The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

About this Item

Title
The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.
Author
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527.
Publication
London :: Printed for John Starkey, Charles Harper, and John Amery ...,
1680.
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Subject terms
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527.
Political science -- Early works to 1800.
Political ethics -- Early works to 1800.
War.
Florence (Italy) -- History.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A50274.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A50274.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 8, 2024.

Pages

CHAP. IV.

Why the Kingdom of Darius usurped by Alexander, did not rebel against his Successors, after Alexander was dead.

THE difficulties encountred in the keeping of a new Conquest being consider'd, it may well be admired how it came to pass that Alexander the Great, having in a few years made himself Master of Asia, and died as soon as he had done, That state could be kept from Rebellion: Yet his Successors enjoy'd it a long time peaceably, without any troubles or con∣cussions but what sprung from their own avarice and ambition. I answer, That all Monar∣chies of which we have any record, were govern'd after two several manners; Either by a Prince and his Servants whom he vouchsafes out of his meer grace to constitute his Mini∣sters, and admits of their Assistance in the Government of his Kingdom; or else by a Prince and his Barons who were persons advanc'd to that quality, not by favour or concession of the Prince, but by the ancientness, and Nobility of their Extraction. These Barons have their proper jurisdictions and subjects, who own their Authority, and pay them a natural respect. Those States which are govern'd by the Prince and his Servants, have their Prince more Arbitrary and absolute, because his Supremacy is acknowledged by every bo∣dy, and if another be obeyed, it is only as his Minister and Substitute, without any affection to the Man. Examples of these different Governments, we may find in our time in the per∣sons of the Grand Signore, and the King of France. The whole Turkish Monarchy is governed by a single person, the rest are but his Servants, and Slaves; for distinguishing his whole Monarchy into Provinces and Governments, (which they call Sangiacchi) he sends when and what Officers he thinks fit, and changes them as he pleases. But the King of France is established in the middle (as it were) of several great Lords, whose Soveraignty having been owned, and families beloved a long time by their Subjects, they keep their pre∣heminence, nor is it in the King's power to deprive them, without inevitable danger to himself. He therefore who considers the one with the other, will find the Turkish Empire harder to be subdued, but when once conquered, more easie to be kept: The reason of the difficulty is, because the Usurper cannot be call'd in by the Grandees of the Empire; nor hope any assistance from the great Officers, to facilitate his Enterprize, which proceeds from the reasons abovesaid, for being all slaves, and under obligation, they are not easily cor∣rupted; and if they could, little good was to be expected from them, being unable for the aforesaid reasons, to bring them any party: So that whoever invades the Turk, must expect to ind him entire and united, and is to depend more upon his own proper force, than any disorders among them; but having once conquered them, and beaten their Army beyond the possibility of a recruit, the danger is at an end; for there is no body remaining to be afraid

Page 204

of, but the Family of the Emperor, which being once extinguished, no body else has any interest with the people, and they are as little to be apprehended after the Victory, as they were to be relyed upon before. But in Kingdoms that are governed according to the Model of France, it happens quite contrary, because having gained some of the Barons, to your side (and some of them will always be discontent, and desirous of change) you may readily enter: They can (as I said before) give you easie admission, and contribute to your Victory. But to defend, and make good what you have got, brings a long train of troubles and cala∣mities with it, as well upon your friends, as your foes. Nor will it suffice to exterminate the race of the King; forasmuch as other Princes will remain, who upon occasion, will make themselves heads of any Commotion, and they being neither to be satisfied nor ex∣tinguished, you must of necessity be expell'd upon the first Insurrection.

Now if it be considered what was the Nature of Darius his Government, it will be found to have been very like the Turks, and therefore Alexander was obliged to fight them, and hav∣ing conquered them, and Darius dying after the Victory, the Empire of the Persians remain∣ed quietly to Alexander for the reasons abovesaid; and his Successors, had they continued united, might have enjoyed it in peace, for in that whole Empire no Tumults succeeded, but what were raised by themselves. But in Kingdoms that are constituted like France, it is o∣therwise, and impossible to possess them in quiet: From hence sprung the many defections of Spain, France, and Greece from the Romans, by reason of the many little Principalities in those several Kingdoms, of which, whil'st there remained any memory, the Romans enjoyed their possession, in a great deal of incertainty, but when their memory was extinct, by power and diuturnity of Empire, they grew secure in their possessions, and quarrelling afterwards among themselves, every Officer of the Romans was able to bring a party into the field, ac∣cording to the latitude and extent of his Command in the said Provinces, and the reason was, because the race of their old Princes being extirpate, there was no body left for them to ac∣knowledge, but the Romans. These things therefore being considered, it is not to be wondred that Alexander had the good fortune to keep the Empire of Asia, whil'st the rest, as Pyrrhus and others, found such difficulty to retain what they had got, for it came not to pass from the small, or great Virtue of the Victor, but from the difference and variety of the Subject.

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