The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

CHAP. XXIV.

That in the generality, Castles and Citadels, do more mischief than good.

TO the States-men of our times, it may perhaps seem indiscretion or inadvertancy in the Romans, that being desirous to keep Latium, and Privernum in subjection, they built neither Castles nor Citadels to secure them: and indeed they differed exceedingly from our Florentine Politicians, who are of opinion that not only Pisa, but all other Cities whatever are to be kept under that way, and surely had the Romans been like us, they would have been of the same opinion; but differing in their courage, their judgment, and their power, they differed likewise in their resolutions. Nor during all the time of their liberty, were the Româns known to build any Castle or Citadel to keep any City in awe, or any Province in peace; only some indeed which were fortified before, they garrisoned, and continued; which being so, and quite contrary to the Sentiment of our times, I think it not amiss, if in this place I inquire whether such things be profitable or unprofitable to the persons who build them. It is therefore to be considered, that such Fortresses are erected, either to repel an Enemy, or restrain a Subject, and keep him in obedience. In the first case I do pronounce them unnecessary; in the second dangerous. They are dangerous, and do rather obstruct than promote obedience in the Subject; because the great danger of Rebellion proceeds from hatred which the people have conceived against their Prince, that hatred proceeds from his injustice to the people, and he is said to be unjust when he governs them arbitrarily, and by force, which is never so manifest, as when he builds such Ca∣stles and Citadels among them, that no man might be able in any manner to oppose him. Which being so, those kind of Fortifications are not only useless and improper to keep the Subject in subjection; but dangerous, seeing by presumption upon them, Princes are en∣couraged to treat their Subjects worse than otherwise they would do, by which they con∣tract the odium of the people; and what is the consequence? Rebellion and Blood, and Confusion: Neither when troubles arise, and Wars break out, is there that defence or security in them, as is now adays imagined; for there are only two ways of keeping a conquered people in obedience, you must either have a standing Army (as the Romans had) always ready to subdue them; or you must divide, disperse, or destroy them in such manner, that they may never get together again to disturb you: For though you impo∣verish and plunder them never so much, Spoliatis arma supersunt, They will find Arms to revenge themselves; and if you disarm them never so carefully, Furor arma, ministrat. Their fury will supply them. If you cut off their Commanders, like Hydra's, others will succeed, and do as much mischief: If you build these Castles, in time of Peace they may be serviceable, and make you more bold, and secure against your Subjects; but when War comes, and both your Subjects and Enemies infest you, it is impossible they should defend you against both. And if ever they were useless, it is now since the use of Artille∣ry is known, against the fury of which no little Fort (from whence other Guns cannot play with security again, and where they want ground for repairing their breaches, or ma∣king new retrenchments upon occasion) can possibly stand: and being so, consider serious∣ly with your self whether these kind of Fortresses are like to keep your old Subjects, or your new Conquests in obedience? If your Territory be hereditary, and you have received it from your Ancestors, to build Castles to keep your own natural Subjects in obedience, will be to little purpose, for the reasons abovesaid, seeing they will be but a means to make you and your posterity the more Tyrannical, and by consequence expose you to the hatred of the people, against which they will be afterwards unable to defend you. So that for these reasons, that neither he himself nor his heirs may have occasion to entrench too much upon the people; and the people have no occasion to abhor him, a wise Prince will never build Citadels; and though Francesco Sforza Duke of Milan was reputed a wise Man, and built a Citadel at Milan to secure his Usurpations, yet his wisdom did not appear in that, for it proved afterwards the ruine of his posterity. For presuming upon that, they took the more confidence to oppress the people, which incensed them so highly, that they re∣volted upon the first approach of an Enemy, and turned their Prince out of that Province.

So that that Citadel did him no good in time of War against the incursions of the Enemy; and in time of Peace, making him more insolent, it did but expose him to the hatred of the people; whereas if no Citadel had been built, and yet they had been so indiscreet as to have behaved themselves insolently to their Subjects, some or other of them who had been injured would have remonstrated to their Prince, the danger of his courses, before he had contracted the general odium; by which there would have been a possibility that he might have reform'd, and reconciled himself to his Subjects; and had he done so, he would have better defended himself against the French with the affections of his people, and no Citadel; than with a Citadel, and no affections of the people. Besides there are many ways of losing these Citadels; by force, by fraud, by corrupting the Governour, by starving, and by storm. And if you have lost a City, which you are in hopes of recovering by the favour of the Citadel, which still holds out for you; it will require an Army as much as if there were no Citadel at all; and so much the stronger, by how much 'tis probable the people may be more incensed from the mischief which they have received out of the Castle, than they would have been, had there been no Castle at all. Experience it self has since taught us that that Citadel of Milan was of no advantage, either to the Dukes of Milan, nor French in time of their adversity; but in time of Peace did them much prejudice, by hindring them from taking such ways as might have obliged the peo∣ple, and rendered them well affected to their Government. Guido Ubaldo Son to Fred••ric Duke of Urbin, was a great Captain as any in his time, being driven out of his Country by Coesar Borgia (Son to Alexander VI.) and recovering it afterwards by an accident, he caused all the Fortresses in the whole Province to be dismantled, and destroyed; as things which he had found by experience were more to his prejudice than security. For being beloved by the people, he would not do them the injury to put Garisons in them; and if he had, upon any invasion from the Enemy, he could not have kept them without a field Army to relieve them. Iulius the Pope, having driven the Bentivogli out of Bononia, built a Citadel there, and put in such a Governour as partly by his own ill nature, and partly by the instructions o•• his Master, killed many of the Citizens, and committed seve∣ral cruelties, which provoked the Bononians so exceedingly, that they rebelled, and reco∣vered the Citadel, which had the Governour been more moderate, might have been longer in his power. Nicolo de Castello Father of the Vitelli, (returning into his Country, from whence he had been banished by the Popes) immediately demolished two Fortresses which had been raised by Sixtus IV. as judging the hearts of the people more like than those Castles, to secure him. But of all, there is no example, evinces the unusefulness of these kind of Garisons, and the convenience of taking them away, more than that which hapned lately at Genoa; for the said City revolting from Lewis XII. of France, in the year 1507. Lewis came with a strong Army into Italy, and having reduced it, built a Castle of greater strength and capacity than any of that time; for it was built upon a promontory that Com∣manded the Sea called Godefa, the Harbour, and the Town, so that by all people it was held inexpugnable. But the French being driven out of Italy in the year 1512. Genoa rebelled (notwithstanding the Castle) and Ottanio Fegosa taking the Government upon him, in sixteen months brought the Castle to such extremity, that it was forced to surren∣der; whereupon, though he was advised to keep it as a refuge in case of any disaster; yet being a wise man, and knowing well that a Prince is in nothing so safe, as in the affections of his Subjects, he caused it to be demolished, and he found the benefit of that Counsel, for by it he has held that Government to this day; and that so strongly, that whereas be∣fore, the appearance of a thousand Foot was sufficient at any time to have carried it; his adversaries assaulted it with ten thousand, and could do him no wrong. So that we see the demolishing de Fegosa no hurt, and the making it did the King of France no good; for when he was able to bring an Army into Italy, he was able to recover Genoa without the help of the Castle; but when he could bring no Army, he could not keep it, though the Castle was for him: From whence it follows, that as the building of it, was a great expence, and the loss of it a great dishonour to the King of France; so the taking of it was great glory to Ottaviano, and the ruining it, a great advantage. And it is the same thing with those who build them in their new Conquests, to keep their new subjects in obedience, which if the example of Genoa and the French should be insufficient to prove, the Cities of Florence and Pisa, will do it effectually. The Florentines built a Citadel at Pisa, and several other Fortresses to keep it in aw; not considering that a City which had been free, and in continual emulation of the Florentine greatness, was not any other way to be kept to its duty, unless (according to the practice of the Romans) they made a fair and honourable league with it, or utterly subverted it. But how much those Fortresses answered their designs, appeared when Charles VIII. made his Expedition into Italy, to

whom they were generally surrendered, either thorow the fear or falshood of their Go∣vernors. So that had not they been built, the Florentines had never relyed so much upon them for the keeping of Pisa, but had thought of some safer way to have secured it against the King of France. I conclude then, that to keep ones own Native Country in subje∣ction, Fortresses are dangerous, and to keep new Conquests, they are ineffectual: To prove that the authority and practice of the Romans ought to be sufficient, who whenever they had a mind to restrain the power, and bridle the fury of the people, did it not by erecting new Fortresses, but by demolishing the old. If it be objected that Tarentum of old, and Brescia of late years were recovered by the fidelity of the Castles, when the Towns had revolted. I answer, that as to the recovery of Tarentum, the Castle contributed no∣thing, for the Consul Quintus Fabius was sent thither with an Army strong enough to have retaken it, had there been no Castle at all: and, what advantage was it to the Romans that the Castle held for them, if the recovery of the Town required a Consular Army, and the presence of so great a Soldier as Fabius Maximus; and that they might have retaken it without the help of the Castle, is clear in the example of Capua, which they recovered, when there was no Castle to befriend them. In the case of Brescia, the circumstances were very extraordinary; for it seldom happens that when a City revolts, and the Castle holds out for you, That the Castle has a field Army hard by, and ready to relieve you. Monsieur de Foix General for the King of France, being with his Army at Bologna, and understanding the desection of the Brescians, marched immediately to recover it, and in three days time (by the help of the Castle) was Master of it again. So that it was not wholly by the benefit of the Castle that Brescia was recovered, but by the presence and dextery of Mon∣sieur de Foix and his Army. And this example may be sufficient to ballance all others to the contrary; for we see daily in our times, multitudes of Castles taken and retaken, and following the fate of their Cities, and that with no more difficulty or variety of fortune, than when there are none at all; as has been visible in Lombardy, Romagna, the Kingdom of Naples, and all other quarters of Italy. And as to those Citadels which are built in your new Conquests, to defend you from your Enemies abroad; they also are absolutely unnecessary, where you have an Army in the field; and where you have none, they are of no use. A good Army without any such Forts, is sufficient to defend you. And this has been found by experience by all those who have been thought excellent in the Arts of War, or of Peace; and particularly by the Romans and Spartans: The Romans never erected any new Castles, and the Spartans never suffered any old; but what Cities soever they conquered, down went their Walls; nay, even in their own Cities they would not permit any fortification, as believing nothing so proper to defend them as the virtue and courage of their Citizens. A Spartan being demanded by an Athenian, Whether the Walls of Athens were not very beautiful? Yes, says the Spartan, if it was but inhabited by Women. A Prince therefore who has a good Army in the field, may have some benefit by his Castles, if they be upon the Frontiers of his Country, or in some places upon the Coast, where they may ••etard and entertain an Enemy for some time till the Army can come up: But if the Prince has no Army on foot, let his Castles be where they will, upon the Frontiers or elsewhere, they are either unserviceable or dangerous: dangerous, because they are easily lost, and made use of by the Enemy against you; or if they be too strong to be taken, yet the Enemy marches on, and leaves them unserviceable behind him. For an Army that has no Enemy in the field to confront it, takes no notice of Cities or Castles, but passing by as it pleases, rambles up and down, and ravages the whole Country; as may be observed both in ancient History and new. Francesco Maria not many years since invaded the Dutchy of Urbin, nor concern'd himself at all, though he left ten of his Enemies Cities behind him. Wherefore that Prince who has a good Army, need not stand upon Castles; and he that has no Castles, need not trouble himself to build any; all that he is to do, is, to fortifie the Town of his own residence as well as he can, and accustom the Citizens to Arms, that he may be able to sustain an Enemy, at least for a while, till he can make his conditions, or procure relief; All other designs are expensive in times of Peace; and unprofitable in time of War; so that he who considers what has been said, must acknowledge that as the Romans were wise in every thing else, so more particularly in their affairs with the Latins, and Privernates, in not thinking of Castles and Fortresses, but of more noble and generous ways of securing their allegiance.