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CHAP. XII.
A wise General is to put a necessity of fighting upon his own Army, but to pre∣vent it to his Enemies.
WE have formerly discoursed of what use and importance necessity is in humane Exploits, and shown how many men, compelled by necessity, have done glo∣rious things, and made their memories immortal. Moral Philosophers have told us, That the Tongue, and the Hands are noble Instruments of themselves; yet they had never brought things to that exactness and perfection, had not necessity impelled them. The Generals therefore of old, understanding well the virtue of this necessity; and how much more desperate and obstinate their Soldiers were rendered thereby, made it their care to bring their Soldiers into a necessity of fighting, and to keep it from their Enemies; to which end, they many times opened a passage for the Enemies Army, which they might easily have obstructed; and precluded it to their own, when they might as easily have passed. Whoever therefore, desires to make his Garrison stout and couragious, and obstinate for the defence of a Town, or to render his Army pertinacious in the Field, is above all things to reduce them into such a necessity, or at least to make them believe it: So that a wise General, who designs the besieging of a Town, judges of the easiness or difficulty of the expugnation, from the necessity which lies upon the Citizens to defend themselves: If the necessity of their defence be great, his enterprize is the more difficult, because the courage and obstinacy of the besieged is like to be the greater; but where there is no such necessity, there is no such danger. Hence it is that revolted Towns are much harder to be recovered, than they were to be taken at first; for at first having committed no fault, they were in fear of no punishment, and therefore surrendered more easily: But in the other case having the guilt of their defect up their Spirits, they are fearful of revenge, and so become more obstinate in their defence. These are not unusual, and yet there are other causes which render the minds of people obstinate in their defence, and one of them is the natural hatred and animosity which is frequently betwixt neighbouring Princes and States, which proceeds from an infatiable desire of Dominion in Princes, and as zealous an inclination to liberty in Commonwealths, especially if they be constituted as in Tuscany, where that emulation and jealousie has made them refractory both on the one side, and the other. Hence it is, though that the Florentines have been at greater charges than the Veneti∣ans, yet their acquests are not so much, because the Towns in Tuscany were most of them free, & by consequence more difficult to be brought to subjection; whereas the Towns which the Venetians conquered, having been most of them under Princes, and accustomed to servitude, it was indifferent to them under whose dominion they were; and they are so far from resisting a change, that they do many times desire it. So that though the Cities upon the Frontiers of the Venetian, were generally stronger, than those upon the Frontiers of the Florentine, yet they were reduced with more ease; because being not so free, they were less obstinate in their defence: when therefore, a wise General resolves upon a Siege, he is with all diligence to take away that necessity from the Citizens which may make them inflexible, either by promising indemnity, if they have deserved to be punished; or if it be only their liberty of which they are fearful, by assuring them that his designs are not against that, but only against the ambition and exorbitancy of some particular persons; which kind of promises had strange effects in the facilitating of Enterprizes, and the taking of Towns; for though wise men will easily discover the fraud, yet the multitude are commonly so impatient of War, and so mad to be at quiet, that they shut their Eyes a∣gainst any thing of mischief that comes to them under propositions of peace; by which means many Cities have lost their liberty, as it happened to Florence not long since; and to M. Crassus and his Army heretofore, who though he was sensible that the promises of the Parthians were fraudulent, and made only to keep his Soldiers from that necessity of defending themselves, yet he could not convince them, nor prevail with them to stand bravely upon their Guard, but being blinded with their overtures of Peace, both Army and General were cut off, as may be seen by the History. The Samnites, put on by the am∣bition of some of their Citizens, brake their Peace with the Romans, and invaded their Country; but being afterwards sensible of what they had done, they sent Embassadors to Rome offering restitution of what they had taken, and to deliver up the Authors of that Counsel into their hands, ••o be punished as they pleas'd; but being rejected, and their Embassadors sent home without any hopes of agreement, Pontius their General used