The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

THE DISCOURSES OF Nicholas Machiavel, CITIZEN, and SECRETARY OF FLORENCE, Upon the First Decade of TITVS LIVIVS.

LIBER III.

CHAP. I.

That a Sect or Commonwealth be long-liv'd, it is necessary to correct it often; and reduce it towards its first Principles.

'TIS a certain truth, that the things of this World are determined, and a set time appointed for their duration; but those run thorow the whole course which is assigned them by their Stars, who keep their body in such order, that it may not alter at all, or if it does, it is for the better. I speak now of mixt bodies, as Commonwealths, and Sects, and I say, that those alterations are salutiferous, which reduce them towards their first principles; and therefore the best ordered, and longest liv'd are they, who (by their own orders) may be often renewed, or else by some accident (without the help of the said orders) may tend to renovation: 'tis as clear as the day, that no bo∣dies of men are of long duration, unless they be renewed; and the way to renew them (as is said before) is to reduce them to their principles. For the Fundamentals of all Sects, Commonwealths and Kingdoms have always something of good in them, by means of which they recover their first reputation and grandeur. And because in process of time that goodness corrupts, that body must of necessity die, unless something intervenes that reduces it to its first principles. The Physitian speaking of the body of man, tell us, Quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid, quod quandoque indiget curatione; That there is not a day passes, but it contracts something which afterwards will require to be cured. 'Tis the same with the Body Politick; and as to them, I say that they are to be cured, by being renewed; and they are renewed, partly by external accident, and partly by internal prudence. The first happens as it were by destiny or fate, as that Rome should be taken by the French, that thereby it might reassume its old customs and virtues, and revive its ancient Worship, Re∣ligion

and Justice, which were superannuated and decayed, as appears very plain by the description of their preparation against the French, in which it is declared by Titus Livius, that upon the marching out of their Army, and investing their Tribunes with Consular power, they observed no religious ceremony: at the same time they not only refused to correct the three Fabii, who contra jus gentium had fought against the French, but created them Tribunes. And it is easily to be presum'd that they made less account of the good Laws and Constitutions ordained by Romulus and other wise Princes, than was reasonable and (perhaps) necessary to preserve the liberty of their State. This foreign invasion hap∣ned to them therefore, that all the obsolete Laws of that City might be revived, and that the people might be taught that it was necessary not only to maintain Religion and Justice, but to respect their good Citizens, and esteem their vertue above the advantages which they seemed to want, for want of their assistance. And it fell out exactly, for Rome was no sooner taken, but they began to renew the Orders of their old Religion: they punished the Fabii who had fought against the Law of Nations, and conceived so great a value for Camillus, that the Senate and People both laid aside their old animosity, and plac'd the whole burden of the Commonwealth upon his single shoulders. 'Tis necessary therefore (as was said before) that men which live together under a Government, be often reminded by these exterior or interior accidents. The interior way is when there is a Law which takes an account of all people in that Corporation; or else when there is some excellent person among them who by his virtuous example does the same thing, so that this happi∣ness results to a Commonwealth either by the virtue of some great person, or the autho∣rity of some Law. And as to this last, the Orders which reduc'd the Commonwealth to∣wards its first principles, were the Tribunes of the people, the Censors and all the other Laws against the ambition and insolence of man; which Laws have need to be revived and quickned by the virtue of some Citizen; who with great courage and generosity shall put them in execution in despight of all the power of the delinquents. The most re∣markable executions before the taking of Rome by the French, were the death of Brutus his Sons, the punishment of the Decem-viri, the execution of Sp. Melius: after the City was sack'd by the French, the most considerable were the death of Manlius Captolinus, the death of the Son of Manlius Torquatus, the prosecution of Papirius Cursor against. Fabius the Master of his Horse, and the accusation against Scipio; which things being extraordi∣nary, were the more remarkable, and when ever any of them hapned, they reminded the people of their beginning, and that they were to live according to Law. But when these examples began to be more rare, men took occasion to grow worse, and their exorbitan∣cies were with more danger and tumult; for if in ten years space no examples be made, nor no execution done, people begin to forget and despise the Laws, and unless something happens that may remember them of the punishments, and infuse something of fear into them, the Delinquents will grow so numerous that it will be dangerous to punish them. To this purpose they who governed the State of Florence from the year 1434 to the year 1494 were wont to say, that it was necessary every five years to review the State; for other∣wise it would be very hard to maintain it: They call'd reviewing the State, reducing the people to the same terror and awe, as they had upon them of old, when every man was punished according to his crime, let his quality be what it would. But when the memory of these punishments are lost, and suffered to go to decay, men take the confidence to at∣tempt any thing, and speak ill of whom they please, against which no remedy is so proper as reducing them towards their first principles, which is to be done by the example of some excellent person, inciting you to such executions, without dependance upon any Law; and they are many times of so great reputation, that good men desire to imitate them, and bad men are ashamed to live contrary to them. Those who in Rome liv'd after this man∣ner were Horatius Cocles, Scaevola, Fabritius, the two Decii, Regulus Attilius and some others, whose rare and virtuous example had the same effect in Rome, that good Laws, and good Customs would have had; and if every ten years some of those examples or executions aforesaid had hapned in that City, the minds and manners of the people could never have been so corrupted, but as those virtuous examples, and heroick punishments grew seldom, and scarce, so corruption began to multiply, for after Regulus his time, there was not any such example to be seen; and though the two Cato's succeeded, yet there was such great distance betwixt them, that their examples could do but little good, especially the last of the Cato's, who finding the greatest part of the City debauched, could not work any considerable reformation upon them. And so much for Civil Governments; as to the conservation of Sects, the same renovation is necessary, as may appear by the example of the Roman Religion, which would doubtless have been lost before this, had it not been reduced towards its first principle by St. Francis and St. Dominick, who by their poverty,

and Christian-like examples revived it in the minds of men, where it was almost effaced; and prevailed that the loosness and depravity of the Prelates and Cardinals did not ruine it; for men seeing them live in that indigence and poverty; by confessing their sins to them, and hearing them preach, they began to learn meekness and charity, and obedience; not to upbraid people by their vices, but to leave them to God, whereas their lives must neces∣sarily be bad, who neither see nor feel what punishment is. So then it is this renovation and reduction to its first principles, that has, and does still maintain our Religion. And as to Kingdoms, they as well as Commonwealths have occasion to reform, and reduce as the other; which course has been of no small advantage to the Kingdom of France; for that Kingdom living under Laws and Customs more than any other, the said Laws and Customs are preserved and executed by Parliaments, and especially by that of Paris, which revives them every time it makes out process against any great Person, or opposes the King in its arrests: and hitherto it has preserv'd it self by its severity against Delinquents, without re∣gard to the greatness of their quality, whereas should they pass unpunished, they would multiply so fast, that they would become incorrigible in a short time, and not to be reform'd but with the disorder, if not the dissolution of the whole Government. We may con∣clude therefore, that there is no safer way of preserving a Commonwealth, Kingdom or Sect, than by reforming and reducing them to their primitive reputation, which is to be done rather by good Laws, and examples at home, than foreign force; for though that way be effectual sometimes, (as it was in Rome) yet it is so uncertain and dangerous, it is not to be desired. And to demonstrate how much particular examples have conduced to the grandeur of Rome, and what great effect they have wrought, I shall make them the subject of my discourse in this third Book; and although among them some great exam∣ples might be produced, which have been exhibited by Kings, yet History having spoken of them so largely, I shall pass them by without speaking any thing of them but what be∣longs to their own private advantage. And begin with Brutus the Father of the liberty of the Romans.

CHAP. II.

'Tis the part of a wise man sometimes to pretend himself a fool.

NO man was ever so commendable for his wisdom and prudence, as Iunius Brutus for counterfeiting the fool. For though Livy gives us but one reason why he did so, and that is, that under that contempt he might live quietly, and enjoy his patrimony in peace; yet it is probable by his ways of proceeding, that he did it, that thereby he might be less un∣der the observation of the Kings, and have fairer advantage of expelling them, and de∣livering his Country, when occasion should be offered. And that this was in his thoughts, may be presumed from his interpretation of the Oracle of Apollo, to which when the Tar∣quins repair'd to understand which of them should succeed in the Government, it being answered that the Government should come to him who first kissed his Mother, the Tar∣quins thought it not to be accomplished till they came to Rome; but Brutus pretending to slip, fell down upon the ground, and kissed it, as the common Mother of us all. And af∣terwards upon the death of Lucretia in the presence of her Father, and Husband, and Kindred, he was the first that drew the dagger out of the wound, and conjured all the slanders by, that for the future they should never suffer a King in Rome. This example may be followed by those who are disguisted with their Prince, but so as first to consider their own power exactly, and if they find it sufficient, they may profess themselves pub∣lickly, and declare open War; and it is the most safe, and most honourable way: but if their force be but small, and they find themselves that way too weak, they are with all industry to endeavour to insinuate with the Tyrant, serving him in his pleasures, applauding him in all his actions and words, and imitating him in every thing he does. By this means you shall be secure from danger, enjoy all the pleasures and delights of the Court, and be ready for any occasion of effecting your designs. Others are of opinion that you keep such a distance with the Prince, as that you be neither so near him as to be covered with his ruines, nor so remote, but that you may take the advantage of his destruction to advance yourself; and this middle way was certainly the best, if it were easie to be kept, but be∣cause I think it impossible, it is necessary to take to one of the other two, and either to re∣move your self quite, or get in as near him as you can; he who does otherwise, is in a great deal of danger, especially if he be a man of any Eminence and Estate: for it is not

enough to say, I expect nothing, I desire neither honour nor preferment, I had rather live at ease, without any controversie or trouble, for those sayings are oftner heard than be∣lieved: nor can great men, if they did really desire it, continue in that condition, because no body believes them, and no body will suffer them. A man is therefore rather to play the fool like Brutus, and he does it abundantly that flatters and applauds every thing his Prince sees, or speaks, or does, how contrary soever it be to his own judgment and mind. And as Bru∣tus was wise in pretending that folly; till occasion was offered for the deliverance of his Country, so he was a severe assertor of its liberty, when obtained, of which severity we shall speak in the next Chapter.

CHAP. III.

The liberty newly acquired, could not have been preserved, but by the execution of Brutus his Sons.

THe severity of Brutus in maintaining that liberty which he had procur'd in Rome, was no less necessary than profitable. 'Tis an example well worthy to be transmitted to posterity, to see a Father sitting in judgment upon his Sons, and not only sentence them to death, but be present, and a spectator of their execution. But so it is decreed, and it will be found so by all that are conversant in Antiquity, that upon any alteration of Go∣vernment, (whether from better to worse, or worse to better, it is the same thing) it is necessary severe example should be made of somebody that opposed it, if you desire the new form would be preserved. In short, this I affirm, that whoever sets up a Tyranny, cannot hope to maintain it, but by cutting off Brutus; and whoever sets up a free State, is as unlike to continue it, but by taking off Brutus his Sons; and of this we have discoursed so largely before, there is no need of enlarging here, I shall add only one example which hapned in our Country and times. Piero Soderini having restored the liberty of Florence believed that by his patience and moderation he could have mollified their minds, who like the Sons of Brutus were impatient of reviving the old tyranny again. But he was highly mistaken, and so much the more to blame, by how much he was a wise man, and knew well enough that there was a necessity of removing such persons as by their ambition opposed themselves against him; yet though there was a necessity to do it, and he had so fair an occa∣sion, he let it pass, and never made use of it: for besides that, he believed his patience and good nature would have wrought upon some, and his munificence and bounty upon others (as he often declared among his friends) he had an opinion, that to make a stout and vigo∣rous opposition against his Enemies, it would be necessary for him to take upon him an extraordinary authority, which would not only be a breach of the Laws, but of the civil e∣quality of the City: and if he should assume such a power, and perhaps exercise it well him∣self, yet the people would be so terrified thereby, that after his death they would never agree to the making their Gonfaloniere for life, which office he thought fit to have augmented and maintained: this consideration, though wise and good in it self, was not prudent at that time, because we are never to entertain a present mischief in hopes of a future good, espe∣cially when, for ought we know, that good may be opprest by that mischief: he ought ra∣ther to have had a care that the end of his intentions might have appeared for the good and benefit of his Country, and not out of any particular ambition; and to have provi∣ded that whoever succeeded him afterwards in his dignity, should not be able to employ that authority to the ruine of the State, which he was forc'd to take upon him to preserve it. But the good man was mistaken in his first opinion, as not understanding that the ma∣lice of mankind is not to be extinguished with time, nor appeased with presents; for could he have imitated the severity of Brutus, he had preserved his own dignity, and the liberty of the State. But as it is a difficult thing to preserve the liberty of a State, so it is no less difficult to preserve the authority of a King, as shall be shewn in the next Chapter.

CHAP. IV.

A Prince is never safe in his new Conquests, whilst they are in being whom he dispossessed.

THe death of Tarquinius Priscus by the Sons of Ancus, and the death of Servins Tullius by Tarquinius Superbus shews how dangerous it is to disposses any man of a King∣dom, and suffer him to live, though you endeavour by all means possible to cares him. Tarquinius Priscus thought his Title unquestionable, being made King by the People, and confirmed by the Senate; nor could it enter into his thoughts that the malice and indig∣nation of the Sons of Ancus should be so great, as to keep them from submitting to that wherewith the whole City of Rome was contented. Servius Tullius was mistaken in the same manner, in thinking with new favours and obligations to have pacified the Sons of Tarquin. So that from the first example, a Prince may take warning, and not delude him∣self with an opinion he is safe, whilst any of them are living whom he dispossessed; and from the second he may inform himself, that old injuries are never cancelled by new fa∣vours, especially if the favours be not equivalent to the injury. And without doubt Ser∣vius Tullius was ill advised to believe that the Sons of Tarquin would be content to be his Sons-in-Law, when it was their due to be his King. And this ambition, and impatience to govern, is so great and insatiable in mankind, that it not only affects those persons who have some right and expectation to govern, but those likewise who in reason can have no such expectancy, as in the example of Tullia the Daughter of Servius, but married to one of the Tarquins: which Tullia was so enflamed with a desire of governing, that not con∣tented with being a King's Daughter, transported with rage, contrary to all silial duty and affection, she incited her Husband against her Father, and forc'd him into a conspiracy, not only against his Kingdom, but Life. Whereas if Tarquinius Priscus and Servius Tullius had known how to have secured themselves against those they had supplanted, they had neither lost their Kingdoms nor Lives. But Tarquinius Superbus was expell'd for not ob∣serving the Laws and Practices of the ancient Kings his Predecessors, as shall appear in the next Chapter.

CHAP. V.

How a King may lose his Kingdom, though he comes to it by inheritance.

TArquinius Superbus seemed to have secure possession of the Kingdom upon the death of Servius Tullius, who dying without heirs, left him nothing of that trouble and vexa∣tion which his Predecessors encountred. For although the way by which he came to the Government was irregular and abominable; nevertheless had he followed the steps of his Predecessors, and observed their old rules, he would not have run himself so fatally in to the displeasure of the Senate and People, nor have provoked them to have been so di∣ligent in his expulsion. Nor is it to be believed that his Son Sextus his deflowring of Lucretia was the chief cause that he lost his Kingdom, but his infraction of the Laws, his tyranny, his usurpation upon the Senate, and his ingrossing all authority to himself: for he had brought things to that pass, that those affairs which were formerly debated pub∣lickly by the Senate, and according to their sentiment and order were put in execution, were now transacted and determined privately in his own Palace, with great dissatisfaction and offence; so that in a short time Rome was deprived of the liberty which it injoyed under other Kings: nor was it enough for him to disoblige the Senate, but he run himself into the odium of the people, harassing them out by mechanick and servile imployments to which they had never been used in the days of his Predecessors; by which cruel and in∣solent actions he had so incensed and inflamed the minds of the Romans against him, that they were ready for rebellion the first opportunity that offered it self; and if that accident had not hapned to Lucretia, as soon as any other had fallen out, it would have had the same effect. And if Tarquin had governed, and lived according to the example of his Ance∣stors, and his Son Sextus had committed that error, Brutus and Collatinus would have ad∣dressed themselves to Tarquin (and not to the people of Rome) for justice against his Son. Let Princes therefore observe that they begin to ruine their own dignity and power, when

they first go about to transgress and violate the old Laws and Customs of their Ancestors: and if after they are removed, and dispossessed of their authority, they should grow so wise as to understand the felicity of governing a Kingdom with good Counsel, their loss would be more insupportable, and they would condemn themselves to a greater pu∣nishment than any body else would condemn them; for 'tis easier to be beloved by good people, than bad, and to obey Laws, than to command them; and to understand the way by which this is to be done, they have no more to do, but to observe the lives of good Prin∣ces, as Timoleon the Corinthian, Aratus Sicionius and others, in which they will find so much ease and security to him that governs, and them that are governed, that they will be tempted to imitate them, if for nothing but the easiness of it. For when men are governed well, they desire no other liberty; as it hapned to the people who were governed by the two persons above named, whom they compelled to continue their Princes whilst they lived, though they endeavoured several times to have laid down, and betaken themselves to a private condition. And because in this and the two precedent Chapters, we have dis∣coursed of the hatred contracted against Princes, and the Conspiracy of the Sons of Bru∣tus against the State, and others against Tarquinius Priscus, and Servius Tullius, I think it not amiss to speak of Conspiracies more largely in my next Chapter, as being a subject well worth the observation both of Princes and private Persons.

CHAP. VI.

Of Conspiracies.

I Did not think it inconvenient in this place to discourse something of Conspiracies, see∣ing they are things of such consequence and danger, both to Princes & private Persons; for by them more Princes have lost their States and their Lives than by open War; a••d the reason is, because few persons are qualified to make War, but every body can con∣spire. On the other side, for a private person, no enterprize is more dangerous and rash; for let him manage it as wisely as he can, it is full of difficulty, and uncertainty of success; and from hence it is that among so many Conspiracies there are so few which arrive at the end that was designed. To the end therefore that Princes may learn how to defend them∣selves; and private persons might be more cautious of engaging themselves in them, but may rather be contented to live quietly under the Government where they are placed, I shall enlarge upon the subject, and leave nothing behind that is considerable for the docu∣ment either of the one or the other. It is a certain truth, and well said of Cornelius Taci∣tus, that men are to pay an honour and respect to things past, and obedience to things present: that they ought to desire good Princes, but when they are once in authority, they are to be endur'd, and those who go about to conspire against them, do most com∣monly ruine themselves or their Country.

To come therefore to the point, we are first to consider against whom these Conspiracies are made, and we shall find them either against their Country, or Prince: and of these two sorts of Conspiracies we shall discourse at present, because of those which are entred into, to deliver up a besieged Town to the Enemy, or upon such occasion, we have spoken amply before. And first of the Conjurations against a Prince, and the occasions of them, which are many, but one of more importance than all the rest, and that is the hatred of the peo∣ple: for that Prince who has contracted the universal odium of the people, may with reason believe that some of those whom he has offended will study to revenge themselves; and they will be the more industrious in it, by how much they observe the general discon∣tent and animosity against him. A Prince therefore is by all means possible to prevent the hatred of the People, (but having spoken of it before, I shall not enlarge upon it again.) For by keeping himself from the general hatred, particular offences will not be able to a∣mount to a War; first, because all men have not the same resentment, and will not put themselves in danger to revenge an injury; and then because if the discontented were all of a mind, and had power to do it, yet they are discouraged by the affection which they observe in the multitude towards their Prince. The injury done by the Prince, is either upon the Estate, Blood, or Honour of the Subject: where the injury extends to Blood, threatning is very dangerous, and much more than down-right execution; for when a man is kill'd, he is past thinking of revenge, and those who are alive will quickly forget him; but when a man is threatned, and finds himself under a necessity of suffering, or do∣ing

something extraordinary, he becomes immediately dangerous, and ought to be regar∣ded by the Prince, as I shall shew hereafter. Next to this necessity for the preservation of ones life; Honour and Estate are the two tenderest points in which men are soonest offended, and of which the Prince is likewise to have a particular care, for no man can be pillaged so perfectly, but he will have a Knife left to revenge himself; nor no man can be dishonoured to such a degree of debasement, but he will have courage enough left to attempt something in revenge; and in point of honour, no injury goes so near a man as what reflects upon the woman; and next to that, is to be despised. This was it that arm'd Pausanias against Philip of Macedon, and many other Subjects against many other Princes. In our times Iu∣lius Belanti had never conspired against Pandolfus Tyrant of Siena, had he not first given him his Daughter to Wife, and then taken her from him again, as we shall shew more at large hereafter. The great motive of the Conjuration of the Pazzi against the Medici was the Patrimony of Giovanni Bonromei, which was given from them by the award of the Medici. But there is another motive (and that no small one) which makes people conspire against their Prince, and that is a desire of rescuing their Country from tyranny and usurpation. This was it which set Brutus and Cassius at work against Caesar. This was it which excited others against Phalaris, Dyonisius, &c. and against this there is no re∣medy, but depositing their usurpations, and because there are few will do that, there are but few which escape the ill consequence.

Ad Generum Cereris, sine caede, & sanguine pauci Descendunt Reges, & sicca morte Tyranni.

Slaughter and Blood pursues, he seldom lies Dry in his Coffin that a Tyrant dies.

But in Conspiracies, as I said before, the dangers are so great and various, that there is not only a hazard in the designing, management, and execution, but even after the execu∣tion is done. The Conspirators are either one or more; one cannot properly be called a Conspiracy, but a firm resolution in a single person to make away his Prince; this way of Conspiracy is more secure than the other, because till it comes to execution, it can never be known, no body being privy to his secret, and therefore no danger of coming to the ears of the Prince. These kind of resolutions may fall into the heart of any man, great or small, noble or ignoble, favourites or strangers: no man but some time or other may have access to his Prince, and he that has opportunity to speak with him, has opportunity to do worse. Pausanias murdered Philip of Macedon as he was going to the Temple attended with a thousand of his Guards, and walking betwixt his own Son and his Son in Law; but Pausanias was a Gentleman, and very conversant at Court, but there was a poor con∣temptible Spaniard who stabb'd Ferdinand King of Spain in the Neck, and though the wound was not mortal, yet it was enough to shew us that there is no man so inconsidera∣ble, but if he has courage to undertake, he may have opportunity to it: Dervis a Turkish Priest drew his Sword upon Bajazet Father to this Present Emperor, and though he did not kill him, yet it was not for want either of courage or opportunity. Nor is it to be doubt∣ed but there are many ill enough disposed, who wish from their hearts to be revenged on their Tyrants, but there are few that dare venture, and scarce one of those few but dies in the attempt, and no man will expose himself where there is no hopes to escape. But enough of this pertinacious malevolence in a single person, we will speak now of Conspi∣racies betwixt a number: I say that in History all Conspiracies are found to be acted by great Persons, and such as have familiarity with their Prince: for others, unless they be mad men or fools, will never attempt it, because people that are weak, & remote from the Court, are destitute of all those hopes and conveniences that are requisite for the execution of such a design. First, men of slender fortune or interest cannot impart themselves freely, no body will be true them, because no man can concur with them upon any of those hopes which do usually encourage men to the undertaking of any great danger; so that they can hard∣ly communicate to two or three persons, but one of them is an informer, and the other are ruined. But if they should be so happy as not to be betrayed, the execution is attended with so many difficulties by reason of the difficulty of their access, that it is impossible but they must miscarry: and if great persons, and such as are very conversant with their Prince are subject to such hazards, those doubtless must be much more who are under none of those qualifications. Wherefore, when men of mean fortune, or little access at Court consider their own weakness and inability, they are discouraged from any such designs; and if at any time they be offended, and would do their Prince a mischief, they content themselves

with libelling and railing, and expect when persons of greater access and capacity should revenge them upon his person, and if any of these persons are so far transported, as to attempt any thing of this nature, their good will is more to be commended than their discre∣tion. We see then, where any great Conspiracy has been made, it has been by great per∣sons, and such as have been familiar with their Prince, and that as often upon the score of benefits, as injuries received; so it was in the Conspiracy of Perennius against Commodus, Plautianus against Severus, Sejanus against Tiberius, all of them preferred by their several Emperors, and advanced to such Honours, Authority and Estates, that their power seem'd to want nothing of perfection, but the Imperial Ensigns, and that they might have them as well as the rest, they conspired every one of them against their Prince, and their Conspi∣racies had such ends as their ingratitude deserved. However, in the memory of our Fa∣thers the Conspiracy of Giacopo d' Apiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti Prince of Pisa had a better end; for the said Giacopo having been brought up, and caressed, and advan∣ced by the said Piero deposed his Benefactor, and took away his Government for his pains. Another of the same nature was that of Coppola in our days against Ferdinand of Arragon, though it had not the same success; for Coppol•• being arrived at that height of Authori∣ty, that there was nothing but the bare name wanting to make him King, he attempted for that, and lost his life in the business. And certainly if any Conspiracy might have suc∣ceeded, it was his, being a person as powerful as the King himself, and seconded with all the conveniences he could desire: but the same greediness of dominion that blinded him in the undertaking, blinded him in the prosecution of his design; for had it been mana∣ged with the least prudence, it would have been impossible to have miscarried.

A Prince therefore who would preserve himself against Conspiracy, is to have an eye rather upon those he has obliged, than those he has offended; for they that are offended have not those frequent opportunities that the other have; and for the disposition, it is much alike, the desire of dominion being as great if not greater than the desire of revenge; so then authority is to be given to his friends with that caution, that there be always some space or interval left betwixt the preferment of the Favourite, and the sovereignty of the Prince, lest if his ambition should not be satisfied, he should aspire immediately at the Crown. But to return to our design, I say, that Conspiratours being to be great men, and such as have easie access to the Prince, we are now to enquire into the successes of their Plots, and see what have been the causes of their prosperity or miscarriage. And because (as I said before) the danger is considerable in the management, execution, and afterwards; for that reason there are very few of them that arrive at their proposed end. In their con∣trivances and consultations there is such extraordinary danger, that unless they be carried on with singular caution and prudence, they will be easily discovered; and they are disco∣vered two ways, either by down-right impeachment, or by conjecture and presumption. Impeachment proceeds either from infidelity or folly in those persons with whom you have communicated; infidelity is easily found, for you cannot communicate in that nature but with such of your Confidents as you suppose will venture their lives for you; or else with such persons as are dissatisfied with the Government: of such kind of Confidents, one or two may possibly be found, but when you begin to multiply them, and commit your secret to more, you must necessarily be betrayed; for their affection to you must be very great, if the apprehension of the danger, and the fear of the punishment do not deter them: be∣sides, men are many times mistaken in the affection of their friends; for they can never be assured of them till they have made experiment, and to make experiment in such ways as this, is exceedingly dangerous, and if perchance you have had trial of them in some other matters of importance in which they have behaved themselves faithfully and well, yet you can take no true measures from that, because this surpasses all other dangers what∣soever. If you presume upon his discontent, animosity to his Prince, you may be ca∣sily deceived, for as soon as you have discovered your design, you have given him a power to reconcile himself, and his rancour must be very great, or your influence extraordinary to keep him faithful: hence it is that many Conspiracies are discovered, and as it were nipp'd in the Bud; and when any of them are kept private where many persons are privy, 'tis look'd upon as a miracle, as that of Piso against Nero, and in our times that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo, and Giuliano de Medici, in which though fifty were concerned, it was ne∣ver discovered till it came to execution; for discoveries by indiscretion, they happen when one of the Conspirators talks carelesly, so as some servant or third person picks it out, as it hapned to the Sons of Brutus, who in their Negotiations with Tarquin's Embassadors, were over-heard, and accused by one of the Servants: another way is when out of levity you communicate with some Child or Woman that you love, or such other incontinent person, as Dinus did, who being (with Philotas) entred into a Conspiracy against Alexander the

Great, imparted it to a Boy that he loved, called Ficomachus who told it to his Brother Cibalinus, and Cibalinus discovered it to the King. As to discoveries by circumstances and conjecture, we have an example in the Pisonian Conspiracy against Nero, in which Scevinus one of the Conspirators having the day before Nero was to have been murther'd, made his Will, ordered Milichius his Freeman to furbish up his old rusty Sword, enfran∣chised all his Slaves, distributed Mony among them, and caused Plagets and L••gatures to be made to bind up Wounds, he gave occasion of conjecture to Milichius, who accused him thereupon to Nero, and Order being given for his apprehension, Scevinus was taken into custody, and with him Natalis another of the Conspirators, who had been observed to have talked privately with him a long time the day before, and not agreeing about their discourse, they contradicted one another, and were forced to confess all.

From these occasions of discovery it is impossible to be secur'd, but either by malice, im∣prudence, or inadvertency, all will out when ever the Conspirators exceed the number of three or four. For if more than one of them be taken, 'tis impossible but they must inter∣fere, because two people cannot hang together so exactly in a Story. If there be but one apprehended, and he be a stout man, perhaps he may have that constancy and resolution as to conceal his Confederates; but then his Confederates must have as much courage as he, and not discover themselves by their slight; for whose heart soever fails, whether his that is apprehended, or his that is escaped, 'tis the same thing, for the Plot is discovered. That example which is mentioned by Titus Livius is very rare and unusual, where in a Conspiracy against Girolamo King of Syracuse, he speaks of one of the Conspirators called Theodorus, who being seized, concealed his accomplices with incomparable constancy, and accused all the Kings Friends; and his Companions were so confident in his courage, that none of them fled, or made the least discovery by their fear. These are the dangers which are to be pass'd in the conduct or management of an Enterprize, before it comes to execu∣tion; and as there are dangers, so there are ways of evading them.

The first, the surest, and indeed the only way is not to give your Confederates time to discover you, but to communicate the business to them when it is just ready for execution, and not before. Those who take that course, are free from the danger of Threatnings and Negotiations, and commonly from all the rest; and have been observed frequently to come to good end, and there is no man that is wise, but would carry it so if he could. I shall give you only two Examples. Nelimatus being unable to endure the Tyranny of Aristoti∣mus King of Epirus, got several of his Friends and Relations together into his house, and exhorting them to the deliverance of their Country, some of them desired them to consi∣der, and prepare themselves; whereupon Nelimatus caused his Servants to make fast the doors, and protested to all the whole Company, that they should swear to go immediately about it, or he would deliver them up Prisoners to Aristotimus, upon which they all took the Oath, and falling incontinently to the work, they effected their design, as Nelimatus had contriv'd it. One of the Magi having by fraud possessed himself of the Kingdom of Persia, and Orthanus a great Person of that Kingdom, having discovered the cheat, he had a conference with six others of his own quality, to contrive how they might rescue their Country from the Tyranny of that Usurper, and (as in the case before) when some of them desired time, Darius (one of the six) stood up and declared boldly, That if they would not execute it presently, he would accuse them every one, and doing it forthwith, they prospered accordingly. Not unlike these two, was the way which the Aetolians used in the Assassination of Nabis the Tyrant of Sparta: They sent one of their Citizens called Alexamenes to him with 30 Horse, 200 Foot under a pretence of a supply, comman∣ding the Soldiers to be obedient to the orders of their chief Officers, but acquainted no∣body with the design but Alexamenes himself. Alexamenes marched to Sparta with his Forces, but communicating nothing of his instructions, till they were fit to be executed, he did his business, and the Tyrant was slain; by which reservedness they avoided the first dangers of being discovered, which are obvious in the management, and whoever takes the same course, shall avoid them as well as they. Piso (whom I have mention'd before) was a man of honour and reputation, a great intimate of Nero's, and one in whom he placed a great deal of confidence. Nero visited him often, and was many times treated very magnificently in his Garden: Piso by virtue of this intimacy was able to make choice of such Complices as were stout and couragious, and disposed to such an Exploit (which for great men to do, is no difficult matter) and when occasion was offered, to break the business to them so suddenly, that having no time either to deliberate or deny him, he must necessarily succeed; and he who examines all the other Examples that are mentioned, will find very few, but have been managed the same way. But men of little experience in the affairs of the world, do many times commit great errors, and more, when their designs

are extraordinary, as in this. A Plot then is never to be imparted, but upon necessity, and when it is ripe for execution; and when you do communicate, do it but to one, and that a person of whom you have had long experience, or one that is prompted by the same interest and provocation as your self; and to find one person so, is much easier than to find many, and by consequence that way is nothing so dangerous. Besides, if you should be mistaken in your confidence, you have more remedy and defence, than where the Conspirators are several; for I have heard wise men say, that to a single person a man may say any thing; (for if nothing be to be produced under your hand) your no, will be as good as his yea: But writing is to be shun'd as a rock, for nothing is of so much con∣viction, as a note under a man's own hand. Plautianus desiring to murther Severus the Emperor, and his Son Antoninus; committed the execution to Saturninus a Tribune, who had more mind to betray, than obey him; but suspecting that when he came to accuse him, Plautianus should have more credit than he, he desired a Warrant under his hand to con∣firm his Commission, which Plautianus granted, being blinded with ambition, whereby it happen'd that he was accused, convicted, and condemned, whereas without that Note, and some other circumstances, Plautianus would have been acquitted, and his accuser been punished, so obstinately did Plautianus deny all. In the Pisonian Conspiracy, there was a Woman called Epicaris, who had been formerly one of Nero's Misses. This Epicaris thinking it of importance to bring in a Captain of certain Galleys which Nero kept for his Guard, she communicated the Plot, but conceal'd the Conspirators, and the Captain be∣traying her, and accusing her to Nero, Epicaris maintained the contrary with such constan∣cy, that the Emperor was amaz'd, and discharged her. So then, he that communicates a thing of this Nature to one, runs but these two dangers, either of being spontaneously accused, and proof brought to make it good; or else being accused by accident and of force, as when his Confederate is apprehended upon suspition, and impeaches him upon the Rack, in both which cases there is something to be said; for in the first he may pretend malice, in the second fear, and that the extremity of his torture constrained him to say false: So that it is great wisdom to communicate with no body, till your designs be ripe but to proceed according to the examples aforesaid; but if you must communicate, to do it but to one alone, and by himself; in which though there be some danger, yet there is much less than where you communicate with many. Another way, and not unlike this, is when the fury or violence of a Tyrant necessitates you to do that to him, which other∣wise he would be sure to do to you; and sometimes it is so sudden and fierce, it leaves you scarce time to think of securing your self. This is an exigence and necessity that has most commonly a good end, and to prove it, I will produce two examples, and no more. Com∣modus the Emperour had two Captains of his Guards (one of them called Lettus,, and the other Elettus) particularly in his favour, and Martia was the most intimate of his Concubines. They having taken the liberty to admonish him of his ill Courses, and the reflection his ill conversation had both upon his Person and Government, he resolved to rid himself of his Monitors, and to that end writ down the names of Martia, Lettus, Elettus, and others (who he designed should be put to death the next night) and put the Note un∣der his Pillow. Being gone out into a Bath, a Child that he lov'd exceedingly, being rummaging about the room, happened upon this Paper, and going out with it in his hand, Martia met him by accident, took it from him, read it, sent it immediately to Lettus and Elettus, who being sensible of their danger, resolved to prevent him, and without more ado, killed Commodus in the Evening.

Antoninus Caracalla the Emperor, was with his Army in Mesopotamia, and having made Macrinus his General (a better Statesman than Soldier) it hapned (as it does to all Prin∣ces that are wicked) that he began to apprehend (what he knew he deserved) that some body conspired against him. To be more certain, he writ privately to a friend (called Maternianus) in Rome, to consult the Astrologers, and give him notice whether any body was contriving against the Empire. Maternianus writ him word he had consulted them, that there were those who did aspire at the Empire, and that Macrinus was the man. This Letter coming by accident to the hands of Macrinus, before the Emperor saw it, he found the necessity that was upon him either to kill or be kill'd; and thereupon committed the execution to a confident of his call'd Martialis (whose Brother Antoninus had slain not many days before) who kill'd him accordingly. We see then that this necessity which allows us no time, has the same effect in a manner with the course which was taken by Nelimatus of Epirus, as I have mentioned before. We see likewise, that (as I said in the beginning of these discourses) that Commination and threatning does a Prince more mis∣chief, and are the occasion of more Plots, than violence it self. A Prince therefore is to have a care of that; to caress those that are about him, and keep them in their Allegiance

by his courtesie and kindness; if that will not do, he is to secure himself otherwise as well as he can, but never to bring them into a condition of thinking themselves under a neces∣sity of killing or being kill'd. As to the dangers which attend the execution of a Plot, they proceed either from a sudden alteration of Orders; a sudden defection of courage in him that is to execute; some imprudence in the attempt; or some imperfection in the act, as when all are not killed that were intended. And first we must understand that there is nothing gives so much Embarrasment, and distraction to the action of men as new and contradictory orders to be executed in an instant. and quite contrary to what was deter∣mined before. And if in any thing this variation be dangerous, it is in Martial affairs, and in such things as we have now spoken of; for in those cases there is nothing so necessary as that every man may know certainly his part, that beforehand he may contrive with himself, and conclude upon all the circumstances of the Fact; whereas if they have fram'd their designs, and fix'd upon their way, and immediately new Orders are brought repug∣nant to the former, it disturbs all, and the whole Plot must be ruined; so that it is better to execute it according to the first Order, though there be something of inconvenience, than to vary your Orders, with a thousand times more: But this is meant only where the variation is sudden, for where you have time enough, it is not so dangerous. The Con∣spiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de Medici is very well known. Their first Orders were, That an entertainment should be made for the Cardinal of St. George, to which the Medici should be invited, and killed. Every mans Office was assigned; some were to kill them; some were to secure the Palace; and others to ride up and down the City, and proclaim liberty to the people: It happened when the Pazzi, Medici, and Car∣dinal were altogether in the Cathedral in Florence at Divine Service, news was brought that Iulian would not be at Dinner: Hereupon the Conspirators consulting again, it was resolved to alter the Plot, and do that in the Church which was designed in the Chamber: This sudden alteration, discomposed the whole order; for Giovan batista da Montesec∣co would not consent to add Sacriledge to his Murther, and commit it in the Church; up∣on which they were forced to appoint another in his place, and shift all their Agents from one Office to another, and their time being too short to fix their resolutions, they commit∣ted so many errors in the execution, that all of them miscarried. And among the Conspi∣rators, when things come to be executed, their heart many times fails them, either out of sudden reverence, or sudden fear; for the presence and Majesty of some Princes is so awe∣ful, it either mitigates or frightens the fury of the Executioner; Marius being taken and kept Prisoner by the Minturnenses, they sent a Servant to kill him; but the poor slave was so terrified at the sight of his Person, and the Memory of his Name, that his courage fail'd, and he was not able to go thorow,; and if the consideration of his quality, and the Majesty of his Countenance could do so much, in a person that was a Prisoner, and in di∣stress; how much more are they effectual in a free Prince, magnificently adorn'd, and as nobly attended. Certainly such a sight is able to strike terror into the boldest person, and work compassion in the most cruel miscreant.

Some there were who conspired against Sitalcis King of Thrace: The day was appointed for the execution; they met at the place, where the Prince was; but when the stroke was to be given, no body durst venture, they departed as they came, every body blamed one another, but no body knew what was the impediment, and having attempted it often with the same intimidation, they were discovered at last, and received punishment for an offence which they might, but would not put in execution. Alfonso Duke of Ferrara had two Brothers, who conspired against him, and employed Giannes a Priest and Chantor in the said Dukes Chappel, to bring the Duke to them, which he did many times, and it was in their power to to have killed him; but yet not any of them durst strike him, so that at length they also were discovered, and received their reward. This remorse can proceed from nothing but the terror of his presence, or the influence of his behaviour and huma∣nity, which compels them to mercy. But the defects and disappointments in these kind of executions, proceed either from imprudence, or terror, with either of which, the minds of the Conspirators being disturbed, they become so confused and distracted, they can neither say, nor do any thing as they should. And that men are subject to those confu∣sions and surprizes, cannot be better demonstrated than by Livy's description of Alexame∣nus the Aetolian, of whom we have spoken before: For when the time was come for the execution of his design against Nabis the Spartan, having imparted it to his friends, Livy tells us, Collegit, & ipse animum, confusum tantae cogitatione rei. He recollected his mind, which was in some measure confounded with the contemplation of the Enterprize For there is no man, how resolute and bloody soever he be, but must be surprized and discomposed in such cases as those, wherefore for such Exploits, experienced men, and such as have

been used to those kind of affairs, are to be chosen, and no other, though never so stout: for he that has had no tryal of himself in that nature, ought not to presume barely upon his courage; nor can he promise himself any certain success, by reason that the terror and perturbation of his mind is many times so strong, that it makes his Weapon fall out of his hand, or words fall from his Mouth, which discover the whole Plot. Lucilla the Sister of Commodus, ordered Quintianus to kill her Brother: Quintianus waited for Commodus as he came into the Amphitheater, and meeting him when he came, he ran at him with his naked Sword, crying aloud, Questo ti mando il Senato, The Senate sends you this; but those words gave an alarm, and he was seized before he could lift up his arm to give the blow. Messer Antonio da Volterra, deputed (as is said before) to kill Lorenzo de Me∣dici, when he advanced to assault him, cryed out, Ah Traytor! but that exclamation was the preservation of Lorenzo, and the ruine of the Conspirators. But these Enterprizes are difficult, when directed only against one person, for the reasons abovesaid, yet when they are bent against two, they are much more, because in several places it is impossible any de∣sign should be well executed at once; so that to conspire against a Prince in that way, is a doubtful, dangerous and imprudent thing. Were it not for the reverence I bear to the Author, I should scarce believe what Herodian says of Plautianus, that he committed to one single Centurion called Saturninus, the killing of Severus and Antoninus who lived in several places; for 'tis so irrational a thing, that nothing but his Authority could have persuaded me to it. Certain young Gentlemen of Athens conspired against Diocles and Hippias, two Tyrants in that City. They killed Diocles, but Hippias escaped, and re∣venged his death. Chiones and Leonides of Heraclea, two of Plato's Disciples, conspired against Clearchus and Satirus, two Tyrants of that place; Clearchus was murthered, but Satirus survived and revenged it. The Pazzi (whom we have so often mentioned) kil∣led only Iulian de Medici, his brother escaping; so that from these Conspiracies against several persons, all wise people will abstain, as things that are fatal to themselves, their Country, and every body else; for those who escape are thereby render'd the more cruel and Tyrannical, as appears by the aforesaid examples in Florence, Athens, and Heraclea. And therefore the Conspiracy of Pelopidas against the Tyrants of Thebes was admirable, in respect of the success, seeing not only one, but ten of them were to be murthered; and that he was neither a favourite, nor had easie access to them; but was a Rebel, and in banishment; yet he overcame all these difficulties, got into Thebes, killed the Tyrants, and delivered his Country; but with the assistance of Caron one of the Tyrants great Counsel∣lors who gave him admission, and contributed much to his success. But let no man pre∣sume upon this example, for it is looked upon not only as a rare thing, but as a miracle. The execution of such a design may be interruped likewise by a false imagination, or some unexpected accident happening in the very act. The very morning that Brutus and his Confederates were to murther Caesar, it hapned that he had a long discourse with Cn. Popilius Lenas one of the Conspirators, which the rest of the accomplices observing, con∣cluded that Popilius had discovered all to Caesar, and was giving him an account; where∣upon it was proposed to kill Caesar presently, and not to defer it till he was in the Senate; and doubtless they had done it, but that their discourse broke off; and Caesar went away without any Commotion. These imaginations are sometimes very considerable, and to be regarded with a great deal of prudence, and the rather, because they are easily taken up; for he who is conscious to himself, is always apt to suspect that they are talking of him; and it may so fall out, that a word spoken to another intent, may gaul and disturb you as much as if it were spoken on purpose, and either force you to fly, or so hasten and preci∣pitate the execution, that you run your self upon many inconveniences, especially where many are privy to the Plot. As to the accidents, because they are unexpected and occa∣sional, no directions can be given against them, but examples by which men are to regu∣late and be cautious. Iulius Belanti of Siena (whom we have mentioned before) being incensed against Pandolfus, who had given him his Daughter in Marriage, and taken her from him again, conspired his death, and laid his design thus, Pandolfus went almost eve∣ry day to visit one of his Relations that was sick; and in his passage went commonly by Iulius his house: upon this consideration, Iulius got all his accomplices together into his house, with intention to assault him as he went by; to which purpose he armed them all, and disposed them into the Porch, that they might be ready upon a signal to be given from a Window above: It hapned that Pandolfus being just by, the person at the Win∣dow gave the signal, when by accident in the very nick of time Pandolfus met a friend, and stopt to salute him: Some of his Attendants passing on, heard a noise of Arms, took the Alarm, and discovered the Ambuscade; so that Pandolfus was miraculously preserved, Iulio and his Companions forced to fly from Siena, and all by the accident of this ren∣counter,

which not only hindred the execution at that time, but defeated the whole enter∣prize.

But against these accidents no remedy can be prescribed, because they happen so rarely; however it is necessary to think of us many, and provide against them as well as we can. It remains now that we say something of those dangers which we incur after execution is done; of which sort there is but one, and that is, when somebody is left alive that may re∣venge it: as his children, brothers, kinsmen, and such others to whom the sovereignty may descend by right of inheritance, and these may be left to revenge the death of their Predecessor, either by your negligence, or by some of the accidents aforesaid, as it hapned to Giovan-Andrea da Lampognano, who conspiring with other persons, killed the Duke of Milan, but they left two of his Brothers and one of his Sons behind, who revenged it in due time. But in these cases the Conspirators are to be excused, because there is no re∣medy to be provided; but where by their own imprudence or negligence they suffer any such to escape, there it is otherwise, and they are highly to be condemned. At Forum Livii some there were who conspired against Count Girolamo, ••lew him, seized upon his wife and children, (which were very young) and clap'd them in Prison: a great mind they had to the Castle, but the Governour was refractory, and would not admit them; the Counsels (called Madonna Caterin••) made them a proposition, that if they would suf∣fer her to go into him, she would prevail with the Governor to surrender, and that in the mean time her children should be left as hostages in their hands. The Conspirators be∣lieved her, and let her go in, but she was no sooner in the Castle, but she began to upbraid them by the death of her Husband, and threaten them with all possible revenge; and to convince them that her care and compassion for her children should not restrain her, she shew'd them her genitals thorow the windows, to let them know, that if they killed those, she had wherewithal to have more: so that perceiving their error too late, and being desti∣tute of all counsel, their indiscretion was punished with their perpetual banishment. But of all dangers after the fact is committed, none is so fatal as the affection of the people to their Prince whom you have slain. For their revenge is not possible to be prevented. Of this, the murder of Caesar may be an example: for the people of Rome being his friends, his death was thorowly revenged upon the Conspirators, who afterwards (though in seve∣ral times and places) were all of them slain. Conjurations against ones Country are not so dangerous as Conjurations against ones Prince; for in the contrivance and management the dangers are not so many; in the execution they are but the same; and after the fact is committed, they are nothing at all. In the management and preparation the dangers are not so many, because a Citizen may make his party, and put his affairs in a posture with∣out discover•• 〈…〉〈…〉 ••is orders be not interrupted, bring his designs to a very good end; or if they be in••errupted by some Law, it is in his power to adjourn the execution, or find out some other way that may be more commodious; but all these (it is to be understood) are to be done only in Commonwealths, where the manners of the people are beginning to be corrupted; because where the City is incorrupt, such designs will never come into any of their thoughts; but in a corrupt Republick where the dangers are not so great, there are many ways for private Citizens to make themselves Princes; because a Commonwealth is not so quick and dexterous as a Prince, their suspicion is less, and by consequence their caution: besides, they are commonly in more awe of their Grandees, and therefore the Grandees are more bold and couragious against them. Every body has read Catilins's Conspiracy written by Salust, and can tell how Catiline (after it was detected) not only continued in Rome, but came audaciously into the Senate, and had the confidence to talk insolently both to the Senate and Consul; so great reverence had that City, for its Citi∣zens. And when things were gone so far, that he had left the City, and was got to the head of an Army, Lentulus, and the rest of the Conspirators had never been seized, had not there been Letters produced against them under their own hands.

Hanno a great Citizen in Carthage had a mind to usurp; and in order thereto; he had contrived at the Wedding of one of his Daughters to poison the whole Senate, and then make himself Prince: when his plot was discovered, the Senate troubled themselves with no farther provision against it, than by making a Law against exorbitant feasting upon such kind of occasions, so great was their respect to a Citizen of his quality! But in a Conspiracy against ones Country, the greatest danger lies in the exe∣cution; for it seldom happens that a particular Citizen is strong enough to subdue a whole Country; and every man is not General of an Army, as Caesar, Agathocles, Cleomenes and others were, who had their Armies ready to back their designs. To such the way is easie and secure; but they who want those advantages must manage their business with more cunning, or employ foreign assistance: this cunning and artifice was used by Pisistrates the

Athenian; for having overcome the Megarenses, and thereby got himself great reputa∣tion among the people, he came forth of his house one morning, and shew'd himself woun∣ded to them, complaining that the Nobility had abused him, and desiring that he might be permitted to have a guard for the security of his person; which being granted inconsi∣derately, gave him opportunity by degrees to make himself absolute. Pandolfus Petrucci (with other Exiles) returned to Siena; and by way of contempt was made Keeper of the Palace, which was a mechanick employment that others had refused. Yet those few arm'd men who were under his Command by virtue of that place, by degres gave him such re∣putation, that at length he made himself Prince. Others have taken other ways, and by time, and their industry, arrived at the same dignity without any danger: but those who have endeavoured to make themselves Masters of their Country by their own force, or foreign supplies; have had various events, as fortune was pleased to befriend them! Cata∣line was ruined: Hanno (of whom we have spoken before) failing in his poison, arm'd many thousands of his Partisans, which were all slain with him. Certain of the principal Citizens of Thebes, by the help of a Spartan Army, made themselves Masters of that City, and tyranniz'd over it: so that if all conspiracies against their Country be examined, there will none, or but very few be found to have miscarried in the management; but the whole stress of their good or bad fortune has layn upon the execution, which being once pass'd, they are subject to no more dangers than what depend upon the nature of the Go∣vernment; for when a man usurps, and makes himself a Tyrant, he exposes himself to those natural and inseparable dangers which are the consequences of Tyranny, against which he has no other remedies than what have been described before.

This is what I have thought convenient to write upon the subject of Conspiracies; and if I have discoursed only of those which are executed by the sword, and not by poison, it is because they have the same orders and methods. True it is, the way of poison is the most dangerous, as being the more uncertain, because every one has not convenience, but is forc'd to confer with other people, and the necessity of that Conference is much to be feared: besides, many things happen which makes your potion ineffectual, as it fell out to those who killed Commodus; who having disgorg'd his poison, forc'd the Conspirators to strangle him. Princes then have no Enemy to which they are more dangerously exposed, than to these Conspiracies, because they are never undertaken against any of them, but they take away his life, or reputation. If they succeed, he dies; if they miscarry, and the in∣struments be put to death, it is look'd upon as a pretence and invention of the Prince to satiate his avarice or cruelty upon the blood or fortunes of his enemies. My advice there∣fore is (both to Prince and Commonwealth, that upon the discovery of a Conspiracy, (before they think of revenge) seriously to consider the quality of it, and to compare the condition of the Conspirators with their own: if they find them potent and strong, till they have furnished themselves with a proportionable force, no notice is to be taken; if notice be taken, they are unable to defend themselves, and certainly ruined; for the Con∣spirators finding themselves discovered, will grow desperate, and be under a necessity of ven∣turing, let the success be what it will. The Romans may be an example of this way of dissembling; for having (as we said before) left two of their Legions at Capua for the se∣curity of that City against the Samnites; the Commanders of the said Legions conspir'd to make themselves Masters of the Town. The Romans having notice of their designs, committed the prevention of it to Rutilius their new Consul, who to lull and delude the Conspirators, gave out that the Senate had confirmed that Station to those Legions for another winter, which the Legions believed, and thinking then they should have time enough, they neglected to hasten their design, till at length observing the Consul to draw them away insensibly, and dispose them into other parts, they began to suspect, and that suspicion made them discover themselves, and put their plot in execution. Nor can an example be brought more properly for either sides; for by it we may see how cool and re∣miss people are when they think they have time enough; and how sudden and vigorous when necessity presses them. And the Prince or Commonwealth which would defer the discovery of a Plot, cannot do it with more advantage to himself, than by giving the Con∣spirators some handsom occasion to believe that they may execute it with more ease and security another time; for thereby the Prince or Commonwealth will have more leisure to provide for their defence: they who have proceeded otherwise, have but hastened their own ruine, as we have seen in the case of the Duke of Athens, and Gulielmo de Pazzi. The Duke having made himself Sovereign in Florence, and understanding there were Conspiracies against him; without enquiring farther into the business, caused one of them to be apprehended, which giving an alarm to the rest, they immediately took arms, and turn'd the Duke out of his Supremacy. Gulielmo being Commissary for that City in the

Val di Chiana in the year 1501, having news of a great Plot in Arezzo in favour of the Vitelli, and that their design was to renounce the dominion of the Florentines, he marched thither directly, without considering the power of the Conspirators, or his own, or so much as furnishing himself with what Forces he might have done; and by the advice of the Bishop his Son, causing one of the Conspirators to be seized, the rest fell presently to their arms, disclaim'd the Florentines, and took their Commissary prisoner. But when Conspiracies are weak, and in their infancy, if they be discovered, they are to suppress them out of hand, without any suspence, and not to follow the example either of the Duke of Athens, or Dion of Syracuse, of whom the first caused a Citizen who had discovered a plot to him, to be put to death, that the rest observing how unwilling he was to believe any thing of them, might be the more secure, and hold themselves obliged. Dion on the other side suspecting the affections of some people, caused one of his Confidents called Calippus to pretend a Conspiracy, and see if he could draw them in; but both these practi∣ces succeeded very ill, for by the first, all people were discouraged from making any disco∣very, and all Conspirators confirmed; and by the other, a way was recommended for the murdering of himself; for Calippus finding he had an opportunity to practice without danger, he did it so effectually, that it cost Dion both his Government and Life.

CHAP. VII.

How it comes to pass that in the changes of State, from liberty to servitude, and from servitude to liberty, some are very innocent, and others very bloody.

SOme people perhaps may wonder how it should come to pass that Governments should be changed from one form to another, sometimes easily, and without blood, and some∣times with great difficulty and slaughter, be the variation as it will, either from liberty to tyranny, or from tyranny to liberty. And this diversity of mutations is so strange, that as History tells us, they happen sometimes with infinite effusion of blood, and at other times without the least injury to any body: as in Rome, when the Government was taken from the Kings, and put into the hands of the Consul••, no body was expulsed, or so much as molested but the Tarquins; but in other alterations it has been otherwise, and the cause of this diversity may (in my judgment) be deduced from the manner in which that State was acquired; if it was obtained by force, it could not be without injury to many people, and then when ever it is destroyed, it will necessarily follow that all those who were injured before, will endeavour to repair and revenge themselves; which is not to be done without great tumult and slaughter. But when a Commonwealth is fix'd gradually, and by universal consent of the people, when it comes to be changed, there is no need of disturbing any body ••lse; for the bare removal of those who are then in authority, will effectually do the business. Of this sort was the revolution at Rome upon the translation of the Govern∣ment from the Kings to the Consuls; and the accident at Florence in the year 1494, when the Medici were expelled without the least prejudice to any body else; for they having been advanced by the general vote of the people, there was no need of doing more than turning them out of the City. Such mutations are not therefore so dangerous; but those others where many have been injured, and as many are to be revenged, have been so dreadfully destructive, that the very History of their consequences is enough to terrifie the Reader; but all Books being full of them, I shall speak no more of them in this place.

CHAP. VIII.

He who would change the form of a Government, is to consider seriously up∣on what grounds he does it, and the disposition of the Subject.

IT has been said before, that an evil disposed Citizen can do no great hurt but in an ill disposed City, which conclusion (besides my former arguments) is much fortfied by the examples of Sp••rius Cassius, and Manlius Capitolinus; Spurius was an ambitious man, and being desirous to procure to himself extraordinary authority in Rome, by favouring the people in the sale of such Lands as the Romans had conquered from the Hernici, the Senate discovered it, and grew so jealous of him, that when in a speech of his to the people he proffered to give them the mony which had been received for corn that the Senate had sent for out of Sicily, the people absolutely refused it; supposing that Spurius intended that their liberty should make it good: but had the people of Rome at that time been corrupt, or ill disposed, they had taken his mony, and opened him a way to the making him∣self absolute; but the example of Manlius Capitolinus is greater than this, for by that we may see how the courage and integrity which he expressed to his Country in their wars against the Gauls, was afterwards clowded and extinguished by an infatiable desire of authority arising from an emulation of Camillus, whom the Romans had advanced to a greater degree of honour; and so strangely was he blinded with this passion, that not con∣sidering the state and incorruption of the City, or how indisposed the people were to any such enterprize, he began to make parties, and raise tumults in Rome both against the Senate and Laws. In which passage it was evident how well that Government was constituted, and how well that people was disposed; for in this case (though the Nobility and he were great friends, and fierce defenders of one anothers interest) none of them, nor his very re∣lations appeared in his behalf; and whereas at other Trials the friends of the criminal used to accompany him to the Bar in mourning, and with all other circumstances of sadness that they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of, to work (if it were possible) the Judges to compassion; Manlius went alone, without so much as one friend to attend him: the Tribunes of the people who were in other things always opposite to the Nobility, and created on purpose to balance their power; when they found the design tending to the ruine of them all, they joyn'd heartily with them to remove so commo•• a destruction: and the people of Rome, who were zealous in any thing that made for their advantage, and lovers of any thing that crossed the Nobility, (though they also had their kindness for Manlius;) nevertheless when the Tribunes cited him, and referred him to the judgment of the people, they condemned him to death, without any consideration of his former services. Wherefore I am of opi∣nion, that in the whole tract of this History there is not an example that with more efficacy demonstrates the justice of that Commonwealth in all its orders and degrees of men than this; seeing there was not one Citizen appeared in the defence of Manlius, who was a person of known virtue and endowments, and had done many honourable things both in publick and private, and the reason was, because the love to their Country had a greater in∣fluence upon them than any other respect; and the consideration of the present danger of their affairs, being stronger than the memory of his past merits, they chose to free them∣selves by decreeing his death. Titus Livius, tells us, Hunc exitum habuit vir nisi in libera Civitatenatusesset, memorabilis; This was the end of a man who had been very memorable, had he been born any where but in a free State. And in his case there are two things very remarkable; one, that in a corrupt State glory and authority is acquir'd a quite contrary way, than where they live exactly according to the true rules of policy and justice; the other, (not much unlike the former) that men in their affairs, especially of greatest impor∣tance, are to consider the times, and accommodate thereunto; and those who by the un∣happiness of their election, or their natural inclination do otherwise, live always unfor∣tunately, and are more unsuccessful in all their enterprizes than they who comply with the times. And doubtless, by the fore-mentioned expression of the Historian, had Manlius been born in the days of Marius and Sylla, when the Mass was corrupt and depraved, and susceptible of any form his ambition would have imprinted, he had had the same success that they had when they aspired to be absolute. So again, had Marius and Sylla come into the World in the time of Manlius, they had miscarried as he did, and been lost in their first attempt. For one man by his ill customs and conversation may indeed give a touch and tincture of corruption to the people, but 'tis impossible his life should be long enough to debauch them so totally that he may expect any advantage of it in his time; or if he

should be so happy, and live long enough to infect a whole City; yet so impatient are the desires of man, that they cannot restrain their passions, or attend an opportunity of pur∣suing them wisely, but they circumvent and delude themselves in those very things of which they are most eagerly ambitious; so that sometimes for want of patience, and sometimes for want of judgment they venture rashly upon things before the matter be pre∣pared, and are ruined in their designs. He therefore who would alter a Government and set up himself, must attend till time has corrupted the Mass, and by degrees brought all into disorder, which of necessity must follow, when it is not (as we said before) purged and refined by the Examples of good Men or good Laws, that may reduce it towards its first principles. Manlius then had been a great and memorable person, had he been born in a corrupt City; for whoever designs any innovation in a State, whether it be for the restitution of liberty, or the erection of Tyranny, is particularly to regard the manners of the peo∣ple, and to consider how far they are disposed to submit to his ambition; and by so doing he may be able to judge of the success of his Enterprize. For to endeavour to make a people free, that are servile in their Nature, is as hard a matter, as to keep them in servi∣tude, who are disposed to be free. And because we have said before, That in all their operations men are to consider and proceed according to the quality of the times, we shall speak of it at large in the following Chapter.

CHAP. IX.

How he that would succeed, must accommodate to the times.

I Have many times considered with my self that the occasion of every mans good or bad fortune consists in his correspondence and accommodation with the times. We see some people acting furiously, and with an impetus; others with more slowness and caution; and because both in the one and the other they are immoderate, and do not ob∣serve their just terms, therefore both of them do err; but their error and misfortune is least, whose customs suit and correspond with the times; and who comports himself in his designs according to the impulse of his own Nature. Every one can tell how Fabius Maxi∣mus conducted his Army, and with what carefulness and caution he proceeded, contrary to the ancient heat and boldness of the Romans, and it hapned that grave way was more conformable to those times; for Hanibal coming young and brisk into Italy, and being elated with his good fortune, as having twice defeated the Armies of the Romans, that Commonwealth having lost most of her best Soldiers, and remaining in great fear and confusion, nothing could have happen'd more seasonably to them, than to have such a General who by his caution and cunctation could keep the Enemy at a Bay. Nor could any times have been more fortunate to his way of proceeding; for that that slow and deliberate way was natural in Fabius, and not affected, appeared afterwards when Scipio being desirous to pass his Army into Africk to give the finishing blow to the War, Fabius opposed it most earnestly, as one who could not force or dissemble, his Nature, which was rather to support wisely against the difficulties that were upon him, than to search out for new. So that had Fabius directed, Hanibal had continued in Italy, and the reason was because he did not consider the times were altered, and the method of the War was to be changed with them: And if Fabius at that time had been King of Rome, he might well have been worsted in the War, as not knowing how to frame his Counsels according to the variation of the times. But there being in that Commonwealth so many brave men, and excellent Commanders of all sorts of tempers and humours, fortune would have it, That as Fabius was ready in hard and difficult times, to sustain the Enemy, and continue the War; so afterwards when affairs were in a better posture, Scipio was presented to finish and conclude it. And hence it is, that an Aristocracy or free State is longer lived, and generally more fortunate, than a Principality, because in the first they are more flexible, and can frame themselves better to the diversity of the times: For a Prince being accustomed to one way, is hardly to be got out of it, though perhaps the variation of the times require it very much. Piero Soderini (whom I have mentioned before) proceeded with great gentleness and humanity in all his actions; and he and his Country prospered whilst the times were according; but when the times changed, and there was a necessity of laying aside that meekness and humility, Pi•••• was at a loss, and he and his Country were both ruined.

Pope Iulius XI. during the whole time of his Papacy carried himself with great vigour and vehemence; and because the times were agreeable, he prospered in every thing; but had the times altered, and required other Counsels, he had certainly been ruined, because he could never have complyed. And the reason why we cannot change so easily with the times, is twofold; first, because we cannot readily oppose our selves against what we natu∣rally desire; and next, because when we have often tryed one way, and have always been prosperous, we can never persuade our selves that we can do so well any other; and this is the true cause why a Princes fortune varies so strangely, because she varies the times, but he does not alter the way of his administrations. And it is the same in a Commonwealth, if the variation of the times be not observed, and their Laws and Customs altered accor∣dingly, many mischiefs must follow, and the Government be ruined, as we have largely demonstrated before; but those alterations of their Laws are more slow in a Common∣wealth, because they are not so easily changed, and there is a necessity of such times as may shake the whole State, to which one man will not be sufficient, let him change his proceedings, and take new measures as he pleases. But because we have mentioned Fa∣bius Maximus, and how he kept Hanibal at a Bay, I think it not amiss to enquire in the next Chapter whether a General who is resolved upon any terms to engage, can be obstru∣cted by the Enemy.

CHAP. X.

A General cannot avoid fighting, when the Enemy is resolved to Engage him upon any terms.

CNeus Sulpitius Dictator (says Livy) adversus Gallos bellum trahebat, nolens se fortunae committere adversus hostem, quem tempus deteriorem indies, & locus alienus, faceret. Cneus Sulpitius the Dictator declined fighting with the French, because he would not expose himself unnecessarily against an Enemy, who by the incommodity of the season, and inconve∣nience of his Station was every day in danger to be undone.

When such a fault happens as deceives all, or the greatest part of Mankind, I think it not improper to reprehend it over and over again; and therefore though I have formerly in several places shown how much our actions in great things, are different from those in ancient times; yet I think it not superfluous to say something of it here.

If in any thing we deviate from the practice of the Ancients, it is in our Military Disci∣pline, in which we are so absolutely new, that there is scarce any thing used that was preferred by our Ancestors; and the reason is, because Commonwealths and Princes, being unwilling to expose themselves to danger, have shifted off that study and charge upon other people: And when in our times any Prince goes in person into the field, no extraordinary matter is to be expected, for he takes the command upon him to show his grandeur and magnificence, more than for any thing else. Yet they commit fewer faults (by reviewing their Armies sometimes, and keeping that command in their own hands) than Republicks are wont to do, especially in Italy, where trusting all to other people, they understand nothing of War themselves; and on the other side, in their Counsels and determinations (which to show their superiority they reserve to themselves) they commit a thousand times more errors than in the field, some of which I have mentioned elsewhere, but I shall speak here of one of them, and that of more than ordinary importance, when these unactive Princes, or effeminate Commonwealths send out an Army, the wisest thing which they think they can give in command to their General, is to enjoyn him from fight∣ing, and above all things to have a care of a Battel, supposing that therein they imitate the wisdom of Fabius Maximus, who preserved the State, by deferring the combat; but they are mistaken, and do not consider that most commonly that injunction is either idle, or dangerous; for this is most certain, a General who desires to keep the Field, cannot avoid fight when the Enemy presses, and makes it his business to engage him. So that to command a General in that Nature, in as much as to bid him fight when the Enemy pleases, and not when he sees occasion himself. For to keep the field, and avoid fighting, is to be done no way so securely as by keeping 50 miles off, and sending out store of Spies and Scouts that may give you notice of the Enemies approach, and opportunity to retreat. There is another way likewise to secure your self, a••d that is to shut your self up in some strong Town, but both the one and the other are dangerous. In the first case, The Coun∣try is exposed to the depredations of the Enemy, and a generous Prince will sooner run

the hazard of a Battel, than spin out a War with so much detriment to his Subjects. In the second, your ruine is evident; for cooping up your Army in a City, the Enemy will block you up, or besiege you, and then the multitude of your men will quickly bring a scarcity of provisions, and supplies being cut off, you will be forced to surrender; so that to avoid fighting either of these two ways, is very pernicious. Fabius his way of standing upon his guard, and keeping his Army in places of advantage is laudable and good, when your Army is so strong, that the Enemy dares not attack you: Nor can it be said that Fa∣bius declined fighting, but that he deferred till he could do it with advantage; for had Hanibal advanced against him, Fabius would have kept his ground and engaged him, but Hanibal was too cunning for that; so that Hanibal as well as Fabius avoided fighting; but if either of them would have fought upon disadvantage the other had only three remedies; that is, the two foresaid, and flying. That this which I say is true, is manifest by a thousand examples, but more particularly by the War which the Romans made upon Philip of Mace∣don; Philip being invaded by the Romans, resolved not to come to a Battel; and to avoid it, he (as Fabius did in Italy) encamped his Army upon the top of a Mountain, and en∣trenched himself so strongly, that he believed the Romans durst not have ventured to come at him: But they not only adventured, but removed him from the Mountain, forced him to fly with the greatest part of his Army, and had it not been for the unpassableness of the Country which hindered the pursuit, the Macedonians had all been cut off. Philip, then, being unwilling to fight, and having (as I said before) encamped upon the Mountains not far from the Romans, durst not trust himself to his advantages; and having found by ex∣perience that he was not secure there, he would not pin himself up in a Town, but made choice of the other way, and kept himself at a distance; so as when the Romans came into one Province, he would remove into another, and what place soever the Romans left, he would be sure to come to: At length finding this protraction of the War, made his af∣fairs but worse, and that his Subjects were harrassed by both Armies, he resolved to try his fortune, and bring all to the decision of a Battel: But it is convenient to avoid fighting when your Army is in the same condition as those of Fabius, and Sulpitius; that is, when it is so considerable that the Enemy fears to attack you in your entrenchments; and though he has got some footing in your Country, yet not so much as is able to supply him with provisions; in this case 'tis best to decline fighting, and follow the example of Sulpitius, Nolens se fortunae committere, &c. But in all other cases it is not to be done, but with dishonour and danger; for to fly (as Philip did) is as bad as to be routed, and more dishonorable, because he gave no proof of his courage, and though he escaped by the diffi∣culty of the Country; yet whoever follows his example without that convenience, may chance to be ruin'd. No man will deny but Hanibal was a great Soldier, and of more than ordinary experience; when he went into Africa against Scipio, if he had seen it for his advantage to have protracted the War, he would have done it, and perchance (being a great Captain, and having as good an Army) he would have done it the same way as Fabius did in Italy; but seeing he did not do it, it is probable he was diverted by some extraordinary occasion. For that Prince who has got an Army together, (if he perceives that for want of pay, or supplies, he is not likely to keep them long) is stark mad if he tries not his fortune before his Army disbands, for by delaying, he is certainly lost; by fighting he may possibly overcome: And above all things, whether we are victorious or beaten, we are to behave ourselves honourably, and 'tis more honourable to be overcome by force, than by some error to run your self into incommodities that ruine you after∣wards. 'Tis not unlikely but Hanibal might be impelled by some such necessity; and on the other side Scipio (if Hanibal should have deferred fighting) might have chose whe∣ther he would have attacked him in his Trenches, because he had already conquered Syphax, and got such footing in Africk, that he was as safe, and with as much commodity as in Italy; but it was otherwise with Hanibal when he had to do with Fabius; and with the French when they had to do with Sulpitius. And he who invades an Enemies Coun∣try, avoids fighting with more difficulty, as being obliged (when ever the Enemy appears to obstruct him) to give him Battel; and if he sets down before any Town, he is obliged so much the more, as in our times it happen'd to Charles Duke of Burgundy, who was beaten up in his Leaguer before Morat by the Swizzers, and defeated. And the same thing fell out to the French at the Seige of Novarra, where they were attacht and beaten by the Swizzers.

CHAP. XI.

One person that has many Enemies upon his hands, though he be inferiour to them, yet if he can sustain their first impression, carries commonly the Victory.

THe power of the Tribunes of the people was great and necessary in the City of Rome to correct the ambition of the Nobility, who otherwise would have debauch'd the said City much sooner than they did: But as it happens in other things, so it happened in this; in the best and most beneficial thing to the Commonwealth, there was an occult, and remote evil that lay snug, which required new Laws, and new methods to suppress. For the insolence of the Tribunitial authority grew so great, that it became terrible both to the Senate and people, and had doubtlesly produced some great mischief to the Com∣monwealth, had not Appius Claudius by his great wisdom, found out a way to temper and ballance their fury, by the intercession of their Colleagues, and the way was by choo∣sing out some person among the Tribunes, whom either out of fear, or corruption, or love to his Country they could dispose to withstand the designs of his Brethren, and oppose himself against them, whenever their resolutions were tending to the diminution of the Nobility, or prejudice of the State. Which way of restraining the petulancy of the Tribunes was for a long time of great advantage to the Romans, and may give us occasion to consider, whether a combination of several great persons, against one less powerful than they (whilst united) is like to be successful against him that is alone; or whether the single person has the advantage against the Confederacy. I answer, That those whose Forces are united, are many times stronger, but their performances are seldom so great, as the single persons, though he be nothing so strong, for committing an infinite number of other things (in which the single person has the advantage) he will be able with a little industry to break, and divide and enfeeble them: To this purpose there is no need of go∣ing to antiquity for examples (where there is plenty enough) the passages of our own times will furnish us sufficiently. In the year 1484, all Italy confederated against the Ve∣netian, who, when they were so over-powr'd and distress'd that they were unable to keep the field, found a way to work off Count Lodavic (Governor of Milan) from their League, by which means they not only obtained a Peace, and restitution of what they had lost; but they got a good part of the Dutchy of Ferrara; so that they whose Forces were too weak to appear before the Enemy; when they came to treat, were the greatest gainers by the War. Not many years since, the whole Christian world seemed to conspire against France; yet before the end of the War, the Spaniard fell off from the League, made his Peace with the French, and forced the rest of the Confederates, one after one, to do the same. And from hence we may easily collect that as often as many Princes or States are confederated together against any single Prince or Commonwealth, if the single Prince and Commonwealth be strong enough to withstand their first impression, and spin out the War, he will certainly prevail; but if his force be not sufficient to do that, he is in extraordinary danger, as it happen'd to the Venetians; for had they been able to have sustained their first shock, and protracted the War, till they had debauched some of the Confederates, the French had never done them so much mischief, and they had preserv'd themselves from ruine: But their Army being too weak to confront them, and their time too little to divide them, they were undone; and this is evident by what happen'd after∣ward; for as soon as the Pope had recovered what he had lost, he reconciled himself, and became their friend; the Spaniard did the same, and both of them would have been glad to have continued Lombardy to the Venetians, rather than the French should have got it, and made himself so considerable in Italy. The Venetians at that time might have pre∣vented a great part of their calamities, had they given some small part of their Territory to the Enemy, and thereby have secured the rest; but then they must have given it in time, and so as it might not have appeared to have been done by necessity, as they might well have done before the War was commenced; when that was begun, it would have been dishonourable, and perhaps ineffectual. But before those troubles, there were few of the Venetian Citizens that could foresee a danger; fewer that could remedy it; and none at all that could advise. To conclude therefore this Chapter, I do pronounce, that as the Ro∣man remedy against the ambition of their Tribunes, was the multitude of them, out of which they always found some or other, that they could make for the interest of the Publick; so it is a ready remedy for any Prince that is engaged against a confederate Enemy, when he can break their League, and work any of the Confederates to a separation.

CHAP. XII.

A wise General is to put a necessity of fighting upon his own Army, but to pre∣vent it to his Enemies.

WE have formerly discoursed of what use and importance necessity is in humane Exploits, and shown how many men, compelled by necessity, have done glo∣rious things, and made their memories immortal. Moral Philosophers have told us, That the Tongue, and the Hands are noble Instruments of themselves; yet they had never brought things to that exactness and perfection, had not necessity impelled them. The Generals therefore of old, understanding well the virtue of this necessity; and how much more desperate and obstinate their Soldiers were rendered thereby, made it their care to bring their Soldiers into a necessity of fighting, and to keep it from their Enemies; to which end, they many times opened a passage for the Enemies Army, which they might easily have obstructed; and precluded it to their own, when they might as easily have passed. Whoever therefore, desires to make his Garrison stout and couragious, and obstinate for the defence of a Town, or to render his Army pertinacious in the Field, is above all things to reduce them into such a necessity, or at least to make them believe it: So that a wise General, who designs the besieging of a Town, judges of the easiness or difficulty of the expugnation, from the necessity which lies upon the Citizens to defend themselves: If the necessity of their defence be great, his enterprize is the more difficult, because the courage and obstinacy of the besieged is like to be the greater; but where there is no such necessity, there is no such danger. Hence it is that revolted Towns are much harder to be recovered, than they were to be taken at first; for at first having committed no fault, they were in fear of no punishment, and therefore surrendered more easily: But in the other case having the guilt of their defect up their Spirits, they are fearful of revenge, and so become more obstinate in their defence. These are not unusual, and yet there are other causes which render the minds of people obstinate in their defence, and one of them is the natural hatred and animosity which is frequently betwixt neighbouring Princes and States, which proceeds from an infatiable desire of Dominion in Princes, and as zealous an inclination to liberty in Commonwealths, especially if they be constituted as in Tuscany, where that emulation and jealousie has made them refractory both on the one side, and the other. Hence it is, though that the Florentines have been at greater charges than the Veneti∣ans, yet their acquests are not so much, because the Towns in Tuscany were most of them free, & by consequence more difficult to be brought to subjection; whereas the Towns which the Venetians conquered, having been most of them under Princes, and accustomed to servitude, it was indifferent to them under whose dominion they were; and they are so far from resisting a change, that they do many times desire it. So that though the Cities upon the Frontiers of the Venetian, were generally stronger, than those upon the Frontiers of the Florentine, yet they were reduced with more ease; because being not so free, they were less obstinate in their defence: when therefore, a wise General resolves upon a Siege, he is with all diligence to take away that necessity from the Citizens which may make them inflexible, either by promising indemnity, if they have deserved to be punished; or if it be only their liberty of which they are fearful, by assuring them that his designs are not against that, but only against the ambition and exorbitancy of some particular persons; which kind of promises had strange effects in the facilitating of Enterprizes, and the taking of Towns; for though wise men will easily discover the fraud, yet the multitude are commonly so impatient of War, and so mad to be at quiet, that they shut their Eyes a∣gainst any thing of mischief that comes to them under propositions of peace; by which means many Cities have lost their liberty, as it happened to Florence not long since; and to M. Crassus and his Army heretofore, who though he was sensible that the promises of the Parthians were fraudulent, and made only to keep his Soldiers from that necessity of defending themselves, yet he could not convince them, nor prevail with them to stand bravely upon their Guard, but being blinded with their overtures of Peace, both Army and General were cut off, as may be seen by the History. The Samnites, put on by the am∣bition of some of their Citizens, brake their Peace with the Romans, and invaded their Country; but being afterwards sensible of what they had done, they sent Embassadors to Rome offering restitution of what they had taken, and to deliver up the Authors of that Counsel into their hands, ••o be punished as they pleas'd; but being rejected, and their Embassadors sent home without any hopes of agreement, Pontius their General used

it as an argument to encourage his men to fight more obstinately, that the Romans having refused their fair overtures of Peace, were resolved upon War; and therefore there was no other course, but of necessity they must fight. And (says he) Iustum est bellum, quibus est necessarium & pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in armis spes est. That Wur is just that is ne∣cessary, and Arms are piously taken up by him, who has no other hopes to secure himself. Upon which necessity he founded the hopes of his Victory. C. Manlius was at the head of an Army against the Vejentes, and part of the Army of the Vejentes being got into his Camp Manlius to cut of their retreat, doubled his Guards at the gates, and fortified all the Passes by which they were to return; but the Vejentes perceiving they were desperate, fought with so much courage and fury, that they killed the Consul, and had cut off his whole Army, had not one of the Tribunes very wisely opened them a way to be gone: In which action we may observe that whilst the Vejentes were under a necessity of fighting, there was no resisting of their courage; but when a way was opened for their retreat, they chose rather to fly. The Volsci and the Equi were entered upon the confines of the Romans, who sent their Consuls against them with an Army: and coming to a Battel, it happened that in the heat of it, the Volsci were inclosed by the Romans, and as it were shut up in their own Camp. Vettius Mescins their General, finding their exigence, and that there was a necessity of being killed; or making their way by the Sword, Ite mecum (says he to his Soldiers) Non murus, nonvallum, armati armatis obstant, virtute pares, (quae ultimum & maximum telum est) necessitate superiores estis. Follow me then couragiously, you have no Wall, no Rampart, nothing but armed men to withstand you: you are equal to them in valour, and being under necessity, have the same advantage of the Weapon. For Livy calls it in this place the highest and heaviest of weapons.

Camillus one of the wisest of all the Roman Generals (having stormed and entred Veii with some part of his Army) to facilitate his Victory, and take away from the Enemy that last necessity of fighting; gave Orders (and so loud that the Vejentes might be sure to hear) that no Soldier should dare to touch any man who had thrown down his Army, by which Proclamation every man was encouraged to throw down his Arms, and the City was taken with so little loss, that since that time, that Stratagem has been used by several Commanders.

CHAP. XIII.

Whether we are more safe in a good General with a bad Army, or a good Army with a bad General.

MArtius Coriolanus being banished from Rome, retired to the Volsci, where having got an Army together, he returned to Rome to revenge himself for the injury his fellow Citizens had done him, and he had done it effectually, had not the Prayers and Piety of his Mother prevailed more upon him, than all the power of the Romans. From which passage Titus Livius observes, that the Roman Commonwealth encreased more by the virtue of their Commanders, than by the excellence of their Soldiers; because though the Volsci had been always beaten before; yet when they got a Roman General, they were too hard for the Romans: But though Livy was of that opinion in that place, yet in many parts of his History there are instances, where the private Soldiers have done great things, and sometimes fought better and in better order, after their Consuls were killed, than they had done whilst they were living. Thus it happened in the Army which the Romans had in Spain under the Command of the two Scipio's, which, when both their Comman∣ders were slain, behaved it self so well, that it not only defended it self, but defeated the Enemy, and preserved that Province to the Romans, So that in the whole, there are examples on both sides, where the Soldiers have done bravely, and got the Victory by their valour, and where the Conduct of the General has done as much as a whole Army; from whence it may be concluded that they are mutually useful, and that the Soldier is as much advan∣taged by the excellence of his General, as the General by the courage of his Army. How∣ever, this I think will not be unworthy our consideration, whether is most formidable, a good Army under a bad Commander, or a good Commander with a bad Army: In the opinion of Caesar neither of them was considerable; for when he went into Spain against Afranius and Petreius, who had a good Army under their command, he went with much confidence; because, as he said himself, Ibat ad exercitum sine duce, He went against an Army without a head; reflecting thereby upon the insufficiency of their Generals. Again

when he went into Thessaly against Pompey, his expression was Vado an ducem fine Exercitu. I go now against a General without an Army. It remains now that we consider whether it be most easie for a good Captain to make a good Army, or a good Army to make a good Captain. But to this, in my opinion, it is easily answered; for many good men in an Army can sooner select one out of their number, and instruct him so, as that he may be fit to command the rest, than the best General in the world can make an Army expert and ready. Lucullus when he was sent against Mithridates, was utterly unexperienced in mat∣ters of War, yet being in a good Army, where his inferior Officers were good, he quickly became a good General. The Romans for want of men, were forced to arm their Ser∣vants, and having referred them to be disciplin'd by Sempronius Gracc••us, in a short time he made them excellent Soldiers. Pelopidas and Epominandas after they had rescued their Country from the Tyranny of the Spartans, in a short time made their Country-men so good Soldiers, that they were not only able to contend, but to conquer the Spartans. So that the case is equal, and which soever is good, may make the other so too. Nevertheless a good Army, without a good Commander, grows insolent and dangerous, as it hapned in the Macedonian Army after Alexander was dead, and as it is in civil Wars among all old Soldiers; so that I think if there be more confidence to be reposed in the one than in the other, it is to be rather in the General, than the Army, especially if he has time to instruct and discipline his Men; for an Army without a head, is insolent and mutinous. Those Captains therefore are worthy of double honour, who have not only the Enemy to over∣come; but are to instruct, and prepare their Forces, before they bring them to engage. And in doing so, they do highly recommend the Conduct of their General, which is so rare a thing, that if the trouble were laid upon many, they would be much less esteemed and respected than they are now.

CHAP. XIV.

What strange effects new inventions have sometimes in a Battle, and how new Noises have the same.

WHat strange consequences have succeeded from sudden and unexpected accidents that have been seen or heard in the heat of the Battel, appears by several examples in History, but especially in the conflict betwixt the Romans and the Volsci, where Quintius observing one of the wings of his Army to stagger and give ground, cry'd out to them to stand firm, for that in the other wing the Victory was theirs; with which words he not only reincouraged his own men, but put such a terror upon the Enemy, that they fled in good earnest. And if in a well ordered Army those unexpected vociferations have such wonderful effect, in a tumultuous and ill governed Army they have much more, where everything is more subject to the agitation of such winds▪ and of this we have a memo∣rable example of our times. The City of Perugia not many years since was divided into two parts, the Oddi, and the Baglioni. The Baglioni prevailing, the Oddi were banished. But the Oddi having got an Army together, and brought them privatly to a place not far from Perugia, by the favour of their friends they were let one night into the Town, and possessed themselves as far as the Piazza. And because the Streets were chained up from one side to other to hinder the passage of the Horse, the Oddesche had a man who went before them with a great engine of Iron wherewith he brake the chains, and he had done his work so effectually, that he had broke all the chains, but what opened into the Piazza the alarm being taken, and every body crying out Arm, Arm, he who broke down the chains being pressed so close by the throng that was behind him, that he had not room for his blow, cryed out to those that were next Back, Back, intending only to have made more room for his arm: But they who were next him calling back to those who were be∣hind them, by degress the word went through the whole Army, and they who were in the Rear not knowing the reason, began to run, and being followed by those who were next, the whole Army retreated by little and little, till at last they brake out into an abso∣lute flight, by which inconsiderable accident, the Oddi were defeated of their design. So that it is to be considered, that in a Battel, order is not only to be taken that the Army be well drawn up, and put in a good posture to fight; but that no such trifling accident be able to discompose it: For if for any thing the popular multitude be unfit for the Wars, it is because every noise, rumour, or alarm, distracts them, and puts them to the rout. Wherefore it ought to be a principal care in a good General to appoint such persons as are to receive

all orders and words of command, and derive them to the rest, that by so doing the Sol∣diers being accustomed to their Officers, may not receive any such orders, but from such persons as are commissioned thereunto, the want of which custom has many times produc'd very great confusion. As to apparitions, and such things as are many times seen, it is the part of a good General, to contrive and exhibit (in the very height of the Battel) such sights as may incourage his own men, and discourage the Enemy; for among many acci∣dents which conduce to your victory, this may be especially effectual. To this purpose is that invention of which Sulpitius made use against the French; being drawn up, and ready to engage the Enemy, he caused all the Servants and refuse of his Army to be armed and mounted upon the Mules and Horses belonging to the Baggage; and having furnished them so formally with Colours and Trumpets that they appeared a compleat body of Horse, he disposed them behind a hill, where they were to continue, till in the heat of the fight, they were to come forth and shew themselves to the Enemy; which stratagem being as well executed as devised, struck such a terror into the French, that it lost them the day. So that a good General has a double care upon him, to contrive by these new surprizes to intimidate the Enemy; and to provide that if any such practices be used upon him, he may discover, and defeat them. Thus an Indian King served Semi∣ramis, who observing the said King to be very strong in the number of Elephants, to fright and persuade him that she was as strong as he, she caused several of her Camels to be dress'd up, and covered with the Skins of Bufaloes and Bulls, that they might look big, and carry the representation of Elephants; and having done so, she marched them in the Van of her Army, but her design did not take; for the King having intelligence of it, perverted it into her prejudice.

The Fidenates being besieged by Mamorcus the dictator, to terrifie the Roman Army contrived to have several of the Townsmen in the heat of the Engagement to come sud∣denly out of the Town with Fire-works at the end of their Launces, hoping that the newness of the sight might be a means to disturb them. And hear it is to be noted, that when such stratagems have more of reality than pretence, they may very well be made use of, because having something of solidity in them, their weakness is not so soon disco∣vered, but where they have more of appearance and fiction than truth, it is best either not to use them at all, or if you do, to keep them at such a distance, as that their fallacy may not be discerned; as Sulpitius did with his Muletiers; for when they are intrinsi∣cally weak, their vanity appears upon their approach, and they do more mischief than good, as the Elephants of Semiramis, and the false fires of the Fidenates, which fires though at first, they gave some disturbance to the Roman Souldiers; yet the Dictator coming in, and questioning them aloud whether they were not ashamed to be smoaked like Bees out of their Huts; encouraging them to turn again, he cryed out, Suis flammis delete Fedenas quos vestris beneficiis placare non potuistis, Go to, destroy the Fidenae with their own fires, seeing all your kindnesses have not been able to oblige them; and by so doing, he defeated the Fidenates, and made their project unprofitable.

CHAP. XV.

One General is best for an Army, and that to govern it by Commissioners, is not so good.

THe Fidenates having rebelled, and cut off that Colony of the Romans that was amongst them, the Romans created four Tribunes, and invested with Consulary power, whereof one being left behind for the security of the City of Rome, the other three were sent against the Fidenates and Veientes; but disagreeing among them∣selves, they came off with dishonour, though their loss was not much: That they gain'd no more honour, they may thank themselves; that they received no more loss, they may thank their good Soldiers. However the Romans finding the inconvenience, re∣turned to their old way of Dictators, that what three persons had disordered, might be re∣medied by one. From whence we may discern the inconvenience of many Commanders either in an Army or Town, which Livy has expressed very clearly in these following words, Tres Tribuni potestate Consulari, documento fuere, quam plurium imperium bello in∣utile esset, tenendo ad sua quis{que} Consilia, cum alii aliud videretur, apperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti; These three Tribunes with Consular power, gave us to understand the uselesness of multiplicity of Commanders, for each of them adhering to his own Counsels, whilst one was

for one thing, and another as positive for another, nothing was done, and they gave the enemy an advantage. And though this be example enough to prove the inconvenience of many Commanders, yet for better illustration I shall add some others both ancient and modern. In the year 1500 King Lewis XII of France having retaken Milan, sent his Army to Pisa to recover it for the Florentines; who to command it had sent thither two Commissaries, one of them called Giovan-battista Ridolsi, and the other Luca d' Antonio de gli Albizzi. Giovan-battista was a person of reputation and gravity, and being ancienter than Luca, Luca left the whole administration to him; but though he shewed no ambition in opposing him; he did it abundantly by his silence, and fullenness; neglecting, and undervaluing every thing that was done; so that he was so far from assisting his Colleague either with his coun∣sel or person, that he appeared as if he had been utterly ignorant in matters of war: but it pro∣ved otherwise afterwards, when upon some accident Giovan-battista was recalled, and Luca remained behind with absolute Command; for then he gave ample testimony both of his courage and conduct, which before, whilst he had a Colleague, no body could have believed. To this purpose I shall add another saying of Livy, who giving an account how Quintius and Agrippa (his Colleague) being sent against the Aequi, Agrippa would needs have the whole management of the war to be committed to Quintius, for (says he) Saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est, summam imperii apud unum esse; In the administra∣tion of great affairs it is best that the Soveraign power be invested in one person. Which is contrary to the present practice of our Princes and States, who do often depute more than one Commander both to their Armies and Towns; which (however they think it for the best) must needs breed inconceivable confusion. And if the cause of the ruine of so ma∣ny Italian and French Armies in our times, be enquired into, it will be found to be the mul∣titude, and emulation of their Commanders, and it be may safely concluded, that it is better to send a man of ordinary prudence, and experience, upon any expedition, than two of the wisest and best Soldiers they have, with equal commission.

CHAP. XVI.

That in times of difficulty, virtue is in esteem; in times of ease and luxury, men of riches and alliance are in greatest request.

IT always was, and always will be the fortune of persons of more than ordinary endow∣ments, to be laid aside and neglected in times of peace, especially in a Commonwealth; for that envy which is contracted by their virtue, sets up many Citizens against them, who will not only be their equals, but superiors. To this purpose Thucidides (a Greek author) has a place in his History, where he shews how the Republick of Athens, having had the better in the Peloponesian War, depressed the pride of the Spartans, and subdued the greatest part of Greece, was so inhansed and elated with their success, that it was proposed to fall upon Sicily.

It was seriously debated in Athens whether the said enterprize should be undertaken or not; Alcibiades and other Citizens of his party promoted it highly, not so much in respect of the publick good as their own private advantage, expecting that the management of that war would be placed in their hands. But Nicias (a person of the greatest reputation in Athens) dissuaded it; and his great argument to make the People believe he spake his judgment, and more for the benefit of the Commonwealth than any interest of his own, was, that he advised rather contrary to his own advantage, because in time of peace there were many of his fellow Citizens before him, but in time of war he knew he should be the first: by which we may see it has been an ancient infirmity in Commonwealths not to value persons of worth in time of peace, which disobliges them doubly; to see themselves deprived of their dignities, and to see others preferred to them of less sufficiency than they, which error has been the occasion of much confusion; for those persons who find them∣selves neglected, and know the reason of all is, the tranquillity of the times, make it their business to embroil them, and put their Country upon war, though never so much to its prejudice. And thinking sometimes with my self what remedies were most proper, I could light but on two, one was to keep the Citizens from growing too rich, that wealth without virtue might not be sufficient to advance any man, or able to corrupt other people, or themselves: the other, so to prepare and adapt themselves for war, that they may never be surprized, but have always employment forthe bravest of their Citizens, as Rome had in the time of her prosperity. For that City having Armies always abroad, there was con∣stant

exercise for the virtue of their Citizens: nor could a man of worth be degraded, nor an improper man be prefer'd in his place, because when ever such a thing was done, (whe∣ther by way of error or experiment, it was the same) the disorders and dangers which fol∣lowed, were so sudden and great, that they quickly found their mistake, and return'd to their old method again. But other Cities and States not so well constituted as that, which make war only in cases of necessity, cannot defend themselves from those inconveniences but are always in trouble and disorder, when ever that excellent Citizen which is neglected is vindicative, and hath any reputation or part in the City. And though for some time Rome kept her self free from these inconveniences, yet after she had conquered Carthage and Antiochus, (as has been said before) and seemed to be past all fear of war for the future, she chose several Commanders for her Army, not so much for their conduct or virtue, as for those qualities which were likely to recommend them to the people. Paulus Aemilius stood many times for the Consulship, and was repulsed; nor could he ever be made Con∣sul till the Macedonian war, which was committed unanimously to his conduct, because they saw it was like to be dangerous and difficult. After the year 1494 our City of Flo∣rence being engaged in several wars▪ in which none of our Citizens had perform'd any great matter, at last the City hapned upon a person who shewed them after what manner an Army was to be commanded, his name was Antonio Giacomini; whilst the war was dan∣gerous, and there was any trouble or difficulty to manage it, Antonio was free from the am∣bition of his fellow Citizens, and had no competitor in his election to be Commissary, and General of their Armies: but when those were past, and new wars that were more easie and honourable were to be undertaken, he had so many competitors, that when three Commissa∣ries were to be chosen for the reduction of Pisa, Antonio could not obtain to be one: and though it be not manifest what inconveniences accrewed to the Commonwealth by the wa∣ving of Antonio, yet it may be easily conjectured, for the Pisans being distressed for want of provisions, and having nothing left wherewithal to defend themselves, (had Antonio been there) would have been forc'd to have surrendred at discretion; but being besieged by such Officers as knew not how to streighten or press them, they held out so long, that the Florentines were glad to buy them out at last, whereas they might as well have had them by force. No question but Antonio resented it highly, and he had need be a good man, and of more than ordinary patience not to think of revenging himself, though with the subversion of the whole City, (if he could) and the ruine of every private Citizen, which is to be carefully prevented by every State, as shall be shewn in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

A man is not to be disobliged, and employed afterwards in any matter of importance.

A Commonwealth is diligently to provide that no Citizen be entrusted in any weighty affair, who has received any remarkable injury; Claudius Nero (who divided the Army which was designed to confront Hanibal, and marched away with a strong party into la Mara to joyn with the other Consul, and engage Asdrubal before he got up with his supplies to Hanibal) having formerly commanded the Roman Army in Spain against the said Asdrubal, had come off with dishonour; for though he had enclosed Asdrubal and his whole Army, and so possest himself of all passes, that he must either fight with disadvantage, or perish with hunger, yet he was over-reach'd with the subtilty of the Carthaginian, who drill'd him on with pretended overtures of peace, till at length in the night he stole his Army thorow the woods, and got of where he was safe. This passage being known in Rome, was no small diminution to Nero's reputation both with the Senate and the People: but being afterwards made Consul, and sent with an Army against Hanibal, he ventured upon that desperate counsel of dividing the Army, which was a thing so doubtful and un∣certain in the opinion of the Romans, that the City was in strange anxiety and suspence till they had the news of his Victory. It is reported that when Claudius Nero was que∣stioned afterwards by his friends what it was that mov'd him to so hazardous an enterprize, in which, without necessary provocation, he had ventured the whole liberty of their Country, he answered, he had done it, because he knew if he succeded, he should recover that honour which he had lost in Spain; if he miscarried, and his design should have a con∣trary end, he should have had the satisfaction to have been revenged of the City and Citi∣zens, by whom he had been so ingratefully, and so indiscreetly calumniated. And if the

indignation arising from these kind of provocations could work so strongly upon a Roman Citizen, in those times when Rome was in its innocence; we may easily imagine what pro∣digious effects it may have upon persons in a City not so well constituted as that; and be∣cause against these kind of disorders (to which all Commonwealths are subject) no certain remedy can be prescrib'd, it follows that no Commonwealth can be possibly perpetual, forasmuch as a thousand unexpected accidents fall in, to hasten its destruction.

CHAP. XVIII.

Nothing is more honourable in a General, than to foresee the Designs of his Enemy.

IT was the saying of Epaminondas the Theban, that no one quality was more useful and necessary in a General, than to be able to know the resolutions and designs of his Enemy, and discover that by conjecture, which he could not do by any certain intelligence. Nor is it difficult only to understand his designs, but his actions; and of those actions not only such as are perform'd privately, or at a distance, but such as are done (as it were) before his Face. For it many times falls out, that when a Battel continues till night, he who has the better, believes he has the worst; and who has lost all, supposes he has the Victory. Which mistakes has put the Generals many times upon pernicious counsels, as it hapned betwixt Brutus and Cassius; for Brutus having defeated the Enemy with his Wing. Cassius suppo∣sing he had been lost, and his whole Body dispers'd, killed himself in despair. In our times, at the Battel of S. Cilicia in Lombardy, Francis King of France coming to an engagement with the Swizzers, the Fight continued till night: a body of the Swizzers remaining en∣tire, and hearing nothing of the defeat and execution of their Comrades, concluded the Victory was theirs, which error was the occasion that they marched not off as they might have done, but kept their ground till the next morning, at which time they were charged again, and overthrown.

The same error had almost ruined the Armies of the Pope and King of Spain, who upon a false alarm of the Victory of the Swizzers, passed the Po, and advanced so far, that ere they were aware they had like to have fallen into the mouths of the victorious French. The like fell out of old in the Camps of the Romans and Aequi; Sempronius the Consul being commanded out with an Army against the enemy, and forcing him to a Battel, it continued till night without any visible advantage on either side. Night coming on, and both Armies sufficiently spent, neither of them retir'd to their Camps, but betook them∣selves to the neighbouring hills, where they believed they should be more safe. The Ro∣man Army divided into two parts, one went with the Consul, and the other with Tempa∣nius the Centurion, by whose courage the Roman Army was preserved that day. The next morning the Consul hearing no more of the enemy, retreated towards Rome; the Aequi with their Army did the same, for both of them though they had been beaten, and marched away without regarding the loss or plunder of their Camps▪ it hapned that Tem∣panius being behind with his squadron, and marching off as the rest, he took certain of the wounded Aequi prisoners, who inform'd him that their Generals were gone out of the field, and had quitted their Camps. Upon enquiry finding it to be true, he entred into the Roman, and secured it, but the enemies Camp was given in prey to the Souldier, after which he returned with Victory to Rome, which Victory consisted only in having the first intelligence of the enemies disorder: from whence it is observable that two Armies en∣gaged, may be each of them in the same distress and despair, and that that Army goes away with the Victory which has first notice of the necessities of the other, and of this I shall give a pregnant example of late days, and at home. In the year 1498 the Florentines had a great Army in the Country of Pisa, and had besieged that City very close. The Vene∣tian having undertaken its protection, and seeing no other way to relieve it; to divert the enemy, and remove the war, they resolved to invade the Territory of the Florentine; to which purpose they raised a strong Army, marched into their Country by the Val di Lamo∣na, possessed themselves of the Town of Marradi, and besieged the Castle of Castiglione which stands above upon an hill. The Florentines upon the alarm resolved to relieve Mar∣adi, and yet not weaken their Army before Pisa, whereupon they raised a new Army both Horse and Foot, and sent them thither under the Command of Iacopo Quarto Appiano (Lord of Piombino) and the Count Rinuccio da Marciano. The Florentine Army being conducted to the hills, the Venetian raised his siege before Castiglione, and retreated into the

Town: the Armies being in this posture, and facing one another for several days, both of them suffered exceedingly for want of all manner of Provisions; at length neither of them being very earnest to come to a Battel, and each of them being ignorant of the others distress, they resolved the next morning to break up their Camp, and each of them to re∣tire, the Venetian towards Berzighella and Faenza, and the Florentine towards Casaglia and Mugello. The morning being come, and the Baggage sent away before, a poor Woman hapned to come into the Florentine Camp, from Marradi to see some of her Relations who were in the service of the Florentine: by this Woman the Florentine Generals had notice that the Venetians were gone; whereupon reassuming their courage, they altered their counsels, pursued the enemy, and writ Letters to Florence, that they had not only beaten the Venetians, but made an end of the War. Which Victory proceeded from nothing but be∣cause they had the first news of the retreat of the Enemy, which if it had come to the other side, as it did to them, the consequence would have been the same, and the Floren∣tines have been beaten.

CHAP. XIX.

Whether for the Government of the multitude, obsequiousness and i••dulgence be more necessary than punishment.

THe Roman Commonwealth was perplexed with the dissentions betwixt the Nobility, and the people; nevertheless, their foreign Wars requiring it, they sent forth with their Armies, Quintius and Appius Claudius: Appius being rough, and cruel in his com∣mands, was so ill obeyed by his Soldiers, that he was defeated, and fled out of his Pro∣vince. Quintius being more gentle and benign, was better obeyed, and carried the Vi∣ctory where he was; from whence it appears more conducing to the well governing of a multitude, to be rather obliging, than proud, and pitiful, than cruel. However Cornelius Tacitus tells us, (and many others are of his mind) In multitudine regend•• plus paena quam obsequium valet, That to the managing of a multitude, severity is more requisite than mildness. And I think both may be true to his distinction, of Companions and Subjects; if those under your command be Companions and fellow Citizens with you, you cannot securely use them with that severity, of which Tacitus speaks; for the people of Rome having equal authority with the Nobility, was not to be used ruggedly by any man that was put over them for but a while. And it has been many times seen that the Roman Generals, who behaved themselves amicably towards their Souldiers, and governed them with mildness, have done greater things than those who used them with austerity, and kept them in per∣petual fear, unless they were endued with more than ordinary virtue, like Manlius Torqua∣tus. But he whose command is over his Subjects, (of whom Cornelius speaks) is to have a care they grow not insolent, and contemn him for his easiness, and there, is rather to use severity than gentleness with them; yet that is to be done (too) with such moderation, that they may be kept from abhorring him; for the hatred of the Subject is never good for a Prince, and the best way to prevent it, is by not interrupting the Subject in the quiet en∣joyment of his Estate; for blood (unless there be some design of rapacity under it) no Prince does desire it, but upon some extraordinary necessity, and that necessity happens but seldom. But when cruelty and rapine meet together in the nature of one person, there ne∣ver wants desire, nor pretences for cruelty, as I have demonstrated largely in another Trea∣tise upon this occasion. Quintius therefore deserved more praise than Appius deserved: and the saying of Tacitus is true enough with the aforesaid restriction, but not in the case of Appius: and because I have spoken of kindness and severity, I will give you one example, how mildness prevailed more upon the Falisci than violence could do.

CHAP. XX.

One instance of humanity wrought more upon the Falisci, than all the force of the Romans.

CAmillus having besieged the Falisci, and attempted many things against them but in vain, a School-master who had the tuition of several of the principal young Gentle∣men of that City, thinking to gratifie Camillus, and ingratiate with the people of Rome, carrying them out of the walls, under pretence of exercise and recreation, he conveyed them all into the Camp of Camillus, and presenting them to him, told him, that by their means he might become Master of the Town: Camillus was so far from accepting his pre∣sent, that he caused the Paedagogue to be strip'd, and his hands tied behind him, and then putting a rod into every one of the young Gentlemens hands, he caused them scourge him back again into the Town: which piece of humanity and justice when the Citizens understood, they resolved to defend themselves no longer, and so immediately surrendred: a great example doubtless, and by which we may learn, that many times kindness and ge∣nerosity moves an Enemy more than all the force and artifice of war; for 'tis frequently seen that those Provinces and Cities which no violence or stratagem have subdued, have been melted and wrought upon by one single act of pity, chastity, or liberality: and of this History is full of many other examples besides. Pyrrhus could not be got out of Italy by all the power of the Romans; and yet Fabritius sent him packing by one act of generosity, and that was giving him notice that some of his intimates would poison him, and had made overtures to the Romans to that purpose. Again, Scipio Africanus got not so much honour by the taking of Carthage, as he did by one act of chastity, when he sent home a young beautiful Lady (that was taken prisoner, and presented to him) untouch'd to her Husband; for at the news of that one act, all Spain was astonished, and began to admire the virtue and innocence of the Romans, which virtue is a thing so universally celebrated, that there are no great persons endued with it, but are highly esteemed by all people, as ap∣pears by all Ethicks, Politicks, and History, among which, the History of Xenophon is abundantly copious, in demonstrating what Honours and what Victories accrewed to Cyrus upon the bare account of his affability and mildness; and how he was never guilty of the least pride, or cruelty, or luxury, or any other vice that defiles the conversation of man. Nevertheless, seeing Hanibal did the same things, and by a contrary way, it will not be amiss in the next Chapter to enquire the reason.

CHAP. XXI.

How it came to pass that Hanibal by methods quite contrary to what were pra∣ctised by Scipio, did the same things in Italy that the other did in Spain.

I Doubt not but it may seem strange to some people, that other Captains who have taken a quite contrary way to what is prescribed in my last Chapter, should notwithstanding have had the same success; for from thence it seems to follow, that Victory does not depend either upon humanity or justice, when we see the same praise and reputation acquir'd by quite contrary habits: and to prove this, we need not go far for examples, the same Sci∣pio whom we mentioned before, being with an Army in Spain, carried himself with so much piety, and justice, and liberality to all people, that he got the love of the whole Pro∣vince: on the other side we see Hanibal in Italy acting quite contrary, and with violence, cruelty, rapine, and all manner of infidelity persecuting the people, and yet with the same laudable effects as Scipio had in Spain. And considering with my self what might be the reason, they seemed to me to be several. The first is, because men are studious of novelty, and that not only those who are under slavery or subjection, but those who are free, and in peace; for (as is said before) men are as well satiated with happiness, as afflicted with misery.

This desire (therefore) of change opens a door to any man that invades a Province with any considerable force: if he be a foreigner, they all follow after him, if a native, they attend him, assist him, and encourage him: so that let him take which way he pleases, he must needs make great progress in those places. Again, people are generally excited

two ways, either by love, or by fear; so that he that is feared, is often times as readily obeyed as he that is beloved, and sometimes more. It is not material therefore to a Com∣mander which of these two ways he takes; for if he be a virtuous person, and of any extraordinary faculties, he will be admired by the people, as Hanibal and Scipio were, whose great worth effaced, or covered all the faults that they committed. But in either of these two ways, great inconveniences may arise, and such as may ruine a Prince. For he who desires to be beloved, upon the least excess or immoderation in his Courtship, is sub∣ject to be despised; and he on the other side who affects to be feared, upon the least extra∣vagance makes himself odious: and to keep the middle way exactly, is not possible to our nature; wherefore it is necessary to those who exceed in either kind, to attone for it with some extraordinary virtue, as Hanibal and Scipio did, who though persons of great pru∣dence and conduct, yet it appeared that both of them suffered by their manner of living, as well as they were advanced. Their advancement is mentioned before; their sufferings (as to Scipio) was the rebellion of his Army, and part of his friends in Spain, which pro∣ceded from nothing but want of being feared, for men are naturally so unquiet, that every little door that is opened to their ambition sets them agog, and abolishes all that love which they ow'd to their Prince for his humanity towards them, as in this example of the Friends and Army of Scipio; wherefore Scipio was constrained to make use of that severity in some measure, which he had always declined. As to Hanibal, there is not any particular example where his cruelty or infidelity did him hurt; only it may be supposed that they were the occasion why Naples and several other Towns stood so firm to the Ro∣mans. It is plain likewise that his bloodiness and impiety made him more odious to the people of Rome, than all the Enemies that ever that City had: for whereas when Pyrrhus was with a great Army in Italy, they gave him notice of a design on foot to have poisoned him, they were so inveterate against Hanibal, that they never forgave him, but when they had defeated and disarm'd him, they pursued him to the death. And these sad inconve∣niences hapned to Hanibal from no other causes, but because he was impious, unfaithful, and cruel: but then on the other side he had the advantage of being admired of all Wri∣ters for keeping his Army without any mutiny or dissention either against him, or among themselves, though it consisted of so many different Nations, which could be derived from nothing but the awe and terror of his person; which terror was so great, (considered with the reputation and authority that he received from his valour) that thereby he kept his Souldiers united and quiet. I conclude therefore, it imports not much which way a Ge∣neral takes, so there be any great excellence in him to recommend it; for (as is said before) both in the one and the other there is danger and defect, if there be not some extraordi∣nary virtue to balance it. And if Hanibal and Scipio, one by laudable, and the other by ignominous and detestable ways arrived at the same end, and had the same effects, I think it convenient in my next Chapter to discourse of two Roman Citizens, who by divers ways (but both honourable) arrived at the same pitch of glory and renown.

CHAP. II.

How the austerity of Manlius Torquatus, and the humanity of Valerius Cor∣vinus gain'd each of them the same honour and reputation.

THere were two famous Captains contemporary in Rome, Manlius Torquatus, and Va∣lerius Corvinus, both of them equal in courage, equal in their triumphs, and each of them (as to the enemy) acquir'd all with equal virtue and terror; but as to their own Armies, and manner of discipline, it was quite different. Manlius commanded with all kind of severity, excused his Souldiers from no labour, nor no punishment. Valerius on the other side used them with as much gentleness and familiarity: Manlius to keep his Souldiers strictly to their discipline, executed his own son; which Valerius was so far from imitating, that he never offended any man: yet in this great diversity of conduct, the effects were the same, both as to the Enemy, the Commonwealth, and themselves; for none of their Souldiers ever declin'd fighting; none of them rebelled, or so much as disputed their commands, though the discipline of Manlius was so severe, that afterwards all excessive and extravagant commands were called Manliana imperia: in which place it is not amiss to enquire how it came to pass that Manlius was constrained to so rigorous a method; what it was that made Valerius comport himself so mildly: how it was that this different way of proceeding should have the same effect; and last of all, which of the two is most wor∣thy

thy to be imitated. If Manlius be considered as he is represented by the Historian, he will be found to be very valiant, carrying himself with great piety to his Father, and Country, and with great reverence to his Superiors, which appeared by his defence of his Father with the hazard of his own life against a Tribune who accused him; and by his fighting with the Gaul, in the behalf of his Country, which notwithstanding he would not under∣take without orders from the Consul; for when he saw a vast man, of a prodigious pro∣portion, marching forth upon the Bridge, and challenging any of the Romans, he went mo∣destly to the Consul for leave, and told him, Injussa tuo adversus hostem, nunquam pugnabo, non si certain victoriam videam; Without your permission I will never engage with the enemy, though I was sure to overcome: and the Consul giving him leave, he conquered his enemy. When therefore a man of his constitution arrives at such a command, he desires all men may be as punctual as himself▪ and being naturally brave, he commands brave things, and when they are once commanded, requires that they be executed exactly; and this is a cer∣tain rule, when great things are commanded, strict obedience must be expected, otherwise your enterprize must fail. That therefore those under your command may be the more obedient to your commands, it is necessary that you command aright; and he commands right, who compares his own quality and condition with the quality and condition of those they command; if he finds them proportionable, then he may command, if other∣wise, he is to forbear; and therefore that saying was not amiss, that to keep a Common∣wealth in subjection by violence, it was convenient that there should be a proportion be∣twixt the persons forced, and forcing; and whilst that proportion lasted, the violence might last too, but when that proportion was dissolved, and he that was forced grew stronger than he that offered it, it was to be doubted much his authority would not hold long. But to return; great things therefore, and magnificent, are not to be commanded but by a man that is great and magnificent himself; and he who is so constituted, having once commanded them, cannot expect, that mildness or gentleness will prevail with his subjects to execute them: but he that is not of this greatness and magnificence of mind, is by no means to command extraordinary things; and if his commands be but ordinary, his humanity may do well enough, for ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince, but to the Laws and Customs of the place: so that we may conclude Manlius was constrained to that se∣verity by his natural temper and complexion; and such persons are many times of great importance to a Commonwealth, because by the exactness of their own lives, and the strictness of their discipline, they revive the old Laws, and reduce every thing towards its first principles:

And if a State could be so happy to have such persons succeeding one another in any reasonable time, as by their examples would not only renew the laws, restrain vice, and re∣move every thing that tended to its ruine or corruption, that State would be immortal. So then Manlius was a severe man, and kept up the Roman discipline exactly, prompted first by his own nature, and then by a strong desire to have that obeyed, which his own inclina∣tion had constrained him to command. Valerius Corvinus on the other side might exer∣cise his gentleness without inconvenience, because he commanded nothing extraordinary, or contrary to the customs of the Romans at that time; which custom, being good, was sufficient to honour him, and not very troublesom to observe, whereby it hapned that Va∣lerius was not necessitated to punish offenders, because there were but very few of that sort, and when there were any, their punishment (as is said before) was imputed to the Laws, and not to the cruelty of the Prince; by which it fell out that Valerius had an op∣portunity by his gentleness to gain both affection and authority in the Army, which was the cause that the Souldiers being equally obedient to one as well as the other, though their humours and discipline were different, yet they might do the same things, and their actions have the same effects. If any are desirous to imitate either of them, they will do well to have a care of running into the same errors as Scipio and Hanibal did before, which is not to be prevented any other way, but by singular virtue and industry. These things being so, it remains now that we enquire which of those two ways are most laudable to follow, and it is the harder to resolve, because I find Authors are strangely divided, some for one way, and others for the other. Nevertheless, they who pretened to write how a Prince is to govern, are more inclinable, to Valerius than Manli••s, and Xenophon in his character of Cyrus jumps exactly with Livy's description of Valerius, especially in his expedition against the Samnites when he was Consul: for the morning before the Fight he made a speech to his Souldiers with that mildness and humanity, that the Historian tells us, Non aliâs militi familiarior dux fuit, inter infimos militum omnia haud gravate munia obeundo. In ludo praeterea militari, cum velocitatis, viriumque inter se aequales cort amina ineunt, comiter facilis vincere, ac vinci, vultu eodem; nec quenquam aspernari parem qui se offerret; factis benig nus

prore; dictis, haud minus libertatis alienae quam suae dignitatis memor, & (quo nihil popu∣larius est) quibus artibus petierat Magistratum, iisdem Gerebat. No General was ever more familiar with his Soldiers; no Soldier too mean for him to converse with, no office too base for him to undertake. In their Military recreations when they ran, or wrestled for a prize, he would not only run or wrestle, but win or lose, be overcome, or conquer, with the same evenness, and unconcernment; nor did he ever disdain or refuse any man that challenged him. In his actions, he was bountiful, as occasion was offered; in his words, he was as mindful of other peoples liberty, as of his own dignity, and (which is the most grateful thing to the people in the world) the same arts which he used in the obtaining, the same he exercised in the manage∣ment of his Magistracy.

Livy speaks likewise very honorably of Manlius▪ acknowledging that his severity upon his Son, made the whole Army so obedient, and diligent, that it was the occasion of their victory against the Latins; and he goes so far in his praise, that after he has given an exact account of the Battel and victory; and described all the dangers and difficulties to which the Romans were exposed, he concludes that it was only the Conduct and courage of Man∣lius that got the victory that day; and afterwards comparing the strength of both Armies, he does not scruple to say, that on which side soever Manlius had been, that side would certainly have had the day. Which being so, makes my question very hard to determine, nevertheless, that it may not be altogether unresolved, I conceive that in a Citizen brought up under the strictness of a Commonwealth, the way of Manlius would be best, and least subject to danger, because it seems most for the interest of the publick, and not at all proceeding from private ambition; besides to carry ones self severely to every body, and pursue nothing but the benefit of the Publick, is not a way to make parties, or friends, without which there can be no troubles in a State. So that he who proceeds in that man∣ner, must needs be very useful, and not at all suspicious to the State. But the way of Va∣lerius is quite contrary; for though the Commonwealth reaps the same fruits as in the other; yet jealousies will arise, and people will be fearful that in the end his great favour among the Souldiers will be employed to set up himself, with very ill consequences upon their liberty. And if in Publicola's time these ill effects did not happen, it was because as then the minds of the Romans were not corrupt, nor had he been long enough in authority. But if we consider a Prince, as Xenophon did, in that case we must leave Manlius, and follow Valerius clearly; because a Prince is by all means to endeavour the obedience of his Subjects and Soldiers by ways of amity and kindness. They will be obedient, if they find him virtuous, and a strict observer of his Laws; they will love him, if they see him courteous, and affable, and merciful, and endued with all the good qualities which were in Valerius, and which Xenophon attributes to Cyrus. For to be particularly beloved, and have an Army true to his interest, is instar omnium, and answers to all other policies of State. But it is otherwise when an Army is commanded by one who is a Citizen of the same City with the rest of his Army; for he is subject to the same Laws and Magistrates as well as they. In the Annals of Venice we read, that in former times the Venetian Galleys returning from some expedition, and lying near the Town, there happened a quarrel betwixt the Citizens and the Seamen, which proceeded so far, that it came to a tumult, both sides betook themselves to their Arms, and neither the power of their Officers, the reverence of the Citizens, nor the authority of the Magistrate was able to quiet them: But as soon as a certain Gentleman appeared, who had commanded them the year before, remembring with what courtesie he had behaved himself, their kindness to him prevail'd above all other courses, and they gave over the combat, and retir'd; but that affection, and ready obedience to his commands, cost the poor Gentle∣man very dear; for thereby he became so obnoxious to the Senate, that not long after, they secured themselves against him, either by imprisonment or death. I conclude then, that a Prince may better follow the example of Valerius; but to a Citizen, it is dangerous both to himself, and the State; to the State, because that way leads directly to Tyranny; to himself, because (let his intentions be never so innocent) he will certainly be suspected, and bring himself in danger. So on the other side, the severity of Manlius is as perni∣cious in a Prince, but in a Citizen it is convenient, and particularly for the State; for it ne∣ver does hurt, if the hatred which follows your severity be not encreased by a jealousie of your great virtue and reputation, as it happen'd to Camillus.

CHAP. XXIII.

Vpon what occasion Camillus was banished from Rome.

WE have concluded in the Chapter before, that to imitate Valerius may prejudice your Country, and your self; and that to imitate Manlius may be convenient for your self, and prejudicial to your Country; which opinion is much confirmed by the case of Camillus, whose proceedings were more like Manlius, than Valerius; for which rea∣son, Livy speaking of him tells us, Ejus virtutem milites oderant••, & Mirabantur. His virtue was both odious, and admirable to his Soldiers. That which made him admired was his Diligence, Prudence, Magnanimity, and Conduct: That which made him hated was, that he was more severe in punishing, than liberal in rewarding. And of this hatred Livy gives these following reasons: First, because he caused the Money which was made of the goods of the Vejentes to be applyed to publick use, and not distributed with the rest of the prey: Next, because in his Triumphal Chariot he caused himself to be drawn by four white Horses, which was accounted so great a piece of arrogance, that it was thought he did it to equalize the Sun. A third was, that he had devoted a tenth part of the spoils of the Vejentes to Apollo, which (to keep his Vow) was to be taken back again from the Soldiers who had got it in their clutches: From whence it may be observed, that nothing makes a Prince more odious to the people, than to deprive them of their possessions, which is a thing of so great importance, that it is never forgotten; because upon every little want, it comes fresh into their Memories, and men being daily subject to those wants, will daily remember it; and next to this is, being insolent and proud, which is likewise extreamly odious to the people, especially if they be free. And although perhaps no detriment ac∣crews to them from his pride, yet they are observed always to detest him that uses it. So that a great person is to avoid it as a rock, because it begets hatred, and that without any advantage, which makes it a very rash, and imprudent thing.

CHAP. XXIV.

The prolongation of Commissions brought Rome first into servitude.

IF the dissolution of the Roman Commonwealth be accurately considered, it will be found to proceed partly from the differences about the Agrarian Law, and partly from the prorogation of their Magistrates, which errors, had they been known in time, and due remedies applyed, would not have been so pernicious, but Rome might have enjoyed her freedom longer, and perhaps with more quiet. For though from the prolongation of Offices▪ there were no tumults no•• seditions to be seen in that City; yet it was clear that those Magistrates which were continued took much upon them, and by degrees their power and authority became a great prejudice to the liberty of the State. Had all the Citizens who were continued, been wise, and honest like L. Quintius, they would not have incurred this inconvenience. The goodness of Quintius appeared in one thing very remarkably; a meeting being appointed for accommodation of the differences betwixt the Nobility, and the People; the people continued their authority to their Tribunes another year, as believing them very proper to resist the ambition of the Nobles: The Senate to retaliate upon the people, and show themselves as considerable as they, continued the Consulship to Quintius; But Quintius refused it absolutely, alledging that ill examples were to be stifled, and not encreased by others that were worse, and therefore pressed them to the election of new Consuls, and prevailed with much importunity and contention. Had the rest of the Roman Citizens imitated this person, they had never admitted that custom of proroguing of Ma∣gistrates, and then the prolongation of their Commands in the Army had never been introduced, which very thing was at length the ruine of that Commonwealth. The first person whose Commission was continued in Rome, was P. Philo, who having besieged Pale-polis, and by the time his Consulship was to expire, reduced it to such extremity, that the victory seemed already in his hands. The Senate would not send another to succeed him, but continued his authority with the Title of Proconsul, which thing (though done then upon grave consideration, and for the benefit of the publick) proved afterwards of such

ill consequence, that it brought that City in servitude and slavery: For by how much their Wars were more remote, by so much they thought these prorogations convenient; from whence it hapned, that fewer of the Romans were prepared for Military Commands, and the glory of their Victories redounded but to few: and besides, he whose Commission was renew'd, and had been a long time accustomed to the Army, might insinuate so, and gain such an interest in it, as might make it disclaim the Senate, and acknowledg no Head but their General. This it was that enabled Marius and Sylla to debauch the Army; this was it that enabled Caesar to conquer his native Country; which miseries had never hap∣ned, had not that custom of continuing Magistrates, and Commanders been introduced. If it be objected, that their great affairs could not have been managed as so great a di∣stance, without that prorogation of commands; I answer; That 'tis possible their Em∣pire might have been longer before it came to that height; but then it would have been more lasting, for the adversary would never have been able to have erected a Monarchy, and destroyed their liberty so soon.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and several other Citizens of Rome.

WE have said elsewhere, that nothing is of more importance to the conservation of the liberty of a State, than to keep the Citizens low, and from being too weal∣thy. Whether there was any Law to that purpose, or what that Law was, I must acknow∣ledge my ignorance, (especially when I consider with what zealand passion the Agrarian was opposed) yet 'tis clear by experience, that for 400 years after the building of Rome, that City was in very great poverty: And it is probable the great cause of it was, that poverty was no impediment to preferment: Virtue was the only thing required in the Ele∣ction of Magistrates, and the distribution of Offices; and wherever it was found, let the person or family be never so poor, it was sure to be advanced; which manner of living, made riches contemptible: And this is manifest by the following example. Minutius the Consul being circumvented, and he and his whole Army, as it were block'd up by the Aequi, the Romans were so possess'd with the danger of their Army, that they betook themselves to the creation of a Dictator, which is their last remedy in their greatest affli∣ctions: They concluded upon L. Quintius Cincinnatus, who was then (when they sent for him) in a little Country farm at Plough, which Livy magnifies exceedingly, and says; Operae pretium est audire, qui omnia prae divitiis humana spernunt, neque honori magno locum, ••••que virtuti putant esse, nisi effuse affluant opes: It is pleasant to hear some people talk of r••ches, as if nothing in this world were comparable to them; as if all honour and virtue depended only upon the Estate. Cincinnatus (as I said before) was at Plough in his Farm, (which consisted only of four acres of ground) when the Embassadors came to him from the Senate to salute him Dictator, and to remonstrate their distress. Having received their message, he made no delay, but call'd immediately for his Robe, came directly for Rome, rais'd his Army, and marched away for the relief of Minutius: having defeated at the Enemy, and pillaged their Camp, he would not suffer the Army of Minutius to participate in the prize, telling him, I do not think it reasonable that you should have share in the prey, who was so near being a prey your self After which he degraded Minutius of his Consul∣ship, and made him only a Legate with this expression; You shall continue here in this Sta∣tion; till you learn to behave your self more like a Consul. The same Dictator, in the same expedition, made L. Tarquinius his Master of his Horse, though he had none to be Master of his own, for his poverty was such, he was forced to serve on foot. 'Tis remarkable how in those days poverty and honour were not so inconsistant as now, and that to an ex∣cellent and worthy person as Cincinnatus was, four acres of Land was a sufficient Estate. In the days of A••tilius Regulus poverty was in the same reputation; for being at the head of an Army in Africa, and having conquered the Carthaginians, he made it his request to the Senate that he might be permitted to come home, and husband his own Farm, which his Servants had neglected. And this frugallty of the Romans is exceedingly wonderful; for looking for nothing but praise and honour from their Victories, they brought all their prize into the publick Treasury: and doubtless had Regulus proposed any thing of advan∣tage to himself by that War, he would never have been concerned to have had his four acres neglected by his Servants. Nor was the modesty and magnanimity of the Romans less remarkable, who being put into command, and placed at the head of an Army, thought

themselves above any Prince; no King, no Commonwealth was able to dismay them: But when their Commissions expired, and they were returned privately to their houses; no body so frugal, no body so humble, no body so laborious, so obedient to the Magistrates, or respectful to their superiors as they; insomuch that one would have thought it impossible the same minds should have been capable of such strange alterations. And this poverty continued till the time of Paulus Emilius (which was the last age of that Commonwealths happiness) for though he by his Triumph enriched the whole City, yet not regarding his own fortunes, he continued poor himself, and poverty was in that esteem, that Paulus to gratifie and encourage one of his Sons-in-Law who had behaved himself bravely in those Wars, gave him a silver Cup, which was the first piece of Plate that was ever seen in his family. And here I have a fair occasion to enlarge upon poverty, and show how much more useful it is to Mankind than riches, and how many excellent Arts it has produced and improved, which riches and luxury have destroyed: But this having been treated of so amply by other people before, I shall mention it no farther at this time.

CHAP. XXVI.

Women are many times the destruction of States.

IN the City of Ardea there was a great controversie betwixt the Patricii and the People, about the Marriage of a young Lady; who being a great Fortune, had a great many Servants, but more especially two, one of them a Patrician, the other a Plebean. Her Father being dead, her Guardian would needs bestow her upon the Plebean; her Mother was for the Nobleman; not agreeing among themselves, it came to a tumult, and by de∣grees to blows; insomuch as the whole Nobility appeared in Arms for the one, and all the people for the other. The result was, the people being beaten out of the Town, and sending to the Volsci for aid, the Nobles sent to Rome. The Volsci were readiest, and com∣ing first to the assistance of the Plebeans, they clap'd down before the Town. They had not entrench'd themselves long, but the Roman Army came upon their backs▪ and shut them up betwixt the Town and them; insomuch that they were quickly distressed, and forced to surrender at discretion. The Romans entred the Town, killed all that were accessary to the sedition, and setled their affairs. In which passage there are many obser∣vable things. First, we see Women have been the occasion of much desolation, prejudice, and dissention: The Rape of Lucrece lost the Tarquins their Government; the attempt upon Virginia, was the ruine of the Decem-viri. And Aristotle in his Politicks imputes the abomination of Tyranny to the injuries they do to people upon the account of Wo∣men, by their Debauchments, their Violences, or Adulteries, as we have show'd at large in our Chapter about Conspiracies. So that in the Government of any Kingdom or Commonwealth, those things are not to be reckon'd as trifles, but as the occasions of much mischief, and are by all means to be prevented, before the rancour has taken too deep root, and is not to be cured, but by the destruction of the State: as it hapned to the Ar∣deates, who let it go so long among their fellow Citizens, that at last they came to an ab∣solute division not to be composed nor setled, but by foreign assistance, which is always the forerunner of servitude and slavery.

CHAP. XXVII.

How the civil discords in a City, are to be composed, and of the falsity of that opinion, That the best way to keep a City in subjection, is to keep it divided.

IN the reconciliation of a City that is labouring under civil dissentions, we are to follow the example of the Roman Consuls, and observe their method in composing the distra∣ctions among the Ardeates, which was by cutting off the chief Actors, and confiscating their Estates. And to compose the distractions of a City, there are three ways; either by cutting off the chief actors (as the Romans did) by banishing them the City, or by forcing them to an accommadation upon such penalties as they shall be afraid to incur: of these three ways the last is most dangerous, uncertain, and unprofitable, because it is impossible

where much blood has been shed, or much injury done, that that peace should last long, which was made by compulsion; for seeing, and hearing, and conversing with one ano∣ther daily, their animosities must of necessity revive, and provoke them to new outrage, by presenting them with new occasions of indignation and revenge: and of this we can∣not have an apter example than in the City of Pistoia, which 15 years since (as it is now) was divided into the Panciatichi, and Cancellieri (only then they were at open defyance, which now they are not.) After many contests and disputes among themselves, they pro∣ceeded to blood, to the plundering and demolishing one anothers houses, and committing all other hostilities imaginable: The Florentines whose business it was to unite them, used this third way, which rather encreased, than mitigated their tumults; so that weary of that way, and grown wiser by experience, they made use of the second; banished some of the Ring-leaders, and imprisoned the rest, whereby they not only quieted their differences then, but have kept them so ever since. But doubtless the safest way had been to cut them off at first, and if those executions were forborn then by us, or have been since by any other Commonwealth, it is for no other cause, but that they require a certain generosity and greatness of spirit, that in weak Commonwealths is hardly to be found. And these are the errors, which as I said in the beginning, are committed by the Princes of our times, when they are to determine in such great controversies; for they should inform themselves how others have comported in the same cases before them; but they are so weak by reason of the slightness of our present education, and their unexperience in History, that they look upon the examples of the ancients as inhumane, or impossible: So that our mo∣dern opinions are as remote from the truth, as that saying of our wise men was upon a time, Che bisognavatener Pistoiacon le parti, & Pisacon le fortezze: That Pistoia was to be kept under by factions, and Pisa by a Citadel; but they were mistaken in both. What my judgment is about Citadels, and such kind of Fortresses, I have delivered else∣where; so as in this place, I shall only demonstrate how unpracticable it is to keep Towns in subjection by fomenting their differences and factions, and first it is impossible to keep both parties true to you (be you Prince, or Commonwealth, or whatever) for men are naturally so inconstant, it cannot be that those parties which favour you to day, should be affected to you always; for they will still look out for some new Patron, and Protector: so that by degrees one of the parties taking some disgust against you, the next War that happens, you run a great hazard of losing your Town. If it be under the Government of a State, the City is in more danger, than in the other case, because each party looks out for friends among the great ones, and will spare no pains nor mony to corrupt them. From whence two great inconveniences do arise: One is, you can never make them love you, because by reason of the frequent alteration of Governors, and putting in sometimes a per∣son of one humour, and sometimes another of another; they can never be well govern'd And then the other is, by this fomenting of Factions, your State must be necessarily divi∣ded. Blondus speaking of the passages betwixt the Florentines and Pistoians, confirms what we have said in these words, Mentreche i Florentini dis••gnavano de riunir Pistoia, divi∣sono se Medesimi. Whilst the Florentines thought to have united the Pistoians, they divided themselves. In the year 1501. Arezzo revolted from the Florentines, and the Valleys di Tenere, and Chiana were entirely over-run by the Vitelli, and Duke Valentine. Whereupon Monsieur de Lant was sent from the King of France to see all that they had lost, restored to the Florentines. Wherever Monsieur de Lant came observing the persons that came to visit him, did still profess themselves of the party of Morzocco, he was much dissatisfied with their factions, and more that they should declare themselves so freely; for (said he) if in France any man should pronounce himself of the King's party, he would be sure to be punished, because it would imply that there was a party against the King, and it was his Masters desire, that his Kingdom and Cities should be all of a mind: If therefore a Prince believes there is no way for him to keep his Towns in obedience, but by keeping up Fa∣ctions, it is a certain argument of his weakness; for being unable by force and courage to keep them under, he betakes himself to these pernicious arts; which in peaceable times may palliate a little, but when troubles, and adversity come will assuredly deceive him.

CHAP. XXVIII.

A strict eye is to be kept upon the Citizens, for many times under pretence of Of∣ficiousness, and Piety, there is hid a principle of Tyranny.

The City of Rome being distressed for want of provisions, and the publick stores be∣ing unable to supply it, it came into the thoughts of Spurius Melius (a rich Citizen of those times) to furnish the Common people gratis out of his own private stock, whereby he wrought himself so far into the favour of the people, that the Senate suspecting the ill con∣sequences of his bounty, began to conspire his destruction before his interest became too great, to which purpose they created a Dictator, who put him to death: from whence it may be observed, that many times those actions which seem charitable and pious at first sight, and are not reasonable to be condemned, are notwithstanding cruel and dangerous for a State, if not corrected in time. To make this more clear, I say a Commonwealth cannot be well governed, nor indeed subsist without the assistance and ministry of power∣ful and great men: and yet on the other side that power and reputation of particular Ci∣tizens is the occasion of tyranny. To regulate this inconvenience, it is necessary, that see∣ing there must be great men, things should be so ordered that they may have praise and reputation by such things as are rather useful than prejudicial to the State. Wherefore it is carefully to be observed what ways they take to acquire their reputation; and they are usually two, either publick or private. The publick way is when they arrive at their re∣putation by some good counsel, or some great exploit which they have atchieved for the benefit of the publick: and this way of reputation is not only not to be precluded to the Citizens, but to be opened by such promises of reward for their good counsels or actions as may both dignify and inrich them; and when a reputation is gained by these plain and sincere ways, it is never to be feared. But when their courses are private, (which is the other of the two ways) they are dangerous, nay totally pernitious. Those private ways are by obliging particular persons, by lending them mony, by marrying their relations, by defending them against the Magistrates and doing several other particular favours which may encourage their Clients to violate the Laws, and vitiate the Commonwealth; for which cause it ought to be so well fortified with good Laws, that the endeavors of such ambitious men may be either discouraged or defeated; and on the other side rewards pro∣posed to such as arrive at their greatness by any extraordinary exploit. In Rome the highest reward of those persons who behaved themselves gloriously for the good of their Country, was a triumph besides which they had other inferior honours, for more inferior services, & to restrain or punish the ambition of those who went about by private and clandestine ways to disturb the peace of their Country, their greatest remedy was to accuse them to the people, and when those accusations were insufficient, (the people being blinded by some specious pretence of benefit and advantage) they created a Dictator, who with a kind of regal authority was to reduce the delinquent from his aberrations, or punish him as he did Spurius Melius; and the leaving of one such fault unpunished, is enough to ruine a Commonwealth, for a single example afterwards will hardly be effectual.

CHAP. XXIX.

That the transgressions of the people do spring commonly from the Prince.

PRinces cannot reasonably complain of the transgressions of their subjects, because it is necessarily their negligence, or ill example that debauches them: and if the people of our times are infamous for thefts, and robberies, and plundering, and such kind of enor∣mities, it proceeds from the exorbitance and rapacity of their Governors. Romania (be∣fore Pope Alexander VI exterminated those Lords who had the command in those parts) was a place of all kind of dissoluteness and iniquity, every day, and every trivial occasion producing notorious murders and rapines; which was not so much from any depravity in the nature of the people, (as some persons would have it) as from the corruption of their Princes; for being poor of themselves, and yet ambitious to live in splendor and magni∣ficence, they were forced upon ill courses, and indeed refused none that could supply them.

To pass by several others, one of their detestable ways was to make Laws against such and such things, which after they were published, they themselves would be the first that should break, to encourage others to do the same; nor was any man ever punished for his inob∣servance, till they saw enough involved in the same premunire; then (forsooth) the Laws were executed most strictly, not out of any true zeal to justice, but out of a desire to be fingring the Fines; from whence it followed, that by grievous mulcts and expilations the people being impoverished, were constrained to use the same violences upon those who were less potent than they; by which means men were not so much corrected, as instructed to do ill; and all these mischiefs proceeded from the iniquity of their Princes. Livy has a story to this purpose, where he tells us, that the Roman Embassadors (passing with a great present to Apollo, which was taken out of the spoils of the Venetians) were taken by the Cor∣sairs of Lipari in Sicily, and carried with it into that Island. Timasitheus Prince of that Town understanding what the Present was; whither it was going, and from whom it was sent, (though born at Lipari) behaved himself in that like a Roman, and remonstra∣ted to the people the impiety of the fact, which he prest upon them so home, that by com∣mon consent the Present was restored, and the Embassadors dismissed; the words of the Historian are these, Timasitheus multitudinem religione implevit, quae semper regenti est simi∣lis: which agrees with that saying of Lorenzo de i Medici.

Et quel che fa li Signor fanno poi molti, Che nel Signor son tuttigl' occhi volti.

A Prince does nought (or regular, or rude,) But's followed straight by th'gaping multitude.

CHAP. XXX.

A Citizen who would do any great matter by his own authority, must first extin∣guish all envy. In what manner things are to be ordered upon the approach of an enemy, and how a City is to be defended.

THe Senate of Rome having intelligence that the Tuscans had made new levies of men to make a new inroad into their Country; and that the Latini and Hernici (formerly in amity with the Romans) had confederated with the Volsci, (implacable enemies to the very name of a Roman) they concluded that War would be dangerous. Camillus being Tribune at that time, and invested with Consular authority, they thought he would be able to defend them, (without creating a Dictator) if the rest of his Colleagues would intrust him with the chief Command; to which they readily condescended, Nec quicquam (says Livy) de majestate suâ detractum credebant, quod Majestati ejus concessissent; Nor did they think any thing substracted from their authority that was added to his. Upon which Camillus (taking their paroles for their obedience) caused three Armies to be raised. The first he designed against the Tuscans, and commanded it himself. The second was to con∣tinue about Rome to attend the motions of the Latiny and Hernici, and was commanded by Quintus Servilius. The third was left in the City, as Guards for the security of the Gates, and the Court, and to be ready upon any accident that should arise, and the Com∣mand of this Army was committed to Lucius Quintius. The care of his Magazines was refer'd to Horatius one of his Colleagues, who was to see them furnished with such arms and provisions, and other things as were necessary in times of War. He caused another Tribune of his Colleagues (called Cornelius) to preside in the Senate, and publick Coun∣sel, that he might be present in all their debates,, and ready to advise in all their daily transactions. So excellent were the Tribunes in those times, that when the safety of their Country was at stake, they were equally disposed either to command or obey. And here may be observed the great ability which a wise and good man has to do good, by the sup∣pression of envy, which is many times a great impediment to the good which some persons would do, could they but get up into such authority as is requisite in affairs of importance. This envy is extinguished two ways; either by some great and difficult accident, in which every man forseeing his own ruine, lays his ambition aside, and submits himself volunta∣rily to the obedience of some person from whose virtue he may hope to be delivered: such a person was this Camillus, who having been three times Dictator, and acted in all his ad∣ministrations more for the good of the publick, than any benefit of his own, and given

many excellent testimonies of his integrity and conduct besides, his Colleagues were not scrupulous to transfer their authority, nor the people at all apprehensive of his greatness, nor any (how great soever) ashamed to be inferior to him.

Wherefore it was not without reason that Livy used that expression, Nec quicquain, &c. The other way of extinguishing envy, is, when either by violence, or the course of na∣ture your competitors die; that is, such persons as envying your reputation and grandeur, and disdaining that you should be above them, cannot contain themselves, and be quiet, but rather than not satisfy the perversity of their minds, will be contented their Country should be ruined, especially if they have been brought up in a corrupt State, and not been meliorated by their education.

Against this sort of envy there is no remedy but in the death of the Subject. And when an excellent person is so happy as to have these impediments removed by the course of nature, without any machination or concurrence of his, he becomes great and honoura∣ble without obstacle, and may exercise his virtues without any offence. But when he has not this good fortune, and nature is so unkind as to suffer them to live, it is necessary he re∣move them some extraordinary way, and make it his whole business to find one; yet with that caution and deliberation, that he be sure his way be practicable before he ventures up∣on it. He who reads the Bible soberly, and consideratly, will find Moses (for the promo∣tion and establishment of his Laws) was forced to put several to death, for no other rea∣son but because out of envy they opposed his designs: and this necessity of removing Com∣petitors was not unknown to Girolamo Savonarola the Frier, and Pietro Soderini Gonsaloniere of Florence. The Frier could not Master it for want of authority; and those of his fol∣lowers who could have done it, had no true knowledge of his mind; yet that was not his fault, for his Sermons were full of declamations against the wisdom of this World, and invectives against the wise men, by whom he intended such envious persons as opposed his Doctrines and Institutions. Soderini was in hopes by the goodness of his conversation, and his beneficence to all people, that he should have been so fortunate as to have out-lived and worn out the envy of his adversaries, seeing he was but young, and found new Clients coming in daily to his party, whom his excellent deportment had drawn over. So that he abstain'd from all kind of severity and violence, not considering that time is not to be lost; that goodness is ineffectual; that fortune is changeable; and that envious persons are not to be obliged by all the presents and good offices in the World, So that both these persons were ruined at last, one of them because he had not authority enough to master the envy of his adversaries; the other because he did not do it (though he had authority) in time. The other thing remarkable in that Story, was, the order taken by Camillus for the safety of Rome, both abroad and at home. And certainly it is not without reason that good Hi∣storians (as ours is) set down certain distinct and particular cases, that posterity may learn upon such accidents in what manner to defend themselves: it is to be observed likewise, that the most dangerous and unprofitable defence is that which is made by tumult and dis∣order; and this is apparent by that third Army which Camillus left as a Guard to the City, which many would have thought unnecessary, because the Citizens were generally arm'd, and martial; so that their needed no more than to have arm'd the rest upon occasion, without troubling them with an Army. But Camillus (and any other wise man would have done the same) was of another opinion; for a multitude is not to be trusted with arms but in an orderly and regular way. For which reason, and according to which ex∣ample, he who has the Government of a Town, is above all things to avoid arming the people in a confused and tumultuous way; but is rather to cull and select such as he dare trust with arms, and such as he is satisfied will obey him, let him send or command them wheresoever he pleases. The rest are to be required to keep at home, and every man look to the defence of his own house. He who is besieged, and observes this course, may defend himself well enough; he that does otherwise, does not follow the example of Camillus and will hardly defend himself.

CHAP. XXXI.

Powerful States, and excellent Persons, retain the same mind and dignity in all kind of conditions.

AMong the rest of the great actions and words which our Author commemorates, and mentions as certain arguments of the great virtue and excellence of Camillus, in a speech of his to his Souldiers, he brings him in with this expression; Nec mihi Dictatura animos fecit, nec exilium ademit; I was neither elated with my Dictatorship, nor dejected with my Banishment. From whence we may observe that great men are never discomposed; let fortune vary as she pleases, let her advance them sometimes, and depress them at others, they are in the same settlement and tranquillity, so quiet and firm in their minds, that every man may see it's not in the power of fortune to disorder them; whereas pusillanimous and mean spirited persons, inebriated with their good fortune, and attributing all to their own virtue and good conduct, make themselves odious and insupportable to all that are about them, and that arrogance exposes them to many revolutions, which coming upon them on a sudden, do so terrifie and dismay them, that they run into the other extreme, and become as abject and vile. Hence it is that in time of adversity such Princes think more of their escape than defence, having made themselves uncapable of that by their ill management be∣fore. And as this diversity of temper is many times to be found in particular Persons, and Princes; so it is incident to Commonwealths, as may be seen by the example of the Ro∣mans and Venetians. The first were never dejected by any ill fortune, nor transported by any good; as appears by their defeat at the Battle of Cannas, and their Victory against An∣tiochus: their defeat at Cannas was the third which they had received, and for that reason was very considerable; yet they were not so terrified, or cowed, as to commit any thing con∣trary to the old dignity of the Romans; for they resolved to continue the war; they raised more forces; they refused to redeem their prisoners upon any new terms; and could not be brought to make any overtures of Peace, either to Hanibal, or the Senate at Carthage; but for want of others, they arm'd their old men, and their servants. and resolved wholly upon war; for which obstinacy and refractoriness, when Hanno was told, he made a speech to the Senate, and remonstrated how little they were to presume upon their Victory at Cannas: we see then the Romans were not to be terrified or discouraged by any adversity of fortune; we shall shew now how far they were on the other side from insulting in their good. Antiochus, before he came to a Battel, sent Embassadors to Scipio to desire a Treaty: Scipio sent him these Conditions, that he should return with his Army into Syria, and leave the rest to the Romans. Autiochus thought that unreasonable, fought him, was beaten, and afterwards sent Embassadors again to Scipio, with instructions to accept of whatever terms the Conqueror should give: Scipio never thought of altering his first propositions, though made before the Battel was won, but told them, Quod Romani si vincuntur, non minuuntur animis, nec si vincunt insolescere solent; That 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mans were never dejected by ill for••une, nor elated by good. The Venetians acted quite the other way, who having got a little good fortune, (ascribing it to a wrong cause, as if it had proceeded from their own power and virtue) had the insolence to call the King of France Son of St. Mark, and ta∣king a fancy that they should bring their Commonwealth to as great a condition of gran∣deur and power as the Romans, they despis'd the Church, and all the Princes of Italy be∣sides. Afterwards, when their fortune began to change, and they received a small defeat at Vaila by the French; they lost their whole Empire in a day; part revolted, and part they gave up themselves to the Pope, and King of Spain; and so much had they abandoned themselves to fear and consternation, that they sent Embassadors to the Emperor to make themselves his Tributaries, and writ poor and mean Letters to the Pope to move him to compassion, and to this extremity of dejection they were brought in four days time, by the loss but of one half of their Army; for the other of their Proveditory retreated, and came off safe to Verona with more than 25000 horse and foot; so that had there been any courage either in the Citizens or Senate, they might quickly have recruited, and shewn their force again; and if they could not have conquered, they might at least have lost all with more reputation, or possibly have brought the enemy to some honourable accord: but the poorness of their spirit, and the illness of their military discipline took from them at one time both their courage and state: and so it will be with whosoever follows the example of the Venetians: for this insolence in good fortune, and dejection in bad, proceeds from their manner of education; which if vain and idle, will make you so too; whereas if it be otherwise, it will give you a better notion of the World, and teach you in both for∣tunes to behave your self with more moderation: and as this is true in single persons, so it is in

Commonwealths, which are good or bad according to their manner of living. We have often said it before, and think it not amiss to repeat it again, that the foundation of all Governments consists in their Military discipline; and that where that is defective, nei∣ther their Laws, nor any thing else can be good; for thorow the whole tract of this Hi∣story, it appears that there is a necessity your Militia should be good, and that cannot be good, but by continual exercise, which you cannot be sure of unless it consists of your own Subjects. and because you are not always in War, and it is impossible you shall be, therefore it is necessary that they be exercised in times of Peace, which is not to be done by any but your own Subjects, in respect of the charge.

Camillus (as is said before) marched out with his Army against the Tuscans, but his Sol∣diers having had a sight of the Enemy, found their Army so great, that they were discou∣raged and dismay'd, and thought themselves so much inferior, that they were not able to fight the••. Camillus understanding this terror in his Camp, went up and down among the Soldiers, and having reprehended their fear, and said many things to encourage them, and drive that fancy out of their heads, at last without further directions, Come (said he) Courage! Quod quisque didicit aut consuevit, faciat. Do what you have been taught and accustomed, I desire no more. From whence it may be collected that he would not have used those words, had not his Army been exercised before, and that in times of Peace as well as War: For no good is to be expected, nor no General to trust himself to an unexperi∣enced or undisciplined Army, which will certainly be his ruine, though he were as good a Commander as Hanibal himself. And the reason is, because when an Army is engaged the General cannot be present in all places, to supply all defects, and remedy all errors; so that he must necessarily miscarry, unless he has such persons disposed up and down in the Army, as are capable of understanding his mind, and executing his Orders. Which being so, the Roman discipline is to be followed, and the Citizens of every City are to be inured to their Arms in times of Peace as well as war, that when they are brought to fight, they may not be at a loss, or meet with any thing new, or unaccustomed to them; by which means it will come to pass, that they will not be surprized or terrified in any condition, but retain still the same courage and sence of their dignity; But where the Citizens are undisciplin'd, and rely more upon their fortune, than experience, their hearts will change with their fortune, and they will give the same testimony of themselves, as the Venetians have done.

CHAP. XXXII.

The ways which some people have taken to prevent a Peace.

THe Circei and the Velitrae two of the Roman Colonies, revolted, in hopes the Latine would have been able to defend them. The Latines being defeated, and they frustra∣ted of their hopes, it was the advice of several Citizens, that they should send Embassa∣dors to Rome to reconcile themselves to the Senate; But those who had been ring-leaders in the defection, apprehending the punishment would fall heavy upon their heads, per∣verted that design; and to run things beyond all possibility of Terms, they incited the people to arm, and invade the Frontiers of the Romans. And doubtless when Prince or Commonwealth are desirous to prevent an agreement, there is no safer, nor surer way, than by running the people into some unpardonable offence, that the fear of being punish'd may keep them averse from all overtures of Peace. After the first War betwixt the Car∣thaginians and Romans, those Soldiers which had been employed by the Carthaginians in Sicily and Sardigna, as soon as the Peace was concluded, went over into Africa, where being denyed or delayed in the demands of their pay, they took Arms, and putting them∣selves under the command of two of their Officers, Matho, and Spendio, they plundered several of the Carthaginian Towns, and possessed themselves of others. The Carthagi∣nians (to try all ways, before they came to extremity) sent Asdrubal (on of their Prin∣cipal Citizens) Embassador to them; who having been formerly their General, it was probable, might have some Authority among them. Asdrubal being arrived, and Matho, and Spendio desirous to put the Soldiers beyond all possibility of pardon, persuaded them that the best and most secure way would be, for them to kill all the Carthaginians that were Prisoners with them, and Asdrubal among the rest. Whereupon they killed them all, with a thousand circumstances of cruelty and torture; to which piece of wickedness they added another by publishing an Edict importing, That all the Carthaginians which

should be taken for the future, should be treated the same way. And thus they prevented all propositions of Peace, and rendered their Soldiers obstinate and implacable to the Carthaginians.

CHAP. XXXIII.

To the obtaining a Victory, it is necessary your Army has a confidence not only in one another, but in their General.

TO win a Battel, and overcome an Enemy, it is necessary to give your Army such a confidence, as may make them believe that nothing is able to withstan•• them; and the way of infusing this confidence is, by Arming, and exercising them well, and giving them a knowledge and acquaintance one with the other; which confidence and acquain∣tance is not to be expected, but where your Soldiers are your own Subjects, and have been brought up together. The General is to be so qualified, that the Soldiers may have confi∣dence in his Wisdom, and Conduct; and they will always have such a confidence if they see him careful, and regular, and couragious, and one who preserves the majesty of his command with discretion and reputation; which he will do, if he punishes strictly, and put his Soldiers upon no over-hard and impertinent duty; keeps his promises; represent victory easie, either by concealing or extenuating the dangers, or by encouraging them bravely against them; and these things rightly observed, are of great consequence both to the Authority of the General, and the obtaining the Victory. The way which the Ro∣mans took to give this assurance to their Armies, was, by pretence of Religion; for which cause before the creation of their Consuls; the raising, or marching, or engaging of their Armies, their Augures and Auspices were consulted: and without some of these, no wise General would undertake any great Enterprize, believing they should certainly miscarry, unless the Soldiers were thorowly convinced that the Gods were on their side. And when any of their Consuls or other Commanders fought in defiance of these Auspi∣ces, he was punished, as Claudius Pulcher for despising the Omen of the Chickens. And although this is obvious in every part of the Roman History; yet it is better prov'd by the complaint of Appius Claudius to the people, against the insolence of their Tribunes, where he tells them that by their means, the Auspices, and other religious Customs were neglected or corrupted, His words are these, Eludant nunc licet Religionem; quid enim interest si pulli non pascentur, si ex cavea tardirts exierint, succinuerit avis? Parvasunt haec, sed parvaista non contemnendo, Majores nostri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt. Let them laugh at Religion as they please, and cry, what are we concerned if the Pullets won't eat, if they come lazily out of their Penns; or if a bird be disposed to sing? 'Tis true they are but trifles, yet by not dispising those trifles, our Ancestors brought this Commonwealth to the Gran∣deur it is at. And it was true; for those little things were sufficient to keep the Soldiers confident and united, which are two things go very far in a Victory, though without vir∣ture and valour, they are not always successful. The Prenestini being in the Field with their Army against the Romans, they went and lodged themselves upon the River Allia (in a place where the Romans had been beaten by the French) that the consideration of the place might be an encouragement to their own men, and a terror to the Romans. And though this design was not improbable for the reason abovesaid, yet it apeared by the success, that true courage is not disturbed by every little accident, as was well expressed by the Dictator to his Master of the House, Vides tu, fortuna illos fretos, ad Alliam consedisse, at tu fretus armis, animis{que} invade mediam acien. You see, by their posting themselves upon the Allia, they rely wholly upon Fortune; do you trust to your Arms, end your courage and attack their main Battel. And he was in the right; for true courage, good discipline, and a confidence arising from so many Victories, cannot be discomposed by such frivolous stratagems; light things will not dismay them, nor every disorder distract them. For even in the absence of their Officers, Soldiers that are expert, and accustomed to Arms, are not easily beaten. As appeared by the two Manlii (both Consuls, and making War upon the Volsci) who having indiscreetly sent part of their Army to forrage, it fell out, that both the commanded party, and those which were left behind, were encompassed by the Enemy, and as it were besieged both at a time, out of which danger the Soldiers were delivered, more by their own courage, than any conduct in the Consuls; whereupon Livy tells us Militum, etiam sine Rectore stabilis virtus tutata est. The stedfast courage of the Soldiers defended them, without any help from their General. Fabius had likewise an

excellent way to confirm his Soldiers and possess them with a confidence, which I cannot omit: Having invaded Tuscany with a new Army; supposing the novelty of the Coun∣try, and their inexperience of that Enemy might have some influence among them, to give them a confidence, he called them together before the Battel, and having in a grave Ora∣tion given several reasons why they might hope for the Victory, he told them, That he had another reason behind, more certain than all of them, but in that he must be private; for to discover it, would be to defeat it: A wise way, and deserves well to be imitated.

CHAP. XXXIV.

What vogue, fame or opinion disposes the people first to favour some parti∣cular Citizen; and whether they, or a Prince distributes their Offices with most prudence and judgment.

WE have shown before, how Titus Manlius (called afterwards Torquatus) preserved his Father L. Manlius from an accusation which Pomponius the Tribune had ex∣hibited against him to the people. And although the way which he took to preserve him was violent and irregular; yet his filial affection to his Father was so grateful to the peo∣ple, that they not only not reprehended him for what he had done, but advanced him to honour; for being not long after to choose Tribunes for their Legions, T. Manlius was the second that was made. And here I think it not amiss to consider the way which the the people of Rome took in the distribution of their honours, and election of Magi∣strates; and to inquire into the truth of what I asserted before, That the distributions of the people are better, and more exact than the distributions of a Prince; for the people follow the common and publick character of every man, unless by some particular notion of his actions, they presume, or believe otherwise. There are three ways by which a man may gain esteem and reputation with the people. The first is by extraction, when the Parents having been great men, and serviceable to the Commonwealth, the people take a fancy that their Children must of necessity be the same, until by some ill act they convince them of the contrary. The second way is to associate with grave per∣sons, of good esteem, and such as are reputed discreet and sober by every body; and be∣cause nothing indicates and discovers a man so much as the Company which he keeps; he who keeps good Company, may be concluded to be good; for of necessity persons so conversant together, must have something of similitude. But their is another way of gaining the favour of the people, which exceeds them both; and that is by performing some extraordinary action, whether publick or private, it matters not, so you come ho∣nourably off. And the judgments which are made in this case, are much better than the other: For the arguments taken from the virtue of the Parents, are doubtful and fallacious; nor can any man conclude any thing, till experience resolves him. The presumptions in the second from their conversations and Company, are much better than the first, but not comparable to the third; for reputation from Ancestors or Company depends bare∣ly upon opinion, and hopes, till some great action be performed that testifies your vir∣tue, and determines the doubt; and then if this action be performed when you are young, it makes the impression much deeper, and so fixes your reputation, that you must commit many ill actions before you can expunge it: Those therefore who would advance them∣selves in a Commonwealth, are to take this course, and endeavour to do some remarkable thing at first; which was done at Rome very frequently by several young persons, either by the promulgation of some Law for the benefit of the publick; or by the accusation of some great person for transgressing the Law; or doing some other great or new thing that may make you be talk'd of. Nor are these things necessary only to recommend you at first; but they are necessary likewise to maintain and augment your reputation; so that they are to be renewed and repeated often as long as you live; as Manlius did; for after he had defended his Father so honourably, and by that noble action laid the foundation of his esteem, many years were not past before he fought singly with a French man, and having slain him very bravely, he took a Gold Chain from his neck, which gave him the name of Torquatus; and having given these testimonies of his courage in his youth, when he came to riper years he made himself as famous for discipline and justice by the exam∣ple upon his Son, whom he caused to be put to death for fighting contrary to Orders, though he defeated the Enemy; which three great instances of his courage and virtue,

made his name so honourable both then and ever since, that no Victory, no Triumph could have done more. And good reason, for in victories, many equalled, and some exceeded him; but in these three very few came near, but no body exceeded him.

Scipio the elder was not so glorious by all his triumphs, as for having in his youth so manfully defended his Father at the Battel upon the Tesin; and after the Battel of Cannas forced certain young Romans with his Sword drawn to take an Oath not to desert their Country as they had resolved to do before; which two actions were the foundations of his following reputation, and served as steps to his Triumphs both over Spain and Africa which favour and good opinion of him was highly encreased, by his returning a Daughter and a Wife (both of them great Beauties, and both of them his Prisoners) immaculate and untouched, one to her Father, and the other to her Husband, in his Wars in Spain. And this way of proceeding is not only necessary for such as would gain honour and pro∣motion in a Commonwealth; but for Princes likewise and Kings who are desirous to retain their reputation with their subjects. For nothing recommends a Prince more efficaciously to the people, than in his youth to give them some taste or specimen of his virtue, by some remarkable act, or proposal for the benefit of the publick; especially if it has any tendancy to justice, magnanimity,, liberality, or the like; for things of that nature that are extra∣ordinary, whether acted, or spoken, are transmitted to posterity with so much reverence, that they even come to be Proverbs among the people: But to return, I say then, when the people designs to confer honour upon a Citizen, upon one of these three accounts, they go upon very good grounds, but especially upon the last, when several and reiterated exam∣ples make him more known; for then 'tis not possible they should be deceived, and in young persons they are certain presages of their deportment for the future. I speak only of those degrees which are given at first, before any firm experience has made them better known, or that they pass from one action to a contrary, in which, both as to mistakes, and corruption, the people do not erre so often as Princes. And because it may happen that the people may be deceived by report or opinion, or perhaps the actions of a man, as believing them more considerable and estimable than they are (which cannot easily hap∣pen to a Prince, by reason of his Council which are by, and always ready to inform him) that the people may not want such Monitors; those who have laid right foundations for a Commonwealth, have provided that when the great and supream Offices of a City are to be supplyed, where it would be dangerous to entertain any incapable persons, if they find the people disposed to the creation of any man who is known to be improper, it may be lawful for any Citizen; nay, an honour to any one that shall publickly discover his defects, that thereby the people understanding him better, may be better able to choose. That this was the practice in Rome appears by the Oration of Fabius Maximus, which he made publickly to the people in the second Punick War, when at the creation of the Con∣suls, the people were inclined to create T. Ottacilius, whom Fabius conceiving an unfit man for those times, remonstrated his thoughts so effectually to them, that he put him by that degree, and prevailed with the people to give it another person that deserv'd it much better. Which being so, the people in the election of their Magistrates do judge according to the best and truest tokens that they can observe; and could they be as well counselled in these affairs as Princes, they would commit fewer errors than they do. So that that Citi∣zen who would work himself into the favour of the people, must do some great matter, or express some great instance of his virtue or parts, that he may seem to imitate Manlius, and get as much honour as he.

CHAP. XXXV.

What dangers they incur, who make themselves authors of any Enterprise, and the more extraordinary the design, the greater the danger.

IT would be too long, and difficult a task to discourse at large of the danger there is in being the head in any new enterprise; what hazards there are in the Conduct, and how impossible to maintain it. Reserving that therefore for a more convenient place; I shall speak here only of the dangers to which such Citizens, or other persons are subject who advise a prince to make himself head of any important design, and do it with that eagerness and impetuosity, that the whole enterprise may be imputed to him. The first thing I would recommend to their observation is, that Counsels are commonly judged by their success; if their success be unfortunate, the whole scandal of the miscarriage falls

upon the author. If it prospers, and the event be good, he is commended, but at a di∣stance, and his reward is not commensurate with the danger. The present Emperor of the Turks Sultan Selimus (as it is reported by some that came late out of that Country) having made great preparations for an Expedition into Syria and Egypt changed his design upon the persuasion of one of his Bassa's, and with a vast Army march'd against the Sophie of Persia. Arriving in an open and ••rge Country, but for the most part Desarts and dry and no Rivers to supply them, many Diseases were contracted in his Army, insomuch as with hunger and sickness, it dwindled away (as many of the Romans had done in that Country before) till at last (though he had the better of the War) he had lost most of his men; upon which the Emperor being highly enraged, caused the Bassa who had coun∣selled him thither to be slain. We read likewise of several Citizens advising and Enter∣prize, upon the miscarriage of which they were all of them banished. At Rome certain Citizens proposed and promoted very earnestly the making one of the Consuls out of the people, and having prevailed, the first of them which went out with their Army being beaten and over-thrown, the authors would doubtless have found the inconvenience of their Counsel, had not the people (in whose favour it was given) appeared in their pro∣tection. So that this is most certain, all Counsellors of this kind (whether to Princes or Commonwealths) are betwixt those two rocks; if they do not advise what in their judg∣ments they think profitable for their Masters, and that frankly and without respect, they fail in their duties, and are defective that way; again if they do counsel freely, they bring their lives and fortunes in danger, because such is the natural blindness of Mankind, they cannot judge of the goodness or badness of any thing, but by the success; and con∣sidering with my self, what way was most likely to avoid this infamy or danger, I can find no better than to take all things moderately, to assume and impropriate no enterprize; to deliver your opinion frankly, but without passion, and to defend it so modestly, that if it be followed by your Prince or Commonwealth, it may appear to be their voluntary act, and not done upon your importunity; in that case it will not be reasonable to com∣plain of your Counsel, when executed by the concurrence of the rest; for if there be any danger, it is where things are done in contradiction of the rest of the Counsel, who upon any miscarriage will be sure to combine against you, and procure your destruction: and though perhaps in this case there may want something of that glory which accrews to a single person, who carries a design against the opposition of the rest, especially if it suc∣ceeds; yet there are two advantages on your side; for first you will not run so great a hazard in the miscarriage, and then if you advise a thing modestly, which by the obstinacy and contradiction of the rest is carried against you, the miscarriage of their Counsel, will make much more to your reputation. And although a good Citizen is not to desire to raise his credit upon the misfortunes of his Country, nor indeed to rejoyce in what happens of it self; yet when a thing is done, it is more satisfaction to have your Counsel applauded, than to be in danger of being punished. Wherefore I am of opinion, in these doubtful and difficult cases, there can be no better way for the Counsel either of a Prince or State, than to deliver themselves modestly and freely; for to be sullen and say nothing, would not only betray your Country, but expose your self, because in time you would become suspected; and perhaps it might befal them as it did to one of the Counsel of Perseus King of Macedon, who being defeated by Emilius Paulius, and escaping with some few of his friends, one of them (in discourse of his Master's misfortune) began to find fault; and blame several passages in his Conduct, which as he pretended might have been managed much better. At which the King being inraged, turn'd to him, told him, And do you (like a Traytor as you are) tell me of it now, when 'tis past remedy? and killed him with his own hands; so that he pay'd dear for being silent, when it was his duty to have spoke, and for speaking when it was discretion to have been silent; nor did his forbearing to give his advice secure him from danger; so that I am confirmed in my opinion that the best way is to observe the directions above said.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The reason why at the first Charge, the French have been, and still are accounted more than Men, but afterwards less than Women.

THe arrogance of that French man who challenged the stoutest of the Romans to fight with him upon the Bridge of the Arrien, and was afterwards killed by T. Manlius Torquatus, puts me in mind of what Livy says in many places, of the French, that in their first attack they are more fierce and daring than men, but afterwards more fearful and pusil∣lanimous than Women. And many people enquiring into the cause, do attribute it to the peculiarity of their temperature and nature: I am of opinion that there is much of that in it; yet I cannot think but that Nature which makes them so furious at first, may be so invigorated and improved by art, as to continue their courage to the last. To prove my opinion, I do affirm there are three sorts of Armies. In the first there is courage and fury, joyn'd with order and discipline; and indeed their courage and fury proceeds from their discipline. And of this sort were the Armies of the Romans, for all Histories do agree that there was always good order by reason of their long discipline and experience. No∣thing was done in their Armies, but with great regularity, and express order from their General. They neither eat, nor slept, nor bought, nor sold, nor did any other action either military or civil, but by permission of the Consul; and therefore these Roman Ar∣mies, who by their discipline and courage subdued the whole world, are the best example we can follow; they who do otherwise, do ill, and though perhaps they may do some∣thing extraordinary sometimes, yet 'tis more by accident than judgment: But where well ordered courage meets with good discipline, and is accommodated to the circumstances of manner, and time, nothing dismays them, nothing withstands them; for the goodness of their order giving new life and courage to their men, makes them confident of Victory, and that confidence never suffers them to give ground, till their whole order be broken. There is another sort of Armies which are acted more by fury than discipline (as in the Armies of the French) and there it is quite otherwise, because not succeeding in their first charge, and not being sustained by a well ordered courage, that fury upon which they wholly rely'd growing cold and remiss, they are quickly overthrown. Whereas the Romans fearing nothing of danger, by reason of their good order and discipline, without the least diffi∣dence or question of the Victory, fought on still obstinately, being animated with the same courage, and agitated by the same ardor at last as at first, and the more they were press'd, the better they resisted. The third sort of Armies is where their is neither natural cou∣rage, nor discipline and order, as in our Italian Armies now adays, which are so useless and unserviceable, that ••••••ess they light upon an Enemy who runs by some accident, they are never like to have a Victory; and this is so obvious every day, it needs no example to prove it. But because by the testimony of Livy every one may know what is the right discipline, and what is the wrong, I will give you the words of Papirius Gursor in his reprimande to Fabius the Master of his Horse. His words are these, Nemo hominum; nemo Deorum verecundiam hebeat. Non edicta Imperatorum, non auspicia observentur: Sine Com∣meatu, vagimilites in pacato, in hostico errent; immemores Sacramenti, se ubi valent exau∣ctorentur; infrequentia deserantur signa; ne{que} conveniatur ad edictum: nec discernatur interdiu, noctu; aequo, iniquo loco, jussu, injussu Imperatoris pugnetur; Non signa, non ordines serventur? latrocinii modo, caeca & fortuita, pro solenni & sacrata Militia, sit. Let them bare no respect or reverence either to God or man: Let neither the orders of the General, nor the directions of the Auspices be observed; Let the loose and vagabond Soldier infest his own Country as much as the Enemies: Let them forget their Oaths, and disband as they please: Let them run from their Colours as they think good, and not come back when they are required: Let them fight hand over head, without consideration of time, or place, or order of their Officers: Let their ranks be confused, and their Colours deserted: In a word, Let their whole Conduct be blind and fortuito like thieves, rather than the solemn and sacred Militia of the Romans. By this we may easily see whether the Militia of our times be blind and fortuitous or whether it be solemn, and sacred, how far is it short of the old discipline of the Romans, which consisting in exact order, produced courage and con∣stancy in the Souldiers; and how far behind the French, among whom though their is not that just order and constancy, yet there is courage enough.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Whether fighting in small parties, or pickeering before a Battel be necessary; and how the temper of a new Enemy is to be found without them.

IN humane affairs (as we have said before) there is not only a perpetual and unavoidable difficulty in carrying them to their perfection, but there is always some concomitant mis∣chief so inseparable from it, that it is impossible to arrive at the one without the other. This is visible in all the actions of mankind, so that that perfection is acquir'd with much dif∣ficulty, unless you be so favoured by fortune, that by her force she overcomes that com∣mon and natural inconvenience: and of this, and duel betwixt Manlius Torquatus and the French-man put me in mind, where, as Livy tell us, Tantiea dimicatio ad universi belli e∣ventum momenti fuit, ut Gallorum exercitus, relictis trepidè Castris, in Tiburtem agrum, mox in Campaniam transierit; The success of that duel was of so much importance to the success of the War, that thereupon the French Army drew off in a great fear into the Tiburtine Coun∣try, and afterwards march'd away into Campania. From whence I infer, on the one side, that a good General is to avoid any thing that (carrying but small advantage with it) may have an ill influence upon his Army; to fight therefore in parties, and venture your whole fortune upon less than your whole Army, is rash and imprudent, (as I have said before, where I dissuaded the keeping of passes.) On the other side, I observe, when an experienced General comes against a new enemy that has the reputation of being stout, before he brings him to a Battel, he is obliged to try him by slight skirmishes and pickeerings, that by so doing he may bring his Souldiers acquainted with their discipline, and way of sighting, and remove that terror, which the fame and reputation of their courage had given them. And this in a General is of very great importance, and so absolutely necessary, that he who engages an unknown enemy with his whole Army, before he has made an essay of his courage, runs himself and his Army into manifest danger. Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with an Army against the Samnites, a new enemy with whom they had never had any conflict before; and Livy tells us he sent small parties abroad, and caused them to entertain light skirmishes with the enemy, Ne eos novum bellum, ne novus hostis terreret; Lest his Souldiers should be terrified with a new war, and a new enemy. But then the dan∣ger is, that your men being overcome, their terror should be encreased; and that which you intended to animate, should discourage and dismay them: and this is one of those good things which have so near a conjunction with evil, that 'tis no hard matter to take one for the other. My advice therefore is, that a wise General abstains from any thing that may strike a terror into his Army; for then the Souldiers begin to apprehend, when they see their Comrades kill'd before their face. For which reason those pickeerings and slight skirmishes are to be avoided by all means, unless upon great advantage, or some more than ordinary hopes of success. Again, it is not his interest certainly to defend any pass, where he cannot upon occasion bring his whole Army to engage: neither are any Towns to be made good, but such as are of importance to the subsistance of his Army, and without which both that and himself must be ruined; and no such Towns are to be fortified, but where not only a good Garison may be disposed and supplyed, but where in case of a Siege your whole Army may be brought to relieve it: other Towns are rather to be quit∣ted than kept; for to abandon a Town whilst your Army is in the field, is no disrepute to you, nor discouragement to your Souldiers: but when you lose a place that you undertook, and every body expected you would defend, that abates much of your credit, and is a great prejudice to you; so that it will be with you as it was then with the French, a trifling loss will endanger the whole war.

Philip of Macedon (the Father of Perseus) a martial Prince, and of great reputation in his time, being invaded by the Romans, quitted and destroyed a great part of his Country, which he supposed he should be unable to defend, as judging it better, and more con∣sistent with his honour to suffer it to be possessed by the enemy as waste and neg∣lected, than to undertake, and not be able to defend it. The affairs of the Romans being in a very ill condition after the battel at Cannas, they refused their assistance to several of their friends and allies, giving them leave to defend themselves if they could: which resolutions are much better than to attempt to defend that which is not in our power; for in the first case we lose only our friends; but in the last, both our friends and our selves. To re∣turn therefore to our skirmishes, I say, that when ever for the discovery of the enemy, or acquainting his Souldiers with the way of their sighting, a General is constrained to make use of them, he is to do it with that art and advantage, that he may run no hazard of being worsted: or else to follow the example of Marius, (which is the better way of the two)

who marching against the Cimbri, a fierce and numerous people which had invaded Italy for prey, and beaten one Roman Army already; observing his Army to be afraid, he thought it would be necessary before he came to a general engagement, to contrive some way or other to dispossess them of their fear; whereupon, as a wise Officer, he disposed his Army (more than once or twice) in some secure place upon the road by which the Cim∣brian Army was to pass, from whence his men might have a view of their march, and ac∣custom themselves to the sight of them; to the end that seeing them to be nothing but a confused and disorderly multitude, incommoded with baggage, and either very ill accoutred, or utterly unarm'd, they might recover their spirits, and grow impatient to be at them: and this prudent invention of Marius ought to be diligently imitated by other people, lest they fall into the dangers aforesaid, and come off like the French, Qui obrem parvi ponde∣ris in Tiburtem agrum, & in Campaniam transierunt; Who upon a trifling accident, desponded, and retired: And because I have mentioned Valerius Corvinus in this Chapter, I shall make use of his words in the next, to shew how a General should be qualified.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

How a Generalis to be qualified, that his Army may rely upon him.

AS we have said before, Valerius Corvinus was gone with his Army against the Sam∣nites, a new enemy, with whom the Romans had had no contest before. To en∣courage his Souldiers, and acquaint them with the discipline of the Samnites, he inured his men to them, by several small skirmishes, but lest that should not do, he made a speech to them before the Battel, remonstrating with all possible efficacy of words, how little they were to value the enemy; and how much they might expect from their own valour, and his conduct: Livy brings him in with these words in his mouth, which gives us an exact character of a General in whom his Army may confide. Tum etiam intueri cujus ductu auspicioque ineunda pugna sit; utrum qui audiendus, duntaxat magnificus adhortator sit, ver∣bis tantum ferox, operum militarium expers; aut qui & ipse tela tractare, procedere ante signa, versari media in mole pugnae sciat. Facta m••a, non dicta vos milites sequi volo, nec discipli∣nam modo, sed exemplum etiam ame petere, qui hac dextra mihi tres Consulatus, summam∣que laudem peperi; Then you may see under whose Conduct you fight; whether he that speaks to you be only a magnificent boaster, valiant in words, but ignorant in whatever belongs to a Souldier; or whether he be one that knows how to manage his Arms, lead up his Men, charge in the head of them, and behave himself manfully in the very heat of the Battel; I would not (fellow Souldiers) that you should follow my words more than my deeds; or take only my pre∣cepts, and not my example, who with this hand have gained three Consulships, and im∣mortal reputation. Which words, if well considered, are sufficient to instruct any man what course he is to take to make himself reputed a great General; he who acts otherwise will find in time that that command (however he came by it, whether by ambi∣tion or fortune) will rather abstract than add to his honour, for it is not titles that make men honourable, but men their titles: and it is to be observed likewise, that if great Captains have been forced to such unusual language to confirm the hearts of an old veteran Army, when it is to fight with a new enemy; how much more care and art is to be used in a new inexperienced Army, that never saw an enemy before. For if a strange enemy be terrible to an old Army, well may he be so to an Army that is new raised, and was never engaged: nevertheless all these difficulties have been overcome by the prudence of several Captains, as by Gracchus the Roman, and Epaminondas the Theban, who with new raised men defeated old veteran Troops, that had been long experienced in matters of war; and their way was to prepare them for some months by continual exercise, and counterfeit bat∣tels; by using them to their ranks, and holding them to strict discipline and obedience; after which, they advanced against the enemy, engaged with great confidence, and per∣formed very well. Let no man therefore (that is any thing of a Souldier) despair of ma∣king his Army good, if he has but men enough; for that Prince who abounds with men, and wants Souldiers, is rather to complain of his own laziness and imprudence, than of their incapacity and dulness.

CHAP. XXXIX.

A General ought to know the Country, and how to take his advantage in the ground.

AMong the many things that are necessary in a General of an Army, the knowledg of Coasts and Countries is one, and that not only in a Generall, but in an exquisite and more particular way, without which he shall not be able to do any great thing: and be∣cause all knowledge requires use and exercise to bring it to perfection, so is it in this know∣ledg of places; and if it be enquired what use, and what exercise is required in this case, I answer, Hunting, and Hawking, and such like recreations; and therefore it is that the Heroes which anciently govern'd the World, were said to be brought up in woods and fo∣rests, and accustomed to those kind of exercises; for hunting (besides the acquaintance which it gives you of the Country) instructs you in many things that are necessary in war; Xenophon in the Life of Cyrus tells us, that when Cyrus went to invade the King of Ar∣menia, assigning several offices and places to the several parts of his Army, he told them that, Questa, non era altro ch'una di quelle caccie le quali molte volte havenano fatte seco; That this expedition was no more than one of those Chaces which they had taken frequently with him. Those whom he placed as Scouts upon the Mountains, he resembled to them who set their nets upon the hills; and those who were to make excursions upon the plain, were like them who were employed to rouse the Deer, and force them into the Toyls. And this is said by Xenophon, to shew the resemblance and similitude betwixt hunting and war: for which cause those kind of exercises are not only honourable, but necessary for great persons; and the rather, because nothing gives a man so true a knowledg of the Coun∣try, or imprints it more deeply and particularly in the memory: and when a man has ac∣quainted himself thorowly with one Country, he may arrive more easily at the knowledg of other, because all Countries and Coasts have some kind of proportion and conformity betwixt them; so that the knowledg of the one contributes much to the understanding of the other. But if before you have acquainted your self with your own, you seek out new Regions, you will hardly without great labour, and long time, come to the knowledg of either. Whereas he that is well vers'd and practised in one, shall at the first cast of his eye give you an account how that plain lies; how that mountain rises; and how far that val∣ley extends; and all by his former knowledg in that kind. To confirm all this, Titus Livius gives us an example in Publius Decius, who being a military Tribune in the Army which the Consul Cornelius commanded against the Samnites, and finding the said Consul and Army fallen by accident into a Vale where they might have been encompassed by the enemy, and cut off, Vides tu Aule Corneli (said Decius to the Consul) cacum••n illud supra hostem? Arx illa est spei salutis{que} nostrae; si eam (quoniam caeci reliquere Samnites) im∣pigre capimus; Do you see, Sir, that hill which hangs over the enemies Camp; there lies our hope; the blind Samnites haue neglected it, and our safety depends upon the seizing of it quickly. For, said Livy before, Publius Decius Tribunus militum, unum editum in saltu Collem, imminentem hostium Castris, aditu arduum impedito agmini, expeditis hand difficilem; Publius Decius the military Tribune observed a hill over the enemies Camp not easily to be ascended by those who were compleatly arm'd, but to those who were lightly arm'd, ac∣cessible enough. Whereupon being commanded to possess it by the Consul with 3000 men, he obeyed his orders, secur'd the Roman Army, and designing to march away in the night, and save both himself and his party; Livy brings him in speaking these words to some of his Comrades, Ite mecum, ut dum lucis aliquid superest, quibus locis hostes praesidia ponant, qua pateat hinc exitus exploremus. Haec omnia sagulo militari amictus, ne Ducem circuire hostes notarent, perlustravit; Come along with me, that whilst we have yet light, we may explore where the enemy keeps his Guards, and which way we may make our retreat: and this he did in the habit of a private Souldier, that the enemy might not suspect him for an Of∣ficer. He then who considers what has been said, will find how useful and necessary it is for a General to be acquainted with the nature of the Country; for had not Decius un∣derstood those things very well, he could not so suddenly have discerned the advantage of that hill, and of what importance it would be to the preservation of the Roman Army; neither could he have judged at that distance whether it was accessible or not, and when he had possessed himself of it, and was to draw off afterwards, and follow the Consul, (be∣ing so environed by the Samnites) he could never have found out the best way for his re∣treat, nor have guessed so well where the enemy kept his Guards. So that it must neces∣sarily

be that Decius had a perfect knowledg of the Country, which knowledg made him secure that hill, and the securing of that hill was the security of the Army. After which, by the same knowledg (though he was as it were besieged by the enemy) he found a way to make his own retreat, and bring off his whole party.

CHAP. XL.

How fraud in the management of War is honourable and glorious.

THough fraud in all other actions is abominable, yet in matters of War it is laudable and glorious; and he who overcomes his enemies by stratagem, is as much to be praised as he who overcomes him by force. This is to be seen by the judgment of those who write the Lives of great Persons, especially of great Commanders; for they command and applaud Hanibal and the rest in all their inventions of that nature. There are many examples in them to this purpose, which I shall not repeat here; only this I must adver∣tize, that I do not intend that fraud which consists in betraying a trust, or breaking an a∣greement, to be honourable; for though by them you may acquire Power, and 'tis possible a Kingdom, (yet, as I said before) it cannot be with honour; but by fraud, I mean that ar∣tifice which is shewn in stratagems and circumventions, against an enemy that is not only in hostility, but a state of defiance, (for where he reposes any confidence in you, it alters the case) and such as I mean, was the artifice of Hanibal when he pretended to fly, only to possess himself of some passes, and so block up the Consul and his Army; as also when to clear himself of Fabius Maximus, he found out the invention of binding fire-brands and other combustible matter about the horns of the Cattel, and turning them out upon the enemy. And much of this nature was that of Pontius General for the Samnites; which he used to circumvent the Roman Army ad Tureas Caudinas. Pontius having disposed his Army privately upon the mountains; sent several of his Souldiers habited like Shep∣herds with several herds of Cattel thorow the plain: being all taken and examined by the Romans where the Army of the Samnites was, they unanimously concurred in the story which Pontius had put into their mouths, that it was gone to besiege Nocera; which be∣ing credited by the Consul, he brake up from his post, and marching thorow the plain for the relief of Nocera, he ran himself into the trap, and was no sooner entred, but he was block'd up by the enemy. This exploit was fraudulently performed, yet it would have been very honourable to Pontius, had he followed his Father's advice, who would have had him either dismissed the Romans frankly, that they might have been obliged by their usage, or else have put them all to the sword, that they might have taken no revenge; but he took the middle way, Quae neque amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit; Which neither mul∣tiply'd his friends, nor lessened the number of his foes. Which way has always been perni∣tious in matters of state, as has been shewn elsewhere.

CHAP. XLI.

That ones Country is to be defended by all means, and whether honourable or dishonourable it imports not, 'tis well defended.

THe Roman Army and their Consul (as is said before) were block'd up by the Samnites, who having proposed terms to them which were very dishonourable, as that they should be dismissed sub jugum, and disarm'd (in token of bondage,) and then sent back again to Rome. The Consuls were amazed at the motion, and the whole Army was in despair; when Lentulus the Roman Legate stood up, and told them that in his judgment no conditions were to be scrupled at that time when their Country was at stake: for the safety of Rome consisting in the safety of that Army, the Army was to be preserved, and that Country which is defended, is well defended, let the way be as it will, honoura∣ble or not honourable, it matters not: for if that Army was preserved, in time Rome might work off that disgrace; but if it were lost, (though it perished never so bravely) Country, and Liberty and all would be lost with it: and so his Counsel was followed. And this ought to be considered and observed by every man whose office it is to advise for the good of his Country; for where the safety of that is in question, no other consideration ought

to be coincident, as whether the way be just or unjust; merciful or cruel, honourable or dishonourable; but postponing all other respects, you are to do that which shall procure the safety of your Country, and preservation of its liberty. And this is effectually imi∣tated by the French both in their words, and deeds, whenever the Majesty of their Prince, or the interest of their Country is at stake. For there is nothing they bear with less patience, than to hear a man say such a thing is dishonourable for their King; for they believe their King uncapable of dishonour, be his Counsels or his fortune what they will, because whe∣ther he wins or loses, or whatever is done, all makes for the King.

CHAP. XLII.

That forc'd Promises are not binding.

THe Consuls being returning to Rome, with their Army disarmed, and a scandal upon them for the dishonourable conditions to which they had submitted; the first who spake against the keeping them, was S. Postumius the Consul, who persuaded the Senate that only himself, and those who accepted them, were obliged thereby; and that they did not extend to the people of Rome; wherefore if the people of Rome would be never so exact, the most that could be expected from them, would be but to deliver up him, and all those who had engaged themselves into the hands of the Samnites; and this he main∣tained with so much obstinacy and zeal, that the Senate was ••onvinced, and sent him and the rest back Prisoners to the Samnites, with a protestation against the Peace, as not ex∣tending to them; and fortune was so favourable to Postumius in the business, that the Sam∣nites not retaining him, he return'd to Rome, and was in greater reputation there after his loss, than Pontius was among the Samnites after his Victory. And here there are two things more particularly remarkable: One is, That there is no action, but is capable of producing honour and renown; in victory there is nothing more frequent: In loss, it is possible, by making it appear that it came not by your fault; or else by doing some action presently after, that may recompense and repair it. The other is, That it is not scanda∣lous to break such promises as are extorted by force. For in promises relating to the pub∣lick, if they be obtained by force, when the force ceases, the promise ceaseth with it, and may be neglected without any disgrace. Of this, all History is full of examples, and there is not a day but presents us with new: For as we see Princes make no Conscience of per∣forming any thing that they are obliged to by force, especially if the force be removed; so they are as little tender of their promises in other things, when the cause which press'd them to promise is taken away: which whether commendable or not in a Prince, or binding or not binding, I shall not determine in this place, having spoken of it so largely in my Treatise called The Prince.

CHAP. XLIII.

Those who are born in the same Country, retain almost the same Nature thorow all the variety of times.

WIsemen were wont to say (and perhaps not unworthily) That he who would know what will be, must consider what has been already, because there is nothing in the world now, nor will be hereafter, but what has▪ and will have conformity with the productions of former times; and the reason is, because proceeding from men who have, and have had always the same passions, they must necessarily have the same effects. 'Tis true indeed their actions are sometimes better and more virtuous in this Province, than in that, and in that more than in another, according to the difference of their Education, for from the manner of their breeding, people take the first rudiments of their conver∣sation; and it makes it more easie to conjecture future events, by what is passed, when we see some Nations retaining their humours and peculiarities a long time. So one Nation has been always covetous, another fraudulent; and so on the other side, one has been con∣stantly famous for one virtue, and another for another. He who peruses the passages of old in our very City of Florence, and compares them with our modern, will find that it has been all along exposed to the avarice, pride, cruelty, and falshood of the Germans and

French: Every one knows how unfaithfully we have been dealt withal: How often Charles VIII. of France received our Money, and promised to restore the Citadels at Pisa; but never perform'd, which was a great instance of his infidelity, and avarice. But to wave such recent examples, every one knows what hapned in the War betwixt the Floren∣tines, and the Visconti Dukes of Milan. The Florentines being destitute of other expe∣dients, resolved to bring the Emperor into Italy, to fall upon Lombardy with all his power and reputation. The Emperor engaged to bring a great Army into Italy; to make War upon the Visconti, and to defend Florence against them, upon condition the Florentines pay'd him 100000 Ducats by way of advance, and as much more when they came into Italy. The Florentines agreed, paid their first Money down, and the rest when they enter'd Italy; yet when he had marched as far as Verona, he turned back without doing any thing, complaining of the Florentines for want of performance: So that had not Florence been under some extraordinary necessity, or passion, or had they ever read and considered the ancient customs of those Nations, they would never have been so often over-reached, see∣ing they have been always alike, and used the same practices in all places, with all people. Thus they served the Tuscans of old, who having been many times over-power'd and routed, and dispersed by the Romans, and finding their own force unable to defend them; they articled with the French on this side of the Alps to give them a Sum of Money, for which the French were to joyn their forces with the Tuscaps, and march with them against the Romans: But when the French had got their Money, they refused to perform the con∣ditions on their part, alledging that they received it not to make War upon the Romans, but to forbear infesting them themselves: by which infidelity and avarice in the French, the poor Tuscans were at once defeated both of their Money and assistance. From whence we may conclude that the Tuscans were formerly of the same nature as now, and especially the Florentines, and the French and other foreign Nations had always the same inclination to deceive them.

CHAP. XLIV.

Confidence and boldness does many times obtain that which would never be compassed by ordinary means.

THe Samnites were invaded by the Romans, and their Army so weak, it durst not meet them in the field: whereupon it was resolved, That all their Garisons should be reinforced, and with the rest of their Troops they should pass into Tuscany (which was then at peace with the Romans) and try if they could tempt them to take up Arms, and break their Peace; and in the Harangue which was made by the Samnites to the Tuscans to remonstrate upon what occasion they had taken up Arms themselves, they had this expres∣sion, Rebellasse quod pax servientibus gravior, quam liberis bellum. They had rebelled, because Peace was more insupportable in servitude, than War to men that are free. And so partly by persuasions, and partly by the presence of their Army, they prevailed with them to take Arms against the Romans, which they had refused to their Embassadors before. From whence it is to be observed, that when a Prince desires to obtain any thing of another (if occasion permits) he ought not to give him time to consider, but is to act so as he may see a necessity upon him of resolving immediately; and this is done when the person to whom the demand is made sees that in either denying it absolutely, or delaying his answer, he runs a manifest danger. This way was used very handsomely in our days by Pope Iu∣lius with the French; and Monsieur de Foix (the King of France's General) against the Marquess of Mantoua. Pope Iulius resolving to drive the Family of the Bentivogli out of Bolonia; and judging that to do it, he should have need of the assistance of the French, and that it would be convenient the Venetians should stand Neuter; To this purpose he sent Embassadors to them both, but could get nothing but uncertain and ambiguous an∣swers; wherefore to surprize them, and bring them that way to his lure whether they would or no, he got what Forces he could together, and marching directly to Bolonia, sent to the Venetians to let them know he expected they should stand Neuter; and to the French to send him Supplies: Both of them finding themselves under a necessity of answering immediately, and that there was no time allowed to consider, fearing the displeasure and indignation of his Holiness, they both of them complyed; the Venetian did not meddle; and the French sent him assistance. Monsieur de Foix being another time with his Army in Bolonia, and understanding the defection of Brescia, he resolved to go immediately and

endeavour to reduce it. There were but two ways that he could possibly pass; one was thorow the Dominions of his Master, but that was tedious and about; the other was a shorter cut, thorow the Territories of the Marquess of Mantoua; but then he was not only to force his way thorow that Country, but, he was to pass certain Sluces betwixt Fens and Lakes (with which that Country abounds) and that was not to be done without great difficulty, in respect of several Forts which were upon them, and all well guarded by the Marquess: However de Foiz resolved upon the shortest, in spite of the difficulty; and that the Marquess might have no time to deliberate, he marched with his Army, and at the same moment sent a Messenger to the Marquess for the Keys of such Castles as stood in his passage; and the Marquess surprized with the suddenness and confidence of the demand, sent them immediately, which he would never have done had they been more modestly de∣sired; the Marquess being in League with the Venetian and Pope, in whose hands he had likewise a Son at that time; all which, had he had time to have considered, would have been very laudable reasons to have denyed it: But being press'd of a sudden, he sent them (as is said before:) Just so it was betwixt the Tuscans, and the Samnites; the presence of the Samnian Army having forced them to take Arms, which they had refused before, and had scarcely done then, had they had liberty to have advis'd.

CHAP. XLV.

Whether in a Battel it is best to give or receive the Charge.

DEvius, and Fabius two Roman Consuls, were in the field with two Armies against the Samnites, and Tuscans; and being come to a Battel, it is observable that they took two several ways in the manner of their fighting, and it is worth our enquiry which of them was the best. Decius charged the Enemy with all imaginable fury, and engaged his whole Army at once: Fabius received the charge, and (judging that way the most safe) reserved his effort till the last, when (as we say) the Enemy had spent their fire, and the heat of their fury was over. By the success of the Battel, it appeared that the design of Fabius was better than that of Decius, who tired with the vehemence of his first charge, and seeing his men engaged farther among the Enemy, than otherwise they would have been, to gain that honour by his death, which he could not hope for by the Victory, in imitation of his Father, he sacrificed himself for the Roman Legions. Which when Fa∣bius understood, that he might not gain less honour by living, than his colleague should do by his death, he advanced with his Reserves, and charg'd the Enemy so briskly, that he overthrew them, and gained a happy and most memorable Victory. By which it ap∣pears that the way of Fabius was more imitable and secure.

CHAP. XLVI.

How it comes to pass that in a City the same Family retains the same manners and customs a long time.

IT appears that not only one City has its manners and institutions different; and produ∣ces men more austere, or effeminate than the rest; but in the same City Families are frequently found to have the same difference. Of this there are multitude of Examples, and particularly in Rome. The Manlii were always rigid and severe: The Publicoli benign, and lovers of the people: The Appii ambitious and enemies to the people, and so in several other Families they had their peculiar qualities that discriminated them from the rest; which cannot proceed barely from their extraction and blood (for that must of necessity have been altred by the variety of their Marriages) but rather from the diversity of their Education, in the several Families; for it is a great matter when a man is accustomed to hear well or ill of any thing from his infancy; and makes such an impression in him, that from thence he many times regulates his conversation as long as he lives; and if this were not so, it would have been impossible that all the Appii should have been agitated by the same passion and ambition, as Livy observed in most of them; and particularly in one of the last, who being made Censor, and to deposite his Office at the expiration of 18 months according to Law, refused it absolutely (though his Colleague resigned) insisting upon an

old Law made by the Censors to continue their Magistracy for five years and though there were many meetings, and great contention and tumult about this; yet in spite both of Senate and People he could not be brought to deposite. And he who reads the Oration which he made against P. Sempronius the Tribune of the people, will discern the insolence of that Family, and the bounty and humanity of several other Citizens expressed by their obedience to the Laws, and their affection to their Country.

CHAP. XLVII.

A good Citizen is to forget all private injury, when in competition with his love to his Country.

MAnlius the Consul being employed in the Wars against the Samnites, received a wound that disabled him for executing his charge; upon which the Senate thought sit to send Papirius Cursor the Dictator to supply his place, and the Dictator being by the Laws to be nominated by Fabius, who was then with his Army in Tuscany, they were fearful (in respect of an old quarrel betwixt them) that Fabius would not name him. Whereupon the Senate dispatched two Embassadors toward him, to intreat that (laying aside all pri∣vate animosity) he would name Cursor for Dictator, which Fabius did out of love to his Country; though by his sullenness and silence, and several other signs he signified his relu∣ctancy, and that that Election went against the hair: From hence therefore all good Citi∣zens are to take example, and learn to prefer the publick good, before any private quarrel of their own.

CHAP. XLVIII.

When an Enemy commits any grand fault, 'tis to be suspected for a fraud.

FUlnius being left Lieutenant of the Roman Army in Tuscany, upon the Consuls going to Rome to be present at some Ceremony, the Tuscans to draw him into a trap, lay'd an Ambuscade for him not far from his Camp; and having disguised some of their Soldiers in the habit of Shepheards, they caused them to drive certain Cattel within sight of the Romans; and the Shepheards were so exact in their obedience, that they came up to their very Stoccadoes: The Lieutenant wondered at their confidence; and the unreasonableness of the thing gave him occasion to suspect; whereupon he found out a way to discover the fraud, and frustrate the whole plot: From whence we may observe that a General is not to presume upon any gross error that his enemy commits; because it is not rational to be∣lieve he would be so sottish, and inconsiderate, were there not some stratagem at the bot∣tom; yet many times men are so blinded with desire of Victory, that they see nothing but what makes for themselves. The French having overthrown the Romans not far from the Allia, and pursuing them to Rome, found the gates open, and without any guards to de∣fend them: They apprehended it a design, and stood drawn up all that day and the next night, without daring to enter, not imagining the Romans could have been so abject and imprudent as to have abandoned their Country. In the year 1508. when the Florentines besieged Pisa, Alfonso del Mutolo a considerable Citizen of that Town, being Prisoner in the Camp, promised that if they would give him his liberty, he would deliver one of the Gates into their hands; the Florentines believed and discharged him; but coming after∣wards to negotiate more particularly with certain Commissioners deputed to that purpose, he was so far from coming privately, that he was always accompanied with several of the Pisans, only when they came to treat, he desired them to withdraw. Forasmuch therefore as he came publickly, and attended by several Pisans, the Florentines had good reason to suspect the performance of his promise: But the Florentines were so blinded with a desire to have the City, that following the direction of Alfonso, they came up to the Gate towards Lucca, expecting to be let in; but all things being prepared for them, they received a great loss, and left many of their best Officers and Soldiers behind them.

CHAP. XLIX.

A Commonwealth which desires to preserve it self free, has need of new pro∣visions every day; and upon what score Fabius was called Maximus.

IT falls out of necessity (as has been said before) that in a great City there is not a day but some accidents occur that have need to be remedied; and as they are of more or less importance, so their Physician ought to be more or less expert. And if strange and un∣expected accidents ever hapned in any City, it was in Rome: one of which sort, was the the general conspiracy of the Roman Women against their Husbands: some had poysoned their Husbands already, and all the rest had their materials ready to do as much by theirs. Of the same sort was the conspiracy of the Bacchanals, discovered during the time of the Macedonian War, in which many thousands of Men and Women were engaged; which would have been very dangerous for that City, had it not been discovered; for the Romans had not a custom of punishing whole multitudes when they offended. And here we can∣not but admire the fortitude, the severity, the magnanimity of the Romans in punishing offenders; which (if there were nothing else to evince it) would be a great testimony of their virtue and power. For so great was their justice, they made no scruple to execute a whole Legion, or City at a time: sometimes they banished 8 or 10000 men together with such conditions as would have been insupportable to a single man: so it hapned to those who escaped from the Battel at Cannas, they banished them all into Sicily, forbidding them to Quarter in any Town, or to commit any disorder. But the most terrible of all their executions was the decimation of their Armies, in which every tenth man was put to death by lot quite thorow their Army; nor for the punishment of a multitude can any way be found more formidable; for where a multitude transgresses, and no certain Author is known, to punish the whole with death would be too severe; and to punish one part, and excuse another would be injust to those who were punish'd, and encourage the other to commit the same offence again: But where all are alike guilty, to execute every tenth man by lots, gives him who is to be punished, occasion to complain only of his fortune; and makes him who escapes afraid against the next time. The good Women then who would have poyson'd their Husbands; and the Priests of Bacchus were punished as they deserv'd; and though these maladies in a Commonwealth have many times very ill Symptoms, yet they are not mortal, because there is still time enough for the cure. But where the State is concern'd, it is otherwise, and time may be wanting; and therefore if they be not seasonably and prudently redressed, the whole Government may miscarry. And this may be clear'd to us, by what hapned in Rome. The Romans having been very free in bestowing the freedom and priviledges of their City upon strangers, the strangers grew so numerous by degrees, and to have so great a Vote in the Councils, that the whole Govern∣ment began to totter, and decline from its old, to its new Inhabitants; which being ob∣served by Qui••••us Fabius the Censor, he applyed a remedy in time, by reducing all the new Citizens into four Tribes; that being contracted into so narrow a space, they might not have so malignant an influence upon the City; and this so timely and so useful expedient, was taken so thankfully from him by the people, that they gave him the addition of Maxi∣mus, and he was called Fabius Maximus ever after.