The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

Machiavel's Prince.

CHAP. I.

The several sorts of Governments, and after what manner they are obtained.

THere never was, nor is at this day any Government in the World, by which one Man has rule and dominion over another, but it is either a Commonwealth, or a Monarchy. Monarchies are either heredi∣tary, where the ancestors of the Soveraign have been a long time in possession, or where they are but new. The new are either so wholly, and entirely (as Milan was to Francis Sforza) or annex'd to the hereditary Dominions of the Conquerour (as the Kingdom of Naples, to the Kingdom of Spain.) These territories thus acqui∣red are accustomed either to be subject to some Prince, or to live at liberty and free, and are subdued, either by his auxiliaries, or own forces, by his good fortune, or conduct.

CHAP. II.

Of Hereditary Principalities.

I Shall omit speaking of Commonwealths, as having discoursed of them largely elsewhere, and write in this place only of Principalities, and how according to the foregoing divi∣sion, the said Principalities may be governed, and maintained. I do affirm then that he∣reditary States, and such as have been accustomed to the Family of their Prince, are pre∣served with less difficulty than the new, and because it is sufficient not to transgress the ex∣amples of their predecessors, and next to comply and frame themselves to the accidents that occur. So that if the Prince be a person of competent industry, he will be sure to▪ keep himself in the throne, unless he be supplanted by some great, and more than ordinary force: and even then, when so supplanted, fortune can never turn tail, or be adverse to the usurper, but he will stand fair to be restored. Of this, Italy affords us an example in the Duke of Ferrara, who supported bravely against the invasion of the Venetians in 1484, and afterwards against Pope Iulius 10, upon no other foundation but his antiquity in that Government; for a natural Prince has not so much occasion or necessity to oppress his Sub∣jects, whereby it follows he must be better beloved, and retain more of the affections of his People unless some extraordinary vices concur to make him odious, so that the successi∣on and coherence of his Government, takes away the causes and memory of innovations; for one new change leaves always (as in buildings) a toothing, and aptitude of ano∣ther.

CHAP. III.

Of mixt Principalities.

BUt the difficulties consist in Governments lately acquired, especially if not absolutely new, but as members annexed to the territories of the Usurper, in which case such a Government is called mixed. The tumults and revolutions in such Monarchies proceed from a natural crosness and difficulty in all new conquests, for Men do easily part with their Prince, upon hopes of bettering their condition, and that hope provokes them to rebel, b••t most commonly they are mistaken, and experience tells them their condition is much worse.

This proceeds from another natural and ordinary cause necessitating the new Prince to overlay or disgust his new subjects by quartring his Army upon them, Taxes, or a thou∣sand other inconveniences, which are the perpetual consequents of conquest. So that you make them your Enemies who suffer, and are injured by your usurpation, but cannot pre∣serve their friendship who introduced you, because you are neither able to satisfy their ex∣pectation, or imploy strong remedies against them, by reason of your obligations, where∣fore though an usurper be never so strong, and his Army never so numerous, he must have intelligence with the natives, if he means to conquer a Province. For these reasons Lewis XII. of France, quickly subdued Milan, and lost it as quickly, for the same People which open'd him their gates, finding themselves deceived in their hopes, and disappointed in the future benefits which they expected, could not brook, nor comport with the haughti∣ness of their new Soveraign: 'tis very true, Countries that have rebelled, and are conquered the second time, are recovered with more difficulty, for the defection of the People having taken off all obligation or respect from the Usurper, he takes more liberty to secure himself by punishing offenders, exposing the suspected, and fortifying where ever he finds him∣self weak; so that Count Lodovick having been able to rescue Milan out of the hands of the French the first time, only by harrasing and infesting its borders, the second time he reco∣vered it, it was necessary for him, to arm and confederate the whole World against the said King, and that his Army should be beaten, and driven out of Italy: and this happe∣ned from the foresaid occasions. Nevertheless the French were twice dispossess'd. The general reasons of the first, we have already discoursed; it remains now that we take a pro∣spect of the second, and declare what remedies the said King Lewis had, or what another may have in his condition, to preserve himself better in his new conquests, than the King of France did before him. I say then that Provinces newly acquir'd, and joyn'd to the ancient territory of him who conquer'd them, are either of the same Country, or Language, or otherwise. In the first case, they are easily kept, especially if the People have not been too much accustomed to liberty: and to secure the possession, there needs no more than to extir∣pate the Family of the Prince which governed before; for in other things maintaining to them their old condition, there being no discrepancy in their customs, Men do acquiesce and live quietly, as has been seen in the cases of Burgundy, Bretagne, Gascogne and Normandy, which have continued so long under the Goverment of France: for though there be some difference in their language, nevertheless their Laws and customs being alike, they do ea∣sily consist. He therefore who acquires any thing, and desires to preserve it, is obliged to have a care of two things more particulary; one is, that the Family of the former Prince be extinguished; the other, that no new Laws or Taxes be imposed; whereby it will come to pass, that in a short time it may be annexed and consolidated with his old Principality. But where Conquest is made in a Country differing in Language, Customs, and Laws, there is the great difficulty, their good fortune and great industry is requisit to keep it; and one of the best and most efficacious expedients to do it, would be for the Usurper to live there himself, which would render his possession more secure, and durable, as the great Turk has done in Greece, who, in despight of all his practices and policies to keep it in subjection, had he not fixed his Imperial residence there, would never have been able to have effected it. For being present in Person, disorders are discovered in the bud, and prevented; but being at a distance, in some remote part, they come only by hear-say, and that, when they are got to a head, and commonly incurable. Besides, the Province is not subject to be pillaged by officers, by reason of the nearness and accessibleness of their Prince, which disposes those to love him who are good, and those to dread him who are other∣wise; and if any foreigner attacks it, he must do it with more care and circumspection, in respect that the Princes residence being there, it will be harder for him to lose it.

There is another Remedy, rather better than worse, and that is, to plant Colonies in one or two places, which may be as it were the Keys of that State, and either that must be done of necessity, or an Army of Horse and Foot be maintained in those parts, which is much worse; for Colonies are of no great expence; The Prince sends and maintains them at very little charge, and intrenches only upon such as he is constrain'd to dispossess of their Houses and Land, for the subsistance and accommodation of the new Inhabitants, who are but few, and a small part of the State; they also who are injur'd and offended, living dispers'd and in poverty, cannot do any mischief, and the rest being quiet and undisturb'd, will not stir, lest they should mistake, and run themselves into the same condition with their Neighbours.

I conclude likewise, That those Colonies which are least chargeable, are most faithful and inoffensive, and those few who are offended are too poor, and dispers'd, to do any hurt, as I said before; And it is to be observ'd, Men are either to be flatter'd and indulged, or utterly destroy'd; because for small offences they do usually revenge themselves, but for great ones they cannot; so that injury is to be done in such a manner, as not to fear any revenge. But if in stead of Colonies, an Army be kept on foot, it will be much more expensive, and the whole revenue of that Province being consum'd in the keeping it, the acquisition will be a loss, and rather a prejudice than otherwise, by removing the Camp up and down the Country, and changing their quarters, which is an inconvenience every man will resent, and be ready to revenge, and they are the most dangerous and implacable Enemies who are provok'd by insolences committed against them in their own houses. In all respects therefore, this kind of guard is unprofitable, whereas on the other side Colo∣nies are useful. Moreover, he who is in a Province of a different constitution (as is said before) ought to make himself head, and Protector of his inferior Neighbours, and endea∣vour with all diligence to weaken and debilitate such as are more powerful, and to have a particular care that no stranger enters into the said Province, with as much power as he; for it will always happen that some body or other will be invited by the Male-contents, either out of ambition, or fear. This is visible in the Etolians, who brought the Romans into Greece, who were never admitted into any Province, but by the temptation of the Natives. The Common method in such Cases is this; As soon as a foreign Potentate enters into a Province, those who are weaker, or disoblig'd, joyn themselves with him, out of emulation and animosity to those who are above them, insomuch that in respect of these inferiour Lords, no pains is to be omitted that may gain them; and when gain'd, they will readily and unanimously fall into one mass with the State that is conquered. Only the Conqueror is to take special care they grow not too strong, nor be intrusted with too much Authority, and then he can easily with his own forces, and their assistance keep down the greatness of his Neighbours, and make himself absolute Arbiter in that Province. And he who acts not this part prudently, shall quickly lose what he has got, and even whil'st he enjoys it, be obnoxious to many troubles and inconveniences. The Romans in their new Conquests ob∣serv'd this Course, they planted their Colonies, entertain'd the inferior Lords into their protection without increasing their power, they kept under such as were more potent, and would not suffer any foreign Prince to have interest among them. I will set down only Greece for an Example. The Etolians, and Achaians were protected; the Kingdom of the Macedonians was depress'd, and Antiochus driven out; yet the merits and fidelity of the Achaians and Etolians could never procure them any increase of Authority, nor the persua∣sions and applications of Philip induce the Romans to be his friends, till he was overcome, nor the power of Antiochus prevail with them to consent that he should retain any Sove∣raignty in that Province: For the Romans acted in that case as all wise Princes ought to do, who are to have an eye, not only upon present, but future incommodities, and to redress them with all possible industry, for dangers that are seen afar off, are easily prevented, but protracting till they are at hand, the remedies grow unseasonable, and the malady incura∣ble. And it falls out in this case, as the Physitians say of an Hectick Feaver; that at first it is easily cur'd, and hard to be known, but in process of time, no being observ'd, or resisted in the beginning, it becomes easie to be known, but very difficult to be cur'd: So is it in matters of State, things which are discover'd at a distance (which is done only by prudent men) produce little mischief, but what is easily averted: But when thorow ignorance or inadvertency, they come to that height that every one discerns them, there is no room for any remedy, and the disease is incurable: The Romans therefore foreseeing their troubles afar off, oppos'd themselves in time, and never swallow'd any injury, to put off a War, for they knew that War was not avoided, but defer'd thereby, and commonly with advantage to the Enemy; wherefore they chose rather to make War upon Philip, and Antiochus in Greece, than suffer them to invade Italy; and yet at that time there was no necessity of either,

they might have avoided them both, but they thought it not fit; for they could never relish the saying that is so frequent in the Mouths of our new Politicians, To enjoy the present benefits of time, but prefer'd the exercise of their courage and wisdom, for time carries all things along with it, and may bring good as well as evil, and ill as well as good. But let us return to France, and examine if what was there done, was conformable to what is prescribed here: and to this purpose I shall not speak of Charles VIII. but of Lewis XII. as of a Prince whose Conduct, and affairs (by reason his possession was longer in Italy) were more con∣spicuous, and you shall see how contrary he acted in every thing that was necessary for the keeping of so different a State. This Lewis was invited into Italy by the Venetians, who had an ambition to have got half Lombardy by his coming: I will not condemn the Expedition, nor blame the Counsels of that King, for being desirous of footing in Italy, and having no Allies left in that Country but all doors shut against him (upon the ill treatment which his predecessor Charles had used towards them) he was constrain'd to take his friends where he could find them, and that resolution would have been lucky enough, had he not miscarried in his other administration; for he had no sooner subdued Lombardy, but he recover'd all the reputation and dignity that was lost by King Charles: Genoa submitted; Florence courted his friendship, the Marquess of Mantoua, the Duke of Ferrara, Bentivoglio, Madam de Furli, the Lords of Faenza, Pesoro, Rimini, Camerino, Piombino; the Lucchesi, Pisani, Sanesi, all of them address themselves to him for his alliance and amity; Then the Venetians began to consider, and reflect upon their indiscretion; who to gain two Towns in Lombardy, had made the King of France Master of two thirds of all Italy. Let any one now think with how little difficulty the said King might have kept up his reputation in that Country, if he had observ'd the rules abovesaid, and protected his friends, who being nu∣merous, and yet weak, and fearful, (some of the Pope, and some of the Venetians) were always under a necessity of standing by him, and with their assistance he might easily have secured himself against any Competitor whatever. But he was no sooner in Milan, but he began to prevaricate▪ and send supplies to Pope Alexander, to put him in possession of Ro∣magna, not considering that thereby he weakned himself, and disoblig'd his friends who had thrown themselves into his arms, and agrandized the Church, by adding to its spiritual au∣thority (which was so formidable before) so great a proportion of temporal, and having committed one error, he was forc'd to proceed so far, as to put a stop to the ambition of Pope Alexander, and hinder his making himself Master of Tuscany, the said Lewis was forced into Italy again. Nor was it enough for him to have advanced the interest of the Church, and deserted his friends, but out of an ardent desire to the Kingdom of Naples, he shared it with the King of Spain; so that whereas before he was sole Umpire in Italy, he now entertained a Partner, to whom the ambitious of that Province, and his own Male-contents might repair upon occasion; and whereas the King of that Kingdom might have been made his Pensioner, he turn'd out him, to put in another that might be able to turn out himself.

It is very obvious, and no more than Natural, for Princes to desire to extend their Dominion, and when they attempt nothing but what they are able to atcheive, they are applauded, at least not upbraided thereby; but when they are unable to compass it, and yet will be doing, then they are condemned, and indeed not unworthily.

If France then with its own forces alone had been able to have enterpriz'd upon Naples, it ought to have been done; but if her own private strength was too weak, it ought not to have been divided: and if the division of Lombardy to which she consented with the Venetian, was excusable; it was, because done to get footing in Italy; But this partition of Naples with the King of Spain, is extreamly to be condemned, because not press'd or quicken'd by such necessity as the former. Lewis therefore committed five faults in this Ex∣pedition: He ruin'd the inferior Lords; He augmented the Dominion of a Neighbour Prince; He call'd in a Forreigner as puissant as himself; He neglected to continue there in person; and planted no Colonies: All which errors might have been no inconvenience whil'st he had lived, had he not been guilty of a sixt, and that was depressing the power of the Vene∣tian: If indeed he had not sided with the Church, nor brought the Spaniards into Italy, it had been but reasonable for him to have taken down the pride of the Venetian, but persuing his first resolutions, he ought not to have suffer'd them to be ruin'd, because whil'st the Venetian strength was intire, they would have kept off other people from attempting upon Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented, unless upon condition it might have been deliver'd to them, and the others would not in probability have forced it from France, to have given it to them: and to have contended with them both, no body would have had the courage. If it be urg'd that King Lewis gave up Romagna to the Pope, and the Kingdom of Naples, to the King of Spain, to evade a War, I answer, as before,

That a present mischief is not to be suffer'd to prevent a War, for the War is not averted, but protracted, and will follow with greater disadvantage.

If the Kings faith and engagements to the Pope to undertake this enterprize for him, be objected, and that he did it to recompence the dissolution of his Marriage, and the Cap which at his intercession his Holiness had confer'd upon the Legate of Amboise, I refer them for an answer, to what I shall say hereafter about the faith of a Prince, how far it obliges. So then King Lewis lost Lombardy, because he did not observe one of those rules, which others have followed with success in the Conquest of Provinces, and in their desire to keep them: Nor is it an extraordinary thing, but what happens every day, and not without reason. To this purpose I remember I was once in discourse with the Cardinal d' Amboise at Nantes, at the time when Valentino (for so Caesar Borgia Pope Alezander's Son was commonly call'd) possess'd himself of Romagna: In the heat of our Conference the Car∣dinal telling me that the Italians were ignorant of the art of War; I replyed, that the French had as little skill in matters of State, for if they had had the least policy in the world, they would never have suffer'd the Church to have come to that height and Elevation. And it has been found since by experience, that the Grandeur of the Church and the Spaniard in Italy, is derived from France, and that they in requital, have been the ruine and expulsion of the French.

From hence a general rule may be deduc'd, and such a one as seldom or never is subject to Exception. Viz. That whoever is the occasion of anothers advancement, is the cause of his own diminution: because that advancement is founded either upon the conduct or power of the Donor, either of which become suspicious at length to the person prefer'd.

CHAP. IV.

Why the Kingdom of Darius usurped by Alexander, did not rebel against his Successors, after Alexander was dead.

THE difficulties encountred in the keeping of a new Conquest being consider'd, it may well be admired how it came to pass that Alexander the Great, having in a few years made himself Master of Asia, and died as soon as he had done, That state could be kept from Rebellion: Yet his Successors enjoy'd it a long time peaceably, without any troubles or con∣cussions but what sprung from their own avarice and ambition. I answer, That all Monar∣chies of which we have any record, were govern'd after two several manners; Either by a Prince and his Servants whom he vouchsafes out of his meer grace to constitute his Mini∣sters, and admits of their Assistance in the Government of his Kingdom; or else by a Prince and his Barons who were persons advanc'd to that quality, not by favour or concession of the Prince, but by the ancientness, and Nobility of their Extraction. These Barons have their proper jurisdictions and subjects, who own their Authority, and pay them a natural respect. Those States which are govern'd by the Prince and his Servants, have their Prince more Arbitrary and absolute, because his Supremacy is acknowledged by every bo∣dy, and if another be obeyed, it is only as his Minister and Substitute, without any affection to the Man. Examples of these different Governments, we may find in our time in the per∣sons of the Grand Signore, and the King of France. The whole Turkish Monarchy is governed by a single person, the rest are but his Servants, and Slaves; for distinguishing his whole Monarchy into Provinces and Governments, (which they call Sangiacchi) he sends when and what Officers he thinks fit, and changes them as he pleases. But the King of France is established in the middle (as it were) of several great Lords, whose Soveraignty having been owned, and families beloved a long time by their Subjects, they keep their pre∣heminence, nor is it in the King's power to deprive them, without inevitable danger to himself. He therefore who considers the one with the other, will find the Turkish Empire harder to be subdued, but when once conquered, more easie to be kept: The reason of the difficulty is, because the Usurper cannot be call'd in by the Grandees of the Empire; nor hope any assistance from the great Officers, to facilitate his Enterprize, which proceeds from the reasons abovesaid, for being all slaves, and under obligation, they are not easily cor∣rupted; and if they could, little good was to be expected from them, being unable for the aforesaid reasons, to bring them any party: So that whoever invades the Turk, must expect to ••ind him entire and united, and is to depend more upon his own proper force, than any disorders among them; but having once conquered them, and beaten their Army beyond the possibility of a recruit, the danger is at an end; for there is no body remaining to be afraid

of, but the Family of the Emperor, which being once extinguished, no body else has any interest with the people, and they are as little to be apprehended after the Victory, as they were to be relyed upon before. But in Kingdoms that are governed according to the Model of France, it happens quite contrary, because having gained some of the Barons, to your side (and some of them will always be discontent, and desirous of change) you may readily enter: They can (as I said before) give you easie admission, and contribute to your Victory. But to defend, and make good what you have got, brings a long train of troubles and cala∣mities with it, as well upon your friends, as your foes. Nor will it suffice to exterminate the race of the King; forasmuch as other Princes will remain, who upon occasion, will make themselves heads of any Commotion, and they being neither to be satisfied nor ex∣tinguished, you must of necessity be expell'd upon the first Insurrection.

Now if it be considered what was the Nature of Darius his Government, it will be found to have been very like the Turks, and therefore Alexander was obliged to fight them, and hav∣ing conquered them, and Darius dying after the Victory, the Empire of the Persians remain∣ed quietly to Alexander for the reasons abovesaid; and his Successors, had they continued united, might have enjoyed it in peace, for in that whole Empire no Tumults succeeded, but what were raised by themselves. But in Kingdoms that are constituted like France, it is o∣therwise, and impossible to possess them in quiet: From hence sprung the many defections of Spain, France, and Greece from the Romans, by reason of the many little Principalities in those several Kingdoms, of which, whil'st there remained any memory, the Romans enjoyed their possession, in a great deal of incertainty, but when their memory was extinct, by power and diuturnity of Empire, they grew secure in their possessions, and quarrelling afterwards among themselves, every Officer of the Romans was able to bring a party into the field, ac∣cording to the latitude and extent of his Command in the said Provinces, and the reason was, because the race of their old Princes being extirpate, there was no body left for them to ac∣knowledge, but the Romans. These things therefore being considered, it is not to be wondred that Alexander had the good fortune to keep the Empire of Asia, whil'st the rest, as Pyrrhus and others, found such difficulty to retain what they had got, for it came not to pass from the small, or great Virtue of the Victor, but from the difference and variety of the Subject.

CHAP. V.

How such Cities and Principalities are to be Govern'd, who lived under their own Laws, before they were subdued.

WHen States that are newly conquered, have been accustomed to their liberty, and lived under their own Laws, to keep them, three ways are to be observed: The first is utterly to ruine them; the second to live personally among them; the third is (con∣tenting your self with a Pension from them) to permit them to enjoy their old priviledges and Laws, erecting a kind of Council of State, to consist of a few, which may have a care of your interest, and keep the people in amity and obedience. And that Council being set up by you, and knowing that it subsists only by your favour and authority, will not omit any thing that may propagate and inlarge them. A Town that has been anciently free, cannot more easily be kept in subjection, than by employing its own Citizens, as may be seen by the Example of the Spartans, and Romans. The Spartans had got possession of Athens, and Thebes, and setled an Oligarchie according to their fancy; and yet they lost them again. The Romans to keep Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, ordered them to be destroyed, and they kept them by that means. Thinking afterwards to preserve Greece, as the Spartans had done, by allowing them their liberty, and indulging their old Laws, they found them∣selves mistaken; so that they were forced to subvert many Cities in that Province, before they could keep it; and certainly that is the safest way which I know; for whoever conquers a free Town, and does not demolish it, commits a great error, and may expect to be ruin'd himself, because whenever the Citizens are disposed to a revolt, they betake them∣selves of course to that blessed name of Liberty, and the Laws of their Ancestors, which no length of time, nor kind usage whatever will be able to eradicate, and let all possible care and provision be made to the contrary, unless they be divided some way or other, or the Inhabitants dispersed, the thought of their old priviledges will never out of their heads, but upon all occasions they will endeavour to recover them, as Pisa did, after it had conti∣nued so many years in subjection to the Florentines; But it falls out quite contrary, where the Cities or Provinces have been us'd to a Prince whose race is extirpated and gone; for being on the one side accustomed to obey, and on the other, at a loss for their old Family,

they can never agree to set up another, and will never know how to live freely without; so that they are not easily to be tempted to rebel, and the Prince may oblige them with less difficulty, and be secure of them when he hath done. But in a Commonwealth their hatred is more inverterate, their revenge more insatiable, nor does the memory of their ancient li∣berty ever suffer, or ever can suffer them to be quiet: So that the most secure way is either to ruine them quite, or make your residence among them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Principalities acquired by ones own proper Conduct and Arms.

LEt no man think it strange, if in speaking of new Governments, either by Princes or States, I introduce great and eminent Examples; forasmuch as men in their actions follow commonly the ways that are beaten, and when they would do any generous thing, they propose to themselves some pattern of that Nature; nevertheless, being impossible to come up exactly to that, or to acquire that virtue in perfection which you desire to imitate; a wise man, ought always to set before him for his Example the actions of great Men, who have excell'd in the atchievement of some great Exploit, to the end that though his virtue and power arrives not at that perfection, it may at least come as near as is possible, and receive some tincture thereby: Like Experienced Archers, who observing the Mark to be at great distance, and knowing the strength of their Bow, and how far it will carry, they fix their aim somewhat higher than the Mark, not with design to shoot at that height, but, that by mounting their Arrow to a certain proportion, they may come the nearer to the Mark they intend. I say then, that Principalities newly acquited by an upstart Prince, are more or less difficult to maintain, as he is more or less provident that gains them. And because the happiness of rising from a private person to be a Prince, presupposes great Vir∣tue, or Fortune, where both of them concur, they do much facilitate the conservation of the Conquest: yet he who has committed least to Fortune, has continued the longest. It prevents much trouble likewise when the Prince (having no better residence elsewhere) is constrained to live personally among them. But to speak of such who by their Virtue, rather than Fortune, have advanced themselves to that Dignity, I say, that the most re∣nowned and excellent, are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and the like: And though Moses might be reasonably excepted, as being only the Executioner of God's immediate Commands, yet he deserves to be mention'd, if it were only for that Grace, which render'd him capable of Communication with God. But if we consider Cyrus, and the rest of the Conquerors and Founders of Monarchies, we shall find them extraordinary; and examining their Lives and Exploits, they will appear, not much different from Moses, who had so incomparable a Master; for by their Conversations and Successes, they do not seem to have received any thing from fortune, but occasion, and opportunity, in introducing what forms of Government they pleas'd; and as without that occasion, the greatness of their Courage had never been known, so had not they been magnanimous, and taken hold of it, that occasion had hapned in vain. It was necessary therefore for Moses, that the people of Israel should be in captivity in Egypt, that to free themselves from bondage, they might be dispos'd to follow him: It was convenient that Romulus should be turned out of Albo, and exposed to the wild beasts when he was young, that he might afterwards be made King of Rome, and Founder of that great Empire. It was not unnecessary likewise that Cyrus should ••ind the Persians mutining at the Tyranny of the Medes, and that the Medes should be grown soft, and effeminate with their long peace. Theseus could never have given proof of his Virtue and Generosity, had not the Athenians been in great troubles and confusion. These great advantages, made those great persons Eminent, and their great Wisdom knew how to improve them to the reputation, and enlargement of their Country. They then who become great by the ways of Virtue (as the Princes abovesaid) do meet with many difficulties, before they arrive at their ends, but having compass'd them once, they easily keep them: The difficulties in the acquisition, arise in part from new Laws and Customs which they are forc'd to introduce for the Establishment and security of their own dominion; and this is to be considered that there is nothing more difficult to undertake, more uncertain to succeed, and more dangerous to manage, than to make ones self Prince, and prescribe new Laws: Because he who innovates in that manner has for his Enemies all those who made any advantage by the Old Laws; and those who expect benefit by the new, will be but cool and luke-warn in his defence; which luke-warmness proceeds from a cer∣tain

awe for their adversaries who have their old Laws on their side, and partly from a na∣tural incredulity in mankind, which gives credit but slowly to any new thing, unless re∣commended first by the experiment of success. Hence it proceeds that the first time the ad∣versary has opportunity to make an attempt, he does it with great briskness, and vigour, but the defence is so t••pid and faint, that for the most part the new Prince, and his adhe∣rents perish together. Wherefore for better discussion of this case, it is necessary to in∣quire whether these innovators do stand upon their own feet, or depend upon other People; that is to say whether in the conduct of their af••airs, they do make more use of their rheto∣rick, than their Arms. In the first case, they commonly miscarry, and their designs sel∣dom succeed; but when their expectations are only from themselves, and they have power in their own hands to make themselves obeyed, they run little or no hazard, and do frequently prevail. For further eviction, the Scripture shows us that those of the Pro∣phets whose Armes were in their hands, and had power to compel, succeeded better in the reformations which they designed; whereas those who came only with exhortation and good language, suffer'd Martyrdom and Banishment, because (besides the reasons above said) the People are unconstant, and susceptible of any new Doctrine at first, but not ea∣sily brought to retain it: so that things are to be ordered in such manner that when their Faith begins to stagger, they may be forc'd to persist. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Ro∣mulus could never have made their Laws to have been long observed, had they not had power to have compelled it; as in our days it happen'd to Frier Ierome Savanorola, who ruined himself by his new institutions, as soon as the People of Florence began to desert him; for he had no means to confirm them who had been of his opinion, nor to constrain such as dissented. Wherefore such persons meet with great difficulty in their affairs; all their dangers are still by the way, which they can hardly overcome, but by some extraor∣dinary virtue, and excellence: nevertheless when once they have surmounted them, and arrived at any degree of veneration, having supplanted those who envyed their advance∣ment, they remain puissant, and firm, and honorable, and happy. I will add to these great examples, another, perhaps not so conspicuous; but one that will bear a proportion and resemblance with the rest, and shall satisfie me for all others of that nature. It is of Hiero of Syracuse, who of a private person was made Prince of that City, for which he was beholding to fortune no further than for the occasion, because the Syracusans being under oppression, chose him for their Captain, in which command he behav'd himself so well, he deserved to be made their Prince, for he was a person of so great virtue and excellence, that those who have writ of him, have given him this Character, that even in his private condition, he wanted nothing, but a Kingdom to make him an admirable King. This Hiero subdued the old Militia, established a new; renounced the old Allies; confederated with others; and having friends and forces of his own, he was able upon such a foundation to erect what fabrick he pleas'd; so that though the acquisition cost him much trouble, he maintain'd it with little.

CHAP. VII.

Of new Principalities acquired by accident, and the supplies of other People.

THey who from private condition ascend to be Princes, and meerly by the indulgence of fortune, arrive without much trouble at their dignity, though it costs them dear to maintain it, meet but little difficulty in their passage, being hurried as it were with wings, yet when they come to settle and establish, then begins their misery. These kind of Persons are such as attain their dignity by Bribes, or concession of some other great Prince, as it hapned to several in Greece in the Cities of Ionia, and upon the Hellespont; where they were invested with that power by Darius for his greater security and Glory, and to those Emperours who arrived at the Empire by the corruption of the Souldiers. These persons I say, subsist wholly upon the pleasure and fortune of those who advanced them, which being two things very valuable and uncertain; they have neither knowledg nor power to continue long in that degree; know not, because unless he be a Man of extraordinary quali∣ties and virtue, it is not reasonable to think he can know how to command other people, who before lived always in a private condition himself; cannot, because they have no for∣ces upon whose friendship, and fidelity they can rely. Moreover States which are suddenly conquered (as all things else in nature whose rise and increase is so speedy) can have no root or

foundation, but what will be shaken and supplanted by the first gust of adversity, unless they who have been so suddenly exalted, be so wise as to prepare prudently in time for the conservation of what fortune threw so luckily into their lap, and establish afterwards such fun∣damentals for their duration, as others (which I mentioned before) have done in the like cases. About the arrival at this Authority either by virtue, or good fortune I shall in∣stance in two examples that are fresh in our memory, one is Francis Sforza, the other Cae∣sar Borgio; Sforza by just means, and extraordinary virtue made himself Duke of Milan, and enjoyed it in great peace, though gained with much trouble. Borgia on the other side (called commonly Duke of Valentine) got several fair territories by the fortune of his Father Pope Alexander, and lost them all after his death, though he used all his industry, and em∣ployed all the Arts which a wise and brave Prince ought to do to fix himself in the sphear, where the Arms, and fortune of other people had placed him: For he (as I said before) who laid not his foundation in time, may yet raise his superstructure, but with great trouble to the Architect, and great danger to the building. If therefore the whole progress of the said Duke be considered, it will be found what solid foundations he had laid for his future dominion, of which progress I think it not superfluous to discourse, because I know not what better precepts to display before a new Prince, than the example of his actions, and though his own orders and methods did him no good, it was not so much his fault, as the malignity of his fortune.

Pope Alexander the sixth had a desire to make his Son Duke Valentine great, but he saw ma∣ny blocks and impediments in the way both for the present, and future. First he could not see any way to advance him to any territory that depended not upon the Church, and to those in his gift, he was sure the Duke of Milan, and the Venetians would never consent, for Faenza and Riminum had already put themselves under the Venetian protection. He was likewise sensible that the forces of Italy, especially those who were capable of assisting him, were in the hands of those who ought to apprehend the greatness of the Pope, as the Ursini, Colonnesi, and their followers, and therefore could not repose any great confidence in them: besides, the Laws and alliances of all the States in Italy must of necessity be distur∣bed, before he could make himself Master of any part, which was no hard matter to do, finding the Venetians upon some private interest of their own, inviting the French to another expedition into Italy, which his Holiness was so far from opposing, that he promoted it by dissolution of King Lewis his former marriage. Lewis therefore passed the Alps by the assistance of the Venetians, and Alexanders consent, and was no sooner in Milan, but he sent forces to assist the Pope in his enterprize against Romagna, which was immediatly surrendred upon the Kings reputation. Romagna being in this manner reduc'd by the Duke, and the Colonnesi defeated, being ambitious not only to keep what he had got, but to ad∣vance in his Conquests, two things obstructed; one was the infidelity of his own Army; the other, the aversion of the French: for he was jealous of the forces of the Ursini who were in his service; suspected by would fail him in his need, and either hinder his con∣quest, or take it from him when he had done; and the same fears he had of the French; and his jealousie of the Ursini was much increased, when after the expugnation of Faenza, assaul∣ting Bologna, he found them very cold and backward in the attack: and the King's incli∣nation he discover'd, when having possess'd himself of the Dutchy of Urbin, he invaded Tuscany, and was by him requir'd to desist. Whereupon the Duke resolved to depend no longer upon fortune, and foraign assistance, and the first course he took, was to weaken the party of the Ursini, and Colonni in Rome, which he effected very neatly by debauch∣ing such of their adherants as were Gentlemen, taking them into his own service, and gi∣ving them honorable pensions, and Governments, and Commands, according to their respective qualities, so that in a few months, their passion for that faction evaporated, and they turn'd all for the Duke. After this he attended an opportunity of supplanting the Ur∣sini, as he had done the Family of the Colonni before; which happened very luckily, and was as luckily improved: for the Ursini considering too late, that the greatness of the Duke and the Church tended to their ruine, held a Council at a place called Magione in Perugia, which occasioned the rebellion of Urbin, the tumults in Romagna, and a thousand dangers to the Duke besides; but though he overcame them all by the assistance of the French, and recovered his reputation, yet he grew weary of his foreign allies, as having nothing fur∣ther to oblige them, and betook himself to his artifice, which he managed so dexterously, that the Ursini reconciled themselves to him, by the mediation of Seignor Paulo, with whom for his security he comported so handsomly by presenting with mony, rich stuffs, and Horses, that being convinced of his integrity, he conducted them to Sinigaglia, and deliver'd them into the Dukes hands. Having by this means exterminated the chief of his adversaries, and reduc'd their friends, the Duke had laid a fair foundation for his great∣ness,

having gain'd Romagna and the Dutchy of Urbin, and insinuated with the People by giving them a gust of their future felicity. And because this part is not unworthy to be known for imitation sake, I will not pass it in silence. When the Duke had possess'd himself of Romagna, finding it had been governed by poor and inferiour Lord's, who had rather robb'd than corrected their Subjects, and given them more occasion of discord than unity, insomuch as that Province was full of robberies, riots, and all manner of insolencies; to reduce them to unanimity, and subjection to Monarchy, he thought it necessary to pro∣vide them a good Governor, and thereupon he confer'd that charge upon R••miro d' Orco, with absolute power, though he was a cruel, and a passionate Man. Orce was not long before he had settled it in peace, with no small reputation to himself. Afterwards the Duke apprehending so large a power might grow odious to the people, he erected a Court of judicature in the middle of the Province, in which every City had its advocate, and an excellent person was appointed to preside. And because he discover'd that his pass'd ••verity had created him many Enemies; to remove that ill opinion, and recover the affections of the people he had a mind to show that if any cruelty had been exercised, it proceeded not from him, but from the arrogance of his Minister; and for their further confirmation; he caused the said Governor to be apprehended, and his Head chopt off one morning in the Market place at Cesena, with a wooden dagger on one side of him, and a bloody knife on the other; the ferocity of which spectacle not only appeas'd, but amaz'd the people for a while. But reassuming our discourse, I say, the Duke finding himself powerfull enough, and secure against present danger, being himself as strong as he desired, and his neighbours in a manner reduced to an incapacity of hurting him, being willing to go on with his con∣quests, there remaining nothing but a jealousie of France, and not without cause, for he knew that King had found his errour at last, and would be sure to obstruct him. Hereupon he be∣gan to look abroad for new allies, and to haesitate and stagger towards France, as appear∣ed when the French Army advanced into the Kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who had besieg'd Cajeta; his great design was to secure himself against the French, and he had doubtless done it, if Alexander had lived. These were his provisions against the dangers that were imminent, but those that were remote, were more doubtful and uncertain. The first thing he feared was, lest the next Pope should be his enemy, & reassume all that Alexan∣der had given him, to prevent which he proposed four several ways. The first was by de∣stroying the whole line of those Lord's whom he had dispossess'd, that his Holiness might have no occasion to restore them; The second was to cajole the Nobility in Rome, and draw them over to his party, that thereby he might put an aw, and restraint upon the Pope. The third was, if possible to make the Colledge his friends. The fourth was to make himself so strong before the Death of his Father, as to be able to stand upon his own legs, and repel the first violence that should be practised against him. Three of these four expe∣dients he had try'd••before Alexander died, and was in a fair way for the fourth, all the disseiz'd Lord's which came into his Clutches, he put to death, and left few of them re∣maining: he had insinuated with the Nobility of Rome and got a great party in the Col∣ledge of Cardinals, and as to his own corroboration, he had design'd to make himself Ma∣ster of Tuscany, had got possession of Perugia, and Piombino already, and taken Pisa into his protection: and having now farther regard of the French (who where beaten out of the Kingdom of Naples by the Spaniard, and both of them reduc'd to necessity of seeking his amity) he leapt bluntly into Pisa, after which Lucca, and Sienna submitted without much trouble, partly in hatred to the Florentines, and partly for fear, and the Florentines were grown desperate & without any hopes of relief; so that had these things happened before, as they did the same year in which Alexander died, doubtless he had gain'd so much strength and reputation, that he would have stood firm by himself, upon the basis of his own pow∣er and conduct▪ without depending upon fortune, or any foreign••supplies. But his Fa∣ther died five years after his Son had taken up Arms, and left him nothing solid, and in certainty but Romagna only, and the rest were in nubious, infested with two formidable Ar∣mies, and himself mortally sick. This Duke was a Man of that magnanimity and prudence, understood so well which way Men were to be wheedled, or destroy'd, and such were the foundations that he had laid in a short time, that had he not had those two great Armies upon his back, and a fierce distemper upon his body, he had overcome all difficulties, and brought his designs to perfection. That the foundations which he had laid were plausible, appear'd by the patience of his Subjects in Romagna who held out for him a compleat month, though they knew he was at deaths door, and unlikely ever to come out of Rome: to which place though the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and Ursini return'd, seeing there was no likelyhood of his recovery, yet they could not gain any of his party, nor debauch them to their side: 'tis possible he was not able to put who he pleas'd into the Pontifical chair,

yet he had power enough to keep any man out who he thought was his Enemy: But had it been his fortune to have been well when his Father Alexander died, all things had suc∣ceeded to his mind. He told me himself about the time that Iulius XI. was created, that he had considered well the accidents that might befal him upon the death of his Father, and provided against them all, only he did no imagine that at his death, he should be so near it himself. Upon serious Examination therefore of the whole Conduct of Duke Valentine, I see nothing to be reprehended, it seems rather proper to me to propose him (as I have done) as an Example for the imitation of all such as by the favour of fortune, or the supplies of other Princes, have got into the saddle; for his mind being so large, and his intentions so high, he could not do otherwise, and nothing could have opposed the greatness and wis∣dom of his designs, but his own infirmity, and the death of his Father. He therefore who thinks it necessary in the minority of his Dominion to secure himself against his Enemies; to gain himself Friends, to overcome whether by force, or by fraud; to make himself belov'd, or fear'd by his people; to be followed and reverenced by his Soldiers; to destory and exterminate such as would do him injury; to repeal and suppress old Laws, and intro∣duce new; to be severe, grateful, magnanimous, liberal, cashier and disband such of his Army as were unfaithful, and put new in their places; manage himself so in his alliances with Kings and Princes, that all of them should be either obliged to requite him, or affear'd to offend him; He, I say cannot find a fresher or better Model than the actions of this Prince. If in any thing he be to be condemned, it is in suffering the Election of Iulius XI. which was much to his prejudice; for though (as is said before) he might be unable to make the Pope as he pleased; yet it was in his power to have put any one by, and he ought never to have consented to the Election of any of the Cardinals whom he had formerly offended, or who after their promotion were like to be jealous of him; for men are as mischievous for fear, as for hatred. Those Cardinals which he had disobliged, were among others, the Cardinals of St. Peter ad Vincula, Collonno St. George, and Ascanius. The rest, if any of them were advanced, to the Papacy, might well be afraid of him, except the Spanish Cardi∣nals, and the Cardinal of Roan; The Spaniards by reason of their obligations and alliance; and the other, by reason of his interest in the Kingdom of France. Wherefore above all things, the Duke should have made a Spanish Cardinal Pope; and if that could not have been done, he should rather have consented to the Election of Roan, than St. Peter ad Vin∣cula; for 'tis weakness to believe, that among great persons, new obligations can obliterate old injuries and disgusts. So that in the Election of this Iulius XI. Duke Valentine com∣mitted and Error that was the cause of his utter destruction.

CHAP. VIII.

Of such as have arriv'd at their Dominion, by wicked and injustifiable means

NOw because there are two ways from a private person to become a Prince, which ways are not altogether to be attributed either to fortune or management, I think it not convenient to pretermit them, though of one of them I may speak more largely where occasion is offered to treat more particularly of Republicks. One of the ways is when one is advanced to the Soveraignty by any illegal nefarious means: The other when a Citi∣zen by the favour and partiality of his Fellow-Citizens is made Prince of his Country. I shall speak of the first in this Chapter, and justifie what I say by two Examples, one Ancient, the other Modern, without entring farther into the merits of the cause, as judging them sufficient for any man who is necessitated to follow them. Agathocles the Sicilian, not only from a private, but from a vile and abject Condition, was made King of Syracuse, and be∣ing but the Son of a Potter, he continued the dissoluteness of his life, thorow all the degrees of his fortune: Nevertheless his vices were accompanied with such courage and activity, that he applyed himself to the Wars, by which, and his great industry, he came at length to the Pretor of Syracuse: Being settled in that Dignity, and having concluded to make him∣self Prince, and hold that by violence, without obligation to any body, which was conferred upon him by consent, he settled an intelligence with Amilcar the Carthaginian, who was then at the head of an Army in Sicily, and calling the People and Senate of Syracuse toge∣ther one morning, as if he had been to consult them in some matter of importance to the State, upon a signal appointed, he caus'd his Soldiers to kill all the Senators and the most wealthy of the People; after whose death, he usurped and possessed the Dominion of that

City without any obstruction: and though afterwards he lost two great Battels to the Carthaginians, and at length was besieg'd, yet he was not only able to defend that City, but leaving part of his forces for the security of that, with the rest he transported into Africk, and ordered things so, that in a short time he reliev'd Syracuse, and reduced the Carthagi∣nians into such extream necessity, that they were glad to make peace with him, and content∣ing themselves with Africk, leave Sicily to Agathocles. He then who examines the Exploits and Conduct of Agathocles▪ will find little or nothing that may be attributed to fortune, seeing he rose not (as is said before) by the favour of any man, but by the steps and grada∣tions of War; with a thousand difficulties and dangers having gotten that Government, which he maintained afterwards with as many noble Atchievements. Nevertheless it cannot be called Virtue in him to kill his fellow-Citizens, betray his Friends, to be without faith, without pity, or Religion; these are ways may get a Man Empire, but no glory nor repu∣tation: Yet if the Wisdom of Agathocles be considered, his dexterity in encountring, and overcoming of dangers, his Courage in supporting and surmounting his misfortunes; I do not see why he should be held inferiour to the best Captains of his time. But his unbounded cruelty, and barbarous inhumanity, added to a million of other Vices, will not permit that he be numbred amongst the most Fxcellent Men. So then that which he performed cannot justly be attributed to either Fortune or Virtue, for he did all himself without either the one or the other. In our days under the Papacy of Alexander VI. Oliverotto da Fermo being left young many years since by his Parents, was brought up by his Unckle by the Mothers side, call'd Iohn Togliani, and in his youth listed a Soldier under Paulo Vitelli, that having improved himself by his Discipline, he might be capable of some Eminent Command. Paulo being dead, he served under Vitellezzo his Brother and in short time by the acuteness of his parts, and the briskness of his Courage, became one of the best Officers in his Army. But thinking it beneath him to continue in any Man's Service, he conspir'd with some of his fellow-Citizens of Fermo (to whom the servitude of their Country, was more agreeable than its liberty) by the help of Vitellesco to seize upon Fermo: In order to which, he writ a Letter to his Unckle Iohn Fogliano, importing, That having been absent many years, he had thoughts of visiting him and Fermo, and taking some little diversion in the place where he was born, and because the design of his Service had been only the gaining of Ho∣nour, That his fellow-Citizens might see his time had not been ill spent, he desired admis∣sion for a hundred Horse of his Friends, and his Equipage, and beg'd of him that he would take care they might be honourably received, which would redound not only to his Honour, but his Unckles, who had had the bringing him up. Iohn was not wanting in any Office to his Nephew, and having caus'd him to be nobly received, he lodged him in his own House, where he continued some days, preparing in the mean time what was necessary to the Exe∣cution of his wicked design: he made a great Entertainment, to which he invited Iohn Fogliani, and all the chief Citizens in the Town. About the end of the treatment, when they were entertaining one another, as is usual at such times, Oliverotto very subtilly pro∣moted certain grave discourses about the greatness of Pope Alexander, and Cesar his Son, and of their Designs; Iohn and the rest replying freely to what was said, Oliverotto smil'd, and told them those were points to be argued more privately, and thereupon removing into a chamber, his Unckle, and the rest of his fellow-Citizens followed; They were scarce sate down, before Soldiers (which were conceal'd about the room) came forth, and kill'd all of them, and the Unckle among the rest; After the Murder was committed Oliverotto mounted on Horseback, rode about, and rummaged the whole Town, having besieged the chief Magistrate, in his Palace; so that for fear, all people submitted, and he establish'd a Government of which he made himself Head. Having put such to death as were discontent∣ed, and in any capacity of doing him hurt, he fortified himself with new Laws, both Military and Civil, insomuch as in a years time he had not only fix'd himself in Fermo, but was become terrible to all that were about him; and he would have been as hard as Agathocles to be supplanted, had he not suffered himself to have been circumvented by Cesar Borgia, when at Singalia (as aforesaid) he took the Ursini, and Vitelli; where also he himself was taken a year after his Parracide was committed, and strangled with his Master Vitellozzo from whom he had learned all his good qualities, and evil

It may seem wonderful to some people how it should come to pass that Agathocles, and such as he, after so many Treacheries, and acts of inhumanity, should live quietly in their own Country so long, defend themselves so well against foreign Enemies, and none of their Subjects conspire against them at home; seeing several others, by reason of their cruelty, have not been able, even in times of Peace, as well as War, to defend their Government. I conceive it fell out according as their cruelty was well or ill applyed: I say well applyed (if that word may be added to an ill action) and it may be called so, when commited but

once, and that of necessity for ones own preservation, but never repeated afterwards, and even then converted as much as possible to the benefit of the Subjects. Ill applyed, are such cruelties as are but few in the beginning, but in time do rather multiply than decrease. Those who are guilty of the first, do receive assistance sometimes both from God and Man, and Agathocles is an instance. But the others cannot possibly subsist long: From whence it is to be observed, that he who usurps the Government of any State, is to execute and put in practice all the cruelties which he thinks material at once, that he may have no occasion to renue them often, but that by his discontinuance, he may mollifie the People, and by his benefits bring them over to his side: He who does otherwise, whether for fear, or ill Coun∣sel, is obliged to be always ready with his Knife in his hand, for he can never repose any confidence in his Subjects, whilst they, by reason of his fresh and continued inhumanities cannot be secure against him: So then Injuries are to be committed all at once, that the last being the less, the distaste may be likewise the less; but benefits should be distilled by drops, that the relish may be the greater. Above all a Prince is so to behave himself towards his Subjects, that neither good fortune or bad should be able to alter him; for being once assaulted with adversity, you have no time to do mischief, and the good which you do, does you no good, being looked upon as forced, and so no thanks to be due for it.

CHAP. IX.

Of Civil Principality.

I Shall speak now of the other way, when a Principal Citizen, not by wicked contrivance, or intolerable violence is made Soveraign of his Country, which may be called a Civil Principality, and is not to be attained by either Virtue, or Fortune alone, but by a lucky sort of craft; This Man I say arrives at the Government by the favour of the People or No∣bility; for in all Cities the meaner, and the better sort of Citizens are of different humours, and it proceeds from hence that the common people are not willing to be commanded and oppressed by the great ones, and the great ones are not to be satisfied without it: From this diversity of appetite, one of these three Effects do arise, Principality, Liberty, or Licen∣tiousness. Principality is caused either by the people, or the great ones, as, either the one, or the other has occasion: The great ones finding themselves unable to resist the popular tor∣rent, do many times unanimously confer their whole Authoriry upon one Person, and create him Prince, that under his protection they may be quiet and secure. The people on the other side, when over-power'd by their Adversaries, do the same thing, transmitting their power to a single Person, who is made King for their better defence. He who arrives at the Soveraignty by the assistance of the great ones, preserves it with more difficulty, than he who is advanced by the people, because he has about him many of his old Associates, who thinking themselves his Equals, are not to be directed and managed as he would have them. But he that is preferred by the people, stands alone without Equals, and has no body, or very few about him, but what are ready to obey: Moreover the Grandees are hardly to be satisfied without injury to others, which is otherwise with the people, because their designs are more reasonable, than the designs of the great ones, which are fixt upon commanding, and oppressing altogether, whil'st the people endeavour only to defend and secure them∣selves. Moreover where the people is adverse, the Prince can never be safe, by reason of their numbers, whereas the great ones are but few, and by consequence not so dangerous. The worst that a Prince can expect from an injured and incensed people, is to be deserted; but if the great ones by provoked, he is not only to fear abandoning, but conspiracy, and banding against him; for the greater sort being more provident and cunning, they look out in time to their own safety, and make their interest with the Person, who they hope will overcome. Besides the Prince is obliged to live always with one and the same people, but with the Grandees he is under no such obligation, for he may create, and degrade ad∣vance and remove them as he pleases. But for the better Explication of this part, I say, That these great men are to be considered two ways especially; That is, whether in the manner of their administration they do wholly follow the fortune and interest of the Prince, or whether they do otherwise. Those who devote themselves entirely to his business, and are not rapacious, are to be valued and preferred. Those who are more remiss, and will not stick to their Prince, do it commonly upon two Motives, either out of laziness or fear (and in those cases they may be employed, especially if they be wise and of good Counsel, because if affairs prosper, thou gainest honour thereby; if they miscarry, thou needest not

to fear them) or upon ambition, and design, and that is a token that their thoughts are more intent upon their own advantage than thine. Of these a Prince ought always to have a more than ordinary care, and order them as if they were Enemies professed, for in his distress they will be sure to set him forwards, and do what they can to destroy him. He therefore who comes to be Prince by the favour and suffrage of the People, is obliged to keep them his friends, which (their desire being nothing but freedom from oppression) may be easily done. But he that is preferred by the interest of the Nobles against the minds of the Commons, is above all things to endeavour to ingratiate with the People, which will be as the other if he undertakes their protection: And Men receiving good Offices, where they expected ill, are indear'd by the surprize, and become better affected to their Benefactor, than perhaps they would have been, had he been made Prince by their imme∣diate favour. There are many ways of insinuating with the People, of which no certain rule can be given, because they vary according to the diversity of the subject, and therefore I shall pass them at this time concluding with this assertion, that it is necessary above all things, that a Prince preserves the affections of his people, otherwise in any Exigence, he has no refuge nor remedy. Nabides Prince of the Spartans, sustained all Greece, and a Vi∣ctorious Army of the Romans, and defended the Government and Country against them all; and to do that great action, it was sufficient for him to secure himself against the Machina∣tions of a few, whereas if the People had been his Enemy, that would not have done it. Let no man impugn my opinion with that old saying, he that builds upon the People, builds upon the sand. That is true indeed when a Citizen of private Condition relies upon the people, and persuades himself that when the Magistrate, or his Adversary, goes about to oppress him, they will bring him off, in which case many presidents may be produced, and particularly the Gracchi in Rome, and Georgio Scali in Florence. But if the Prince that builds upon them, knows how to command, and be a man of Courage not dejected in adversity, nor deficient in his other preparations, but keeps up the spirits of his people by his own Valour and Conduct, he shall never be deserted by them, nor find his foundations laid in a wrong place.

These kind of Governments are most tottering and uncertain, when the Prince strains of a sudden, and passes (as at one leap) from a Civil, to an absolute power, and the reason is, because they either command, and act by themselves, or by the Ministry and Mediation of the Magistrate: In this last case their authority is weaker, and more ticklish, because it de∣pends much upon the pleasure and concurrence of the Chief Officers, who (in time of ad∣versity especially) can remove them easily, either by neglecting, or resisting their Com∣mands: nor is there any way for such a Prince in the perplexity of his affairs to establish a Tyranny because those Citizens and Subjects who used to exercise the Magistracy, retain still such power and influence upon the people, that they will not infringe the Laws, to obey his; and in time of danger he shall always want such as he can trust, So that a Prince is not to take his measures according to what he sees in times of peace when of the Subjects (having nothing to do but to be governed) every one runs, every one promises, and every one dyes for him, when death is at a distance: but when times are tempestuous, and the ship of the State has need of the help and assistance of the Subject, there are but few will expose themselves: And this experiment is the more dangerous, because it can be practised but once: So then, a Prince who is provident and wise ought to carry himself so, that in all place, times, and occasions the People may have need of his ad∣ministration and Regiment, an ever after they shall be faithful and true.

CHAP. X.

How the strength of all principalities is to be computed.

TO any man that examines the nature of principalities, it is worthy his consideration, whether a Prince has power and territory enough to subsist by himself, or whether he needs the assistance, and protection of other People. To clear the point a little better, I think those Princes capable of ruling, who are able either by the numbers of their men, or the greatness of their wealth to raise a compleat Army, and bid Battel to any that shall invade them; and those I think depend upon others, who of themselves dare not meet their Enemy in the field, but are forced to keep within their bounds, and defend them as well as they can. Of the first we have spoken already, and shall say more as occasion is presented. Of the second no more can be said, but to advise such Princes to strengthen and fortifie the

Capital Town in their Dominions, and not to trouble himself with the whole Country; and whoever shall do that, and in other things, manage himself with the Subjects as I have described, and perhaps shall do hereafter, shall with great caution be invaded, for men are generally wary and tender of enterprizing any thing that is difficult▪ and no great easiness is to be found in attacking a Town well fortified and provided, where the Prince is not hated by the People.

The Towns in Germany are many of them free; though their Country and district be but small, yet they obey the Emperor but when they please, and are in no awe either of him, or any other Prince of the Empire, because they are all so well fortified, every one looks upon the taking of any one of them as a work of great difficulty and time, their Wals being so strong, their Ditches so deep, their works so regular, and well provided with Cannon, and their stores and Magazines always furnish'd for a Twelvemonth. Besides which, for the aliment and sustenance of the People, and that they may be no burthen to the publick, they have work-houses where for a year together the poor may be employed in such things as are the Nerves and life of that City, and sustain themselves by their labour. Military Discipline and Exercises are likewise much request there, and many Laws and good Customs they have to maintain them.

A Prince then who has a City well fortified, and the affections of his people, is not easily to be molested, and he that does molest him, is like to repent it, for the affairs of this world are so various, it is almost impossible for any Army to lie quietly a whole year before a Town, without interruption. If any objects that the people having houses and possessions out of the Town, will not have patience to see them plundered and burned; and that Cha∣rity to themselves will make them forget their Prince; I answer, that a wise and dexterous Prince will easily evade those difficulties, by encouraging his Subjects and persuading them, sometimes their troubles will not be long; sometimes, inculcating, and possessing them with the cruelty of the Enemy; and sometimes by correcting and securing himself nimbly of such as appear too turbulent and audacious. Moreover the usual practice is for the Enemy to plunder and set the Country on fire at their first coming, whil'st every man's spirits is high, and fixed upon defence; so that the Prince needs not concern himself, nor be fearful of that for those mischiefs are pass'd, and inconveniencies received, and when the People in three or four days time begin to be cool, and consider things soberly, they will find there is no remedy and joyn more cordially with the Prince, looking upon him as under an obligation to them, for having sacrificed their Houses and Estates in his defence. And the nature of Man is such, to take as much pleasure in having obliged another, as in being obliged himself. Wherefore all things fairly considered, it is no such hard matter for a Prince not only to gain, but to retain the affection of his Subjects, and make them patient of a long Siege, if he be wise, and provident, and takes care, they want nothing, either for their livelyhood or defence.

CHAP. XI

Of Ecclesiastical Principalities

THere remains nothing of this Nature to be discoursed, but of Ecclesiastical Principa∣lities about which the greatest difficulty is to get into possession, because they are gained either by Fortune or Virtue, but kept without either, being supported by ancient Statutes universally received in the Christian Church, which are of such power and authority, they do keep their Prince in his dignity, let his conversation or conduct be what it will. These are the only persons who have lands & do not defend them, Subjects, & do not go∣vern them, and yet their lands are not taken from them though they never defend them, nor their Subjects dissatisfied, though they never regard them; so that these Principalities are the happiest and most secure in the world; but being managed by a supernatural power above the wisdom and contrivance of man; I shall speak no more of them, for being set up, and continued by God himself, it would be great presumption in any man who should undertake to dispute them. Nevertheless, if it should be questioned how it came to pass that in Temporal things the Church is arrived at that height, seeing that before, Alexan∣der's time, the Italian Ptinces, not only such as were Soveraigns, but every Baron and Lord, how inconsiderable soever in Temporal affairs, esteemed of them but little; yet since, it has been able not only to startle and confront the King of France, but to drive him out of Italy, and to ruine the Venetians, the reason of which, though already well known, I think it not superfluous, to revive in some measure.

Before Charles King of France passed himself into Italy, that Province was under the Empire of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, Duke of Milan, and the Floren∣tines. It was the interest of these Potentates, to have a care, some of them that no foreign Prince should come with an Army into Italy, and some that none among themselves should usurp upon the other. Those of whom the rest were concern'd to be most jealous, were the Pope, and the Venetian: to restrain the Venetians, all the rest were us'd to con∣federate, as in the defence of Ferrara. To keep under the Pope, the Roman Barons contri∣buted much, who being divided into two factions (the Ursini, and Colonnessi in perpetual contention, with their Arms constantly in their hands under the very nose of the Pope) they kept the Pontifical power very low, and infirm: and although now and then there happened a couragious Pope (as Sextus) yet neither his courage, wisdom, nor fortune was able to disintangle him from those incommodities; and the shortness of their reign was the reason thereof; for ten years time (which was as much as any of them reign'd) was scarce suf∣ficient for the suppression of either of the parties, and when the Colonnesi as a man may say were almost extinct, a new Enemy sprang up against the Ursini, which revived the Colonne∣si, and reestablished them again. This emulation and animosity at home, was the cause the Pope was no more formidable in Italy; after this Alexander VI. was advanc'd to the Pa∣pacy, who more than all that had ever been before him, demonstrated what a Pope with mony and power was able to do; having taken advantage of the French invasion, by the Ministry and conduct of Duke Valentine, he performed all that I have mentioned else where among the Actions of the said Duke. And though his design was not so much to advantage the Church, as to aggrandize the Duke, yet what he did for the one, turned afterwards to the benefit of the other, for the Pope being dead, and Valentine extinct, what both of them had got, devolv'd upon the Church: after him Iulius succeeded, and found the Church in a flourishing condition; Romagna was wholly in its possession, the Barons of Rome exterminated, and gone, and their factions suppressed by Pope Alexander, and be∣sides, a way opened for raising and hoarding of mony never practised before; which way Iulius improving rather than otherwise, he began to entertain thoughts, not only of con∣quering Bologna, but mastering the Venetians, and forcing the French out of Italy. All which great enterprizes succeeding, it added much to his honor that he impropriated no∣thing, but gave all to the Church. He maintained also the Colonnesi and Ursini in the same condition as he found them, and though in case of sedition there were those ready on both sides to have headed them, yet there were two considerations which kept them at Peace. One was the greatness of the Church which kept them in awe; the other was their want of Cardinals, which indeed was the Original of their discontents, and will never cease till some of them be advanced to that dignity; for by them the Parties in Rome and without, are maintained, aud the Barons oblig'd to defend them; so that the ambition of the pre∣lates is the cause of all the dissention and tumults among the Barons.

His present Holiness Pope Leo had the happiness to be elected at a time when it was most powerful, and it is hop'd, if they made the Church great by their Arms, he by the inte∣grity of his conversation▪ and a thousand other virtues will enlarge it much more and make it more venerable and august.

CHAP. XII.

How many forms there are of Military Discipline, and of those Souldiers which are called Mercenary

HAving spoken particularly of the several sorts of Principalities as I proposed in the be∣ginning; considered in part the reasons of their constitution and their evil; and the ways which many have taken to acquire, and preserve them; it remains that I pro∣ceed now in a general way upon such things as may conduce to the offence, or defence of either of them.

We have declared before that it is not only expedient, but necessary for a Prince to take care his foundations be good, otherwise his fabrick will be sure to fail.

The principal foundations of all States, (new, old, or mixt) are good Laws, and good Arms, and because there cannot be good Laws, where there are not good arms, and where the Arms are good, there must be good Laws, I shall pass by the Laws, and discourse of the Arms.

I say, the Arms then with which a Prince defends his State, are his own, Mercenary, Auxilia∣ry

or mixt. The Mercenary, and Auxiliary are unprofitable, and dangerous, and that Prince who founds the duration of his Government upon his Mercenary forces, shall never be firm nor secure, for they are divided, ambitious, undisciplin'd, unfaithful, insolent to their friends, abject to their Enemies, without fear of God, or faith to Men, so the ruine of that person who trusts to them is no longer protracted, than the attempt is deferred; in time of peace they divorce you, in time of War they desert you, and the reason is be∣cause it is not love, nor any principle of honor that keeps them in the field, 'tis only their pay, and that is not a consideration strong enough to prevail with them to die for you; whilst you have more service to imploy them in, they are excellent Souldiers; but tell them of an engagement, and they will either disband before, or run away in the battel.

And to evince this, would require no great pains; seeing the ruine of Italy proceeded from no other cause, than that for several years together it had repos'd it self upon Merce∣nary Arms; which forces 'tis possible may have formerly done service to some particular per∣son, and behav'd themselves well enough among one another, but no sooner were they attackt by a powerful foreigner, but they discovered themselves, and shewed what they were to the World: hence it was that Charles 8 chaulk'd out his own way into Italy; and that person was in the right, who affirmed our own faults were the cause of our miseries; but it was not those faults he believed, but those I have mention'd, which being commit∣ted most eminently by Princes, they suffered most remarkably in the punishment. But to come closer to the point, and give you a clearer prospect of the imperfection and infe∣licity of those forces. The great officers of these mercenaries, are Men of great courage, or otherwise; if the first, you can never be safe, for they always aspire to make themselves great, either by supplanting of you who is their Master, or oppressing of other People, whom you desir'd to have preserved; and on the other side, if the Commanders be not couragious you are ruined again; if it should be urged that all Generals will do the same, whether mercenaries or others, I would answer, that all War is managed either by a Prince or Republick: the Prince is obliged to go in person, and perform the office of General himself: the Republick must depute some one of her choice Citizens, who is to be changed, if he carries himself ill; If he behaves himself well, he is to be continued, but so straitned and circumscrib'd by his commission, that he may not transgress: and indeed experience tells us that Princes alone, and Common wealths alone with their own private forces have performed great things, whereas mercenaries do nothing but hurt. Besides, a martial Commonwealth that stands upon its own legs, and maintains it self by its own prowess, is not easily usurp'd, and falls not so readily under the obedience of one of their fellow Citi∣zens, as where all the forces are foreign. Rome, and Sparta maintained their own liberty for many years together by their own forces and Arms: the Swisses are more material than their Neighbours, and by consequency more free. Of the danger of Mercenary forces, we have an ancient example in the Carthaginians, who after the end of their first War with the Romans, had like to have been ruin'd, and overrun by their own Mercenaries, though their own Citizens commanded them.

After the death of Epaminondas the Thebans made Philip of Macedon their General, who defeated their Enemies, and enslaved themselves. Upon the death of Duke Philip, the Milanesi entertained Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, and Francesco, having worsted the Ene∣my at Caravaggio, joyned himself with him, with design to have master'd his Masters, Francesco's Father was formerly in the service of Ioan Queen of Naples, and on a sudden marched away from her with his Army, and left her utterly destitute, so that she was constrain'd to throw her self under the protection of the King of Aragon, and though the Venetians, and Florentines both, have lately enlarged their Dominion by employing these forces, and their Generals have rather advanced than enslav'd them; I answer that the Flo∣rentines may impute it to their good fortune, because, of such of their Generals as they might have rationally feared, some had no Victories to encourage them, others were obstructed, and others turned their ambition another way; he that was not Victorious was Giovanni Acuto, whose fidelity could not be known, because he had no opportunity to break it, but every body knows, had he succeeded, the Florentines had been all at his mercy: Sforza had always the Bracceschi in opposition, and they were reciprocally an impediment the one to the other. Francesco turned his ambition upon Lombardy, Braccio upon the Church, and the Kingdom of Naples. But to speak of more modern occurrences. The Florentines made Paul Vitelli their General, a wise Man, and one who from a private for∣tune had raised himself to a great reputation: had Paul taken Pisa, no body can be in∣sensible how the Florentines must have comported with him, for should he have quitted their service, and taken pay of their Enemy, they had been lost without remedy, and to have continued him in that power, had been in time to have made him their Master. If

the progress of the Venetians be considered, they will be found to have acted securely, and honorably whilst their affairs were managed by their own forces (which was before they attempted any thing upon the terra firma) then all was done by the Gentlemen and Com∣mon People of that City, and they did very great things; but when they began to enter∣prize at land, they began to abate of their old reputation and discipline, and to degenerate into the customs of Italy; and when they began to conquer first upon the Continent, ha∣ving no great territory, and their reputation being formidable abroad, there was no occasi∣on that they should be much afraid of their officers; but afterwards when they began to ex∣tend their Empire, under the command of Carmignola, then it was they became sensible of their error; for having found him to be a great Captain by their Victories (under his con∣duct) against the Duke of Milan, perceiving him afterwards grow cool and remiss in their service, they concluded, no more great things were to be expected from him; and being neither willing, nor indeed able to take away his commission, for fear of losing what they had got, they were constrain'd for their own security to put him to Death. Their Gene∣rals after him were Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San. Severino, and the Conte de Piti∣gliano, and such as they, under whose conduct the Venetians were more like to lose than to gain, as it hapned not long after at Vaila, where in one Battel they lost as much as they had been gaining eight hundred years with incredible labour and difficulty; which is not strange, if it be considered that by those kind of forces the conquests are slow, and tedious, and weak; but their losses are rapid and wonderful. And because I am come with my ex∣amples into Italy, where for many years all things have been manag'd by mercenary Ar∣mies, I shall lay my discourse a little higher, that their Original and progress being ren∣dred more plain, they may with more ease be regulated and corrected. You must under∣stand that in latter times when the Roman Empire began to decline in Italy, and the Pope to take upon him authority in Temporal affairs, Italy became divided into several States: For many of the great Cities took Arms against their Nobility, who having been formerly favoured by the Emperours, kept the People under oppression, against which the Church opposed, to gain to it self a reputation and interest in temporal affairs: other Cities were subdued by their Citizens who made themselves Princes; so that Italy (upon the tran∣slation of the Empire) being fallen into the hands of the Pope and some other Common∣wealths; and those Priests and Citizens unacquainted with the use and exercise of Arms; they began to take foreigners into their pay: the first Man who gave reputation to these kind of forces was Alberigo da Como of Romagna: among the rest Braccio and Sforza (the two great Arbiters of Italy in their time) were brought up under his discipline, after whom succeeded the rest who commanded the Armies in Italy to our days: and the end of their great discipline and conduct was, that Italy was overrun by Charles, pillaged by Lewis, violated by Ferrand, and defamed by the Swizzers. The order which they observ'd, was first to take away the reputation from the Foot, and appropriate it to themselves; and this they did, because their dominion being but small, and to be maintained by their own indu∣stry, a few foot could not do their business, and a great body they could not maintain; hereupon they changed their Militia into horse, which being digested into Troops they sustain'd and rewarded themselves with the commands, and by degrees this way of Caval∣ry was grown so much in fashion, that in an Army of 20000 Men, there was scarce 2000 Foot to be found. Besides they endeavour'd with all possible industry to prevent trouble or fear, either to themselves or their Souldiers, and their way was by killing no body in fight, only taking one another Prisoners, and dismissing them afterwards without either preju∣dice or ransom. When they were in Leaguer before a Town, they shot not rudely amongst them in the night, nor did they in the Town disturb them with any sallies in their Camp; no approaches or intrenchments were made at unseasonable hours, and nothing of lying in the field when Winter came on; and all these things did not happen by any negligence in their Officers, but were part of their discipline, and introduc'd (as is faid before) to ease the poor Souldier both of labour and danger, by which practices they have brought Italy both into slavery, and contempt.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Auxiliaries, mix'd, and Natural Soldiers.

AUxiliaries (which are another sort of unprofitable Soldiers) are when some potent Prince is called in to your assistance and defence; as was done not long since by Pope Iulius, who in his Enterprize of Ferrara having seen the sad experience of his Mercenary Army, betook himself to auxiliaries, and capitulated with Ferrand King of Spain, that he should come with his Forces to his relief. These Armies may do well enough for themselves, but he who invites them, is sure to be a sufferer; for if they be beaten, he is sure to be a loser, if they succeed, he is left at their discretion; and though ancient Histories are full of examples of this kind, yet I shall keep to that of Pope Iulius XI, as one still fresh in our Memory, whose Expedition against Ferrara was very rash and inconsiderate, in that he put all into the hands of a stranger; but his good fortune presented him with a third accident, which prevented his reaping the fruit of his imprudent Election; for his subsidiary Troops being broken at Ravenna, and the Swizzers coming in, and beating off the Victors, beyond all expectation he escaped being a Prisoner to his Enemies, because they also were de∣feated, and to his Auxiliary friends, because he had conquered by other peoples Arms. The Florentines being destitute of Soldiers, hired 10000 French for the reduction of Pisa, by which Counsel they ran themselves into greater danger, than ever they had done in all their troubles before. The Emperor of Constantinople in opposition to his Neighbors, sent 10000 Turks into Greece, which could not be got out again when the War was at an end, but gave the first beginning to the servitude and captivity which those Infidels brought upon that Country. He then who has no mind to overcome, may make use of these Forces, for they are much more dangerous than the Mercenary, and will ruine you out of hand, because they are always unanimous, and at the command of other people, whereas the Mercenaries after they have gotten a Victory, must have longer time, and more occasion before they can do you a mischief, in respect they are not one body, but made up out of several Coun∣tries entertain'd into your pay, to which if you add a General of your own, they cannot suddenly assume so much Authority as will be able to do you any prejudice, In short, it is Cowardize and sloth that is to be feared in the Mercenaries, and courage and activity in the Auxiliaries. A wise Prince therefore never made use of these Forces, but committed him∣self to his own; choosing rather to be overcome with them, than to conquer with the other, because, he cannot think that a Victory, which is obtain'd by other peoples Arms. I shall make no scruple to produce Caesar Borgia for an Example. This Duke invaded Romagna with an Army of Auxiliaries, consisting wholly of French, by whose assistance he took Imola, and Furli: But finding them afterwards to totter in their faith, and himself insecure, he betook himself to Mercenaries, as the less dangerous of the two, and entertained the Ursini and Vitelli into his pay; finding them also irresolute, unfaithful, and dangerous, he dis∣miss'd them, and for the future employed none but his own. From hence we may collect the difference betwixt these two sorts of Forces, if we consider the difference in the Dukes reputation when the Ursini and Vitelli were in his Service, and when he had no Soldiers but his own: When he began to stand upon his own Legs, his renown began to increase, and indeed, before, his esteem was not so great, till every body found him absolute Master of his own Army.

Having begun my Examples in Italy, I am unwilling to leave it, especially whil'st it supplies us with such as are fresh in our memory; yet I cannot pass by Hiero of Syracuse, whom I have mentioned before. This person being made General of the Syracusan Army, quickly discovered the Mercenary Militia was not be relied upon, their Officers being qualified like ours in Italy, and finding that he could neither continue, not discharge them securely, he ordered things so, that they were all cut to pieces, and then prosecuted the War with his own Forces alone, without any foreign assistance. To this purpose the Old Testament affords us a figure not altogether improper. When David presented himself to Saul, and offered his Service against Goliah the Champion of the Philistius, Saul to encou∣rage him, accoutred him in his own Arms, but David having tryed them on, excused himself, pretending they were unfit, and that with them he should not be able to manage himself; wherefore he desired he might go forth against the Enemy with his own Arms only, which were his Sling and his Sword. The sum of all is, the Arms of other people are commonly unfit; and either too wide, or too strait, or too cumbersom.

CHARLES VII. the Father of Lewis XI. having by his Fortune and Courage re∣deem'd his Country out of the hands of the English, began to understand the necessity of having Soldiers of his own, and erected a Militia at home to consist of Horse as well as Foot, after which, his Son King Lewis cashiered his own Foot, and took the Swissers into his pay, which error being followed by his Successors, (as is visible to this day) is the occasion of all the dangers to which that Kingdom of France is still obnoxious; for having advanced the reputation of the Swisses he vilified his own people, by disbanding the foot entirely, and accustoming his Horse so much to engage with other Soldiers, that fighting still in Conjun∣ction with the Swissers, they began to believe they could do nothing without them; Hence it proceeds that the French are not able to do any thing against the Swisses, and without them they will venture upon nothing: So that the French Army is mix'd, consists of Mer∣cenaries, and Natives, and is much better than either Mercenaries or Auxiliaries alone, but much worse than if it were entirely Natural, as this Example testifies abundantly; for doubtless France would be insuperable, if Charles his Establishment was made use of, and improv'd: But the imprudence of Man begins many things, which favouring of persent good, conceal the poyson that is latent, (as I said before of the Hectick Feaver) wherefore if he who is rais'd to any Soveraignty, foresees not a mischief till it falls upon his head, he is not to be reckoned a wise Prince, and truly that is a particular blessing of God, bestowed upon few people: if we reflect upon the first cause of the ruine of the Roman Empire, it will be found to begin at their entertaining the Goths into their Service, for thereby they weakened and enervated their own Native courage, and (as it were) transfused it into them.

I conclude therefore, that without having proper and peculiar forces of his own, no Prince is secure, but depends wholly upon fortune, as having no Natural and intrinsick strength to sustain him in adversity: and it was always the opinion, and position of wise Men, that nothing is so infirm and unstable as the name of Power, not founded upon forces of its own; those forces are composed of your Subjects, your Citizens, or Servants, all the rest are either Mercenaries or Auxiliaries, and as to the manner of Ordering and Disciplining these Domesticks, it will not be hard, if the Orders which I have prescribed be perused, and the ways considered which Philip the Father of Alexander the Great, and many other Princes and Republicks have used in the like cases, to which Orders and Establishments I do wholly refer you.

CHAP. XIV.

The duty of a Prince in relation to his Militia.

A Prince then is to have no other design, nor thought, nor study, but War, and the Arts and Disciplines of it; for indeed that is the only profession worthy of a Prince, and is of so much importance, that it not only preserves those who are born Princes in their patrimonies, but advances men of private condition to that Honorable degree. On the otherside it is frequently seen when Princes have addicted themselves more to delicacy and softness, than to Arms, they have lost all, and been driven out of their States; for the prin∣cipal things which deprives or gains a man authority, is the neglect or profession of that Art: Francesco Sforza by his Experience in War, of a private person made himself Duke of Milan, and his Children, seeking to avoid the fatigues and incommodities thereof, of Dukes became private Men; for among other evils and inconveniences which attend when you are ignorant in War, it makes you contemptible, which is a scandal a Prince ought with all diligence to avoid, for reasons I shall name hereafter; besides betwixt a potent, and an impotent, a vigilant and a negligent Prince there is no proportion, it being unreasona∣ble that a Martial and Generous person should be subject willingly to one that is weak and remiss; or that those who are careless and effeminate, should be safe amongst those who are Military and Active; for the one is too insolent, and the other too captious, ever to do any thing well together; so that a Prince unacquainted with the Discipline of War, besides, other infelicities to which he is expos'd, cannot be beloved by, nor confident in his Armies. He never therefore ought to relax his thoughts from the Exercises of War, not so much as in time of Peace, and indeed then he should employ his thoughts more studiously therein, than in War it self, which may be done two ways, by the application of the body, and the mind. As to his bodily application, or matter of action, besides that he is obliged to keep his Armies in good Discipline and Exercise, he ought to inure himself to sports, and by

Hunting and Hawking, and such like recreation, accustom his body to hardship, and hun∣ger, and thirst, and at the same time inform himself of the Coasts and situation of the Country, the bigness and elevation of the Mountains, the largeness and avenues of the Val∣lies, the extent of the Plains, the Nature of the Rivers and Fens, which is to be done with great curiosity; and this knowledge is useful two ways; for hereby he not only learns to know his own Country, and to provide better for its defence, but it prepares and adapts him, by observing their situations, to comprehend the situations of other Countries, which will perhaps be necessary for him to discover: For the Hills, the Vales, the Plains, the Rivers, and the Marshes (for Example) in Tuscany, have a certain similitude and resem∣blance with those in other Provinces; so that by the knowledge of one, we may easily ima∣gine the rest: and that Prince who is defective in this, wants the most necessary qualification of a General; for by knowing the Country, he knows how to beat up his Enemy; take up his quarters; March his Armies; Draw up his Men; and besiege a Town with advantage. In the Character which Historians give of Philopomenes Prince of Achaia, one of his great Commendations is, that in time of peace he thought of nothing but Military affairs, and when he was in Company with his Friends in the Country, he would many times stop sud∣denly, and expostulate with them; if the Enemy were upon that Hill, and our Army where we are, which would have the advantage of the ground? How could we come at them with most security? if we would draw off, how might we do it best? Or if they would retreat, how might we follow? so that as he was travelling, he would propose all the accidents to which an Army was subject; he would hear their opinion, give them his own, and reinforce it with arguments; and this he did so frequently, that by continual pra∣ctice, and a constant intention of his thoughts upon that business, he brought himself to that perfection, no accident could happen, no inconvenience could occur to an Army, but he could presently redress it. But as to the exercise of the mind, a Prince is to do that by diligence in History, and solemn consideration of the actions of the most Excellent Men; by observing how they demean'd themselves in the Wars, examining the grounds and rea∣sons of their Victories, and Losses, that he may be able to avoid the one, and imitate the other; and above all, to keep close to the Example of some great Captain of old (if any such occurs in his reading) and not only to make him his pattern, but to have all his actions perpetually in his mind, as it was said Alexander did by Achilles; Caesar by Alexander, Scipio by Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus written by Xenophon, will find how much Scipio advantaged his renown by that imitation, and how much in modesty, affability, humanity, and liberality he framed himself to the description which Xenophon had given him. A wise Prince therefore is to observe all these rules, and never be idle in time of peace, but employ himself therein with all his industry, that in his adversity he may reap the fruit of it, and when fortune frowns, be ready to defie her.

CHAP. XV.

Of such things as render Men (especially Princes) worthy of blame, or applause.

IT remains now that we see in what manner a Prince ought to comport with his Subjects and friends: and because many have writ of this subject before, it may perhaps seem ar∣rogant in me, especially considering that in my discourse I shall deviate from the opinion of other Men. But my intention being to write for the benefit and advantage of him who understands, I thought it more convenient to respect the essential verity, than the ima∣gination of the thing (and many have fram'd imaginary Commonwealths and Govern∣ments to themselves which never were seen, nor had any real existence) for the present manner of living is so different from the way that ought to be taken, that he who neglects what is done, to follow what ought to be done, will sooner learn how to ruine, than how to preserve himself; for a tender Man, and one that desires to be honest in every thing, must needs run a great hazard among so many of a contrary Principle. Wherefore it is necessa∣ry for a Prince that is willing to subsist, to harden himself, and learn to be good, or other∣wise according to the exigence of his affairs. Laying aside therefore all imaginable no∣tions of a Prince, and discoursing of nothing but what is actually true, I say that all Men when they are spoken of, especially Princes (who are in a higher and more eminent stati∣on) are remarkable for some quality or other that makes them either honorable or con∣temptible. Hence it is that some are counted liberal, others miserable (according to the

propriety of the Tuscan word Misero, for Quaro in our language is one that desires to ac∣quire by rapine, or any otherway; Misero is he that abstains too much from making use of his own) some munificent, others rapacious, some cruel, others merciful; some faith∣less, others precise. One poor spirited and effeminate, another fierce and ambitious, one courteous, another haughty, one modest, another libidinous, one sincere, another cun∣ning, one rugged and morose, another accessible and easie, one grave, another giddy, one a Devote, and another an Atheist. No man (I am sure) will deny but that it would be an admirable thing, and highly to be commended to have a Prince endued with all the good qualities abovesaid; but because it is impossible to have, much less to exercise them all, by reason of the frailty and crossness of our Nature, it is convenient that he be so well instru∣cted as to know how to avoid the scandal of those Vices which may deprive him of his State, and be very cautious of the rest, though their consequence be not so pernicious, but where they are unavoidable, he need trouble himself the less. Again, he is not to concern himself, if run under the infamy of those Vices without which his Dominion was not to be preserved; for if we consider things impartially, we shall find some things in appearance are virtuous, and yet if pursued, would bring certain destruction; and others on the contrary that are seemingly bad, which if followed by a Prince, procure his peace and security.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Liberality, and Parsimony.

TO begin then with the first of the above-mentioned qualities, I say, it would be advan∣tagious to be accounted liberal; nevertheless liberality so used as not to render you formidable, does but injure you, for if it be used virtuously, and as it ought to be, it will not be known, nor secure you from the imputation of its contrary: To keep up therefore the name of liberal amongst men, it is necessary that no kind of luxury be omitted, so that a Prince of that disposition will consume his revenue in those kind of expences, and be obliged at last, if he would preserve that reputation, to become grievous, and a great exactor upon the people, and do whatever is practicable for the getting of Money, which will cause him to be hated of his Subjects, and despised by every body else, when he once comes to be poor, so that offending many with his liberality, and rewarding but few, he becomes sen∣sible of the first disaster, and runs great hazard of being ruined, the first time he is in dan∣ger; which when afterwards he discovers, and desires to remedy; he runs into the other extream, and grows as odious for his avarice. So then if a Prince cannot exercise this vir∣tue of liberality, so as to be publickly known, without detriment to himself, he ought if he be wise, not to dread the imputation of being covetous, for in time he shall be esteemed liberal when it is discovered that by his parsimony he has increased his revenue to a Condi∣tion of defending him against any Invasion, and to enterprize upon other people, without oppressing of them; so that he shall be accounted Noble to all from whom he takes nothing away, which are an infinite number; and near and parsimonious only to such few as he gives nothing to.

In our days we have seen no great action done, but by those who were accounted misera∣ble, the other have been always undone. Pope Lulius XI. made use of his bounty to get into the Chair, but (to enable himself to make War with the King of France) he never practised it after, and by his frugality he maintained several Wars without any tax or impo∣sition upon the people, his long parsimony having furnished him for his extraordinary expences. The present King of Spain, if he had affected to be thought liberal, could never have undertaken so many great designs, nor obtain'd so many great Victories. A Prince therefore ought not so much to concern himself (so he exacts not upon his Subjects, so he be able to defend himself, so he becomes not poor and despicable, nor commits rapine upon his people) though he be accounted covetous, for that is one of those Vices which fortifies his Dominion, If any one objects that Caesar by his liberality made his way to the Em∣pire, and many others upon the same score of reputation have made themselves great; I answer, That you are either actually a Prince, or in a fair way way to be made one. In the first case liberality is hurtful; in the second, 'tis necessary, and Caesar was one of those who design'd upon the Empire: But when he was arrived at that dignity, if he had lived, and not retrenched his Expences, he would have ruined that Empire. If any replys, Many have been Princes, and with their Armies performed great matters, who have been reputed liberal, I rejoyn, that a Prince spends either of his own, or his Subjects, or other peoples.

In the first case, he is to be frugal: In the second he may be as profuse as he pleases, and baulk no point of liberality. But that Prince whose Army is to be maintained with free quarter, and plunder, and exactions from other people, is obliged to be liberal, or his Army will desert him; and well he may be prodigal of what neither belongs to him, nor his Subject, as was the case with Caesar, and Cyrus and Alexander; for to spend upon anothers stock, rather adds to, than substracts from his reputation, 'tis spending of his own, that is so mortal, and pernicious. Nor is there any thing that destroys it self like liberality; for in the use of it, taking away the faculty of using it, thou becomest poor and contemptible, or to avoid that poverty, thou makest thy self odious and a Tyrant; and there is nothing of so much importance to a Prince to prevent, as to be either contemptible or odious, both which depend much upon the prudent exercise of your liberality. Upon these considerations it is more wisdom to lie under the scandal of being miserable, which is an imputation rather infamous, than odious, than to be thought liberal, and ••un your self into a necessity of playing the Tyrant, which is infamous and odious both.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Cruelty, and Clemency, and whether it is best for a Prince to be beloved, or feared.

TO come now to the other qualities proposed, I say every Prince is to desire to be esteemed rather merciful than cruel, but with great caution that his mercy be not abused; Caesar Borgia was counted cruel, yet that cruelty reduced Romagna, united it, setled it in peace, and rendered it faithful: so that if well considered, he will appear much more merciful than the Florentines, who rather than be thought cruel, suffered Pistoia to be destroyed: A Prince therefore is not to regard the scandal of being cruel, if thereby he keeps his Subjects in their Allegiance, and united, seeing by some few examples of Justice you may be more merciful, than they who by an universal exercise of pity, permit several disorders to follow, which occasion Rapine and Murder; and the reason is, because that exorbitant mercy has an ill effect upon the whole universality, whereas particular Execu∣tions extend only to particular persons. But among all Princes, a new Prince has the hardest task to avoid the scandal of being cruel, by reason of the newness of his Government, and the dangers which attend it: Hence Virgil in the person of Dido excused the inhospitality of her Government.

Res dura, & regni novitas, metalia cogunt Moliri, & late fines Custode tueri.

My new Dominion, and my harder fate Constrains me to't, and I must guard my State.

Nevertheless he is not to be too credulous of reports, too hasty in his motions, nor create fears and jealousies to himself, but so to temper his administrations with prudence and hu∣manity, that neither too much confidence may make him careless, nor too much diffidence inrolerable. And from hence arises a new question, Whether it be better to be belov'd than fear'd, or fear'd than belov'd? It is answered, Both would be convenient, but because that is hard to attain, it is better and more secure (if one must be wanting) to be fear'd than belov'd; for in the general, Men are ingrateful, inconstant, hypocritical, fearful of danger, and covetous of gain; whil'st they receive any benefit by you, and the danger is at distance, they are absolutely yours, their Blood, their Estates, their Lives, and their Children (as I said before) are all at your Service, but when mischief is at hand, and you have present need of their help, they make no scruple to revolt: And that Prince who leaves himself naked of other preparations, and relies wholly upon their professions, is sure to be ruined; for an••ity contracted by price, and not by the greatness and generosity of the mind, may seem a good pennyworth; yet when you have occasion to make use of it, you will find no such thing. Moreover Men do with less remorse offend against those who desire to be beloved, than against those who are ambitious of being feared, and the reason is because Love is fasten'd only by a ligament of obligation, which the ill Nature of Mankind, breaks upon every occa∣sion that is presented to his profit; But fear depends upon an apprehension of punishment, which is never to be dispell'd. Yet a Prince is to render himself aweful in such fort, that if

he gains not his Subjects love, he may eschew their hatred; for to be feared and not hated, are compatible enough, and he may be always in that condition, if he offers no violence to their Estates, nor attempts any thing upon the honour of their Wifes, as also when he has occasion to take away any Man's life, if he takes his time when the cause is manifest, and he has good matter for his justification: But above all things, he is to have a care of intren∣ching upon their Estates, for men do sooner forget the death of their Father, than the loss of their Patrimony: Besides occasions of confiscation, never fail, and he that gives once way to that humour of rapine, shall never want temptation to ruine his Neighbor. But on the contrary, provocations to blood, are more rare, and do sooner evaporate: But when a Prince is at the head of his Army, and has a multitude of Soldiers to govern, then it is absolutely necessary not to value the Epithet of cruel, for without that, no Army can be kept in unity, nor in disposition for any great act.

Among the several instances of Hannibal's great Conduct, it is one, That having a vast Army, constituted out of several Nations, and conducted to make War in an Enemies Country, there never hapned any Sedition among them, or any Mutiny against their Ge∣neral, either in his adversity or prosperity: Which can proceed from nothing so probably as his great cruelty, which, added to his infinite Virtues, rendered him both aweful, and terrible to his Soldiers, and without that, all his Virtues would have signified nothing. Some Writers there are (but of little consideration) who admire his great Exploits, and condemn the true causes of them. But to prove that his other Virtues would never have carried him thorow, let us reflect upon Scipio, a person Honorable not only in his own time, but in all History whatever; nevertheless his Army mutined in Spain, and the true cause of it was, his too much gentleness and lenity, which gave his Soldiers more liberty than was sutable or consistant with Military Discipline. Fabius Maximus upbraided him by it in the Senate, and call'd him Corrupter of the Roman Militia; The inhabitants of Locrus having been plundered and destroyed by one of Scipio's Lieutenants, they were never redressed, nor the Legat's insolence corrected, all proceeding from the mildness of Scipio's Nature, which was so eminent in him, that a person undertaking to excuse him in the Se∣nate, declared, that there were many who knew better how to avoid doing ill themselves, than to punish it in other people. Which temper would doubtless in time have eclipsed the glory and reputation of Scipio, had that authority been continued in him; but receiving Orders, and living under the direction of the Senate, that ill quality, was not only not dis∣covered in him, but turned to his renown. I conclude therefore according to what I have said about being feared, or beloved; That forasmuch as men do love at their own discre∣tion, but fear at their Princes, a wise Prince is obliged to lay his foundation upon that which is in his own power, not what which depends on other people, but (as I said before) with great caution that he does not make himself odious.

CHAP. XVIII.

How far a Prince is obliged by his promise.

HOw Honorable it is for a Prince to keep his word, and act rather with integrity than collusion, I suppose every body understands: Nevertheless Experience has shown in out times, That those Princes who have not pinn'd themselves up to that punctuality and preciseness, have done great things, and by their cunning and subtilty not only circum∣vented, and darted the brains of those with whom they had to deal, but have overcome, and been too hard for those who have been so superstitiously exact. For further explana∣tion, you must understand there are two ways of contending, by Law, and by force: The first is proper to Men; the second to Beasts; but because many times the first is insufficient, recourse must be had to the second. It belongs therefore to a Prince to understand both, when to make use of the rational, and when of the brutal way; and this is recommended to Princes (though abstrusely) by ancient Writers, who tell them how Achilles and several other Princes were committed to the Education of Chiron the Centaur, who was to keep them under his Discipline, choosing them a Master, half Man and half Beast, for no other reason but to show how necessary it is for a Prince to be acquainted with both, for that one without the other will be of little duration. Seeing therefore it is of such impor∣tance to a Prince to take upon him the Nature and disposition of a Beast, of all the whole flock, he ought to imitate the Lyon and the Fox: for the Lyon is in danger of toils and snares, and the Fox of the Wolf: So that he must be a Fox to find out the snares, and a Lyon to

fright away the Wolves, but they who keep wholly to the Lyon, have no true notion of themselves. A Prince therefore that is wise and prudent, cannot, nor ought not to keep his p••••ole, when the keeping of it is to his prejudice, and the causes for which he promised, removed. Were men all good, this Doctrine was not to be taught, but because they are wicked, and not likely to be punctual with you, you are not obliged to any such strictness with them: Nor was their ever any Prince that wanted lawful pretence to justifie his breach of promise. I might instance in many modern Examples, and shew how many Con∣federations, and Peaces, and Promises have been broken by the infidelity of Princes, and how he that best personated the Fox, had the better success. Nevertheless it is of great consequence to disguise your inclination, and to play the Hypocrite well; and men are so simple in their temper, and so submissive to their present necessities, that he that is neat and cleanly in his collusions, shall never want people to practise them upon. I cannot forbear one Example which is still fresh in our memory. Alexander VI. never did, nor thought of any thing but cheating, and never wanted matter to work upon, & though no man promised a thing with greater asseveration, nor confirmed it with more oaths and impreca∣tions, and observ'd them less; yet understanding the world well, he never miscarried.

A Prince therefore is not obliged to have all the forementioned good qualities in reality, but it is necessary he have them in appearance; nay, I will be bold to affirm, that having them actually, and employing them upon all occasions, they are extreamly prejudicial, whereas having then only in appearance, they turn to better accompt; it is honorable to seem mild, and merciful, and courteous, and religious, and sincere, and indeed to be so, provided your mind be so rectified and prepared that you can act quite contrary upon occa∣sion. And this must be premised, that a Prince, especially if come but lately to the throne, cannot observe all those things exactly which make men be esteemed virtuous, being often∣times necessitated for the preservation of his State to do things in humane, uncharitable, and irreligious; and therefore it is convenient his mind be at his command, and flexible to all the puffs, and variations of his fortune: Not forbearing to be good, whil'st it is in his choice, but knowing how to be evil when there is a necessity. A Prince then is to have particular care that nothing falls from his mouth, but what is full of the five qualities afore∣said, and that to see, and to hear him, he appears all goodness, integrity, humanity, and religion, which last he ought to pretend to more than ordinarily, because more men do judge by the eye, then by the touch, for every body sees, but few understand; every body sees how you appear, but few know what in reality you are, and those few d••re not, oppose the opinion of the multitude who have the Majesty of their Prince to defend them; and in the actions of all men, especially Princes, where no man has power to judge, every one looks to the end. Let a Prince therefore do what he can to preserve his life, and continue his Supremacy, the means which he uses shall be thought honorable, and be commended by every body; because the people are always taken with the appearance, and event of things, and the greatest part of the world consists of the people: Those few who are wise, taking place when the multitude has nothing else to rely upon. There is a Prince at this time in being (but his name I shall conceal) who has nothing in his mouth but fidelity and peace and yet had he exercised either the one or the other, they had robb'd him before this both of his power and reputation.

CHAP. XIX.

That Princes ought to be cautious of becoming either odious or contemptible.

ANd because in our discourse of the qualifications of a Prince, we have hitherto spoken only of those which are of greatest importance, we shall now speak briefly of the rest under these general heads. That a Prince make it his business (as is partly hinted before) to avoid such things as may make him odious or contemptible: and as often as he does that, he plays his part very well, and shall meet no danger or inconveniencies by the rest of his Vices: Nothing (as I said before) make a Prince so insufferably odious, as usurping his Subjects Estates, and debauching their Wives, which are two things he ought studiously to forbear; for whil'st the generality of the world live quietly upon their Estates, and un∣prejudiced in their honor, they live peaceably enough, and all his contention is only with the pride and ambition of some few persons who are many ways, and with great ease to be restrained. But a Prince is contemptable when he is counted effeminate, light, unconstant, pusillanimous, and irresolute; and of this he ought to be as careful, as of a Rock in the Sea, and strive that his in all actions there may appear magnanimity, courage, gravity, and for∣titude,

desiring that in the private affairs of his Subjects, his sentence and determination may be irrevocable, and himself to stand so in their opinion, that none may think it pos∣sible either to delude or divert him. The Prince who causes himself to be esteemed in that manner, shall be highly redoubted, and if he be feared, people will not easily conspire against him, nor readily invade him, because he is known to be an excellent Person and formidable to his Subjects; for a prince ought to be terrible in two places, at home to his Subjects, and abroad to his Equals; from whom he defends himself by good Arms, and good Allies; for if his power be good, his friends will not be wanting, and while his affairs are fixed at home, there will be no danger from abroad, unless they be disturb'd by some former conspiracy, and upon any Commotion ab extra, if he be composed at home, has liv'd as I prescribe, and not deserted himself, he will be able to bear up against any im∣pression according to the example of Nabis the Spartan. When things are well abroad, his affairs at home will be safe enough, unless they be perplexed by some secret Conspiracy, against which the Prince sufficiently provides, if he keeps himself from being hated or de∣spised, and the people remain satisfied of him, which is a thing very necessary, as I have largely inculcated before. And one of the best Remedies Prince can use against conspiracy, is to keep himself from being hated or despised by the multitude; for no body p••••ts, but he expects by the death of the Prince, to gratifie the people, and the thought of offending them will deter him from any such Enterprize, because in conspiracies the difficulties are infinite. By experience we find that many conjurations have been on foot, but few have succeeded, because no man can conspire alone: nor choose a Confederate but out of those who are discontented, and no sooner shall you impart your mind to a Male-content, but you give him opportunity to reconcile himself, because there is nothing he proposes to him∣self, but he may expect from the discovery. So that the gain being certain on that side, and hazardous and uncertain on the other, he must be either an extraordinary friend to you, or an implacable Enemy to the Prince if he does not betray you; In short, on the side, of the Conspirators there is nothing but fear, and jealousie, and apprehension of punishment, but one the Princes side there is the Majesty of the Government, the Laws, the Assistance of his Friends and State, which defend him so effectually, that if the affections of the people be added to them, no man can be so rash, and precipitate as to conspire; for if before the execution of his design, the Conspirator has reason to be afraid, in this case he has much more afterwards, having offended the people in the Execution, and left himself no refuge to fly to. Of this many Examples might be produced, but I shall content my self with one which happened in the memory of our Fathers. Hanibal Bentiv••gli (Grandfather to this present Hanibal) was Prince of Bolonia, and killed by the Canneschi who conspired against him; none of his race being left behind, but Iohn who was then in his Cradle: The Mur∣ther was no sooner committed, but the people took Arms, and slew all the Canneschi, which proceeded only from the affection that the House of the Bentivogli had at that time among the populacy in Bolonia, which was then so great, that when Hanibal was dead, there being none of that Family remaining, in a capacity for the Government of the State, upon infor∣mation that at Florence there was a Natural Son of the said Bentivogli's (who till that time had passed only for the Son of a smith) they sent Embassadors for him, and having condu∣cted him honorably to that City, they gave him the Government, which he executed very well, till the said Iohn came of Age. I conclude therefore a Prince need not be much appre∣hensive of Conspiracies, whil'st the people are his friends; but when they are dissatisfied, and have taken a prejudice against him, there is no thing, nor no person which he ought not to fear. And it has been the constant care of all wise Princes, and all well-governed States, not to reduce the Nobility to despair, nor the people to discontent, which is one of the most material things a Prince is to prevent. Among the best ordered Monarchies of our times, France is one, in which there are many good Laws and Constitutions tending to the liberty and preservation of the King: The first of them is the Parliament, and the Authority wherewith it is invested; for he who was the founder of that Monarchy, being sensible of the ambition and insolence of the Nobles, and judging it convenient to have them bridled and restrained; and knowing on the other side the hatred of the people against the Nobility, and that it proceeded from fear (being willing to secure them) to exempt the King from the displeasure of the Nobles, if he sided with the Commons, or from the malice of the commons, if he inclined to the Nobles, he erected a third judge, which (without any reflexion upon the King, should keep the Nobility under, and protect the people; nor could there be a better order, wiser, nor of greater security to the King and the Kingdom; from whence we may deduce another observation, That Princes are to leave things of injustice and envy to the Ministery and Execution of others, but acts of favour and grace are to be per∣form'd by themselves. To conclude, a Prince is to value his Grandees, but so as not to make the people hate him.

Contemplating the lifes and deaths of several of the Roman Emperors, it is possible many would think to find plenty of Examples quite contrary to my opinion, forasmuch as some of them whose Conduct was remarkable, and Magnanimity obvious to every body, were turn'd out of their Authority, or murthered by the Conspiracy of their subjects. To give a punctual answer, I should inquire into the qualities and conversations of the said Empe∣rors, and in so doing I should find the reason of their ruine to be the same, or very conso∣nant to what I have opposed. And in part I will represent such things as are most notable, to the consideration of him that reads the actions of our times, and I shall content my self with the examples of all the Emperors which succeeded in the Empire from Marcus the Philosopher, to Maximinus, and they were, Marcus, his Son Commodus, Pertinax, Iulian, Severus, Antoninus, his Son Caracalla, Macrinus, Heligabalus, Alexander, and Maxi∣minus.

It is first to be considered, That whereas in other Governments there was nothing to contend with, but the ambition of the Nobles, and the insolence of the people, the Roman Emperors had a third inconvenience, to support against, the avarice and cruelty of the Soldiers, which was a thing of such difficult practice, that it was the occasion of the destru∣ction of many of them, it being very uneasie to please the Subject and the Soldier together; for the Subject loves Peace, and chooses therefore a Prince that is gentle and mild, whereas the Soldier prefers a Martial Prince, and one that is haughty, and rigid, a••d rapacious, which good qualities they are desirous he should exercise upon the people, that their pay might be encreased: and their covetousness and cruelty satiated upon them. Hence it is, That those Emperors, who neither by Art, nor Nature are endued with that address, and reputation as is necessary for the restraining both of the one and the other, do always miscarry; and of them the greatest part (especially if but lately advanced to the Empire) understanding the inconsistancy of their two humors, incline to satisfie the Soldiers, without regarding how far the people are disobliged. Which Council is no more than is necessary; for seeing it cannot be avoided but Princes must fall under the hatred of somebody, they ought dili∣gently to contend that it be not of the multitude; If that be not to be obtain'd, their next great care is to be, that they incur not the odium of such as are most potent among them: And therefore those Emperors who were new, and had need of extraordinary support, adhered more readily to the Soldiers than to the people which turn'd to their detriment or advantage, as the Prince knew how to preserve his reputation with them: From the causes aforesaid, it hapned that Marcus Aurelius, Pertinax, and Alexander being Princes of more than ordinary Modesty, lovers of Justice, Enemies of cruelty, courteous, and bountiful, came all of them (except Marcus) to unfortunate ends. Marcus indeed lived and died in great honour, because he came to the Empire by way of inheritance and succession, without being beholden either to Soldiers or people, and being afterwards indued with many good qualities which recommended him, and made him venerable among them, he kept them both in such order whil'st he liv'd, and held them so exactly to their bounds, that he was never either hated or despised. But Pertinax was chosen Emperor against the will of the Soldiers, who being used to live licentiously under Commodus, they could not brook that regularity to which Pertinax endeavoured to bring them; so that having contracted the Odium of the Soldiers, and a certain disrespect and neglect by reason of his Age, he was ruined in the very beginning of his reign; from whence it is observable, that hatred is ob∣tained two ways, by good works, and bad, and therefore a Prince (as I said before) being willing to retain his jurisdiction, is oftentimes compelled to be bad. For if the chief par∣ty, (whether it be people, or army, or Nobility) which you think most useful, and of most consequence to you for the conservation of your dignity, be corrupt, you must follow their humour and indulge them, and in that case honesty and virtue are pernicious.

But let us come to Alexander who was a Prince of such great equity and goodness, it is reckoned among his praises▪ that in the fourteen years of his Empire, there was no man put to death without a fair Tryal: Nevertheless being accounted effeminate, and one that suffered himself to be managed by his Mother. and falling by that means into disgrace, the Army conspired and killed him. Examining on the other side the Conduct of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus, Caracalla, and Maziminus, you will find them cruel and rapacious and such as to satisfie the Soldiers, omitted no kind of injury that could be exercised against the people, and all of them but Severus were unfortunate in their ends: for Severus was a Prince of so great courage and magnanimity, that preserving the friendship of the Army (though the people were oppressed) he made his whole Reign happy, his virtues having represented him so admirable both to the Soldiers and people, that these remained in a man∣ner stupid, and astonished, and the other obedient and contented. And because the actions of Severus were great in a new Prince, I shall shew in brief how he personated of the Fox

and the Lyon, whose Natures and properties are (as I said before) necessary for the imita∣tion of a Prince. Severus therefore, knowing the laziness and inactivity of Iulian the Emperor, persuaded the Army under his Command in Sclavonia to go to Rome, and revenge the death of Pertinax who was murthered by the Imperial Guards; and under that colour, without the least pretence to the Empire, he marched his Army towards Rome, and was in Italy before any thing of his motion was known: being arrived at Rome, the Senate were afraid of him, killed Iulian, and elected Severus. After which beginning, there remained two difficulties to be removed before he could be Master of the whole Em∣pire; The one was in Asia, where Niger General of the Asiatick Army, had proclaimed himself Emperor: The other, in the west, where Albinus the General aspired to the same: and thinking it hazardous to declare against both, he resolved to oppose himself against Niger, and cajole and wheedle Albinus, to whom he writ word, That being chosen Emperor by the Senate, he was willing to receive him to a participation of that dignity, gave him the title of Caesar, and by consent of the Senate admitted him his Collegue; which Albinus embraced very willingly, and thought him in earnest; but when Severus had over∣come Niger, put him to death, and setled the affairs of the East, being returned to Rome, he complained in the Senate against Albinus, as a person, who contrary to his obligations for the benefits received from him, had endeavoured treacherously to murther him, told them that he was obliged to march against him to punish his ingratitude, and afterwards following him into France, he executed his design, deprived him of his Command, and put him to death. He then who strictly examines the Actions of this Prince, will find him fierce as a Lyon, subtile as a Fox, feared and reverenced by every body, and no way odious to his Army: Nor will it seem strange that he (though newly advanced to the Empire) was able to defend it, seeing his great reputation protected him against the hatred which his people might have conceived against him by reason of his Rapine. But his Son Anto∣ninus was an excellent person likewise endued with transcendant parts, which rendered him admirable to the people, and grateful to the Soldiers; for he was Martial in his Na∣ture, patient of labour and hardship, and a great despiser of all sensuality and softness, which recommended him highly to his Armies. Nevertheless his fury and cruelty was so immoderately great (having upon several private and particular occasions, put a great part of the people of Rome, and all the inhabitants of Alexandria, to death) that he fell into the hatred of the whole world, and began to be feared by his Confidents that were about him, so that he was killed by one of his Captains in the middle of his Camp. From whence it may be observed, That these kind of Assassinations which follow upon a deliberate and obstinate resolution, cannot be prevented by a Prince, for he who values not his own life, can commit them when he pleases; but they are to be feared the less, because they happen but seldom, he is only to have a care of doing any great injury to those that are about him, of which error Antoninus was too guilty having put the Brother of the said Captain to an ignomi∣nious death, threatned the Captain daily, and yet continued him in his Guards, which was a rash and pernicious act, and prov'd so in the end. But to come to Commodus, who had no hard task to preserve his Empire, succeeding to it by way of inheritance, as Son to Marcus, for that to satisfie the people, and oblige the Soldiers, he had no more to do, but to follow the footsteps of his Father. But being of a brutish and cruel disposition, to exer∣cise his rapacity upon the people, he indulged his Army, and allowed them in all manner of licentiousness. Besides, prostituting his Dignity, by descending many times upon the Theater to fight with the Gladiators, and committing many other acts which were vile, and unworthy the Majesty of an Emperor, he became contemptible to the Souldiers, and growing odious to one party, and despicable to the other, they conspired and murthered him. Maximinus was likewise a Martial Prince, and addicted to the Wars, and the Army being weary of the Effeminacy of Alexander (whom I have mentioned before) having slain him, they made Maximinus Emperor, but he possessed it not long, for two things contri∣buted to make him odious, and despised. One was the meanness of his extraction, having kept sheep formerly in Thrace, which was known to all the world, and made him univer∣sally contemptable. The other was, that at his first coming to the Empire, by not repairing immediately to Rome, and putting himself into possession of his Imperial seat, he had con∣tracted the imputation of being cruel, having exercised more than ordinary severity by his Prefects in Rome, and his Lieutenants in all the rest of the Empire; so that the whole world being provoked, by the vileness of his birth, and detestation of his cruelty, in apprehension of his fury, Africa, the Senate and all the people both in Italy and Rome, conspired against him, and his own Army joyning themselves with them, in their Leaguer before Aquileia finding it difficult to be taken, weary of his cruelties, and encouraged by the multitude of his Enemies, they set upon him, and slew him.

I will not trouble my self with Heliogabalus, Macrinus, nor Iulian, who being all effeminate and contemptible, were quickly extinguished. But I shall conclude this discourse, and say that the Princes of our times are not obliged to satisfie the Soldiers in their respective Governments by such extraordinary ways; for though they are not altogether to be neg∣lected, yet the remedy and resolution is easie because none of these Princes have entire Ar∣mies, brought up, and inveterated in their several Governments and Provinces, as the Ar∣mies under the Roman Empire were. If therefore at that time it was necessary to satisfie the Soldiers rather than the people, it was because the Soldiers were more potent. At present it is more the interest of all Princes (except the great Turk and the Soldan) to com∣ply with the people, because they are more considerable than the Soldiers. I except the Turk, because he has in his Guards 12000 Foot, and 15000 Horse constantly about him, upon whom the strength and security of his Empire depends, and it is necessary (post∣poning all other respect to the people) they be continued his freinds. It is the same case with the Soldan, who being wholly in the power of the Soldiers, it is convenient that he also wave the people, and insinuate with the Army. And here it is to be noted, that this Government of the Soldans is different from all other Monarchies, for it is not unlike the Papacy in Christendom, which can neither be called a new, nor an hereditary Principality, because the Children of the deceased Prince, are neither Heirs to his Estate, nor Lords of his Empire, but he who is chosen to succeed, by those who have the faculty of Election; which Custom being of old, the Government cannot be called new, and by consequence is not subject to any of the difficulties wherewith a new one is infested; because though the person of the Prince be new, and perhaps the Title; yet the Laws and Orders of State are old, and disposed to receive him as if he were hereditary Lord. But to return to our business, I say, That whoever considers the aforesaid discourse, shall find either hatred or contempt the perpetual cause of the ruine of those Emperors, and be able to judge how it came about that part of them taking one way in their administrations, and part of them another, in both parties some were happy, and some unhappy at last. Pertinax and Alex∣ander being but Upstart Princes, it was not only vain, but dangerous for them to imitate Marcus, who was Emperor by right of Succession. Again, it was no less pernicious for Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to make Severus their pattern, not having force nor vertue enough to follow his footsteps. So then if a new Prince cannot imitate the actions of Marcus; (and to regulate by the example of Severus, is unnecessary) he is only to take that part from Severus that is necessary to the foundation of his State, and from Marcus, what is convenient to keep and defend it gloriously, when 'tis once established and firm.

CHAP. XX.

Whether Citadels, and other things which Princes many times do, be profitable, or dangerous?

SOme Princes for the greater security of their Dominion, have disarmed their Subjects; others have cantonized their Countries; others have fomented factions and animosity among them; some have applyed themselves to flatter and insinuate with those who were suspicious in the beginning of their Government: Some have built Castles, others have demolished them; and though in all these cases, no certain or determined rule can be pre∣scribed, unless we come to a particular consideration of the State where it is to be used; yet I shall speak of them all, as the matter it self will endure. A wise Prince therefore was never known to disarm his Subjects; rather finding them unfurnished, he put Arms into their hands; for by arming them, and inuring them to warlike Exercise, those Arms are surely your own; they who were suspicious to you, become faithful; they who are faithful, are confirm'd; and all your Subjects become of your party; and because the whole multi∣tude which submits to your Government is not capable of being armed, if you be beneficial and obliging to those you do arm, you may make the bolder with the rest; for the difference of your behaviour to the Soldier, binds him more firmly to your Service; and the rest will excuse you, as judging them most worthy of reward, who are most liable to danger. But when you disarm, you disgust them, and imply a diffidence in them, either for cowardize, or Treachery, and the one or the other is sufficient to give them an impression of hatred against you. And because you cannot subsist without Soldiers, you will be forced to enter∣tain Mercenaries, whom I have formerly described, and if it were possible for the said Mercenaries to be good, they could not be able to defend you against powerful Adver∣saries,

and Subjects disobliged. Wherefore (as I have said) a new Prince, in his new Government, puts his Subjects always into Arms, as appears by several Examples in Hi∣story. But when a Prince conquers a new State, and annexes it (as a Member) to his old, then it is necessary your Subjects be disarmed, all but such as appeared for you in the Conquest, and they are to be mollified by degrees, and brought into such a condition of laziness and effeminacy, that in time your whole strength may devolve upon your own Na∣tural Militia, which were trained up in your ancient Dominion, and are to be always about you. Our Ancestors (and they were esteemed wise men) were wont to say, That it was necessary to keep Pisto••a by factions, and Pisa by fortresses, and accordingly in several Towns under their Subjection, they created, and fomented factions and animosities, to keep them with more ease. This, at a time when Italy was unsetled, and in a certain kind of suspence, might be well enough done, but I do not take it at this time for any precept for us, being clearly in opinion that the making of factions, never does good, but that where the Enemy approaches, and the City is divided, it must necessarily, and that suddenly be lost, because the weaker party will always fall off to the Enemy, and the other cannot be able to defend it. The Venetians, (as I guess) upon the same grounds nourished the factions of the Guelfs, and the Ghibilins in the Cities under their jurisdiction; and though they kept them from blood; yet they encouraged their dissentions, to the end that the Citizens being employed among themselvs, should have no time to conspire against them; which as appeared afterwards, did not answer expectation; for being defeated at Valia, one of the said factions took Arms, and turned the Venetians out of their State. Such methods there∣fore as these, do argue weakness in the Prince; for no Government of any strength or con∣sistance will suffer such divisions, because they are useful only in time of Peace, when per∣haps they may contribute to the more easie management of their Subjects, but when War comes, the fallacy of those Counsels are quickly discovered, Without doubt, Princes grow great when they overcome the difficulties and impediments which are given them; and therefore Fortune, especially when she has a mind to exalt a new Prince (who has greater need of reputation than a Prince that is old and Hereditary) raises him up Enemies, and encourages enterprizes against him, that he may have opportunity to conquer them, and advance himself by such steps as his Enemies had prepared. For which reason many have thought that a wise Prince when opportunity offers, ought (but with great cunning and address) to maintain some enmity against himself, that when time serves to destroy them, his own greatness may be encreas'd.

Princes, and particularly those who are not of long standing, have found more fidelity and assistance from those whom they suspected at the beginning of their Reign, than from them who at first were their greatest confidents. Pandolfus Petrucci Prince of Sienna govern'd his State rather by those who were suspected, than others. But this is not to be treated of largely, because it varies according to the subjects; I shall only say this, That those Men who in the beginning of his Government, opposed him (if they be of so such quality as to want the support of other people) are easily wrought over to the Prince, and more strictly engaged to be faithful; because they knew that it must be their good carriage for the future that must cancel the prejudice that is against them; and so the Prince comes to receive more benefit by them, than by those who serving him more securely, do most commonly neglect his affairs.

And seeing the matter requires, I will not omit to remind a Prince who is but newly advanced (and that by some inward favour and correspondence in the Country) that he considers well what it was that disposed those parties to befreind him; if it be not affection to him, but Pique, and animosity to the old Government, it will cost much trouble and difficulty to keep them his friends, because it will be impossible to satisfie them: and upon serious disquisition, Ancient and Modern Examples will give us the reason, and we shall find it more easie to gain such persons as were satisfied with the former Government, and by consequence his Enemies, than those who being disobliged, sided with him, and assisted to subvert it.

It has been a Custom among Princes, for the greater security of their Territories to build Citadels and Fortresses to bridle and restrain such as would enterprize against them, and to serve as a refuge in times of Rebellion; and I approve the way because anciently practised, yet no longer ago than in our days, Mr. Nicolo Vitelli was known to dismantle two Forts in the City of Castello, to secure his Government; Guidobaldo Duke of Urbin returning to his State from whence Caesar Borgia had driven him, demolished all the strong places in that Province, and thereby thought it more unlikely again to fall into the hands of the Enemy. The Bentivogli being returned to Bologna, used the same course: So that Fortresses, are useful, or not useful, according to the difference of time, and if in one place they do good,

they do as much mischief in another: And the case may be argued thus, That Prince who is more afraid of his Subjects than Neighbours, is to suffer them to stand: The Family of the Sforza's, has and will suffer more mischief by the Castle of Milan (which ws built by Francesco Sforza) than by all its other troubles whatever; so that the best fortification of all, is not to be hated by the people, for your Fortresses will not protect you, if the people have you in detestation, because they shall no sooner take Arms, but Strangers will fall in, and sustain them. In our times, there is not one instance to be produced, of advantage, which that course has brought to any Prince, but to the Countess of Furly, when upon the Death of Hier••nimo her Husband, by means of those Castles she was able to withstand the popular fury, and expect till supplies came to her from Milan, and resetled her in the Go∣vernment; and as times then stood, the people were not in a Condition to be relieved by any stranger. But afterwards they stood her in no stead when Caesar Borgia invaded her, and the people being incensed, joyned with her Enemy. Wherefore it had been better for her both then, and at first to have possessed the affections of the people, than all the Castles in the Country. These things being considered, I approve both of him that builds those Fortresses, and of him that neglects them, but must needs condemn him who relies so much upon them, as to despise the displeasure of the people.

CHAP. XXI.

How a Prince is to demean himself to gain reputation.

NOthing recommends a Prince so highly to the world, as great Enterprizes, and noble Expressions of his own Valor and Conduct. We have in our days Ferdinand King of Aragon, the present King of Spain, who may (and not improperly) be called a new Prince, being of a small and weak King, become for fame, and renown the greatest Monarch in Christendom; and if his Exploits be considered, you will find them all brave, but some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his Reign he invaded the Kingdom of Granada, and that Enterprize was the foundation of his Grandeur. He began it leisurely, and with∣out suspicion of impediment, holding the Barons of Castile employed in that service, and so intent upon that War, that they dreamt not of any Innovation, whil'st in the mean time before they were aware, he got reputation, and Authority over them. He found out a way of maintaining his Army at the expence of the Church, and the people, and by the length of that War, to establish such Order and Discipline among his Soldiers, that afterwards they gained him many honourable Victories. Beside this, to adapt him for greater Enterprizes, (always making Religion his pretence) by a kind of devout cruelty, he destroyed and exter∣minated the jews called Marrani, than which nothing could be more strange, or deplorable. Under the same Cloak of Religion, he invaded Affrica, made his Expedition into Italy, assaulted France, and began many great things which always kept the minds of his Subjects in admiration and suspence, expecting what the event of his Machinations would be. And these his Enterprizes had so sudden a spring and result one from the other, that they gave no leisure to any man to be at quiet, or to continue any thing against him. It is likewise of great advantage to a Prince to give some rare Example of his own administration at home (such is reported of Messer Bernardo da Milano) when there is occasion for some body to perform any thing Extraordinary in the Civil Government, whether it be good or bad, and to find out such a way either to reward or punish him, as may make him much talk'd of in the world. Above all, a Prince is to have a care in all his actions to behave himself so as may give him the reputation of being excellent as well as great. A Prince is likewise much esteemed when he shows himself a sincere friend, or a generous Enemy, That is when without any hesitation he declares himself in favour of one against another, which as it is more frank and Princely, so it is more profitable than to stand neuter; for if two of your potent Neighbours be at Wars, they are either of such condition that you are to be afraid of the Victor or not: In either which cases it will be always more for your benefit to disco∣ver your self freely, and make a fair War: For in the first cause, if you do not declare, you shall be a prey to him who overcomes, and it will be a pleasure, and satisfaction to him that is conquered to see you his Fellow-sufferer, nor will any body either defend, or receive you, and the reason is, because the Conqueror will never understand them to be his Friends, who would not assist him in his distress; and he that is worsted will not receive you, because you neglected to run his fortune with your Arms in your hands. Antiochus, upon the invita∣tion of the Etolians, passed into Greece, to repel the Romans: Antiochus sent Embassa∣dors

to the Achaians (who were in amity with the Romans) to persude them a Neu∣trality, and the Romans sent to them to associate with them. The busines coming to be debatedin the Council of the Achaians, and Antiochus his Embassador pressing them to be Neuters; The Roman Embassador replyed, As to what he has remonstrated, That it is most useful and most consistent with the interest of your State, not to engage your selves in our War, their is nothing more contrary aud pernicious; for if you do not concern your selves, you will assuredly become a prey to the Conqueror without any thanks or reputation; and it will always be, that he who has least kindness for you, will tempt you to be Neuters, but they that are your friends will invite you to take up Arms. And those Princes who are ill advised, to avoid some present danger follow the Neutral way, are most commonly ruin'd: But when a Prince discovers himself couragiously, in favour of one party, if he with whom you joyn overcome, though he be very powerful, and you seem to remain at his discretion, yet he is obliged to you, and must needs have a respect for you, and Men are not so wicked, with such signal and exemplary ingratitude to oppress you. Besides Victories are never so clear and compleat, as to leave the Conqueror without all sparks of reflexion, and especially upon what is just. But if your Confederate comes by the worst, you are received by him, and assisted whil'st he is able, and becomest a Companion of his fortune, which may possibly restore the. In the second place, if they who contend be of such condition, that they have no occasion to fear, let which will overcome; you are in pur∣dence to declare your self the sooner, because by assisting the one, you contribute to the ruine of the other, (whom, if your Confederate had been wise, he oughtrather to have preserved) so that he overcoming, remains wholly at your discretion, and by your assistance, he must of necessity overcome. And hear it is to be noted (if he can avoid it) a Prince is never to league himself with another more powerful than himself, in an offensive War: because in that case, if he overcomes, you remain at his mercy, and Princes ought to be as cautious as possible, of falling under the discretion of other people. The Venetians (when there was no necessity for it) associated with France against the Duke of Milan, and that association was the cause of their ruine: But where it is not to be avoided (as hapned to the Florentines when the Pope and the Spaniard sent their Armies against Lombardy) there a Prince is to adhere for the reasons aforesaid. Nor is any Prince of Government to imagine that in those cases any certain counsel can be taken, because the affairs of this world are so ordered, that in avoiding one mischief, we fall commonly into another. But a Man's wisdom is most conspicuous where he is able to distinguish of dangers, and make choice of the least. More∣over a Prince to show himself a Virtuoso, and Honourer of all that is excellent in any Art whatsoever. He is likewise to encourage and assure his Subjects that they may live quietly in peace and exercise themselves in their several Vocations whether marchandize, Agri∣culture, or any other employment whatever, to the end that one may not forbear impro••ing or imbellishing his Estate for fear it should be taken from him, nor another advancing his Trade in apprehension of taxes; but the Prince is rather to excite them by propositions of reward, and immunities to all such as shall any way amplifie his Territory, or powers. He is obliged likewise, at convenient times in the year to entertain the people by Feastings and Plays, and Spectacles of Recreation; and because all Cities divided into Companies, or Wards, he ought to have respect to those Societies, be merry with them sometimes, and give them some instance of his humanity, and magnificence, but always retaining the Ma∣jesty of his degree, which is never to be debased in any case whatever.

CHAP. XXII.

of the Secretaries of Princes.

THe Election of his Ministers, is of no small importance to a Prince; for the first judg∣ment that is made of him, or his parts, is from the persons he has about him; when they are wise and faithful, be sure the Prince is discreet himself, who as he knew how to choose them able at first, so he has known how to oblige them to be faithful; but when his Ministers are otherwise, it reflects shrewdly upon the Prnice; for commonly the first error he commits, is in the Election of his Servants. No Man knew Antonio da Vanafro to be Secretary to Pandolfo Petrucci Prince of Sienna but he could judge Pandolfo to be aprudent Man for choosing such a one to his Minister. In the capacities and parts of Men, there are three sorts of degrees; one Man understands of himself; another understands what is ex∣plained; and a third understands neither of himself, nor by any Explanation: The first is

excellent, the second commendable, the third altogether unprofitable. If therefore Pan∣dolfus was not in the first rank, he might be concluded in the second; for whenever a Prince 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the judgment to know the good, and the bad of what is spoken or done, though his own invention be not excellent, he can distinguish a good servant from a bad, and exalt the one, and correct the other, and the Minister despairing of deluding him, remains good in spight of his teeth. But the business is how a Prince may understand his Minister, and the rule for that is infallible. When you observe your Officer more careful of himself, than of you, and all his actions and designs pointing at his own interest and advantage, that Man will never be a good Minister, nor ought you ever to repose any confidence in him; for he who has the affairs of his Prince in his hand, ought to lay aside all thoughts of him∣self, and regard nothing but what is for the profit of his Master. And on the otherside, to keep him faithful, the Prince is as much concerned to do for him, by honouring him, en∣riching him, giving him good Offices and Preferments, that the wealth and honour confer∣red by his Master, may keep him from looking out for himself, and the plenty and goodness of his Offices, make him afraid of a change, knowing that without his Princes favour he can never subsist. When therefore the Prince, and the Minister are qualified in this manner, they may depend one upon the other: But when 'tis otherwise with them, the end must be bad; and one of them will be undone.

CHAP. XXIII.

How flatterers are to be avoided.

I Will not pass by a thing of great consequence, being an error against which Princes do hardly defend themselves, unless they be very wise, and their judgment very good. And that is about Flatterers, of which kind of Cattle all Histories are full; for Men are generally so fond of their own actions, and so easily mistaken in them, that it is not with∣out difficulty they defend themselves against those sort of people, and he that goes about to defend himself, runs a great hazard of being despised: For there is no other remedy against Flatterers, than to let every body understand you are not disobliged by telling the truth; yet if you suffer every body to tell it, you injure your self, and lessen your reverence. Wherefore a wise Prince ought to go a third way, and select out of his State certain discreet men, to whom only he is to commit that liberty of speaking truth, and that, of such things as he demands, and nothing else; but then he is to inquire of every thing, hear their opinions, and resolve afterwards, as he pleases, and behave himself towards them in such sort, that every one may find with how much the more freedom he speaks, with so much the more kindness he is accepted; That besides them, he will hearken to no body; That he considers well before he resolves; and that his resolutions once taken, are never to be altered: He that does otherwise, shall either precipitate his affairs by means of his Flatterers; or by variety of advices, often change his designs, which will lessen his esteem, and render him contemptible. To This purpose I shall instance in one Modern Example.

Father Lucas, a Servant to Maximilian the present Emperor, giving a Character of His Majesty, declared him a person that never consulted any body, and yet never acted accor∣ding to his own judgment and inclination; and the reason was, because he proceeded con∣trary to the presriptions aforesaid, for the Emperor is a close Man, communicates his secrets with no body, nor takes any man's advice; but when his determinations are to be executed, and begin to be known in the world, those who are about him begin to discourage and dissuade him, and he being good natur'd does presently desist: Hence it comes to pass that his resolutions of one day, are dissolved in the next, no man knows what he desires or designs; nor no man can depend upon his resolutions. A Prince therefore is always to consult; but at his own, not other peoples pleasure, and rather to deter people from giving their advice undemanded; but he ought not to be sparing in his demands, nor when he has demanded, impatient of hearing the truth; but if he understands that any suppressed it, and forbore to speak out, for fear of displeasing, then, and not till then, he is to show his displeasure. And because there are those who believe that a Prince which creates an opinion of his prudence in the people, does it not by any excellence in his own Nature, but by the Counsels of those who are about him; without doubt they are deceived; for this is a gene∣ral and infallible rule, That that Prince who has no Wisdom of his own, can never be well ad∣vised; unless by accident he commits all to the Government and Administration of some honest and discreet man: In this case 'tis possible things may be well ordered for a while,

but they can never continue; for his Minister or Vicegerent in a short time will set up for himself; but if a Prince who has no great judgment of his own, consults with more than one; their Counsels will never agree, nor he have ever the cunning to unite them; Every man will advise according to his own interest, or Capriccio, and he not have the parts either to correct or discover it: And other Counsellors are not to be found, for men will always prove bad, unless by necessity they are compelled to be good. So then it is clear, That good Counsels (from whomsoever they come) proceed rather from the Wisdom of the Prince, than the Princes Wisdom from the goodness of his Counsels.

CHAP. XXIV.

How it came to pass that the Princes of Italy have most of them lost their Dominions.

THE Qualities aforesaid being observed; they make a new Prince appear in the number of the more Ancient, and render him presently more firm and secure in his Govern∣ment, than if he had descended to it by right of inheritance; for the Actions of a new Prince are liable to stricter observation, than if he were Hereditary, and when they are known to be virtuous, gain more upon people, and oblige them farther than antiquity of Blood; because Men are more affected with present, than pass'd things, and when in their present condition they find themselves well, they content themselves with it, without looking out any where else, employing themselves wholly in defence of their Prince, unless in other things he be defective to himself: So that thereby he will have double honor, in having laid the foundation of a new Principality, and embellished and fortified it, with good Laws, good Force, good Friends, and good Example: whereas he multiplies his disgrace, who being born Prince, loses his inheritance by his own ill management and imprudence. And if the Soveraign Princes in Italy, who in our time have lost their Dominions, be con∣sidered, as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, there will be found in their beginning one common defect as to the management of their Arms, for the reasons largely discours'd of before: besides some of them will appear to have been hated by the people, or if they have had so much prudence as to preserve a friendship with them, they have been ignorant how to secure themselves against the Grandees; for without these errors no States are lost that have Money and strength enough to bring an Army into the Field. Philip of Macedon (not Alexander the Great's Father, but he who was overcome by Titus Quintus) had no great force in comparison of the Romans and the Grecians which invaded him; yet, being a Martial Man, and one that understood how to insinuate with the Peo∣ple, and oblige the Nobility, he maintained War several years agaisnt both of them, and though at last he lost some Towns, yet he kept his Kingdom in spight of them. Those therefore of our Princes who for many years together were settled in their Principalities, if they lost them afterwards, they cannot accuse fortune, but their own negligence and indis∣cretion, for not having in quiet times considered they might change (and it is the common infirmity of Mankind in a calm to make no reckoning of a Tempest) when adversity ap∣proached, they thought more of making their escape than defence, resting their whole hopes upon this, that when the people were weary of the insolence of the Conqueror, they would recal them again. Which resolution is tolerable indeed, when others are wanting, but to neglect all other remedies, and trust only to that, is much to be condemned, for a man would never throw himself down, that another might take him up; besides, that may not happen, or if it does, not with your security, because that kind of defence is poor, and depends not on your self, and no defences are good, certain, and lasting, which proceed not from the Princes own Courage and Virtue.

CHAP. XXV.

How far in human affairs Fortune may avail; and in what manner she may be resisted.

I Am not ignorant that it is, and has been of old the opinion of many people, that the affairs of the world are so govern'd by Fortune and Divine Providence, that Man can∣not by his Wisdom correct them, or apply any remedy at all; from whence they would infer that we are not to labour and sweat, but to leave every thing to its own tendancy and event. This opinion has obtained more in our days, by the many and frequent revolutions, which have been, and are still seen beyond all humane conjecture. And when I think of it seriously sometimes, I am in some measure inclined to it my self; nevertheless that our own free will may not utterly be exploded, I conceive it may be true that fortune may have the arbitrement of one half of our actions, but that she leaves the other half (or little less) to be governed by our selves. Fortune, I do resemble to a rapid and impetuous River, which when swelled, and enraged, overwhelms the Plains, subverts the T••ees, and the Houses, forces away the Earth from one place, and carries it to another, every body fears, every body shuns, but no body knows how to resist it; Yet though it be thus furious some∣times, it does not follow but when it is quiet and calm, men may by banks, and fences, and other provisions correct it in such manner, that when it swells again, it may be carried off by some Canal, or the violence thereof rendered less licentious and destructive. So it is with Fortune, which shows her power where there is no predisposed virtue to resist it, and turns all her force and impetuosity, where she knows there are no banks, no fences to restrain her: If you consider Italy (the seat of all these revolutions) and what it was that caus'd them, you will find it an open field, without any bounds or Ramparts of secure it; and that, had it been defended by the Courage of their Ancestors, as Germany, and Spain, and France have been, those inundations had never hapned, or never made such devasta∣tion as they have done. And this I hold sufficient to have spoken in general against For∣tune. But restraining my self a little more to particulars, I say it is ordinary to see a Prince happy one day, and ruined the next, without discerning any difference in his humor or Government; and this I impute to the reasons of which I have discoursed largely before; and one of them is, because that Prince which relies wholly upon Fortune, being subject to her Variations, must of necessity be ruined. I believe, again that Prince may be happy, whose manner of proceeding concerts with the times, and he unhappy who cannot accom∣modate to them: For in things leading to the end of their designs (which every man has in his eye, and they are riches and honour) we see men have various methods of proceeding. Some with circumspection, others with heat; some with violence, others with cunning; some with patience, and others with fury, and every one (notwithstanding the diversity of their ways) may possibly attain them. Again we see two persons equally cautious, one of them prospers, and the other miscarri••s, and on the other side, two equally happy by different measures, one being deliberate, and the other as hasty; and this proceeds from nothing but the condition of the times which suits, or does not suit; with the manner of their proceedings. From hence arises what I have said, That two persons by different operations do attain the same end, whil'st two others steer the same Course, and one of them succeeds, and the other is ruined. From hence likewise may be deduced the Vicissi∣tudes of good; for if to one who manages with deliberation and patience, the times and conjuncture of affairs, come about so favourably that his Conduct be in fashion, he must needs be happy; but if the face of affairs, and the times change, and he changes not with them, he is certainly ruined. Nor is there any man to be found so wise, that knows how to accommodate, or frame himself to all these varieties, both because he cannot deviate from that to which Nature has inclined him; as likewise because if a man has constantly prospered in one way, it is no easie matter to persuade him to another; and he that is so cautious, being at a loss when time requires he should be vigorous, must of necessity be de∣stroyed; whereas if he could turn with the times, his fortune would never betray him. Pope Iulius XI. in all his Enterprizes, acted with passion and vehemence, and the times and accident of affairs were so sutable to his manner of proceeding, that he prospered in whatever he undertook. Consider his Expedition of Bolonia in the days of Messer Giovanni Ben••ivogli, The V••netians were against it, and the Kings of Spain and France were in treaty, and had a mind to it themselves; yet he with his promptitude and fury, undertook it per∣sonally himself, and that activity of his, kept both Spaniard, and Venetian in suspence (the Venetians for fear; the Spaniards, in hopes to recover the whole Kingdom of Naples, and

the King of France came over to his side; for seeing him in motion, and desirous to make him his friend, and thereby to correct the insolence of the Venetian, he thought he could not deny him his assistance, without manifest injustice; so that Iulius with his rashness and huffing, did that which never any other Pope could have done with all his cunning and insinuation: For had he deferred his departure from Rome, till all things had been put into exact order, and his whole progress concluded (as any other Pope would have done) he could never have succeeded; The King of France would have pretended a thousand ex∣cuses, and others, would have suggested twice as many fears; I will pass by the rest of his Enterprizes, which were all alike, and prospered as well, and the shortness of his life secured him against change: for had the times fallen out so, that he had been forced to proceed with accurate circumspection, he would have certainly been ruined, for he could never have left those ways to which his Nature inclined him. I conclude then, That whil'st the obstinacy of Princes consists with the motion of fortune, 'tis possible they may be happy; but when once they disagree, the poor Prince comes certainly to the ground. I am of opinion likewise, that 'tis better to be hot and precipitate, then cautious and apprehensive, for fortune is a Woman, and must be Hector'd, to keep her under; and 'tis visible every day she suffers her self to be managed by those who are brisk and audacious, rather than by those who are cold and phlegmatick in their Motions, and therefore (like a Woman) she is always a friend to those who are young; because being less circumspect, they attack her with more security and boldness.

CHAP. XXVI.

An Exhortation to deliver Italy from the Barbarians.

HAving weighed therefore all that is said before, and considered seriously with my self whether in this juncture of affairs in Italy, the times were disposed for the advance∣ment of a new Prince, and whether there was competent matter that could give occasion to a virtuous and wise person to introduce such a form as would bring reputation to him, and benefit to all his Subjects; it seems to me that at this present so many things concur to the exaltation of a new Prince, that I do not know any time that has been more proper than this: and if (as I said before) for the Manifestation of the courage of Moses, it was neces∣sary that the Israelites should be Captives in Egypt; for discovery of the Magnanimity of Cyrus, that the Persians should be oppressed by the Medes; and for the illustration of the excellence of Theseus, that the Athenians should be banished and dispersed; so to evince and demonstrate the courage of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy should be reduced to its present condition; That it should be in greater bondage than the Iews; in greater servitude than the Persians, and in greater dispersion than the Athenians, without Head, without order, harras'd, spoyl'd, overcome, over-run, and over-flown with all kind of Calamity: and though formerly some sparks of virtue have appeared in some persons, that might give it hopes that God had ordained them for its redemption; yet it was found after∣wards that in the very height and career of their exploits, they were check'd, and forsaken by Fortune, and poor Italy left half dead, expecting who would be her Samaritan to bind up her wounds, put an end to the Sackings and devastations in Lombardy, the Taxes and Expilations in the Kingdom of Naples, and Tuscany, and cure her sores, which length of time had fester'd and imposthumated. 'Tis manifest how she prays to God daily to send some person who may redeem her from the cruelty, and insolence of the Barbarians. 'Tis mani∣fest how prone and ready she is to follow the Banner that any man will take up; nor is it at present to be discerned where she can repose her hopes with more probability, than in your illustrious Family, which by its own courage and interest, and the favour of God and the Church (of which it is now chief) may be induced to make it self Head in her redemption: which will be no hard matter to be effected, if you lay before you the lives and actions of the persons above named; who though they were rare, and wonderful, were yet but men, and not accommodated with so fair circumstances as you. Their Enterprize was not more just, nor easie, nor God Almighty more their friend than yours. You have Justice on your side; for that War is just which is necessary, and 'tis piety to fight, were no hope is left in any thing else. The people are universally disposed, and where the disposition is so great, the opposition can be but small, especially you taking your rules from those persons which I have proposed to you for a Model. Besides, many things that they did were super-natural, and by Gods immediate Conduct, the Sea opened, a cloud directed, a rock afforded water,

it rained Manna, all these things are recompenced in your Grandeur, and the rest remains to be executed by you: God will not do every thing immediately, because he will not de∣prive us of our free will, and the honour that devolves upon us. Nor is it any wonder if none of the fore-named Italians have been able to do that which may be hoped for from your illustrious Family: and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and so long continuation of War, their Military Virtue seems spent and extinguished; the reason is, their old Disci∣pline was not good, and no body was able to direct to a better. Nothing makes so much to the honour of a new Prince, as new Laws, and new Orders invented by him, which if they be well founded, and carry any thing of Grandeur along with them, do render him vene∣rable, and wonderful; and Italy is susceptible enough of any new form. Their courage is great enough in the Soldier, if it be not wanting in the Officer, witness the Duels, and Combats, in which the Italians have generally the better by their force, and dexterity, and stratagem; but come to their Battels, and they have oftner the worst, and all from the in∣experience of their Commanders; for those who pretend to have Skill, will never obey, and every one thinks he has Skill, there having been no body to this very day, raised by his virtue and fortune to that height of reputation, as to prevail with others to obey him. Hence it came, that in so long time, in the many Wars during the last twenty years, when ever an Army consisted wholly of Italians, it was certainly beaten; and this may be testified by Tarus, Alexandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, and Mestri. If therefore your illustri∣ous Family be inclined to follow the examples of those excellent persons who redeemed their Countries, it is necessary as a true fundamental of all great Enterprizes, to provide your selves with Forces of your own Subjects, for you cannot have more faithful, nor better Soldiers than they. And though all of them be good, yet altogether they will be much better, when they find themselves not only commanded, but preferred, and caressed by a Prince of their own. It is necessary therefore to be furnished with these Forces, before you can be able with Italian virtue to vindicate your Country from the oppression of Strangers: And though the Swiss, and Spanish Infantry be counted terrible, they have both of them their defects: and a third sort may be composed that may not only encounter, but be con∣fident to beat them; for the Spanish Foot cannot deal with Horse, and the Swiss are not invincible when they meet with Foot as obstinate as themselves. It has been seen by expe∣rience, and would be so again, the Spaniards cannot sustain the fury of the French Cavalry, and the Swisses have been overthrown by the Infantry of Spain. And though of this last we have seen no perfect Experiment; yet we had a competent Essay at the Battel of Ra∣venna, where the Spanish Foot being engaged with the German Battalions (which observe the same Order and Discipline with the Swisses) the Spaniards by the agility of their Bodies, and the protection of their Bucklers, broke in under their Pikes, and killed them securely, while the poor Germans were uncapable to defend themselves; and had not the Spaniards been charged by the Horse, the German Foot had been certainly cut off. 'Tis possible therefore (the defect of both those Foot being known) to institute a third, which may buckle with the Horse, and be in no fear of their foot; which will be effected, not by the variation of their Arms, but by changing their Discipline. And these are some of those things which being newly reformed, give great grandeur and reputation to any new Prince. This opportunity therefore is by no means to be slip'd, that Italy, after so long expectation, may see some hopes of deliverance: Nor can it be expressed with what joy, with what impatience of revenge, with what fidelity, with what compassion, with what Tears, such a Champion would be received into all the Provinces that have suffered by those barbarous inundations. What Gates would be shut against him? What people would deny him obe∣dience? what malice would oppose him? what true Italian would refuse to follow him? There is not, there is not any body but abhors, and nauseates this barbarous domination. Let your illustrious Family, then address it self to the work, with as much Courage and Confidence as just Enterprizes are undertaken; That under their Ensigns our Country may be recovered, and under their Conduct, Petrarch's Prophesie may be fulfilled, who has promised that,

Virtu contr' al furore Prendera l' arme, and fia il combatter Corto. Che l' antico valore Ne' gl' Italici curr' non e ancor morto.

Virtue shall arm 'gainst rage, and in short sight Prove th' Roman Valour's not extinguish'd quite.

The Original of the words Guelf and Ghibilin, so much mentioned in History.

THese two Factions so famous in History, were eminent in Italy two ages before Ca∣struccio was born. Machiavel in his Treatise of the Wars of that Country, affirms that Pistoia was the first place where those names of distinction were used, but the account wherewith the publick Libraries supply me, runs thus. These two words, Guelf and Ghi∣bilin, deduce their original from a schism which molested the Church in the year 1130. by the competition of two Popes, Innocent 11. and Anaclet: the greatest part of Christendom acknowledged Innocent, who was particularly supported by the Emperors of the West. Ana∣clet the anti-Pope had persuaded into his interests, Roger Comte de Naples and Sicily, a mar∣tial Prince, and descended from the Normans, who had conquered that Country. The pretence of this double Election having kept a War on foot eight years together, which was still favourable to Roger, the Emperor Conrad the third march'd himself at the head of an Army of Germans, into Italy, leaving his Grand-son Prince Henry to come after. Roger, to oppose him with men of his own Nation, allured to the defence of his Countries Guelf Duke of Bavaria. During the course of this War which began in the year 1139. it hapned sometimes that the Emperors Army was commanded by the said Prince Herny, who was brought up in a Village in Germany called Ghibilin, whose situation being very pleasant, made the very name of it ••ear to him. One day the Armies being drawn up, and ready to engage, the Bavarians to encourage their Comrades, cryed out in their language, a Guelf, a Guelf; and the Emperors Troops (being at the same time as well disposed to their General) to comply with the kindness he had for that place, cryed out on the other side, a Ghibilin, a Ghibilin. These words seemed barbarous to the Italians that were with Roger, who came to Guelf to know what they meant: He told them the Pope's Party were intended by the word Guelf, and the Emperors by the word Ghibilin: from that time those names grew so com∣mon in both Armies, that by them they answered their Who goes there? and they were given to the Italians according to their several sides. 'Tis true, at first they were used to discri∣minate only Anaclet's Party from the Emperors, but afterwards Roger having vanquished and taken prisoner Pope Innocent; as the price of his liberty he oblig'd him to erect the Countries of Naples and Sicily into Kingdoms, by which treaty Roger being taken off from the interest of the anti-Pope, and engaging entirely with the Church, he affix'd the name of Guelf to the Pope's Party, and confirm'd the name Ghibilin to the Faction of the Em∣peror.

The Italians would fain have the credit of the Etymology themselves, and by a certain gingling of words, (and that mightily strain'd) would have Guelf deriv'd from Guardatori di fe, because (forsooth) 'tis they who defend the Faith of the Church: and that by cor∣ruption the word Ghibilin was form'd from Guida belli, that is Guidatori di Bataglia, a great Title, and sutable to the Majesty of the Empire.

Be it which way it will, these two Factions were in the height of their emulation two hundred years after, that is to say, about the year 1320. which was very near the time that Castruccio was in his prosperity. And in Europe the face of affairs stood thus.

The Popes (driven from Rome by the violence of the Emperors of the West) had trans∣ferred the Holy Chair to Avignon in France. In the year 1320. it was possessed by Iohn XXII. a Prince of himself firm and entire, but one who by the precipitate counsels of other people had excommunicated the Emperor Lewis of the house of Bavaria, and been too busie with his fulminations against five more Princes of Italy, who (being treated by him like Tyrants) confederated against him; their names were Castruccio Sovereign of Lucca, Scaliger, Lord of Verona, the Marquess d' Esti Lord of Ferrara, and Visconti, and Gonzague the first Sovereign of Milan, and the other of Mantoua: which created troubles to Italy.

The Empire of the East was at that time torn, and distracted by the ambition of the Pali∣ologi and others, whilst in the mean time the Sultan Orchan son of Ottoman, swept away Lycaonia, Phrygia, and all the Coast of the Hellespont from the Greeks.

The Empire of the West was then in dispute betwixt Frederick of Austria, and Lewis of Bavaria, (whom Machiavel, by mistake or inadvertency, has called Frederick, Lewis af∣ter long and bloody Wars overcome his Competitor, and made several Voyages into Italy to invigorate and reinforce Castruccio and the Ghibilins.

France was governed by Philip le Long, who at the solicitation of Pope Iohn passed an Army into Italy to the relief of the Guelfs, which Army was commanded by Philip de Va∣lois afterwards King, but his Expedition did not answer expectation; for either the cun∣ning or bribes of the Ghibilins had dispelled the storm which our preparations threatned upon Lombardy; or our Forces were recalled upon some secret apprehension of a fourth War with the English, or by the vast projects of a fifth Expedition to the Holy Land.

Spain was divided into five Kingdoms, each of which had its peculiar King; four of them were Christians, and one a Mahumetan.

Navar had the same King with France. Philip the Long found a way to extend the Sa∣lick Law into that Country, and defeat his Niece Iane of France, Daughter of Lewis Hutin, of both Kingdoms at once.

Alphonso XI. as Mariana calls him, (the XII. as Garibay) had at that time the Scepter of Castile, but his minority transferr'd the Conduct of Affairs into the hands of the two Infanti, Don Pedro, and Don Iohn, insomuch as by the jealousie and division betwixt the two Regents, that Kingdom was exposed to such disorders as are inseparable from the mi∣nority of a Prince. At length the two Infanti were slain in the year 1320. in a Fight which their rashness caused them to lose to the Mores under the walls of Granada.

Arragon was in obedience to Don Iacques the second of that name; He was Brother to Fredrick, who reigned in Sicily to the prejudice of Robert, a Prince of the House of Anjou. This Robert was King of Naples, sided with the Guelfs, and leagued himself sun∣dry times with the Florentines against Castruccio. Iames, King of Aragon, designing to establish himself in Italy, and judging that the Conquests which he mediated upon the Isles of Corsica and Sardinia, depended much upon the Concord of his Subjects at home; He caused a General Assembly of his Estates to be held in the year 1320. in which was concluded the Union of the Kingdoms of Aragon and Valentia, with the Principality of Catolonia.

Don Denis reigned in Portugal, a person eminent among his Subjects for magnificent Building, and in great veneration for his Piety and Justice. But the felicity of his Reign was disturbed by domestick broils which he had with his Son, the Infant Don Alphonso, who succeeded him in the Crown. Don Denis instituted the Order of Christ in the year 1320.

The More, Ismael, first of that name, had the Monarchy of Granada; the Battel which he gained 1320. against the two Infanti of Castile, reviv'd the affairs of that Nation, which were in their declension before, and gave new alarms to all Spain.

The King and Kingdom of England were both governed by favourites at that time. Edward 2. gave his authority and confidence, one while to Gaveston, and then to the two Spencers; and this weakness and imprudence of his created so many discontents, and ren∣dred him so odious to the people, that after much trouble to quit himself of an Impostor who pretended to the Crown, he was forced to go thorow a cruel War against the Nobi∣lity, and another no less dangerous against Robert Bruce King of Scotland. These great stirs and commotions could not but give some jealousies to France, which seeing the Provin∣ces that the English had on that side the Sea perpetually in Arms, was obliged to keep upon so strong a Guard, as was little different from an open War.

It is not then to be admired, the affairs of Europe being in this confusion, if Italy was left in prey to the Guelfs and the Ghibilins, and gave opportunity to the laying the founda∣tion of so many Principalities, that the most part of them are still in existence. But it is certain, that neither Paulus Iovius, Girolamo Briani, il Biondo, nor the rest of the Historians, who have written of the Wars and Concussions of these two Factions, have left any thing comparable to the adventures of Castruccio, they have lent me indeed some circumstances for the illustration and ornament of this History, and I have been forced to paraphrase upon five or six of the sayings of Castruccio to give them their true Grace, and make them in∣telligible, I know not whether I have followed the just temperament that is to be observed in a translation. 'Tis vitious to assume such liberty as the History will not bear, but on the other, to tye ones self up to the same, and same quantity of words, is as disingenuous and servile. 'Tis true, the same comma's and stops were by no means to be neglected, were all treatises that are translated, like the fallacious answer of a Divine to Braccio Montone So∣vereign of Perusia, which Braccio being a Ghibilin as well as Castruccio, departed for the Siege of Aquila a Town in the Kingdom of Naples, and being impatient to know his suc∣cess,

upon application to an Astrologer, he received this answer, Ibis redibis non morieris in bello: which if punctuated thus, Ibis, redibis non, morieris in bello, threatned the said Braccio with the unfortunateness of his Expedition; whereas altering it thus, Ibis, redibis, non morieris in bello, portended quite contrary. An ambiguity like this was sent also to Manfred King of Sicily, not long before he was defeated by Charles of Anjou. NO CARLO SARA VITORIOSO DEL RE MANFREDO, and ought to be interpreted with great exactness and acuracy, the mistake of a comma being as much as a mans life is worth. There is another kind of Tyranny likewise, and that is when the Text of the Author is to regulate in a point of Religion: but here we are not under any such necessities, and he who in a quarrelsom capriccio, to defame my translati∣on, would compare every line, and put the English words all along under the Italian, would make a new and pleasant kind of Dictionary, and the beauties which are peculiar to each language, would be excellently presented.