The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

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Title
The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.
Author
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527.
Publication
London :: Printed for John Starkey, Charles Harper, and John Amery ...,
1680.
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Subject terms
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527.
Political science -- Early works to 1800.
Political ethics -- Early works to 1800.
War.
Florence (Italy) -- History.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A50274.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A50274.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 16, 2024.

Pages

CHAP. XII.
Vpon an apprehension of being invaded, whether it be better to make war, or expect it.

AMong wise men, and very good Souldiers, I have heard it often disputed, whether when two Princes are of equal strength, and one of them designing war (visibly) against the other) it be better for that Prince which is like to be invaded, to sit still, and expect him at home; or to begin with him, and make the first inroad himself? There are arguments on both sides, and they who think it best to be the aggressor, and fall upon the Enemy first, may alledge the Counsel which Craesus gave to Cyrus, when being with his Ar∣my upon the Frontiers of the Massageti, Thamyris Queen of that Country sent to him to take his choice whether she should fight him within her Country, or upon the Frontiers: if he desired to advance, she would stand still and expect him; if he had rather fight where he was, she would be with him immediately: when it came to be debated in Counsel, Craesus, contrary to the opinion of the rest, was for marching to her; and the reason he gave, was, because if she should be beaten at any distance, Cyrus would get but little of her Country, for she would have time to recruit, whereas, if she were beaten at home, he would be able to sit so close upon her skirts, that she being never capable of rallying, or bringing another Army into the field, must of necessity lose her whole Kingdom: Hanibal gave the same Counsel to Antiochus, assuring him that if the Romans were any way to be

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conquered, it was by carrying the war into Italy, for by so doing he might have the benefit of their Arms, their Wealth, and their Allies; but whilst the war was abroad, and Italy undisturbed, he would leave the man inexhaustible magazine that would supply them with what and wheresoever they had occasion; and at last Hanibal concluded that Rome was to be taken more easily than the Empire, and Italy it self, than any of its Provinces. Aga∣thocles being unable to resist the Carthaginians at home, invaded their borders, and forc'd them to a peace; and Scipio in the same manner to remove the war out of Italy, transpor∣ted it into Africk. Those who are on the other side do argue as stifly, that there can be nothing more dangerous than to hazard an Army in an enemies Country, at a great distance from their own; and they produce the Athenians for an instance, who, whilst they kept themselves upon the defensive part, and expected their enemies at home were always vi∣ctorious; but when they began to make war at a distance, and send Armies into Sicily they lost their liberty, and everything else. They produce also the Fable of Antius King of Lybia, who being invaded by Hercules the Egyptian, was invincible whilst he kept him∣self within his own borders but being inveigled out by the subtility of his enemy, he lost both his Kingdom and Life; upon which occasion that story was raised of Antius; that being born of the earth, (as they pretended) so oft as he touch'd it, so oft he received new vigour from his Mother, which Hercules perceiving, got him up in his arms, crush'd him to death.

They produce likewise more modern examples. Every body knows that Ferrand King of Naples was esteemed a wise Prince in his time, and hearing two years before his death that King Charles viii of France was preparing to invade him, he let him alone; but falling sick afterwards, as he lay upon his death-bed, he called his Son Alphonso to him, and among other things, charged him that he should expect the King of France upon his Frontiers, and fight him there, but that by no means he should be tempted beyond them; and it had been better for Alphonso to have follow'd his Counsel, for neglecting it afterwards, and sending an Army into Romagna he lost both Army and Kingdom without striking a blow: But besides these arguments on both sides, it is urged in behalf of the Aggressor, that he invades with more confidence and courage than his Adversary receives him (which is a great advantage and enhancement to his Army) That he brings many inconveniences upon the person whom he invades, to which he would not be liable, if he expected him at home. For when the enemies Country is wasted, and their Houses plunder'd, his Subjects are not much to be trusted, nor can any more Taxes be laid upon them, without great difficulty, by which means (as Hanibal said) their Magazines will be spent and their fountain dryed up that was to supply them with all Provisions for War. Besides, if your Army be in the Enemies Country, it will be under a greater necessity of fighting, and by consequence will fight more desperately than at home. But to this it is answered on the other side, That it is more for your advantage to attend your enemy in your own Country, than to seek him abroad; for thereby you may furnish your self with Victuals and Amunition, and all other necessaries without any inconvenience, and distress him by driving the Country. You may likewise with much more ease incommode and frustrate his designs, by your better know∣ledge of the Country, and what places are more proper to attack him in; as also you may attack him with your whole force at once, or give him battel as you please, which out of your own Confines is not to be done: Moreover if Fortune should be adverse, and it be your chance to be beaten; more of your Men will escape where their refuge is so near, and you will sooner rally them again: In short, if you fight at home, you venture your whole force, and not your whole fortune: but if you fight abroad, you venture your whole fortune with but part of your force: Others there have been, who with design to weaken the Enemy, and fighting him afterwards with more ease and advantage, have suffered him quietly to march several days Journey into their Country, and possess himself of several Towns; but whether they did well or not, I will not determine, only I think this distinction is to be considered, whether my Country be strong in Fortresses, and Men; as the Romans were of old, and as the Swizzers at this day; or whether it be weak and unfortified, as the Territory of the Carthaginians formerly, and France and Italy now. In this case the Enemy is by all means to be kept at a distance, because your chief strength lying in your Mony, and not in your Men, whenever you are interrupted in raising or re¦ceiving of that, your business is done; and nothing interrupts you so fatally, as an Ene∣my in your Country. And of this the Carthaginians may be an example, who whilst they were free at home, were able by their Revenue and Taxes to wage War with the Ro∣mans themselves; whereas afterwards when they were assaulted, they were not able to contend with Agathocles. The Florentines, when Castruccio of Lucca brought his Arms into their Country, could not support against him, but were forced to put themselves un∣der

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the Dominion of the King of Naples, to procure his protection; but Castruccio was no sooner dead, but they were agog again, and had the confidence to invade the Duke of Milan, and to attempt the beating him out of that Province; so couragious were they in their foreign War, and so abject at home. But when Countries are in a posture of defence, and people Martial and well disciplin'd (as the Romans of old, and the Swizzers at this day) 'tis better to keep off; for the nearer they are to their own Country, they are the harder to overcome, because they can raise more force to defend themselves, than to invade another people. Nor does the opinion of Hanibal affect me at all; for though he persua∣ded Antiochus to pass into Italy he did it as a thing that would have been more for his own, and the Carthaginian than for Antiochus his advantage; for had the Romans received those three great defeats which they received of Hanibal in Italy, in the same space of time, in France or any where else, they had been ruined irrecoverably, for they could neither have rallyed, nor recruited so soon. I do not remember any foreign Expedition by the Romans for the Conquest of any Province, in which their Army exceeded the number of 50000. But upon the invasion of the Gauls, after the first Punick war, they brought 118000 Men into the Field for their defence: Nor could they beat them afterwards in Lombardy, as they did at first in Tuscany, because it was more remote, and they could not fight them with so much convenience, nor with so many men. The Cimbri repulsed the Romans in Germany, but following them into Italy, they were defeated, and driven out again them∣selves; and the reason was, because the Romans could bring more forces against them: The Swizzers may without much difficulty be over-powered abroad, because they seldom march above 30 or 40000 strong; but to attack and beat them at home, is much more difficult, where they can bring into the field 100000 and more. I conclude therefore that that Prince whose people are in a posture, and provided for War, does wisely if he expects a Potent and dangerous Enemy at home, rather than to invade him in his own Country: But that Prince whose Country is ill provided, and whose Subjects are ill disciplined, does better if he keeps the War as far off as he can: and by so doing, each of them (in his several degree) will defend himself best.

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