The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

About this Item

Title
The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.
Author
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527.
Publication
London :: Printed for John Starkey, Charles Harper, and John Amery ...,
1680.
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Subject terms
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527.
Political science -- Early works to 1800.
Political ethics -- Early works to 1800.
War.
Florence (Italy) -- History.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A50274.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A50274.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 15, 2024.

Pages

Page 413

CHAP. XXVIII.
A strict eye is to be kept upon the Citizens, for many times under pretence of Of∣ficiousness, and Piety, there is hid a principle of Tyranny.

The City of Rome being distressed for want of provisions, and the publick stores be∣ing unable to supply it, it came into the thoughts of Spurius Melius (a rich Citizen of those times) to furnish the Common people gratis out of his own private stock, whereby he wrought himself so far into the favour of the people, that the Senate suspecting the ill con∣sequences of his bounty, began to conspire his destruction before his interest became too great, to which purpose they created a Dictator, who put him to death: from whence it may be observed, that many times those actions which seem charitable and pious at first sight, and are not reasonable to be condemned, are notwithstanding cruel and dangerous for a State, if not corrected in time. To make this more clear, I say a Commonwealth cannot be well governed, nor indeed subsist without the assistance and ministry of power∣ful and great men: and yet on the other side that power and reputation of particular Ci∣tizens is the occasion of tyranny. To regulate this inconvenience, it is necessary, that see∣ing there must be great men, things should be so ordered that they may have praise and reputation by such things as are rather useful than prejudicial to the State. Wherefore it is carefully to be observed what ways they take to acquire their reputation; and they are usually two, either publick or private. The publick way is when they arrive at their re∣putation by some good counsel, or some great exploit which they have atchieved for the benefit of the publick: and this way of reputation is not only not to be precluded to the Citizens, but to be opened by such promises of reward for their good counsels or actions as may both dignify and inrich them; and when a reputation is gained by these plain and sincere ways, it is never to be feared. But when their courses are private, (which is the other of the two ways) they are dangerous, nay totally pernitious. Those private ways are by obliging particular persons, by lending them mony, by marrying their relations, by defending them against the Magistrates and doing several other particular favours which may encourage their Clients to violate the Laws, and vitiate the Commonwealth; for which cause it ought to be so well fortified with good Laws, that the endeavors of such ambitious men may be either discouraged or defeated; and on the other side rewards pro∣posed to such as arrive at their greatness by any extraordinary exploit. In Rome the highest reward of those persons who behaved themselves gloriously for the good of their Country, was a triumph besides which they had other inferior honours, for more inferior services, & to restrain or punish the ambition of those who went about by private and clandestine ways to disturb the peace of their Country, their greatest remedy was to accuse them to the people, and when those accusations were insufficient, (the people being blinded by some specious pretence of benefit and advantage) they created a Dictator, who with a kind of regal authority was to reduce the delinquent from his aberrations, or punish him as he did Spurius Melius; and the leaving of one such fault unpunished, is enough to ruine a Commonwealth, for a single example afterwards will hardly be effectual.

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