The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

CHAP. VI.

Of Conspiracies.

I Did not think it inconvenient in this place to discourse something of Conspiracies, see∣ing they are things of such consequence and danger, both to Princes & private Persons; for by them more Princes have lost their States and their Lives than by open War; a••d the reason is, because few persons are qualified to make War, but every body can con∣spire. On the other side, for a private person, no enterprize is more dangerous and rash; for let him manage it as wisely as he can, it is full of difficulty, and uncertainty of success; and from hence it is that among so many Conspiracies there are so few which arrive at the end that was designed. To the end therefore that Princes may learn how to defend them∣selves; and private persons might be more cautious of engaging themselves in them, but may rather be contented to live quietly under the Government where they are placed, I shall enlarge upon the subject, and leave nothing behind that is considerable for the docu∣ment either of the one or the other. It is a certain truth, and well said of Cornelius Taci∣tus, that men are to pay an honour and respect to things past, and obedience to things present: that they ought to desire good Princes, but when they are once in authority, they are to be endur'd, and those who go about to conspire against them, do most com∣monly ruine themselves or their Country.

To come therefore to the point, we are first to consider against whom these Conspiracies are made, and we shall find them either against their Country, or Prince: and of these two sorts of Conspiracies we shall discourse at present, because of those which are entred into, to deliver up a besieged Town to the Enemy, or upon such occasion, we have spoken amply before. And first of the Conjurations against a Prince, and the occasions of them, which are many, but one of more importance than all the rest, and that is the hatred of the peo∣ple: for that Prince who has contracted the universal odium of the people, may with reason believe that some of those whom he has offended will study to revenge themselves; and they will be the more industrious in it, by how much they observe the general discon∣tent and animosity against him. A Prince therefore is by all means possible to prevent the hatred of the People, (but having spoken of it before, I shall not enlarge upon it again.) For by keeping himself from the general hatred, particular offences will not be able to a∣mount to a War; first, because all men have not the same resentment, and will not put themselves in danger to revenge an injury; and then because if the discontented were all of a mind, and had power to do it, yet they are discouraged by the affection which they observe in the multitude towards their Prince. The injury done by the Prince, is either upon the Estate, Blood, or Honour of the Subject: where the injury extends to Blood, threatning is very dangerous, and much more than down-right execution; for when a man is kill'd, he is past thinking of revenge, and those who are alive will quickly forget him; but when a man is threatned, and finds himself under a necessity of suffering, or do∣ing

something extraordinary, he becomes immediately dangerous, and ought to be regar∣ded by the Prince, as I shall shew hereafter. Next to this necessity for the preservation of ones life; Honour and Estate are the two tenderest points in which men are soonest offended, and of which the Prince is likewise to have a particular care, for no man can be pillaged so perfectly, but he will have a Knife left to revenge himself; nor no man can be dishonoured to such a degree of debasement, but he will have courage enough left to attempt something in revenge; and in point of honour, no injury goes so near a man as what reflects upon the woman; and next to that, is to be despised. This was it that arm'd Pausanias against Philip of Macedon, and many other Subjects against many other Princes. In our times Iu∣lius Belanti had never conspired against Pandolfus Tyrant of Siena, had he not first given him his Daughter to Wife, and then taken her from him again, as we shall shew more at large hereafter. The great motive of the Conjuration of the Pazzi against the Medici was the Patrimony of Giovanni Bonromei, which was given from them by the award of the Medici. But there is another motive (and that no small one) which makes people conspire against their Prince, and that is a desire of rescuing their Country from tyranny and usurpation. This was it which set Brutus and Cassius at work against Caesar. This was it which excited others against Phalaris, Dyonisius, &c. and against this there is no re∣medy, but depositing their usurpations, and because there are few will do that, there are but few which escape the ill consequence.

Ad Generum Cereris, sine caede, & sanguine pauci Descendunt Reges, & sicca morte Tyranni.

Slaughter and Blood pursues, he seldom lies Dry in his Coffin that a Tyrant dies.

But in Conspiracies, as I said before, the dangers are so great and various, that there is not only a hazard in the designing, management, and execution, but even after the execu∣tion is done. The Conspirators are either one or more; one cannot properly be called a Conspiracy, but a firm resolution in a single person to make away his Prince; this way of Conspiracy is more secure than the other, because till it comes to execution, it can never be known, no body being privy to his secret, and therefore no danger of coming to the ears of the Prince. These kind of resolutions may fall into the heart of any man, great or small, noble or ignoble, favourites or strangers: no man but some time or other may have access to his Prince, and he that has opportunity to speak with him, has opportunity to do worse. Pausanias murdered Philip of Macedon as he was going to the Temple attended with a thousand of his Guards, and walking betwixt his own Son and his Son in Law; but Pausanias was a Gentleman, and very conversant at Court, but there was a poor con∣temptible Spaniard who stabb'd Ferdinand King of Spain in the Neck, and though the wound was not mortal, yet it was enough to shew us that there is no man so inconsidera∣ble, but if he has courage to undertake, he may have opportunity to it: Dervis a Turkish Priest drew his Sword upon Bajazet Father to this Present Emperor, and though he did not kill him, yet it was not for want either of courage or opportunity. Nor is it to be doubt∣ed but there are many ill enough disposed, who wish from their hearts to be revenged on their Tyrants, but there are few that dare venture, and scarce one of those few but dies in the attempt, and no man will expose himself where there is no hopes to escape. But enough of this pertinacious malevolence in a single person, we will speak now of Conspi∣racies betwixt a number: I say that in History all Conspiracies are found to be acted by great Persons, and such as have familiarity with their Prince: for others, unless they be mad men or fools, will never attempt it, because people that are weak, & remote from the Court, are destitute of all those hopes and conveniences that are requisite for the execution of such a design. First, men of slender fortune or interest cannot impart themselves freely, no body will be true them, because no man can concur with them upon any of those hopes which do usually encourage men to the undertaking of any great danger; so that they can hard∣ly communicate to two or three persons, but one of them is an informer, and the other are ruined. But if they should be so happy as not to be betrayed, the execution is attended with so many difficulties by reason of the difficulty of their access, that it is impossible but they must miscarry: and if great persons, and such as are very conversant with their Prince are subject to such hazards, those doubtless must be much more who are under none of those qualifications. Wherefore, when men of mean fortune, or little access at Court consider their own weakness and inability, they are discouraged from any such designs; and if at any time they be offended, and would do their Prince a mischief, they content themselves

with libelling and railing, and expect when persons of greater access and capacity should revenge them upon his person, and if any of these persons are so far transported, as to attempt any thing of this nature, their good will is more to be commended than their discre∣tion. We see then, where any great Conspiracy has been made, it has been by great per∣sons, and such as have been familiar with their Prince, and that as often upon the score of benefits, as injuries received; so it was in the Conspiracy of Perennius against Commodus, Plautianus against Severus, Sejanus against Tiberius, all of them preferred by their several Emperors, and advanced to such Honours, Authority and Estates, that their power seem'd to want nothing of perfection, but the Imperial Ensigns, and that they might have them as well as the rest, they conspired every one of them against their Prince, and their Conspi∣racies had such ends as their ingratitude deserved. However, in the memory of our Fa∣thers the Conspiracy of Giacopo d' Apiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti Prince of Pisa had a better end; for the said Giacopo having been brought up, and caressed, and advan∣ced by the said Piero deposed his Benefactor, and took away his Government for his pains. Another of the same nature was that of Coppola in our days against Ferdinand of Arragon, though it had not the same success; for Coppol•• being arrived at that height of Authori∣ty, that there was nothing but the bare name wanting to make him King, he attempted for that, and lost his life in the business. And certainly if any Conspiracy might have suc∣ceeded, it was his, being a person as powerful as the King himself, and seconded with all the conveniences he could desire: but the same greediness of dominion that blinded him in the undertaking, blinded him in the prosecution of his design; for had it been mana∣ged with the least prudence, it would have been impossible to have miscarried.

A Prince therefore who would preserve himself against Conspiracy, is to have an eye rather upon those he has obliged, than those he has offended; for they that are offended have not those frequent opportunities that the other have; and for the disposition, it is much alike, the desire of dominion being as great if not greater than the desire of revenge; so then authority is to be given to his friends with that caution, that there be always some space or interval left betwixt the preferment of the Favourite, and the sovereignty of the Prince, lest if his ambition should not be satisfied, he should aspire immediately at the Crown. But to return to our design, I say, that Conspiratours being to be great men, and such as have easie access to the Prince, we are now to enquire into the successes of their Plots, and see what have been the causes of their prosperity or miscarriage. And because (as I said before) the danger is considerable in the management, execution, and afterwards; for that reason there are very few of them that arrive at their proposed end. In their con∣trivances and consultations there is such extraordinary danger, that unless they be carried on with singular caution and prudence, they will be easily discovered; and they are disco∣vered two ways, either by down-right impeachment, or by conjecture and presumption. Impeachment proceeds either from infidelity or folly in those persons with whom you have communicated; infidelity is easily found, for you cannot communicate in that nature but with such of your Confidents as you suppose will venture their lives for you; or else with such persons as are dissatisfied with the Government: of such kind of Confidents, one or two may possibly be found, but when you begin to multiply them, and commit your secret to more, you must necessarily be betrayed; for their affection to you must be very great, if the apprehension of the danger, and the fear of the punishment do not deter them: be∣sides, men are many times mistaken in the affection of their friends; for they can never be assured of them till they have made experiment, and to make experiment in such ways as this, is exceedingly dangerous, and if perchance you have had trial of them in some other matters of importance in which they have behaved themselves faithfully and well, yet you can take no true measures from that, because this surpasses all other dangers what∣soever. If you presume upon his discontent, animosity to his Prince, you may be ca∣sily deceived, for as soon as you have discovered your design, you have given him a power to reconcile himself, and his rancour must be very great, or your influence extraordinary to keep him faithful: hence it is that many Conspiracies are discovered, and as it were nipp'd in the Bud; and when any of them are kept private where many persons are privy, 'tis look'd upon as a miracle, as that of Piso against Nero, and in our times that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo, and Giuliano de Medici, in which though fifty were concerned, it was ne∣ver discovered till it came to execution; for discoveries by indiscretion, they happen when one of the Conspirators talks carelesly, so as some servant or third person picks it out, as it hapned to the Sons of Brutus, who in their Negotiations with Tarquin's Embassadors, were over-heard, and accused by one of the Servants: another way is when out of levity you communicate with some Child or Woman that you love, or such other incontinent person, as Dinus did, who being (with Philotas) entred into a Conspiracy against Alexander the

Great, imparted it to a Boy that he loved, called Ficomachus who told it to his Brother Cibalinus, and Cibalinus discovered it to the King. As to discoveries by circumstances and conjecture, we have an example in the Pisonian Conspiracy against Nero, in which Scevinus one of the Conspirators having the day before Nero was to have been murther'd, made his Will, ordered Milichius his Freeman to furbish up his old rusty Sword, enfran∣chised all his Slaves, distributed Mony among them, and caused Plagets and L••gatures to be made to bind up Wounds, he gave occasion of conjecture to Milichius, who accused him thereupon to Nero, and Order being given for his apprehension, Scevinus was taken into custody, and with him Natalis another of the Conspirators, who had been observed to have talked privately with him a long time the day before, and not agreeing about their discourse, they contradicted one another, and were forced to confess all.

From these occasions of discovery it is impossible to be secur'd, but either by malice, im∣prudence, or inadvertency, all will out when ever the Conspirators exceed the number of three or four. For if more than one of them be taken, 'tis impossible but they must inter∣fere, because two people cannot hang together so exactly in a Story. If there be but one apprehended, and he be a stout man, perhaps he may have that constancy and resolution as to conceal his Confederates; but then his Confederates must have as much courage as he, and not discover themselves by their slight; for whose heart soever fails, whether his that is apprehended, or his that is escaped, 'tis the same thing, for the Plot is discovered. That example which is mentioned by Titus Livius is very rare and unusual, where in a Conspiracy against Girolamo King of Syracuse, he speaks of one of the Conspirators called Theodorus, who being seized, concealed his accomplices with incomparable constancy, and accused all the Kings Friends; and his Companions were so confident in his courage, that none of them fled, or made the least discovery by their fear. These are the dangers which are to be pass'd in the conduct or management of an Enterprize, before it comes to execu∣tion; and as there are dangers, so there are ways of evading them.

The first, the surest, and indeed the only way is not to give your Confederates time to discover you, but to communicate the business to them when it is just ready for execution, and not before. Those who take that course, are free from the danger of Threatnings and Negotiations, and commonly from all the rest; and have been observed frequently to come to good end, and there is no man that is wise, but would carry it so if he could. I shall give you only two Examples. Nelimatus being unable to endure the Tyranny of Aristoti∣mus King of Epirus, got several of his Friends and Relations together into his house, and exhorting them to the deliverance of their Country, some of them desired them to consi∣der, and prepare themselves; whereupon Nelimatus caused his Servants to make fast the doors, and protested to all the whole Company, that they should swear to go immediately about it, or he would deliver them up Prisoners to Aristotimus, upon which they all took the Oath, and falling incontinently to the work, they effected their design, as Nelimatus had contriv'd it. One of the Magi having by fraud possessed himself of the Kingdom of Persia, and Orthanus a great Person of that Kingdom, having discovered the cheat, he had a conference with six others of his own quality, to contrive how they might rescue their Country from the Tyranny of that Usurper, and (as in the case before) when some of them desired time, Darius (one of the six) stood up and declared boldly, That if they would not execute it presently, he would accuse them every one, and doing it forthwith, they prospered accordingly. Not unlike these two, was the way which the Aetolians used in the Assassination of Nabis the Tyrant of Sparta: They sent one of their Citizens called Alexamenes to him with 30 Horse, 200 Foot under a pretence of a supply, comman∣ding the Soldiers to be obedient to the orders of their chief Officers, but acquainted no∣body with the design but Alexamenes himself. Alexamenes marched to Sparta with his Forces, but communicating nothing of his instructions, till they were fit to be executed, he did his business, and the Tyrant was slain; by which reservedness they avoided the first dangers of being discovered, which are obvious in the management, and whoever takes the same course, shall avoid them as well as they. Piso (whom I have mention'd before) was a man of honour and reputation, a great intimate of Nero's, and one in whom he placed a great deal of confidence. Nero visited him often, and was many times treated very magnificently in his Garden: Piso by virtue of this intimacy was able to make choice of such Complices as were stout and couragious, and disposed to such an Exploit (which for great men to do, is no difficult matter) and when occasion was offered, to break the business to them so suddenly, that having no time either to deliberate or deny him, he must necessarily succeed; and he who examines all the other Examples that are mentioned, will find very few, but have been managed the same way. But men of little experience in the affairs of the world, do many times commit great errors, and more, when their designs

are extraordinary, as in this. A Plot then is never to be imparted, but upon necessity, and when it is ripe for execution; and when you do communicate, do it but to one, and that a person of whom you have had long experience, or one that is prompted by the same interest and provocation as your self; and to find one person so, is much easier than to find many, and by consequence that way is nothing so dangerous. Besides, if you should be mistaken in your confidence, you have more remedy and defence, than where the Conspirators are several; for I have heard wise men say, that to a single person a man may say any thing; (for if nothing be to be produced under your hand) your no, will be as good as his yea: But writing is to be shun'd as a rock, for nothing is of so much con∣viction, as a note under a man's own hand. Plautianus desiring to murther Severus the Emperor, and his Son Antoninus; committed the execution to Saturninus a Tribune, who had more mind to betray, than obey him; but suspecting that when he came to accuse him, Plautianus should have more credit than he, he desired a Warrant under his hand to con∣firm his Commission, which Plautianus granted, being blinded with ambition, whereby it happen'd that he was accused, convicted, and condemned, whereas without that Note, and some other circumstances, Plautianus would have been acquitted, and his accuser been punished, so obstinately did Plautianus deny all. In the Pisonian Conspiracy, there was a Woman called Epicaris, who had been formerly one of Nero's Misses. This Epicaris thinking it of importance to bring in a Captain of certain Galleys which Nero kept for his Guard, she communicated the Plot, but conceal'd the Conspirators, and the Captain be∣traying her, and accusing her to Nero, Epicaris maintained the contrary with such constan∣cy, that the Emperor was amaz'd, and discharged her. So then, he that communicates a thing of this Nature to one, runs but these two dangers, either of being spontaneously accused, and proof brought to make it good; or else being accused by accident and of force, as when his Confederate is apprehended upon suspition, and impeaches him upon the Rack, in both which cases there is something to be said; for in the first he may pretend malice, in the second fear, and that the extremity of his torture constrained him to say false: So that it is great wisdom to communicate with no body, till your designs be ripe but to proceed according to the examples aforesaid; but if you must communicate, to do it but to one alone, and by himself; in which though there be some danger, yet there is much less than where you communicate with many. Another way, and not unlike this, is when the fury or violence of a Tyrant necessitates you to do that to him, which other∣wise he would be sure to do to you; and sometimes it is so sudden and fierce, it leaves you scarce time to think of securing your self. This is an exigence and necessity that has most commonly a good end, and to prove it, I will produce two examples, and no more. Com∣modus the Emperour had two Captains of his Guards (one of them called Lettus,, and the other Elettus) particularly in his favour, and Martia was the most intimate of his Concubines. They having taken the liberty to admonish him of his ill Courses, and the reflection his ill conversation had both upon his Person and Government, he resolved to rid himself of his Monitors, and to that end writ down the names of Martia, Lettus, Elettus, and others (who he designed should be put to death the next night) and put the Note un∣der his Pillow. Being gone out into a Bath, a Child that he lov'd exceedingly, being rummaging about the room, happened upon this Paper, and going out with it in his hand, Martia met him by accident, took it from him, read it, sent it immediately to Lettus and Elettus, who being sensible of their danger, resolved to prevent him, and without more ado, killed Commodus in the Evening.

Antoninus Caracalla the Emperor, was with his Army in Mesopotamia, and having made Macrinus his General (a better Statesman than Soldier) it hapned (as it does to all Prin∣ces that are wicked) that he began to apprehend (what he knew he deserved) that some body conspired against him. To be more certain, he writ privately to a friend (called Maternianus) in Rome, to consult the Astrologers, and give him notice whether any body was contriving against the Empire. Maternianus writ him word he had consulted them, that there were those who did aspire at the Empire, and that Macrinus was the man. This Letter coming by accident to the hands of Macrinus, before the Emperor saw it, he found the necessity that was upon him either to kill or be kill'd; and thereupon committed the execution to a confident of his call'd Martialis (whose Brother Antoninus had slain not many days before) who kill'd him accordingly. We see then that this necessity which allows us no time, has the same effect in a manner with the course which was taken by Nelimatus of Epirus, as I have mentioned before. We see likewise, that (as I said in the beginning of these discourses) that Commination and threatning does a Prince more mis∣chief, and are the occasion of more Plots, than violence it self. A Prince therefore is to have a care of that; to caress those that are about him, and keep them in their Allegiance

by his courtesie and kindness; if that will not do, he is to secure himself otherwise as well as he can, but never to bring them into a condition of thinking themselves under a neces∣sity of killing or being kill'd. As to the dangers which attend the execution of a Plot, they proceed either from a sudden alteration of Orders; a sudden defection of courage in him that is to execute; some imprudence in the attempt; or some imperfection in the act, as when all are not killed that were intended. And first we must understand that there is nothing gives so much Embarrasment, and distraction to the action of men as new and contradictory orders to be executed in an instant. and quite contrary to what was deter∣mined before. And if in any thing this variation be dangerous, it is in Martial affairs, and in such things as we have now spoken of; for in those cases there is nothing so necessary as that every man may know certainly his part, that beforehand he may contrive with himself, and conclude upon all the circumstances of the Fact; whereas if they have fram'd their designs, and fix'd upon their way, and immediately new Orders are brought repug∣nant to the former, it disturbs all, and the whole Plot must be ruined; so that it is better to execute it according to the first Order, though there be something of inconvenience, than to vary your Orders, with a thousand times more: But this is meant only where the variation is sudden, for where you have time enough, it is not so dangerous. The Con∣spiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de Medici is very well known. Their first Orders were, That an entertainment should be made for the Cardinal of St. George, to which the Medici should be invited, and killed. Every mans Office was assigned; some were to kill them; some were to secure the Palace; and others to ride up and down the City, and proclaim liberty to the people: It happened when the Pazzi, Medici, and Car∣dinal were altogether in the Cathedral in Florence at Divine Service, news was brought that Iulian would not be at Dinner: Hereupon the Conspirators consulting again, it was resolved to alter the Plot, and do that in the Church which was designed in the Chamber: This sudden alteration, discomposed the whole order; for Giovan batista da Montesec∣co would not consent to add Sacriledge to his Murther, and commit it in the Church; up∣on which they were forced to appoint another in his place, and shift all their Agents from one Office to another, and their time being too short to fix their resolutions, they commit∣ted so many errors in the execution, that all of them miscarried. And among the Conspi∣rators, when things come to be executed, their heart many times fails them, either out of sudden reverence, or sudden fear; for the presence and Majesty of some Princes is so awe∣ful, it either mitigates or frightens the fury of the Executioner; Marius being taken and kept Prisoner by the Minturnenses, they sent a Servant to kill him; but the poor slave was so terrified at the sight of his Person, and the Memory of his Name, that his courage fail'd, and he was not able to go thorow,; and if the consideration of his quality, and the Majesty of his Countenance could do so much, in a person that was a Prisoner, and in di∣stress; how much more are they effectual in a free Prince, magnificently adorn'd, and as nobly attended. Certainly such a sight is able to strike terror into the boldest person, and work compassion in the most cruel miscreant.

Some there were who conspired against Sitalcis King of Thrace: The day was appointed for the execution; they met at the place, where the Prince was; but when the stroke was to be given, no body durst venture, they departed as they came, every body blamed one another, but no body knew what was the impediment, and having attempted it often with the same intimidation, they were discovered at last, and received punishment for an offence which they might, but would not put in execution. Alfonso Duke of Ferrara had two Brothers, who conspired against him, and employed Giannes a Priest and Chantor in the said Dukes Chappel, to bring the Duke to them, which he did many times, and it was in their power to to have killed him; but yet not any of them durst strike him, so that at length they also were discovered, and received their reward. This remorse can proceed from nothing but the terror of his presence, or the influence of his behaviour and huma∣nity, which compels them to mercy. But the defects and disappointments in these kind of executions, proceed either from imprudence, or terror, with either of which, the minds of the Conspirators being disturbed, they become so confused and distracted, they can neither say, nor do any thing as they should. And that men are subject to those confu∣sions and surprizes, cannot be better demonstrated than by Livy's description of Alexame∣nus the Aetolian, of whom we have spoken before: For when the time was come for the execution of his design against Nabis the Spartan, having imparted it to his friends, Livy tells us, Collegit, & ipse animum, confusum tantae cogitatione rei. He recollected his mind, which was in some measure confounded with the contemplation of the Enterprize For there is no man, how resolute and bloody soever he be, but must be surprized and discomposed in such cases as those, wherefore for such Exploits, experienced men, and such as have

been used to those kind of affairs, are to be chosen, and no other, though never so stout: for he that has had no tryal of himself in that nature, ought not to presume barely upon his courage; nor can he promise himself any certain success, by reason that the terror and perturbation of his mind is many times so strong, that it makes his Weapon fall out of his hand, or words fall from his Mouth, which discover the whole Plot. Lucilla the Sister of Commodus, ordered Quintianus to kill her Brother: Quintianus waited for Commodus as he came into the Amphitheater, and meeting him when he came, he ran at him with his naked Sword, crying aloud, Questo ti mando il Senato, The Senate sends you this; but those words gave an alarm, and he was seized before he could lift up his arm to give the blow. Messer Antonio da Volterra, deputed (as is said before) to kill Lorenzo de Me∣dici, when he advanced to assault him, cryed out, Ah Traytor! but that exclamation was the preservation of Lorenzo, and the ruine of the Conspirators. But these Enterprizes are difficult, when directed only against one person, for the reasons abovesaid, yet when they are bent against two, they are much more, because in several places it is impossible any de∣sign should be well executed at once; so that to conspire against a Prince in that way, is a doubtful, dangerous and imprudent thing. Were it not for the reverence I bear to the Author, I should scarce believe what Herodian says of Plautianus, that he committed to one single Centurion called Saturninus, the killing of Severus and Antoninus who lived in several places; for 'tis so irrational a thing, that nothing but his Authority could have persuaded me to it. Certain young Gentlemen of Athens conspired against Diocles and Hippias, two Tyrants in that City. They killed Diocles, but Hippias escaped, and re∣venged his death. Chiones and Leonides of Heraclea, two of Plato's Disciples, conspired against Clearchus and Satirus, two Tyrants of that place; Clearchus was murthered, but Satirus survived and revenged it. The Pazzi (whom we have so often mentioned) kil∣led only Iulian de Medici, his brother escaping; so that from these Conspiracies against several persons, all wise people will abstain, as things that are fatal to themselves, their Country, and every body else; for those who escape are thereby render'd the more cruel and Tyrannical, as appears by the aforesaid examples in Florence, Athens, and Heraclea. And therefore the Conspiracy of Pelopidas against the Tyrants of Thebes was admirable, in respect of the success, seeing not only one, but ten of them were to be murthered; and that he was neither a favourite, nor had easie access to them; but was a Rebel, and in banishment; yet he overcame all these difficulties, got into Thebes, killed the Tyrants, and delivered his Country; but with the assistance of Caron one of the Tyrants great Counsel∣lors who gave him admission, and contributed much to his success. But let no man pre∣sume upon this example, for it is looked upon not only as a rare thing, but as a miracle. The execution of such a design may be interruped likewise by a false imagination, or some unexpected accident happening in the very act. The very morning that Brutus and his Confederates were to murther Caesar, it hapned that he had a long discourse with Cn. Popilius Lenas one of the Conspirators, which the rest of the accomplices observing, con∣cluded that Popilius had discovered all to Caesar, and was giving him an account; where∣upon it was proposed to kill Caesar presently, and not to defer it till he was in the Senate; and doubtless they had done it, but that their discourse broke off; and Caesar went away without any Commotion. These imaginations are sometimes very considerable, and to be regarded with a great deal of prudence, and the rather, because they are easily taken up; for he who is conscious to himself, is always apt to suspect that they are talking of him; and it may so fall out, that a word spoken to another intent, may gaul and disturb you as much as if it were spoken on purpose, and either force you to fly, or so hasten and preci∣pitate the execution, that you run your self upon many inconveniences, especially where many are privy to the Plot. As to the accidents, because they are unexpected and occa∣sional, no directions can be given against them, but examples by which men are to regu∣late and be cautious. Iulius Belanti of Siena (whom we have mentioned before) being incensed against Pandolfus, who had given him his Daughter in Marriage, and taken her from him again, conspired his death, and laid his design thus, Pandolfus went almost eve∣ry day to visit one of his Relations that was sick; and in his passage went commonly by Iulius his house: upon this consideration, Iulius got all his accomplices together into his house, with intention to assault him as he went by; to which purpose he armed them all, and disposed them into the Porch, that they might be ready upon a signal to be given from a Window above: It hapned that Pandolfus being just by, the person at the Win∣dow gave the signal, when by accident in the very nick of time Pandolfus met a friend, and stopt to salute him: Some of his Attendants passing on, heard a noise of Arms, took the Alarm, and discovered the Ambuscade; so that Pandolfus was miraculously preserved, Iulio and his Companions forced to fly from Siena, and all by the accident of this ren∣counter,

which not only hindred the execution at that time, but defeated the whole enter∣prize.

But against these accidents no remedy can be prescribed, because they happen so rarely; however it is necessary to think of us many, and provide against them as well as we can. It remains now that we say something of those dangers which we incur after execution is done; of which sort there is but one, and that is, when somebody is left alive that may re∣venge it: as his children, brothers, kinsmen, and such others to whom the sovereignty may descend by right of inheritance, and these may be left to revenge the death of their Predecessor, either by your negligence, or by some of the accidents aforesaid, as it hapned to Giovan-Andrea da Lampognano, who conspiring with other persons, killed the Duke of Milan, but they left two of his Brothers and one of his Sons behind, who revenged it in due time. But in these cases the Conspirators are to be excused, because there is no re∣medy to be provided; but where by their own imprudence or negligence they suffer any such to escape, there it is otherwise, and they are highly to be condemned. At Forum Livii some there were who conspired against Count Girolamo, ••lew him, seized upon his wife and children, (which were very young) and clap'd them in Prison: a great mind they had to the Castle, but the Governour was refractory, and would not admit them; the Counsels (called Madonna Caterin••) made them a proposition, that if they would suf∣fer her to go into him, she would prevail with the Governor to surrender, and that in the mean time her children should be left as hostages in their hands. The Conspirators be∣lieved her, and let her go in, but she was no sooner in the Castle, but she began to upbraid them by the death of her Husband, and threaten them with all possible revenge; and to convince them that her care and compassion for her children should not restrain her, she shew'd them her genitals thorow the windows, to let them know, that if they killed those, she had wherewithal to have more: so that perceiving their error too late, and being desti∣tute of all counsel, their indiscretion was punished with their perpetual banishment. But of all dangers after the fact is committed, none is so fatal as the affection of the people to their Prince whom you have slain. For their revenge is not possible to be prevented. Of this, the murder of Caesar may be an example: for the people of Rome being his friends, his death was thorowly revenged upon the Conspirators, who afterwards (though in seve∣ral times and places) were all of them slain. Conjurations against ones Country are not so dangerous as Conjurations against ones Prince; for in the contrivance and management the dangers are not so many; in the execution they are but the same; and after the fact is committed, they are nothing at all. In the management and preparation the dangers are not so many, because a Citizen may make his party, and put his affairs in a posture with∣out discover•• 〈…〉〈…〉 ••is orders be not interrupted, bring his designs to a very good end; or if they be in••errupted by some Law, it is in his power to adjourn the execution, or find out some other way that may be more commodious; but all these (it is to be understood) are to be done only in Commonwealths, where the manners of the people are beginning to be corrupted; because where the City is incorrupt, such designs will never come into any of their thoughts; but in a corrupt Republick where the dangers are not so great, there are many ways for private Citizens to make themselves Princes; because a Commonwealth is not so quick and dexterous as a Prince, their suspicion is less, and by consequence their caution: besides, they are commonly in more awe of their Grandees, and therefore the Grandees are more bold and couragious against them. Every body has read Catilins's Conspiracy written by Salust, and can tell how Catiline (after it was detected) not only continued in Rome, but came audaciously into the Senate, and had the confidence to talk insolently both to the Senate and Consul; so great reverence had that City, for its Citi∣zens. And when things were gone so far, that he had left the City, and was got to the head of an Army, Lentulus, and the rest of the Conspirators had never been seized, had not there been Letters produced against them under their own hands.

Hanno a great Citizen in Carthage had a mind to usurp; and in order thereto; he had contrived at the Wedding of one of his Daughters to poison the whole Senate, and then make himself Prince: when his plot was discovered, the Senate troubled themselves with no farther provision against it, than by making a Law against exorbitant feasting upon such kind of occasions, so great was their respect to a Citizen of his quality! But in a Conspiracy against ones Country, the greatest danger lies in the exe∣cution; for it seldom happens that a particular Citizen is strong enough to subdue a whole Country; and every man is not General of an Army, as Caesar, Agathocles, Cleomenes and others were, who had their Armies ready to back their designs. To such the way is easie and secure; but they who want those advantages must manage their business with more cunning, or employ foreign assistance: this cunning and artifice was used by Pisistrates the

Athenian; for having overcome the Megarenses, and thereby got himself great reputa∣tion among the people, he came forth of his house one morning, and shew'd himself woun∣ded to them, complaining that the Nobility had abused him, and desiring that he might be permitted to have a guard for the security of his person; which being granted inconsi∣derately, gave him opportunity by degrees to make himself absolute. Pandolfus Petrucci (with other Exiles) returned to Siena; and by way of contempt was made Keeper of the Palace, which was a mechanick employment that others had refused. Yet those few arm'd men who were under his Command by virtue of that place, by degres gave him such re∣putation, that at length he made himself Prince. Others have taken other ways, and by time, and their industry, arrived at the same dignity without any danger: but those who have endeavoured to make themselves Masters of their Country by their own force, or foreign supplies; have had various events, as fortune was pleased to befriend them! Cata∣line was ruined: Hanno (of whom we have spoken before) failing in his poison, arm'd many thousands of his Partisans, which were all slain with him. Certain of the principal Citizens of Thebes, by the help of a Spartan Army, made themselves Masters of that City, and tyranniz'd over it: so that if all conspiracies against their Country be examined, there will none, or but very few be found to have miscarried in the management; but the whole stress of their good or bad fortune has layn upon the execution, which being once pass'd, they are subject to no more dangers than what depend upon the nature of the Go∣vernment; for when a man usurps, and makes himself a Tyrant, he exposes himself to those natural and inseparable dangers which are the consequences of Tyranny, against which he has no other remedies than what have been described before.

This is what I have thought convenient to write upon the subject of Conspiracies; and if I have discoursed only of those which are executed by the sword, and not by poison, it is because they have the same orders and methods. True it is, the way of poison is the most dangerous, as being the more uncertain, because every one has not convenience, but is forc'd to confer with other people, and the necessity of that Conference is much to be feared: besides, many things happen which makes your potion ineffectual, as it fell out to those who killed Commodus; who having disgorg'd his poison, forc'd the Conspirators to strangle him. Princes then have no Enemy to which they are more dangerously exposed, than to these Conspiracies, because they are never undertaken against any of them, but they take away his life, or reputation. If they succeed, he dies; if they miscarry, and the in∣struments be put to death, it is look'd upon as a pretence and invention of the Prince to satiate his avarice or cruelty upon the blood or fortunes of his enemies. My advice there∣fore is (both to Prince and Commonwealth, that upon the discovery of a Conspiracy, (before they think of revenge) seriously to consider the quality of it, and to compare the condition of the Conspirators with their own: if they find them potent and strong, till they have furnished themselves with a proportionable force, no notice is to be taken; if notice be taken, they are unable to defend themselves, and certainly ruined; for the Con∣spirators finding themselves discovered, will grow desperate, and be under a necessity of ven∣turing, let the success be what it will. The Romans may be an example of this way of dissembling; for having (as we said before) left two of their Legions at Capua for the se∣curity of that City against the Samnites; the Commanders of the said Legions conspir'd to make themselves Masters of the Town. The Romans having notice of their designs, committed the prevention of it to Rutilius their new Consul, who to lull and delude the Conspirators, gave out that the Senate had confirmed that Station to those Legions for another winter, which the Legions believed, and thinking then they should have time enough, they neglected to hasten their design, till at length observing the Consul to draw them away insensibly, and dispose them into other parts, they began to suspect, and that suspicion made them discover themselves, and put their plot in execution. Nor can an example be brought more properly for either sides; for by it we may see how cool and re∣miss people are when they think they have time enough; and how sudden and vigorous when necessity presses them. And the Prince or Commonwealth which would defer the discovery of a Plot, cannot do it with more advantage to himself, than by giving the Con∣spirators some handsom occasion to believe that they may execute it with more ease and security another time; for thereby the Prince or Commonwealth will have more leisure to provide for their defence: they who have proceeded otherwise, have but hastened their own ruine, as we have seen in the case of the Duke of Athens, and Gulielmo de Pazzi. The Duke having made himself Sovereign in Florence, and understanding there were Conspiracies against him; without enquiring farther into the business, caused one of them to be apprehended, which giving an alarm to the rest, they immediately took arms, and turn'd the Duke out of his Supremacy. Gulielmo being Commissary for that City in the

Val di Chiana in the year 1501, having news of a great Plot in Arezzo in favour of the Vitelli, and that their design was to renounce the dominion of the Florentines, he marched thither directly, without considering the power of the Conspirators, or his own, or so much as furnishing himself with what Forces he might have done; and by the advice of the Bishop his Son, causing one of the Conspirators to be seized, the rest fell presently to their arms, disclaim'd the Florentines, and took their Commissary prisoner. But when Conspiracies are weak, and in their infancy, if they be discovered, they are to suppress them out of hand, without any suspence, and not to follow the example either of the Duke of Athens, or Dion of Syracuse, of whom the first caused a Citizen who had discovered a plot to him, to be put to death, that the rest observing how unwilling he was to believe any thing of them, might be the more secure, and hold themselves obliged. Dion on the other side suspecting the affections of some people, caused one of his Confidents called Calippus to pretend a Conspiracy, and see if he could draw them in; but both these practi∣ces succeeded very ill, for by the first, all people were discouraged from making any disco∣very, and all Conspirators confirmed; and by the other, a way was recommended for the murdering of himself; for Calippus finding he had an opportunity to practice without danger, he did it so effectually, that it cost Dion both his Government and Life.