The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

CHAP. III.

Of mixt Principalities.

BUt the difficulties consist in Governments lately acquired, especially if not absolutely new, but as members annexed to the territories of the Usurper, in which case such a Government is called mixed. The tumults and revolutions in such Monarchies proceed from a natural crosness and difficulty in all new conquests, for Men do easily part with their Prince, upon hopes of bettering their condition, and that hope provokes them to rebel, b••t most commonly they are mistaken, and experience tells them their condition is much worse.

This proceeds from another natural and ordinary cause necessitating the new Prince to overlay or disgust his new subjects by quartring his Army upon them, Taxes, or a thou∣sand other inconveniences, which are the perpetual consequents of conquest. So that you make them your Enemies who suffer, and are injured by your usurpation, but cannot pre∣serve their friendship who introduced you, because you are neither able to satisfy their ex∣pectation, or imploy strong remedies against them, by reason of your obligations, where∣fore though an usurper be never so strong, and his Army never so numerous, he must have intelligence with the natives, if he means to conquer a Province. For these reasons Lewis XII. of France, quickly subdued Milan, and lost it as quickly, for the same People which open'd him their gates, finding themselves deceived in their hopes, and disappointed in the future benefits which they expected, could not brook, nor comport with the haughti∣ness of their new Soveraign: 'tis very true, Countries that have rebelled, and are conquered the second time, are recovered with more difficulty, for the defection of the People having taken off all obligation or respect from the Usurper, he takes more liberty to secure himself by punishing offenders, exposing the suspected, and fortifying where ever he finds him∣self weak; so that Count Lodovick having been able to rescue Milan out of the hands of the French the first time, only by harrasing and infesting its borders, the second time he reco∣vered it, it was necessary for him, to arm and confederate the whole World against the said King, and that his Army should be beaten, and driven out of Italy: and this happe∣ned from the foresaid occasions. Nevertheless the French were twice dispossess'd. The general reasons of the first, we have already discoursed; it remains now that we take a pro∣spect of the second, and declare what remedies the said King Lewis had, or what another may have in his condition, to preserve himself better in his new conquests, than the King of France did before him. I say then that Provinces newly acquir'd, and joyn'd to the ancient territory of him who conquer'd them, are either of the same Country, or Language, or otherwise. In the first case, they are easily kept, especially if the People have not been too much accustomed to liberty: and to secure the possession, there needs no more than to extir∣pate the Family of the Prince which governed before; for in other things maintaining to them their old condition, there being no discrepancy in their customs, Men do acquiesce and live quietly, as has been seen in the cases of Burgundy, Bretagne, Gascogne and Normandy, which have continued so long under the Goverment of France: for though there be some difference in their language, nevertheless their Laws and customs being alike, they do ea∣sily consist. He therefore who acquires any thing, and desires to preserve it, is obliged to have a care of two things more particulary; one is, that the Family of the former Prince be extinguished; the other, that no new Laws or Taxes be imposed; whereby it will come to pass, that in a short time it may be annexed and consolidated with his old Principality. But where Conquest is made in a Country differing in Language, Customs, and Laws, there is the great difficulty, their good fortune and great industry is requisit to keep it; and one of the best and most efficacious expedients to do it, would be for the Usurper to live there himself, which would render his possession more secure, and durable, as the great Turk has done in Greece, who, in despight of all his practices and policies to keep it in subjection, had he not fixed his Imperial residence there, would never have been able to have effected it. For being present in Person, disorders are discovered in the bud, and prevented; but being at a distance, in some remote part, they come only by hear-say, and that, when they are got to a head, and commonly incurable. Besides, the Province is not subject to be pillaged by officers, by reason of the nearness and accessibleness of their Prince, which disposes those to love him who are good, and those to dread him who are other∣wise; and if any foreigner attacks it, he must do it with more care and circumspection, in respect that the Princes residence being there, it will be harder for him to lose it.

There is another Remedy, rather better than worse, and that is, to plant Colonies in one or two places, which may be as it were the Keys of that State, and either that must be done of necessity, or an Army of Horse and Foot be maintained in those parts, which is much worse; for Colonies are of no great expence; The Prince sends and maintains them at very little charge, and intrenches only upon such as he is constrain'd to dispossess of their Houses and Land, for the subsistance and accommodation of the new Inhabitants, who are but few, and a small part of the State; they also who are injur'd and offended, living dispers'd and in poverty, cannot do any mischief, and the rest being quiet and undisturb'd, will not stir, lest they should mistake, and run themselves into the same condition with their Neighbours.

I conclude likewise, That those Colonies which are least chargeable, are most faithful and inoffensive, and those few who are offended are too poor, and dispers'd, to do any hurt, as I said before; And it is to be observ'd, Men are either to be flatter'd and indulged, or utterly destroy'd; because for small offences they do usually revenge themselves, but for great ones they cannot; so that injury is to be done in such a manner, as not to fear any revenge. But if in stead of Colonies, an Army be kept on foot, it will be much more expensive, and the whole revenue of that Province being consum'd in the keeping it, the acquisition will be a loss, and rather a prejudice than otherwise, by removing the Camp up and down the Country, and changing their quarters, which is an inconvenience every man will resent, and be ready to revenge, and they are the most dangerous and implacable Enemies who are provok'd by insolences committed against them in their own houses. In all respects therefore, this kind of guard is unprofitable, whereas on the other side Colo∣nies are useful. Moreover, he who is in a Province of a different constitution (as is said before) ought to make himself head, and Protector of his inferior Neighbours, and endea∣vour with all diligence to weaken and debilitate such as are more powerful, and to have a particular care that no stranger enters into the said Province, with as much power as he; for it will always happen that some body or other will be invited by the Male-contents, either out of ambition, or fear. This is visible in the Etolians, who brought the Romans into Greece, who were never admitted into any Province, but by the temptation of the Natives. The Common method in such Cases is this; As soon as a foreign Potentate enters into a Province, those who are weaker, or disoblig'd, joyn themselves with him, out of emulation and animosity to those who are above them, insomuch that in respect of these inferiour Lords, no pains is to be omitted that may gain them; and when gain'd, they will readily and unanimously fall into one mass with the State that is conquered. Only the Conqueror is to take special care they grow not too strong, nor be intrusted with too much Authority, and then he can easily with his own forces, and their assistance keep down the greatness of his Neighbours, and make himself absolute Arbiter in that Province. And he who acts not this part prudently, shall quickly lose what he has got, and even whil'st he enjoys it, be obnoxious to many troubles and inconveniences. The Romans in their new Conquests ob∣serv'd this Course, they planted their Colonies, entertain'd the inferior Lords into their protection without increasing their power, they kept under such as were more potent, and would not suffer any foreign Prince to have interest among them. I will set down only Greece for an Example. The Etolians, and Achaians were protected; the Kingdom of the Macedonians was depress'd, and Antiochus driven out; yet the merits and fidelity of the Achaians and Etolians could never procure them any increase of Authority, nor the persua∣sions and applications of Philip induce the Romans to be his friends, till he was overcome, nor the power of Antiochus prevail with them to consent that he should retain any Sove∣raignty in that Province: For the Romans acted in that case as all wise Princes ought to do, who are to have an eye, not only upon present, but future incommodities, and to redress them with all possible industry, for dangers that are seen afar off, are easily prevented, but protracting till they are at hand, the remedies grow unseasonable, and the malady incura∣ble. And it falls out in this case, as the Physitians say of an Hectick Feaver; that at first it is easily cur'd, and hard to be known, but in process of time, no being observ'd, or resisted in the beginning, it becomes easie to be known, but very difficult to be cur'd: So is it in matters of State, things which are discover'd at a distance (which is done only by prudent men) produce little mischief, but what is easily averted: But when thorow ignorance or inadvertency, they come to that height that every one discerns them, there is no room for any remedy, and the disease is incurable: The Romans therefore foreseeing their troubles afar off, oppos'd themselves in time, and never swallow'd any injury, to put off a War, for they knew that War was not avoided, but defer'd thereby, and commonly with advantage to the Enemy; wherefore they chose rather to make War upon Philip, and Antiochus in Greece, than suffer them to invade Italy; and yet at that time there was no necessity of either,

they might have avoided them both, but they thought it not fit; for they could never relish the saying that is so frequent in the Mouths of our new Politicians, To enjoy the present benefits of time, but prefer'd the exercise of their courage and wisdom, for time carries all things along with it, and may bring good as well as evil, and ill as well as good. But let us return to France, and examine if what was there done, was conformable to what is prescribed here: and to this purpose I shall not speak of Charles VIII. but of Lewis XII. as of a Prince whose Conduct, and affairs (by reason his possession was longer in Italy) were more con∣spicuous, and you shall see how contrary he acted in every thing that was necessary for the keeping of so different a State. This Lewis was invited into Italy by the Venetians, who had an ambition to have got half Lombardy by his coming: I will not condemn the Expedition, nor blame the Counsels of that King, for being desirous of footing in Italy, and having no Allies left in that Country but all doors shut against him (upon the ill treatment which his predecessor Charles had used towards them) he was constrain'd to take his friends where he could find them, and that resolution would have been lucky enough, had he not miscarried in his other administration; for he had no sooner subdued Lombardy, but he recover'd all the reputation and dignity that was lost by King Charles: Genoa submitted; Florence courted his friendship, the Marquess of Mantoua, the Duke of Ferrara, Bentivoglio, Madam de Furli, the Lords of Faenza, Pesoro, Rimini, Camerino, Piombino; the Lucchesi, Pisani, Sanesi, all of them address themselves to him for his alliance and amity; Then the Venetians began to consider, and reflect upon their indiscretion; who to gain two Towns in Lombardy, had made the King of France Master of two thirds of all Italy. Let any one now think with how little difficulty the said King might have kept up his reputation in that Country, if he had observ'd the rules abovesaid, and protected his friends, who being nu∣merous, and yet weak, and fearful, (some of the Pope, and some of the Venetians) were always under a necessity of standing by him, and with their assistance he might easily have secured himself against any Competitor whatever. But he was no sooner in Milan, but he began to prevaricate▪ and send supplies to Pope Alexander, to put him in possession of Ro∣magna, not considering that thereby he weakned himself, and disoblig'd his friends who had thrown themselves into his arms, and agrandized the Church, by adding to its spiritual au∣thority (which was so formidable before) so great a proportion of temporal, and having committed one error, he was forc'd to proceed so far, as to put a stop to the ambition of Pope Alexander, and hinder his making himself Master of Tuscany, the said Lewis was forced into Italy again. Nor was it enough for him to have advanced the interest of the Church, and deserted his friends, but out of an ardent desire to the Kingdom of Naples, he shared it with the King of Spain; so that whereas before he was sole Umpire in Italy, he now entertained a Partner, to whom the ambitious of that Province, and his own Male-contents might repair upon occasion; and whereas the King of that Kingdom might have been made his Pensioner, he turn'd out him, to put in another that might be able to turn out himself.

It is very obvious, and no more than Natural, for Princes to desire to extend their Dominion, and when they attempt nothing but what they are able to atcheive, they are applauded, at least not upbraided thereby; but when they are unable to compass it, and yet will be doing, then they are condemned, and indeed not unworthily.

If France then with its own forces alone had been able to have enterpriz'd upon Naples, it ought to have been done; but if her own private strength was too weak, it ought not to have been divided: and if the division of Lombardy to which she consented with the Venetian, was excusable; it was, because done to get footing in Italy; But this partition of Naples with the King of Spain, is extreamly to be condemned, because not press'd or quicken'd by such necessity as the former. Lewis therefore committed five faults in this Ex∣pedition: He ruin'd the inferior Lords; He augmented the Dominion of a Neighbour Prince; He call'd in a Forreigner as puissant as himself; He neglected to continue there in person; and planted no Colonies: All which errors might have been no inconvenience whil'st he had lived, had he not been guilty of a sixt, and that was depressing the power of the Vene∣tian: If indeed he had not sided with the Church, nor brought the Spaniards into Italy, it had been but reasonable for him to have taken down the pride of the Venetian, but persuing his first resolutions, he ought not to have suffer'd them to be ruin'd, because whil'st the Venetian strength was intire, they would have kept off other people from attempting upon Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented, unless upon condition it might have been deliver'd to them, and the others would not in probability have forced it from France, to have given it to them: and to have contended with them both, no body would have had the courage. If it be urg'd that King Lewis gave up Romagna to the Pope, and the Kingdom of Naples, to the King of Spain, to evade a War, I answer, as before,

That a present mischief is not to be suffer'd to prevent a War, for the War is not averted, but protracted, and will follow with greater disadvantage.

If the Kings faith and engagements to the Pope to undertake this enterprize for him, be objected, and that he did it to recompence the dissolution of his Marriage, and the Cap which at his intercession his Holiness had confer'd upon the Legate of Amboise, I refer them for an answer, to what I shall say hereafter about the faith of a Prince, how far it obliges. So then King Lewis lost Lombardy, because he did not observe one of those rules, which others have followed with success in the Conquest of Provinces, and in their desire to keep them: Nor is it an extraordinary thing, but what happens every day, and not without reason. To this purpose I remember I was once in discourse with the Cardinal d' Amboise at Nantes, at the time when Valentino (for so Caesar Borgia Pope Alezander's Son was commonly call'd) possess'd himself of Romagna: In the heat of our Conference the Car∣dinal telling me that the Italians were ignorant of the art of War; I replyed, that the French had as little skill in matters of State, for if they had had the least policy in the world, they would never have suffer'd the Church to have come to that height and Elevation. And it has been found since by experience, that the Grandeur of the Church and the Spaniard in Italy, is derived from France, and that they in requital, have been the ruine and expulsion of the French.

From hence a general rule may be deduc'd, and such a one as seldom or never is subject to Exception. Viz. That whoever is the occasion of anothers advancement, is the cause of his own diminution: because that advancement is founded either upon the conduct or power of the Donor, either of which become suspicious at length to the person prefer'd.