the Prince; yet this I shall say in short, that the Romans made always sure of some friend or other in the Provinces against which they design'd, that might be a means to admit them, and gave them enterance, and help after∣wards to keep what they had been instrumental in getting. So by intelligence with the Capuans they invaded Samnium; by the help of the Camertines they got into Tuscany; by the Mamertines into Sicily; by the Saguntines into Spain; Massinissa gave them enterance into Africk, the Etoli into Greece, Eumenes and other Princes into Asia, and the Massilien∣ses and Hedai into France; and as by their correspondence they conquered most of those Countries, so by their interest they preserved them; which way, if diligently observed by other people, it will be found that their prosperity depended less upon fortune than those States who observed not that course: but to illustrate what we have said, and make it so plain and perspicuous that every one may see how much more their virtue than their for∣tune contributed to their Empire; in our next Chapter we will consider what those peo∣ple were whom the Romans subdued, and with what obstinacy they defended their li∣berty.

CHAP. II.

With what Nations the Romans contended, and with what obstinancy those Nations resisted.

NOthing made it so difficult for the Romans to conquer their Neighbours, and some other remoter Provinces, as the love which the people of those times did bear to their liberty: for in defence of that, they were so indefatigably studious, that nothing but singular and extraordinary virtue could have subdued them: and this is demonstrable by the many and great dangers to which they exposed themselves, sometimes to preserve, and sometimes to recover it; as also by the severity of their revenge upon those who had usurp'd it. 'Tis evident likewise in History what detriment the People and Cities have suffered whilst they were in servitude and subjection; and whereas now a-days there is but one Province which can boast of free Cities, in ancient times there was not one Province but had plenty. In Italy from the Alps (which divide Tuscany and Lombardy) to the ex∣tremest part of that Country, there were many free States; as the Tuscans, the Romans, the Samnites, and others; nor is there mention of any King (but what reigned in Rome) besides Porsena King of Tuscany, the extinction of whose Line, though not set down in History, yet it is manifest that Tuscany was free at the time when the Romans encamped before Veii; so well satisfied with their liberty, and so abhorring from the very name of a King, that the Veientes having for their better defence created one in their own Town, and sent to the Tuscans to implore their assistance against the Romans, after a grave and solemn debate, it was resolved, no assistance should be sent whilst they were under the dominion of a King; as thinking it unfit to engage in the defence of a Country that had betraid it self, and prostituted to the dominion of a single person. Nor is this universal af∣fection to liberty so wonderful in the people.

Experience tells us, that no Cities have augmented their Revenues, or enlarged their Territories, but whilst they were free and at liberty: and certainly 'tis a prodigious thing to consider to what height and grandeur in an hundred years time the City of Athens ar∣rived, after it had freed it self from the tyranny of Pisistrates; but much more to consider the greatness of Rome upon the expulsion of her Kings; and the reason of all is, because in Common-wealths private wealth and emolument is not so much aim'd at as the im∣provement of the publick; nor is there any where so much care of the publick as in free States, where what-ever is equitable, and for the common advantage, is decreed and execu∣ted, without respect to particular persons, who may perhaps be sufferers thereby; whereas in Cities that are governed by a Prince it falls out quite contrary; for there, what makes commonly for the advantage of the Prince, is prejudice to the publick: so that when a free-State degenerates into a Tyranny, the least mischief that it can expect, is, to make no further advancement in its Empire; and no farther encrease either in riches or power; but for the most part it goes backward, and declines: and if it should so happen that the Tyrant should be a virtuous man, and one who by his courage and military discipline should enlarge his Dominions; yet what-ever he took would be converted to his own private use, without any benefit to the publick. For he dares not advance any of those Citizens (how worthy and honest soever) left he should have occasion to suspect them afterwards. Nor can he make those Cities which he subdues, dependant or tributary to that where he is absolute; for 'tis not the interest of a Tyrant to make his Subjects powerful or united; but to keep them low, and divided, that every Town, every Province may depend wholly upon himself; so that the Conquests of an Usurper may turn to his own profit, but never to the publick; to which purpose many things are very handsomely written by Xenophon in his Treatise of Tyranny; and things being thus, no body is to admire if our Ancestors had so great a zeal for their liberty; and the very name of a Tyrant was so odious to them, that when long since news was brought to the Army of the assassination of Hieronymo the Nephew of Hiero of Syracuse, and the whole Camp was in an uproar against the Conspira∣tors; yet when it was told them that they had proclaimed Liberty, and a free Government, they laid by their indignation against the Tyrannicids, and being pacified with the very name of Liberty, fell into consultation how it was to be preserved. Nor is it to be won∣dred at then, if their revenge be so violent and extraordinary upon those who would violate it; of which, though there be many examples, I shall instance only in one, but that most remarkable and horrid; and hapning in Corcirca a City in Greece: for all Greece be∣ing divided, and consisting of two Factions, one of them under the protection of the Athe∣nians,

and the other of the Spartans; and in Corcirca the Nobility prevailing, and ha∣ving usurped upon the liberty of the people, it hapned that the people being reinforced by the assistance of the Athenians, overpowred the Nobility, and conquered them again. Ha∣ving restored their liberty, and shaked off their servitude, they clap'd up all the Nobility in a large prison, and bringing them forth by ten at a time, as if they were to be banished, they put them to death with most exquisite torments; which severity coming by degrees to the ears of the remainder, they resolved to do what was possible to defend themselves against it, upon which they stood upon their guard, and would suffer none of the Officers to come in; whereupon, in a great fury, the people ran thither, pull'd off the covering of the house where they were, and throwing down the walls, buried them all in the ruines: and of this sort of cruelty there were many other examples in that Province; for the people are usually more impetuous in revenging the loss of their Liberty, than in defen∣ding it.

But it may (not unfitly) be admir'd in this place what should be the cause that the anci∣ents should be more zealous for publick liberty than we in our days: if my opinion may pass, I think it is for the same reason, that in those times men were more robust, and stron∣ger than now; which proceedeth much from the diversity betwixt their Education, their Religion and ours: for whereas our Religion gives us a just prospect and contemplation of things, and teaches us to despise the magnificence and pomp of the World; the Ethnicks valued them so highly, and believing them their chiefest happiness, it made them more fierce and busie to defend them, and this may be collected from several of their customs; for if the sacrifices in their days be compared with the sacrifices in ours, theirs will be found magnificent and horrid; ours delicate and neat, but neither so magnificent nor cruel. They wanted not pomp nor formality in those ceremonies, and yet to make them the more venerable and solemn, they added blood and slaughter to them, offering up infinite numbers of beasts, which being slain before the people, made them more hard-hearted and cruel. Moreover the Religion of the Gentiles did not place their beatitude any where but upon such as were full of worldly glory, and had done some great action for the benefit of their Country. In our Religion the meek and humble, and such as devote themselves to the contemplation of divine things, are esteemed more happy than the greatest Tyrant, and the greatest Conquerer upon Earth; and the summum bonum, which the others placed in the greatness of the mind, the strength of the body, and what-ever else contributed to make men active, we have determined to consist in humility, abjection, and contempt of the World; and if our Religion requires any fortitude, it is rather to enable us to suffer than to act. So that it seems to me, this way of living, so contrary to the ancients; has rendred the Christians more weak and effeminate; and left them as a prey to those who are more wicked, and may order them as they please, the most part of them thinking more of Paradise than Preferment, and of enduring than revenging of injuries; as if Heaven was to be won rather by idleness than arms: but that explication of our Religion is erro∣neous, and they who made it were poor and pusillanimous, and more given to their case than any thing that was great: for if the Christian Religion allows us to defend and exalt our Country, it allows us certainly to love it, and honour it, and prepare our selves so as we may be able to defend it. But that lazy and unactive way of education, and interpreting things falsly has been the cause that there are not so many Commonwealths as formerly in the World, nor so many Lovers and Champions for their Liberty: and yet I believe the greatness of the Roman Empire contributed something, by reducing all the free States and Republicks under their Dominion.

Nevertheless when that great Empire was broken and dissolved, very few of those poor States could recover their liberty: but when it began first to encrease and extend it self, no Country was without them, and where-ever the Romans carried their Arms, they found little Commonwealths banding and confederating against them, and defending their li∣berties with all imaginable constancy; which shews that the Romans were a people of more than ordinary courage, or they could never have subdued them. The Samnites alone will be example sufficient, who (as Livy reports) were so powerful, and so hearty defenders of their liberty, that for 46 years together they maintained War with the Romans; and though they had received many losses, and such devastations had been committed in their Country, yet they could never be wholly reduc'd before the Consulship of Papyrius Cursor, the Son of the first Papyrius. But 'tis a spectacle worthy of any mans pity, to see a Country so full (formerly) of brave Cities, and brave men, and all of them free; now desolate and uninhabited, and scarce any body left; to which condition it could have never been re∣duced but by the discipline, and diligence, and courage of the Romans: but all this pro∣ceeded from diversity of Constitution, for all Cities and free States whatsoever, encrease not

only in riches and authority, but in the numbers of their men: for who is it that had not rather procreate and have children where he may marry and enrich himself freely, than where there is danger that what he gets painfully, and lays up carefully for his children, may be ravished from them by a Tyrant.

In a free State you may be sure your children shall be no slaves, and that if they behave themselves virtuously, they shall be sure of preferment, and perhaps come to be Princes; riches encrease there faster, and that not only by tillage and agriculture, but by traffick and arts; and people do naturally throng to those places where they may get what they law∣fully can, and keep securely what they have got. The quite contrary happens in Coun∣tries that are servile, and their condition is worse, as their servitude is greater: but there is no servitude so severe as to depend upon a Commonwealth, and that for two reasons; first because it is more durable, and less hopes of recovering their liberty; and secondly, because it is the practise of all Commonwealths to impoverish and weaken what-ever they conquer, to fortifie themselves; which with Princes is not the way, unless they be very bar∣barous indeed, and like the Eastern Princes, who not only ruine whole Countries, but destroy all human conversation: but where Princes are well instituted, they know better things, and do many times indulge their new Conquests as much as their own Territories, leaving them the exercise of their Arts, and the enjoyment of their Laws; so that though they cannot encrease their wealth as where they are free; yet they are not so subject to be ruined as where they are slaves: I speak now of servitude to a foreign Prince, for the usurpation of a Citizen I have spoken before. All which being considered, no wonder if the Samnites whilst they enjoyed their liberty were so couragious and strong, and when it was once lost grew so abject and contemptible. Titus Livius tells us in his History of the Punick War, that the Samnites were so overlaid and cowed by one single Legion of the Romans at Nola, that they sent Embassadors to Hanibal to beg his assistance, and that the said Am∣bassadors in their Oration to Hanibal, the better to move his compassion, had this expres∣sion, We are the People who for an hundred years together waged War with the Romans with our own private Forces, and bore up many times against two Armies and two Consuls at once; but now our misery is so great, and our spirits so low, we are unable to defend our selves against one pitiful Legion.

CHAP. III.

It contributed much to the grandeur of the City of Rome, that they ruined the neighbouring Cities, and admitted strangers to their own dignities and priviledges.

CRescit interea Roma, Albae ruinis; The ruine of Alba was the rise of the Romans. 'Twas the saying of Livy, and 'tis true; for who-ever would make any City great, and apt for dominion, must endeavour with all industry to throng it with inhabitants, otherwise it will be impossible to bring it to any great perfection. And this is done two ways, by love and by force: the first by giving passage and security to all persons that will come and in∣habit there, that every man shall be free; the second by destroying the neighbour Cities, and forcing the people to come and dwell in yours. The Romans observed both ways, and grew so numerous upon it, that in the time of their sixth King they had 80000 men in the Town able to bear Arms, proceeding in some respects like the Country-man, who to make his plant larger, and more fruitful, cuts off its first shoots, that the juyce and virtue which otherwise would dilate into the branches, being kept close to the trunk, might break out with more vigor afterwards, and make it more beautiful and fertile. And that this way is necessary for the propagation of the strength and authority of a City, appears by the example of Athens and Sparta, which Cities, though they were both free, numerous in Men, and happy in their Laws; yet they could never arrive at the grandeur of the Ro∣mans, though Rome seemed more tumultuous, and not so well governed as they, and all for the reason abovesaid: for Rome having by both those ways encreased the number of their Citizens, was able to set out an Army at one time of 280000 men, whereas Sparta and Athens could never exceed 20000. which is not to be attributed to the excellence of the situation of Rome; but to the diversity of their Conduct; for Lycurgus the Founder of the Spartan Commonwealth, conceiving nothing could be more pernitious to it, nor more easily abro∣gate his Laws, than intermixing with new inhabitants, he provided with all possible in∣dustry that his Citizens should have no commerce or conversation with strangers. To

that end he not only prohibited the admission of foreigners, and their marrying with them, but that there might be no encouragement or occasion of entercourse betwixt them, he put out a certain Mony of Leather, so pitifully inconsiderable, that he presumed no Mer∣chants would trouble themselves to import any foreign Commodities for it; by which means that City was never in a capacity of being very populous: And because all human affairs do hold some proportion and analogy with Nature; and it is impossible that a slen∣der trunk, should bear vast and ponderous branches, it is not to be expected that a small Commonwealth consisting of a small number of Citizens, should subdue, or at least keep and maintain greater and more populous States than themselves; and if it should happen that they should conquer them at any time, upon every slight accident they would be sub∣ject to lose them, like the tree it would be too weak for its boughs, and every puff of wind apt to blow it down. And thus it fell out with Sparta, though it had conquered all Greece, made it self absolute thorow that whole Province; yet Thebes no sooner rebelled, but all the rest of the Cities revolted, and having lost its great Empire in a moment, it remained like a Tree destitute of its Branches. But with Rome it was otherwise, its Root and Trunk was strong enough to support its Branches how heavy and spacious soever; and this was the great cause of the greatness of the Roman Empire, which Livy expressed in two words, when he said, Crescit interea Roma, Alvae ruinis.

CHAP. IV.

There are three ways which Commonwealths have taken to enlarge their Territories.

HE who has read and observed the History of our Ancestors must find, That Common∣wealths had generally three ways of enlarging their Empire. One is that which was observed of the Tuscans of old, who entred into a League of Confederacy with several other Commonwealths, with condition of Equality, that no particular should have any degree or authority above the rest, and that comprehension should be left for all their new Conquests to come in, not much unlike the practice of the Swizzers in our times, and the Achaians, and Aetolians of old. And because the Romans had in those times much controversie with the Tuscans and their Confederates, I shall enlarge my self something in the explanation of their affairs, of which, though there be but little Monu∣ment in History, yet we are assured, that before the greatness of the Romans, the Tuscans were very powerful both by Sea, and by Land; of which power it is no small argument, their sending a Colony into the Mare superum to a place called Adria, which grew so con∣siderable and famous, that it denominated that whole Sea, and it has been called the Mare Adriaticum ever since. It is known likewise that their Empire extended from the Tyber to the foot of the Alps, which comprehends the greatest part of Italy at this day; though 200 years before the Romans came to any considerable strength, the Tuscans received a great defeat by the Gauls; who under the Command of Bollovesus, either in quest of new quar∣ters, or tempted by the pleasantness of the Country, having passed the Alps, possessed themselves of that Province called Lombardy, and gave it the name of Gallia Cisalpina; after which they turn'd out the Natives, settled themselves there, and built several Cities, which they enjoyed, till in process of time, they also were supplanted by the Romans. And this was the method of the Tuscans proceeding, and the manner of their confederating with their Neighbours, which was no less than XII Cities; of which Clusium, Veii, Fe∣sulae, Aretium, and Volterra were the chief; but yet with all their assistance they could not exceed the limits of Italy, nor indeed conquer all that, for reasons which we shall mention hereafter. Another way of extending your Empire, is by associating with several Cities, but so as that the dignity of the Command, the seat of the Empire, and the honour of the Enterprize may remain with you; which was the way observed by the Romans. The third is the way of the Spartans and Athenians, who entertained no Confederates, but what ever Territories they Conquered, they annexed them to their own: which way is undoubt∣edly the worst of the three, as appeared by the two said Republicks, who were ruined upon no other account, but because they had grasped more Dominion than they were able to hold. For it is a thing in it self very arduous and difficult, to keep a City in subjection by a con∣tinued force, especially if ever it was free; wherefore unless your Citizens be very nume∣rous, and your associates very considerable, by whose assistance you may be able to keep what you conquer, it will never be in your power to enlarge your dominion very much,

and the Spartans and Athenians miscarrying in their way, miscarried likewise in their end, and all their great conquest came to nothing: The Romans took the second way, and succeeded to that vast and extraordinary power, by associating equally in many things, with many States, but reserving always to themselves the Seat of the Empire, and the chief command in their Wars, by which means it came to pass, that their Confederates (ere they were aware) subjected themselves to the Romans, at the expence of their own labour, and blood. For after they had carried their Arms out of Italy; reduced several Kingdoms into Provinces, and the Inhabitants being accustomed to live in subjection, without much diffi∣culty submitted, the Romans bearing the name of the War, and the Nations that were con∣quered knowing nothing of their Allies, submitted to their dominion, and would own no body else: whereby it happen'd that their associates in Italy being over-powred by the multitude of provinces which had submitted to the Romans, and by the strength and popu∣lousness of Rome, began to find their error by degrees, but too late, and when they had no way left to defend themselves; for if any of them conspired, they were quickly sup∣pressed, and made Subjects of Associates. This way of administration, and enlarging their Empire was peculiar to the Romans; no other people observed it, and certainly no bet••er is to be found. The next way of confederating (which was practised by the Tus∣cans, Achaians, and Aetolians in old time, and by the Swizzers of late) is the best way next to that of the Romans; for though it cannot arrive at any great Empire, the Confede∣racy consisting of so many free Cities, which being all to be consulted, makes their resolu∣tions very tedious, besides, the Citizens are not so vigorous in a War, where the prize is to be divided into so many parts; yet for these reasons it has two advantages of the third. First, whatever it gains, it keeps a long time, and loses very hardly; and secondly, it engages not so rashly in War, but enjoys with more ease and felicity the blessings of peace: for they are longer in their consultations and debates, where there is to be a general Dyet and Convention, than where things are to be dispatched within the Walls of one City, Be∣sides experience tells us that this way has certain bounds, which have not been exceeded by any example we can find. For after XII or XIV Cities have confederated, they admit no more into the League, as holding themselves enough, and sufficient for their defence, nor are they much solicitous of extending their Empire, because they are under no necessity of making themselves stronger; and their conquest would be of little advantage to every par∣ticular State, for they would be forced upon one of these two rocks, either to incorporate them into their League, and then the multitude would breed confusion, or make them their Subjects which they will hardly continue: When therefore they are got to such a number in their association, as that they seem safe against foreign invasion, and strong enough to defend themselves; They take one of these two ways, either they receive their Neighbour States or Cities into their protection (by which means they draw vast sums of Mony sometimes, that are easily distributed) or else they ••ight for other people, and receive pay from this or that Prince, as the Swizzers do now, and other Nations have done of old. To this purpose Titus Livius gives us an account That at a conference betwixt Phi∣lip of Macedon and Titus Quintus Flaminius, an Aetolian Praetor being present, there happening some words betwixt the said Praetor and King Philip, King Philip reproached him by the avarice, and inconstancy of his Country, as a people that were not ashamed to take pay on one side, and send supplies to the other, by which means it was frequently seen that in both Armies the Aetolian Colours were displayed; from whence we may con∣clude that this way of proceeding by League and Confederacies, has been always the same, and has had the same effects. The third way of subjecting your conquests and annexing them to your own dominions, is very incommodious, and instable; and if it were so to a Commonwealth well constituted and armed, it must needs be much worse to a Government that is weak, as most of the Italian States are at this day; but the Roman way is the best, and most to be admired; for there is no example of any body that made use of it before them, nor has any body imitated them since; and as to the practice of the Tuscans, and Aetolians in their Confederations, there is no body follows it now a days, but the Swizzers, and the Suevians: Which being so, and so many brave things performed by the people of Rome as well for the conservation, as the augmentation of their Empire, it is not strange our affairs succeeded no better, and that we have been a prey to whoever would invade us; for (to say nothing of the rest) it has doubtless becom'd the Tuscans if they could not have imitated the Roman Discipline, nor followed their measures in extend∣ing their Empire, at least to have follow'd the example of their own Ancestors, who though they brought not their Empire to that Grandeur and immensity as the Romans; yet they enlarged it as far as they thought good, and as far as consisted with the Nature of their Government; and by doing so, they kept it a long time, with immortal honour to

their memory, till they were first shaken by the Gauls, and afterwards so totally ruined by the Romans, that there is scarce the lest token left, that there was ever any such thing; which having brought it into my mind to consider what may be the causes of this oblivion of things, I shall discourse of them in the following Chapter.

CHAP. V.

The variation of Religions and Languages, with the accidents of Deluges and Plagues have been the cause that many great things have been forgotten.

IN my judgment it may be objected to those Philosophers who hold the world to be Eternal, that if so long a course of antiquity was true, it would be but reasonable that the memory of some of their affairs should have lasted above five thousand years: yet there may be some reasons given for that oblivion of things, and they seem twofold, partly from the Nature of Man, and partly from the influence of the Heavens; the me∣mory of great things are abolished from the nature of Man, by the variation of their Reli∣gion, or Language; for when a new Religion is introduced, the first care of him that would propagate it, is to explode, and extinguish whatever was memorable in the old, to give the greater credit to his new innovation; and if it fall out that the introducers of this new Sect, be of a different language, all goes to wreck, and whatever was before, is easily forgotten. And that this is so, appears by the institution of the Christian Religion, whose first establishers did principally intend the cancelling and extirpation of all old Ethnick Customs, Ceremonies, and Theology; and if there remained any memory of their affairs, it was because there was no new language introduced with it, the Christians being constrain'd to explain themselves in Latine; whereas could they have done it in a new tongue (considering their other persecutions) we may conclude there would have been no memory left of their Religion or Worship: For so diligent and zealous was Saint Gregory, and other Moderators of the Christian Religion, in abolishing the superstitions of the Gentiles, that they caused the works of all the Poets and Historians to be burn'd, which made any mention of them; they threw down their Images and Idols, and destroy'd all that might afford the least memory of Paganism; to which diligence of theirs, if a new language had been added, in a short time all would have been utterly forgotton; what therefore was done by the Christians for the extirpation of Gentilism, it is not improbable but the Gentiles might have done of old for the extirpation of the Religion before. And because in five or six thousand years, Religion may be twice or thrice changed, no wonder if what was before be so entirely lost, that if there remains any thing of it, it is looked upon as fabulous and incredible, as it hapned to the Histories of Diodorus Siculus, which gives an account of 40 or 50000 years, and are not unworthily accounted false. As to the Coelestial causes from the influence of the Heavens, they are such as destroy mankind in general, or reduce it to a very small number, as great Mortalities, Famines, and inunda∣tions of Water, but especially the last, because the mischief is more universal, and if any be saved, it is only the Mountaneers, which being commonly barbarous, have no know∣ledge of antiquity, and by consequence can convey nothing of it to their posterity; and if it so happens that among them which are preserved, some one man may be more learned than ordinary, and have some knowledge of affairs, to give himself a name and reputation afterwards, he conceals, preverts, and transmits them as he pleases; so that there remains to posterity no more than he thought fit to communicate. Nor do I believe it is doubted but these accidents happen, and Famine, and Pestilence do sometimes rage in the world, seeing all Histories mention them, and this oblivion of things is a certain effect of them: Nor is it unreasonable to think that the great Universe has its way of evacuation, as well as the Microcosm; for as in that, when the humours are redundant, and the body unable to digest them, Nature exerts, and finds out some way to throw them off, without which the person must certainly miscarry; so it is in the other, when all Countries are repleat, and no room left for those that are to come; when the Cunning and Malignity of man∣kind is at the height, there is a necessity the world should be purged by some of those three ways, that men being reduced in their numbers, and humbled under the considera∣tion of their Mortality, may (if possible) become better: which being so, no wonder if the Tuscans formerly so famous for their administration both in War and in Peace, so eminent for their Courage, and so venerable for their Religion, should be oppressed by the Romans, and so totally abolished, that (as is said before) there remains nothing of them but the name.

CHAP. VI.

How the Romans proceeded in making of War.

WE have already discoursed of the way of the Romans in extending their Empire; we shall now speak of their Customs in the management of their Wars, by which it will appear with what wisdom they deviated from the common ways of the world, and by what easie methods they arrived at that Supremacy and Grandeur. He who makes War at his own choice (and is under no constraint) or else by ambition, has doubtless this end; To get what he is able, and to keep it whilst he can, and rather to enrich than impo∣verish his own Country: for such a one it is necessary to have regard to his charge, and to see that neither the conquering nor maintaining are more expensive to him, than will con∣sist with his revenue. This the Romans observed very strictly, by coming strong and sud∣denly into the field; for by that one practice, all their Wars with the Latini, Samnites, and Tuscans, were dispatched in a short time. And whoever considers their Wars from the beginning of Rome, to the Siege of the Veientes, will find that they were determined in a very short time, some in six, some in ten, and some in twenty days. For their Custom was, upon the first appearance of a War, immediately to draw out their Army, and seeking out the Enemy, they did what they could to bring him to a Battel; having beaten him (by reason of the surprize.) The Enemy (that his Country might not wholly be har∣rassed) for the most part proposed an agreement, in which the Romans were sure to insist upon some part of their Territory; which either they converted to their particular profit, or consigned to some Colony which was to be placed there for the security of their Fron∣tiers; by which means the wars being ended in a short time, their Conquests were kept without any considerable expence, for the Colony had that Country for their pay, and the Romans had their Colonies for their security. Nor could there be any way more advan∣tagious and safe; for whilst there was no enemy in the field, those guards were sufficient; and when any Army was set out to disturb them, the Romans were always ready with ano∣ther in their defence, and having fought them, they commonly prevailed, forced them to harder conditions, and returned when they had done: by which means they gained daily upon the enemy, and grew more powerful at home: and in this manner they proceeded till their Leaguer before Veii, where they altred their method, and allowed pay to their Souldiers for the better continuation of the war, whereas before that, their wars being short; there was no necessity of paying their Armies. Nevertheless, though they paid their Soul∣diers from that time, and maintained war at greater distance, (whereby they were obliged to continue longer in the field) yet they left not their old custom of dispatching it as soon as they could, with respect to the circumstances of place and time; for which reason they continued their Colonies: and besides their old custom of shortning their wars as much as they were able, the ambition of their Consuls contributed exceedingly; for their Consul∣ships being but for a year, and six months of that to be spent in their employments at home, they were as diligent and vigorous as possible, because they were not capable of tri∣umphing till the war was concluded: and then for continuing their Colonies; the great ad∣vantage and convenience that resulted from them, was sufficient to prevail. This practice therefore was observed perpetually among the Romans in the management of their wars; only they varied something about the distribution of the prey, in which formerly they were more liberal than in after-times; either because they thought it not so necessary when the Souldiers were paid; or else because their spoils being greater than before, they thought convenient that the publick should have its share; that upon any new enterprize they might not be constrained to lay new taxes upon the people; and by this way their Coffers were filled in a short time. So that by these two ways, by the distribution of their prey, and the setling of Colonies, Rome grew rich by its wars, whereas other Princes and States (without great discretion) grow poor: and so great was every mans ambition of enriching the Aerarium, that by degrees it came to that pass, no Consul was permitted to triumph, un∣less he returned with a vast quantity of silver or gold, or some other inestimable commodity, and put it into the treasury. So that the designs of the Romans tended wholly to this, to finish the war quickly, by forcing the enemy to a Battel; or else to harrass and tire them with frequent excursions, that thereby compelling them to dishonourable conditions, they might make their advantage, and become more powerful and rich.

CHAP. VII.

What proportion of Land the Romans allowed to every man in their Colonies.

I Think it no easie matter to set down the exact proportion of Land, which the Romans assigned to every single person in their Colonies; for I believe they gave more or less ac∣cording to the barrenness or fertility of the soil; and that in all places they were sparing enough. And the first reason that induces me, is, that thereby they might send more men and by consequence their frontiers be better guarded: another is, because living at home in∣digent themselves, it is not to be supposed they would suffer those whom they sent abroad to grow too opulent and rich: and in this I'am much confirm'd by Livy, where he tells us that upon the taking of Veii, the Romans sent a Colony thither, and in the distribution of the Land allotted every man no more than three acres, and a little more according to our measure.

They might consider likewise that their wants would not be supplyed by the quantity so much as the improvement and cultivation of their Land. Yet I do not doubt but they had publick Pastures and Woods to sustain their Cattel, and supply themselves with firing, without which a Colony could hardly subsist.

CHAP. VIII.

What it is that disposes some people to leave their native Countries, to dispossess other people.

SEeing I have spoken already of the Military Discipline of the Romans; and how the Tuscans were invaded by the French; it follows properly enough that we say some∣thing of their several kinds of War, which are two: one sort of commenced upon the am∣bition of some Prince or commonwealth, in hopes to extend, and enlarge his Empire; as those wars which were made by Alexander the Great, by the Romans, and by one Prince against another: which wars, though dangerous, are not yet so pernicious as to supplant the inhabitants, and drive them out of their Country; for the Conqueror contents him∣self with his Victory, and the submission of the people allows them their own Laws, and many times their Estates. The other kind of war is much more dangerous and destru∣ctive, and that is when an entire Nation with their Wives and their Children, compelled either by hunger, or war, leaves its own Country, to fix themselves somewhere else, not to extend their dominion, or exercise any authority, (as in the other) but to kill or expel all the Natives, and possess themselves of their Estates.

This war indeed is most bloody and dreadful, as Salust shews very well in the end of his Bellum Iugurthinum, where, after Iugurtha was beaten, speaking of the invasion of the Gauls he tells us, Cum caeteris Gentibus a populo Romano de imperio tantum fuisse dimicatum, cum Gallis, de singulorum hominum salute; With other Nations the Romans fought only for Em∣pire and Dominion, with the Gauls they fought for their Country and Lives. For when a Prince or Commonwealth invades a Country according to the first way, it is sufficient, if those who are at the Helm be removed or destroyed; in this every mans life is in danger; for when a whole Nation transplants, and invades a new Province, not only the Colonies, but the Natives must be extinguished, that they may fix themselves upon their Lands, and possess themselves of their Goods: and by these kind of people the Romans were three times invaded. First by the Gauls, who took Rome, and (as I said before) drove the Tuscans out of Lombardy; of which invasion Titus Livius gives two reasons: one was the pleasant∣ness of the Country, and the delicacy of the Wine, wherewith (being then but ill provi∣ded in France) they were infinitely taken: the other was, the Country was grown so ex∣ceedingly populous, that it was not able to sustain its own natives; whereupon the Princes of those parts judging it necessary to find them new quarters they appointed which were to transplant, and putting Bellovesus and Sicovesus (two French Princes) at the head of them they sent one part of them into Italy, and the other into Spain: it was Bellovesus lot to in∣vade Italy, and he did it so effectually, that he possessed himself of all Lombardy, and made the first war upon the Romans that was ever made upon them by the French. The second

time they were invaded in this manner was likewise by the French, and it was after the first Punic war, in which invasion the Gauls lost above 200000 men betwixt Pisa and Piombino: the third and last was by the Germans and Cimbrians, who having defeated several Armies of the Romans, were at last themselves defeated by Marius. From whence we may ob∣serve the great courage and constancy of the Romans of old, that could not only bear up against three such dangerous invasions, but overcome them at last; whereas afterwards their courage began to fail, and they were not able to resist the inundation of those Barbarians; for when the Goths and the Vandals invaded, they possessed themselves of the whole Western Empire, without any considerable opposition. The reasons which move these Nations to transmigrate (as I said before) is necessity, and that necessity proceeds either from famine, or from wars and disturbances at home; and when they undertake these Expedi∣tions with vast and innumerable numbers, they invade with irresistible violence, put all the Natives to the sword; possess themselves of their Estates; establish a new Kingdom, and change the very name of the Province, as Moses did of old, and the Barbarians since, who possessed themselves of the Roman Empire.

From hence are all the new names in Italy and elsewhere imposed by their several Con∣querors: Lombardy was called anciently Gallia Cisalpina, Francia (from the Franks) was called anciently Gallia trans Alpina, Sclavonia was called Illyria, Hungaria, Pannonia, An∣glia, Britannta; Moses gave the name of Iudea to that part of Syria which he conquered, and many other Countries have changed their names upon the same occasion, which would be too long to recount. And because I have said before, that sometimes these kind of peo∣ple are forc'd out of their Country by intestine troubles and disturbances, I shall present you with one example of the Maurusians an ancient people of Syria, who foreseeing the invasion of the Hebrews, and knowing themselves unable to oppose them, thought it more wisdom to forsake their Country betimes, and preserve themselves, than to expect their coming, and lose both; whereupon they pack'd up their goods, and with their wives and children removed into Africk, where they drove out the inhabitants, and setled in their Country: so that they who were too weak to defend their own Province, were strong enough to force out another people. To this purpose Prooopius who writes the wars of Bellisarius against the Vandals (who had setled themselves in Africk) tells us, that upon certain pillars in the houses where these Maurusians had lived, he himself read these words, Nos Maurusii qui fugimus a facie Iesu latronis filii Navae; We Maurisians fled hither from Iesus the Usurper, who was the son of Navi. By which we may perceive the occasion of their departure out of Syria. And certainly these Nations forc'd out of their own Country by irresistible ne∣cessity, are more than ordinarily dreadful, and not to be opposed but by a potent and well disciplin'd people: but when they move in small numbers, their danger is not so great, be∣cause they dare not use that violence, but are put to their wits, and to possess themselves of some quarters by cunning and insinuation, which they are to keep afterwards by ways of amity and friendship, as Aeneas did, and Dido, the Massilians and others, who by the as∣sistance and friendship of their neighbours, made good what they had possessed. But the people that came out of their own Countries the most numerous and strong, were the Scy∣thians; for their Country being barren and cold, and the natives too numerous to be su∣stained in it, they were forced abroad, as having nothing to preserve them at home. And if now for five hundred years and upwards we have not heard of any such transmigration, I conceive the reasons may be several: the first may be the great evacuation in those Coun∣tries, from whence the Roman Empire was invaded. A second may be, because Germany and Hungaria (from whence those inundations came) is better cultivated and improved, so as they can live plentifully at home, without rambling abroad: another reason may be, that the Germans, Poles, Cimbrians, and other Nations which border upon the Scythians, being martial people, and continually at wars with them, are as it were a Bulwark to these parts, and keep the Scythians from all new invasions. The Tartars likewise have been many times upon their march with very great Armies, but they have been always encountred and repulsed by the Poles and Hungarians, which has given them occasion frequently to boast, that were it not for their arms and resistance, not only Italy, but the very Roman Church had been many times sensible of the barbarity of the Tartars.

CHAP. IX.

What those occasions are which do most commonly create War among Princes.

THe occasion of the War betwixt the Samnites and the Romans, who had been a long time in league together, was the common cause betwixt all Princes and Governments, and was either fortuitous, or designed. The war betwixt the Samnites and the Romans was fortuitous; for when the Samnites made war upon the Sidicins, and afterwards upon the Campani, they intended not any controversy with the Romans; but the Campani being beaten, and betaking themselves to the Romans for relief, (contrary to the expectation both of the Romans and Samnites) the Romans being in league with the Samnites, could not, without violence to the said league, give them protection; upon which (having no other way to secure themselves) the Campani submitted to the Romans, and made themselves their subjects; and the Romans, how unjust soever they thought it before to assist the Campani (whilst they were but associates) against the Samnites, their old friends, yet now they were become their subjects, and had incorporated with their State, the case was altred, and they thought it very reasonable, supposing, that if they should refuse to defend them, they should discourage all others that had an inclination to do the like, which would have been contrary to the great design of the Romans to propagate their Glory and Empire. The same accidental cause gave occasion to their first War with the Carthaginians, upon the Romans protecting the Massinenses in Sicily. But their second war with the Carthaginians, was designed; for Hanibal the Carthaginian General fell upon the Saguntins in Spain, (who were in alliance with the Romans) not so much out of malice to the Saguntins, but that the Romans being provoked to their defence, should give the Carthaginians occasion to transport the war into Italy.

This way of provoking and hedging in a War has been always practised among Poten∣tates, especially where they had any faith or respect for other people; for, that the peace which has been a long time betwixt them upon articles of alliance may seem firm and in∣violate, they will not meddle with him against whom they do principally design, but turn their arms upon some of his friends and confederates that he is most particularly obliged to receive into his protection, knowing, that if he appears in their defence, they must have oc∣casion to fight him; if he does not, but disowns his allies, they publish his weakness and infidelity to the World, and by either of those ways they do their business. This example of the Campani is of singular importance, as well to those who would make war upon any body, as those that are in distress; for when you are unable to defend your self, and unwil∣ling to fall into their hands that invade you, the best and most safe way is to put your self in subjection to some neighbouring Prince, as the Campani did then, and the Florentines af∣terward when they found themselves too weak to support against the power of Castruccio of Lucca; for finding that Robert King of Naples would not protect them as friends, they threw themselves into his arms to be defended as his subjects.

CHAP. X.

That, according to the common opinion, mony is not the sinews of War.

BEcause it is easie to begin war as a man pleases, but harder to end it; every Prince be∣fore he undertakes an enterprize is obliged to consider his own strength well, and to re∣gulate by it. But then he must be so wise too as not to make a wrong judgment, and that he will certainly do as oft as he computes it by his Bags, by the situation of his Towns, or the affection of his Friends, rather than by his own proper Power and Arms. Mony, and Towns, and Friends are all good, when in conjunction with a strong Army of your own, but without it they do nothing: without Men, to what purpose is either Mony or Towns? and the affection of your subjects will hold no longer than you are able to defend them. There is no mountain, no lake, no streight inaccessible, where there is no force to defend it. Vast sums of mony are not only incapable of protecting you, but they expose you to more danger; nor can any thing be more false than that old and common saying, That mony is the sinews of the war: Quintus Curtius was the first author of it in the war betwixt Antipater of Macedon, and the King of Sparta, where he tells us, that for want of monies the Spar∣tans

were forced to fight, and were beaten; whereas, could they have protracted but some few days, they had had the news of Alexander's death, and got the victory without fighting a blow; but wanting mony, and apprehending their Army would moulder, they were con∣strained to come to a Battel, and were defeated; which was the occasion of that A∣pophthegm, That mony is the sinews of war: which saying is now a-days in every Princes mouth, but improperly, in my judgment: for relying wholly upon that Maxim, they think their treasure is sufficient to defend them, not considering that, if that would have done it, Darius would have conquered Alexander; the Grecians the Romans; Duke Charles the Swizzers: and of late the Pope and Florentines united, would not have found it so hard to have mastered Francesco Maria (Nephew to Iulius 2d.) at the Battel of Urbin. But these whom I have mentioned, presuming more upon the multitude of their bags than the goodness of their men, were all beaten and overcome. Craesus the King of Lydia car∣rying Solon into his Treasury, and shewing him an immense quantity of riches, ask'd him what he thought of his power; to which Solon replyed, I think it never the greater for this; for War is carried on, and Battels are fought more with iron than gold; and it might happen for ought he knew, that some body might come with his iron and take it all from him. Again, when after the death of Alexander the Great, a great Army of Gauls transplanted into Greece, (from whence they passed afterwards into Asia) before they be∣gan their march, the Gauls sent Embassadors to the King of Macedon to treat an accord; which being almost concluded, to make the Embassadors more plyable, the said King shews them his treasure, which consisted of a vast quantity of silver and gold, which the Embas∣sadors had no sooner seen, but longing impatiently to be at it, they broke of the treaty, and brought their Army into his Country; so that that very thing in which he had re∣posed his great confidence and security proved his ruine and destruction. The Venetians not long since had their Coffers well stor'd, yet they lost all, and their wealth was not able to defend them. So that I do affirm 'tis not mony, (as the common opinion will have it) but good Souldiers that is the sinews of war: for mony cannot find good Souldiers, but good Souldiers will be sure to find mony; had not the Romans done more in their wars with their iron than their gold, the treasure of the whole World would not have been suf∣ficient for them, considering their great enterprizes abroad, and their no less difficulties at home; but fighting with iron, they had no want of gold, for those who were afraid of their Armies supplyed them. And if the King of Sparta was forced to run the hazard of a Battel, and was beaten for want of monies, it was no more than what has hapned to others, and might have hapned to him upon other occasions: for it falls out of many times that for want of provisions an Army is forc'd either to fight or to starve; in which case there is no General so weak but he will choose that which is most honourable, where for∣tune has some power to befriend him. Again, a General having news of supplies that are coming to the enemy, considers with himself whether he had not better engage them as they are, than attend till their recruits come up, and then fight them with more disadvan∣tage: sometimes likewise it falls out, (as it did to Asdrubal in the Country of the Piseni, when he was surprized by Claudius Nero, and the other Roman Consul) that a General is either forc'd to fight or to fly, in which case it is incomparably more safe to hazard all in a Battel, than to lose all in a Flight. Which being so, we see there are many causes that con∣strain a General to fight upon disadvantage; among which, if want of mony be one, there is no more reason we should therefore call that the sinews of war, than any of the rest which do the same thing: so that mony is not so much the snews of war, as good souldiers: 'tis true, mony is requisite for the carrying on of a war, but not principally, and in the first place; for good souldiers have many times been contented without it, though it is but seldom they want it, for 'tis as impossible for good souldiers to want mony, as it is for mony alone to make good souldiers. And this is clear by the testimony of Historians in a thou∣sand places. Pericles persuaded the Athenians to a war with all Peloponnesus, and assured them of success, upon consideration of their industry and riches; the Athenians undertook the War, and for some time prospered with their industry, but at last it appeared that the conduct and discipline of the Spartans was too hard for the Athenians industry and treasure. Livy desides this controversie the best of any man, where, in his comparison of Comman∣ders, enquiring what would have been the event if Alexander the Great had turn'd his Arms against the Romans, he declares that in war there are three things fundamentally ne∣cessary, good Souldiers, good Officers, and good fortune; and then arguing whether Alex∣ander or the Romans were more considerable in those three points, he concludes, without the least mention of mony. It is not improbable but the Campani, (of whom we have spoken in the former Chapter) when they undertook the assistance of the Sidicins against the Samnites measured their power more by their mony than their men; from whence it hapned that'

being defeated in two Battels, they were forced to submit, and become tributary to the Romans.

CHAP. XI.

'Tis not discretion to enter into strict amity with a Prince, whose reputation is greater than his strength.

THe Sidicins were in a great error to desire the assistance of the Campani against the Samnites, as being (by reason of their luxury) unable to assist them, but the error of the Capuans was greater, in not knowing their own weakness and incapacity to defend them: both their errors Livy has very well described in these words, Campani magis nomen in auxilium Sidicinorum, quam vires ad praesidium attulerunt; The Capuans made a great noise, but they brought no force to the relief of the Sidicins.

And here it is not unseasonable to consider, that the leagues which are made with Prin∣ces whose distance is too great, or power too little to relieve one, are more honourable than safe, and give more reputation than security to the person that desires them. This was experienced by the Florentines in the year 1489, when the Pope and King of Naples in∣vaded them; for they were at that time confederate with the King of France, yet they had more reputation than assistance thereby. The same would happen likewise to such of the Italian Princes as should confederate with Maximilian the Emperor, and in confi∣dence of his alliance, undertake any great enterprize, because that alliance would be one of those that bring more reputation than relief. So then, as it was a great error in the Ca∣puans, when they were unable to defend themselves, to undertake the protection of the Sidicins, so it is and will be the same in whoever follows their example. It was the same case with the Tarentini, who would needs interpose betwixt the Samnites and the Ro∣mans, to mediate a peace: for when both Romans and Samnites were in the field, and their Armies preparing for an engagement, the Tarentini sent Embassadors to the Consul, to let him know from the Senate of the Tarentini, that they would have peace betwixt them and the Samnites, and that they were resolved to take Arms against them which refused it. But the Consul smiling at their imprudence, in the presence of the said Embassadors, caused a charge to be sounded, and immediately marching his Army against the enemy, he let them see by his proceedings what answer they deserved.

Thus you have seen to what errors Princes are subject, who undertake the protection of other States; I shall now in the next Chapter remonstrate what ways are most convenient for their own proper defence.

CHAP. XII.

Vpon an apprehension of being invaded, whether it be better to make war, or expect it.

AMong wise men, and very good Souldiers, I have heard it often disputed, whether when two Princes are of equal strength, and one of them designing war (visibly) against the other) it be better for that Prince which is like to be invaded, to sit still, and expect him at home; or to begin with him, and make the first inroad himself? There are arguments on both sides, and they who think it best to be the aggressor, and fall upon the Enemy first, may alledge the Counsel which Craesus gave to Cyrus, when being with his Ar∣my upon the Frontiers of the Massageti, Thamyris Queen of that Country sent to him to take his choice whether she should fight him within her Country, or upon the Frontiers: if he desired to advance, she would stand still and expect him; if he had rather fight where he was, she would be with him immediately: when it came to be debated in Counsel, Craesus, contrary to the opinion of the rest, was for marching to her; and the reason he gave, was, because if she should be beaten at any distance, Cyrus would get but little of her Country, for she would have time to recruit, whereas, if she were beaten at home, he would be able to sit so close upon her skirts, that she being never capable of rallying, or bringing another Army into the field, must of necessity lose her whole Kingdom: Hanibal gave the same Counsel to Antiochus, assuring him that if the Romans were any way to be

conquered, it was by carrying the war into Italy, for by so doing he might have the benefit of their Arms, their Wealth, and their Allies; but whilst the war was abroad, and Italy undisturbed, he would leave the man inexhaustible magazine that would supply them with what and wheresoever they had occasion; and at last Hanibal concluded that Rome was to be taken more easily than the Empire, and Italy it self, than any of its Provinces. Aga∣thocles being unable to resist the Carthaginians at home, invaded their borders, and forc'd them to a peace; and Scipio in the same manner to remove the war out of Italy, transpor∣ted it into Africk. Those who are on the other side do argue as stifly, that there can be nothing more dangerous than to hazard an Army in an enemies Country, at a great distance from their own; and they produce the Athenians for an instance, who, whilst they kept themselves upon the defensive part, and expected their enemies at home were always vi∣ctorious; but when they began to make war at a distance, and send Armies into Sicily they lost their liberty, and everything else. They produce also the Fable of Antius King of Lybia, who being invaded by Hercules the Egyptian, was invincible whilst he kept him∣self within his own borders but being inveigled out by the subtility of his enemy, he lost both his Kingdom and Life; upon which occasion that story was raised of Antius; that being born of the earth, (as they pretended) so oft as he touch'd it, so oft he received new vigour from his Mother, which Hercules perceiving, got him up in his arms, crush'd him to death.

They produce likewise more modern examples. Every body knows that Ferrand King of Naples was esteemed a wise Prince in his time, and hearing two years before his death that King Charles viii of France was preparing to invade him, he let him alone; but falling sick afterwards, as he lay upon his death-bed, he called his Son Alphonso to him, and among other things, charged him that he should expect the King of France upon his Frontiers, and fight him there, but that by no means he should be tempted beyond them; and it had been better for Alphonso to have follow'd his Counsel, for neglecting it afterwards, and sending an Army into Romagna he lost both Army and Kingdom without striking a blow: But besides these arguments on both sides, it is urged in behalf of the Aggressor, that he invades with more confidence and courage than his Adversary receives him (which is a great advantage and enhancement to his Army) That he brings many inconveniences upon the person whom he invades, to which he would not be liable, if he expected him at home. For when the enemies Country is wasted, and their Houses plunder'd, his Subjects are not much to be trusted, nor can any more Taxes be laid upon them, without great difficulty, by which means (as Hanibal said) their Magazines will be spent and their fountain dryed up that was to supply them with all Provisions for War. Besides, if your Army be in the Enemies Country, it will be under a greater necessity of fighting, and by consequence will fight more desperately than at home. But to this it is answered on the other side, That it is more for your advantage to attend your enemy in your own Country, than to seek him abroad; for thereby you may furnish your self with Victuals and Amunition, and all other necessaries without any inconvenience, and distress him by driving the Country. You may likewise with much more ease incommode and frustrate his designs, by your better know∣ledge of the Country, and what places are more proper to attack him in; as also you may attack him with your whole force at once, or give him battel as you please, which out of your own Confines is not to be done: Moreover if Fortune should be adverse, and it be your chance to be beaten; more of your Men will escape where their refuge is so near, and you will sooner rally them again: In short, if you fight at home, you venture your whole force, and not your whole fortune: but if you fight abroad, you venture your whole fortune with but part of your force: Others there have been, who with design to weaken the Enemy, and fighting him afterwards with more ease and advantage, have suffered him quietly to march several days Journey into their Country, and possess himself of several Towns; but whether they did well or not, I will not determine, only I think this distinction is to be considered, whether my Country be strong in Fortresses, and Men; as the Romans were of old, and as the Swizzers at this day; or whether it be weak and unfortified, as the Territory of the Carthaginians formerly, and France and Italy now. In this case the Enemy is by all means to be kept at a distance, because your chief strength lying in your Mony, and not in your Men, whenever you are interrupted in raising or re¦ceiving of that, your business is done; and nothing interrupts you so fatally, as an Ene∣my in your Country. And of this the Carthaginians may be an example, who whilst they were free at home, were able by their Revenue and Taxes to wage War with the Ro∣mans themselves; whereas afterwards when they were assaulted, they were not able to contend with Agathocles. The Florentines, when Castruccio of Lucca brought his Arms into their Country, could not support against him, but were forced to put themselves un∣der

the Dominion of the King of Naples, to procure his protection; but Castruccio was no sooner dead, but they were agog again, and had the confidence to invade the Duke of Milan, and to attempt the beating him out of that Province; so couragious were they in their foreign War, and so abject at home. But when Countries are in a posture of defence, and people Martial and well disciplin'd (as the Romans of old, and the Swizzers at this day) 'tis better to keep off; for the nearer they are to their own Country, they are the harder to overcome, because they can raise more force to defend themselves, than to invade another people. Nor does the opinion of Hanibal affect me at all; for though he persua∣ded Antiochus to pass into Italy he did it as a thing that would have been more for his own, and the Carthaginian than for Antiochus his advantage; for had the Romans received those three great defeats which they received of Hanibal in Italy, in the same space of time, in France or any where else, they had been ruined irrecoverably, for they could neither have rallyed, nor recruited so soon. I do not remember any foreign Expedition by the Romans for the Conquest of any Province, in which their Army exceeded the number of 50000. But upon the invasion of the Gauls, after the first Punick war, they brought 118000 Men into the Field for their defence: Nor could they beat them afterwards in Lombardy, as they did at first in Tuscany, because it was more remote, and they could not fight them with so much convenience, nor with so many men. The Cimbri repulsed the Romans in Germany, but following them into Italy, they were defeated, and driven out again them∣selves; and the reason was, because the Romans could bring more forces against them: The Swizzers may without much difficulty be over-powered abroad, because they seldom march above 30 or 40000 strong; but to attack and beat them at home, is much more difficult, where they can bring into the field 100000 and more. I conclude therefore that that Prince whose people are in a posture, and provided for War, does wisely if he expects a Potent and dangerous Enemy at home, rather than to invade him in his own Country: But that Prince whose Country is ill provided, and whose Subjects are ill disciplined, does better if he keeps the War as far off as he can: and by so doing, each of them (in his several degree) will defend himself best.

CHAP. XIII.

That from mean to great fortune people rise rather by fraud than by force.

I Have found it always true, that men do seldom or never advance themselves from a small beginning, to any great height, but by fraud, or by force (unless they come by it by donation, or right of inheritance). I do not think any instance is to be found where force alone brought any man to that Grandeur, but fraud and artifice have done it many times, as is clear in the lives of Philip of Macedon, Agathocles the Sicilian, and several others, who from mean and inconsiderable extraction, came at length to be Kings. Xenophon in his History of Cyrus insinuates the necessity of fraud when he represents (in his first Expe∣dition against the King of Armenia) how all Cyrus his actions and negotiations were full of fallacy and deceit, and that it was that way he conquered his Kingdom, and not by bravery and force, by which he implyes that no Prince can do any great matters without that art of dissembling Besides he represents him jugling, and playing of tricks with his own Unckle by the Mother-side, the King of the Medes, and shows that without that excellence, he had never been King; and indeed I am of opinion that from a mean and base fortune never any man came to be very great by down-right generosity and force; but by fraud alone there have been many, as particularly Iohn Galeazzo, who by that alone wrested the Government of Lombardy out of the hands of Messer Bernardo, his Unckle. And the same courses which Princes are forced to in the beginning of their authority, the same courses are taken by Commonwealths at first, till they be settled in their government, and have force sufficient to defend themselves. Rome (which either by change or election took all ways to make it self great) was not without this; and what greater cunning or artifice could it use in the beginning of its greatness, than what it did take, and is men∣tioned before. For by their fair carriage and insinuation, they got several Cities into con∣sideration, and under that name, they subjected them insensibly, and made them their slaves. The Latins, and other Neigbouring, people were of this sort, by whose Arms and Alliance, the Romans having conquered their Enemies, they were rendered so powerful that they began to handle them now, not as Associates, but Subjects; nor could the Latini

be convinced of their servitude, till they saw the Samnites twice over-thrown, and forced to accept of their Conditions. Which Victories, though they gain'd the Romans great reputation abroad, among remote Princes, who understood more of the name, than the power of the Romans, yet they created envy and jealousie among those who were nearer and more sensible of their greatness; and this jealousie and apprehension was so great, that not only the Latins, but the Colonies in Latium and Campagnia (which had been sent thither not long before) confederated against the Romans, and resolved to make War upon them. And this War was commenced in the same manner (as I have said before) most other Wars are commenced. Not by down-right denunciation of War against the Romans, but by defending the Sidicins against the Samnites, who made War by allowance from the Romans. Nor was there any other reason of their Conspiracy, but because the Confe∣rates began to smell out their cunning, and to be sensible that under that false title of Allies, they were in great danger of being made slaves, which Annius Selinus (a Latin Praetor) in an Oration to the Counsel expressed very properly in these words, Nam si etiam nunc sub umbra faederis aequi, servitutem pati possumus, quid obest quin proditis Sidicinis, non Ro∣manorum solum, sed Samnitium dictis pareamus? For if even now under the shadow of an equal Confederacy, we can endure servitude: What hinders but that we betray the Sidicins, and put our necks under the feet not only of the Romans, but the Samnites. Which things being so, it is manifest the Romans wanted not at the beginning of their rise, that dexterity of cheating that is so necessary to all people that are ambitious of raising themselves to a great height, from an inconsiderable beginning; which artifice is always the less scandalous, by how much he that does practise it, understands better how to disguise it by some hono∣rable pretence, as the Romans did very well.

CHAP. XIV.

Many People are mistaken, who expect with meekness and humility to work upon the proud.

IT falls out many times that humility and modesty towards such as have any picque or prejudice to you, is so far from doing good, that it does a great deal of mischief and of this the debate and consultation of the Romans about the preservation of their peace with the Latins, is an example, from whom they were in expectation of a War. For the Samnites complaining to the Romans that the Latins had invaded them, the Romans (un∣willing to exasperate them more, who were already too prone to be quarrelling) return'd this answer, that by their league with them, the Latins were not tyed up from making War as they pleas'd. The Latins were so far from being satisfied by the mildness of their answer, that it made them more insolent; insomuch that not long after they profess'd themselves their Enemies, as appears by that speech of the aforesaid Annius in the Council aforesaid, where he tells the Latins, Tentâstis patientiam negando militem: Quis dubitat exarsisse eos? Pertulerunt tamen hunc dolorem. Exercitus nos parare adversus Samnites foe∣deratos suos audiêrunt, nec moverunt se ab urbe. Unde haec illis tanta modestia, nisi a con∣scientia virium, & nostrarum, & suarum. You tried their patience before, in refusing them supplies; who doubts but they were netled? yet they swallow'd it: They had notice of our preparations against the Samnites their Confederates, and stirred not in their defence. Whence comes this mighty modesty, and good nature? from nothing but a sence of the disparity betwixt our strength, and their own. From hence it is clear, the patience and civility of the Romans, augmented the arrogance of the Latins: and that it is the interest of all Princes to be very cautious of condescending from their dignity, or stooping willingly to any thing that may give the Enemy an opinion of his weakness or pusillanimity; for it is better to lose any thing bravely and by open War, than to part with it poorly in hopes to prevent it; and it many times happens that those who part so easily with their Lands or Monies to prevent a War, do rather excite, than satisfie the Enemy, whose nature commonly is such, that upon the discovery of their impotence or fear, his desires encrease, and new things are succes∣sively demanded; nor will your friends be so ready to assist, if they find you timorous and irresolute. But if as soon as you have notice of the designs or insolence of the Enemy, you immediately prepare to correct him; he will not invade you so boldly, though he be stronger than you, and then your friends will come in more freely to your assistance, who, had you abandoned your self, would certainly have forsaken you. This is intended only where you have but one Enemy; where you have more, the best way is to give

and promise what you think fit, that if possible, you may draw off some or other of them from their Confederacy, and so break their League by dividing them.

CHAP. XV.

Weak States are irresolute and uncertain in their Councils, and slow Councils are most commonly pernicious.

FRom these occasions and beginnings of the War betwixt the Latins and the Romans, we may observe, that in all consultations, it is best to come immediately to the point in question, and bring things to a result, without too tedious an hesitation and suspence. And this we may learn from the Council which the said Latins took at that time when their war with the Romans was in debate. For the Romans, suspecting the defection of the Latins, for their better information, and that they might reduce them (if possible) without blows, sent to them to send over eight of their Principal Citizens to Rome, to consult with them about keeping of the Peace. The Latins being conscious to themselves of many things which they had acted against the pleasure of the Romans, call'd a Council to consider of the persons that were to go, and what their Comissioners should say when they came there. The Council being divided, one man proposing one thing, and another man another, An∣nius the Praetor had this expression, Ad summam rerum nostrarum pertinere arbitror, ut cogi∣tetis magis, quid agendum nobis, quam quid loquendum sit, facile erit explicatis Consiliis, accommodare rebus verba. I conceive it more pertinent to our business, That you consider rather what is to be done, than what is to be said; for when you are come to a resolution, it will be no hard matter to accomodate your words. Which saying was doubtlesly true, and ought to be regarded by all Princes and Commonwealths. For whilst we are ambiguous, and uncer∣tain what is to be done, we cannot tell how to adapt and accommodate our language; but when we are come to a resolution, and have decreed what is to be done, it is not so diffi∣cult. I have inserted this passage the more willingly, because I my self have known this irresolution do much mischief, to the detriment and dishonour of our State; and it is a fault peculiar to all weak and improvident Princes and Governments to be slow and tedious, as well as uncertain in their Councils, which is as dangerous as the other, especially when the debate is about the relief or protection of a friend; for your slowness does no good to him, and exposes your self. These uncertain or tedious resolutions proceed either from want of courage and force, or from the crossness and malevolence of the Counsellors, who carried away by some private passion of their own, will rather ruine the State, than not accomplish their revenge, so that instead of expediting and pushing things to a conclusion, they impede and obstruct whatever is before them. For your good Citizens (though the vogue of the people runs the more dangerous way) will never hinder the coming to a result, especially in things that will not dispense with much time. Girolamo a Tyrant in Syracuse being dead, and the War betwixt the Romans and Carthaginians very hot, a Council was called by the Syracusans, and it was debated which side they should take. The question was canvas'd with such order by both parties, that it remained in ambiguo, and nothing was resolved, till at length Appolonides (one of the Principal in that City) in a grave and prudent Oration remonstrated, That neither they were to be blamed who had spoken for the Romans, nor they who adhered to the Carthaginians, but the length and uncertainty of their debate; for that irresolution would be the occasion of certain ruine; but if they came to a conclusion, with which side soever they joyn'd, they might hope for some good. Titus Livius could not better have displayed the danger of this kind of suspence, than in this case of the Latins; whose assistance against the Romans being desired by the Lavinians, they were so long in their debate, that when at last they came to a reso∣lution, their supplies were scarce gone out of their Gates, before they had news that their Confederates were beaten. Whereupon Milonius the Praetor said very wittily, This little ground which we have marched, will cost us very dear to the Romans; and this hapned to them for the tediousness of their Councils; for they should either have assisted, or denyed them out of hand; had they denyed them, the Romans had not been disgusted; had they complyed, they might have supported their Associates, and have kept them from being ruined; but doing neither, they destroyed their friends, and hazarded themselves. Had this precept of bringing things to a speedy resolution, been followed by the Florentines, they had prevented many mischiefs and damages which they met withal upon the coming

of Lewis XII into Italy against the Duke of Milan; for the said King Lewis having resol∣ved upon the said expedition, he proposed to their Embassadors in his Court, that the Florentines should not interpose or concern themselves in the quarrel, upon which terms, he would receive them into his protection, and defend them from any harm; the Embas∣sadors agreed, and a Months time was allowed for ratification from the City. But the ratification was deferred (by the imprudence of some persons who favoured the Duke of Milan's interest) till the French had almost conquered all, and being offered then, it was refused by the King of France (who knew well enough that the Florcntines were then forced to what they did; and desired his amity more out of fear, than affection) which piece of delay cost the Florentines a good round Sum of Mony, and might well have been their ruine; as just such an accident was afterward. And this indiscretion of theirs was the greater, because they were no way serviceable to the Duke of Milan; who, if he had prevailed, would doubtless have shown himself a greater Enemy to them, than the King of France. Of this slowness, and uncertainly of Councils, I have spoken before, but new occasion presenting it self, I have discoursed of it again, as a thing worthy the observation of all Commonwealths, especially like ours.

CHAP. XVI.

How much the Soldiers of our times do differ from the Discipline of the Ancients.

THe Battel which the Romans fought with the Latins, in the Consulships of Manlius Torquatus, and Decius, was the greatest and most important that ever they had in any War, with any other Nation. For as the Latins lost all by losing the Victo∣ry, and the Romans got the Dominion of them: So the Romans had they lost the Battel, must have lost their liberty with it, and turn'd Subjects to the Latins. Livy tells us the same thing, for (says he) the Latin Army was in nothing inferiour to the Romans; their courage the same, their constancy the same, and their numbers the same; if the Romans had any advantage, it was in their Generals, which indeed were better than the Latins, and it is expressed by several, both Latins and Romans who have left an account of that Battel to posterity; that where-ever Manlius had been, that side would certainly have conquered. In this Battel there were two things very exemplary and remarkable: One of the Consuls, to keep his Souldiers firm in their obedience, and preserve their Military Discipline, caused his own Son to be slain for transgressing his Orders, though he gain'd the Victory by the means. The other devoted himself freely to death, for the good of his Country; for the dispute was like to be very hard, fighting against the Latins, who (as Livy tells us) had the same Language, the same Customs, the same Arms, the same Discipline with the Romans; the Soldiers, the Captains, the Tribunes both in one Army and the other, had been Come∣rades and served formerly together, not only in the same Army, or Garison, but in the same Company and Band. It was necessary therefore, being equal in their numbers, and equal in their courage, that something extraordinary should be done, that might render the Sol∣diers fiercer, and more obstinate to overcome, upon which fierceness and obstinacy the whole hopes of the victory did depend; for whilst there is any such in the breasts of the Soldiers, they never think of running, but press still on for victory and prize; and be∣cause there was more of this constancy and fortitude in the breasts of the Romans, than in the breasts of the Latins, partly the destiny, and partly the bravery of the Consuls effected that for the good success of their Army, and the preservation of their Discipline, Torquatus killed his Son, and Decius himself. Titus Livius in his description of the equality of their force, gives us an exact account of the Orders which they observed in their Armies and Fights, and he has done it so largely, I need not repeat it all, but shall only select what I think most particularly remarkable, and what, if observed by the Generals of our days, might have prevented very great disorders. I say then that according to Livy's description, their Armies were divided into three principal Schieri or Squadrons. The first consisted of their Hastati, which were most of them young men in the flower of their age digested into Ma∣nipuli or small parties, and disposed at a certain distance with Pikes or Darts in their hands, from whence they were called Hastati. The second Squadron was as numerous as the first, and divided into as many Manipuli, but their distance was something greater, and it con∣sisted of choice men, from whence they were called Principes. The third and last Squa∣dron was the biggest of the three, and had almost as many in it as both the other: and

this was made up of the ancientest and most experienced Soldiers, whom they called Triarii. They too had their certain distances, but something greater than in either of the other. In their Battels, the Hastati were in the Van; the Principes behind them, and the Triarii in the Rear. To every one of these Squadrons there was a body of Horse, which being drawn up in two divisions, and disposed one of the right, and the other on the left hand of the Army, represented two wings, and were therefore called Ala. These three Squadrons preceded and followed one another exactly, but the Hastati in the first Squadron were drawn up closer, That, being to receive the first impetus of the Enemy, they might en∣dure it the better. The Principes that followed them was not in such close order, but were disposed at more distance, to the end that if the Hastati should be forced to retire, they might be received into that Squadron without disorder or confusion. But the Triarii were drawn up with greater spaces and intervals than both the other, and for the same rea∣son, that if they were repulsed, that might fall back among them, and make an entire Body together: Being drawn up in this order, the Hastati began the sight; if they were over-powred by the Enemy and forced to give ground, they fell back to the Principes, and uniting with them, renewed the fight in one body; if they were both of them too weak, and unable to bear up against the Enemy, they retreated gradually into the spaces betwixt the Triarii, and then all the three Squadrons being joyned, the whole Army charged in a body, and if they were beaten, farewel, there was no more reserves, but the Battel was lost; and because whenever the Triarii was engaged, the whole Army was in ••••nger, this Proverb grew very frequent, Res reducta est ad Triarios. Things are now at the Extremity. The Generals of our times, having laid aside all the old discipline of the Romans, have neglected this among the rest, to their no little prejudice. For he that draws up his Army in a posture with two such reserves, must be beaten three times before he can be utterly defeated; whereas once beating will do the Enemies business. But he that trusts only to the first shock (as the Christian Armies do generally now) may easily be broken, the least disorder, or relaxation of courage, puting all to the rout. And that which is the reason why our Armies are so quickly defeated, is, because they have lost the old way of falling back one body into another, and rallying three times. For whoever draws up his Army according to Modern Custom, does it with one of these two inconve∣niences, He either draws up his several Squadrons shoulder to shoulder, and by enlarging his Ranks, makes his Files very thin (which weakens his Army very much by leaving the distance so small betwixt the Front, and the Rear) or else he draws them up deeper, ac∣cording to the manner of the Romans; but then their Files are so close, that if the Front be beaten (there being no spaces in the Battel to receive them) they entangle and confound one another; so as the Front being repulsed, falls foul upon the middle Squadron, and both of them upon the third, whereby they are embarrassed, and hindred from advancing or receiving the Enemy in any order, and the whole Battel is lost. The Spanish and French Armies at the Battel of Ravenna (where Monsieur de Foix the French General was slain) fought very well, being drawn up according to the mode of our times, with their Fronts so extended, that their Battalions were much more in wideness than depth and his was done in respect of the ground, which in that place was very spacious and large; for being sensible that retreats are more difficult where the Files are too deep, they drew them up large in the Front to prevent it as much as possible: But when they are straightned for room they are forced to be contented, and draw up as well as they can, for there is no remedy. They are subject likewise to the same disorders in their Marches and Incursions into the Enemies Country, whether to forrage, or upon some other design. In the War betwixt the Florentines and Pisans (upon their Rebellion after the King of France's passage into Italy) coming to a Battel at Santo Regolo, the Florentines were defeated by their own Horse, which being drawn up in the Front of the Army, and charged smartly by the Enemy, were put into disorder, and forced to fall foul upon their Foot, which broke the whole Army. And I have been many times assured by Monsieur Griacus de Burgo (an old Officer of Foot in the Florentine Army) that their Foot had not fled that day, but for the disorder of their own Horse; The Swizzers (the best Soldiers of our times) when they are drawn up with the French, will be sure to be drawn up in the Flanks, that if their Horse should be beaten, they may not be driven in among them. And though these things seem easie to be understood, and more easie to practise, yet there has not been one of our late Generals that has found the way of imitating this old method, or correcting the new; for though they also have their Armies divided into three Squadrons, which they call the Van-guard, the Body, and the Rear; yet they use them only in their Marches, and Incampments; but when they come to a Battel, it is seldom seen but they are drawn up as abovesaid, and altogether run

the risk of one shock, and no more. And because some people to excuse their igno∣rance, pretend the Execution of the Cannon, will not suffer them to make use of the old order, I shall examine in the next Chapter whether that can be a just impediment, or not.

CHAP. XVII.

How the Armies of our times are to judge of Artillery, and whether the general opinion of it, be true.

WHen I consider with my self how many Field Battels were fought by the Romans in several times, it falls into my thoughts to examine what many people have believed, that had there been great Guns in those days, as there are now, the Romans could never have over-run Provinces, nor made them tributary so easily, nor have done so many great things as they did; for by reason of these fire-arms, Granadoes, and such kind of Engines, people are sooner terrified, and cannot show their valour so freely as heretofore; To which it is added, that Armies come with more difficulty to a Battel, and that their Orders and Ranks are not so easily kept, so that in time the whole business of War will be dispatched by the Cannon. Not thinking it improper to enquire into these opinions; to examine whether Artillery have added or substracted from the strength of our Armies, and taken away, or given more occasion to our Captains of doing brave things; I shall begin with their first opinion, that the Romans would not have made those vast Conquests, had there been Artillery in those days: In answer, I say, that War is twofold, defensive, or offensive; and it is first to be considered, which of these two Wars it does most mischief or good; and though it may be said it does great mischief in both, yet I am of opinion, it is much more prejudicial to him that is upon the defensive, than him that is upon the offensive part. The reason is, because he who defends himself, is either blocked up in some Town, or straightned in his Camp: If in a Town, it is either small (like your Citadels) or large: In the first case the besieged is lost; for the force of those Guns is such, that no wall is so thick, but in a few days they will beat it down: So that if he has no retreat, nor time to stop up the breaches, or throw up new works within, the Enemy enters pell mell at the breach, and the Cannon of the Town does the Garison very little good; for this is a Maxim, where people can fall on in a crowd, and run head∣long in their fury to a storm, great Guns do never repel them. Wherefore the fierce assaults of the Tramontani are not so easily sustained, as the attacks of the Italians who fall not on with that fury and impatience as the other, but march up cooly and quietly to the Battel, and do rather skirmish, than storm. Those who enter a breach in this gravity and state, are sure to go to pot, for the Artillery does certain execution upon them: But those who fall on briskly, and crowd one another into the breach (if there be no new works or retrenchments thrown up within) enter as they please without any great preju∣dice by the Cannon; for though some of them may be killed, yet they cannot be so many as to hinder the taking of the Town. That this is true, we find by many instances in Italy, and among the rest in the Siege of Brescia, the Town revolted to the Venetians, only the Castle stood firm for the French. That the Town might receive no prejudice from the Castle, the Venetians fortified the great Street that comes down from the Castle with great Guns in the Front, Flanks, and every where, so that they thought themselves secure not only from sallies within, but from relief without. But Monsieur de Foix made no reckon∣ing of them; for marching thither with a Body of Horse, he alighted, and charging boldly thorow the said Street, relieved the Castle, without any considerable loss. So that he who is shut up in a small place, his walls battered down, and has nothing left but his Artillery to defend him, is in very great danger, and can hardly escape: If the place you defend be a large Town, where you have room enough to retire, and throw up new works; yet your disadvantage is great, and the Enemies great Guns shall do more mischief upon you, than yours upon him. For first you must be forced to advance your Cannon, and raise them to some higher place; for whilst they are level with the ground, every blind, or small work that the Enemy throws up, is sufficient to secure him; and being forced to plant them higher, either upon the top of some Wall, or Church, or Mount (erected on purpose) you fall under two inconveniences; One is, that you cannot bring such large Guns upon those places, as he can bring without, because in those little places, great Guns are not to be managed; The other is, that if you could get them up, they cannot be so

easily secur'd, because they cannot have the convenience of works or baskets to defend them, as the Enemy has whose Guns are planted as he pleases. So that it is almost im∣possible for him that is besieged, to keep his Cannon long upon a high place, without being dismounted, if the Enemy without has any store of Artillery; and to keep them upon the ground, is to have little or no use of them, as I said before: so that when all is done, the best way to defend a Town is as they did of old, by their small shot, and the courage of the Soldier: And yet though small shot be of some use to the besieged, it cannot counter∣vail the dammage which they receive from the Enemies great shot, for by them their walls are battered, and beaten down into the Ditches, so that when the Enemy comes to storm (which he may do with more ease when the Ditches are filled up with the ruines of the walls) the besieged are under great disadvantage. Wherefore, as I said before, those Guns are more beneficial to the besieger, than the besieged. And if you do not defend your self either in a great Town or a little, but shall choose rather some strong and convenient place, where you may encamp and entrench, so as not to be forced to an Engagement, but with advantage to your self; I say that in this case you have no better way now, than the Ancients had of old, and that many times your great Guns are more inconvenient, than otherwise; for if the Enemy falls upon your back, with any advantage of ground, as may easily happen; That is, if he gains by accident any eminence that commands your Camp, or surprizes you before your intrenchments are finished, he quickly dislodges you, and compells you to fight. This was the case with the Spaniards before the Battel of Ravenna, who entrenched upon the River Roncus, but made their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 too low, whereupon the French having the advantage of the ground, with their great Guns played so furiously over them into their Camp, that the Spaniards 〈…〉〈…〉, and forced afterwards to give them Battel. And if you shall choose such a place to ••••trench in, as commands the whole Country, and fortifie it so well, that the 〈…〉〈…〉 you, yet the Enemy will have the same ways of provoking and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 you, as were practised of old, that is, by making inroads, and plundring your Country; by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 your Roads, and intercepting your Convoys, and a thousand other 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dities which he will put upon you, against which your Artillery will 〈…〉〈…〉. So that considering what has been said, and that the Roman Wars 〈◊〉〈◊〉 most 〈◊〉〈◊〉 offensive; they would have had advantage by them, and in probability 〈…〉〈…〉 their conquests, had there been any Artillery in their times. As to the 〈…〉〈…〉, that by reason of those great Guns, men could not show their valour so much as an ancient times; I answer, it is true, and the danger is greater when they come to place their ••ad∣ders, and make an assault dully and heavily, and rather one by one, than in a body; their Officers being in the same hazard, and liable to be killed at greater distance, nor can the strongest guards, nor choicest men about them, secure them; yet for all these great dangers, no memorable instance can be produced of any great dammage that ever was received. For Towns are not taken usually by storm, or assault; but by way of Leaguer as formerly; and in those that are taken by storm, the danger is not much greater than it was then; for even in those times, whoever undertook the defence of a Town, had his Machines and instruments of War, which though not discharged with such force, did the same execu∣tion. And as to the reaching of Commanders at a distance, and killing them in the midst of their Reserves, there have been fewer of them slain (since great Guns came up) in 24 years Wars in Italy, than there was in any ten years in the time of the Romans; for unless it were Count Lodovic della Mirandola (who was killed in Ferrara, when the Venetians invaded that State) and the Duke of Nemours who was killed at Cirignuola, there has not been one great Officer slain; for Monsieur de Foix at Ravenna dyed by the Sword. So that if men show themselves not so couragious as formerly; it is from the weakness and ill order of their Armies, rather than the Artillery: And whereas it is said that these great Guns are an impediment to their fighting, and that the decision of Battels will by degrees be left to the Artillery; I reply, That that opinion is clearly a mistake, and has been judged so by all those who are for the old way of Discipline. For he that would have his Soldiers good, must exercise them well, and with frequent Alarms (true or false, 'tis no matter) accustom them to the Enemy, bring them to handy-stroaks, and as it were to take one ano∣ther by the beards; by which means they will come to a greater dexterity in handling their weapons, and grappling with the Enemy; and for the same reason, the Foot are rather to be relyed upon than the Horse; for if your Foot be nimble and good, you may fall with more security upon an Enemy perplexed and embarrassed with a train of Artillery, than you could of old when they had their Elephants, their Chariots with Cythes, and such other devices. And if the Romans could find out remedies daily against such daily inventions, no question but they would have found out some or other against great Guns; and so much

the more easily, because the danger of the Guns is sooner over, than the danger of the other: for the execution which is done by the Cannon, is done before the engagement be∣gins; The execution by the Chariots and Elephants, during the whole fight; besides the Cannon is easily avoided by the Infantry, either by posting themselves behind some bank, or clapping down upon their bellies; and yet of this so easie and obvious an evasion, expe∣rience tells us there is seldom any necessity; for it is a hard matter to point your great Guns so exactly, but that either they will be mounted too high and shoot over you, or too low, and never come at you: And when the Battel is joyn'd, 'tis as clear as the day, that neither great nor small shot is of any advantage; for if the Artillery be placed before the Army, 'tis odds but it is taken; if behind, the execution it does, is upon themselves; and on either side it can gaul you but little, before you get to it, and either cloy, or secure it, and if an example be required, we have one ready in the Swizzers, who at Navarre in the year 1513. without Horse or Artillery, or any such thing, fell upon the French Camp, and overcame them, though they were as strong as Trenches and Artillery could make them; and another reason is (besides what has been urged before) because Artillery ought to be guarded (if you would have it do service) with walls or ramparts, or some such thing as may secure it from being taken, otherwise it will be of no use, as when in field fights, it has nothing to defend it, but the Bodies of men. In the Flanks they are of no use, more than the old Roman Engines in those days who were placed out of their Squadrons, that they might be managed with more dexterity, and (when-ever overlaid by the Horse or any thing else) they were received into their Legions: and if there be any way of making ad∣vantage of Artillery in a field fight, it is this; He that uses it otherwise, understands not very well, and puts his confidence in that which may easily deceive him: The Turk indeed by the help of his great Guns-obtained two or three Victories against the Sophy, and the Soldan; but if produced more from the novelty of the noise, and the terror it brought upon their Horse, than any great execution they did. I conclude therefore that Artillery may be good, in an Army that is stout; but where they are used in an Army that is raw and inexperienced, they are of little advantage, if the Enemy be either couragious or strong.

CHAP. XVIII.

How by the authority of the Romans, and the universal Discipline of the Ancients, the Foot are more serviceable than the Horse.

BY many Arguments and Examples, it may be proved that the Romans in their Military exploits had greater estimation for their Infantry, than their Horse; and how all their principal designs were executed by their Foot: This appeared in their Wars with the Latins, when the Roman Army being over-powered, and giving ground in that great Battel near the Lake of Regillum, the Roman General caused his Cavalry to dismount, and fight on foot, and by so doing, they recovered their ground, and got the Victory; by which it is manifest the Romans thought them more serviceable on foot than on horse-back, and in that posture placed more confidence in them. The same thing they practised in many other fights, and always with good success: nor can the raillery of Hanibal be ob∣jected against this, who when news was brought him at the Battel of Cannas, that the Consuls had caused all their Horse to dismount, resolving to fight it out on foot, cryed out in derision, Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent Equites. They might as will have bound them, and delivered them to me, Which expression though coming out of the mouth of an excellent person, yet his single authority is not to be put in the ballance against the judg∣ment of the whole Roman Commonwealth, and the experience of so many brave Captains as had been educated under it; and if it were, there are reasons to defend it: The Foot can get into several places, where the Horse cannot get: The Foot keep their ranks better than the Horse, and in any disorder, are sooner rallyed, and in a posture again, whereas the Horse are more unmanageable, and when once out of order, with great difficulty to be rallyed. Besides (as it is among men) so it is among Horses, some are high spirited and couragious, others are untoward and dull; and it frequently happens, that a mettled Horse, has a cowardly Rider, or a mettled Rider a dull Horse; be it which it will, the disparity is inconvenient. A body of Foot well order'd and drawn up, will easily be too hard, for the same number of Horse; but the same number of Horse, will have hard ser∣vice to break a Body of Foot, if there be any thing of proportion betwixt them; and this

opinion is confirmed not only by ancient and modern examples, but by the relations and constitutions of Legislators, and whoever else have left any rules and directions for the Government of an Army; for though they tell us, indeed, That at first, Horse were in greatest reputation, because the way of ordering of Foot was not known; but as soon as the way of managing them was found out, and their usefulness was discovered, they were preferred to the Horse. Not but that Horse are very necessary in an Army to scout abroad, make incursions into the Enemies Country, pursue the Enemy when he runs, and con∣front their Horse when they come to a Battel, yet the hopes and strength of an Army lies more especially in the Foot, and if any one error in the Conduct of our Italian Princes has contributed to the enslaving of their Country, it is their neglecting to improve themselves in the management of Foot, and addressing themselves wholly to the Horse. And this fault proceeded from the malignity of the Officers, or the ignorance of those who govern'd the State: For this last 25 years, the Commands of the Italian Militia being in the hands of Reformades and Soldiers of fortune, who had no setled Estates, they made it their de∣sign to preserve their Commands by all possible means, though with never so much preju∣dice to their Masters: And because a great Body of Foot, was not like to be long paid (nor would there always be occasion to use them) and a little one would not turn to account; they applyed themselves wholly to the Discipline of Horse; for 200 or 300 Horse was a fair Command, and maintained the Officers in a good reputation; nor was the charge so great, but their Governors could pay them. For the better insurance therefore of their places, they began to undervalue and decry the Foot service, in such manner, that by de∣grees, they were almost wholly laid aside; so that in the greatest of their Armies, there were very few Foot; the unhappiness of which practice, with other irregularities in our days, has made the Italian Militia so weak, it has not been able to defend it self against the insults, and depredations of foreigners. So then the Foot is with more confidence to be rely'd upon, than the Horse; and that this was the judgment of the Romans, appears by another example. The Romans were encamped before Sora, and a party of Horse sal∣lying out of the Town to beat them from some post, was met by a Roman Captain at the Head of his Troop, who charging his adversary, it was their fortune both of them to be slain. However, their Troops continued the fight, though their Officers were dead, and the Romans to facilitate their Victory, dismounted in the middle of the fight, and forced the Enemy to do the same, if they had a mind to defend themselves; so that the nature of the fight was changed; the Foot service was preferred, and the Samnites were routed. Nothing can be more plain, that the Foot were preferred, than this case; for though upon other occasions the Consuls many times dismounted their Troops, yet it was to reinforce and bring off the Foot, that were overlaid by the Enemy; but here they dismounted not to relieve their own Foot, or to engage with the Enemies, but fighting Horse against Horse, and finding their Victory doubtful, they thought, though they could not master them on Horse-back, they might do it on foot, and accordingly they alighted: I conclude there∣fore, that a Body of well ordered Foot is very hardly to be broken, but by another Body of the same. Crassus and Marcus Antonius, with a small Body of Horse, but a good Army of Foot, over-run and harrassed the whole Country of the Parthians for several days toge∣ther, though the Parthians had a vast Army of Horse to defend it. Crassus 'tis true mis∣carried in the Expedition, but it was more by the falshood, than gallantry of the Enemy; for relying too much upon their promises, he was reduced to such distress for Provisions, that he and his whole Squadron were lost; nevertheless in the midst of these exigences, being in an open and Champian Country, where there were no Mountains, no Woods, no Rivers to shelter or ease them, far from all relief, and nothing left to sustain them, the Foot brought themselves off under the command of M. Anthonie, and behaved themselves so well in the opinion of the Parthians themselves, that their vast Army of Horse durst not venture upon them: But to what purpose do we trouble our Reader with examples so remote, we have testimony nearer home that will do it effectually. We have known in our time 9000 Swizzers at Novara attack 10000 Horse, and as many Foot (being most Gascoignes) they never regarded: After this 26000 Swizzers set upon the King of France in Milan, who had with him 20000 Horse, 40000 Foot, and a hundred pieces of Artillery, and though they did not vanquish him, as at the Battel of Novara, yet they fought him bravely for two days together, and though worsted at last, yet the greatest part of them got off. Marcus Regulus Attilius, placed such confidence in his Foot, that he not only opposed them to the Enemies Horse, but to their Elephants; and though his success did not answer his expectation, yet it hindered not, but that as great matters might have been expected from his Foot. So then whoever would defeat a Body of Foot well ordered, must do it with another Body better ordered than they, or it is never to be done.

In the time of Philip Visconti Duke of Milan, 16000 Swizzers having made a descent in∣to Lombardy, Carmignuola the said Dukes General marched against them with about 1000 Horse and some Foot; for not being acquainted with their way of fighting, he thought they would have been sufficient, but having fallen upon them with his Horse, and been repulsed with loss, being a wise man, and one that knew how to frame himself to every accident, he recruited very well, marched against them again, and coming to an engage∣ment, caused all his Cuirassiers to dismount, and at the Head of his Foot, fall on upon the Swizzers, who were not able to resist them. For the Cuirassiers being compleatly arm'd, forced their way into the Body of the Swizzers without any loss, so as their whole Army was defeated, and cut off, and none left alive, but what were preserved by the humanity of Carmignuola. I do not doubt but many people are well enough satisfied in their judg∣ments, that Foot are more serviceable than Horse, yet such is the infelicity of our times, that neither ancient nor modern examples, nor the confession of those who have tryed them are sufficient to prevail with our Princes to correct this Error, or to believe that to give reputation to the Arms of a Province, it is necessary to revive this Order, countenance their Foot, and see them well pay'd; and then doubtless they will repay him by their noble Exploits. But they deviate from this way, as they do from the rest, and therefore no wonder if their Conquests be more to the detriment, than augmentation of their State.

CHAP. XIX.

The Conquests of Commonwealths that are ill governed, and contrary to the Model of the Romans, do conduce more to the ruine, than advancement of their affairs.

THese false opinions of the use and excellence of Horse and Foot, are so rooted in the minds of men, and so confirmed with ill Examples, that no body thinks of refor∣ming our late errors, or restoring the old Discipline of the Romans. Thirty years since who could have persuaded an Italian that 10000 Foot could have assaulted 10000 Horse, and as many Foot, and have beaten them? Yet this was done by the Swizzers at Novara. For though all Histories ring of it, yet none of our people will believe that it is possible to do now, what was anciently done. They object the excellence of our Horse, and say they are so well arm'd, that they are able to repulse not only a Body of Foot, but even a Mountain or Rock; and by these kind of fallacious Arguments, they deceive themselves, not considering that Lucullus with a few Foot defeated 150000 of Tigranes Horse, and yet they had a sort of Cuirassiers among them like ours. This Exploit of Lucullus we have seen acted over again by the Germans in Italy, as if on purpose to convince us of our error. Which if Princes and Common-Wealths could be persuaded to believe, they would commit fewer faults, be more strong against the insults of the Enemy, and not place all their hopes in their Heels, as they do at this day; and those who had the Govern∣ment of any Civil State, would know better how to conduct and manage themselves, ei∣ther as to the enlargement, or conservation of their Dominion, and find, that Leagues and Confederacies, rather than absolute Conquests; sending Colonies into what they had conquered; making publick feuds of the spoils of the Enemy; to infest and perplex the Enemy rather with Excursions, and Battels, than Sieges; to keep the publick rich, and the private poor, and with all possible caution to keep up the Discipline of the Army, are the ways to make a Common-Wealth formidable and great. These are the true ways of enlarging, an Empire; all the rest are uncertain, or pernicious; and if thereby any to whom these ways are not pleasing, they are by any means to lay aside all thoughts of ex∣tending their Dominion; to think only of regulating their Laws at home and providing for their defence, like the little States in Germany, which by so doing have lived in peace and tranquillity for many years together. But how industrious and careful soever we are, in abstaining from injury, or using violence to our Neighbour, some body or other will be injuring us, and it will be impossible to live always in quiet; from which provocation will arise, not only a desire in us, but a necessity of vindicating our selves, and retaliating upon them; and when this desire is once kindled, if our Neighbors do not supply us, with oc∣casion, we can find it at home, as will inevitably fall out where Citizens are opulent and strong. And if the Cities of Germany have continued free, and at peace a long time, it proceeds from a peculiar disposition in that Country, which is scarce to be found any

where else. That part of Germany of which I now speak (like France and Spain) was subject to the Empire of the Romans: But when afterwards that Empire began to decline, and the title of the Empire was removed into that Province, Those that were the wealthiest and most powerful of the Cities (taking advantage of the pusillanimity or distresses of their Emperors) made themselves free, paying only a small annual Rent for the redemption of their Liberties; which being permitted, by degrees all those Cities which held immedi∣ately of the Emperour, and had no dependance upon any body else, redeemed themselves in that manner. Whilst these Cities were imployed in this Traffick with the Emperour, it fell out that several Corporations that belonged to the Duke of Austria, rebelled, and having established their Liberty, they encreased so fast in reputation and wealth, that in∣stead of returning to their subjection to the Duke, they became terrible to all people about them. From hence it is, that in our days this Province is said to consist of the Swizzers, the free Towns, the Princes, and the Emperor. And if in the diversity of their constitu∣tions, no Wars do arise, or at least continue any time, it is from their universal respect and defence to the Emperour, who, though his force be not great, has such reputation among them, that upon any controversie betwixt them, he can easily compose it, and this it is that has kept them quiet so long, that in man's memory they have had little or no trou∣bles, but what hapned betwixt the Swizzers and the House of Austria; and though for many years past, the title of Emperour, has been in the said House; yet has it not been a∣ble to reduce the pertinacy of the Swizzers, though it has attempted it very solemnly. Nor did the rest of the Princes and free Towns in Germany contribute their assistance against the Swizzers, partly because they were favourers of Liberty, and partly because being poor themselves, they had no mind the House of Austria should be rich. Germany being constituted in this ballance, and aequilibrium, it rather reverences than fears the Authority of the Emperour, and is quiet and at peace, because the particular Princes, and States being contented with their own moderate Dominions, and in awe one of another, do forbear those injuries and encroachments which are common in other places; whereas if its constitution was otherwise, the people would certainly think of enlarging as well as their Neighbors, and by consequence interrupt that happy tranquillity which at present they enjoy. In o∣ther Countries where there is not that exact proportion and equality of power betwixt the Princes and free Towns, 'tis not so easie to preserve them in peace; so that those Com∣monwealths which have an ambition of extending their Empire, must do it by confede∣ration, or by the ways of the Romans, and whoever takes any other course, rather ruines, than advantages himself; for new Conquests are prejudicial a thousand ways, and, espe∣cially when your force does not encrease with your Territory, and you are not able to keep what you conquer; and this happens when the expence of an Enterprise is greater than the profit, though it succeeds. This was the case with our Florentines, and the Venetians, who after they had conquered Lombardy and Tuscany, were much weaker than before, when one of them was contented with the Dominion of the Gulf, and the other with a territory of six miles about. We all think of getting what we can, but take no care which way we shall keep it; which is the more inexcusable, because we have the Roman example before our eyes, which we may follow if we please, whereas they had no such ad∣vantage, but wrought all out by their own industry, and wisdom. But there is another way by which new Conquests do a great deal of mischief, and especially to a well ordered Commonwealth; and that is when the City or Province that is conquered, is voluptuous, or effeminate; as it hapned first to the Romans, and then to Hannibal in the Con∣quest of Capua, where the contagion of their ill manners spread it self so suddenly among the Soldiers, that had Capua been farther off, the remedies not so near, or the Romans in the least measure corrupted themselves, that Conquest would have been the ruine of their State: For it was true what Livy told us in these words, Iam tunc minime salubris mili∣tari disciplinae Capua, instrumentum omnium voluptatum, delinitos militum animos aver∣tit a memoria patriae. Capua at that time was no place for Military Discipline; for be∣ing the instrument and contriver of all sorts of sensuality, it debauched the minds of the Sol∣dier from the memory of his Country. And certainly such Cities and Provinces do revenge themselves of their Conqueror without effusion of Blood; for diffusing their ill manners among his people, they become so weak and enervated thereby, that they are at the mer∣cy of whoever assails them: which Iuvenal has excellently well expressed, when he tells us that by their conversation among strangers, the Roman manners were so changed, that instead of their old temperance and parsimony, they were given up wholly to luxury and excess.

—Stevior armis Luxuria incubuit, victum{que} ulciscitur Orbem.

What by the Conquer'd world could never be Reveng'd by force, is done by luxurie.

Things being thus, and even the people of Rome, notwithstanding the excellence of their constitution and discipline, being subject to suffer, and be corrupted by their new acquisi∣tions; what will become of those who have no such virtue nor education to defend them? but besides all the errors above-mentioned, are guilty of another as dangerous as the rest, and that is, by making use in their Wars, not of their own Subjects or Soldiers, but of Auxi∣liaries, and Hirelings.

CHAP. XX.

No Prince, or Commonwealth without manifest danger, can employ foreign Forces, either Auxiliary, or Mercenary.

HAd I not discoursed at large in another place about the inconvenience of Auxiliary or Mer•••••••••••• Forces, in respect of ones own, I would have taken this opportunity to have spoken more of it here, than I shall do now: but having done it already, I shall only touch upon it at present, which I cannot forbear, upon a new occasion which I have met withal in Livr. I call those Forces Auxiliaries, which a Prince or Confederate sends to your assistance under his own Officers, and pay. Of this sort were the two Leg••ons which after the defeat of the Samnites, upon the importunity of the Capu•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 left with them for the security of their City. But those Legions which were intended for the defence of that City, languishing in ease, and wallowing in luxury, began to forget the Disciplne of their Country, and their Reverence to the Senate, and contrive how they might make themselves Masters of the Town, conceiving the Inhabitants unworthy to enjoy those pos∣sessions which they were unable to defend. But this Conspiracy was di••covered in time, and not only prevented, but punished by the Romans, as we shall shew more largly here∣after: At present I shall only say this, that of all Soldiers, none are employed with so much hazard, as your Auxiliaries. For first, neither Soldiers nor Officers receiving pay from you, but from the Prince or State by whom they are sent, they have but little regard either to your interest or authority; but when the War is done, give themselves wholly to pillaging and mischief, and that not only with the Enemy, but their Friends; moved some∣times by their own, and sometimes by the avarice of their Prince. The Romans when they left those Legions at Capua, had no thoughts of breaking their league, or offering them any injury; but the Souldiers being depraved by the licentiousness of the place, and encouraged by the pusillanimity of the Inhabitants, took occasion to conspire, and doubtlesly had they not been prevented, had seized upon the Town. This we could enforce with several other examples, but the case is so plain, I shall content my self with this, and that of the Regini, whose Inhabitants were not only rob'd and dispossessed, but murther'd by a Legion which the Romans sent to them for their security. So then in prudence a Prince or Common∣wealth is to take any course, rather than to bring himself into a necessity of employing Auxiliaries, especially when he is to rely wholly upon them; for no treaty or accommoda∣tion can be made with the Enemy, but shall be more for his advantage, than to entertain such Forces. And if old passages be consulted, and considered together with the new, it will be found that for one time in which they ever did good, there are hundreds in which they have done harm: Nor can an ambitious State or Prince have a more commodious occasion to possess himself of a City or Province, than when he is invited in this manner for its assistance and defence. Wherefore, he whose indiscretion is so great as to make use of such Armies, not only for his defence, but his conquests of other people, takes a course that must necessarily undo him; for he aims at the acquisition of what he cannot keep any longer than his Auxiliaries will give him leave, for they can take it from him when they please: But such is the unhappiness of human ambition, that fixing their eyes only upon present satisfaction, they never think of inconveniences that will follow, whereas if they would reflect upon ancient examples, they would find that the less injurious they

were to their Neighbours, and the more generosity they shew towards them, the more ready would they be to throw themselves into their Arms, as shall be shewn in the next Chapter, by the example of the Capuans.

CHAP. XXI.

The first Praetor which the Romans ever sent out of their own City, was to Capua, and that was 400 years after they began first to make War.

THe People of Rome (as we have said many times before) in the management of their Wars, and the enlargement of their Empire differed much from the methods of our times: For the Cities which they conquered (if they did not think fit to demolish them) were left free, with the exercise of their own Laws, as before, and that without any other mark of subjection, than the subscribing certain Articles of Agreement, and whilst they kept them, they kept their old Priviledges and Dignity. And this Custom they observed till they carried their Arms into Foreign Countries, and began to unravel the Govern∣ments where they conquered, and reduce whole Kingdoms and States into Provinces: This will be clear'd, if we consider that the first Praetor which was ever sent abroad by the Romans, was to Capua; not out of any ambitious design, but at the request of the said Capuans to rectifie and compose some differences, which they could not do among them∣selves. The Antiates following the example of the Capuans, and moved by the same necessity, desired a Praetor likewise, because at that time, as Livy tells us, Non solum arma, sed jura Romana pollebant. Not only the Arms, but the Laws of the Romans were victorious. And this way of lenity in their Government, contributed exceedingly to the enlargement of their Empire; for those Cities or States which have been accustomed to their own Li∣berty and Laws, do more easily submit to a Dominion that seems remote and at a distance (though indeed it may have something of servitude in it) than to that which is always be∣fore their Eyes, and keeps them in perpetual apprehension of slavery; and there is this ad∣vantage besides, That if in the administration of Justice, or the management of publick affairs, any thing be acted to the displeasure of the people, it has less infamous reflection upon the Prince who leaves them to their own Customs and Laws, than upon him who sets up Magistrates of his own, and dispatches all things by them; and this way takes off a great deal of hatred and calumny from the Prince, which would otherwise fall heavily up∣on him. Of the certainty of this opinion, we have a fresh instance in Italy; every body knows that Genoua was oftentimes in the possession of the French, and that that King (excepting of late years) used always to send thither a Governor of his own; at present, (the necessity of his affairs requiring it) he has given them the election of their own Go∣vernor, and it is constantly a Genouese. No body questions but this way is most pleasing to the City, and by consequence their affections must be much enlarged to the King. For it is the Nature of Mankind (and inseparable from it) to trust those with more frankness, who are least like to oppress them; and to fear those least, who are most merciful and humane. This gentleness and familiarity in the Romans prevailed so far upon the Capuans, that they made it their solemn request, that they would send them a Praetor, which if the Ro∣man austerity had but pretended to have done, they would not only have refused, but used all means to have freed themselves from them. But what need we go to Rome and Capua for examples, when we have them at home? Every one knows how long it is since Pistoia threw it self voluntarily into the Arms of the Florentines: Every one knows the jealou∣sies and emulations that were betwixt them and the Florentines, Pisans, Lucchesi, and Sa∣nesi: and this diversity of humours proceeded not from any neglect in the Pistoians of their affairs, or from any disesteem they had of their liberty, more than the others; but from an ancient experience they had had of the affection and tenderness of the Florentines, and that was the true cause why they threw themselves under their protection; whereas carrying themselves more severely to the rest, they were so far from coming in, and sub∣mitting to their jurisdiction, that they did what they could, and tryed all ways possible to disclaim it. And doubtless had the Florentines, by their Leagues, or supplies comported themselves with more kindness to their Neighbors, and not incensed them by their austeri∣ties, they had been Masters of all Tuscany at this hour; Not but that Arms and Severity are to be used upon occasion, but mild ways are to be tryed first, and extremities only in extremity.

CHAP. XXII.

How uncertain the judgments of most People are, in things of greatest importance.

HOw false and erroneous the opinions of men are, all persons can testifie who have any conversation in their Counsels; which unless managed by persons of more than ordinary sagacity, are for the most part contrary to the truth. And because men of these excellent qualifications, in corrupted States (especially in times of peace) by reason of the envy or ambition of other people, are subject to be hated; such Counsels are fre∣quently followed, as the deluded Commons think best, or such as are recommended by those who are more solicitous of the favour, than the benefit of the people: But their errors being discovered in the time of their adversity, necessity directs them to those per∣sons whom in the time of prosperity they dispised, as shall be shown at large in conve∣nient place. Moreover humane consultations are subject to certain accidents by which men are frequently deluded, unless their experience be more than ordinary, which acci∣dents are apt by their likelyhood and probability to persuade people to whatever they de∣sire. This I mention, in consideration of the advice of Numisius the Proetor (after the Latins were defeated by the Romans) and of what was not long since generally believed when Francis I. of France invaded Milan, which was defended by the Swizzers. For Lewis XII. being dead, and Francis d' Angolesme succeeding in that kingdom, he had a great design of recovering Milan, which not many years before had been taken from them by the Swizzers, at the encouragement of Iulius II. To facilitate his Enterprize, he made it his business to gain a party in Italy, and having made sure of the Venetians, he addressed himself to the Florentines, and Pope Leo X. conceiving it would be a great corroboration to his affairs if he could make them, seeing the Forces of the King of Spain were in Lom∣bardy, and the Emperours at Verona. Pope Leo could not be brought to consent, being persuaded (as is said) by his Counsel, that if he kept himself Neuter, he should be cer∣tain of Victory; for it was not for the interest of the Church, that either the King of France, or the Swizzers should be too potent in Italy; but he who would restore it to its ancient Liberty, must deliver it from the servitude both of the one and the other: And because both of them together were not to be dealt withal, nor indeed either of them a∣part, as things stood then; occasion was to be expected, and they were to attend till the King of France and Swizzers had fought, and one of them beaten the other, and then before the Conquerour had recruited, or recovered what he had lost in the Battel, the Pope and his Friends should fall upon him, and so both of them be expulsed. It was impossi∣ble he should ever have a fairer opportunity; for the Enemy were both of them in the Field, and the Popes Army strong upon the borders of Lombardy (under pretence of secu∣ring the Territories of the Church) where it might attend the event of the Battel, which the vigor, and strength of both Armies portended would be bloody, and when they had destroyed one another, and were both of them weaken'd, then might his Army fall securely upon them, possess it self of Lombardy, and govern all Italy as he pleased himself. These were the Counsels which were given his Holiness, and at first they seemed solid enough, but how vain they prov'd afterwards, the event did clearly demonstrate; for the Swizzers after a long and bloody Fight being defeated the Popes and the King of Spains Forces were so far from taking that opportunity of falling upon the French (as they had promised them∣selves) That they prepared to run away, nor would that have secured them, had not they been befriended by the humanity (not to say laziness) of the King of France, who con∣tenting himself with one Victory, never regarded a second, but strook up a Peace with the Pope: And truly at a distance these Counsels seem'd not unreasonable, though in reality they were irrational and idle; for the Conqueror seldom loses many men, what he loses is in the Fight, and the greatest part of the execution is in the pursuit; but grant a Battel is a long time before it be decided (which notwithstanding happens but seldom) and that many are slain and disabled of the conquering side, yet the reputation of Victory gives the Con∣queror such esteem, and strikes such awe and terror into all people, as transcends the consi∣deration of any loss he can sustain: so that he is in an egregious error, who thinks a victo∣rious Army may be the more easily overcome by reason of the prejudice it received in the Fight; for 'tis madness to attempt such an Army with a less number, than you would have engaged it before; because their late fortune will add to their courage. This appeared by

the experience of the Latins; by the Counsel of Numisius the Praetor; and by the losses of the people who followed it. For the Romans having beaten the Latins with much ado, and such slaughter of their own men, that they seemed to have got nothing of a Victory but the Name; Numisius proclaimed it up and down, that then was the time to recover their liberty, and that if with new Forces they fell suddenly upon the Romans, before they were recruited, or had any expectation of being invaded, they would certainly be over∣thrown: Upon which the Latins believing him, raised a new Army, and fell upon the Romans, but they were presently defeated, and suffered the inconvenience, to which all people are subject that follow such Counsels.

CHAP. XXIII.

How the Romans upon any accident which necessitated them to give judgment upon their Subjects, avoided always the mid way.

JAm Latio is status erat rerum, ut ne{que} bellum ne{que} pacem pati possent. The Latins were now in such a condition, that they were neither fit for War nor Peace. And what Livy said of Latium, is true every where else; That Prince or Commonwealth is at the highest pitch of unhappiness, which is in such a condition, as that he can neither receive Peace, nor maintain War: And this happens, when people are conquered, and necessitated to submit upon such hard terms as in their hearts they disdain, or else (to go on with the War) are constrained to implore their assistance, who will make them a prey. The ways by which we are brought into so sad a condition, are commonly ill Counsels, for want of just consideration of our affairs, both as to Mony and Men. For that Commonwealth or Prince who takes right measures in those, shall very hardly fall into the d••••••resses of the Latins, who accepted the condition of the Romans when they should have refused them; and declared War against the Romans when they should have desired a Peace; so that as they ordered the matter, the enmity and amity of the Romans did equally afflict them. The first that overcame them was Manlius Torquatus, and after him Camillus, who seized upon all their Cities, and putting Garisons in them, return'd to Rome, and in his account to the Senate acquainted them, that the whole Country of the Latins was then in their hands. And because the Sentence and Judgment of the Senate at that time upon the Latins is more than ordinarily remarkable; That it may be readier for the imitation of Princes when occasion is offered, I shall set down the ••••rds which Livy makes Camillus speak, which confirm what we have said about the ways which the Romans observed in the enlargement of their Empire; and shows, that in their determinations in matters of State, they left the middle ways, and followed only the extreams. For Government is nothing but keeping Subjects in such a posture as that they may have no will, or power to offend you. And this is done either by taking away all means from them of doing you any hurt; or by obliging and indulging them so, as they may not in reason hope to better their for∣tune; all which will appear, first by Camillus his Speech to the Senate, and then by their resolution upon it. His words were these, Dii immortales ita vos potentes hujus Consilii fecerunt, ut sit Latium, an non sit, in vestra manu posuerint. Ita{que} pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos attinet, parare in perpetuum, vel soeviendo, velignoscendo potestis. Vult is crudeliter consulere in debitos victos{que}? licet delere omne Latium. Vultis exemplo Majorum augere rem Romanam, victos in Civitatem accipiendo? Materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppet it. Certe id firmissimum imperium est, quo obedientes gaudent. Illorum igitur animos dum Ex∣pectatione stupent, seu poen••, seu beneficio praeoccupari opportet. The Gods have put it into the power of this Reverend Council, to determine whether the Latins shall be a people, or not. As to them, your peace will be perpetual, which way soever you take; Are you disposed to severity, and will destroy those poor people that are conquered, and your Prisoners? They are at your mercy, and you may extinguish their very name. Are you disposed according to the example of your Ancestors to propagate your interest by receiving them into your City? You have an opportunity of doing it with the highest advantage and glory. Certainly no Empire is so firm, as where Subjects exsult in their obedience. It will be expedient therefore, whilst they are in amazement and suspence, to settle their minds one way, either by punishment or pardon. According to the Consuls proposal, the Senate came to an issue, and gave sentence Town by Town, according to the Nature of their deserts; but all in extreams, without any me∣diocrity; for some they not only pardoned, but loaded them with benefits, made them f••••e of their own City, and gave them many other priviledges, and exemptions, and the•••• ••y

secured them not only from Rebelling, but from ever conspiring again. The rest whom they thought fit to make examples, were brought Prisoners to Rome, punish'd with all kind of severity, Their Houses destroyed, their Lands confiscated, their Persons dispersed, so as it was not possible for them any way to do any mischief for the future. This was the way the Romans took in the settlement of Latium, which ought to be observed and imitated by all wise Princes and States; and if the Florentines had followed it in the year 1502. when Arezzo and the whole Valley of Chiana rebelled, they had continued their Authority, aug∣mented their State, and supplyed themselves with those Fields which they wanted for their subsistance. But they took the middle way (betwixt the extreams of rigour and remis∣sion) which is always most dangerous; they kept the City, removed the Magistrates, de∣graded the great Men, banished some, and executed others. If any in their Councils ad∣vised to have the City demolished, it was answered, It could not be done without dishonor and rexection upon their own; as if Florence was so weak and inconsiderable, it was not able to keep a Garrison in Arezzo. This Argument was of that sort which carry some appearance, but are not really true. 'Tis much as if we should argue a Parricide or Felon, or other egregious Malefactor, is not to be put to death, lest it should be thought the Prince or Republick was too impotent to restrain them any other way. But those who are of that opinion are to consider, that when a private person, or whole City offends so highly against his Prince, or his Government; To make them examples to other people, and bridle them so as they may be sure to be no more guilty for the future, the surest way is utterly to destroy them; and it is more honourable for a Prince to extirpate them quite at once, than to endeavour to preserve them with a thousand difficulties and dangers: For whoever he be that knows not how to punish his delinquents according to the merits of their offences, and so as to secure himself for the future, is either a weak, or a poor spirited Prince. To con∣firm what is said, we may produce another example of the Romans, in their Sentence upon the Privernates; from whence (as Livy says) two things are to be concluded; one is, that Rebels are to be pardoned frankly, and obliged; or utterly extinguished. The other that generosity of mind, and steddiness and constancy in our answers when given to wise men, make strangely for our advantage. The Roman Senate was assembled to give Sentence up∣on the Privernates who had been in Rebellion, and being reduced by force of Arms, had sent several of their chief Citizens to implore the mercy of the Romans: being brought into the Senate (where every body was persuading according to his inclination, some for mercy, and some for severity) one of the Senators (before they could come to a resolution) ask'd one of the Petitioners, Quam poenam meritos Privernates censeret. What punishment he thought his fellow Citizens deserved: To which he replyed, Eam quam merentur qui se libertate dignos censent, The same that they deserve, who desire to be free. The Senator continuing, Quid si poenam remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vobiscum speremus? If we should pardon you this time, what peace could we hope for from you? To which he answer∣ed, Si bonam dederitis, & fide lem & perpetuam; si malam, haud diuturnam. If it be upon good terms, it will be firm and perpetual; if upon ill, it will hardly last long. Upon which the better part of the Senate (though some opposed it) declared, Se audivisse vocem liberi & viri; nec credi posse illum populum aut hominem deni{que} in ea conditione cujus eum paeniteat, diutius quam necesse sit mansurum. Ibi pacem esse fidam, ubi voluntarii pacati sint, ne{que} eo loco ubi servitutem esse velint, fidem sperandam. That he had spoke like a man, and like a Free-man. That it was not to be imagined any people or private person would submit to a condition that oppress'd him, longer than by necessity he was constrained. That if any peace be lasting and inviolable, it is where the parties do voluntarily subscribe, not where servitude and slavery is imposed. And thereupon it was decreed, that the Privernates should be Civitate donati, and enjoy all the Priviledges of the Romans, concluding, Eos qui nihil praeterquam de libertate cogitant dignos esse qui Romani fiant. That they deserved to be Ro∣mans, whose liberty was the greatest part of their care. And this frank and generous way of answering, took mightily with those grave men, as knowing that whatever they had said otherwise, would not have been from the heart, but with compliance and submission to their fortune and distress. And this is most certain, whoever speaks otherwise (especially if either he has been or but thought himself free) does but equivocate, and he that be∣lieves him, takes wrong Counsels, such as are neither good for himself, nor satisfactory to them, which many times produces Rebellion, and the ruine of the State, And things being so, we conclude, according to our proposition in the beginning of our discourse; That upon any great Sentence to be given against a people or City that has been formerly free, the surest way is, to wave all moderation, and either to caress or extinguish them. He that proceeds otherwise, will find himself in an error, as the Samnites were, when ha∣ving enclosed the Romans ad Turcas Caudinas, they neither discharged them freely, nor

put them to the Sword, as one of their grave Citizens advised; but abused them, and pil∣laged them, and dismissed them sub jugum when they had done. But not long after, they were made sensible of their error, and that the old Citizen was in the right; as we shall show more at large hereafter.

CHAP. XXIV.

That in the generality, Castles and Citadels, do more mischief than good.

TO the States-men of our times, it may perhaps seem indiscretion or inadvertancy in the Romans, that being desirous to keep Latium, and Privernum in subjection, they built neither Castles nor Citadels to secure them: and indeed they differed exceedingly from our Florentine Politicians, who are of opinion that not only Pisa, but all other Cities whatever are to be kept under that way, and surely had the Romans been like us, they would have been of the same opinion; but differing in their courage, their judgment, and their power, they differed likewise in their resolutions. Nor during all the time of their liberty, were the Româns known to build any Castle or Citadel to keep any City in awe, or any Province in peace; only some indeed which were fortified before, they garrisoned, and continued; which being so, and quite contrary to the Sentiment of our times, I think it not amiss, if in this place I inquire whether such things be profitable or unprofitable to the persons who build them. It is therefore to be considered, that such Fortresses are erected, either to repel an Enemy, or restrain a Subject, and keep him in obedience. In the first case I do pronounce them unnecessary; in the second dangerous. They are dangerous, and do rather obstruct than promote obedience in the Subject; because the great danger of Rebellion proceeds from hatred which the people have conceived against their Prince, that hatred proceeds from his injustice to the people, and he is said to be unjust when he governs them arbitrarily, and by force, which is never so manifest, as when he builds such Ca∣stles and Citadels among them, that no man might be able in any manner to oppose him. Which being so, those kind of Fortifications are not only useless and improper to keep the Subject in subjection; but dangerous, seeing by presumption upon them, Princes are en∣couraged to treat their Subjects worse than otherwise they would do, by which they con∣tract the odium of the people; and what is the consequence? Rebellion and Blood, and Confusion: Neither when troubles arise, and Wars break out, is there that defence or security in them, as is now adays imagined; for there are only two ways of keeping a conquered people in obedience, you must either have a standing Army (as the Romans had) always ready to subdue them; or you must divide, disperse, or destroy them in such manner, that they may never get together again to disturb you: For though you impo∣verish and plunder them never so much, Spoliatis arma supersunt, They will find Arms to revenge themselves; and if you disarm them never so carefully, Furor arma, ministrat. Their fury will supply them. If you cut off their Commanders, like Hydra's, others will succeed, and do as much mischief: If you build these Castles, in time of Peace they may be serviceable, and make you more bold, and secure against your Subjects; but when War comes, and both your Subjects and Enemies infest you, it is impossible they should defend you against both. And if ever they were useless, it is now since the use of Artille∣ry is known, against the fury of which no little Fort (from whence other Guns cannot play with security again, and where they want ground for repairing their breaches, or ma∣king new retrenchments upon occasion) can possibly stand: and being so, consider serious∣ly with your self whether these kind of Fortresses are like to keep your old Subjects, or your new Conquests in obedience? If your Territory be hereditary, and you have received it from your Ancestors, to build Castles to keep your own natural Subjects in obedience, will be to little purpose, for the reasons abovesaid, seeing they will be but a means to make you and your posterity the more Tyrannical, and by consequence expose you to the hatred of the people, against which they will be afterwards unable to defend you. So that for these reasons, that neither he himself nor his heirs may have occasion to entrench too much upon the people; and the people have no occasion to abhor him, a wise Prince will never build Citadels; and though Francesco Sforza Duke of Milan was reputed a wise Man, and built a Citadel at Milan to secure his Usurpations, yet his wisdom did not appear in that, for it proved afterwards the ruine of his posterity. For presuming upon that, they took the more confidence to oppress the people, which incensed them so highly, that they re∣volted upon the first approach of an Enemy, and turned their Prince out of that Province.

So that that Citadel did him no good in time of War against the incursions of the Enemy; and in time of Peace, making him more insolent, it did but expose him to the hatred of the people; whereas if no Citadel had been built, and yet they had been so indiscreet as to have behaved themselves insolently to their Subjects, some or other of them who had been injured would have remonstrated to their Prince, the danger of his courses, before he had contracted the general odium; by which there would have been a possibility that he might have reform'd, and reconciled himself to his Subjects; and had he done so, he would have better defended himself against the French with the affections of his people, and no Citadel; than with a Citadel, and no affections of the people. Besides there are many ways of losing these Citadels; by force, by fraud, by corrupting the Governour, by starving, and by storm. And if you have lost a City, which you are in hopes of recovering by the favour of the Citadel, which still holds out for you; it will require an Army as much as if there were no Citadel at all; and so much the stronger, by how much 'tis probable the people may be more incensed from the mischief which they have received out of the Castle, than they would have been, had there been no Castle at all. Experience it self has since taught us that that Citadel of Milan was of no advantage, either to the Dukes of Milan, nor French in time of their adversity; but in time of Peace did them much prejudice, by hindring them from taking such ways as might have obliged the peo∣ple, and rendered them well affected to their Government. Guido Ubaldo Son to Fred••ric Duke of Urbin, was a great Captain as any in his time, being driven out of his Country by Coesar Borgia (Son to Alexander VI.) and recovering it afterwards by an accident, he caused all the Fortresses in the whole Province to be dismantled, and destroyed; as things which he had found by experience were more to his prejudice than security. For being beloved by the people, he would not do them the injury to put Garisons in them; and if he had, upon any invasion from the Enemy, he could not have kept them without a field Army to relieve them. Iulius the Pope, having driven the Bentivogli out of Bononia, built a Citadel there, and put in such a Governour as partly by his own ill nature, and partly by the instructions o•• his Master, killed many of the Citizens, and committed seve∣ral cruelties, which provoked the Bononians so exceedingly, that they rebelled, and reco∣vered the Citadel, which had the Governour been more moderate, might have been longer in his power. Nicolo de Castello Father of the Vitelli, (returning into his Country, from whence he had been banished by the Popes) immediately demolished two Fortresses which had been raised by Sixtus IV. as judging the hearts of the people more like than those Castles, to secure him. But of all, there is no example, evinces the unusefulness of these kind of Garisons, and the convenience of taking them away, more than that which hapned lately at Genoa; for the said City revolting from Lewis XII. of France, in the year 1507. Lewis came with a strong Army into Italy, and having reduced it, built a Castle of greater strength and capacity than any of that time; for it was built upon a promontory that Com∣manded the Sea called Godefa, the Harbour, and the Town, so that by all people it was held inexpugnable. But the French being driven out of Italy in the year 1512. Genoa rebelled (notwithstanding the Castle) and Ottanio Fegosa taking the Government upon him, in sixteen months brought the Castle to such extremity, that it was forced to surren∣der; whereupon, though he was advised to keep it as a refuge in case of any disaster; yet being a wise man, and knowing well that a Prince is in nothing so safe, as in the affections of his Subjects, he caused it to be demolished, and he found the benefit of that Counsel, for by it he has held that Government to this day; and that so strongly, that whereas be∣fore, the appearance of a thousand Foot was sufficient at any time to have carried it; his adversaries assaulted it with ten thousand, and could do him no wrong. So that we see the demolishing de Fegosa no hurt, and the making it did the King of France no good; for when he was able to bring an Army into Italy, he was able to recover Genoa without the help of the Castle; but when he could bring no Army, he could not keep it, though the Castle was for him: From whence it follows, that as the building of it, was a great expence, and the loss of it a great dishonour to the King of France; so the taking of it was great glory to Ottaviano, and the ruining it, a great advantage. And it is the same thing with those who build them in their new Conquests, to keep their new subjects in obedience, which if the example of Genoa and the French should be insufficient to prove, the Cities of Florence and Pisa, will do it effectually. The Florentines built a Citadel at Pisa, and several other Fortresses to keep it in aw; not considering that a City which had been free, and in continual emulation of the Florentine greatness, was not any other way to be kept to its duty, unless (according to the practice of the Romans) they made a fair and honourable league with it, or utterly subverted it. But how much those Fortresses answered their designs, appeared when Charles VIII. made his Expedition into Italy, to

whom they were generally surrendered, either thorow the fear or falshood of their Go∣vernors. So that had not they been built, the Florentines had never relyed so much upon them for the keeping of Pisa, but had thought of some safer way to have secured it against the King of France. I conclude then, that to keep ones own Native Country in subje∣ction, Fortresses are dangerous, and to keep new Conquests, they are ineffectual: To prove that the authority and practice of the Romans ought to be sufficient, who whenever they had a mind to restrain the power, and bridle the fury of the people, did it not by erecting new Fortresses, but by demolishing the old. If it be objected that Tarentum of old, and Brescia of late years were recovered by the fidelity of the Castles, when the Towns had revolted. I answer, that as to the recovery of Tarentum, the Castle contributed no∣thing, for the Consul Quintus Fabius was sent thither with an Army strong enough to have retaken it, had there been no Castle at all: and, what advantage was it to the Romans that the Castle held for them, if the recovery of the Town required a Consular Army, and the presence of so great a Soldier as Fabius Maximus; and that they might have retaken it without the help of the Castle, is clear in the example of Capua, which they recovered, when there was no Castle to befriend them. In the case of Brescia, the circumstances were very extraordinary; for it seldom happens that when a City revolts, and the Castle holds out for you, That the Castle has a field Army hard by, and ready to relieve you. Monsieur de Foix General for the King of France, being with his Army at Bologna, and understanding the desection of the Brescians, marched immediately to recover it, and in three days time (by the help of the Castle) was Master of it again. So that it was not wholly by the benefit of the Castle that Brescia was recovered, but by the presence and dextery of Mon∣sieur de Foix and his Army. And this example may be sufficient to ballance all others to the contrary; for we see daily in our times, multitudes of Castles taken and retaken, and following the fate of their Cities, and that with no more difficulty or variety of fortune, than when there are none at all; as has been visible in Lombardy, Romagna, the Kingdom of Naples, and all other quarters of Italy. And as to those Citadels which are built in your new Conquests, to defend you from your Enemies abroad; they also are absolutely unnecessary, where you have an Army in the field; and where you have none, they are of no use. A good Army without any such Forts, is sufficient to defend you. And this has been found by experience by all those who have been thought excellent in the Arts of War, or of Peace; and particularly by the Romans and Spartans: The Romans never erected any new Castles, and the Spartans never suffered any old; but what Cities soever they conquered, down went their Walls; nay, even in their own Cities they would not permit any fortification, as believing nothing so proper to defend them as the virtue and courage of their Citizens. A Spartan being demanded by an Athenian, Whether the Walls of Athens were not very beautiful? Yes, says the Spartan, if it was but inhabited by Women. A Prince therefore who has a good Army in the field, may have some benefit by his Castles, if they be upon the Frontiers of his Country, or in some places upon the Coast, where they may ••etard and entertain an Enemy for some time till the Army can come up: But if the Prince has no Army on foot, let his Castles be where they will, upon the Frontiers or elsewhere, they are either unserviceable or dangerous: dangerous, because they are easily lost, and made use of by the Enemy against you; or if they be too strong to be taken, yet the Enemy marches on, and leaves them unserviceable behind him. For an Army that has no Enemy in the field to confront it, takes no notice of Cities or Castles, but passing by as it pleases, rambles up and down, and ravages the whole Country; as may be observed both in ancient History and new. Francesco Maria not many years since invaded the Dutchy of Urbin, nor concern'd himself at all, though he left ten of his Enemies Cities behind him. Wherefore that Prince who has a good Army, need not stand upon Castles; and he that has no Castles, need not trouble himself to build any; all that he is to do, is, to fortifie the Town of his own residence as well as he can, and accustom the Citizens to Arms, that he may be able to sustain an Enemy, at least for a while, till he can make his conditions, or procure relief; All other designs are expensive in times of Peace; and unprofitable in time of War; so that he who considers what has been said, must acknowledge that as the Romans were wise in every thing else, so more particularly in their affairs with the Latins, and Privernates, in not thinking of Castles and Fortresses, but of more noble and generous ways of securing their allegiance.

CHAP. XXV.

To attempt a City full of intestine divisions, and to expect to carry it thereby, is uncertain and dangerous.

THe divisions in the Commonwealth of Rome were so great betwixt the People and the Nobility, that the Veientes and Hetrusci, taking the opportunity, conspired its destruction, and having raised an Army, and harrassed their whole Country, the Senate sent out G. Manlius, and M. Fabius against them; whose Army encamping near the Enemy, were so provoked by the insolence of their language, that the Romans laid aside their private animosities, and coming to a Battel overthrew them; by which we may ob∣serve how easily we erre in our Counsels, and how we lose things many times the same way by which we intended to gain them. The Veientes thought by assaulting the Romans whilst they were embroil'd in their intestine divisions, they should certainly overcome them; and their invading them at that time, united the Enemy, and ruined themselves; and not without reason, for the occasion of discord and faction in a Commonwealth is idleness, and peace; and there is nothing unites like apprehension, and War. So that had the Veientes been wise as they should have been, they should have forborn making War upon them at that time, and have tryed other artificial ways to have destroyed them. The surest way is to insinuate, and make your self a Mediator betwixt them, and to take upon your self the arbitration, rather than they should come to blows. When it is come to that, you are privately and gently to supply the weaker side; to foment and continue the War, till they consume one another; but be sure your supplies be not too great, lest both parties begin to suspect you, and believe your design is to ruine them both, and make your self Prince. If this way be well managed, it will certainly bring you to the end which you desired; for when both sides are weary, they will commit themselves to your arbitration. By these Arts, the City of Pistoia returned to its dependance upon Florence; for labouring under intestine divisions, the Florentines favouring first one side, and then the other (but so slily that no occasion of jealousie was given to either) brought them both in a short time to be weary of their distractions, and throw themselves unanimously into their arms. The Government of the City of Siena had never been changed by their own domestick dissentions, had not the Florentines supplied both parties under-hand, and fomented them that way, whereas had they appeared openly and above board, it would have been a means to have united them. I shall add one example more, Philip Visconti Duke of Milan made War many times upon the Florentines, hoping by the dissentions of the City to have con∣quered them the more easily, but he never succeeded. So that complaining one time of his misfortunes, he had this Expression, The follies of the Florentines have cost me two millions of Mony, to no purpose. In short, as the Veientes and Tuscans found themselves in an error (when they thought by help of the differences in Rome, to have mastered the Romans) and were ruined themselves for their pains. So it will fare with whoever takes that way to oppress or subvert any other Government.

CHAP. XXVI.

He who contemns or reproaches another person, incurs his hatred, without any advantage to himself.

I Look upon it as one of the greatest points of discretion in a man, to forbear injury and threatning, especially in words: neither of them weakens the Enemy, but threatning makes him more cautious, and injury the more inveterate, and industrious to revenge it. This is manifest by the example of the Veienti (of which I discoursed in the foregoing Chapter) for not contenting themselves with the mischiefs that they brought upon them by the War, they added contumely and opprobrious language, which so provoked and enflamed the Roman Army, that whereas before they were irresolute, and seemed to decline it, they now fell upon them unanimously, and over-threw them. So that it ought to be the principal care in an Officer that neither himself nor his Soldiers do incense and exaspe∣rate his Enemy by ill language; for that makes him but the more so, does not at all hinder him from revenging himself, but does the Author more mischief than the Enemy. And

of this we have a notable example in Asia. Gabades the Persian General having besieged Amida a long time, without any considerable progress; weary of the tediousness of the Leaguer, and hopeless of success, he resolved to draw off and be gone; but as he was raising his Camp, the Garison perceiving it, got all upon the Walls, and with the basest and most provoking circumstances imaginable upbraided them with Cowardize; which nettled Gabedes in such manner, that he changed his Counsels, sate down again, and ply'd it with that industry and indignation, that he took it in few days, and gave it up to the fury of the Soldier. The same thing hapned to the Veienti (as I said before) who not co••tenting themselves to make War upon the Romans, went up under their very Noses to reproach them; and what followed? they irritated them so, that they settled the courage, and united the animosities of the Roman Army, and put them into so high a sit of impa∣tience, that they forced the Consul to a Battel, in which the Veientes received the reward of their contumacy. He therefore who is General of an Army, or Governour of a Com∣monwealth, and commands or governs discreetly, ••hkes particular care that such ill lan∣guage be not used either in the City or Army, to one another, nor to the Enemy: For to an Enemy, they make him but worse, unless such remedies be applyed, as are practised by wise men. The Romans having left two of their Legions at Capoua, they conspired against the Capouans (as shall be described more largely hereafter) which occasioned a great sedition, but it was afterwards appeased by Valerius Corvinus, and among other things necessary in that juncture, an Act of Oblivion was passed, with great penalty to any man that should upbraid any of the Soldiers by their Sedition. Tiberius Grachus having the command of a certain number of Servants (in the time of Hanibal's Wars) which the scarcity of men, had forced the Romans to Arm, made it no less than death for any man to reproach them by their servitude. So mindful were the Roman Officers always of pre∣venting such exprobration, as knowing that nothing provokes and incenses a man so high∣ly as to have his imperfections rip'd up, whether in earnest, or in jest, 'tis the same thing. Nam facetiae asperae, quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem sui memoriam relinquunt; for biting, raillery, especially with a tincture of truth, leaves an ill impression upon the Memory.

CHAP. XXVII.

Wise Princes, and well governed States ought to be contented with victory; for many times whilst they think to push things forward, they lose all.

THat we use our Enemy with rude and dishonorable language, proceeds either from in∣solence upon some victory past or extraordinary confidence of obtaining it, which being false, perplexes our understanding, and makes us err not only in our words, but our actions. For from the time that error seizes upon our judgments, it makes us many times lose the occasion of a certain good, in hopes of a better that is but uncertain, which is a point not unworthy our consideration, seeing thereby our reason is disturbed, and our State many times brought in danger of ruine; and this I shall demonstrate by examples both ancient and modern, because arguments cannot do it so distinctly. Hanibal after he had defeated the Romans at Cannas, sent Messengers to Carthage with the news of his Vi∣ctory, and to desire Supplies. The Senate was a long time in Counsel what was to be done, Annon, a grave and solid Citizen being present, advised them to make wise use of their Victory, and think of making Peace with the Romans, which they might do upon better conditions, now they were Conquerors, than they were in reason to expect upon any disaster. That the Carthaginians had satisfied the whole world that they were able to ba∣lance the Romans; for they had fought with them, and beaten them; and having gone so far with honour and success, they ought not (at least in his judgment) expose what they had got, and by hoping for more, run a hazard of losing all: But this Counsel was not followed, though afterwards, when too late, it was found to be the better.

Alexander the great had conquered all the East, when the Commonwealth of Tyre (a great Town situate like Venice in the water) amazed at the grandeur of Alexander, sent Embassadors to him to offer him their obedience and subjection upon what terms he pleased, only they were unwilling either himself, or any of his Army should come into their Town. Alexander disdaining to be excluded by a private City, to whom the whole world had opened their Gates; rejected their offers, sent their Embassadors back, and went im∣mediately to besiege it. The Town stood in the Sea, and was well provided both with

Victual and Ammunition; insomuch as at four months end Alexander began to consider that that single Town had deprived his glory of more time, than many other of his Con∣quests of much greater importance: Whereupon he resolved to come to an agreement with them, and to grant them the conditions which they demanded at first; but the Tyrians transported with pride, not only refused his proffers, but put his Messengers to death; upon which in a rage Alexander caused it to be assaulted immediately, and it was done with that fury, that the Town was taken and sack'd, and part of the people put to the Sword, and the rest made slaves. In the year 1512. a Spanish Army came into the Dominions of the Florentines to restore the Medici in Florence, and tax the City; and they were called in, and conducted by the Citizens themselves, who had promised, that as soon as they appeared in those parts, they would take Arms, and declare for them; being entered in the plain, and finding no body to joyn with them, or supply them, scarcity of provisions prevailed with the Spaniard to think of a Treaty, and propose it to the Enemy, but the Florentines were too high, and re••used it, which was the loss of Prato, and the ruine of their State. So then a Prince that is attack'd by another Prince more potent than himself, cannot be guilty of a greater error, than to refuse an agreement, especially when it is offered; for it can never be so bad, but it shall have in it something of advantage for him who accepts it, and perhaps contribute to his Victory. It ought therefore to have satisfied the people of Tyre, that Alexander accepted of the conditions which he had formerly denyed them; and it had been Victory enough for them, that with Arms in their hands they had forced so great a Conqueror to condescend. It was the same case with the Florentines; they ought to have been contented, and thought it honour enough that the Spanish Army complyed, and was reduced to a condition of granting part of their desires, though they would not gratifie them in all; for it was plain, the design of that Army was to change the Govern∣ment; to break their league with the French; and to raise what Money upon them they could. Though of these three points, they had obtained the two last, and the first alone had remained entire to the Florentines (that is to say, the Government of the City) every Citizen (besides the security of his life) would have had some honour and satisfaction, without concerning themselves so much for the loss of the other two. And though by the posture of their affairs their success seem'd to be certain; yet they ought not to have ex∣posed things to the discretion of Fortune, seeing their all was at stake, which no wise man will hazard but upon inevitable necessity. Hanibal having left Italy, where he had been sixteen years together with a great deal of honour, being called home to the relief of his own Country, found Asdrubal and Siphax defeated; the Kingdom of Numidia lost; The Carthaginians retired, and coop'd up within the circumference of their own walls, so as they had no hopes but in Hanibal and his Army. Hanibal being sensible that this was the last cast, and that if he miscarried, his Country was quite lost, resolved to put nothing to a hazard, till he had tryed all other ways; and was not ashamed to make the first overture of a Peace, as knowing that if there was any hopes left for his Country, it was in that, rather than War; but being refused, he resolved to fight (though with very little hopes) supposing he might possibly win the day, or if he did lose it, it should not be without leaving some testimony of his courage and generosity. If then Hanibal, a person of that great Experience and Conduct, at the head of a great Army, chose rather to have had things determined by treaty and accommodation, than Battel; upon the loss of which, the wealth and liberty of his Country depended: what is he to do, who has not his courage nor experience? But men are subject to strange and imaginary hopes, upon which reposing with too much confidence, they take their measures amiss, and are many times ruined.

CHAP. XXVIII.

How much it is for the interest of all Governments that all injury be punished, whether against the publick, or particular persons.

IT is easily known to what men are often transported by choler and indignation, by what hapned to the Romans, when they sent the three Fabii Embassadors towards the Gauls, who were entered into Tuscany, and had laid siege to Clusium. For the Clusians being besieged, sent to the Romans to relieve them, and the Romans sent to the French to require them in the name of the people of Rome, to withdraw their forces out of Tuscany; The Roman Embassadors arrived at the Army, but being better Soldiers than Orators,

when the Armies came to engage, they put themselves at the head of the Clusians, to fight against the French, which being observed by the French, turn'd all their former hatred to the Tuscans, upon the Romans, which was much encreased after they had sent Embassa∣dors to complain of it at Rome, and to require that those who had committed that fault, might be delivered up into their hands, to make satisfaction for their offence. But instead of granting their demands, or punishing their delinquency themselves, they were created Tribunes with Consular authority. Which coming afterwards to the Ears of the French, finding those persons advanced, who ought rather to have been punished, they interpre∣ted it as done in affront to them, and being enflamed with anger and disdain, they marched directly to Rome, assaulted and took it, all but the Capitol, which hapned to them for nothing, but that the Romans (when their Embassadors had contra jus gentium, fought against the French) had been so far from doing them justice, that the said Embassadors were advanced and preferred. For which reason, a Prince and Commonwealth is to take care that no such injury be done, not only to a Nation, or Commonalty, but to any particular person; for if a man be highly offended either by a State, or private person, and has not the satisfaction he desires, if it be in a Republick, he ceases not to pursue his revenge, though with the ruine of the State. If it be under a Monarchy, and he finds himself touched in point of honour, if he has the least spark of generosity in him, he will never be quiet till he be revenged, though with never so much prejudice to himself, of which case we cannot have an apter and truer example, than in Philip of Macedon, the Father of Alexander the great. Philip had in his Court a young Gentleman of very ex∣quisite beauty called Pausanias, with whom Attalus (a great favourite of the said Phi∣lips) was enamoured; having tempted and solicited him many times to satisfie his passion, and found him always averse, he resolved to do that by force or surprise, which he could not do otherwise: To this purpose he made a solemn feast, and invited Pausanias, and several other great persons: when they had filled themselves will with their good cheer, he caused Pausanias to be taken from the Table, and carried to a private place, and not only satisfied his own lust, but caused him to be vitiated by several others. Pausanias com∣plained heavily to King Philip, who having kept him for some time in hopes of doing him justice, instead of performing, he advanced Attalus to the Government of a Province in Greece: Which Pausanias resenting; in great anger that his adversary against whom he had so long, and so earnestly solicited, should now be preferred, he began to turn his in∣dignation upon the King, who had refused to right him, rather than upon the person who had done him the wrong: Insomuch that the very morning his Daughter was married to Alexander of Epirus, as Philip was going to the Temple to celebrate the Nuptiality with his Son Alexander on one hand of him, and his new Son-in-Law on the other, Pausanias assaulted and slew him. This example is much like that of the Romans, and is to be ob∣served by any man that governs; who is never to despise any body so as not to believe but he who is injured will revenge himself some time or other, though with never so much danger and detriment to himself.

CHAP. XXIX.

Fortune casts a mist before peoples eyes, when she would not have them oppose her designs.

IF the course of humane affairs be considered, it will appear, that many accidents, arise, against which the Heavens do not suffer us to provide: And when this hapned at Rome, where there was so much Virtue, and Piety, and Order, well may it happen more frequently in those Cities and Provinces where there are no such things to be found. And because the place is remarkable, to show the influence which the Heavens have upon human affairs, Titus Livius has discoursed of it largely and efficaciously, telling us, That the Stars to make us sensible of their power, first disposed the said Fabii (who were sent Embassa∣dors to the French) to fight as abovesaid, to the end that upon that occasion, they might make War upon Rome. In the next place, they besotted the Romans so, as they did no∣thing worthy of the name of Romans in order to their defence, having banished Camillus (the only person capable of standing them in stead) to Ardea. Again, when the French were upon their march towards Rome, those who to repel the inroads of the Volsci, and other bordering Enemies, had made Dictators many times, and with very good success, made none upon the approach of the French. They were so slow likewise, and so remiss in

the raising of Men, and so tedious in furnishing them with Arms, that they could scarce draw out any considerable force against them, till the Enemy was as far as the River Allia which is within ten miles of Rome, and when their Army was come thither, it was not encamped by the Tribunes with the usual diligence and discretion, they having neither chosen a good place, nor drawn their line, nor fortified themselves with Trenches, nor Stoccadoes as formerly, nor done any thing for their security, either humane, or divine: When they came to fight, they drew up their men so awkwardly and untowardly, that neither Soldier nor Officer did any thing worthy of the Discipline of the Romans, so that the Battel was lost without any effusion of Blood, the Romans running at the very first charge, the greatest part of them to Veii, the rest to Rome, and in such consternation, that they fled directly to the Capitol before they went home to their houses. So that the Senate without so much as thinking to defend their City, any more than the rest, never caused the Gates to be shut, but part of them fled away, and part into the Capitol. There, it is true they began to observe better orders than before, and managed things with less confusion; They discharged all those that were unserviceable, and furnished themselves with what provision they could get, that they might be able to hold out. The greatest part of those useless people which were turn'd out of the Capitol, as old Men, Women, and Children, fled into the Neighbouring Cities; the rest continued in Rome, and were a prey to the French. So that if a man should have read their Exploits in former times, and compared them with their actions then, he would not have believed them to be the same people; and Titus Livius gives the reason after he had described all the disorders aforesaid in these words, Adeo obcaecat animos fortuna, cum vim suam ingruentem refringi non vult. So strangely does fortune blind other people, when she would not be obstructed in her designs; and there can be nothing more true. Wherefore men are not so much to be blamed or commended for their adversity or prosperity; for it is frequently seen, some are hurried to ruine, and others advanced to great honour by the swing and impulse of their fate, wisdom availing little against the misfortunes of the one, and folly as little against the felicity of the other. When fortune designs any great matter, she makes choice of some man of such courage and parts, as is able to discern when she presents him with an occasion: and so on the otherside, when she intends any great destruction, she has her Instruments ready to push on the wheel, and assist to her designs; and if there be any man capable of obstructing them in the least, she either rids him out of the way, or deprives him of all authority, and leaves him without any faculty to do good. And this is abundantly cleared by this place, where Fortune, to amplifie Rome, and bring it to that Grandeur to which it arrived afterwards; thought fit to debase it, (as we shall show at large in the beginning of our third Book) but would not utterly destroy it: For which reason, though she permitted Camillus to be banished, she would not suffer him to be killed; though she let Rome be taken, she preserved the Capitol: Though she intimidated the Romans, and would suffer them to do nothing wisely for the safety of the City, yet she left them so much wisdom as secured the Capitol: That Rome might be taken, she caused the greatest part of the Army that was defeated upon the Allia, to retire to Veii, thereby cutting off all ways for the defence of Rome: But in the midst of her Career, when she seem'd in such haste, and so impatient of its destruction, she prepared every thing that was necessary for its preservation; having conveyed a good Army to Veii, and Camillus to Ardea, that once again they might make head under a General whose repu∣tation was never fully'd with the ignominy of such a loss, but stood clear and entire for the recovery of his Country: And here we might bring store of modern examples to prove what is said, were not this sufficient without them. Yet this I shall assert again (and by the occurrences in all History there is nothing more true) That men may second their fortune, not resist it; and follow the order of her designs, but by no means defeat them: Nevertheless men are not wholly to abandon themselves, because they know not her end; for her ways being unknown and irregular, may possibly be at last for our good; so that we are always to hope the best, and that hope is to preserve us in whatever troubles or distresses we shall fall.

CHAP. XXX.

Princes and Republicks that are truly magnificent, do not make their Leagues and Alliances with Money, but by their virtue, reputation, and force.

THe Romans were besieged in the Capitol, and though they were in expectation of relief from V••ii and Camillus, yet Famine constraining them, they proposed a par∣ley with the French, and were to pay a certain Sum of Money for their liberty; The Arti∣cles were sign'd, all things concluded, and Commissioners sent in to receive the Money, when on a sudden Camillus appears with his Army, as if fortune had done it (says Livy). Ut Romani auro redempti non viverent. That it might not be said the Romans had ever been ransom'd: Which point is not only observable in this place, but in the whole progress of the affairs of that Commonwealth, where it may be seen that they never got Town, nor never made Peace with their Money; whatever they did, was bravely, and with their Arms, which I think is more than can be said of any other State in the world. One of the great marks of the puissance of this Commonwealth, was the manner of her living with her Neighbors. When things are so managed in a Government, that the Neighbors purchase its amity, and make themselves its Pensioners; 'tis a certain sign of the potency of that Government: But when the Neighbors on the contrary receive Money from it, 'tis as infallible a sign of its weakness. If one reads the Roman History, he shall find the Massilians, the Edui, the Rhodians, Hiero of Syracuse, and Massi••issa, as they were Neigh∣bors, so they were Tributaries to the Romans, contributing to their expences, and Taxes as there was occasion, without expectation of any other recompence, but protection. Where a Prince or Commonwealth is weak, it is otherwise, as it appeared by our own City of Florence, which in former times when it was in its greatest reputation, paid annual stipends to most of the little Governments in Romania, besides what was received by the Perugians, Castellans, and all their other Neighbors; whereas had it been strong, and well Armed, it would have been quite otherwise, and all the rest would have given Flo∣rence Money for her protection. Nor were the Florentines singular in this case, the Vene∣tians did the same, and so did the King of France, who notwithstanding the greatness of his Kingdom, was tributary to the Swizzers, and the King of England, which proceeded from his having disarmed the people, and preferring a present opportunity of squeezing them, and avoiding an imaginary danger, before the doing those things that might have secured his State, and made it happy for ever; which practice though for some time it may produce quiet and repose, yet the end is troubles, and losses, and ruine without remedy.

It would be too tedious to recount how often the Florentines, the Venetians, and the Kingdom of France have bought off their Wars, and submitted to such dishonorable terms, as the Romans could never be brought to but once. It would be too tedious to recount how many Towns the Florentines, and the Venetians have brought with their Mony, which have been the occasion of great disorders afterwards, and prov'd that what is gotten by gold, is not to be kept with iron.

This point of generosity, and this manner of living the Romans observed very pun∣ctually whilst they were free; but after they fell under the Government of Emperors, and those Emperors grew bad, they began to degenerate too, and prefer the shadow before the Sun. They began to be Pensionaries first to the Parthians, then to the Germans, and by degrees to all their Neighbors, which was the first step to the ruine of that great Empire; and ••ll these inconveniences proceeded from the disarming of the people, and neglecting to train them up to Military Discipline, from whence a greater mischief does arise; and that is, That the nearer the Enemy approaches, the weaker, and more unable he finds you; and therefore not being strong enough of your self to repel the Enemy from your borders, you are forced to pay tribute to your Neighbors to undertake it for you; which being to be raised and extorted from your Subjects, renders them more feeble and impotent. By which means it happens sometimes that those States which are in this condition, may per∣haps make some little resistance upon the Frontiers, but if the Enemy passes that, all is gone without remedy. But all this is disorderly, and unnatural; for as nature in all ani∣mals has fortified the vital and principal, and not extream parts of the body, because the body can subsist without the one, but not without the other. So 'tis in all Governments, the heart and center is to be fortified, rather than the Frontiers: But this was very ill observed by the Florentines, for whenever an Enemy had past our borders, and took his way towards the City, there was no body in a condition to oppose him. It was the same

with the Venetians not many years since, and had not their City been as it were swadled with the Sea, it had been certainly destroyed. This indeed has not been seen so frequent∣ly in France, because it is so great a Kingdom, and too strong for most of its neighbours; nevertheless when in the year 1513 they were invaded by the English, the whole Kingdom trembled, and the King of France himself, and many others were of opinion, that if he lost one Battel, the whole Kingdom was gone. With the Romans it was quite contrary; the nearer the Enemy approached the City, the stronger he found it: this was evident in Hanibal's invasion, though he had forc'd his way into Italy, fought three great Battels with the Romans, and beat them in every one, though they had lost so many brave Souldiers and Officers, yet they were not only able to continue the War, but to conquer them atlast, and all by fortifying the heart and center of their Country, and leaving the extremities to shift for themselves: for the vitals and fundamentals of their State was the People of Rome, the Country of the Latins, the neighbouring Cities that were in League, and their Colonies from whence they drew so many Souldiers as were able to fight, and entertain the whole World. And this Hanno the Carthaginian understood very well: for when after the Bat∣tel at Cannas Hanibal sent Mago to Carthage to give them an account of the particu∣lars of the Victory, Mago having exceedingly magnified the exploits of his Brother, and debased the Condition of the Romans, Hanno interrupted him, and enquir'd whether any of the Roman Cities, or any of their Confederates had revolted? whether any of their Senators were come in to Hanibal? or whether they had sent any Embassadors to him to treat? and when Mago denied that any thing of all this had passed, Hanno replyed, Hosti∣um ergo multum superest, & bellum tam integrum habemus, atque habuimus qua die Annibal Italian est ingressus; There is work enough behind, and the War is as entire as when Hanibal passed first into Italy. It is apparent therefore, both by what is said in this Chapter, and what has been said often before, that there is great difference betwixt the present and an∣cient methods of the Romans; and if we seriously consider it, we shall not wonder that so many Towns are taken and lost, and so many Governments subverted, as we have seen in our days: for where discipline is neglected, and military virtue laid aside, all things are committed wholly to Fortune, which being various and unconstant, produces various mu∣tations; and this vicissitude and unconstancy of affairs will continue till some excellent person arises to restore the ancient discipline, and restrain fortune from giving such eviden∣ces of her power every hour of the day.

CHAP. XXXI.

How dangerous it is to believe Exiles too far.

I Think it not amiss in this place to shew how much it imports all persons not to give too much credit to those who are banished, for many times they are but the practices and stratagems of Princes and States. We have a memorable example of their inconstancy in Livy, though something improper. When Alexander the Great passed into Asia with his Army, Alexander of Epirus his Kinsman and Unckle passed with another into Italy, invi∣ted by the Exiles of Lucca, who put him in hopes that by their means he should be Master of that whole Province: but when he was come into Italy, instead of assisting him, they conspir'd against him, and slew him, upon promise of indempnity, and restitution of their Estates. From whence we may learn what faith is to be given to such as are banished out of their own Country: for as to their engagements, they are nothing; it is not to be doubted but when ever they can return by any other means, they will leave you, and be∣take themselves to any body else, notwithstanding any promise or engagement to you; and that which makes their promises and confidence the less to be trusted, is, because their ex∣treme passion and desire to come home, make them believe many things that are impossible, and pretend many things that they do not believe: so that betwixt what they believe, and what they pretend, they feed you with fair hopes, but if you depend upon them, you are undone, your expence is all lost, and your whole enterprize miscarries; I shall only give you an instance in the aforesaid Alexander, and Themistocles the Athenian; Themistocles being in rebellion against the Athenians, fled into Asia to Darius, whom he solicited with large promises to an expedition into Greece. Darius was persuaded, and passed into Greece, but Themistocles being unable to make his promises good, either for shame of what he had done, or fear of punishment for what he had not, he poisoned himself; and if Themistocles a man of that Excellence and Virtue could delude the King, and promise more than he could

perform, how little are they to be trusted, who having no such thing to restrain them, give themselves up wholly to their passion and desires? Princes therefore and States ought to be very tender of undertaking any enterprize upon the encouragement of an Exile, for they seldom succeed. And because it seldom happens that Towns are taken by intelligence within, I shall discourse of it in my next Chapter, and add what variety of ways the Romans used to come by their Conquests.

CHAP. XXXII.

How many several ways the Romans used to Conquer their Towns.

THe Romans being a martial people, and given wholly to war, they considered every thing very diligently that might any ways conduce to the facilitating their designs; whether it was matter of charge, or any thing else: for this reason they seldom attempted any Town by the way of siege, because they thought the expence and incommodity of that way would be more than could be recompenced by the taking it; so as they never tried that whilst there was any other hopes; and in all their great Wars, there are but very few examples of any long Leaguers by them. The ways which they took were common∣ly either by storm, or surrender: when they took a Town by storm, it was either by open force, or stratagem. Open force was, when they made their attaque without battering the walls, which they called Aggredi urbem cum Corona; To begirt a Town, because they drew their whole Army round the Town, and fell on in all quarters, and in this manner it hap∣pened sometimes that they carried very considerable places at one Storm, as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain. If this way was ineffectual, they battered down the walls with their Rams, and other, engines of War. Sometimes they min'd, and entred the Towns under ground, as they did at Veii; sometimes that they might fight with the Enemy upon equal terms, they built wooden Towers, or raised Mounts to the height of the walls from whence they might plague and molest them within their Works. The besieged were in most danger in the first case upon a general assault, for their walls were to be made good in all places at once, and it fell out many times, that there were not men enough to supply and relieve all parts; or if they had men enough to do that, they were not all of an equal courage, and when any gave ground, the whole Town was like to be lost, and by this means that way was often succesful. When this way miscarried, they seldom sate down before a Town, or went formally to beleaguer it, because it could not be done but with greater ha∣zard to their Army, for their quarters being to be extended, and their guards round about the Town, they must of necessity be thinner and weaker in some places, and unable to make any considerable opposition, if the Enemy should make any considerable eruption, so that the sudden and brisk way was prefer'd: when their walls were battered with their Engines, those who were in the Town defended themselves much as we do now against great Guns, by repairing their breaches as well as they could. Their way of defeating their mines was by countermining, and opposing themselves personally against the Enemy, or disturbing them with their inventions, as particularly, putting of feathers, and oyls, and other stinking stuff into barrels of wood, they set them on fire, and then tumbled them among the Enemy, that what with the fire, the smoak, and the stench, they might not be able to endure them▪ their Towers of wood, they destroyed commonly by throwing fire into them; and then for the mounts which were raised against the walls, their way was to dig under the walls, and steal away their earth, or by loosening the foundations of the mount, till it all fell to the ground. But these ways of taking a Town are not long to be tried; if they carried it not quickly, they raised their siege, and sought out some other way of prosecuting the War, as Scipio did when he went over into Africk, for having assaulted Utica, without any success, he altred his Counsels, raised his Siege, and addressed himself wholly to the bringing the Carthaginian Army to an engagement; yet sometimes they continued their Siege, as they did at Veii, Carthage, and Ierusalem: as to their way of taking of Towns by fraud and intelligence, (as they took Paloepolis) the Romans and others attempted many places after that manner, but they seldom succeeded; for those secret correspondencies are easily discovered, and the least discovery spoils the whole design, because the conspiracy is commonly discovered before it comes to execution, it either being unpracti∣cable in it self, or betrayed by the infidelity of some of the Conspirators, there being a neces∣sity of meeting and discoursing with such persons, as it is not lawful to discourse with, but

upon some specious occasion, But suppose it be not discovered in the management, there are so many difficulties in putting it into action, that it is almost impossible to overcome them; for if you come too soon, or too late, all is spoiled: if any noise be made, (as by the geese in the Capitol) the least disorder, the least error or mistake destroys the whole enterprize. Besides, these things being executed in the night, the darkness strikes a ter∣ror into the instruments, and the more, because they are commonly unacquainted with the place or people which they are to attaque, and therefore every little noise or accident is sufficient to confound them, and every trifling imagination will make them turn their backs; but no body was so daring and succesful in these fraudulent and nocturnal designs as Aratus Sicionius, though in the day-time he was but like other men, which was rather from some secret virtue in him, than any excellence in the way. And as to the taking of Towns by surrender, they either surrender freely, or by force. When they do it freely, it is done out of some extrinsick necessity, (as when Capua surrendred to the Romans, for fear of falling into the hands of the Samnites) or else out of desire to be well governed, as being taken with the administration of that Prince to whom they surrender; and thus it was with the Rhodians, the Massillians, and other Cities which gave themselves up to the Romans upon no other inducement, but that they might live more happily under the Roman Laws, and be under a better Constitution. But there are many Cities which surrender by force, which force proceeds either from the fatigues and calamities of a te∣dious Siege, or from continual excursions and depredations to which they are subject; and against which they have no other way to secure themselves. And then all the ways we have mentioned, the Romans made more use of this, carrying on their wars with their neighbours 450 years together, in this manner for the most part; for though they tried all the other, they found this the more profitable and safe. In Sieges there is delay and loss of time, in storms, hazard and danger; and uncertainty in conspiracies: but in bringing things to a Battel, it has been seen that by beating the enemies Army, they have got a whole Kingdom in a day, whereas an obstinate Town has cost them several years.

CHAP. XXXIII.

How the Romans upon any Expedition, gave their Generals general Commissions.

I Am of opinion, that to read the History of Livy, with any profit and advantage we must consider not only the actions, but the whole means and process both of the People and Senate of Rome. Among other things, it is very remarkable with what authority they invested their Consuls, Dictators and Generals of their Armies, and it was so great, that the Senate reserved to it self only the power of making Peace, or new Wars as they saw occasion; all the rest was left to the discretion of the Consul, who might fight, or not fight, assault this Town or that Town as he pleased, without any contradiction.

This may be proved by many examples, by more especially by what hapned in an Ex∣pedition against the Tuscans; for Fabius the Consul having defeated the Enemy at Sutri, resolving to pass the Forrest of Gimina with his Army, and invade Tuscany, he was so far from receiving Orders from the Senate, or consulting them in the business, that he gave them not the least notice, though the War was to be removed into another Country, and like to be very dangerous; which appeared by the resolution of the Senate in that very case; for having heard of his Victory at Sutri, and apprehending that he might fall upon such counsels, and pass his Army into Tuscany, thorow that dangerous Forrest, they sent two Embassadors to him to advise him from that Expedition; but they came too late, for he was gone before, and having over-run the whole Country, and routed the Enemy, instead of hindering his design, the Embassadors went back with the news of his Victory. This custom of the Romans, if it be seriously considered, will be found to be very solid and wise. For should the Senate have been consulted by their Generals upon every particular occasion, and have expected all their Orders from them, it would have made their Gene∣rals less circumspect, and vigorous, because the honour of the Victory would not accrew totally to them, but they must participate with the Senate. Besides, the Senate understood very well that Fortune is various, and that many accidents and advantages happen which

cannot be known or improved by any but those who are present; so that if they should desire to be consulted in things of which they can have no knowledge, they must of neces∣sity err, though they were persons of never so much experience and wisdom. Wherefore they gave their General absolute power of disposing all things at his own will, and the whole honour of the Expedition was to be his, that it might be a spur to prick on his di∣ligence, and a bridle to regulate his rashness. And this I have thought fit to insert, that I might shew how much the famous Commonwealths in our times do differ from the Ro∣mans, particularly the Venetians and Florentines, who are so strict with their General, that if a great Gun be but to be planted against a Town, the Senate must be advised, and give order how, and from whence it is to play. But this custom deserves commendation as much as the rest, which all together, have brought their affairs into that sad condition in which they are at present.

THE DISCOURSES OF Nicholas Machiavel, CITIZEN, and SECRETARY OF FLORENCE, Upon the First Decade of TITVS LIVIVS.

LIBER III.

CHAP. I.

That a Sect or Commonwealth be long-liv'd, it is necessary to correct it often; and reduce it towards its first Principles.

'TIS a certain truth, that the things of this World are determined, and a set time appointed for their duration; but those run thorow the whole course which is assigned them by their Stars, who keep their body in such order, that it may not alter at all, or if it does, it is for the better. I speak now of mixt bodies, as Commonwealths, and Sects, and I say, that those alterations are salutiferous, which reduce them towards their first principles; and therefore the best ordered, and longest liv'd are they, who (by their own orders) may be often renewed, or else by some accident (without the help of the said orders) may tend to renovation: 'tis as clear as the day, that no bo∣dies of men are of long duration, unless they be renewed; and the way to renew them (as is said before) is to reduce them to their principles. For the Fundamentals of all Sects, Commonwealths and Kingdoms have always something of good in them, by means of which they recover their first reputation and grandeur. And because in process of time that goodness corrupts, that body must of necessity die, unless something intervenes that reduces it to its first principles. The Physitian speaking of the body of man, tell us, Quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid, quod quandoque indiget curatione; That there is not a day passes, but it contracts something which afterwards will require to be cured. 'Tis the same with the Body Politick; and as to them, I say that they are to be cured, by being renewed; and they are renewed, partly by external accident, and partly by internal prudence. The first happens as it were by destiny or fate, as that Rome should be taken by the French, that thereby it might reassume its old customs and virtues, and revive its ancient Worship, Re∣ligion

and Justice, which were superannuated and decayed, as appears very plain by the description of their preparation against the French, in which it is declared by Titus Livius, that upon the marching out of their Army, and investing their Tribunes with Consular power, they observed no religious ceremony: at the same time they not only refused to correct the three Fabii, who contra jus gentium had fought against the French, but created them Tribunes. And it is easily to be presum'd that they made less account of the good Laws and Constitutions ordained by Romulus and other wise Princes, than was reasonable and (perhaps) necessary to preserve the liberty of their State. This foreign invasion hap∣ned to them therefore, that all the obsolete Laws of that City might be revived, and that the people might be taught that it was necessary not only to maintain Religion and Justice, but to respect their good Citizens, and esteem their vertue above the advantages which they seemed to want, for want of their assistance. And it fell out exactly, for Rome was no sooner taken, but they began to renew the Orders of their old Religion: they punished the Fabii who had fought against the Law of Nations, and conceived so great a value for Camillus, that the Senate and People both laid aside their old animosity, and plac'd the whole burden of the Commonwealth upon his single shoulders. 'Tis necessary therefore (as was said before) that men which live together under a Government, be often reminded by these exterior or interior accidents. The interior way is when there is a Law which takes an account of all people in that Corporation; or else when there is some excellent person among them who by his virtuous example does the same thing, so that this happi∣ness results to a Commonwealth either by the virtue of some great person, or the autho∣rity of some Law. And as to this last, the Orders which reduc'd the Commonwealth to∣wards its first principles, were the Tribunes of the people, the Censors and all the other Laws against the ambition and insolence of man; which Laws have need to be revived and quickned by the virtue of some Citizen; who with great courage and generosity shall put them in execution in despight of all the power of the delinquents. The most re∣markable executions before the taking of Rome by the French, were the death of Brutus his Sons, the punishment of the Decem-viri, the execution of Sp. Melius: after the City was sack'd by the French, the most considerable were the death of Manlius Captolinus, the death of the Son of Manlius Torquatus, the prosecution of Papirius Cursor against. Fabius the Master of his Horse, and the accusation against Scipio; which things being extraordi∣nary, were the more remarkable, and when ever any of them hapned, they reminded the people of their beginning, and that they were to live according to Law. But when these examples began to be more rare, men took occasion to grow worse, and their exorbitan∣cies were with more danger and tumult; for if in ten years space no examples be made, nor no execution done, people begin to forget and despise the Laws, and unless something happens that may remember them of the punishments, and infuse something of fear into them, the Delinquents will grow so numerous that it will be dangerous to punish them. To this purpose they who governed the State of Florence from the year 1434 to the year 1494 were wont to say, that it was necessary every five years to review the State; for other∣wise it would be very hard to maintain it: They call'd reviewing the State, reducing the people to the same terror and awe, as they had upon them of old, when every man was punished according to his crime, let his quality be what it would. But when the memory of these punishments are lost, and suffered to go to decay, men take the confidence to at∣tempt any thing, and speak ill of whom they please, against which no remedy is so proper as reducing them towards their first principles, which is to be done by the example of some excellent person, inciting you to such executions, without dependance upon any Law; and they are many times of so great reputation, that good men desire to imitate them, and bad men are ashamed to live contrary to them. Those who in Rome liv'd after this man∣ner were Horatius Cocles, Scaevola, Fabritius, the two Decii, Regulus Attilius and some others, whose rare and virtuous example had the same effect in Rome, that good Laws, and good Customs would have had; and if every ten years some of those examples or executions aforesaid had hapned in that City, the minds and manners of the people could never have been so corrupted, but as those virtuous examples, and heroick punishments grew seldom, and scarce, so corruption began to multiply, for after Regulus his time, there was not any such example to be seen; and though the two Cato's succeeded, yet there was such great distance betwixt them, that their examples could do but little good, especially the last of the Cato's, who finding the greatest part of the City debauched, could not work any considerable reformation upon them. And so much for Civil Governments; as to the conservation of Sects, the same renovation is necessary, as may appear by the example of the Roman Religion, which would doubtless have been lost before this, had it not been reduced towards its first principle by St. Francis and St. Dominick, who by their poverty,

and Christian-like examples revived it in the minds of men, where it was almost effaced; and prevailed that the loosness and depravity of the Prelates and Cardinals did not ruine it; for men seeing them live in that indigence and poverty; by confessing their sins to them, and hearing them preach, they began to learn meekness and charity, and obedience; not to upbraid people by their vices, but to leave them to God, whereas their lives must neces∣sarily be bad, who neither see nor feel what punishment is. So then it is this renovation and reduction to its first principles, that has, and does still maintain our Religion. And as to Kingdoms, they as well as Commonwealths have occasion to reform, and reduce as the other; which course has been of no small advantage to the Kingdom of France; for that Kingdom living under Laws and Customs more than any other, the said Laws and Customs are preserved and executed by Parliaments, and especially by that of Paris, which revives them every time it makes out process against any great Person, or opposes the King in its arrests: and hitherto it has preserv'd it self by its severity against Delinquents, without re∣gard to the greatness of their quality, whereas should they pass unpunished, they would multiply so fast, that they would become incorrigible in a short time, and not to be reform'd but with the disorder, if not the dissolution of the whole Government. We may con∣clude therefore, that there is no safer way of preserving a Commonwealth, Kingdom or Sect, than by reforming and reducing them to their primitive reputation, which is to be done rather by good Laws, and examples at home, than foreign force; for though that way be effectual sometimes, (as it was in Rome) yet it is so uncertain and dangerous, it is not to be desired. And to demonstrate how much particular examples have conduced to the grandeur of Rome, and what great effect they have wrought, I shall make them the subject of my discourse in this third Book; and although among them some great exam∣ples might be produced, which have been exhibited by Kings, yet History having spoken of them so largely, I shall pass them by without speaking any thing of them but what be∣longs to their own private advantage. And begin with Brutus the Father of the liberty of the Romans.

CHAP. II.

'Tis the part of a wise man sometimes to pretend himself a fool.

NO man was ever so commendable for his wisdom and prudence, as Iunius Brutus for counterfeiting the fool. For though Livy gives us but one reason why he did so, and that is, that under that contempt he might live quietly, and enjoy his patrimony in peace; yet it is probable by his ways of proceeding, that he did it, that thereby he might be less un∣der the observation of the Kings, and have fairer advantage of expelling them, and de∣livering his Country, when occasion should be offered. And that this was in his thoughts, may be presumed from his interpretation of the Oracle of Apollo, to which when the Tar∣quins repair'd to understand which of them should succeed in the Government, it being answered that the Government should come to him who first kissed his Mother, the Tar∣quins thought it not to be accomplished till they came to Rome; but Brutus pretending to slip, fell down upon the ground, and kissed it, as the common Mother of us all. And af∣terwards upon the death of Lucretia in the presence of her Father, and Husband, and Kindred, he was the first that drew the dagger out of the wound, and conjured all the slanders by, that for the future they should never suffer a King in Rome. This example may be followed by those who are disguisted with their Prince, but so as first to consider their own power exactly, and if they find it sufficient, they may profess themselves pub∣lickly, and declare open War; and it is the most safe, and most honourable way: but if their force be but small, and they find themselves that way too weak, they are with all industry to endeavour to insinuate with the Tyrant, serving him in his pleasures, applauding him in all his actions and words, and imitating him in every thing he does. By this means you shall be secure from danger, enjoy all the pleasures and delights of the Court, and be ready for any occasion of effecting your designs. Others are of opinion that you keep such a distance with the Prince, as that you be neither so near him as to be covered with his ruines, nor so remote, but that you may take the advantage of his destruction to advance yourself; and this middle way was certainly the best, if it were easie to be kept, but be∣cause I think it impossible, it is necessary to take to one of the other two, and either to re∣move your self quite, or get in as near him as you can; he who does otherwise, is in a great deal of danger, especially if he be a man of any Eminence and Estate: for it is not

enough to say, I expect nothing, I desire neither honour nor preferment, I had rather live at ease, without any controversie or trouble, for those sayings are oftner heard than be∣lieved: nor can great men, if they did really desire it, continue in that condition, because no body believes them, and no body will suffer them. A man is therefore rather to play the fool like Brutus, and he does it abundantly that flatters and applauds every thing his Prince sees, or speaks, or does, how contrary soever it be to his own judgment and mind. And as Bru∣tus was wise in pretending that folly; till occasion was offered for the deliverance of his Country, so he was a severe assertor of its liberty, when obtained, of which severity we shall speak in the next Chapter.

CHAP. III.

The liberty newly acquired, could not have been preserved, but by the execution of Brutus his Sons.

THe severity of Brutus in maintaining that liberty which he had procur'd in Rome, was no less necessary than profitable. 'Tis an example well worthy to be transmitted to posterity, to see a Father sitting in judgment upon his Sons, and not only sentence them to death, but be present, and a spectator of their execution. But so it is decreed, and it will be found so by all that are conversant in Antiquity, that upon any alteration of Go∣vernment, (whether from better to worse, or worse to better, it is the same thing) it is necessary severe example should be made of somebody that opposed it, if you desire the new form would be preserved. In short, this I affirm, that whoever sets up a Tyranny, cannot hope to maintain it, but by cutting off Brutus; and whoever sets up a free State, is as unlike to continue it, but by taking off Brutus his Sons; and of this we have discoursed so largely before, there is no need of enlarging here, I shall add only one example which hapned in our Country and times. Piero Soderini having restored the liberty of Florence believed that by his patience and moderation he could have mollified their minds, who like the Sons of Brutus were impatient of reviving the old tyranny again. But he was highly mistaken, and so much the more to blame, by how much he was a wise man, and knew well enough that there was a necessity of removing such persons as by their ambition opposed themselves against him; yet though there was a necessity to do it, and he had so fair an occa∣sion, he let it pass, and never made use of it: for besides that, he believed his patience and good nature would have wrought upon some, and his munificence and bounty upon others (as he often declared among his friends) he had an opinion, that to make a stout and vigo∣rous opposition against his Enemies, it would be necessary for him to take upon him an extraordinary authority, which would not only be a breach of the Laws, but of the civil e∣quality of the City: and if he should assume such a power, and perhaps exercise it well him∣self, yet the people would be so terrified thereby, that after his death they would never agree to the making their Gonfaloniere for life, which office he thought fit to have augmented and maintained: this consideration, though wise and good in it self, was not prudent at that time, because we are never to entertain a present mischief in hopes of a future good, espe∣cially when, for ought we know, that good may be opprest by that mischief: he ought ra∣ther to have had a care that the end of his intentions might have appeared for the good and benefit of his Country, and not out of any particular ambition; and to have provi∣ded that whoever succeeded him afterwards in his dignity, should not be able to employ that authority to the ruine of the State, which he was forc'd to take upon him to preserve it. But the good man was mistaken in his first opinion, as not understanding that the ma∣lice of mankind is not to be extinguished with time, nor appeased with presents; for could he have imitated the severity of Brutus, he had preserved his own dignity, and the liberty of the State. But as it is a difficult thing to preserve the liberty of a State, so it is no less difficult to preserve the authority of a King, as shall be shewn in the next Chapter.

CHAP. IV.

A Prince is never safe in his new Conquests, whilst they are in being whom he dispossessed.

THe death of Tarquinius Priscus by the Sons of Ancus, and the death of Servins Tullius by Tarquinius Superbus shews how dangerous it is to disposses any man of a King∣dom, and suffer him to live, though you endeavour by all means possible to cares him. Tarquinius Priscus thought his Title unquestionable, being made King by the People, and confirmed by the Senate; nor could it enter into his thoughts that the malice and indig∣nation of the Sons of Ancus should be so great, as to keep them from submitting to that wherewith the whole City of Rome was contented. Servius Tullius was mistaken in the same manner, in thinking with new favours and obligations to have pacified the Sons of Tarquin. So that from the first example, a Prince may take warning, and not delude him∣self with an opinion he is safe, whilst any of them are living whom he dispossessed; and from the second he may inform himself, that old injuries are never cancelled by new fa∣vours, especially if the favours be not equivalent to the injury. And without doubt Ser∣vius Tullius was ill advised to believe that the Sons of Tarquin would be content to be his Sons-in-Law, when it was their due to be his King. And this ambition, and impatience to govern, is so great and insatiable in mankind, that it not only affects those persons who have some right and expectation to govern, but those likewise who in reason can have no such expectancy, as in the example of Tullia the Daughter of Servius, but married to one of the Tarquins: which Tullia was so enflamed with a desire of governing, that not con∣tented with being a King's Daughter, transported with rage, contrary to all silial duty and affection, she incited her Husband against her Father, and forc'd him into a conspiracy, not only against his Kingdom, but Life. Whereas if Tarquinius Priscus and Servius Tullius had known how to have secured themselves against those they had supplanted, they had neither lost their Kingdoms nor Lives. But Tarquinius Superbus was expell'd for not ob∣serving the Laws and Practices of the ancient Kings his Predecessors, as shall appear in the next Chapter.

CHAP. V.

How a King may lose his Kingdom, though he comes to it by inheritance.

TArquinius Superbus seemed to have secure possession of the Kingdom upon the death of Servius Tullius, who dying without heirs, left him nothing of that trouble and vexa∣tion which his Predecessors encountred. For although the way by which he came to the Government was irregular and abominable; nevertheless had he followed the steps of his Predecessors, and observed their old rules, he would not have run himself so fatally in to the displeasure of the Senate and People, nor have provoked them to have been so di∣ligent in his expulsion. Nor is it to be believed that his Son Sextus his deflowring of Lucretia was the chief cause that he lost his Kingdom, but his infraction of the Laws, his tyranny, his usurpation upon the Senate, and his ingrossing all authority to himself: for he had brought things to that pass, that those affairs which were formerly debated pub∣lickly by the Senate, and according to their sentiment and order were put in execution, were now transacted and determined privately in his own Palace, with great dissatisfaction and offence; so that in a short time Rome was deprived of the liberty which it injoyed under other Kings: nor was it enough for him to disoblige the Senate, but he run himself into the odium of the people, harassing them out by mechanick and servile imployments to which they had never been used in the days of his Predecessors; by which cruel and in∣solent actions he had so incensed and inflamed the minds of the Romans against him, that they were ready for rebellion the first opportunity that offered it self; and if that accident had not hapned to Lucretia, as soon as any other had fallen out, it would have had the same effect. And if Tarquin had governed, and lived according to the example of his Ance∣stors, and his Son Sextus had committed that error, Brutus and Collatinus would have ad∣dressed themselves to Tarquin (and not to the people of Rome) for justice against his Son. Let Princes therefore observe that they begin to ruine their own dignity and power, when

they first go about to transgress and violate the old Laws and Customs of their Ancestors: and if after they are removed, and dispossessed of their authority, they should grow so wise as to understand the felicity of governing a Kingdom with good Counsel, their loss would be more insupportable, and they would condemn themselves to a greater pu∣nishment than any body else would condemn them; for 'tis easier to be beloved by good people, than bad, and to obey Laws, than to command them; and to understand the way by which this is to be done, they have no more to do, but to observe the lives of good Prin∣ces, as Timoleon the Corinthian, Aratus Sicionius and others, in which they will find so much ease and security to him that governs, and them that are governed, that they will be tempted to imitate them, if for nothing but the easiness of it. For when men are governed well, they desire no other liberty; as it hapned to the people who were governed by the two persons above named, whom they compelled to continue their Princes whilst they lived, though they endeavoured several times to have laid down, and betaken themselves to a private condition. And because in this and the two precedent Chapters, we have dis∣coursed of the hatred contracted against Princes, and the Conspiracy of the Sons of Bru∣tus against the State, and others against Tarquinius Priscus, and Servius Tullius, I think it not amiss to speak of Conspiracies more largely in my next Chapter, as being a subject well worth the observation both of Princes and private Persons.

CHAP. VI.

Of Conspiracies.

I Did not think it inconvenient in this place to discourse something of Conspiracies, see∣ing they are things of such consequence and danger, both to Princes & private Persons; for by them more Princes have lost their States and their Lives than by open War; a••d the reason is, because few persons are qualified to make War, but every body can con∣spire. On the other side, for a private person, no enterprize is more dangerous and rash; for let him manage it as wisely as he can, it is full of difficulty, and uncertainty of success; and from hence it is that among so many Conspiracies there are so few which arrive at the end that was designed. To the end therefore that Princes may learn how to defend them∣selves; and private persons might be more cautious of engaging themselves in them, but may rather be contented to live quietly under the Government where they are placed, I shall enlarge upon the subject, and leave nothing behind that is considerable for the docu∣ment either of the one or the other. It is a certain truth, and well said of Cornelius Taci∣tus, that men are to pay an honour and respect to things past, and obedience to things present: that they ought to desire good Princes, but when they are once in authority, they are to be endur'd, and those who go about to conspire against them, do most com∣monly ruine themselves or their Country.

To come therefore to the point, we are first to consider against whom these Conspiracies are made, and we shall find them either against their Country, or Prince: and of these two sorts of Conspiracies we shall discourse at present, because of those which are entred into, to deliver up a besieged Town to the Enemy, or upon such occasion, we have spoken amply before. And first of the Conjurations against a Prince, and the occasions of them, which are many, but one of more importance than all the rest, and that is the hatred of the peo∣ple: for that Prince who has contracted the universal odium of the people, may with reason believe that some of those whom he has offended will study to revenge themselves; and they will be the more industrious in it, by how much they observe the general discon∣tent and animosity against him. A Prince therefore is by all means possible to prevent the hatred of the People, (but having spoken of it before, I shall not enlarge upon it again.) For by keeping himself from the general hatred, particular offences will not be able to a∣mount to a War; first, because all men have not the same resentment, and will not put themselves in danger to revenge an injury; and then because if the discontented were all of a mind, and had power to do it, yet they are discouraged by the affection which they observe in the multitude towards their Prince. The injury done by the Prince, is either upon the Estate, Blood, or Honour of the Subject: where the injury extends to Blood, threatning is very dangerous, and much more than down-right execution; for when a man is kill'd, he is past thinking of revenge, and those who are alive will quickly forget him; but when a man is threatned, and finds himself under a necessity of suffering, or do∣ing

something extraordinary, he becomes immediately dangerous, and ought to be regar∣ded by the Prince, as I shall shew hereafter. Next to this necessity for the preservation of ones life; Honour and Estate are the two tenderest points in which men are soonest offended, and of which the Prince is likewise to have a particular care, for no man can be pillaged so perfectly, but he will have a Knife left to revenge himself; nor no man can be dishonoured to such a degree of debasement, but he will have courage enough left to attempt something in revenge; and in point of honour, no injury goes so near a man as what reflects upon the woman; and next to that, is to be despised. This was it that arm'd Pausanias against Philip of Macedon, and many other Subjects against many other Princes. In our times Iu∣lius Belanti had never conspired against Pandolfus Tyrant of Siena, had he not first given him his Daughter to Wife, and then taken her from him again, as we shall shew more at large hereafter. The great motive of the Conjuration of the Pazzi against the Medici was the Patrimony of Giovanni Bonromei, which was given from them by the award of the Medici. But there is another motive (and that no small one) which makes people conspire against their Prince, and that is a desire of rescuing their Country from tyranny and usurpation. This was it which set Brutus and Cassius at work against Caesar. This was it which excited others against Phalaris, Dyonisius, &c. and against this there is no re∣medy, but depositing their usurpations, and because there are few will do that, there are but few which escape the ill consequence.

Ad Generum Cereris, sine caede, & sanguine pauci Descendunt Reges, & sicca morte Tyranni.

Slaughter and Blood pursues, he seldom lies Dry in his Coffin that a Tyrant dies.

But in Conspiracies, as I said before, the dangers are so great and various, that there is not only a hazard in the designing, management, and execution, but even after the execu∣tion is done. The Conspirators are either one or more; one cannot properly be called a Conspiracy, but a firm resolution in a single person to make away his Prince; this way of Conspiracy is more secure than the other, because till it comes to execution, it can never be known, no body being privy to his secret, and therefore no danger of coming to the ears of the Prince. These kind of resolutions may fall into the heart of any man, great or small, noble or ignoble, favourites or strangers: no man but some time or other may have access to his Prince, and he that has opportunity to speak with him, has opportunity to do worse. Pausanias murdered Philip of Macedon as he was going to the Temple attended with a thousand of his Guards, and walking betwixt his own Son and his Son in Law; but Pausanias was a Gentleman, and very conversant at Court, but there was a poor con∣temptible Spaniard who stabb'd Ferdinand King of Spain in the Neck, and though the wound was not mortal, yet it was enough to shew us that there is no man so inconsidera∣ble, but if he has courage to undertake, he may have opportunity to it: Dervis a Turkish Priest drew his Sword upon Bajazet Father to this Present Emperor, and though he did not kill him, yet it was not for want either of courage or opportunity. Nor is it to be doubt∣ed but there are many ill enough disposed, who wish from their hearts to be revenged on their Tyrants, but there are few that dare venture, and scarce one of those few but dies in the attempt, and no man will expose himself where there is no hopes to escape. But enough of this pertinacious malevolence in a single person, we will speak now of Conspi∣racies betwixt a number: I say that in History all Conspiracies are found to be acted by great Persons, and such as have familiarity with their Prince: for others, unless they be mad men or fools, will never attempt it, because people that are weak, & remote from the Court, are destitute of all those hopes and conveniences that are requisite for the execution of such a design. First, men of slender fortune or interest cannot impart themselves freely, no body will be true them, because no man can concur with them upon any of those hopes which do usually encourage men to the undertaking of any great danger; so that they can hard∣ly communicate to two or three persons, but one of them is an informer, and the other are ruined. But if they should be so happy as not to be betrayed, the execution is attended with so many difficulties by reason of the difficulty of their access, that it is impossible but they must miscarry: and if great persons, and such as are very conversant with their Prince are subject to such hazards, those doubtless must be much more who are under none of those qualifications. Wherefore, when men of mean fortune, or little access at Court consider their own weakness and inability, they are discouraged from any such designs; and if at any time they be offended, and would do their Prince a mischief, they content themselves

with libelling and railing, and expect when persons of greater access and capacity should revenge them upon his person, and if any of these persons are so far transported, as to attempt any thing of this nature, their good will is more to be commended than their discre∣tion. We see then, where any great Conspiracy has been made, it has been by great per∣sons, and such as have been familiar with their Prince, and that as often upon the score of benefits, as injuries received; so it was in the Conspiracy of Perennius against Commodus, Plautianus against Severus, Sejanus against Tiberius, all of them preferred by their several Emperors, and advanced to such Honours, Authority and Estates, that their power seem'd to want nothing of perfection, but the Imperial Ensigns, and that they might have them as well as the rest, they conspired every one of them against their Prince, and their Conspi∣racies had such ends as their ingratitude deserved. However, in the memory of our Fa∣thers the Conspiracy of Giacopo d' Apiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti Prince of Pisa had a better end; for the said Giacopo having been brought up, and caressed, and advan∣ced by the said Piero deposed his Benefactor, and took away his Government for his pains. Another of the same nature was that of Coppola in our days against Ferdinand of Arragon, though it had not the same success; for Coppol•• being arrived at that height of Authori∣ty, that there was nothing but the bare name wanting to make him King, he attempted for that, and lost his life in the business. And certainly if any Conspiracy might have suc∣ceeded, it was his, being a person as powerful as the King himself, and seconded with all the conveniences he could desire: but the same greediness of dominion that blinded him in the undertaking, blinded him in the prosecution of his design; for had it been mana∣ged with the least prudence, it would have been impossible to have miscarried.

A Prince therefore who would preserve himself against Conspiracy, is to have an eye rather upon those he has obliged, than those he has offended; for they that are offended have not those frequent opportunities that the other have; and for the disposition, it is much alike, the desire of dominion being as great if not greater than the desire of revenge; so then authority is to be given to his friends with that caution, that there be always some space or interval left betwixt the preferment of the Favourite, and the sovereignty of the Prince, lest if his ambition should not be satisfied, he should aspire immediately at the Crown. But to return to our design, I say, that Conspiratours being to be great men, and such as have easie access to the Prince, we are now to enquire into the successes of their Plots, and see what have been the causes of their prosperity or miscarriage. And because (as I said before) the danger is considerable in the management, execution, and afterwards; for that reason there are very few of them that arrive at their proposed end. In their con∣trivances and consultations there is such extraordinary danger, that unless they be carried on with singular caution and prudence, they will be easily discovered; and they are disco∣vered two ways, either by down-right impeachment, or by conjecture and presumption. Impeachment proceeds either from infidelity or folly in those persons with whom you have communicated; infidelity is easily found, for you cannot communicate in that nature but with such of your Confidents as you suppose will venture their lives for you; or else with such persons as are dissatisfied with the Government: of such kind of Confidents, one or two may possibly be found, but when you begin to multiply them, and commit your secret to more, you must necessarily be betrayed; for their affection to you must be very great, if the apprehension of the danger, and the fear of the punishment do not deter them: be∣sides, men are many times mistaken in the affection of their friends; for they can never be assured of them till they have made experiment, and to make experiment in such ways as this, is exceedingly dangerous, and if perchance you have had trial of them in some other matters of importance in which they have behaved themselves faithfully and well, yet you can take no true measures from that, because this surpasses all other dangers what∣soever. If you presume upon his discontent, animosity to his Prince, you may be ca∣sily deceived, for as soon as you have discovered your design, you have given him a power to reconcile himself, and his rancour must be very great, or your influence extraordinary to keep him faithful: hence it is that many Conspiracies are discovered, and as it were nipp'd in the Bud; and when any of them are kept private where many persons are privy, 'tis look'd upon as a miracle, as that of Piso against Nero, and in our times that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo, and Giuliano de Medici, in which though fifty were concerned, it was ne∣ver discovered till it came to execution; for discoveries by indiscretion, they happen when one of the Conspirators talks carelesly, so as some servant or third person picks it out, as it hapned to the Sons of Brutus, who in their Negotiations with Tarquin's Embassadors, were over-heard, and accused by one of the Servants: another way is when out of levity you communicate with some Child or Woman that you love, or such other incontinent person, as Dinus did, who being (with Philotas) entred into a Conspiracy against Alexander the

Great, imparted it to a Boy that he loved, called Ficomachus who told it to his Brother Cibalinus, and Cibalinus discovered it to the King. As to discoveries by circumstances and conjecture, we have an example in the Pisonian Conspiracy against Nero, in which Scevinus one of the Conspirators having the day before Nero was to have been murther'd, made his Will, ordered Milichius his Freeman to furbish up his old rusty Sword, enfran∣chised all his Slaves, distributed Mony among them, and caused Plagets and L••gatures to be made to bind up Wounds, he gave occasion of conjecture to Milichius, who accused him thereupon to Nero, and Order being given for his apprehension, Scevinus was taken into custody, and with him Natalis another of the Conspirators, who had been observed to have talked privately with him a long time the day before, and not agreeing about their discourse, they contradicted one another, and were forced to confess all.

From these occasions of discovery it is impossible to be secur'd, but either by malice, im∣prudence, or inadvertency, all will out when ever the Conspirators exceed the number of three or four. For if more than one of them be taken, 'tis impossible but they must inter∣fere, because two people cannot hang together so exactly in a Story. If there be but one apprehended, and he be a stout man, perhaps he may have that constancy and resolution as to conceal his Confederates; but then his Confederates must have as much courage as he, and not discover themselves by their slight; for whose heart soever fails, whether his that is apprehended, or his that is escaped, 'tis the same thing, for the Plot is discovered. That example which is mentioned by Titus Livius is very rare and unusual, where in a Conspiracy against Girolamo King of Syracuse, he speaks of one of the Conspirators called Theodorus, who being seized, concealed his accomplices with incomparable constancy, and accused all the Kings Friends; and his Companions were so confident in his courage, that none of them fled, or made the least discovery by their fear. These are the dangers which are to be pass'd in the conduct or management of an Enterprize, before it comes to execu∣tion; and as there are dangers, so there are ways of evading them.

The first, the surest, and indeed the only way is not to give your Confederates time to discover you, but to communicate the business to them when it is just ready for execution, and not before. Those who take that course, are free from the danger of Threatnings and Negotiations, and commonly from all the rest; and have been observed frequently to come to good end, and there is no man that is wise, but would carry it so if he could. I shall give you only two Examples. Nelimatus being unable to endure the Tyranny of Aristoti∣mus King of Epirus, got several of his Friends and Relations together into his house, and exhorting them to the deliverance of their Country, some of them desired them to consi∣der, and prepare themselves; whereupon Nelimatus caused his Servants to make fast the doors, and protested to all the whole Company, that they should swear to go immediately about it, or he would deliver them up Prisoners to Aristotimus, upon which they all took the Oath, and falling incontinently to the work, they effected their design, as Nelimatus had contriv'd it. One of the Magi having by fraud possessed himself of the Kingdom of Persia, and Orthanus a great Person of that Kingdom, having discovered the cheat, he had a conference with six others of his own quality, to contrive how they might rescue their Country from the Tyranny of that Usurper, and (as in the case before) when some of them desired time, Darius (one of the six) stood up and declared boldly, That if they would not execute it presently, he would accuse them every one, and doing it forthwith, they prospered accordingly. Not unlike these two, was the way which the Aetolians used in the Assassination of Nabis the Tyrant of Sparta: They sent one of their Citizens called Alexamenes to him with 30 Horse, 200 Foot under a pretence of a supply, comman∣ding the Soldiers to be obedient to the orders of their chief Officers, but acquainted no∣body with the design but Alexamenes himself. Alexamenes marched to Sparta with his Forces, but communicating nothing of his instructions, till they were fit to be executed, he did his business, and the Tyrant was slain; by which reservedness they avoided the first dangers of being discovered, which are obvious in the management, and whoever takes the same course, shall avoid them as well as they. Piso (whom I have mention'd before) was a man of honour and reputation, a great intimate of Nero's, and one in whom he placed a great deal of confidence. Nero visited him often, and was many times treated very magnificently in his Garden: Piso by virtue of this intimacy was able to make choice of such Complices as were stout and couragious, and disposed to such an Exploit (which for great men to do, is no difficult matter) and when occasion was offered, to break the business to them so suddenly, that having no time either to deliberate or deny him, he must necessarily succeed; and he who examines all the other Examples that are mentioned, will find very few, but have been managed the same way. But men of little experience in the affairs of the world, do many times commit great errors, and more, when their designs

are extraordinary, as in this. A Plot then is never to be imparted, but upon necessity, and when it is ripe for execution; and when you do communicate, do it but to one, and that a person of whom you have had long experience, or one that is prompted by the same interest and provocation as your self; and to find one person so, is much easier than to find many, and by consequence that way is nothing so dangerous. Besides, if you should be mistaken in your confidence, you have more remedy and defence, than where the Conspirators are several; for I have heard wise men say, that to a single person a man may say any thing; (for if nothing be to be produced under your hand) your no, will be as good as his yea: But writing is to be shun'd as a rock, for nothing is of so much con∣viction, as a note under a man's own hand. Plautianus desiring to murther Severus the Emperor, and his Son Antoninus; committed the execution to Saturninus a Tribune, who had more mind to betray, than obey him; but suspecting that when he came to accuse him, Plautianus should have more credit than he, he desired a Warrant under his hand to con∣firm his Commission, which Plautianus granted, being blinded with ambition, whereby it happen'd that he was accused, convicted, and condemned, whereas without that Note, and some other circumstances, Plautianus would have been acquitted, and his accuser been punished, so obstinately did Plautianus deny all. In the Pisonian Conspiracy, there was a Woman called Epicaris, who had been formerly one of Nero's Misses. This Epicaris thinking it of importance to bring in a Captain of certain Galleys which Nero kept for his Guard, she communicated the Plot, but conceal'd the Conspirators, and the Captain be∣traying her, and accusing her to Nero, Epicaris maintained the contrary with such constan∣cy, that the Emperor was amaz'd, and discharged her. So then, he that communicates a thing of this Nature to one, runs but these two dangers, either of being spontaneously accused, and proof brought to make it good; or else being accused by accident and of force, as when his Confederate is apprehended upon suspition, and impeaches him upon the Rack, in both which cases there is something to be said; for in the first he may pretend malice, in the second fear, and that the extremity of his torture constrained him to say false: So that it is great wisdom to communicate with no body, till your designs be ripe but to proceed according to the examples aforesaid; but if you must communicate, to do it but to one alone, and by himself; in which though there be some danger, yet there is much less than where you communicate with many. Another way, and not unlike this, is when the fury or violence of a Tyrant necessitates you to do that to him, which other∣wise he would be sure to do to you; and sometimes it is so sudden and fierce, it leaves you scarce time to think of securing your self. This is an exigence and necessity that has most commonly a good end, and to prove it, I will produce two examples, and no more. Com∣modus the Emperour had two Captains of his Guards (one of them called Lettus,, and the other Elettus) particularly in his favour, and Martia was the most intimate of his Concubines. They having taken the liberty to admonish him of his ill Courses, and the reflection his ill conversation had both upon his Person and Government, he resolved to rid himself of his Monitors, and to that end writ down the names of Martia, Lettus, Elettus, and others (who he designed should be put to death the next night) and put the Note un∣der his Pillow. Being gone out into a Bath, a Child that he lov'd exceedingly, being rummaging about the room, happened upon this Paper, and going out with it in his hand, Martia met him by accident, took it from him, read it, sent it immediately to Lettus and Elettus, who being sensible of their danger, resolved to prevent him, and without more ado, killed Commodus in the Evening.

Antoninus Caracalla the Emperor, was with his Army in Mesopotamia, and having made Macrinus his General (a better Statesman than Soldier) it hapned (as it does to all Prin∣ces that are wicked) that he began to apprehend (what he knew he deserved) that some body conspired against him. To be more certain, he writ privately to a friend (called Maternianus) in Rome, to consult the Astrologers, and give him notice whether any body was contriving against the Empire. Maternianus writ him word he had consulted them, that there were those who did aspire at the Empire, and that Macrinus was the man. This Letter coming by accident to the hands of Macrinus, before the Emperor saw it, he found the necessity that was upon him either to kill or be kill'd; and thereupon committed the execution to a confident of his call'd Martialis (whose Brother Antoninus had slain not many days before) who kill'd him accordingly. We see then that this necessity which allows us no time, has the same effect in a manner with the course which was taken by Nelimatus of Epirus, as I have mentioned before. We see likewise, that (as I said in the beginning of these discourses) that Commination and threatning does a Prince more mis∣chief, and are the occasion of more Plots, than violence it self. A Prince therefore is to have a care of that; to caress those that are about him, and keep them in their Allegiance

by his courtesie and kindness; if that will not do, he is to secure himself otherwise as well as he can, but never to bring them into a condition of thinking themselves under a neces∣sity of killing or being kill'd. As to the dangers which attend the execution of a Plot, they proceed either from a sudden alteration of Orders; a sudden defection of courage in him that is to execute; some imprudence in the attempt; or some imperfection in the act, as when all are not killed that were intended. And first we must understand that there is nothing gives so much Embarrasment, and distraction to the action of men as new and contradictory orders to be executed in an instant. and quite contrary to what was deter∣mined before. And if in any thing this variation be dangerous, it is in Martial affairs, and in such things as we have now spoken of; for in those cases there is nothing so necessary as that every man may know certainly his part, that beforehand he may contrive with himself, and conclude upon all the circumstances of the Fact; whereas if they have fram'd their designs, and fix'd upon their way, and immediately new Orders are brought repug∣nant to the former, it disturbs all, and the whole Plot must be ruined; so that it is better to execute it according to the first Order, though there be something of inconvenience, than to vary your Orders, with a thousand times more: But this is meant only where the variation is sudden, for where you have time enough, it is not so dangerous. The Con∣spiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de Medici is very well known. Their first Orders were, That an entertainment should be made for the Cardinal of St. George, to which the Medici should be invited, and killed. Every mans Office was assigned; some were to kill them; some were to secure the Palace; and others to ride up and down the City, and proclaim liberty to the people: It happened when the Pazzi, Medici, and Car∣dinal were altogether in the Cathedral in Florence at Divine Service, news was brought that Iulian would not be at Dinner: Hereupon the Conspirators consulting again, it was resolved to alter the Plot, and do that in the Church which was designed in the Chamber: This sudden alteration, discomposed the whole order; for Giovan batista da Montesec∣co would not consent to add Sacriledge to his Murther, and commit it in the Church; up∣on which they were forced to appoint another in his place, and shift all their Agents from one Office to another, and their time being too short to fix their resolutions, they commit∣ted so many errors in the execution, that all of them miscarried. And among the Conspi∣rators, when things come to be executed, their heart many times fails them, either out of sudden reverence, or sudden fear; for the presence and Majesty of some Princes is so awe∣ful, it either mitigates or frightens the fury of the Executioner; Marius being taken and kept Prisoner by the Minturnenses, they sent a Servant to kill him; but the poor slave was so terrified at the sight of his Person, and the Memory of his Name, that his courage fail'd, and he was not able to go thorow,; and if the consideration of his quality, and the Majesty of his Countenance could do so much, in a person that was a Prisoner, and in di∣stress; how much more are they effectual in a free Prince, magnificently adorn'd, and as nobly attended. Certainly such a sight is able to strike terror into the boldest person, and work compassion in the most cruel miscreant.

Some there were who conspired against Sitalcis King of Thrace: The day was appointed for the execution; they met at the place, where the Prince was; but when the stroke was to be given, no body durst venture, they departed as they came, every body blamed one another, but no body knew what was the impediment, and having attempted it often with the same intimidation, they were discovered at last, and received punishment for an offence which they might, but would not put in execution. Alfonso Duke of Ferrara had two Brothers, who conspired against him, and employed Giannes a Priest and Chantor in the said Dukes Chappel, to bring the Duke to them, which he did many times, and it was in their power to to have killed him; but yet not any of them durst strike him, so that at length they also were discovered, and received their reward. This remorse can proceed from nothing but the terror of his presence, or the influence of his behaviour and huma∣nity, which compels them to mercy. But the defects and disappointments in these kind of executions, proceed either from imprudence, or terror, with either of which, the minds of the Conspirators being disturbed, they become so confused and distracted, they can neither say, nor do any thing as they should. And that men are subject to those confu∣sions and surprizes, cannot be better demonstrated than by Livy's description of Alexame∣nus the Aetolian, of whom we have spoken before: For when the time was come for the execution of his design against Nabis the Spartan, having imparted it to his friends, Livy tells us, Collegit, & ipse animum, confusum tantae cogitatione rei. He recollected his mind, which was in some measure confounded with the contemplation of the Enterprize For there is no man, how resolute and bloody soever he be, but must be surprized and discomposed in such cases as those, wherefore for such Exploits, experienced men, and such as have

been used to those kind of affairs, are to be chosen, and no other, though never so stout: for he that has had no tryal of himself in that nature, ought not to presume barely upon his courage; nor can he promise himself any certain success, by reason that the terror and perturbation of his mind is many times so strong, that it makes his Weapon fall out of his hand, or words fall from his Mouth, which discover the whole Plot. Lucilla the Sister of Commodus, ordered Quintianus to kill her Brother: Quintianus waited for Commodus as he came into the Amphitheater, and meeting him when he came, he ran at him with his naked Sword, crying aloud, Questo ti mando il Senato, The Senate sends you this; but those words gave an alarm, and he was seized before he could lift up his arm to give the blow. Messer Antonio da Volterra, deputed (as is said before) to kill Lorenzo de Me∣dici, when he advanced to assault him, cryed out, Ah Traytor! but that exclamation was the preservation of Lorenzo, and the ruine of the Conspirators. But these Enterprizes are difficult, when directed only against one person, for the reasons abovesaid, yet when they are bent against two, they are much more, because in several places it is impossible any de∣sign should be well executed at once; so that to conspire against a Prince in that way, is a doubtful, dangerous and imprudent thing. Were it not for the reverence I bear to the Author, I should scarce believe what Herodian says of Plautianus, that he committed to one single Centurion called Saturninus, the killing of Severus and Antoninus who lived in several places; for 'tis so irrational a thing, that nothing but his Authority could have persuaded me to it. Certain young Gentlemen of Athens conspired against Diocles and Hippias, two Tyrants in that City. They killed Diocles, but Hippias escaped, and re∣venged his death. Chiones and Leonides of Heraclea, two of Plato's Disciples, conspired against Clearchus and Satirus, two Tyrants of that place; Clearchus was murthered, but Satirus survived and revenged it. The Pazzi (whom we have so often mentioned) kil∣led only Iulian de Medici, his brother escaping; so that from these Conspiracies against several persons, all wise people will abstain, as things that are fatal to themselves, their Country, and every body else; for those who escape are thereby render'd the more cruel and Tyrannical, as appears by the aforesaid examples in Florence, Athens, and Heraclea. And therefore the Conspiracy of Pelopidas against the Tyrants of Thebes was admirable, in respect of the success, seeing not only one, but ten of them were to be murthered; and that he was neither a favourite, nor had easie access to them; but was a Rebel, and in banishment; yet he overcame all these difficulties, got into Thebes, killed the Tyrants, and delivered his Country; but with the assistance of Caron one of the Tyrants great Counsel∣lors who gave him admission, and contributed much to his success. But let no man pre∣sume upon this example, for it is looked upon not only as a rare thing, but as a miracle. The execution of such a design may be interruped likewise by a false imagination, or some unexpected accident happening in the very act. The very morning that Brutus and his Confederates were to murther Caesar, it hapned that he had a long discourse with Cn. Popilius Lenas one of the Conspirators, which the rest of the accomplices observing, con∣cluded that Popilius had discovered all to Caesar, and was giving him an account; where∣upon it was proposed to kill Caesar presently, and not to defer it till he was in the Senate; and doubtless they had done it, but that their discourse broke off; and Caesar went away without any Commotion. These imaginations are sometimes very considerable, and to be regarded with a great deal of prudence, and the rather, because they are easily taken up; for he who is conscious to himself, is always apt to suspect that they are talking of him; and it may so fall out, that a word spoken to another intent, may gaul and disturb you as much as if it were spoken on purpose, and either force you to fly, or so hasten and preci∣pitate the execution, that you run your self upon many inconveniences, especially where many are privy to the Plot. As to the accidents, because they are unexpected and occa∣sional, no directions can be given against them, but examples by which men are to regu∣late and be cautious. Iulius Belanti of Siena (whom we have mentioned before) being incensed against Pandolfus, who had given him his Daughter in Marriage, and taken her from him again, conspired his death, and laid his design thus, Pandolfus went almost eve∣ry day to visit one of his Relations that was sick; and in his passage went commonly by Iulius his house: upon this consideration, Iulius got all his accomplices together into his house, with intention to assault him as he went by; to which purpose he armed them all, and disposed them into the Porch, that they might be ready upon a signal to be given from a Window above: It hapned that Pandolfus being just by, the person at the Win∣dow gave the signal, when by accident in the very nick of time Pandolfus met a friend, and stopt to salute him: Some of his Attendants passing on, heard a noise of Arms, took the Alarm, and discovered the Ambuscade; so that Pandolfus was miraculously preserved, Iulio and his Companions forced to fly from Siena, and all by the accident of this ren∣counter,

which not only hindred the execution at that time, but defeated the whole enter∣prize.

But against these accidents no remedy can be prescribed, because they happen so rarely; however it is necessary to think of us many, and provide against them as well as we can. It remains now that we say something of those dangers which we incur after execution is done; of which sort there is but one, and that is, when somebody is left alive that may re∣venge it: as his children, brothers, kinsmen, and such others to whom the sovereignty may descend by right of inheritance, and these may be left to revenge the death of their Predecessor, either by your negligence, or by some of the accidents aforesaid, as it hapned to Giovan-Andrea da Lampognano, who conspiring with other persons, killed the Duke of Milan, but they left two of his Brothers and one of his Sons behind, who revenged it in due time. But in these cases the Conspirators are to be excused, because there is no re∣medy to be provided; but where by their own imprudence or negligence they suffer any such to escape, there it is otherwise, and they are highly to be condemned. At Forum Livii some there were who conspired against Count Girolamo, ••lew him, seized upon his wife and children, (which were very young) and clap'd them in Prison: a great mind they had to the Castle, but the Governour was refractory, and would not admit them; the Counsels (called Madonna Caterin••) made them a proposition, that if they would suf∣fer her to go into him, she would prevail with the Governor to surrender, and that in the mean time her children should be left as hostages in their hands. The Conspirators be∣lieved her, and let her go in, but she was no sooner in the Castle, but she began to upbraid them by the death of her Husband, and threaten them with all possible revenge; and to convince them that her care and compassion for her children should not restrain her, she shew'd them her genitals thorow the windows, to let them know, that if they killed those, she had wherewithal to have more: so that perceiving their error too late, and being desti∣tute of all counsel, their indiscretion was punished with their perpetual banishment. But of all dangers after the fact is committed, none is so fatal as the affection of the people to their Prince whom you have slain. For their revenge is not possible to be prevented. Of this, the murder of Caesar may be an example: for the people of Rome being his friends, his death was thorowly revenged upon the Conspirators, who afterwards (though in seve∣ral times and places) were all of them slain. Conjurations against ones Country are not so dangerous as Conjurations against ones Prince; for in the contrivance and management the dangers are not so many; in the execution they are but the same; and after the fact is committed, they are nothing at all. In the management and preparation the dangers are not so many, because a Citizen may make his party, and put his affairs in a posture with∣out discover•• 〈…〉〈…〉 ••is orders be not interrupted, bring his designs to a very good end; or if they be in••errupted by some Law, it is in his power to adjourn the execution, or find out some other way that may be more commodious; but all these (it is to be understood) are to be done only in Commonwealths, where the manners of the people are beginning to be corrupted; because where the City is incorrupt, such designs will never come into any of their thoughts; but in a corrupt Republick where the dangers are not so great, there are many ways for private Citizens to make themselves Princes; because a Commonwealth is not so quick and dexterous as a Prince, their suspicion is less, and by consequence their caution: besides, they are commonly in more awe of their Grandees, and therefore the Grandees are more bold and couragious against them. Every body has read Catilins's Conspiracy written by Salust, and can tell how Catiline (after it was detected) not only continued in Rome, but came audaciously into the Senate, and had the confidence to talk insolently both to the Senate and Consul; so great reverence had that City, for its Citi∣zens. And when things were gone so far, that he had left the City, and was got to the head of an Army, Lentulus, and the rest of the Conspirators had never been seized, had not there been Letters produced against them under their own hands.

Hanno a great Citizen in Carthage had a mind to usurp; and in order thereto; he had contrived at the Wedding of one of his Daughters to poison the whole Senate, and then make himself Prince: when his plot was discovered, the Senate troubled themselves with no farther provision against it, than by making a Law against exorbitant feasting upon such kind of occasions, so great was their respect to a Citizen of his quality! But in a Conspiracy against ones Country, the greatest danger lies in the exe∣cution; for it seldom happens that a particular Citizen is strong enough to subdue a whole Country; and every man is not General of an Army, as Caesar, Agathocles, Cleomenes and others were, who had their Armies ready to back their designs. To such the way is easie and secure; but they who want those advantages must manage their business with more cunning, or employ foreign assistance: this cunning and artifice was used by Pisistrates the

Athenian; for having overcome the Megarenses, and thereby got himself great reputa∣tion among the people, he came forth of his house one morning, and shew'd himself woun∣ded to them, complaining that the Nobility had abused him, and desiring that he might be permitted to have a guard for the security of his person; which being granted inconsi∣derately, gave him opportunity by degrees to make himself absolute. Pandolfus Petrucci (with other Exiles) returned to Siena; and by way of contempt was made Keeper of the Palace, which was a mechanick employment that others had refused. Yet those few arm'd men who were under his Command by virtue of that place, by degres gave him such re∣putation, that at length he made himself Prince. Others have taken other ways, and by time, and their industry, arrived at the same dignity without any danger: but those who have endeavoured to make themselves Masters of their Country by their own force, or foreign supplies; have had various events, as fortune was pleased to befriend them! Cata∣line was ruined: Hanno (of whom we have spoken before) failing in his poison, arm'd many thousands of his Partisans, which were all slain with him. Certain of the principal Citizens of Thebes, by the help of a Spartan Army, made themselves Masters of that City, and tyranniz'd over it: so that if all conspiracies against their Country be examined, there will none, or but very few be found to have miscarried in the management; but the whole stress of their good or bad fortune has layn upon the execution, which being once pass'd, they are subject to no more dangers than what depend upon the nature of the Go∣vernment; for when a man usurps, and makes himself a Tyrant, he exposes himself to those natural and inseparable dangers which are the consequences of Tyranny, against which he has no other remedies than what have been described before.

This is what I have thought convenient to write upon the subject of Conspiracies; and if I have discoursed only of those which are executed by the sword, and not by poison, it is because they have the same orders and methods. True it is, the way of poison is the most dangerous, as being the more uncertain, because every one has not convenience, but is forc'd to confer with other people, and the necessity of that Conference is much to be feared: besides, many things happen which makes your potion ineffectual, as it fell out to those who killed Commodus; who having disgorg'd his poison, forc'd the Conspirators to strangle him. Princes then have no Enemy to which they are more dangerously exposed, than to these Conspiracies, because they are never undertaken against any of them, but they take away his life, or reputation. If they succeed, he dies; if they miscarry, and the in∣struments be put to death, it is look'd upon as a pretence and invention of the Prince to satiate his avarice or cruelty upon the blood or fortunes of his enemies. My advice there∣fore is (both to Prince and Commonwealth, that upon the discovery of a Conspiracy, (before they think of revenge) seriously to consider the quality of it, and to compare the condition of the Conspirators with their own: if they find them potent and strong, till they have furnished themselves with a proportionable force, no notice is to be taken; if notice be taken, they are unable to defend themselves, and certainly ruined; for the Con∣spirators finding themselves discovered, will grow desperate, and be under a necessity of ven∣turing, let the success be what it will. The Romans may be an example of this way of dissembling; for having (as we said before) left two of their Legions at Capua for the se∣curity of that City against the Samnites; the Commanders of the said Legions conspir'd to make themselves Masters of the Town. The Romans having notice of their designs, committed the prevention of it to Rutilius their new Consul, who to lull and delude the Conspirators, gave out that the Senate had confirmed that Station to those Legions for another winter, which the Legions believed, and thinking then they should have time enough, they neglected to hasten their design, till at length observing the Consul to draw them away insensibly, and dispose them into other parts, they began to suspect, and that suspicion made them discover themselves, and put their plot in execution. Nor can an example be brought more properly for either sides; for by it we may see how cool and re∣miss people are when they think they have time enough; and how sudden and vigorous when necessity presses them. And the Prince or Commonwealth which would defer the discovery of a Plot, cannot do it with more advantage to himself, than by giving the Con∣spirators some handsom occasion to believe that they may execute it with more ease and security another time; for thereby the Prince or Commonwealth will have more leisure to provide for their defence: they who have proceeded otherwise, have but hastened their own ruine, as we have seen in the case of the Duke of Athens, and Gulielmo de Pazzi. The Duke having made himself Sovereign in Florence, and understanding there were Conspiracies against him; without enquiring farther into the business, caused one of them to be apprehended, which giving an alarm to the rest, they immediately took arms, and turn'd the Duke out of his Supremacy. Gulielmo being Commissary for that City in the

Val di Chiana in the year 1501, having news of a great Plot in Arezzo in favour of the Vitelli, and that their design was to renounce the dominion of the Florentines, he marched thither directly, without considering the power of the Conspirators, or his own, or so much as furnishing himself with what Forces he might have done; and by the advice of the Bishop his Son, causing one of the Conspirators to be seized, the rest fell presently to their arms, disclaim'd the Florentines, and took their Commissary prisoner. But when Conspiracies are weak, and in their infancy, if they be discovered, they are to suppress them out of hand, without any suspence, and not to follow the example either of the Duke of Athens, or Dion of Syracuse, of whom the first caused a Citizen who had discovered a plot to him, to be put to death, that the rest observing how unwilling he was to believe any thing of them, might be the more secure, and hold themselves obliged. Dion on the other side suspecting the affections of some people, caused one of his Confidents called Calippus to pretend a Conspiracy, and see if he could draw them in; but both these practi∣ces succeeded very ill, for by the first, all people were discouraged from making any disco∣very, and all Conspirators confirmed; and by the other, a way was recommended for the murdering of himself; for Calippus finding he had an opportunity to practice without danger, he did it so effectually, that it cost Dion both his Government and Life.

CHAP. VII.

How it comes to pass that in the changes of State, from liberty to servitude, and from servitude to liberty, some are very innocent, and others very bloody.

SOme people perhaps may wonder how it should come to pass that Governments should be changed from one form to another, sometimes easily, and without blood, and some∣times with great difficulty and slaughter, be the variation as it will, either from liberty to tyranny, or from tyranny to liberty. And this diversity of mutations is so strange, that as History tells us, they happen sometimes with infinite effusion of blood, and at other times without the least injury to any body: as in Rome, when the Government was taken from the Kings, and put into the hands of the Consul••, no body was expulsed, or so much as molested but the Tarquins; but in other alterations it has been otherwise, and the cause of this diversity may (in my judgment) be deduced from the manner in which that State was acquired; if it was obtained by force, it could not be without injury to many people, and then when ever it is destroyed, it will necessarily follow that all those who were injured before, will endeavour to repair and revenge themselves; which is not to be done without great tumult and slaughter. But when a Commonwealth is fix'd gradually, and by universal consent of the people, when it comes to be changed, there is no need of disturbing any body ••lse; for the bare removal of those who are then in authority, will effectually do the business. Of this sort was the revolution at Rome upon the translation of the Govern∣ment from the Kings to the Consuls; and the accident at Florence in the year 1494, when the Medici were expelled without the least prejudice to any body else; for they having been advanced by the general vote of the people, there was no need of doing more than turning them out of the City. Such mutations are not therefore so dangerous; but those others where many have been injured, and as many are to be revenged, have been so dreadfully destructive, that the very History of their consequences is enough to terrifie the Reader; but all Books being full of them, I shall speak no more of them in this place.

CHAP. VIII.

He who would change the form of a Government, is to consider seriously up∣on what grounds he does it, and the disposition of the Subject.

IT has been said before, that an evil disposed Citizen can do no great hurt but in an ill disposed City, which conclusion (besides my former arguments) is much fortfied by the examples of Sp••rius Cassius, and Manlius Capitolinus; Spurius was an ambitious man, and being desirous to procure to himself extraordinary authority in Rome, by favouring the people in the sale of such Lands as the Romans had conquered from the Hernici, the Senate discovered it, and grew so jealous of him, that when in a speech of his to the people he proffered to give them the mony which had been received for corn that the Senate had sent for out of Sicily, the people absolutely refused it; supposing that Spurius intended that their liberty should make it good: but had the people of Rome at that time been corrupt, or ill disposed, they had taken his mony, and opened him a way to the making him∣self absolute; but the example of Manlius Capitolinus is greater than this, for by that we may see how the courage and integrity which he expressed to his Country in their wars against the Gauls, was afterwards clowded and extinguished by an infatiable desire of authority arising from an emulation of Camillus, whom the Romans had advanced to a greater degree of honour; and so strangely was he blinded with this passion, that not con∣sidering the state and incorruption of the City, or how indisposed the people were to any such enterprize, he began to make parties, and raise tumults in Rome both against the Senate and Laws. In which passage it was evident how well that Government was constituted, and how well that people was disposed; for in this case (though the Nobility and he were great friends, and fierce defenders of one anothers interest) none of them, nor his very re∣lations appeared in his behalf; and whereas at other Trials the friends of the criminal used to accompany him to the Bar in mourning, and with all other circumstances of sadness that they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of, to work (if it were possible) the Judges to compassion; Manlius went alone, without so much as one friend to attend him: the Tribunes of the people who were in other things always opposite to the Nobility, and created on purpose to balance their power; when they found the design tending to the ruine of them all, they joyn'd heartily with them to remove so commo•• a destruction: and the people of Rome, who were zealous in any thing that made for their advantage, and lovers of any thing that crossed the Nobility, (though they also had their kindness for Manlius;) nevertheless when the Tribunes cited him, and referred him to the judgment of the people, they condemned him to death, without any consideration of his former services. Wherefore I am of opi∣nion, that in the whole tract of this History there is not an example that with more efficacy demonstrates the justice of that Commonwealth in all its orders and degrees of men than this; seeing there was not one Citizen appeared in the defence of Manlius, who was a person of known virtue and endowments, and had done many honourable things both in publick and private, and the reason was, because the love to their Country had a greater in∣fluence upon them than any other respect; and the consideration of the present danger of their affairs, being stronger than the memory of his past merits, they chose to free them∣selves by decreeing his death. Titus Livius, tells us, Hunc exitum habuit vir nisi in libera Civitatenatusesset, memorabilis; This was the end of a man who had been very memorable, had he been born any where but in a free State. And in his case there are two things very remarkable; one, that in a corrupt State glory and authority is acquir'd a quite contrary way, than where they live exactly according to the true rules of policy and justice; the other, (not much unlike the former) that men in their affairs, especially of greatest impor∣tance, are to consider the times, and accommodate thereunto; and those who by the un∣happiness of their election, or their natural inclination do otherwise, live always unfor∣tunately, and are more unsuccessful in all their enterprizes than they who comply with the times. And doubtless, by the fore-mentioned expression of the Historian, had Manlius been born in the days of Marius and Sylla, when the Mass was corrupt and depraved, and susceptible of any form his ambition would have imprinted, he had had the same success that they had when they aspired to be absolute. So again, had Marius and Sylla come into the World in the time of Manlius, they had miscarried as he did, and been lost in their first attempt. For one man by his ill customs and conversation may indeed give a touch and tincture of corruption to the people, but 'tis impossible his life should be long enough to debauch them so totally that he may expect any advantage of it in his time; or if he

should be so happy, and live long enough to infect a whole City; yet so impatient are the desires of man, that they cannot restrain their passions, or attend an opportunity of pur∣suing them wisely, but they circumvent and delude themselves in those very things of which they are most eagerly ambitious; so that sometimes for want of patience, and sometimes for want of judgment they venture rashly upon things before the matter be pre∣pared, and are ruined in their designs. He therefore who would alter a Government and set up himself, must attend till time has corrupted the Mass, and by degrees brought all into disorder, which of necessity must follow, when it is not (as we said before) purged and refined by the Examples of good Men or good Laws, that may reduce it towards its first principles. Manlius then had been a great and memorable person, had he been born in a corrupt City; for whoever designs any innovation in a State, whether it be for the restitution of liberty, or the erection of Tyranny, is particularly to regard the manners of the peo∣ple, and to consider how far they are disposed to submit to his ambition; and by so doing he may be able to judge of the success of his Enterprize. For to endeavour to make a people free, that are servile in their Nature, is as hard a matter, as to keep them in servi∣tude, who are disposed to be free. And because we have said before, That in all their operations men are to consider and proceed according to the quality of the times, we shall speak of it at large in the following Chapter.

CHAP. IX.

How he that would succeed, must accommodate to the times.

I Have many times considered with my self that the occasion of every mans good or bad fortune consists in his correspondence and accommodation with the times. We see some people acting furiously, and with an impetus; others with more slowness and caution; and because both in the one and the other they are immoderate, and do not ob∣serve their just terms, therefore both of them do err; but their error and misfortune is least, whose customs suit and correspond with the times; and who comports himself in his designs according to the impulse of his own Nature. Every one can tell how Fabius Maxi∣mus conducted his Army, and with what carefulness and caution he proceeded, contrary to the ancient heat and boldness of the Romans, and it hapned that grave way was more conformable to those times; for Hanibal coming young and brisk into Italy, and being elated with his good fortune, as having twice defeated the Armies of the Romans, that Commonwealth having lost most of her best Soldiers, and remaining in great fear and confusion, nothing could have happen'd more seasonably to them, than to have such a General who by his caution and cunctation could keep the Enemy at a Bay. Nor could any times have been more fortunate to his way of proceeding; for that that slow and deliberate way was natural in Fabius, and not affected, appeared afterwards when Scipio being desirous to pass his Army into Africk to give the finishing blow to the War, Fabius opposed it most earnestly, as one who could not force or dissemble, his Nature, which was rather to support wisely against the difficulties that were upon him, than to search out for new. So that had Fabius directed, Hanibal had continued in Italy, and the reason was because he did not consider the times were altered, and the method of the War was to be changed with them: And if Fabius at that time had been King of Rome, he might well have been worsted in the War, as not knowing how to frame his Counsels according to the variation of the times. But there being in that Commonwealth so many brave men, and excellent Commanders of all sorts of tempers and humours, fortune would have it, That as Fabius was ready in hard and difficult times, to sustain the Enemy, and continue the War; so afterwards when affairs were in a better posture, Scipio was presented to finish and conclude it. And hence it is, that an Aristocracy or free State is longer lived, and generally more fortunate, than a Principality, because in the first they are more flexible, and can frame themselves better to the diversity of the times: For a Prince being accustomed to one way, is hardly to be got out of it, though perhaps the variation of the times require it very much. Piero Soderini (whom I have mentioned before) proceeded with great gentleness and humanity in all his actions; and he and his Country prospered whilst the times were according; but when the times changed, and there was a necessity of laying aside that meekness and humility, Pi•••• was at a loss, and he and his Country were both ruined.

Pope Iulius XI. during the whole time of his Papacy carried himself with great vigour and vehemence; and because the times were agreeable, he prospered in every thing; but had the times altered, and required other Counsels, he had certainly been ruined, because he could never have complyed. And the reason why we cannot change so easily with the times, is twofold; first, because we cannot readily oppose our selves against what we natu∣rally desire; and next, because when we have often tryed one way, and have always been prosperous, we can never persuade our selves that we can do so well any other; and this is the true cause why a Princes fortune varies so strangely, because she varies the times, but he does not alter the way of his administrations. And it is the same in a Commonwealth, if the variation of the times be not observed, and their Laws and Customs altered accor∣dingly, many mischiefs must follow, and the Government be ruined, as we have largely demonstrated before; but those alterations of their Laws are more slow in a Common∣wealth, because they are not so easily changed, and there is a necessity of such times as may shake the whole State, to which one man will not be sufficient, let him change his proceedings, and take new measures as he pleases. But because we have mentioned Fa∣bius Maximus, and how he kept Hanibal at a Bay, I think it not amiss to enquire in the next Chapter whether a General who is resolved upon any terms to engage, can be obstru∣cted by the Enemy.

CHAP. X.

A General cannot avoid fighting, when the Enemy is resolved to Engage him upon any terms.

CNeus Sulpitius Dictator (says Livy) adversus Gallos bellum trahebat, nolens se fortunae committere adversus hostem, quem tempus deteriorem indies, & locus alienus, faceret. Cneus Sulpitius the Dictator declined fighting with the French, because he would not expose himself unnecessarily against an Enemy, who by the incommodity of the season, and inconve∣nience of his Station was every day in danger to be undone.

When such a fault happens as deceives all, or the greatest part of Mankind, I think it not improper to reprehend it over and over again; and therefore though I have formerly in several places shown how much our actions in great things, are different from those in ancient times; yet I think it not superfluous to say something of it here.

If in any thing we deviate from the practice of the Ancients, it is in our Military Disci∣pline, in which we are so absolutely new, that there is scarce any thing used that was preferred by our Ancestors; and the reason is, because Commonwealths and Princes, being unwilling to expose themselves to danger, have shifted off that study and charge upon other people: And when in our times any Prince goes in person into the field, no extraordinary matter is to be expected, for he takes the command upon him to show his grandeur and magnificence, more than for any thing else. Yet they commit fewer faults (by reviewing their Armies sometimes, and keeping that command in their own hands) than Republicks are wont to do, especially in Italy, where trusting all to other people, they understand nothing of War themselves; and on the other side, in their Counsels and determinations (which to show their superiority they reserve to themselves) they commit a thousand times more errors than in the field, some of which I have mentioned elsewhere, but I shall speak here of one of them, and that of more than ordinary importance, when these unactive Princes, or effeminate Commonwealths send out an Army, the wisest thing which they think they can give in command to their General, is to enjoyn him from fight∣ing, and above all things to have a care of a Battel, supposing that therein they imitate the wisdom of Fabius Maximus, who preserved the State, by deferring the combat; but they are mistaken, and do not consider that most commonly that injunction is either idle, or dangerous; for this is most certain, a General who desires to keep the Field, cannot avoid fight when the Enemy presses, and makes it his business to engage him. So that to command a General in that Nature, in as much as to bid him fight when the Enemy pleases, and not when he sees occasion himself. For to keep the field, and avoid fighting, is to be done no way so securely as by keeping 50 miles off, and sending out store of Spies and Scouts that may give you notice of the Enemies approach, and opportunity to retreat. There is another way likewise to secure your self, a••d that is to shut your self up in some strong Town, but both the one and the other are dangerous. In the first case, The Coun∣try is exposed to the depredations of the Enemy, and a generous Prince will sooner run

the hazard of a Battel, than spin out a War with so much detriment to his Subjects. In the second, your ruine is evident; for cooping up your Army in a City, the Enemy will block you up, or besiege you, and then the multitude of your men will quickly bring a scarcity of provisions, and supplies being cut off, you will be forced to surrender; so that to avoid fighting either of these two ways, is very pernicious. Fabius his way of standing upon his guard, and keeping his Army in places of advantage is laudable and good, when your Army is so strong, that the Enemy dares not attack you: Nor can it be said that Fa∣bius declined fighting, but that he deferred till he could do it with advantage; for had Hanibal advanced against him, Fabius would have kept his ground and engaged him, but Hanibal was too cunning for that; so that Hanibal as well as Fabius avoided fighting; but if either of them would have fought upon disadvantage the other had only three remedies; that is, the two foresaid, and flying. That this which I say is true, is manifest by a thousand examples, but more particularly by the War which the Romans made upon Philip of Mace∣don; Philip being invaded by the Romans, resolved not to come to a Battel; and to avoid it, he (as Fabius did in Italy) encamped his Army upon the top of a Mountain, and en∣trenched himself so strongly, that he believed the Romans durst not have ventured to come at him: But they not only adventured, but removed him from the Mountain, forced him to fly with the greatest part of his Army, and had it not been for the unpassableness of the Country which hindered the pursuit, the Macedonians had all been cut off. Philip, then, being unwilling to fight, and having (as I said before) encamped upon the Mountains not far from the Romans, durst not trust himself to his advantages; and having found by ex∣perience that he was not secure there, he would not pin himself up in a Town, but made choice of the other way, and kept himself at a distance; so as when the Romans came into one Province, he would remove into another, and what place soever the Romans left, he would be sure to come to: At length finding this protraction of the War, made his af∣fairs but worse, and that his Subjects were harrassed by both Armies, he resolved to try his fortune, and bring all to the decision of a Battel: But it is convenient to avoid fighting when your Army is in the same condition as those of Fabius, and Sulpitius; that is, when it is so considerable that the Enemy fears to attack you in your entrenchments; and though he has got some footing in your Country, yet not so much as is able to supply him with provisions; in this case 'tis best to decline fighting, and follow the example of Sulpitius, Nolens se fortunae committere, &c. But in all other cases it is not to be done, but with dishonour and danger; for to fly (as Philip did) is as bad as to be routed, and more dishonorable, because he gave no proof of his courage, and though he escaped by the diffi∣culty of the Country; yet whoever follows his example without that convenience, may chance to be ruin'd. No man will deny but Hanibal was a great Soldier, and of more than ordinary experience; when he went into Africa against Scipio, if he had seen it for his advantage to have protracted the War, he would have done it, and perchance (being a great Captain, and having as good an Army) he would have done it the same way as Fabius did in Italy; but seeing he did not do it, it is probable he was diverted by some extraordinary occasion. For that Prince who has got an Army together, (if he perceives that for want of pay, or supplies, he is not likely to keep them long) is stark mad if he tries not his fortune before his Army disbands, for by delaying, he is certainly lost; by fighting he may possibly overcome: And above all things, whether we are victorious or beaten, we are to behave ourselves honourably, and 'tis more honourable to be overcome by force, than by some error to run your self into incommodities that ruine you after∣wards. 'Tis not unlikely but Hanibal might be impelled by some such necessity; and on the other side Scipio (if Hanibal should have deferred fighting) might have chose whe∣ther he would have attacked him in his Trenches, because he had already conquered Syphax, and got such footing in Africk, that he was as safe, and with as much commodity as in Italy; but it was otherwise with Hanibal when he had to do with Fabius; and with the French when they had to do with Sulpitius. And he who invades an Enemies Coun∣try, avoids fighting with more difficulty, as being obliged (when ever the Enemy appears to obstruct him) to give him Battel; and if he sets down before any Town, he is obliged so much the more, as in our times it happen'd to Charles Duke of Burgundy, who was beaten up in his Leaguer before Morat by the Swizzers, and defeated. And the same thing fell out to the French at the Seige of Novarra, where they were attacht and beaten by the Swizzers.

CHAP. XI.

One person that has many Enemies upon his hands, though he be inferiour to them, yet if he can sustain their first impression, carries commonly the Victory.

THe power of the Tribunes of the people was great and necessary in the City of Rome to correct the ambition of the Nobility, who otherwise would have debauch'd the said City much sooner than they did: But as it happens in other things, so it happened in this; in the best and most beneficial thing to the Commonwealth, there was an occult, and remote evil that lay snug, which required new Laws, and new methods to suppress. For the insolence of the Tribunitial authority grew so great, that it became terrible both to the Senate and people, and had doubtlesly produced some great mischief to the Com∣monwealth, had not Appius Claudius by his great wisdom, found out a way to temper and ballance their fury, by the intercession of their Colleagues, and the way was by choo∣sing out some person among the Tribunes, whom either out of fear, or corruption, or love to his Country they could dispose to withstand the designs of his Brethren, and oppose himself against them, whenever their resolutions were tending to the diminution of the Nobility, or prejudice of the State. Which way of restraining the petulancy of the Tribunes was for a long time of great advantage to the Romans, and may give us occasion to consider, whether a combination of several great persons, against one less powerful than they (whilst united) is like to be successful against him that is alone; or whether the single person has the advantage against the Confederacy. I answer, That those whose Forces are united, are many times stronger, but their performances are seldom so great, as the single persons, though he be nothing so strong, for committing an infinite number of other things (in which the single person has the advantage) he will be able with a little industry to break, and divide and enfeeble them: To this purpose there is no need of go∣ing to antiquity for examples (where there is plenty enough) the passages of our own times will furnish us sufficiently. In the year 1484, all Italy confederated against the Ve∣netian, who, when they were so over-powr'd and distress'd that they were unable to keep the field, found a way to work off Count Lodavic (Governor of Milan) from their League, by which means they not only obtained a Peace, and restitution of what they had lost; but they got a good part of the Dutchy of Ferrara; so that they whose Forces were too weak to appear before the Enemy; when they came to treat, were the greatest gainers by the War. Not many years since, the whole Christian world seemed to conspire against France; yet before the end of the War, the Spaniard fell off from the League, made his Peace with the French, and forced the rest of the Confederates, one after one, to do the same. And from hence we may easily collect that as often as many Princes or States are confederated together against any single Prince or Commonwealth, if the single Prince and Commonwealth be strong enough to withstand their first impression, and spin out the War, he will certainly prevail; but if his force be not sufficient to do that, he is in extraordinary danger, as it happen'd to the Venetians; for had they been able to have sustained their first shock, and protracted the War, till they had debauched some of the Confederates, the French had never done them so much mischief, and they had preserv'd themselves from ruine: But their Army being too weak to confront them, and their time too little to divide them, they were undone; and this is evident by what happen'd after∣ward; for as soon as the Pope had recovered what he had lost, he reconciled himself, and became their friend; the Spaniard did the same, and both of them would have been glad to have continued Lombardy to the Venetians, rather than the French should have got it, and made himself so considerable in Italy. The Venetians at that time might have pre∣vented a great part of their calamities, had they given some small part of their Territory to the Enemy, and thereby have secured the rest; but then they must have given it in time, and so as it might not have appeared to have been done by necessity, as they might well have done before the War was commenced; when that was begun, it would have been dishonourable, and perhaps ineffectual. But before those troubles, there were few of the Venetian Citizens that could foresee a danger; fewer that could remedy it; and none at all that could advise. To conclude therefore this Chapter, I do pronounce, that as the Ro∣man remedy against the ambition of their Tribunes, was the multitude of them, out of which they always found some or other, that they could make for the interest of the Publick; so it is a ready remedy for any Prince that is engaged against a confederate Enemy, when he can break their League, and work any of the Confederates to a separation.

CHAP. XII.

A wise General is to put a necessity of fighting upon his own Army, but to pre∣vent it to his Enemies.

WE have formerly discoursed of what use and importance necessity is in humane Exploits, and shown how many men, compelled by necessity, have done glo∣rious things, and made their memories immortal. Moral Philosophers have told us, That the Tongue, and the Hands are noble Instruments of themselves; yet they had never brought things to that exactness and perfection, had not necessity impelled them. The Generals therefore of old, understanding well the virtue of this necessity; and how much more desperate and obstinate their Soldiers were rendered thereby, made it their care to bring their Soldiers into a necessity of fighting, and to keep it from their Enemies; to which end, they many times opened a passage for the Enemies Army, which they might easily have obstructed; and precluded it to their own, when they might as easily have passed. Whoever therefore, desires to make his Garrison stout and couragious, and obstinate for the defence of a Town, or to render his Army pertinacious in the Field, is above all things to reduce them into such a necessity, or at least to make them believe it: So that a wise General, who designs the besieging of a Town, judges of the easiness or difficulty of the expugnation, from the necessity which lies upon the Citizens to defend themselves: If the necessity of their defence be great, his enterprize is the more difficult, because the courage and obstinacy of the besieged is like to be the greater; but where there is no such necessity, there is no such danger. Hence it is that revolted Towns are much harder to be recovered, than they were to be taken at first; for at first having committed no fault, they were in fear of no punishment, and therefore surrendered more easily: But in the other case having the guilt of their defect up their Spirits, they are fearful of revenge, and so become more obstinate in their defence. These are not unusual, and yet there are other causes which render the minds of people obstinate in their defence, and one of them is the natural hatred and animosity which is frequently betwixt neighbouring Princes and States, which proceeds from an infatiable desire of Dominion in Princes, and as zealous an inclination to liberty in Commonwealths, especially if they be constituted as in Tuscany, where that emulation and jealousie has made them refractory both on the one side, and the other. Hence it is, though that the Florentines have been at greater charges than the Veneti∣ans, yet their acquests are not so much, because the Towns in Tuscany were most of them free, & by consequence more difficult to be brought to subjection; whereas the Towns which the Venetians conquered, having been most of them under Princes, and accustomed to servitude, it was indifferent to them under whose dominion they were; and they are so far from resisting a change, that they do many times desire it. So that though the Cities upon the Frontiers of the Venetian, were generally stronger, than those upon the Frontiers of the Florentine, yet they were reduced with more ease; because being not so free, they were less obstinate in their defence: when therefore, a wise General resolves upon a Siege, he is with all diligence to take away that necessity from the Citizens which may make them inflexible, either by promising indemnity, if they have deserved to be punished; or if it be only their liberty of which they are fearful, by assuring them that his designs are not against that, but only against the ambition and exorbitancy of some particular persons; which kind of promises had strange effects in the facilitating of Enterprizes, and the taking of Towns; for though wise men will easily discover the fraud, yet the multitude are commonly so impatient of War, and so mad to be at quiet, that they shut their Eyes a∣gainst any thing of mischief that comes to them under propositions of peace; by which means many Cities have lost their liberty, as it happened to Florence not long since; and to M. Crassus and his Army heretofore, who though he was sensible that the promises of the Parthians were fraudulent, and made only to keep his Soldiers from that necessity of defending themselves, yet he could not convince them, nor prevail with them to stand bravely upon their Guard, but being blinded with their overtures of Peace, both Army and General were cut off, as may be seen by the History. The Samnites, put on by the am∣bition of some of their Citizens, brake their Peace with the Romans, and invaded their Country; but being afterwards sensible of what they had done, they sent Embassadors to Rome offering restitution of what they had taken, and to deliver up the Authors of that Counsel into their hands, ••o be punished as they pleas'd; but being rejected, and their Embassadors sent home without any hopes of agreement, Pontius their General used

it as an argument to encourage his men to fight more obstinately, that the Romans having refused their fair overtures of Peace, were resolved upon War; and therefore there was no other course, but of necessity they must fight. And (says he) Iustum est bellum, quibus est necessarium & pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in armis spes est. That Wur is just that is ne∣cessary, and Arms are piously taken up by him, who has no other hopes to secure himself. Upon which necessity he founded the hopes of his Victory. C. Manlius was at the head of an Army against the Vejentes, and part of the Army of the Vejentes being got into his Camp Manlius to cut of their retreat, doubled his Guards at the gates, and fortified all the Passes by which they were to return; but the Vejentes perceiving they were desperate, fought with so much courage and fury, that they killed the Consul, and had cut off his whole Army, had not one of the Tribunes very wisely opened them a way to be gone: In which action we may observe that whilst the Vejentes were under a necessity of fighting, there was no resisting of their courage; but when a way was opened for their retreat, they chose rather to fly. The Volsci and the Equi were entered upon the confines of the Romans, who sent their Consuls against them with an Army: and coming to a Battel, it happened that in the heat of it, the Volsci were inclosed by the Romans, and as it were shut up in their own Camp. Vettius Mescins their General, finding their exigence, and that there was a necessity of being killed; or making their way by the Sword, Ite mecum (says he to his Soldiers) Non murus, nonvallum, armati armatis obstant, virtute pares, (quae ultimum & maximum telum est) necessitate superiores estis. Follow me then couragiously, you have no Wall, no Rampart, nothing but armed men to withstand you: you are equal to them in valour, and being under necessity, have the same advantage of the Weapon. For Livy calls it in this place the highest and heaviest of weapons.

Camillus one of the wisest of all the Roman Generals (having stormed and entred Veii with some part of his Army) to facilitate his Victory, and take away from the Enemy that last necessity of fighting; gave Orders (and so loud that the Vejentes might be sure to hear) that no Soldier should dare to touch any man who had thrown down his Army, by which Proclamation every man was encouraged to throw down his Arms, and the City was taken with so little loss, that since that time, that Stratagem has been used by several Commanders.

CHAP. XIII.

Whether we are more safe in a good General with a bad Army, or a good Army with a bad General.

MArtius Coriolanus being banished from Rome, retired to the Volsci, where having got an Army together, he returned to Rome to revenge himself for the injury his fellow Citizens had done him, and he had done it effectually, had not the Prayers and Piety of his Mother prevailed more upon him, than all the power of the Romans. From which passage Titus Livius observes, that the Roman Commonwealth encreased more by the virtue of their Commanders, than by the excellence of their Soldiers; because though the Volsci had been always beaten before; yet when they got a Roman General, they were too hard for the Romans: But though Livy was of that opinion in that place, yet in many parts of his History there are instances, where the private Soldiers have done great things, and sometimes fought better and in better order, after their Consuls were killed, than they had done whilst they were living. Thus it happened in the Army which the Romans had in Spain under the Command of the two Scipio's, which, when both their Comman∣ders were slain, behaved it self so well, that it not only defended it self, but defeated the Enemy, and preserved that Province to the Romans, So that in the whole, there are examples on both sides, where the Soldiers have done bravely, and got the Victory by their valour, and where the Conduct of the General has done as much as a whole Army; from whence it may be concluded that they are mutually useful, and that the Soldier is as much advan∣taged by the excellence of his General, as the General by the courage of his Army. How∣ever, this I think will not be unworthy our consideration, whether is most formidable, a good Army under a bad Commander, or a good Commander with a bad Army: In the opinion of Caesar neither of them was considerable; for when he went into Spain against Afranius and Petreius, who had a good Army under their command, he went with much confidence; because, as he said himself, Ibat ad exercitum sine duce, He went against an Army without a head; reflecting thereby upon the insufficiency of their Generals. Again

when he went into Thessaly against Pompey, his expression was Vado an ducem fine Exercitu. I go now against a General without an Army. It remains now that we consider whether it be most easie for a good Captain to make a good Army, or a good Army to make a good Captain. But to this, in my opinion, it is easily answered; for many good men in an Army can sooner select one out of their number, and instruct him so, as that he may be fit to command the rest, than the best General in the world can make an Army expert and ready. Lucullus when he was sent against Mithridates, was utterly unexperienced in mat∣ters of War, yet being in a good Army, where his inferior Officers were good, he quickly became a good General. The Romans for want of men, were forced to arm their Ser∣vants, and having referred them to be disciplin'd by Sempronius Gracc••us, in a short time he made them excellent Soldiers. Pelopidas and Epominandas after they had rescued their Country from the Tyranny of the Spartans, in a short time made their Country-men so good Soldiers, that they were not only able to contend, but to conquer the Spartans. So that the case is equal, and which soever is good, may make the other so too. Nevertheless a good Army, without a good Commander, grows insolent and dangerous, as it hapned in the Macedonian Army after Alexander was dead, and as it is in civil Wars among all old Soldiers; so that I think if there be more confidence to be reposed in the one than in the other, it is to be rather in the General, than the Army, especially if he has time to instruct and discipline his Men; for an Army without a head, is insolent and mutinous. Those Captains therefore are worthy of double honour, who have not only the Enemy to over∣come; but are to instruct, and prepare their Forces, before they bring them to engage. And in doing so, they do highly recommend the Conduct of their General, which is so rare a thing, that if the trouble were laid upon many, they would be much less esteemed and respected than they are now.

CHAP. XIV.

What strange effects new inventions have sometimes in a Battle, and how new Noises have the same.

WHat strange consequences have succeeded from sudden and unexpected accidents that have been seen or heard in the heat of the Battel, appears by several examples in History, but especially in the conflict betwixt the Romans and the Volsci, where Quintius observing one of the wings of his Army to stagger and give ground, cry'd out to them to stand firm, for that in the other wing the Victory was theirs; with which words he not only reincouraged his own men, but put such a terror upon the Enemy, that they fled in good earnest. And if in a well ordered Army those unexpected vociferations have such wonderful effect, in a tumultuous and ill governed Army they have much more, where everything is more subject to the agitation of such winds▪ and of this we have a memo∣rable example of our times. The City of Perugia not many years since was divided into two parts, the Oddi, and the Baglioni. The Baglioni prevailing, the Oddi were banished. But the Oddi having got an Army together, and brought them privatly to a place not far from Perugia, by the favour of their friends they were let one night into the Town, and possessed themselves as far as the Piazza. And because the Streets were chained up from one side to other to hinder the passage of the Horse, the Oddesche had a man who went before them with a great engine of Iron wherewith he brake the chains, and he had done his work so effectually, that he had broke all the chains, but what opened into the Piazza the alarm being taken, and every body crying out Arm, Arm, he who broke down the chains being pressed so close by the throng that was behind him, that he had not room for his blow, cryed out to those that were next Back, Back, intending only to have made more room for his arm: But they who were next him calling back to those who were be∣hind them, by degress the word went through the whole Army, and they who were in the Rear not knowing the reason, began to run, and being followed by those who were next, the whole Army retreated by little and little, till at last they brake out into an abso∣lute flight, by which inconsiderable accident, the Oddi were defeated of their design. So that it is to be considered, that in a Battel, order is not only to be taken that the Army be well drawn up, and put in a good posture to fight; but that no such trifling accident be able to discompose it: For if for any thing the popular multitude be unfit for the Wars, it is because every noise, rumour, or alarm, distracts them, and puts them to the rout. Wherefore it ought to be a principal care in a good General to appoint such persons as are to receive

all orders and words of command, and derive them to the rest, that by so doing the Sol∣diers being accustomed to their Officers, may not receive any such orders, but from such persons as are commissioned thereunto, the want of which custom has many times produc'd very great confusion. As to apparitions, and such things as are many times seen, it is the part of a good General, to contrive and exhibit (in the very height of the Battel) such sights as may incourage his own men, and discourage the Enemy; for among many acci∣dents which conduce to your victory, this may be especially effectual. To this purpose is that invention of which Sulpitius made use against the French; being drawn up, and ready to engage the Enemy, he caused all the Servants and refuse of his Army to be armed and mounted upon the Mules and Horses belonging to the Baggage; and having furnished them so formally with Colours and Trumpets that they appeared a compleat body of Horse, he disposed them behind a hill, where they were to continue, till in the heat of the fight, they were to come forth and shew themselves to the Enemy; which stratagem being as well executed as devised, struck such a terror into the French, that it lost them the day. So that a good General has a double care upon him, to contrive by these new surprizes to intimidate the Enemy; and to provide that if any such practices be used upon him, he may discover, and defeat them. Thus an Indian King served Semi∣ramis, who observing the said King to be very strong in the number of Elephants, to fright and persuade him that she was as strong as he, she caused several of her Camels to be dress'd up, and covered with the Skins of Bufaloes and Bulls, that they might look big, and carry the representation of Elephants; and having done so, she marched them in the Van of her Army, but her design did not take; for the King having intelligence of it, perverted it into her prejudice.

The Fidenates being besieged by Mamorcus the dictator, to terrifie the Roman Army contrived to have several of the Townsmen in the heat of the Engagement to come sud∣denly out of the Town with Fire-works at the end of their Launces, hoping that the newness of the sight might be a means to disturb them. And hear it is to be noted, that when such stratagems have more of reality than pretence, they may very well be made use of, because having something of solidity in them, their weakness is not so soon disco∣vered, but where they have more of appearance and fiction than truth, it is best either not to use them at all, or if you do, to keep them at such a distance, as that their fallacy may not be discerned; as Sulpitius did with his Muletiers; for when they are intrinsi∣cally weak, their vanity appears upon their approach, and they do more mischief than good, as the Elephants of Semiramis, and the false fires of the Fidenates, which fires though at first, they gave some disturbance to the Roman Souldiers; yet the Dictator coming in, and questioning them aloud whether they were not ashamed to be smoaked like Bees out of their Huts; encouraging them to turn again, he cryed out, Suis flammis delete Fedenas quos vestris beneficiis placare non potuistis, Go to, destroy the Fidenae with their own fires, seeing all your kindnesses have not been able to oblige them; and by so doing, he defeated the Fidenates, and made their project unprofitable.

CHAP. XV.

One General is best for an Army, and that to govern it by Commissioners, is not so good.

THe Fidenates having rebelled, and cut off that Colony of the Romans that was amongst them, the Romans created four Tribunes, and invested with Consulary power, whereof one being left behind for the security of the City of Rome, the other three were sent against the Fidenates and Veientes; but disagreeing among them∣selves, they came off with dishonour, though their loss was not much: That they gain'd no more honour, they may thank themselves; that they received no more loss, they may thank their good Soldiers. However the Romans finding the inconvenience, re∣turned to their old way of Dictators, that what three persons had disordered, might be re∣medied by one. From whence we may discern the inconvenience of many Commanders either in an Army or Town, which Livy has expressed very clearly in these following words, Tres Tribuni potestate Consulari, documento fuere, quam plurium imperium bello in∣utile esset, tenendo ad sua quis{que} Consilia, cum alii aliud videretur, apperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti; These three Tribunes with Consular power, gave us to understand the uselesness of multiplicity of Commanders, for each of them adhering to his own Counsels, whilst one was

for one thing, and another as positive for another, nothing was done, and they gave the enemy an advantage. And though this be example enough to prove the inconvenience of many Commanders, yet for better illustration I shall add some others both ancient and modern. In the year 1500 King Lewis XII of France having retaken Milan, sent his Army to Pisa to recover it for the Florentines; who to command it had sent thither two Commissaries, one of them called Giovan-battista Ridolsi, and the other Luca d' Antonio de gli Albizzi. Giovan-battista was a person of reputation and gravity, and being ancienter than Luca, Luca left the whole administration to him; but though he shewed no ambition in opposing him; he did it abundantly by his silence, and fullenness; neglecting, and undervaluing every thing that was done; so that he was so far from assisting his Colleague either with his coun∣sel or person, that he appeared as if he had been utterly ignorant in matters of war: but it pro∣ved otherwise afterwards, when upon some accident Giovan-battista was recalled, and Luca remained behind with absolute Command; for then he gave ample testimony both of his courage and conduct, which before, whilst he had a Colleague, no body could have believed. To this purpose I shall add another saying of Livy, who giving an account how Quintius and Agrippa (his Colleague) being sent against the Aequi, Agrippa would needs have the whole management of the war to be committed to Quintius, for (says he) Saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est, summam imperii apud unum esse; In the administra∣tion of great affairs it is best that the Soveraign power be invested in one person. Which is contrary to the present practice of our Princes and States, who do often depute more than one Commander both to their Armies and Towns; which (however they think it for the best) must needs breed inconceivable confusion. And if the cause of the ruine of so ma∣ny Italian and French Armies in our times, be enquired into, it will be found to be the mul∣titude, and emulation of their Commanders, and it be may safely concluded, that it is better to send a man of ordinary prudence, and experience, upon any expedition, than two of the wisest and best Soldiers they have, with equal commission.

CHAP. XVI.

That in times of difficulty, virtue is in esteem; in times of ease and luxury, men of riches and alliance are in greatest request.

IT always was, and always will be the fortune of persons of more than ordinary endow∣ments, to be laid aside and neglected in times of peace, especially in a Commonwealth; for that envy which is contracted by their virtue, sets up many Citizens against them, who will not only be their equals, but superiors. To this purpose Thucidides (a Greek author) has a place in his History, where he shews how the Republick of Athens, having had the better in the Peloponesian War, depressed the pride of the Spartans, and subdued the greatest part of Greece, was so inhansed and elated with their success, that it was proposed to fall upon Sicily.

It was seriously debated in Athens whether the said enterprize should be undertaken or not; Alcibiades and other Citizens of his party promoted it highly, not so much in respect of the publick good as their own private advantage, expecting that the management of that war would be placed in their hands. But Nicias (a person of the greatest reputation in Athens) dissuaded it; and his great argument to make the People believe he spake his judgment, and more for the benefit of the Commonwealth than any interest of his own, was, that he advised rather contrary to his own advantage, because in time of peace there were many of his fellow Citizens before him, but in time of war he knew he should be the first: by which we may see it has been an ancient infirmity in Commonwealths not to value persons of worth in time of peace, which disobliges them doubly; to see themselves deprived of their dignities, and to see others preferred to them of less sufficiency than they, which error has been the occasion of much confusion; for those persons who find them∣selves neglected, and know the reason of all is, the tranquillity of the times, make it their business to embroil them, and put their Country upon war, though never so much to its prejudice. And thinking sometimes with my self what remedies were most proper, I could light but on two, one was to keep the Citizens from growing too rich, that wealth without virtue might not be sufficient to advance any man, or able to corrupt other people, or themselves: the other, so to prepare and adapt themselves for war, that they may never be surprized, but have always employment forthe bravest of their Citizens, as Rome had in the time of her prosperity. For that City having Armies always abroad, there was con∣stant

exercise for the virtue of their Citizens: nor could a man of worth be degraded, nor an improper man be prefer'd in his place, because when ever such a thing was done, (whe∣ther by way of error or experiment, it was the same) the disorders and dangers which fol∣lowed, were so sudden and great, that they quickly found their mistake, and return'd to their old method again. But other Cities and States not so well constituted as that, which make war only in cases of necessity, cannot defend themselves from those inconveniences but are always in trouble and disorder, when ever that excellent Citizen which is neglected is vindicative, and hath any reputation or part in the City. And though for some time Rome kept her self free from these inconveniences, yet after she had conquered Carthage and Antiochus, (as has been said before) and seemed to be past all fear of war for the future, she chose several Commanders for her Army, not so much for their conduct or virtue, as for those qualities which were likely to recommend them to the people. Paulus Aemilius stood many times for the Consulship, and was repulsed; nor could he ever be made Con∣sul till the Macedonian war, which was committed unanimously to his conduct, because they saw it was like to be dangerous and difficult. After the year 1494 our City of Flo∣rence being engaged in several wars▪ in which none of our Citizens had perform'd any great matter, at last the City hapned upon a person who shewed them after what manner an Army was to be commanded, his name was Antonio Giacomini; whilst the war was dan∣gerous, and there was any trouble or difficulty to manage it, Antonio was free from the am∣bition of his fellow Citizens, and had no competitor in his election to be Commissary, and General of their Armies: but when those were past, and new wars that were more easie and honourable were to be undertaken, he had so many competitors, that when three Commissa∣ries were to be chosen for the reduction of Pisa, Antonio could not obtain to be one: and though it be not manifest what inconveniences accrewed to the Commonwealth by the wa∣ving of Antonio, yet it may be easily conjectured, for the Pisans being distressed for want of provisions, and having nothing left wherewithal to defend themselves, (had Antonio been there) would have been forc'd to have surrendred at discretion; but being besieged by such Officers as knew not how to streighten or press them, they held out so long, that the Florentines were glad to buy them out at last, whereas they might as well have had them by force. No question but Antonio resented it highly, and he had need be a good man, and of more than ordinary patience not to think of revenging himself, though with the subversion of the whole City, (if he could) and the ruine of every private Citizen, which is to be carefully prevented by every State, as shall be shewn in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

A man is not to be disobliged, and employed afterwards in any matter of importance.

A Commonwealth is diligently to provide that no Citizen be entrusted in any weighty affair, who has received any remarkable injury; Claudius Nero (who divided the Army which was designed to confront Hanibal, and marched away with a strong party into la Mara to joyn with the other Consul, and engage Asdrubal before he got up with his supplies to Hanibal) having formerly commanded the Roman Army in Spain against the said Asdrubal, had come off with dishonour; for though he had enclosed Asdrubal and his whole Army, and so possest himself of all passes, that he must either fight with disadvantage, or perish with hunger, yet he was over-reach'd with the subtilty of the Carthaginian, who drill'd him on with pretended overtures of peace, till at length in the night he stole his Army thorow the woods, and got of where he was safe. This passage being known in Rome, was no small diminution to Nero's reputation both with the Senate and the People: but being afterwards made Consul, and sent with an Army against Hanibal, he ventured upon that desperate counsel of dividing the Army, which was a thing so doubtful and un∣certain in the opinion of the Romans, that the City was in strange anxiety and suspence till they had the news of his Victory. It is reported that when Claudius Nero was que∣stioned afterwards by his friends what it was that mov'd him to so hazardous an enterprize, in which, without necessary provocation, he had ventured the whole liberty of their Country, he answered, he had done it, because he knew if he succeded, he should recover that honour which he had lost in Spain; if he miscarried, and his design should have a con∣trary end, he should have had the satisfaction to have been revenged of the City and Citi∣zens, by whom he had been so ingratefully, and so indiscreetly calumniated. And if the

indignation arising from these kind of provocations could work so strongly upon a Roman Citizen, in those times when Rome was in its innocence; we may easily imagine what pro∣digious effects it may have upon persons in a City not so well constituted as that; and be∣cause against these kind of disorders (to which all Commonwealths are subject) no certain remedy can be prescrib'd, it follows that no Commonwealth can be possibly perpetual, forasmuch as a thousand unexpected accidents fall in, to hasten its destruction.

CHAP. XVIII.

Nothing is more honourable in a General, than to foresee the Designs of his Enemy.

IT was the saying of Epaminondas the Theban, that no one quality was more useful and necessary in a General, than to be able to know the resolutions and designs of his Enemy, and discover that by conjecture, which he could not do by any certain intelligence. Nor is it difficult only to understand his designs, but his actions; and of those actions not only such as are perform'd privately, or at a distance, but such as are done (as it were) before his Face. For it many times falls out, that when a Battel continues till night, he who has the better, believes he has the worst; and who has lost all, supposes he has the Victory. Which mistakes has put the Generals many times upon pernicious counsels, as it hapned betwixt Brutus and Cassius; for Brutus having defeated the Enemy with his Wing. Cassius suppo∣sing he had been lost, and his whole Body dispers'd, killed himself in despair. In our times, at the Battel of S. Cilicia in Lombardy, Francis King of France coming to an engagement with the Swizzers, the Fight continued till night: a body of the Swizzers remaining en∣tire, and hearing nothing of the defeat and execution of their Comrades, concluded the Victory was theirs, which error was the occasion that they marched not off as they might have done, but kept their ground till the next morning, at which time they were charged again, and overthrown.

The same error had almost ruined the Armies of the Pope and King of Spain, who upon a false alarm of the Victory of the Swizzers, passed the Po, and advanced so far, that ere they were aware they had like to have fallen into the mouths of the victorious French. The like fell out of old in the Camps of the Romans and Aequi; Sempronius the Consul being commanded out with an Army against the enemy, and forcing him to a Battel, it continued till night without any visible advantage on either side. Night coming on, and both Armies sufficiently spent, neither of them retir'd to their Camps, but betook them∣selves to the neighbouring hills, where they believed they should be more safe. The Ro∣man Army divided into two parts, one went with the Consul, and the other with Tempa∣nius the Centurion, by whose courage the Roman Army was preserved that day. The next morning the Consul hearing no more of the enemy, retreated towards Rome; the Aequi with their Army did the same, for both of them though they had been beaten, and marched away without regarding the loss or plunder of their Camps▪ it hapned that Tem∣panius being behind with his squadron, and marching off as the rest, he took certain of the wounded Aequi prisoners, who inform'd him that their Generals were gone out of the field, and had quitted their Camps. Upon enquiry finding it to be true, he entred into the Roman, and secured it, but the enemies Camp was given in prey to the Souldier, after which he returned with Victory to Rome, which Victory consisted only in having the first intelligence of the enemies disorder: from whence it is observable that two Armies en∣gaged, may be each of them in the same distress and despair, and that that Army goes away with the Victory which has first notice of the necessities of the other, and of this I shall give a pregnant example of late days, and at home. In the year 1498 the Florentines had a great Army in the Country of Pisa, and had besieged that City very close. The Vene∣tian having undertaken its protection, and seeing no other way to relieve it; to divert the enemy, and remove the war, they resolved to invade the Territory of the Florentine; to which purpose they raised a strong Army, marched into their Country by the Val di Lamo∣na, possessed themselves of the Town of Marradi, and besieged the Castle of Castiglione which stands above upon an hill. The Florentines upon the alarm resolved to relieve Mar∣adi, and yet not weaken their Army before Pisa, whereupon they raised a new Army both Horse and Foot, and sent them thither under the Command of Iacopo Quarto Appiano (Lord of Piombino) and the Count Rinuccio da Marciano. The Florentine Army being conducted to the hills, the Venetian raised his siege before Castiglione, and retreated into the

Town: the Armies being in this posture, and facing one another for several days, both of them suffered exceedingly for want of all manner of Provisions; at length neither of them being very earnest to come to a Battel, and each of them being ignorant of the others distress, they resolved the next morning to break up their Camp, and each of them to re∣tire, the Venetian towards Berzighella and Faenza, and the Florentine towards Casaglia and Mugello. The morning being come, and the Baggage sent away before, a poor Woman hapned to come into the Florentine Camp, from Marradi to see some of her Relations who were in the service of the Florentine: by this Woman the Florentine Generals had notice that the Venetians were gone; whereupon reassuming their courage, they altered their counsels, pursued the enemy, and writ Letters to Florence, that they had not only beaten the Venetians, but made an end of the War. Which Victory proceeded from nothing but be∣cause they had the first news of the retreat of the Enemy, which if it had come to the other side, as it did to them, the consequence would have been the same, and the Floren∣tines have been beaten.

CHAP. XIX.

Whether for the Government of the multitude, obsequiousness and i••dulgence be more necessary than punishment.

THe Roman Commonwealth was perplexed with the dissentions betwixt the Nobility, and the people; nevertheless, their foreign Wars requiring it, they sent forth with their Armies, Quintius and Appius Claudius: Appius being rough, and cruel in his com∣mands, was so ill obeyed by his Soldiers, that he was defeated, and fled out of his Pro∣vince. Quintius being more gentle and benign, was better obeyed, and carried the Vi∣ctory where he was; from whence it appears more conducing to the well governing of a multitude, to be rather obliging, than proud, and pitiful, than cruel. However Cornelius Tacitus tells us, (and many others are of his mind) In multitudine regend•• plus paena quam obsequium valet, That to the managing of a multitude, severity is more requisite than mildness. And I think both may be true to his distinction, of Companions and Subjects; if those under your command be Companions and fellow Citizens with you, you cannot securely use them with that severity, of which Tacitus speaks; for the people of Rome having equal authority with the Nobility, was not to be used ruggedly by any man that was put over them for but a while. And it has been many times seen that the Roman Generals, who behaved themselves amicably towards their Souldiers, and governed them with mildness, have done greater things than those who used them with austerity, and kept them in per∣petual fear, unless they were endued with more than ordinary virtue, like Manlius Torqua∣tus. But he whose command is over his Subjects, (of whom Cornelius speaks) is to have a care they grow not insolent, and contemn him for his easiness, and there, is rather to use severity than gentleness with them; yet that is to be done (too) with such moderation, that they may be kept from abhorring him; for the hatred of the Subject is never good for a Prince, and the best way to prevent it, is by not interrupting the Subject in the quiet en∣joyment of his Estate; for blood (unless there be some design of rapacity under it) no Prince does desire it, but upon some extraordinary necessity, and that necessity happens but seldom. But when cruelty and rapine meet together in the nature of one person, there ne∣ver wants desire, nor pretences for cruelty, as I have demonstrated largely in another Trea∣tise upon this occasion. Quintius therefore deserved more praise than Appius deserved: and the saying of Tacitus is true enough with the aforesaid restriction, but not in the case of Appius: and because I have spoken of kindness and severity, I will give you one example, how mildness prevailed more upon the Falisci than violence could do.

CHAP. XX.

One instance of humanity wrought more upon the Falisci, than all the force of the Romans.

CAmillus having besieged the Falisci, and attempted many things against them but in vain, a School-master who had the tuition of several of the principal young Gentle∣men of that City, thinking to gratifie Camillus, and ingratiate with the people of Rome, carrying them out of the walls, under pretence of exercise and recreation, he conveyed them all into the Camp of Camillus, and presenting them to him, told him, that by their means he might become Master of the Town: Camillus was so far from accepting his pre∣sent, that he caused the Paedagogue to be strip'd, and his hands tied behind him, and then putting a rod into every one of the young Gentlemens hands, he caused them scourge him back again into the Town: which piece of humanity and justice when the Citizens understood, they resolved to defend themselves no longer, and so immediately surrendred: a great example doubtless, and by which we may learn, that many times kindness and ge∣nerosity moves an Enemy more than all the force and artifice of war; for 'tis frequently seen that those Provinces and Cities which no violence or stratagem have subdued, have been melted and wrought upon by one single act of pity, chastity, or liberality: and of this History is full of many other examples besides. Pyrrhus could not be got out of Italy by all the power of the Romans; and yet Fabritius sent him packing by one act of generosity, and that was giving him notice that some of his intimates would poison him, and had made overtures to the Romans to that purpose. Again, Scipio Africanus got not so much honour by the taking of Carthage, as he did by one act of chastity, when he sent home a young beautiful Lady (that was taken prisoner, and presented to him) untouch'd to her Husband; for at the news of that one act, all Spain was astonished, and began to admire the virtue and innocence of the Romans, which virtue is a thing so universally celebrated, that there are no great persons endued with it, but are highly esteemed by all people, as ap∣pears by all Ethicks, Politicks, and History, among which, the History of Xenophon is abundantly copious, in demonstrating what Honours and what Victories accrewed to Cyrus upon the bare account of his affability and mildness; and how he was never guilty of the least pride, or cruelty, or luxury, or any other vice that defiles the conversation of man. Nevertheless, seeing Hanibal did the same things, and by a contrary way, it will not be amiss in the next Chapter to enquire the reason.

CHAP. XXI.

How it came to pass that Hanibal by methods quite contrary to what were pra∣ctised by Scipio, did the same things in Italy that the other did in Spain.

I Doubt not but it may seem strange to some people, that other Captains who have taken a quite contrary way to what is prescribed in my last Chapter, should notwithstanding have had the same success; for from thence it seems to follow, that Victory does not depend either upon humanity or justice, when we see the same praise and reputation acquir'd by quite contrary habits: and to prove this, we need not go far for examples, the same Sci∣pio whom we mentioned before, being with an Army in Spain, carried himself with so much piety, and justice, and liberality to all people, that he got the love of the whole Pro∣vince: on the other side we see Hanibal in Italy acting quite contrary, and with violence, cruelty, rapine, and all manner of infidelity persecuting the people, and yet with the same laudable effects as Scipio had in Spain. And considering with my self what might be the reason, they seemed to me to be several. The first is, because men are studious of novelty, and that not only those who are under slavery or subjection, but those who are free, and in peace; for (as is said before) men are as well satiated with happiness, as afflicted with misery.

This desire (therefore) of change opens a door to any man that invades a Province with any considerable force: if he be a foreigner, they all follow after him, if a native, they attend him, assist him, and encourage him: so that let him take which way he pleases, he must needs make great progress in those places. Again, people are generally excited

two ways, either by love, or by fear; so that he that is feared, is often times as readily obeyed as he that is beloved, and sometimes more. It is not material therefore to a Com∣mander which of these two ways he takes; for if he be a virtuous person, and of any extraordinary faculties, he will be admired by the people, as Hanibal and Scipio were, whose great worth effaced, or covered all the faults that they committed. But in either of these two ways, great inconveniences may arise, and such as may ruine a Prince. For he who desires to be beloved, upon the least excess or immoderation in his Courtship, is sub∣ject to be despised; and he on the other side who affects to be feared, upon the least extra∣vagance makes himself odious: and to keep the middle way exactly, is not possible to our nature; wherefore it is necessary to those who exceed in either kind, to attone for it with some extraordinary virtue, as Hanibal and Scipio did, who though persons of great pru∣dence and conduct, yet it appeared that both of them suffered by their manner of living, as well as they were advanced. Their advancement is mentioned before; their sufferings (as to Scipio) was the rebellion of his Army, and part of his friends in Spain, which pro∣ceded from nothing but want of being feared, for men are naturally so unquiet, that every little door that is opened to their ambition sets them agog, and abolishes all that love which they ow'd to their Prince for his humanity towards them, as in this example of the Friends and Army of Scipio; wherefore Scipio was constrained to make use of that severity in some measure, which he had always declined. As to Hanibal, there is not any particular example where his cruelty or infidelity did him hurt; only it may be supposed that they were the occasion why Naples and several other Towns stood so firm to the Ro∣mans. It is plain likewise that his bloodiness and impiety made him more odious to the people of Rome, than all the Enemies that ever that City had: for whereas when Pyrrhus was with a great Army in Italy, they gave him notice of a design on foot to have poisoned him, they were so inveterate against Hanibal, that they never forgave him, but when they had defeated and disarm'd him, they pursued him to the death. And these sad inconve∣niences hapned to Hanibal from no other causes, but because he was impious, unfaithful, and cruel: but then on the other side he had the advantage of being admired of all Wri∣ters for keeping his Army without any mutiny or dissention either against him, or among themselves, though it consisted of so many different Nations, which could be derived from nothing but the awe and terror of his person; which terror was so great, (considered with the reputation and authority that he received from his valour) that thereby he kept his Souldiers united and quiet. I conclude therefore, it imports not much which way a Ge∣neral takes, so there be any great excellence in him to recommend it; for (as is said before) both in the one and the other there is danger and defect, if there be not some extraordi∣nary virtue to balance it. And if Hanibal and Scipio, one by laudable, and the other by ignominous and detestable ways arrived at the same end, and had the same effects, I think it convenient in my next Chapter to discourse of two Roman Citizens, who by divers ways (but both honourable) arrived at the same pitch of glory and renown.

CHAP. II.

How the austerity of Manlius Torquatus, and the humanity of Valerius Cor∣vinus gain'd each of them the same honour and reputation.

THere were two famous Captains contemporary in Rome, Manlius Torquatus, and Va∣lerius Corvinus, both of them equal in courage, equal in their triumphs, and each of them (as to the enemy) acquir'd all with equal virtue and terror; but as to their own Armies, and manner of discipline, it was quite different. Manlius commanded with all kind of severity, excused his Souldiers from no labour, nor no punishment. Valerius on the other side used them with as much gentleness and familiarity: Manlius to keep his Souldiers strictly to their discipline, executed his own son; which Valerius was so far from imitating, that he never offended any man: yet in this great diversity of conduct, the effects were the same, both as to the Enemy, the Commonwealth, and themselves; for none of their Souldiers ever declin'd fighting; none of them rebelled, or so much as disputed their commands, though the discipline of Manlius was so severe, that afterwards all excessive and extravagant commands were called Manliana imperia: in which place it is not amiss to enquire how it came to pass that Manlius was constrained to so rigorous a method; what it was that made Valerius comport himself so mildly: how it was that this different way of proceeding should have the same effect; and last of all, which of the two is most wor∣thy

thy to be imitated. If Manlius be considered as he is represented by the Historian, he will be found to be very valiant, carrying himself with great piety to his Father, and Country, and with great reverence to his Superiors, which appeared by his defence of his Father with the hazard of his own life against a Tribune who accused him; and by his fighting with the Gaul, in the behalf of his Country, which notwithstanding he would not under∣take without orders from the Consul; for when he saw a vast man, of a prodigious pro∣portion, marching forth upon the Bridge, and challenging any of the Romans, he went mo∣destly to the Consul for leave, and told him, Injussa tuo adversus hostem, nunquam pugnabo, non si certain victoriam videam; Without your permission I will never engage with the enemy, though I was sure to overcome: and the Consul giving him leave, he conquered his enemy. When therefore a man of his constitution arrives at such a command, he desires all men may be as punctual as himself▪ and being naturally brave, he commands brave things, and when they are once commanded, requires that they be executed exactly; and this is a cer∣tain rule, when great things are commanded, strict obedience must be expected, otherwise your enterprize must fail. That therefore those under your command may be the more obedient to your commands, it is necessary that you command aright; and he commands right, who compares his own quality and condition with the quality and condition of those they command; if he finds them proportionable, then he may command, if other∣wise, he is to forbear; and therefore that saying was not amiss, that to keep a Common∣wealth in subjection by violence, it was convenient that there should be a proportion be∣twixt the persons forced, and forcing; and whilst that proportion lasted, the violence might last too, but when that proportion was dissolved, and he that was forced grew stronger than he that offered it, it was to be doubted much his authority would not hold long. But to return; great things therefore, and magnificent, are not to be commanded but by a man that is great and magnificent himself; and he who is so constituted, having once commanded them, cannot expect, that mildness or gentleness will prevail with his subjects to execute them: but he that is not of this greatness and magnificence of mind, is by no means to command extraordinary things; and if his commands be but ordinary, his humanity may do well enough, for ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince, but to the Laws and Customs of the place: so that we may conclude Manlius was constrained to that se∣verity by his natural temper and complexion; and such persons are many times of great importance to a Commonwealth, because by the exactness of their own lives, and the strictness of their discipline, they revive the old Laws, and reduce every thing towards its first principles:

And if a State could be so happy to have such persons succeeding one another in any reasonable time, as by their examples would not only renew the laws, restrain vice, and re∣move every thing that tended to its ruine or corruption, that State would be immortal. So then Manlius was a severe man, and kept up the Roman discipline exactly, prompted first by his own nature, and then by a strong desire to have that obeyed, which his own inclina∣tion had constrained him to command. Valerius Corvinus on the other side might exer∣cise his gentleness without inconvenience, because he commanded nothing extraordinary, or contrary to the customs of the Romans at that time; which custom, being good, was sufficient to honour him, and not very troublesom to observe, whereby it hapned that Va∣lerius was not necessitated to punish offenders, because there were but very few of that sort, and when there were any, their punishment (as is said before) was imputed to the Laws, and not to the cruelty of the Prince; by which it fell out that Valerius had an op∣portunity by his gentleness to gain both affection and authority in the Army, which was the cause that the Souldiers being equally obedient to one as well as the other, though their humours and discipline were different, yet they might do the same things, and their actions have the same effects. If any are desirous to imitate either of them, they will do well to have a care of running into the same errors as Scipio and Hanibal did before, which is not to be prevented any other way, but by singular virtue and industry. These things being so, it remains now that we enquire which of those two ways are most laudable to follow, and it is the harder to resolve, because I find Authors are strangely divided, some for one way, and others for the other. Nevertheless, they who pretened to write how a Prince is to govern, are more inclinable, to Valerius than Manli••s, and Xenophon in his character of Cyrus jumps exactly with Livy's description of Valerius, especially in his expedition against the Samnites when he was Consul: for the morning before the Fight he made a speech to his Souldiers with that mildness and humanity, that the Historian tells us, Non aliâs militi familiarior dux fuit, inter infimos militum omnia haud gravate munia obeundo. In ludo praeterea militari, cum velocitatis, viriumque inter se aequales cort amina ineunt, comiter facilis vincere, ac vinci, vultu eodem; nec quenquam aspernari parem qui se offerret; factis benig nus

prore; dictis, haud minus libertatis alienae quam suae dignitatis memor, & (quo nihil popu∣larius est) quibus artibus petierat Magistratum, iisdem Gerebat. No General was ever more familiar with his Soldiers; no Soldier too mean for him to converse with, no office too base for him to undertake. In their Military recreations when they ran, or wrestled for a prize, he would not only run or wrestle, but win or lose, be overcome, or conquer, with the same evenness, and unconcernment; nor did he ever disdain or refuse any man that challenged him. In his actions, he was bountiful, as occasion was offered; in his words, he was as mindful of other peoples liberty, as of his own dignity, and (which is the most grateful thing to the people in the world) the same arts which he used in the obtaining, the same he exercised in the manage∣ment of his Magistracy.

Livy speaks likewise very honorably of Manlius▪ acknowledging that his severity upon his Son, made the whole Army so obedient, and diligent, that it was the occasion of their victory against the Latins; and he goes so far in his praise, that after he has given an exact account of the Battel and victory; and described all the dangers and difficulties to which the Romans were exposed, he concludes that it was only the Conduct and courage of Man∣lius that got the victory that day; and afterwards comparing the strength of both Armies, he does not scruple to say, that on which side soever Manlius had been, that side would certainly have had the day. Which being so, makes my question very hard to determine, nevertheless, that it may not be altogether unresolved, I conceive that in a Citizen brought up under the strictness of a Commonwealth, the way of Manlius would be best, and least subject to danger, because it seems most for the interest of the publick, and not at all proceeding from private ambition; besides to carry ones self severely to every body, and pursue nothing but the benefit of the Publick, is not a way to make parties, or friends, without which there can be no troubles in a State. So that he who proceeds in that man∣ner, must needs be very useful, and not at all suspicious to the State. But the way of Va∣lerius is quite contrary; for though the Commonwealth reaps the same fruits as in the other; yet jealousies will arise, and people will be fearful that in the end his great favour among the Souldiers will be employed to set up himself, with very ill consequences upon their liberty. And if in Publicola's time these ill effects did not happen, it was because as then the minds of the Romans were not corrupt, nor had he been long enough in authority. But if we consider a Prince, as Xenophon did, in that case we must leave Manlius, and follow Valerius clearly; because a Prince is by all means to endeavour the obedience of his Subjects and Soldiers by ways of amity and kindness. They will be obedient, if they find him virtuous, and a strict observer of his Laws; they will love him, if they see him courteous, and affable, and merciful, and endued with all the good qualities which were in Valerius, and which Xenophon attributes to Cyrus. For to be particularly beloved, and have an Army true to his interest, is instar omnium, and answers to all other policies of State. But it is otherwise when an Army is commanded by one who is a Citizen of the same City with the rest of his Army; for he is subject to the same Laws and Magistrates as well as they. In the Annals of Venice we read, that in former times the Venetian Galleys returning from some expedition, and lying near the Town, there happened a quarrel betwixt the Citizens and the Seamen, which proceeded so far, that it came to a tumult, both sides betook themselves to their Arms, and neither the power of their Officers, the reverence of the Citizens, nor the authority of the Magistrate was able to quiet them: But as soon as a certain Gentleman appeared, who had commanded them the year before, remembring with what courtesie he had behaved himself, their kindness to him prevail'd above all other courses, and they gave over the combat, and retir'd; but that affection, and ready obedience to his commands, cost the poor Gentle∣man very dear; for thereby he became so obnoxious to the Senate, that not long after, they secured themselves against him, either by imprisonment or death. I conclude then, that a Prince may better follow the example of Valerius; but to a Citizen, it is dangerous both to himself, and the State; to the State, because that way leads directly to Tyranny; to himself, because (let his intentions be never so innocent) he will certainly be suspected, and bring himself in danger. So on the other side, the severity of Manlius is as perni∣cious in a Prince, but in a Citizen it is convenient, and particularly for the State; for it ne∣ver does hurt, if the hatred which follows your severity be not encreased by a jealousie of your great virtue and reputation, as it happen'd to Camillus.

CHAP. XXIII.

Vpon what occasion Camillus was banished from Rome.

WE have concluded in the Chapter before, that to imitate Valerius may prejudice your Country, and your self; and that to imitate Manlius may be convenient for your self, and prejudicial to your Country; which opinion is much confirmed by the case of Camillus, whose proceedings were more like Manlius, than Valerius; for which rea∣son, Livy speaking of him tells us, Ejus virtutem milites oderant••, & Mirabantur. His virtue was both odious, and admirable to his Soldiers. That which made him admired was his Diligence, Prudence, Magnanimity, and Conduct: That which made him hated was, that he was more severe in punishing, than liberal in rewarding. And of this hatred Livy gives these following reasons: First, because he caused the Money which was made of the goods of the Vejentes to be applyed to publick use, and not distributed with the rest of the prey: Next, because in his Triumphal Chariot he caused himself to be drawn by four white Horses, which was accounted so great a piece of arrogance, that it was thought he did it to equalize the Sun. A third was, that he had devoted a tenth part of the spoils of the Vejentes to Apollo, which (to keep his Vow) was to be taken back again from the Soldiers who had got it in their clutches: From whence it may be observed, that nothing makes a Prince more odious to the people, than to deprive them of their possessions, which is a thing of so great importance, that it is never forgotten; because upon every little want, it comes fresh into their Memories, and men being daily subject to those wants, will daily remember it; and next to this is, being insolent and proud, which is likewise extreamly odious to the people, especially if they be free. And although perhaps no detriment ac∣crews to them from his pride, yet they are observed always to detest him that uses it. So that a great person is to avoid it as a rock, because it begets hatred, and that without any advantage, which makes it a very rash, and imprudent thing.

CHAP. XXIV.

The prolongation of Commissions brought Rome first into servitude.

IF the dissolution of the Roman Commonwealth be accurately considered, it will be found to proceed partly from the differences about the Agrarian Law, and partly from the prorogation of their Magistrates, which errors, had they been known in time, and due remedies applyed, would not have been so pernicious, but Rome might have enjoyed her freedom longer, and perhaps with more quiet. For though from the prolongation of Offices▪ there were no tumults no•• seditions to be seen in that City; yet it was clear that those Magistrates which were continued took much upon them, and by degrees their power and authority became a great prejudice to the liberty of the State. Had all the Citizens who were continued, been wise, and honest like L. Quintius, they would not have incurred this inconvenience. The goodness of Quintius appeared in one thing very remarkably; a meeting being appointed for accommodation of the differences betwixt the Nobility, and the People; the people continued their authority to their Tribunes another year, as believing them very proper to resist the ambition of the Nobles: The Senate to retaliate upon the people, and show themselves as considerable as they, continued the Consulship to Quintius; But Quintius refused it absolutely, alledging that ill examples were to be stifled, and not encreased by others that were worse, and therefore pressed them to the election of new Consuls, and prevailed with much importunity and contention. Had the rest of the Roman Citizens imitated this person, they had never admitted that custom of proroguing of Ma∣gistrates, and then the prolongation of their Commands in the Army had never been introduced, which very thing was at length the ruine of that Commonwealth. The first person whose Commission was continued in Rome, was P. Philo, who having besieged Pale-polis, and by the time his Consulship was to expire, reduced it to such extremity, that the victory seemed already in his hands. The Senate would not send another to succeed him, but continued his authority with the Title of Proconsul, which thing (though done then upon grave consideration, and for the benefit of the publick) proved afterwards of such

ill consequence, that it brought that City in servitude and slavery: For by how much their Wars were more remote, by so much they thought these prorogations convenient; from whence it hapned, that fewer of the Romans were prepared for Military Commands, and the glory of their Victories redounded but to few: and besides, he whose Commission was renew'd, and had been a long time accustomed to the Army, might insinuate so, and gain such an interest in it, as might make it disclaim the Senate, and acknowledg no Head but their General. This it was that enabled Marius and Sylla to debauch the Army; this was it that enabled Caesar to conquer his native Country; which miseries had never hap∣ned, had not that custom of continuing Magistrates, and Commanders been introduced. If it be objected, that their great affairs could not have been managed as so great a di∣stance, without that prorogation of commands; I answer; That 'tis possible their Em∣pire might have been longer before it came to that height; but then it would have been more lasting, for the adversary would never have been able to have erected a Monarchy, and destroyed their liberty so soon.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and several other Citizens of Rome.

WE have said elsewhere, that nothing is of more importance to the conservation of the liberty of a State, than to keep the Citizens low, and from being too weal∣thy. Whether there was any Law to that purpose, or what that Law was, I must acknow∣ledge my ignorance, (especially when I consider with what zealand passion the Agrarian was opposed) yet 'tis clear by experience, that for 400 years after the building of Rome, that City was in very great poverty: And it is probable the great cause of it was, that poverty was no impediment to preferment: Virtue was the only thing required in the Ele∣ction of Magistrates, and the distribution of Offices; and wherever it was found, let the person or family be never so poor, it was sure to be advanced; which manner of living, made riches contemptible: And this is manifest by the following example. Minutius the Consul being circumvented, and he and his whole Army, as it were block'd up by the Aequi, the Romans were so possess'd with the danger of their Army, that they betook themselves to the creation of a Dictator, which is their last remedy in their greatest affli∣ctions: They concluded upon L. Quintius Cincinnatus, who was then (when they sent for him) in a little Country farm at Plough, which Livy magnifies exceedingly, and says; Operae pretium est audire, qui omnia prae divitiis humana spernunt, neque honori magno locum, ••••que virtuti putant esse, nisi effuse affluant opes: It is pleasant to hear some people talk of r••ches, as if nothing in this world were comparable to them; as if all honour and virtue depended only upon the Estate. Cincinnatus (as I said before) was at Plough in his Farm, (which consisted only of four acres of ground) when the Embassadors came to him from the Senate to salute him Dictator, and to remonstrate their distress. Having received their message, he made no delay, but call'd immediately for his Robe, came directly for Rome, rais'd his Army, and marched away for the relief of Minutius: having defeated at the Enemy, and pillaged their Camp, he would not suffer the Army of Minutius to participate in the prize, telling him, I do not think it reasonable that you should have share in the prey, who was so near being a prey your self After which he degraded Minutius of his Consul∣ship, and made him only a Legate with this expression; You shall continue here in this Sta∣tion; till you learn to behave your self more like a Consul. The same Dictator, in the same expedition, made L. Tarquinius his Master of his Horse, though he had none to be Master of his own, for his poverty was such, he was forced to serve on foot. 'Tis remarkable how in those days poverty and honour were not so inconsistant as now, and that to an ex∣cellent and worthy person as Cincinnatus was, four acres of Land was a sufficient Estate. In the days of A••tilius Regulus poverty was in the same reputation; for being at the head of an Army in Africa, and having conquered the Carthaginians, he made it his request to the Senate that he might be permitted to come home, and husband his own Farm, which his Servants had neglected. And this frugallty of the Romans is exceedingly wonderful; for looking for nothing but praise and honour from their Victories, they brought all their prize into the publick Treasury: and doubtless had Regulus proposed any thing of advan∣tage to himself by that War, he would never have been concerned to have had his four acres neglected by his Servants. Nor was the modesty and magnanimity of the Romans less remarkable, who being put into command, and placed at the head of an Army, thought

themselves above any Prince; no King, no Commonwealth was able to dismay them: But when their Commissions expired, and they were returned privately to their houses; no body so frugal, no body so humble, no body so laborious, so obedient to the Magistrates, or respectful to their superiors as they; insomuch that one would have thought it impossible the same minds should have been capable of such strange alterations. And this poverty continued till the time of Paulus Emilius (which was the last age of that Commonwealths happiness) for though he by his Triumph enriched the whole City, yet not regarding his own fortunes, he continued poor himself, and poverty was in that esteem, that Paulus to gratifie and encourage one of his Sons-in-Law who had behaved himself bravely in those Wars, gave him a silver Cup, which was the first piece of Plate that was ever seen in his family. And here I have a fair occasion to enlarge upon poverty, and show how much more useful it is to Mankind than riches, and how many excellent Arts it has produced and improved, which riches and luxury have destroyed: But this having been treated of so amply by other people before, I shall mention it no farther at this time.

CHAP. XXVI.

Women are many times the destruction of States.

IN the City of Ardea there was a great controversie betwixt the Patricii and the People, about the Marriage of a young Lady; who being a great Fortune, had a great many Servants, but more especially two, one of them a Patrician, the other a Plebean. Her Father being dead, her Guardian would needs bestow her upon the Plebean; her Mother was for the Nobleman; not agreeing among themselves, it came to a tumult, and by de∣grees to blows; insomuch as the whole Nobility appeared in Arms for the one, and all the people for the other. The result was, the people being beaten out of the Town, and sending to the Volsci for aid, the Nobles sent to Rome. The Volsci were readiest, and com∣ing first to the assistance of the Plebeans, they clap'd down before the Town. They had not entrench'd themselves long, but the Roman Army came upon their backs▪ and shut them up betwixt the Town and them; insomuch that they were quickly distressed, and forced to surrender at discretion. The Romans entred the Town, killed all that were accessary to the sedition, and setled their affairs. In which passage there are many obser∣vable things. First, we see Women have been the occasion of much desolation, prejudice, and dissention: The Rape of Lucrece lost the Tarquins their Government; the attempt upon Virginia, was the ruine of the Decem-viri. And Aristotle in his Politicks imputes the abomination of Tyranny to the injuries they do to people upon the account of Wo∣men, by their Debauchments, their Violences, or Adulteries, as we have show'd at large in our Chapter about Conspiracies. So that in the Government of any Kingdom or Commonwealth, those things are not to be reckon'd as trifles, but as the occasions of much mischief, and are by all means to be prevented, before the rancour has taken too deep root, and is not to be cured, but by the destruction of the State: as it hapned to the Ar∣deates, who let it go so long among their fellow Citizens, that at last they came to an ab∣solute division not to be composed nor setled, but by foreign assistance, which is always the forerunner of servitude and slavery.

CHAP. XXVII.

How the civil discords in a City, are to be composed, and of the falsity of that opinion, That the best way to keep a City in subjection, is to keep it divided.

IN the reconciliation of a City that is labouring under civil dissentions, we are to follow the example of the Roman Consuls, and observe their method in composing the distra∣ctions among the Ardeates, which was by cutting off the chief Actors, and confiscating their Estates. And to compose the distractions of a City, there are three ways; either by cutting off the chief actors (as the Romans did) by banishing them the City, or by forcing them to an accommadation upon such penalties as they shall be afraid to incur: of these three ways the last is most dangerous, uncertain, and unprofitable, because it is impossible

where much blood has been shed, or much injury done, that that peace should last long, which was made by compulsion; for seeing, and hearing, and conversing with one ano∣ther daily, their animosities must of necessity revive, and provoke them to new outrage, by presenting them with new occasions of indignation and revenge: and of this we can∣not have an apter example than in the City of Pistoia, which 15 years since (as it is now) was divided into the Panciatichi, and Cancellieri (only then they were at open defyance, which now they are not.) After many contests and disputes among themselves, they pro∣ceeded to blood, to the plundering and demolishing one anothers houses, and committing all other hostilities imaginable: The Florentines whose business it was to unite them, used this third way, which rather encreased, than mitigated their tumults; so that weary of that way, and grown wiser by experience, they made use of the second; banished some of the Ring-leaders, and imprisoned the rest, whereby they not only quieted their differences then, but have kept them so ever since. But doubtless the safest way had been to cut them off at first, and if those executions were forborn then by us, or have been since by any other Commonwealth, it is for no other cause, but that they require a certain generosity and greatness of spirit, that in weak Commonwealths is hardly to be found. And these are the errors, which as I said in the beginning, are committed by the Princes of our times, when they are to determine in such great controversies; for they should inform themselves how others have comported in the same cases before them; but they are so weak by reason of the slightness of our present education, and their unexperience in History, that they look upon the examples of the ancients as inhumane, or impossible: So that our mo∣dern opinions are as remote from the truth, as that saying of our wise men was upon a time, Che bisognavatener Pistoiacon le parti, & Pisacon le fortezze: That Pistoia was to be kept under by factions, and Pisa by a Citadel; but they were mistaken in both. What my judgment is about Citadels, and such kind of Fortresses, I have delivered else∣where; so as in this place, I shall only demonstrate how unpracticable it is to keep Towns in subjection by fomenting their differences and factions, and first it is impossible to keep both parties true to you (be you Prince, or Commonwealth, or whatever) for men are naturally so inconstant, it cannot be that those parties which favour you to day, should be affected to you always; for they will still look out for some new Patron, and Protector: so that by degrees one of the parties taking some disgust against you, the next War that happens, you run a great hazard of losing your Town. If it be under the Government of a State, the City is in more danger, than in the other case, because each party looks out for friends among the great ones, and will spare no pains nor mony to corrupt them. From whence two great inconveniences do arise: One is, you can never make them love you, because by reason of the frequent alteration of Governors, and putting in sometimes a per∣son of one humour, and sometimes another of another; they can never be well govern'd And then the other is, by this fomenting of Factions, your State must be necessarily divi∣ded. Blondus speaking of the passages betwixt the Florentines and Pistoians, confirms what we have said in these words, Mentreche i Florentini dis••gnavano de riunir Pistoia, divi∣sono se Medesimi. Whilst the Florentines thought to have united the Pistoians, they divided themselves. In the year 1501. Arezzo revolted from the Florentines, and the Valleys di Tenere, and Chiana were entirely over-run by the Vitelli, and Duke Valentine. Whereupon Monsieur de Lant was sent from the King of France to see all that they had lost, restored to the Florentines. Wherever Monsieur de Lant came observing the persons that came to visit him, did still profess themselves of the party of Morzocco, he was much dissatisfied with their factions, and more that they should declare themselves so freely; for (said he) if in France any man should pronounce himself of the King's party, he would be sure to be punished, because it would imply that there was a party against the King, and it was his Masters desire, that his Kingdom and Cities should be all of a mind: If therefore a Prince believes there is no way for him to keep his Towns in obedience, but by keeping up Fa∣ctions, it is a certain argument of his weakness; for being unable by force and courage to keep them under, he betakes himself to these pernicious arts; which in peaceable times may palliate a little, but when troubles, and adversity come will assuredly deceive him.

CHAP. XXVIII.

A strict eye is to be kept upon the Citizens, for many times under pretence of Of∣ficiousness, and Piety, there is hid a principle of Tyranny.

The City of Rome being distressed for want of provisions, and the publick stores be∣ing unable to supply it, it came into the thoughts of Spurius Melius (a rich Citizen of those times) to furnish the Common people gratis out of his own private stock, whereby he wrought himself so far into the favour of the people, that the Senate suspecting the ill con∣sequences of his bounty, began to conspire his destruction before his interest became too great, to which purpose they created a Dictator, who put him to death: from whence it may be observed, that many times those actions which seem charitable and pious at first sight, and are not reasonable to be condemned, are notwithstanding cruel and dangerous for a State, if not corrected in time. To make this more clear, I say a Commonwealth cannot be well governed, nor indeed subsist without the assistance and ministry of power∣ful and great men: and yet on the other side that power and reputation of particular Ci∣tizens is the occasion of tyranny. To regulate this inconvenience, it is necessary, that see∣ing there must be great men, things should be so ordered that they may have praise and reputation by such things as are rather useful than prejudicial to the State. Wherefore it is carefully to be observed what ways they take to acquire their reputation; and they are usually two, either publick or private. The publick way is when they arrive at their re∣putation by some good counsel, or some great exploit which they have atchieved for the benefit of the publick: and this way of reputation is not only not to be precluded to the Citizens, but to be opened by such promises of reward for their good counsels or actions as may both dignify and inrich them; and when a reputation is gained by these plain and sincere ways, it is never to be feared. But when their courses are private, (which is the other of the two ways) they are dangerous, nay totally pernitious. Those private ways are by obliging particular persons, by lending them mony, by marrying their relations, by defending them against the Magistrates and doing several other particular favours which may encourage their Clients to violate the Laws, and vitiate the Commonwealth; for which cause it ought to be so well fortified with good Laws, that the endeavors of such ambitious men may be either discouraged or defeated; and on the other side rewards pro∣posed to such as arrive at their greatness by any extraordinary exploit. In Rome the highest reward of those persons who behaved themselves gloriously for the good of their Country, was a triumph besides which they had other inferior honours, for more inferior services, & to restrain or punish the ambition of those who went about by private and clandestine ways to disturb the peace of their Country, their greatest remedy was to accuse them to the people, and when those accusations were insufficient, (the people being blinded by some specious pretence of benefit and advantage) they created a Dictator, who with a kind of regal authority was to reduce the delinquent from his aberrations, or punish him as he did Spurius Melius; and the leaving of one such fault unpunished, is enough to ruine a Commonwealth, for a single example afterwards will hardly be effectual.

CHAP. XXIX.

That the transgressions of the people do spring commonly from the Prince.

PRinces cannot reasonably complain of the transgressions of their subjects, because it is necessarily their negligence, or ill example that debauches them: and if the people of our times are infamous for thefts, and robberies, and plundering, and such kind of enor∣mities, it proceeds from the exorbitance and rapacity of their Governors. Romania (be∣fore Pope Alexander VI exterminated those Lords who had the command in those parts) was a place of all kind of dissoluteness and iniquity, every day, and every trivial occasion producing notorious murders and rapines; which was not so much from any depravity in the nature of the people, (as some persons would have it) as from the corruption of their Princes; for being poor of themselves, and yet ambitious to live in splendor and magni∣ficence, they were forced upon ill courses, and indeed refused none that could supply them.

To pass by several others, one of their detestable ways was to make Laws against such and such things, which after they were published, they themselves would be the first that should break, to encourage others to do the same; nor was any man ever punished for his inob∣servance, till they saw enough involved in the same premunire; then (forsooth) the Laws were executed most strictly, not out of any true zeal to justice, but out of a desire to be fingring the Fines; from whence it followed, that by grievous mulcts and expilations the people being impoverished, were constrained to use the same violences upon those who were less potent than they; by which means men were not so much corrected, as instructed to do ill; and all these mischiefs proceeded from the iniquity of their Princes. Livy has a story to this purpose, where he tells us, that the Roman Embassadors (passing with a great present to Apollo, which was taken out of the spoils of the Venetians) were taken by the Cor∣sairs of Lipari in Sicily, and carried with it into that Island. Timasitheus Prince of that Town understanding what the Present was; whither it was going, and from whom it was sent, (though born at Lipari) behaved himself in that like a Roman, and remonstra∣ted to the people the impiety of the fact, which he prest upon them so home, that by com∣mon consent the Present was restored, and the Embassadors dismissed; the words of the Historian are these, Timasitheus multitudinem religione implevit, quae semper regenti est simi∣lis: which agrees with that saying of Lorenzo de i Medici.

Et quel che fa li Signor fanno poi molti, Che nel Signor son tuttigl' occhi volti.

A Prince does nought (or regular, or rude,) But's followed straight by th'gaping multitude.

CHAP. XXX.

A Citizen who would do any great matter by his own authority, must first extin∣guish all envy. In what manner things are to be ordered upon the approach of an enemy, and how a City is to be defended.

THe Senate of Rome having intelligence that the Tuscans had made new levies of men to make a new inroad into their Country; and that the Latini and Hernici (formerly in amity with the Romans) had confederated with the Volsci, (implacable enemies to the very name of a Roman) they concluded that War would be dangerous. Camillus being Tribune at that time, and invested with Consular authority, they thought he would be able to defend them, (without creating a Dictator) if the rest of his Colleagues would intrust him with the chief Command; to which they readily condescended, Nec quicquam (says Livy) de majestate suâ detractum credebant, quod Majestati ejus concessissent; Nor did they think any thing substracted from their authority that was added to his. Upon which Camillus (taking their paroles for their obedience) caused three Armies to be raised. The first he designed against the Tuscans, and commanded it himself. The second was to con∣tinue about Rome to attend the motions of the Latiny and Hernici, and was commanded by Quintus Servilius. The third was left in the City, as Guards for the security of the Gates, and the Court, and to be ready upon any accident that should arise, and the Com∣mand of this Army was committed to Lucius Quintius. The care of his Magazines was refer'd to Horatius one of his Colleagues, who was to see them furnished with such arms and provisions, and other things as were necessary in times of War. He caused another Tribune of his Colleagues (called Cornelius) to preside in the Senate, and publick Coun∣sel, that he might be present in all their debates,, and ready to advise in all their daily transactions. So excellent were the Tribunes in those times, that when the safety of their Country was at stake, they were equally disposed either to command or obey. And here may be observed the great ability which a wise and good man has to do good, by the sup∣pression of envy, which is many times a great impediment to the good which some persons would do, could they but get up into such authority as is requisite in affairs of importance. This envy is extinguished two ways; either by some great and difficult accident, in which every man forseeing his own ruine, lays his ambition aside, and submits himself volunta∣rily to the obedience of some person from whose virtue he may hope to be delivered: such a person was this Camillus, who having been three times Dictator, and acted in all his ad∣ministrations more for the good of the publick, than any benefit of his own, and given

many excellent testimonies of his integrity and conduct besides, his Colleagues were not scrupulous to transfer their authority, nor the people at all apprehensive of his greatness, nor any (how great soever) ashamed to be inferior to him.

Wherefore it was not without reason that Livy used that expression, Nec quicquain, &c. The other way of extinguishing envy, is, when either by violence, or the course of na∣ture your competitors die; that is, such persons as envying your reputation and grandeur, and disdaining that you should be above them, cannot contain themselves, and be quiet, but rather than not satisfy the perversity of their minds, will be contented their Country should be ruined, especially if they have been brought up in a corrupt State, and not been meliorated by their education.

Against this sort of envy there is no remedy but in the death of the Subject. And when an excellent person is so happy as to have these impediments removed by the course of nature, without any machination or concurrence of his, he becomes great and honoura∣ble without obstacle, and may exercise his virtues without any offence. But when he has not this good fortune, and nature is so unkind as to suffer them to live, it is necessary he re∣move them some extraordinary way, and make it his whole business to find one; yet with that caution and deliberation, that he be sure his way be practicable before he ventures up∣on it. He who reads the Bible soberly, and consideratly, will find Moses (for the promo∣tion and establishment of his Laws) was forced to put several to death, for no other rea∣son but because out of envy they opposed his designs: and this necessity of removing Com∣petitors was not unknown to Girolamo Savonarola the Frier, and Pietro Soderini Gonsaloniere of Florence. The Frier could not Master it for want of authority; and those of his fol∣lowers who could have done it, had no true knowledge of his mind; yet that was not his fault, for his Sermons were full of declamations against the wisdom of this World, and invectives against the wise men, by whom he intended such envious persons as opposed his Doctrines and Institutions. Soderini was in hopes by the goodness of his conversation, and his beneficence to all people, that he should have been so fortunate as to have out-lived and worn out the envy of his adversaries, seeing he was but young, and found new Clients coming in daily to his party, whom his excellent deportment had drawn over. So that he abstain'd from all kind of severity and violence, not considering that time is not to be lost; that goodness is ineffectual; that fortune is changeable; and that envious persons are not to be obliged by all the presents and good offices in the World, So that both these persons were ruined at last, one of them because he had not authority enough to master the envy of his adversaries; the other because he did not do it (though he had authority) in time. The other thing remarkable in that Story, was, the order taken by Camillus for the safety of Rome, both abroad and at home. And certainly it is not without reason that good Hi∣storians (as ours is) set down certain distinct and particular cases, that posterity may learn upon such accidents in what manner to defend themselves: it is to be observed likewise, that the most dangerous and unprofitable defence is that which is made by tumult and dis∣order; and this is apparent by that third Army which Camillus left as a Guard to the City, which many would have thought unnecessary, because the Citizens were generally arm'd, and martial; so that their needed no more than to have arm'd the rest upon occasion, without troubling them with an Army. But Camillus (and any other wise man would have done the same) was of another opinion; for a multitude is not to be trusted with arms but in an orderly and regular way. For which reason, and according to which ex∣ample, he who has the Government of a Town, is above all things to avoid arming the people in a confused and tumultuous way; but is rather to cull and select such as he dare trust with arms, and such as he is satisfied will obey him, let him send or command them wheresoever he pleases. The rest are to be required to keep at home, and every man look to the defence of his own house. He who is besieged, and observes this course, may defend himself well enough; he that does otherwise, does not follow the example of Camillus and will hardly defend himself.

CHAP. XXXI.

Powerful States, and excellent Persons, retain the same mind and dignity in all kind of conditions.

AMong the rest of the great actions and words which our Author commemorates, and mentions as certain arguments of the great virtue and excellence of Camillus, in a speech of his to his Souldiers, he brings him in with this expression; Nec mihi Dictatura animos fecit, nec exilium ademit; I was neither elated with my Dictatorship, nor dejected with my Banishment. From whence we may observe that great men are never discomposed; let fortune vary as she pleases, let her advance them sometimes, and depress them at others, they are in the same settlement and tranquillity, so quiet and firm in their minds, that every man may see it's not in the power of fortune to disorder them; whereas pusillanimous and mean spirited persons, inebriated with their good fortune, and attributing all to their own virtue and good conduct, make themselves odious and insupportable to all that are about them, and that arrogance exposes them to many revolutions, which coming upon them on a sudden, do so terrifie and dismay them, that they run into the other extreme, and become as abject and vile. Hence it is that in time of adversity such Princes think more of their escape than defence, having made themselves uncapable of that by their ill management be∣fore. And as this diversity of temper is many times to be found in particular Persons, and Princes; so it is incident to Commonwealths, as may be seen by the example of the Ro∣mans and Venetians. The first were never dejected by any ill fortune, nor transported by any good; as appears by their defeat at the Battle of Cannas, and their Victory against An∣tiochus: their defeat at Cannas was the third which they had received, and for that reason was very considerable; yet they were not so terrified, or cowed, as to commit any thing con∣trary to the old dignity of the Romans; for they resolved to continue the war; they raised more forces; they refused to redeem their prisoners upon any new terms; and could not be brought to make any overtures of Peace, either to Hanibal, or the Senate at Carthage; but for want of others, they arm'd their old men, and their servants. and resolved wholly upon war; for which obstinacy and refractoriness, when Hanno was told, he made a speech to the Senate, and remonstrated how little they were to presume upon their Victory at Cannas: we see then the Romans were not to be terrified or discouraged by any adversity of fortune; we shall shew now how far they were on the other side from insulting in their good. Antiochus, before he came to a Battel, sent Embassadors to Scipio to desire a Treaty: Scipio sent him these Conditions, that he should return with his Army into Syria, and leave the rest to the Romans. Autiochus thought that unreasonable, fought him, was beaten, and afterwards sent Embassadors again to Scipio, with instructions to accept of whatever terms the Conqueror should give: Scipio never thought of altering his first propositions, though made before the Battel was won, but told them, Quod Romani si vincuntur, non minuuntur animis, nec si vincunt insolescere solent; That 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mans were never dejected by ill for••une, nor elated by good. The Venetians acted quite the other way, who having got a little good fortune, (ascribing it to a wrong cause, as if it had proceeded from their own power and virtue) had the insolence to call the King of France Son of St. Mark, and ta∣king a fancy that they should bring their Commonwealth to as great a condition of gran∣deur and power as the Romans, they despis'd the Church, and all the Princes of Italy be∣sides. Afterwards, when their fortune began to change, and they received a small defeat at Vaila by the French; they lost their whole Empire in a day; part revolted, and part they gave up themselves to the Pope, and King of Spain; and so much had they abandoned themselves to fear and consternation, that they sent Embassadors to the Emperor to make themselves his Tributaries, and writ poor and mean Letters to the Pope to move him to compassion, and to this extremity of dejection they were brought in four days time, by the loss but of one half of their Army; for the other of their Proveditory retreated, and came off safe to Verona with more than 25000 horse and foot; so that had there been any courage either in the Citizens or Senate, they might quickly have recruited, and shewn their force again; and if they could not have conquered, they might at least have lost all with more reputation, or possibly have brought the enemy to some honourable accord: but the poorness of their spirit, and the illness of their military discipline took from them at one time both their courage and state: and so it will be with whosoever follows the example of the Venetians: for this insolence in good fortune, and dejection in bad, proceeds from their manner of education; which if vain and idle, will make you so too; whereas if it be otherwise, it will give you a better notion of the World, and teach you in both for∣tunes to behave your self with more moderation: and as this is true in single persons, so it is in

Commonwealths, which are good or bad according to their manner of living. We have often said it before, and think it not amiss to repeat it again, that the foundation of all Governments consists in their Military discipline; and that where that is defective, nei∣ther their Laws, nor any thing else can be good; for thorow the whole tract of this Hi∣story, it appears that there is a necessity your Militia should be good, and that cannot be good, but by continual exercise, which you cannot be sure of unless it consists of your own Subjects. and because you are not always in War, and it is impossible you shall be, therefore it is necessary that they be exercised in times of Peace, which is not to be done by any but your own Subjects, in respect of the charge.

Camillus (as is said before) marched out with his Army against the Tuscans, but his Sol∣diers having had a sight of the Enemy, found their Army so great, that they were discou∣raged and dismay'd, and thought themselves so much inferior, that they were not able to fight the••. Camillus understanding this terror in his Camp, went up and down among the Soldiers, and having reprehended their fear, and said many things to encourage them, and drive that fancy out of their heads, at last without further directions, Come (said he) Courage! Quod quisque didicit aut consuevit, faciat. Do what you have been taught and accustomed, I desire no more. From whence it may be collected that he would not have used those words, had not his Army been exercised before, and that in times of Peace as well as War: For no good is to be expected, nor no General to trust himself to an unexperi∣enced or undisciplined Army, which will certainly be his ruine, though he were as good a Commander as Hanibal himself. And the reason is, because when an Army is engaged the General cannot be present in all places, to supply all defects, and remedy all errors; so that he must necessarily miscarry, unless he has such persons disposed up and down in the Army, as are capable of understanding his mind, and executing his Orders. Which being so, the Roman discipline is to be followed, and the Citizens of every City are to be inured to their Arms in times of Peace as well as war, that when they are brought to fight, they may not be at a loss, or meet with any thing new, or unaccustomed to them; by which means it will come to pass, that they will not be surprized or terrified in any condition, but retain still the same courage and sence of their dignity; But where the Citizens are undisciplin'd, and rely more upon their fortune, than experience, their hearts will change with their fortune, and they will give the same testimony of themselves, as the Venetians have done.

CHAP. XXXII.

The ways which some people have taken to prevent a Peace.

THe Circei and the Velitrae two of the Roman Colonies, revolted, in hopes the Latine would have been able to defend them. The Latines being defeated, and they frustra∣ted of their hopes, it was the advice of several Citizens, that they should send Embassa∣dors to Rome to reconcile themselves to the Senate; But those who had been ring-leaders in the defection, apprehending the punishment would fall heavy upon their heads, per∣verted that design; and to run things beyond all possibility of Terms, they incited the people to arm, and invade the Frontiers of the Romans. And doubtless when Prince or Commonwealth are desirous to prevent an agreement, there is no safer, nor surer way, than by running the people into some unpardonable offence, that the fear of being punish'd may keep them averse from all overtures of Peace. After the first War betwixt the Car∣thaginians and Romans, those Soldiers which had been employed by the Carthaginians in Sicily and Sardigna, as soon as the Peace was concluded, went over into Africa, where being denyed or delayed in the demands of their pay, they took Arms, and putting them∣selves under the command of two of their Officers, Matho, and Spendio, they plundered several of the Carthaginian Towns, and possessed themselves of others. The Carthagi∣nians (to try all ways, before they came to extremity) sent Asdrubal (on of their Prin∣cipal Citizens) Embassador to them; who having been formerly their General, it was probable, might have some Authority among them. Asdrubal being arrived, and Matho, and Spendio desirous to put the Soldiers beyond all possibility of pardon, persuaded them that the best and most secure way would be, for them to kill all the Carthaginians that were Prisoners with them, and Asdrubal among the rest. Whereupon they killed them all, with a thousand circumstances of cruelty and torture; to which piece of wickedness they added another by publishing an Edict importing, That all the Carthaginians which

should be taken for the future, should be treated the same way. And thus they prevented all propositions of Peace, and rendered their Soldiers obstinate and implacable to the Carthaginians.

CHAP. XXXIII.

To the obtaining a Victory, it is necessary your Army has a confidence not only in one another, but in their General.

TO win a Battel, and overcome an Enemy, it is necessary to give your Army such a confidence, as may make them believe that nothing is able to withstan•• them; and the way of infusing this confidence is, by Arming, and exercising them well, and giving them a knowledge and acquaintance one with the other; which confidence and acquain∣tance is not to be expected, but where your Soldiers are your own Subjects, and have been brought up together. The General is to be so qualified, that the Soldiers may have confi∣dence in his Wisdom, and Conduct; and they will always have such a confidence if they see him careful, and regular, and couragious, and one who preserves the majesty of his command with discretion and reputation; which he will do, if he punishes strictly, and put his Soldiers upon no over-hard and impertinent duty; keeps his promises; represent victory easie, either by concealing or extenuating the dangers, or by encouraging them bravely against them; and these things rightly observed, are of great consequence both to the Authority of the General, and the obtaining the Victory. The way which the Ro∣mans took to give this assurance to their Armies, was, by pretence of Religion; for which cause before the creation of their Consuls; the raising, or marching, or engaging of their Armies, their Augures and Auspices were consulted: and without some of these, no wise General would undertake any great Enterprize, believing they should certainly miscarry, unless the Soldiers were thorowly convinced that the Gods were on their side. And when any of their Consuls or other Commanders fought in defiance of these Auspi∣ces, he was punished, as Claudius Pulcher for despising the Omen of the Chickens. And although this is obvious in every part of the Roman History; yet it is better prov'd by the complaint of Appius Claudius to the people, against the insolence of their Tribunes, where he tells them that by their means, the Auspices, and other religious Customs were neglected or corrupted, His words are these, Eludant nunc licet Religionem; quid enim interest si pulli non pascentur, si ex cavea tardirts exierint, succinuerit avis? Parvasunt haec, sed parvaista non contemnendo, Majores nostri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt. Let them laugh at Religion as they please, and cry, what are we concerned if the Pullets won't eat, if they come lazily out of their Penns; or if a bird be disposed to sing? 'Tis true they are but trifles, yet by not dispising those trifles, our Ancestors brought this Commonwealth to the Gran∣deur it is at. And it was true; for those little things were sufficient to keep the Soldiers confident and united, which are two things go very far in a Victory, though without vir∣ture and valour, they are not always successful. The Prenestini being in the Field with their Army against the Romans, they went and lodged themselves upon the River Allia (in a place where the Romans had been beaten by the French) that the consideration of the place might be an encouragement to their own men, and a terror to the Romans. And though this design was not improbable for the reason abovesaid, yet it apeared by the success, that true courage is not disturbed by every little accident, as was well expressed by the Dictator to his Master of the House, Vides tu, fortuna illos fretos, ad Alliam consedisse, at tu fretus armis, animis{que} invade mediam acien. You see, by their posting themselves upon the Allia, they rely wholly upon Fortune; do you trust to your Arms, end your courage and attack their main Battel. And he was in the right; for true courage, good discipline, and a confidence arising from so many Victories, cannot be discomposed by such frivolous stratagems; light things will not dismay them, nor every disorder distract them. For even in the absence of their Officers, Soldiers that are expert, and accustomed to Arms, are not easily beaten. As appeared by the two Manlii (both Consuls, and making War upon the Volsci) who having indiscreetly sent part of their Army to forrage, it fell out, that both the commanded party, and those which were left behind, were encompassed by the Enemy, and as it were besieged both at a time, out of which danger the Soldiers were delivered, more by their own courage, than any conduct in the Consuls; whereupon Livy tells us Militum, etiam sine Rectore stabilis virtus tutata est. The stedfast courage of the Soldiers defended them, without any help from their General. Fabius had likewise an

excellent way to confirm his Soldiers and possess them with a confidence, which I cannot omit: Having invaded Tuscany with a new Army; supposing the novelty of the Coun∣try, and their inexperience of that Enemy might have some influence among them, to give them a confidence, he called them together before the Battel, and having in a grave Ora∣tion given several reasons why they might hope for the Victory, he told them, That he had another reason behind, more certain than all of them, but in that he must be private; for to discover it, would be to defeat it: A wise way, and deserves well to be imitated.

CHAP. XXXIV.

What vogue, fame or opinion disposes the people first to favour some parti∣cular Citizen; and whether they, or a Prince distributes their Offices with most prudence and judgment.

WE have shown before, how Titus Manlius (called afterwards Torquatus) preserved his Father L. Manlius from an accusation which Pomponius the Tribune had ex∣hibited against him to the people. And although the way which he took to preserve him was violent and irregular; yet his filial affection to his Father was so grateful to the peo∣ple, that they not only not reprehended him for what he had done, but advanced him to honour; for being not long after to choose Tribunes for their Legions, T. Manlius was the second that was made. And here I think it not amiss to consider the way which the the people of Rome took in the distribution of their honours, and election of Magi∣strates; and to inquire into the truth of what I asserted before, That the distributions of the people are better, and more exact than the distributions of a Prince; for the people follow the common and publick character of every man, unless by some particular notion of his actions, they presume, or believe otherwise. There are three ways by which a man may gain esteem and reputation with the people. The first is by extraction, when the Parents having been great men, and serviceable to the Commonwealth, the people take a fancy that their Children must of necessity be the same, until by some ill act they convince them of the contrary. The second way is to associate with grave per∣sons, of good esteem, and such as are reputed discreet and sober by every body; and be∣cause nothing indicates and discovers a man so much as the Company which he keeps; he who keeps good Company, may be concluded to be good; for of necessity persons so conversant together, must have something of similitude. But their is another way of gaining the favour of the people, which exceeds them both; and that is by performing some extraordinary action, whether publick or private, it matters not, so you come ho∣nourably off. And the judgments which are made in this case, are much better than the other: For the arguments taken from the virtue of the Parents, are doubtful and fallacious; nor can any man conclude any thing, till experience resolves him. The presumptions in the second from their conversations and Company, are much better than the first, but not comparable to the third; for reputation from Ancestors or Company depends bare∣ly upon opinion, and hopes, till some great action be performed that testifies your vir∣tue, and determines the doubt; and then if this action be performed when you are young, it makes the impression much deeper, and so fixes your reputation, that you must commit many ill actions before you can expunge it: Those therefore who would advance them∣selves in a Commonwealth, are to take this course, and endeavour to do some remarkable thing at first; which was done at Rome very frequently by several young persons, either by the promulgation of some Law for the benefit of the publick; or by the accusation of some great person for transgressing the Law; or doing some other great or new thing that may make you be talk'd of. Nor are these things necessary only to recommend you at first; but they are necessary likewise to maintain and augment your reputation; so that they are to be renewed and repeated often as long as you live; as Manlius did; for after he had defended his Father so honourably, and by that noble action laid the foundation of his esteem, many years were not past before he fought singly with a French man, and having slain him very bravely, he took a Gold Chain from his neck, which gave him the name of Torquatus; and having given these testimonies of his courage in his youth, when he came to riper years he made himself as famous for discipline and justice by the exam∣ple upon his Son, whom he caused to be put to death for fighting contrary to Orders, though he defeated the Enemy; which three great instances of his courage and virtue,

made his name so honourable both then and ever since, that no Victory, no Triumph could have done more. And good reason, for in victories, many equalled, and some exceeded him; but in these three very few came near, but no body exceeded him.

Scipio the elder was not so glorious by all his triumphs, as for having in his youth so manfully defended his Father at the Battel upon the Tesin; and after the Battel of Cannas forced certain young Romans with his Sword drawn to take an Oath not to desert their Country as they had resolved to do before; which two actions were the foundations of his following reputation, and served as steps to his Triumphs both over Spain and Africa which favour and good opinion of him was highly encreased, by his returning a Daughter and a Wife (both of them great Beauties, and both of them his Prisoners) immaculate and untouched, one to her Father, and the other to her Husband, in his Wars in Spain. And this way of proceeding is not only necessary for such as would gain honour and pro∣motion in a Commonwealth; but for Princes likewise and Kings who are desirous to retain their reputation with their subjects. For nothing recommends a Prince more efficaciously to the people, than in his youth to give them some taste or specimen of his virtue, by some remarkable act, or proposal for the benefit of the publick; especially if it has any tendancy to justice, magnanimity,, liberality, or the like; for things of that nature that are extra∣ordinary, whether acted, or spoken, are transmitted to posterity with so much reverence, that they even come to be Proverbs among the people: But to return, I say then, when the people designs to confer honour upon a Citizen, upon one of these three accounts, they go upon very good grounds, but especially upon the last, when several and reiterated exam∣ples make him more known; for then 'tis not possible they should be deceived, and in young persons they are certain presages of their deportment for the future. I speak only of those degrees which are given at first, before any firm experience has made them better known, or that they pass from one action to a contrary, in which, both as to mistakes, and corruption, the people do not erre so often as Princes. And because it may happen that the people may be deceived by report or opinion, or perhaps the actions of a man, as believing them more considerable and estimable than they are (which cannot easily hap∣pen to a Prince, by reason of his Council which are by, and always ready to inform him) that the people may not want such Monitors; those who have laid right foundations for a Commonwealth, have provided that when the great and supream Offices of a City are to be supplyed, where it would be dangerous to entertain any incapable persons, if they find the people disposed to the creation of any man who is known to be improper, it may be lawful for any Citizen; nay, an honour to any one that shall publickly discover his defects, that thereby the people understanding him better, may be better able to choose. That this was the practice in Rome appears by the Oration of Fabius Maximus, which he made publickly to the people in the second Punick War, when at the creation of the Con∣suls, the people were inclined to create T. Ottacilius, whom Fabius conceiving an unfit man for those times, remonstrated his thoughts so effectually to them, that he put him by that degree, and prevailed with the people to give it another person that deserv'd it much better. Which being so, the people in the election of their Magistrates do judge according to the best and truest tokens that they can observe; and could they be as well counselled in these affairs as Princes, they would commit fewer errors than they do. So that that Citi∣zen who would work himself into the favour of the people, must do some great matter, or express some great instance of his virtue or parts, that he may seem to imitate Manlius, and get as much honour as he.

CHAP. XXXV.

What dangers they incur, who make themselves authors of any Enterprise, and the more extraordinary the design, the greater the danger.

IT would be too long, and difficult a task to discourse at large of the danger there is in being the head in any new enterprise; what hazards there are in the Conduct, and how impossible to maintain it. Reserving that therefore for a more convenient place; I shall speak here only of the dangers to which such Citizens, or other persons are subject who advise a prince to make himself head of any important design, and do it with that eagerness and impetuosity, that the whole enterprise may be imputed to him. The first thing I would recommend to their observation is, that Counsels are commonly judged by their success; if their success be unfortunate, the whole scandal of the miscarriage falls

upon the author. If it prospers, and the event be good, he is commended, but at a di∣stance, and his reward is not commensurate with the danger. The present Emperor of the Turks Sultan Selimus (as it is reported by some that came late out of that Country) having made great preparations for an Expedition into Syria and Egypt changed his design upon the persuasion of one of his Bassa's, and with a vast Army march'd against the Sophie of Persia. Arriving in an open and ••rge Country, but for the most part Desarts and dry and no Rivers to supply them, many Diseases were contracted in his Army, insomuch as with hunger and sickness, it dwindled away (as many of the Romans had done in that Country before) till at last (though he had the better of the War) he had lost most of his men; upon which the Emperor being highly enraged, caused the Bassa who had coun∣selled him thither to be slain. We read likewise of several Citizens advising and Enter∣prize, upon the miscarriage of which they were all of them banished. At Rome certain Citizens proposed and promoted very earnestly the making one of the Consuls out of the people, and having prevailed, the first of them which went out with their Army being beaten and over-thrown, the authors would doubtless have found the inconvenience of their Counsel, had not the people (in whose favour it was given) appeared in their pro∣tection. So that this is most certain, all Counsellors of this kind (whether to Princes or Commonwealths) are betwixt those two rocks; if they do not advise what in their judg∣ments they think profitable for their Masters, and that frankly and without respect, they fail in their duties, and are defective that way; again if they do counsel freely, they bring their lives and fortunes in danger, because such is the natural blindness of Mankind, they cannot judge of the goodness or badness of any thing, but by the success; and con∣sidering with my self, what way was most likely to avoid this infamy or danger, I can find no better than to take all things moderately, to assume and impropriate no enterprize; to deliver your opinion frankly, but without passion, and to defend it so modestly, that if it be followed by your Prince or Commonwealth, it may appear to be their voluntary act, and not done upon your importunity; in that case it will not be reasonable to com∣plain of your Counsel, when executed by the concurrence of the rest; for if there be any danger, it is where things are done in contradiction of the rest of the Counsel, who upon any miscarriage will be sure to combine against you, and procure your destruction: and though perhaps in this case there may want something of that glory which accrews to a single person, who carries a design against the opposition of the rest, especially if it suc∣ceeds; yet there are two advantages on your side; for first you will not run so great a hazard in the miscarriage, and then if you advise a thing modestly, which by the obstinacy and contradiction of the rest is carried against you, the miscarriage of their Counsel, will make much more to your reputation. And although a good Citizen is not to desire to raise his credit upon the misfortunes of his Country, nor indeed to rejoyce in what happens of it self; yet when a thing is done, it is more satisfaction to have your Counsel applauded, than to be in danger of being punished. Wherefore I am of opinion, in these doubtful and difficult cases, there can be no better way for the Counsel either of a Prince or State, than to deliver themselves modestly and freely; for to be sullen and say nothing, would not only betray your Country, but expose your self, because in time you would become suspected; and perhaps it might befal them as it did to one of the Counsel of Perseus King of Macedon, who being defeated by Emilius Paulius, and escaping with some few of his friends, one of them (in discourse of his Master's misfortune) began to find fault; and blame several passages in his Conduct, which as he pretended might have been managed much better. At which the King being inraged, turn'd to him, told him, And do you (like a Traytor as you are) tell me of it now, when 'tis past remedy? and killed him with his own hands; so that he pay'd dear for being silent, when it was his duty to have spoke, and for speaking when it was discretion to have been silent; nor did his forbearing to give his advice secure him from danger; so that I am confirmed in my opinion that the best way is to observe the directions above said.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The reason why at the first Charge, the French have been, and still are accounted more than Men, but afterwards less than Women.

THe arrogance of that French man who challenged the stoutest of the Romans to fight with him upon the Bridge of the Arrien, and was afterwards killed by T. Manlius Torquatus, puts me in mind of what Livy says in many places, of the French, that in their first attack they are more fierce and daring than men, but afterwards more fearful and pusil∣lanimous than Women. And many people enquiring into the cause, do attribute it to the peculiarity of their temperature and nature: I am of opinion that there is much of that in it; yet I cannot think but that Nature which makes them so furious at first, may be so invigorated and improved by art, as to continue their courage to the last. To prove my opinion, I do affirm there are three sorts of Armies. In the first there is courage and fury, joyn'd with order and discipline; and indeed their courage and fury proceeds from their discipline. And of this sort were the Armies of the Romans, for all Histories do agree that there was always good order by reason of their long discipline and experience. No∣thing was done in their Armies, but with great regularity, and express order from their General. They neither eat, nor slept, nor bought, nor sold, nor did any other action either military or civil, but by permission of the Consul; and therefore these Roman Ar∣mies, who by their discipline and courage subdued the whole world, are the best example we can follow; they who do otherwise, do ill, and though perhaps they may do some∣thing extraordinary sometimes, yet 'tis more by accident than judgment: But where well ordered courage meets with good discipline, and is accommodated to the circumstances of manner, and time, nothing dismays them, nothing withstands them; for the goodness of their order giving new life and courage to their men, makes them confident of Victory, and that confidence never suffers them to give ground, till their whole order be broken. There is another sort of Armies which are acted more by fury than discipline (as in the Armies of the French) and there it is quite otherwise, because not succeeding in their first charge, and not being sustained by a well ordered courage, that fury upon which they wholly rely'd growing cold and remiss, they are quickly overthrown. Whereas the Romans fearing nothing of danger, by reason of their good order and discipline, without the least diffi∣dence or question of the Victory, fought on still obstinately, being animated with the same courage, and agitated by the same ardor at last as at first, and the more they were press'd, the better they resisted. The third sort of Armies is where their is neither natural cou∣rage, nor discipline and order, as in our Italian Armies now adays, which are so useless and unserviceable, that ••••••ess they light upon an Enemy who runs by some accident, they are never like to have a Victory; and this is so obvious every day, it needs no example to prove it. But because by the testimony of Livy every one may know what is the right discipline, and what is the wrong, I will give you the words of Papirius Gursor in his reprimande to Fabius the Master of his Horse. His words are these, Nemo hominum; nemo Deorum verecundiam hebeat. Non edicta Imperatorum, non auspicia observentur: Sine Com∣meatu, vagimilites in pacato, in hostico errent; immemores Sacramenti, se ubi valent exau∣ctorentur; infrequentia deserantur signa; ne{que} conveniatur ad edictum: nec discernatur interdiu, noctu; aequo, iniquo loco, jussu, injussu Imperatoris pugnetur; Non signa, non ordines serventur? latrocinii modo, caeca & fortuita, pro solenni & sacrata Militia, sit. Let them bare no respect or reverence either to God or man: Let neither the orders of the General, nor the directions of the Auspices be observed; Let the loose and vagabond Soldier infest his own Country as much as the Enemies: Let them forget their Oaths, and disband as they please: Let them run from their Colours as they think good, and not come back when they are required: Let them fight hand over head, without consideration of time, or place, or order of their Officers: Let their ranks be confused, and their Colours deserted: In a word, Let their whole Conduct be blind and fortuito like thieves, rather than the solemn and sacred Militia of the Romans. By this we may easily see whether the Militia of our times be blind and fortuitous or whether it be solemn, and sacred, how far is it short of the old discipline of the Romans, which consisting in exact order, produced courage and con∣stancy in the Souldiers; and how far behind the French, among whom though their is not that just order and constancy, yet there is courage enough.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Whether fighting in small parties, or pickeering before a Battel be necessary; and how the temper of a new Enemy is to be found without them.

IN humane affairs (as we have said before) there is not only a perpetual and unavoidable difficulty in carrying them to their perfection, but there is always some concomitant mis∣chief so inseparable from it, that it is impossible to arrive at the one without the other. This is visible in all the actions of mankind, so that that perfection is acquir'd with much dif∣ficulty, unless you be so favoured by fortune, that by her force she overcomes that com∣mon and natural inconvenience: and of this, and duel betwixt Manlius Torquatus and the French-man put me in mind, where, as Livy tell us, Tantiea dimicatio ad universi belli e∣ventum momenti fuit, ut Gallorum exercitus, relictis trepidè Castris, in Tiburtem agrum, mox in Campaniam transierit; The success of that duel was of so much importance to the success of the War, that thereupon the French Army drew off in a great fear into the Tiburtine Coun∣try, and afterwards march'd away into Campania. From whence I infer, on the one side, that a good General is to avoid any thing that (carrying but small advantage with it) may have an ill influence upon his Army; to fight therefore in parties, and venture your whole fortune upon less than your whole Army, is rash and imprudent, (as I have said before, where I dissuaded the keeping of passes.) On the other side, I observe, when an experienced General comes against a new enemy that has the reputation of being stout, before he brings him to a Battel, he is obliged to try him by slight skirmishes and pickeerings, that by so doing he may bring his Souldiers acquainted with their discipline, and way of sighting, and remove that terror, which the fame and reputation of their courage had given them. And this in a General is of very great importance, and so absolutely necessary, that he who engages an unknown enemy with his whole Army, before he has made an essay of his courage, runs himself and his Army into manifest danger. Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with an Army against the Samnites, a new enemy with whom they had never had any conflict before; and Livy tells us he sent small parties abroad, and caused them to entertain light skirmishes with the enemy, Ne eos novum bellum, ne novus hostis terreret; Lest his Souldiers should be terrified with a new war, and a new enemy. But then the dan∣ger is, that your men being overcome, their terror should be encreased; and that which you intended to animate, should discourage and dismay them: and this is one of those good things which have so near a conjunction with evil, that 'tis no hard matter to take one for the other. My advice therefore is, that a wise General abstains from any thing that may strike a terror into his Army; for then the Souldiers begin to apprehend, when they see their Comrades kill'd before their face. For which reason those pickeerings and slight skirmishes are to be avoided by all means, unless upon great advantage, or some more than ordinary hopes of success. Again, it is not his interest certainly to defend any pass, where he cannot upon occasion bring his whole Army to engage: neither are any Towns to be made good, but such as are of importance to the subsistance of his Army, and without which both that and himself must be ruined; and no such Towns are to be fortified, but where not only a good Garison may be disposed and supplyed, but where in case of a Siege your whole Army may be brought to relieve it: other Towns are rather to be quit∣ted than kept; for to abandon a Town whilst your Army is in the field, is no disrepute to you, nor discouragement to your Souldiers: but when you lose a place that you undertook, and every body expected you would defend, that abates much of your credit, and is a great prejudice to you; so that it will be with you as it was then with the French, a trifling loss will endanger the whole war.

Philip of Macedon (the Father of Perseus) a martial Prince, and of great reputation in his time, being invaded by the Romans, quitted and destroyed a great part of his Country, which he supposed he should be unable to defend, as judging it better, and more con∣sistent with his honour to suffer it to be possessed by the enemy as waste and neg∣lected, than to undertake, and not be able to defend it. The affairs of the Romans being in a very ill condition after the battel at Cannas, they refused their assistance to several of their friends and allies, giving them leave to defend themselves if they could: which resolutions are much better than to attempt to defend that which is not in our power; for in the first case we lose only our friends; but in the last, both our friends and our selves. To re∣turn therefore to our skirmishes, I say, that when ever for the discovery of the enemy, or acquainting his Souldiers with the way of their sighting, a General is constrained to make use of them, he is to do it with that art and advantage, that he may run no hazard of being worsted: or else to follow the example of Marius, (which is the better way of the two)

who marching against the Cimbri, a fierce and numerous people which had invaded Italy for prey, and beaten one Roman Army already; observing his Army to be afraid, he thought it would be necessary before he came to a general engagement, to contrive some way or other to dispossess them of their fear; whereupon, as a wise Officer, he disposed his Army (more than once or twice) in some secure place upon the road by which the Cim∣brian Army was to pass, from whence his men might have a view of their march, and ac∣custom themselves to the sight of them; to the end that seeing them to be nothing but a confused and disorderly multitude, incommoded with baggage, and either very ill accoutred, or utterly unarm'd, they might recover their spirits, and grow impatient to be at them: and this prudent invention of Marius ought to be diligently imitated by other people, lest they fall into the dangers aforesaid, and come off like the French, Qui obrem parvi ponde∣ris in Tiburtem agrum, & in Campaniam transierunt; Who upon a trifling accident, desponded, and retired: And because I have mentioned Valerius Corvinus in this Chapter, I shall make use of his words in the next, to shew how a General should be qualified.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

How a Generalis to be qualified, that his Army may rely upon him.

AS we have said before, Valerius Corvinus was gone with his Army against the Sam∣nites, a new enemy, with whom the Romans had had no contest before. To en∣courage his Souldiers, and acquaint them with the discipline of the Samnites, he inured his men to them, by several small skirmishes, but lest that should not do, he made a speech to them before the Battel, remonstrating with all possible efficacy of words, how little they were to value the enemy; and how much they might expect from their own valour, and his conduct: Livy brings him in with these words in his mouth, which gives us an exact character of a General in whom his Army may confide. Tum etiam intueri cujus ductu auspicioque ineunda pugna sit; utrum qui audiendus, duntaxat magnificus adhortator sit, ver∣bis tantum ferox, operum militarium expers; aut qui & ipse tela tractare, procedere ante signa, versari media in mole pugnae sciat. Facta m••a, non dicta vos milites sequi volo, nec discipli∣nam modo, sed exemplum etiam ame petere, qui hac dextra mihi tres Consulatus, summam∣que laudem peperi; Then you may see under whose Conduct you fight; whether he that speaks to you be only a magnificent boaster, valiant in words, but ignorant in whatever belongs to a Souldier; or whether he be one that knows how to manage his Arms, lead up his Men, charge in the head of them, and behave himself manfully in the very heat of the Battel; I would not (fellow Souldiers) that you should follow my words more than my deeds; or take only my pre∣cepts, and not my example, who with this hand have gained three Consulships, and im∣mortal reputation. Which words, if well considered, are sufficient to instruct any man what course he is to take to make himself reputed a great General; he who acts otherwise will find in time that that command (however he came by it, whether by ambi∣tion or fortune) will rather abstract than add to his honour, for it is not titles that make men honourable, but men their titles: and it is to be observed likewise, that if great Captains have been forced to such unusual language to confirm the hearts of an old veteran Army, when it is to fight with a new enemy; how much more care and art is to be used in a new inexperienced Army, that never saw an enemy before. For if a strange enemy be terrible to an old Army, well may he be so to an Army that is new raised, and was never engaged: nevertheless all these difficulties have been overcome by the prudence of several Captains, as by Gracchus the Roman, and Epaminondas the Theban, who with new raised men defeated old veteran Troops, that had been long experienced in matters of war; and their way was to prepare them for some months by continual exercise, and counterfeit bat∣tels; by using them to their ranks, and holding them to strict discipline and obedience; after which, they advanced against the enemy, engaged with great confidence, and per∣formed very well. Let no man therefore (that is any thing of a Souldier) despair of ma∣king his Army good, if he has but men enough; for that Prince who abounds with men, and wants Souldiers, is rather to complain of his own laziness and imprudence, than of their incapacity and dulness.

CHAP. XXXIX.

A General ought to know the Country, and how to take his advantage in the ground.

AMong the many things that are necessary in a General of an Army, the knowledg of Coasts and Countries is one, and that not only in a Generall, but in an exquisite and more particular way, without which he shall not be able to do any great thing: and be∣cause all knowledge requires use and exercise to bring it to perfection, so is it in this know∣ledg of places; and if it be enquired what use, and what exercise is required in this case, I answer, Hunting, and Hawking, and such like recreations; and therefore it is that the Heroes which anciently govern'd the World, were said to be brought up in woods and fo∣rests, and accustomed to those kind of exercises; for hunting (besides the acquaintance which it gives you of the Country) instructs you in many things that are necessary in war; Xenophon in the Life of Cyrus tells us, that when Cyrus went to invade the King of Ar∣menia, assigning several offices and places to the several parts of his Army, he told them that, Questa, non era altro ch'una di quelle caccie le quali molte volte havenano fatte seco; That this expedition was no more than one of those Chaces which they had taken frequently with him. Those whom he placed as Scouts upon the Mountains, he resembled to them who set their nets upon the hills; and those who were to make excursions upon the plain, were like them who were employed to rouse the Deer, and force them into the Toyls. And this is said by Xenophon, to shew the resemblance and similitude betwixt hunting and war: for which cause those kind of exercises are not only honourable, but necessary for great persons; and the rather, because nothing gives a man so true a knowledg of the Coun∣try, or imprints it more deeply and particularly in the memory: and when a man has ac∣quainted himself thorowly with one Country, he may arrive more easily at the knowledg of other, because all Countries and Coasts have some kind of proportion and conformity betwixt them; so that the knowledg of the one contributes much to the understanding of the other. But if before you have acquainted your self with your own, you seek out new Regions, you will hardly without great labour, and long time, come to the knowledg of either. Whereas he that is well vers'd and practised in one, shall at the first cast of his eye give you an account how that plain lies; how that mountain rises; and how far that val∣ley extends; and all by his former knowledg in that kind. To confirm all this, Titus Livius gives us an example in Publius Decius, who being a military Tribune in the Army which the Consul Cornelius commanded against the Samnites, and finding the said Consul and Army fallen by accident into a Vale where they might have been encompassed by the enemy, and cut off, Vides tu Aule Corneli (said Decius to the Consul) cacum••n illud supra hostem? Arx illa est spei salutis{que} nostrae; si eam (quoniam caeci reliquere Samnites) im∣pigre capimus; Do you see, Sir, that hill which hangs over the enemies Camp; there lies our hope; the blind Samnites haue neglected it, and our safety depends upon the seizing of it quickly. For, said Livy before, Publius Decius Tribunus militum, unum editum in saltu Collem, imminentem hostium Castris, aditu arduum impedito agmini, expeditis hand difficilem; Publius Decius the military Tribune observed a hill over the enemies Camp not easily to be ascended by those who were compleatly arm'd, but to those who were lightly arm'd, ac∣cessible enough. Whereupon being commanded to possess it by the Consul with 3000 men, he obeyed his orders, secur'd the Roman Army, and designing to march away in the night, and save both himself and his party; Livy brings him in speaking these words to some of his Comrades, Ite mecum, ut dum lucis aliquid superest, quibus locis hostes praesidia ponant, qua pateat hinc exitus exploremus. Haec omnia sagulo militari amictus, ne Ducem circuire hostes notarent, perlustravit; Come along with me, that whilst we have yet light, we may explore where the enemy keeps his Guards, and which way we may make our retreat: and this he did in the habit of a private Souldier, that the enemy might not suspect him for an Of∣ficer. He then who considers what has been said, will find how useful and necessary it is for a General to be acquainted with the nature of the Country; for had not Decius un∣derstood those things very well, he could not so suddenly have discerned the advantage of that hill, and of what importance it would be to the preservation of the Roman Army; neither could he have judged at that distance whether it was accessible or not, and when he had possessed himself of it, and was to draw off afterwards, and follow the Consul, (be∣ing so environed by the Samnites) he could never have found out the best way for his re∣treat, nor have guessed so well where the enemy kept his Guards. So that it must neces∣sarily

be that Decius had a perfect knowledg of the Country, which knowledg made him secure that hill, and the securing of that hill was the security of the Army. After which, by the same knowledg (though he was as it were besieged by the enemy) he found a way to make his own retreat, and bring off his whole party.

CHAP. XL.

How fraud in the management of War is honourable and glorious.

THough fraud in all other actions is abominable, yet in matters of War it is laudable and glorious; and he who overcomes his enemies by stratagem, is as much to be praised as he who overcomes him by force. This is to be seen by the judgment of those who write the Lives of great Persons, especially of great Commanders; for they command and applaud Hanibal and the rest in all their inventions of that nature. There are many examples in them to this purpose, which I shall not repeat here; only this I must adver∣tize, that I do not intend that fraud which consists in betraying a trust, or breaking an a∣greement, to be honourable; for though by them you may acquire Power, and 'tis possible a Kingdom, (yet, as I said before) it cannot be with honour; but by fraud, I mean that ar∣tifice which is shewn in stratagems and circumventions, against an enemy that is not only in hostility, but a state of defiance, (for where he reposes any confidence in you, it alters the case) and such as I mean, was the artifice of Hanibal when he pretended to fly, only to possess himself of some passes, and so block up the Consul and his Army; as also when to clear himself of Fabius Maximus, he found out the invention of binding fire-brands and other combustible matter about the horns of the Cattel, and turning them out upon the enemy. And much of this nature was that of Pontius General for the Samnites; which he used to circumvent the Roman Army ad Tureas Caudinas. Pontius having disposed his Army privately upon the mountains; sent several of his Souldiers habited like Shep∣herds with several herds of Cattel thorow the plain: being all taken and examined by the Romans where the Army of the Samnites was, they unanimously concurred in the story which Pontius had put into their mouths, that it was gone to besiege Nocera; which be∣ing credited by the Consul, he brake up from his post, and marching thorow the plain for the relief of Nocera, he ran himself into the trap, and was no sooner entred, but he was block'd up by the enemy. This exploit was fraudulently performed, yet it would have been very honourable to Pontius, had he followed his Father's advice, who would have had him either dismissed the Romans frankly, that they might have been obliged by their usage, or else have put them all to the sword, that they might have taken no revenge; but he took the middle way, Quae neque amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit; Which neither mul∣tiply'd his friends, nor lessened the number of his foes. Which way has always been perni∣tious in matters of state, as has been shewn elsewhere.

CHAP. XLI.

That ones Country is to be defended by all means, and whether honourable or dishonourable it imports not, 'tis well defended.

THe Roman Army and their Consul (as is said before) were block'd up by the Samnites, who having proposed terms to them which were very dishonourable, as that they should be dismissed sub jugum, and disarm'd (in token of bondage,) and then sent back again to Rome. The Consuls were amazed at the motion, and the whole Army was in despair; when Lentulus the Roman Legate stood up, and told them that in his judgment no conditions were to be scrupled at that time when their Country was at stake: for the safety of Rome consisting in the safety of that Army, the Army was to be preserved, and that Country which is defended, is well defended, let the way be as it will, honoura∣ble or not honourable, it matters not: for if that Army was preserved, in time Rome might work off that disgrace; but if it were lost, (though it perished never so bravely) Country, and Liberty and all would be lost with it: and so his Counsel was followed. And this ought to be considered and observed by every man whose office it is to advise for the good of his Country; for where the safety of that is in question, no other consideration ought

to be coincident, as whether the way be just or unjust; merciful or cruel, honourable or dishonourable; but postponing all other respects, you are to do that which shall procure the safety of your Country, and preservation of its liberty. And this is effectually imi∣tated by the French both in their words, and deeds, whenever the Majesty of their Prince, or the interest of their Country is at stake. For there is nothing they bear with less patience, than to hear a man say such a thing is dishonourable for their King; for they believe their King uncapable of dishonour, be his Counsels or his fortune what they will, because whe∣ther he wins or loses, or whatever is done, all makes for the King.

CHAP. XLII.

That forc'd Promises are not binding.

THe Consuls being returning to Rome, with their Army disarmed, and a scandal upon them for the dishonourable conditions to which they had submitted; the first who spake against the keeping them, was S. Postumius the Consul, who persuaded the Senate that only himself, and those who accepted them, were obliged thereby; and that they did not extend to the people of Rome; wherefore if the people of Rome would be never so exact, the most that could be expected from them, would be but to deliver up him, and all those who had engaged themselves into the hands of the Samnites; and this he main∣tained with so much obstinacy and zeal, that the Senate was ••onvinced, and sent him and the rest back Prisoners to the Samnites, with a protestation against the Peace, as not ex∣tending to them; and fortune was so favourable to Postumius in the business, that the Sam∣nites not retaining him, he return'd to Rome, and was in greater reputation there after his loss, than Pontius was among the Samnites after his Victory. And here there are two things more particularly remarkable: One is, That there is no action, but is capable of producing honour and renown; in victory there is nothing more frequent: In loss, it is possible, by making it appear that it came not by your fault; or else by doing some action presently after, that may recompense and repair it. The other is, That it is not scanda∣lous to break such promises as are extorted by force. For in promises relating to the pub∣lick, if they be obtained by force, when the force ceases, the promise ceaseth with it, and may be neglected without any disgrace. Of this, all History is full of examples, and there is not a day but presents us with new: For as we see Princes make no Conscience of per∣forming any thing that they are obliged to by force, especially if the force be removed; so they are as little tender of their promises in other things, when the cause which press'd them to promise is taken away: which whether commendable or not in a Prince, or binding or not binding, I shall not determine in this place, having spoken of it so largely in my Treatise called The Prince.

CHAP. XLIII.

Those who are born in the same Country, retain almost the same Nature thorow all the variety of times.

WIsemen were wont to say (and perhaps not unworthily) That he who would know what will be, must consider what has been already, because there is nothing in the world now, nor will be hereafter, but what has▪ and will have conformity with the productions of former times; and the reason is, because proceeding from men who have, and have had always the same passions, they must necessarily have the same effects. 'Tis true indeed their actions are sometimes better and more virtuous in this Province, than in that, and in that more than in another, according to the difference of their Education, for from the manner of their breeding, people take the first rudiments of their conver∣sation; and it makes it more easie to conjecture future events, by what is passed, when we see some Nations retaining their humours and peculiarities a long time. So one Nation has been always covetous, another fraudulent; and so on the other side, one has been con∣stantly famous for one virtue, and another for another. He who peruses the passages of old in our very City of Florence, and compares them with our modern, will find that it has been all along exposed to the avarice, pride, cruelty, and falshood of the Germans and

French: Every one knows how unfaithfully we have been dealt withal: How often Charles VIII. of France received our Money, and promised to restore the Citadels at Pisa; but never perform'd, which was a great instance of his infidelity, and avarice. But to wave such recent examples, every one knows what hapned in the War betwixt the Floren∣tines, and the Visconti Dukes of Milan. The Florentines being destitute of other expe∣dients, resolved to bring the Emperor into Italy, to fall upon Lombardy with all his power and reputation. The Emperor engaged to bring a great Army into Italy; to make War upon the Visconti, and to defend Florence against them, upon condition the Florentines pay'd him 100000 Ducats by way of advance, and as much more when they came into Italy. The Florentines agreed, paid their first Money down, and the rest when they enter'd Italy; yet when he had marched as far as Verona, he turned back without doing any thing, complaining of the Florentines for want of performance: So that had not Florence been under some extraordinary necessity, or passion, or had they ever read and considered the ancient customs of those Nations, they would never have been so often over-reached, see∣ing they have been always alike, and used the same practices in all places, with all people. Thus they served the Tuscans of old, who having been many times over-power'd and routed, and dispersed by the Romans, and finding their own force unable to defend them; they articled with the French on this side of the Alps to give them a Sum of Money, for which the French were to joyn their forces with the Tuscaps, and march with them against the Romans: But when the French had got their Money, they refused to perform the con∣ditions on their part, alledging that they received it not to make War upon the Romans, but to forbear infesting them themselves: by which infidelity and avarice in the French, the poor Tuscans were at once defeated both of their Money and assistance. From whence we may conclude that the Tuscans were formerly of the same nature as now, and especially the Florentines, and the French and other foreign Nations had always the same inclination to deceive them.

CHAP. XLIV.

Confidence and boldness does many times obtain that which would never be compassed by ordinary means.

THe Samnites were invaded by the Romans, and their Army so weak, it durst not meet them in the field: whereupon it was resolved, That all their Garisons should be reinforced, and with the rest of their Troops they should pass into Tuscany (which was then at peace with the Romans) and try if they could tempt them to take up Arms, and break their Peace; and in the Harangue which was made by the Samnites to the Tuscans to remonstrate upon what occasion they had taken up Arms themselves, they had this expres∣sion, Rebellasse quod pax servientibus gravior, quam liberis bellum. They had rebelled, because Peace was more insupportable in servitude, than War to men that are free. And so partly by persuasions, and partly by the presence of their Army, they prevailed with them to take Arms against the Romans, which they had refused to their Embassadors before. From whence it is to be observed, that when a Prince desires to obtain any thing of another (if occasion permits) he ought not to give him time to consider, but is to act so as he may see a necessity upon him of resolving immediately; and this is done when the person to whom the demand is made sees that in either denying it absolutely, or delaying his answer, he runs a manifest danger. This way was used very handsomely in our days by Pope Iu∣lius with the French; and Monsieur de Foix (the King of France's General) against the Marquess of Mantoua. Pope Iulius resolving to drive the Family of the Bentivogli out of Bolonia; and judging that to do it, he should have need of the assistance of the French, and that it would be convenient the Venetians should stand Neuter; To this purpose he sent Embassadors to them both, but could get nothing but uncertain and ambiguous an∣swers; wherefore to surprize them, and bring them that way to his lure whether they would or no, he got what Forces he could together, and marching directly to Bolonia, sent to the Venetians to let them know he expected they should stand Neuter; and to the French to send him Supplies: Both of them finding themselves under a necessity of answering immediately, and that there was no time allowed to consider, fearing the displeasure and indignation of his Holiness, they both of them complyed; the Venetian did not meddle; and the French sent him assistance. Monsieur de Foix being another time with his Army in Bolonia, and understanding the defection of Brescia, he resolved to go immediately and

endeavour to reduce it. There were but two ways that he could possibly pass; one was thorow the Dominions of his Master, but that was tedious and about; the other was a shorter cut, thorow the Territories of the Marquess of Mantoua; but then he was not only to force his way thorow that Country, but, he was to pass certain Sluces betwixt Fens and Lakes (with which that Country abounds) and that was not to be done without great difficulty, in respect of several Forts which were upon them, and all well guarded by the Marquess: However de Foiz resolved upon the shortest, in spite of the difficulty; and that the Marquess might have no time to deliberate, he marched with his Army, and at the same moment sent a Messenger to the Marquess for the Keys of such Castles as stood in his passage; and the Marquess surprized with the suddenness and confidence of the demand, sent them immediately, which he would never have done had they been more modestly de∣sired; the Marquess being in League with the Venetian and Pope, in whose hands he had likewise a Son at that time; all which, had he had time to have considered, would have been very laudable reasons to have denyed it: But being press'd of a sudden, he sent them (as is said before:) Just so it was betwixt the Tuscans, and the Samnites; the presence of the Samnian Army having forced them to take Arms, which they had refused before, and had scarcely done then, had they had liberty to have advis'd.

CHAP. XLV.

Whether in a Battel it is best to give or receive the Charge.

DEvius, and Fabius two Roman Consuls, were in the field with two Armies against the Samnites, and Tuscans; and being come to a Battel, it is observable that they took two several ways in the manner of their fighting, and it is worth our enquiry which of them was the best. Decius charged the Enemy with all imaginable fury, and engaged his whole Army at once: Fabius received the charge, and (judging that way the most safe) reserved his effort till the last, when (as we say) the Enemy had spent their fire, and the heat of their fury was over. By the success of the Battel, it appeared that the design of Fabius was better than that of Decius, who tired with the vehemence of his first charge, and seeing his men engaged farther among the Enemy, than otherwise they would have been, to gain that honour by his death, which he could not hope for by the Victory, in imitation of his Father, he sacrificed himself for the Roman Legions. Which when Fa∣bius understood, that he might not gain less honour by living, than his colleague should do by his death, he advanced with his Reserves, and charg'd the Enemy so briskly, that he overthrew them, and gained a happy and most memorable Victory. By which it ap∣pears that the way of Fabius was more imitable and secure.

CHAP. XLVI.

How it comes to pass that in a City the same Family retains the same manners and customs a long time.

IT appears that not only one City has its manners and institutions different; and produ∣ces men more austere, or effeminate than the rest; but in the same City Families are frequently found to have the same difference. Of this there are multitude of Examples, and particularly in Rome. The Manlii were always rigid and severe: The Publicoli benign, and lovers of the people: The Appii ambitious and enemies to the people, and so in several other Families they had their peculiar qualities that discriminated them from the rest; which cannot proceed barely from their extraction and blood (for that must of necessity have been altred by the variety of their Marriages) but rather from the diversity of their Education, in the several Families; for it is a great matter when a man is accustomed to hear well or ill of any thing from his infancy; and makes such an impression in him, that from thence he many times regulates his conversation as long as he lives; and if this were not so, it would have been impossible that all the Appii should have been agitated by the same passion and ambition, as Livy observed in most of them; and particularly in one of the last, who being made Censor, and to deposite his Office at the expiration of 18 months according to Law, refused it absolutely (though his Colleague resigned) insisting upon an

old Law made by the Censors to continue their Magistracy for five years and though there were many meetings, and great contention and tumult about this; yet in spite both of Senate and People he could not be brought to deposite. And he who reads the Oration which he made against P. Sempronius the Tribune of the people, will discern the insolence of that Family, and the bounty and humanity of several other Citizens expressed by their obedience to the Laws, and their affection to their Country.

CHAP. XLVII.

A good Citizen is to forget all private injury, when in competition with his love to his Country.

MAnlius the Consul being employed in the Wars against the Samnites, received a wound that disabled him for executing his charge; upon which the Senate thought sit to send Papirius Cursor the Dictator to supply his place, and the Dictator being by the Laws to be nominated by Fabius, who was then with his Army in Tuscany, they were fearful (in respect of an old quarrel betwixt them) that Fabius would not name him. Whereupon the Senate dispatched two Embassadors toward him, to intreat that (laying aside all pri∣vate animosity) he would name Cursor for Dictator, which Fabius did out of love to his Country; though by his sullenness and silence, and several other signs he signified his relu∣ctancy, and that that Election went against the hair: From hence therefore all good Citi∣zens are to take example, and learn to prefer the publick good, before any private quarrel of their own.

CHAP. XLVIII.

When an Enemy commits any grand fault, 'tis to be suspected for a fraud.

FUlnius being left Lieutenant of the Roman Army in Tuscany, upon the Consuls going to Rome to be present at some Ceremony, the Tuscans to draw him into a trap, lay'd an Ambuscade for him not far from his Camp; and having disguised some of their Soldiers in the habit of Shepheards, they caused them to drive certain Cattel within sight of the Romans; and the Shepheards were so exact in their obedience, that they came up to their very Stoccadoes: The Lieutenant wondered at their confidence; and the unreasonableness of the thing gave him occasion to suspect; whereupon he found out a way to discover the fraud, and frustrate the whole plot: From whence we may observe that a General is not to presume upon any gross error that his enemy commits; because it is not rational to be∣lieve he would be so sottish, and inconsiderate, were there not some stratagem at the bot∣tom; yet many times men are so blinded with desire of Victory, that they see nothing but what makes for themselves. The French having overthrown the Romans not far from the Allia, and pursuing them to Rome, found the gates open, and without any guards to de∣fend them: They apprehended it a design, and stood drawn up all that day and the next night, without daring to enter, not imagining the Romans could have been so abject and imprudent as to have abandoned their Country. In the year 1508. when the Florentines besieged Pisa, Alfonso del Mutolo a considerable Citizen of that Town, being Prisoner in the Camp, promised that if they would give him his liberty, he would deliver one of the Gates into their hands; the Florentines believed and discharged him; but coming after∣wards to negotiate more particularly with certain Commissioners deputed to that purpose, he was so far from coming privately, that he was always accompanied with several of the Pisans, only when they came to treat, he desired them to withdraw. Forasmuch therefore as he came publickly, and attended by several Pisans, the Florentines had good reason to suspect the performance of his promise: But the Florentines were so blinded with a desire to have the City, that following the direction of Alfonso, they came up to the Gate towards Lucca, expecting to be let in; but all things being prepared for them, they received a great loss, and left many of their best Officers and Soldiers behind them.

CHAP. XLIX.

A Commonwealth which desires to preserve it self free, has need of new pro∣visions every day; and upon what score Fabius was called Maximus.

IT falls out of necessity (as has been said before) that in a great City there is not a day but some accidents occur that have need to be remedied; and as they are of more or less importance, so their Physician ought to be more or less expert. And if strange and un∣expected accidents ever hapned in any City, it was in Rome: one of which sort, was the the general conspiracy of the Roman Women against their Husbands: some had poysoned their Husbands already, and all the rest had their materials ready to do as much by theirs. Of the same sort was the conspiracy of the Bacchanals, discovered during the time of the Macedonian War, in which many thousands of Men and Women were engaged; which would have been very dangerous for that City, had it not been discovered; for the Romans had not a custom of punishing whole multitudes when they offended. And here we can∣not but admire the fortitude, the severity, the magnanimity of the Romans in punishing offenders; which (if there were nothing else to evince it) would be a great testimony of their virtue and power. For so great was their justice, they made no scruple to execute a whole Legion, or City at a time: sometimes they banished 8 or 10000 men together with such conditions as would have been insupportable to a single man: so it hapned to those who escaped from the Battel at Cannas, they banished them all into Sicily, forbidding them to Quarter in any Town, or to commit any disorder. But the most terrible of all their executions was the decimation of their Armies, in which every tenth man was put to death by lot quite thorow their Army; nor for the punishment of a multitude can any way be found more formidable; for where a multitude transgresses, and no certain Author is known, to punish the whole with death would be too severe; and to punish one part, and excuse another would be injust to those who were punish'd, and encourage the other to commit the same offence again: But where all are alike guilty, to execute every tenth man by lots, gives him who is to be punished, occasion to complain only of his fortune; and makes him who escapes afraid against the next time. The good Women then who would have poyson'd their Husbands; and the Priests of Bacchus were punished as they deserv'd; and though these maladies in a Commonwealth have many times very ill Symptoms, yet they are not mortal, because there is still time enough for the cure. But where the State is concern'd, it is otherwise, and time may be wanting; and therefore if they be not seasonably and prudently redressed, the whole Government may miscarry. And this may be clear'd to us, by what hapned in Rome. The Romans having been very free in bestowing the freedom and priviledges of their City upon strangers, the strangers grew so numerous by degrees, and to have so great a Vote in the Councils, that the whole Govern∣ment began to totter, and decline from its old, to its new Inhabitants; which being ob∣served by Qui••••us Fabius the Censor, he applyed a remedy in time, by reducing all the new Citizens into four Tribes; that being contracted into so narrow a space, they might not have so malignant an influence upon the City; and this so timely and so useful expedient, was taken so thankfully from him by the people, that they gave him the addition of Maxi∣mus, and he was called Fabius Maximus ever after.