An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

The Tenth Part OF THE INSTITUTION OF PHILOSOPHY. VIZ. ETHICKS, Or, The Right way of Ordering the LIFE of MAN. (Book 10)

A PREFATORY Discourse. Of the Dignity and Ʋse of Ethicks.

I. The Dig∣nity of Ethicks above other Sciences. THO' all Philosophy was Invented for the Good of Man, and there is no part of it, which is not con∣ducive to his Natural Felicity; yet doth ETHICKS deserved∣ly take the first place amongst them all, as excelling them, both in Usefulness and the Worthiness of its End. For whatsoever other Sciences prescribe, is only an Exercise and Accom∣plishment of Human Wit; whereas the Rules of Ethicks are the Remedies of the Soul. Logick may pride her self, for that her Rules direct and guide the Operations of the Mind, and by putting a difference between Truth and Falshood, illuminate the Understanding, and prevent it from falling into Errour: But Ethicks, taking a higher flight, enquires into the Nature of what is Good, persuades the pursuit of it, and having discover'd its Charms and Amiableness, allures Mortals, and enflames them with the Love of it. Natural Philosophy may boast her searching into the Essence of things, and that by penetrating all the Secrets of the World, she discerns those hidden Properties that escape the most piercing Eye: But Moral Philo∣sophy, pursuing a more Noble Game, teaches us to subdue Monsters, to tame our Passions, and to be Victors over them. Let Metaphysicks please her self, that mounting up to Heaven, she takes a view of Intelligences separate from Matter, and by a daring Undertaking endeavours to discover the Divine Majesty, Power, and Unity: Whilst Ethicks with much more certainty displays the Honour that is due to Angels, and the Worship we owe to GOD; and by manifesting to us that Supream Essence, as the first and chiefest of all Beings, doth not only put us in mind of the Obedience and Observance we owe to Him, but also forceth us to believe it most due to Him.

II. It is a more excellent thing to pursue Good▪ than Truth. Who is there amongst Men, that doth not pre∣fer the Love of Good before the Love of Truth, and that would not rather embrace Vertue, than to please himself with the barren Knowledge of it? I confess it is a Noble thing to understand the Affections of Material things, and to search out the Nature and Properties of all the sorts of Bo∣dies contained in the Universe: And yet who must not own, that it is far more glorious to put a Curb in the Mouth of Concupiscence; and to undervalue all the gay Bubbles, which almost the World doth admire and doat upon? What can be imagin'd more great and wonderful, than to wrestle against Fawning Lust, and to retort the Darts of this Domestick Enemy upon himself? Is it not the express Character of a great and sublime Soul, to despise Honour, and to prefer a mean and low Estate before the Pleasures of the Court, and the top of Grandure? All those are the Effects of the good Counsel Ethicks gives us, and all the great Qualities we so much admire in Men, are but the product of her Precepts. And therefore the Ancients look'd upon that Philosophy to be in a manner fruitless and to no purpose, which did not restrain our Passions; which did not put us upon the practice of Vertue, nor insinuate into our Minds the wholsom Laws of Nature.

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Book. 1. To front Part 10.

ETHICA

G. Freman. In.

I. Kip Sculp

* 1.1 For as that Art of Physick is of no use, which cannot remove the Disease of Mans Body, or teach us how Health may be preserved or restored; so there is little or no advantage in that Philosophy, which doth not remove the Maladies of the Mind, and which like some Trees produceth nothing but Leaves, and pleaseth us only with the shade of Words. This commendation doth only belong to Ethicks, who like a Mistress of Manners in∣forms Men what they ought to do; and is indeed the discipline and exercise of Actions, rather than of Words or Notions. If we take a view of the ex∣tent of her Power, it is she that first built Cities, and reduced People of different inclinations into Societies. She it is that instructs States-men, and teaches them the Art of Governing, shewing them how they may avoid the Envy of those that are governed. She it is that informs Husbands, how they are to behave themselves towards their Wives, with what care they are to mind the E∣ducation of their Children, and to govern both the one and the other, without injuring them. She it is that prescribes Rules to Masters, how to go∣vern their Servants: In a word, there is no man∣ner of Life, which is not directed by her advice, and which doth not borrow the Rules of Govern∣ing and Obeying from her.

IV. What things are to be hand∣led in this Tenth part. In order therefore to the more distinct discovery of the end of Moral Philosophy, it will be worth my pains in a few Words, to declare what I intend to treat of in this Part, and to lay open the whole Order and disposition of this Work. First, I in∣tend to begin with the Nature of the Summum Bonum or Highest Good, and to shew wherein it precisely consists; next I shall proceed to the De∣finition of Vertue, which I distribute into two Parts.

V. The divi∣sion and Nature of Vertue. One of these, named Prudence, is the Directive, she that giveth Instruction. The other are the chief Doers, employed in the making men vertuous.

The First whereof re∣gards our selves, viz.

• Temperance and
• Fortitude.

The latter regards o∣thers, viz. Justice towards

• GOD, and this is Godli∣ness or Religion.
• Men, which is Benevo∣lence and Beneficence.

Neither have I unadvisedly resolved upon this Method, forasmuch as the Vertues are a help to us, in the constant prosecution of this Highest Good, and as so many steps, whereby we raise our Souls to that which is Worthy and Honest. And having done this, I proceed to the use of the Passions, as being the Matter for the exercise of Vertues, and whereon they chiefly exert their Activity. To these I add a few Chapters of Human Actions, wherein is chiefly treated concerning the Liberty of the Will, whether it belong to Man, and whe∣ther it be consistent with the Knowledge and Pow∣er of GOD. Upon this occasion also, I enter up∣on the examination of the Goodness and Evil of Human Actions, and when they may be said to be conformable to right Reason, and when to thwart and cross the same. And Last of all, I shut up this discourse with the Duties of Man in general, and of a good Citizen in particular; in which two considerations, all that belongs to Man may be comprehended. I would also have the Reader to take notice, that in this Treatise I follow the Sentiments of DES CARTES: And tho' he hath writ but litle concerning Moral Philosophy, yet I have a mind to raise this structure upon the Foundation he hath laid, and from what he hath Writ concerning the Soul of Man, and the Pas∣sions to discover his Sense of Moral Matters.

CHAP. I. Of the Nature of Ethicks, and the princi∣pal Parts thereof.

I. The Cer∣tainty of Moral Phi∣losophy. FOrasmuch as ETHICKS is a part of Phi∣losophy, and the Directrix of Human Life, accordingly she derives her certainty from her own Principles; which do so much conduce to the ob∣taining of her end, that without their assistance, Goodness and Vertue can never be had. For as PLATO well observes, it is not by an impulse of Nature only, or by Divine choice and favour, that Vertues are acquired, and Vices banished; but it is necessary to call in Science, or rather the Art of doing well, to our assistance, that by her Rules and Directions, we may be exercised to good man∣ners, and the inborn Seeds of Vertue, that lye bu∣ried in us, may be cherished and spring forth. And if at any time some have been known to arrive at the perfection of a Vertuous Life, without the precepts of Ethicks, yet must not we therefore deny her to be an Art; no more than we refuse the title of Art to Physick, tho' sometimes we may recover our Health without it.

II. Tho' Ethicks in it self be very familiar, yet there are but few that agree in explain∣ing of its Nature. Some think it is but a small thing to undertake the Explications of the Precepts of Ethicks, be∣cause the Rules conducing to the right deport∣ment of our Lives, seem so very notorious and familiar, and common to all Nations. Who knows not, say they, that Vertue is to be had in∣esteem and practised; that Parents are to be obeyd and honour'd; and that GOD, whom all adore, is to be beloved above all things? It is proper in∣deed, to form Rules concerning things we are ig∣norant of; but as for Matters that are known to all men, these are best left to every ones owns Sense and consideration. For my part, I should be apt enough to be of their mind also, if all men did agree universally in the Principles and dictates of this Art, and if all without exception embraced, what seems evident to some. But alas, most men now adays are so infected with the itch of contra∣diction, that they many times start, and maintain new Opinions only to gratifie their wrangling and disputing Humour. As appears more particularly in this Matter before us, for tho' the name of Mo∣ral Philosophy be tost in the mouths of all men, yet there are but few that concur in their Sense about the nature of it; and notwithstanding it be very dangerous to mistake in the forming of our Man∣ners, and the due regulating of our Lives, yet many chuse rather, to question the truth of Moral Dictates, than to want an opportunity of thwart∣ing and contradicting the Sentiments of others, tho' never so clear and incontestable. But may I never be tainted with this Evil, whose aim only is, to pursue Truth, not concerning my self about what others teach, or what Opinions they espouse:

My design only being to explain what DES CARTES hath left in writing about these Mat∣ters, and to pursue his sense and meaning.

III. The Defini∣tion of E∣thicks. Wherefore from his Method of discoursing a∣right, I gather this definition of Moral Philosophy: viz. that it is a right way or course of thinking, in order to the obtaining of Human Felicity. Or a Discipline directing man, in his voluntary Actions, so as to live well and happily. In the name of Discipline, it agrees with the other parts of Philo∣sophy, but is distinguisht from those Arts, which leave behind them some perceptible Matter, when the Action is over. For Moral Philosophy is not conversant about any External Matters, nor con∣siders Bodily Actions; but is intirely employed and concern'd about the inward Operations of the Will, inasmuch as they are submitted to Right Rea∣son, and by it directed to that which is Good. Wherefore to constitute its difference from other Arts, it is added to live well and happily; that from thence we might gather, that the Mind of man is perfected by Moral Philosophy, and directed by its precepts to act rightly, and comporting with reason.

IV. The Object and end of Ethicks. The Object of Ethicks is right reason, which is to be exercised towards all persons and things, and in all our Actions, and the several circumstances of them. Or if you will, it is man himself, inas∣much as he can and ought to be directed to an Honest, that is Moral, Good, according to certain reason. And the end of Ethicks is to perfect man, and make him happy. For if a man be steadily conformable to right reason, in all circumstances of Persons, Things and Human Actions, he is arrived to the highest top of his Moral Perfection and Blessedness.

V. What Man∣ners are. The word Ethicks, signifies nothing but Moral, or that which concerns Manners; and according∣ly Ethicks takes upon her to frame and direct our Manners; which are nothing else, but a way or course of Living confirmed by custom; or a certain accustomedness of Acting, or repeated Human Actions, which when they are conformable to right reason, are called Good manners; but if contrary to the same, Vitious and Wicked.

VI. Ethicks does not so much consider Ex∣ternal as Internal Actions. And altho' many Human Actions are External, and such as cannot be performed without the help of the Body, as Liberality, which communicates her Benefits to others; Justice which gives to every one his due, and other such like which are free, and at the command of the Will: Yet are not these Actions primarily considered by Moral Philosophy, but secondarily only, so far as they are the effects of Internal Actions, and the product of the Will. For the Duty of Liberality doth not principally consist in the relieving of our Friend, but in the care and desire we have to assist him, which is the peculiar property of a generous and vertuous Mind. Neither can we suppose that the restoring of a Pledge or Trust, or the paying of a Debt, doth fulfil the whole requiring of Justice; but rather that firm purpose of the Will, whereby a man unalterably resolves to restore the Trust that is committed to him, and not wrong any by with∣holding their due from them. Wherefore out∣ward Actions may be said to be the Instruments only, whereby the Will executes her decrees, and performs what she hath resolved upon. And tho' all particular Actions be free, as being performed or omitted according to the pleasure of the Will; yet it is not the concern of Ethicks to consider particular Actions, but only the Actions of the Will in general, to which it universally prescribes, that GOD is to be loved, Vertue to be embraced, and Vice to be avoided, &c.

VII. Moral Phi∣losophy is to be account∣ed amongst the practi∣cal Sciences From all which it is evident, that Moral Philoso∣phy is not meerly Speculative, or consisting in the sole contemplation of Manners; but that it is to be reckoned amongst the active Sciences, its work and business being to form our Manners, to instruct us to Vertue, and prescribe the Rules of well-do∣ing.

VIII. Of the three parts of Moral Philosophy. Moral Philosophy is commonly divided into three Parts, viz. into Private, Domestick and Po∣litick. For man may be considered under various respects; First, as he is a particular man, that is, as he takes care of himself, and provides for his own Good: Secondly, as he is the Master of a Family, and performs the Duties incumbent on a Master or Parent; and Lastly, as he is concern'd in the Government of a City, or Commonwealth, and the giving Laws to others. All which di∣versities of Offices or Duties, are directed by so many several parts of Moral Philosophy. The Private, which some call Monastick or Solitary, is that part of Ethicks, which gives Rules how men in their singular State ought to behave themseves: The Domestick or Oeconomical, is that which lays down Precepts, how Families may be rightly or∣dered: And the Political teaches and instructs us in whatsoever conduceth to the good of Societies, and how both Magistrates and Subjects, are to be∣have themselves in their several Stations: For seeing that man stands in need of the Help and assistance of others, as well with reference to those things which are the necessaries of Life, as those which are the comforts and conveniences of it; he is assisted in those things which are necessary to Life by his Family, and by the Society or Common∣wealth, with that which conduceth to his safety and well being.

IX. The Dome∣stick and Political part of E∣thicks are reducible to the pri∣vate. But whatsoever Modern Philosophers may talk of this distribution of Ethicks, it seems clear to me, that the two latter parts of Moral Philoso∣phy are contained in the former, and that if a man be only instructed in good Manners, this is suffi∣cient to qualifie him, for the well and happy go∣verning of his House or Commonwealth. For it is still a Private man, that manageth matters, whe∣ther in a Family or Commonwealth, and who cer∣tainly will be by so much the more fitted to discharge his Duty and Trust in either, by how much greater command he hath got over his Passions, and the more eminent he is in Vertue. For the Vertue of a Private person, doth not differ from that of a publick and Political; no more than the Felicity of the one, differs from that of the other. For whatsoever the Private part of E∣thicks professeth, the same is with equal Right contained in the two others, viz. the Science of Life, besides which nothing is taught, or contain∣ed in the Oeconomical and Political. Neither can we assign any other difference betwixt them than there is, in the several Pipes of Wind-Engines or Instruments, in which one and the same Wind pro∣duceth several Sounds. In like manner all men receive from the Private part of Moral Philosophy, the Rules of living well and conformably to rea∣son,

notwithstanding that as the greater Pipes of an Organs yield a deeper Sound, so those who are in high and honourable places in the Commonwealth, may have a more large field wherein to exercise their Vertues, and more ample matter, of giving illustrious and signal instances of their Firm Pro∣bity.

CHAP. II. What Good is, and how and why the same is desired.

I. Nothing is Good but with refer∣ence to an∣other. BEfore we proceed to explain the nature of Good, and to discover that which is the desire and delight of all men; we are to take notice, that a thing considered in it self, cannot be said to be either Good or Evil, but only with reference to some other thing, to which it is conducive to attain that which it pursues, or on the contrary. Thus Venom is good and wholesome to a Serpent; but hurtful and destructve to man. And therefore, if we except GOD Almighty only, who doth good to all, and preserves the Being of every thing; there is nothing in the World, which in a different respect may not be accounted Good and Evil. But this being so, a difficulty seems to arise, how then we may come to know and perceive that which is Good, and how to distinguish it from that which is Evil.

II. Good can∣not be defi∣ned with the refer∣ence it hath to our Ap∣petite or desire. Some define the Essence of Good by our inborn Propensity, or Inclination; as supposing that to be Good which excites our desire, and allures us to embrace and pursue it. But these according to my Judgment, do not exactly enough lay open the nature of Good. For that Inclination whereby we are carried out to desire that which is Good, sup∣poseth it to be something that is suitable to our Na∣ture, so that the thing must be endued with the formal reason of Goodness, before ever it can move our Appetite. For Appetibility or desirableness, is nothing else but an Affection or Property of that which is Good, and which flows from its Essence. Now it is inconsistent with the Rules of true De∣finition, to make the proprieties of things to con∣stitute the natures of them.

III. The true Definition of Good. Good thefore may better be defined thus, viz. that which is acceptable and suitable to every one. And that this is a true Definition, will appear by an enumeration of the several general heads of Good things; for all Good is comprehended under one of the three heads of Honest, Pleasant or Profitable. An Ho∣nest Good is that which is agreeable to right reason, and is desired for its own sake: As Vertue, Piety, to love Good, to honour ones Parents, to relieve the Poor, to curb the lusts of the Flesh. Pleasant Good is that which is desired for delights sake (yet with∣out thwarting the Honest Good and Right Reason) as Musick delights the Ear, a curious Picture the Eye, and the conscience of Good deeds, does afford innocent pleasure to Mind or Body. Profitable Good is that which is Good, in order to some other thing, for the acquiring whereof it is desired, as Mony, Riches, &c. But not one of all these is called Good, save only in reference to its being suitable, or a∣greeable to some other thing. The reason whereof is this, because the operation of the Understand∣ing, must go before the Act of the Will; and therefore it is necessary that the Object be first known to be agreeable to a reasonable Nature, before that the Will can be carried out towards it.

IV. There are two sorts of Appeti∣tes. Now it will be easie to shew how, and in what manner things are carried out towards that which is Good, that is to the desire of that which is agree∣able to, and convenient for them, if we consider the two Appetites in Man, whereof the one is call'd Innate, the other Elicit: The Innate Appetite is an inborn inclination, whereby a thing is carried towards that which is convenient for, and accept∣able to it. Thus the Peripateticks generally hold, that the Fire by a natural propensity tends up∣wards; and that Plants attract a suitable Aliment out of the Earth. Tho' indeed this seems very difficult to conceive, that things utterly devoid of Sense and Knowledge should desire any thing, or be endued with any propensity. We cannot deny, but that in things of this nature, there are some certain Laws of Motion, appointed by the Au∣thor of Nature, which may be said to be a kind of inward propensions; as that every motion affects to pursue a right Line; but we yet must have a care, not to attribute any Appetites or Inclinations to things, when we search into their more hidden Qualities, for this would be to confound the Attri∣butes of the most different things. Wherefore Ap∣petite is only to be attributed to Man, it being an Act of the Will, whereby upon previous Under∣standing, it is carried out to that which is conve∣nient for it.

V. In what sense Ina∣nimate things may be said to desire things. Wherefore when I say, that Inanimate things have an Appetite, I would not be so understood, as if I did attribute any Knowledge to them, by which they desire things grateful, and avoid the contrary (for Knowledge is no where but in the Mind) but only that by an infallible necessity they follow the guidance of the Divine Reason, and indispensably obey his Will; in like manner, as an Arrow by a skilful Archer is guided to the mark, with out having any Knowledge or Perception thereof: Inanimate things therefore pursue that which is Good by a natural impulse, and reach it by means of Local motion, which the great Creator of the Universe hath furnisht them with. Man alone desires Good from a preceding Know∣ledge, because he only is possest of a Soul, whose peculiar nature it is to Perceive, Will and Ima∣gin.

VI. How it comes to pass that Man some∣times de∣sires Evil. But it may be enquired, seeing that Man doth not pursue that which is Good, without a foregoing knowledge of it, how it comes to pass, that he sometimes goes in quest of the contrary, that is, Evil? To which I answer, that Evil is never de∣sired by Man; but whatsoever his desire is car∣ried out after, the same is always proposed to him, under the likeness and appearance of Good. For tho' it may be, that which he hankers after, be contrary to Reason, and the Law of GOD; yet is the same always represented to him as some Plea∣surable or Profitable Good, and is consequently al∣lured to it, under the notion of its being suitable to him.

VII. Why all Men, none excepted, desire Good. It will be sufficient for the explication of the Nature of Good, only to discover the cause, why all Men promiscuously desire that which is Good, and are byast towards it, by an inborn propensity. To do this will be very obvious, if we remember, that GOD is the supreme Good, comprehending all

the Perfections that can be conceived by the Mind of Man. Wherefore when any other Good is re∣presented to us, we desire it upon no other ac∣count, but as we apprehend it to partake of the Divine Goodness, because by its Essence and Ex∣istence it bears some kind of Resemblance with him. And hence it is that no Rest can be found, either in the Possession of Good things, or in the Con∣templation of Truth; because nothing created can equal the Idea we have of Good and Truth: tho' in the mean time we snatch at some imperfect Ima∣ges and Glances of it, whereby our Love is in∣flamed to attain the Supream Good. This Affecti∣on also is sometimes kindled in us from the Diver∣sity of Objects, as being apt to imagin that we make some approaches to the infinity of that Highest Good, by enquiring into the Nature of new Objects, and by extending the Bounds of our Knowledge and Enjoyments. Accordingly it hap∣pens sometimes that Covetous Misers, quitting their niggardly Companions, frequent the company of Liberal Persons; and that such as are Sad, keep company with those that are Merry and Jovial; and those that are Angry and Froward, with persons of Meek and Quiet Spirits; as being sensible of an insufficiency in themselves, and that they stand in need of the help of others towards the obtaining of their proper Good.

VIII. In every Desire there is some ap∣pearance of the Su∣pream Good. Now in all these there is somewhat of a ten∣dency towards that Highest Good: for Ambition doth not proceed from an Inborn desire of Honour; nor doth the concupiscence of Love proceed from Nature, but from a Pravity of Manners, whilst they are panting after that Immense Good, and affect the Possession of that which is infinite. For the desire of that which is Good, is, as it were, the Great Artificer that endeavours to make Created Beings conformable to their first Principle and like unto him.

CHAP. III. What the Highest Good is.

I. All Men aspire af∣ter Happi∣ness. THERE is nothing sticks so close to the mind of Man as the desire of Blessedness, and tho' sometimes we can hardly obtain or reach it, yet we are still in pursuit of it. For all the other mo∣tions of our Mind vanish away by degrees, and in process of time are lessened and weakned. For we are not always taken with the splendor of Ho∣nours, or inflamed with the love of Riches; and Pleasure or Voluptuousness at last loseth all its charms, whereby it formerly captivated us, so that we loath the Objects we before panted after. But the desire of Happiness admits of no vicissitude, but as long as we breathe, or our Hearts do beat, excites us to the pursuit of it.

II. What the Highest Good is. This is that in which all People do agree, that they desire to be Happy; and how greatly soever they may differ in their Tempers and Inclinations, yet they all unite in this Passion, that they all af∣fect to be happy. And accordingly the Anci∣ents called the Highest Good the last of all▪ de∣sirable things; forasmuch as the said Good is eve∣ry way perfect and absolute, which being once at∣tained, there remains nothing further to be desired The SUPREAM GOOD therefore is that Mark which all our Words and Deeds tend to; and as Seafaring-men, direct their Eyes to the Pole Star, so likewise is our Soul to be directed to some end, to which all our consults and deliberations of living well, and acting aright must tend.

III. Why there be so few that know it. Tho' almost all Philosophers have written con∣cerning the Highest Good, and have left great Vo∣lumes on that subject to Posterity, yet were they never more mistaken in any thing, than they have been in that point, insomuch that I dare affirm, that excepting only a few, they were never more unhappy in any of their undertakings than in this research after the true Nature of Human Felicity. I conceive that their mistake herein was caused by reason of their not duely considering what properly belongs to Man, or for want of accurately distin∣guishing between the functions of the Mind, and the motions of the Body; by which means, slight∣ing the Inhabitant, they only had regard to his Home or Lodging.

IV. The Su∣pream Good defi∣ned. The Highest Good therefore of this Life, is that which makes Man, here on Earth, most perfect and happy. And therefore for its sake only all other things are desired, whereas the Supream Good is desired for its own sake. We seem to ex∣press, at least, a kind of confused knowledge of this Good, when we prefer one thing before another: for when-ever we choose one thing rather than another, we always suppose the one to be Better: now that only is so which comes nearest to the Best. So that it appears we have an indelible no∣tion of the Best, that is, Supream Good imprest on our Minds.

V. The Differ∣ing Opini∣ons of the Antients concerning the Nature of the High∣est Good. Some have defined the end of all our Actions to be Pleasure, the desire whereof is born with us, as well as the aversation of Pain; of which num∣ber was ARISTIPPUS the Philosopher, and the CYRENAICKS. Others deter∣mined Blessedness to consist in the enjoyment of a concourse of all Good Things; and that no Man was happy, that did not possess the affluence of them all. And accordingly, for to constitute their Happy Man, they require that he have Friends to advise and assist him; that he have Riches for ne∣cessaries and convenience; Power, whereby he may command others, and make them serviceable to him; Nobility, to make him conspicuous and eminent; yea, and Beauty too, with a fruitful Wife, and wel-mannered and witty Children. But, as I said before, I suppose that these Philosophers, who placed Happiness in these things, never well considered the Nature of Man, nor what belongs to his Mind, and what to his Body. For had they lookt upon the Mind, as they ought, to have been the chief and principal part in Man, they would never have placed his Felicity and satisfaction in things that gratifie his outward Part, seeing that true satisfaction appertains only to his Rational and inward Part. But forasmuch as the dispute amongst Philosophers is not so much about the Nature of Felicity, as the Causes of it, that is, the means which lead to it; it shall be our care chiefly to discover, whence Happiness doth arise, and what that Supream Good is, by the enjoyment whereof we are made Happy.

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Book. 1. Part. 10. Chap. 3.

Lens Inv.

I. Kip Sculp.

To the Worship∣full Captaine William Wallis of S^t. Martins in the Fields in the County of Midles ex

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

CHAP. IV. That the Good Things of the Body conduce nothing to Mans Happiness.

I. Aristotle ranks Health a∣mongst the most consi∣derable Good things that concur to Mans Happiness. THE Good things of the Body are common∣ly reduced to these three, viz. Health, Beauty, Pleasure; in the enjoyment whereof we are commonly esteemed happy. For if we con∣sult ARISTOTLE, he will tell us, that Health is as great a Good to us, as a calm Sea is to the Birds called Halcyons; who, when the Face of the Sea is smooth, and not wrinkled with Winds, with great ease and delight dispatch their affairs, sit brooding upon their Eggs, hatch their Young, cherish and feed them: and that much the same pleasure and ease attends those that have a firm and healthful Constitution of Body, whereby they with chearfulness exert all the functions of Life, and with a ready activity discharge all the Offices incumbent upon them. For when the Body is sick and weak, who knows not that the Briskness and activity of Man languisheth, and that the very perceptions of his Senses prove bur∣thensome and irksome unto him? His Ears loath the sweetest Musick, his Sight is tired with the most Beautiful and charming Objects, the Confe∣rences of his Friends prove tedious, and by an ut∣ter dislike of all things, he sometimes becomes in∣tolerable, even to himself.

II. If Health were the peculiar Good of Man▪ Beasts would ex∣cel him. But, notwithstanding all this, far be it from us to constitute the Good of Man in so mean a gift of Nature, and to make his Felicity to depend on his Body. For if we place the chiefest Good in a due state of the Body, shall we not make Beasts more happy than Man, who generally enjoy a more firm and vigorous health, and more perfect Senses? Whatsoever conduceth to the Happiness of Man, must be peculiar to him, and not common to him with the Brutes. Besides, the things that con∣stitute the Highest Good, must be stable and un∣moveable; but what is more weak and tottering than Health, which is overturn'd with the least fit of Sickness, and which as years encrease upon us, decreaseth continually? That which is not in our Power, but depends on another for its subsistence, doth not deserve the name of Good. Do'nt we see frequently that the most Learned and most accom∣plisht Men are the most weak and sickly? And that the things which promote and assist the mind, are hurtful to the Body? Are not Studies, which inform and enlighten the Mind, and inflame the Will, prejudicial to the good Temperament and State of our Bodies which they alter and wea∣ken?

III. Beauty is no part of Mans Hap∣piness. And the same judgment must be made of Beau∣ty, because of its Frailty, and short continuance. For what season of the Year can be named, that doth not conspire to the defacing of it? The Win∣ters Cold by driving the Heat inwards, much abates the florid colour of the Face, whilst the Summers Heat tans the Skin, wherein Beauty hath its peculiar residence, and sits exalted as on hes Throne. But suppose we this fading Flower to be perpetual, and exempt from the Power of the di∣stemperature of Seasons or Weather, yet after all, we shall never be able to make it a part of the Highest Good, seeing it brings nothing but trouble along with it, and disturbs the peace of those that are most possest of it with continual sollicitude. How vexatiously sollicitous are Young Men and Maids to appear Beautiful to the Eyes of Specta∣tors? What pains and inconveniencies do they not undergo, to preserve this fading Flower? How ma∣ny hours do they spend in Curling and Combing their Hair, and other Trimmings, and neglect the improvement and good state of their Minds, to adorn and deck their Bodies? Nothing can be esteemed Good, but what is conducive to Vertue; but who is so blinded with the Charms of Beauty, to assert that it is any way helpful or conducive to Vertue and Honesty? When on the contrary it is apparent that it is the greatest allurement to Sin, and furnisheth the strongest incentives to Lust and Concupiscence? A Woman that sets many Hearts on fire, is in no small danger of being fired her self: And it is but seldom that we find exact Chastity and great Beauty to go hand in hand together; and there is but too just reason to suspect, that she who is too industrious to please others, is not free from impure desires her self. Wherefore conclude we, that Beauty cannot be ranked amongst the Good things that constitute Human Felicity, as well because it is so brittle and fading, as because it gives occasion to promote Vice and advance Folly.

IV. Bodily Pleasure cannot make Ma•• happy. But there are none that more abuse the name of the Highest Good, than those who place it in Plea∣sure, and take its height from sensual delectation. not that I suppose this to have been the opinion of EPICURUS, as most do, since I am perswaded that his Precepts were Vertuous and Good, and that he made use of the word Pleasure, not to advance Voluptuousness, but to promote Vertue, as I have elsewhere shewed at large. Wherefore I do here contend with them only, who owning nothing in Man besides his Body, suppose that his happiness consists in abounding with Pleasure, and that he is then Blessed when every part of him hath its share of joy and delectation.

V. They that constitute the Felicity of Man in Bodily Pleasure, do level him with the Beasts. But these may be easily convinc'd of their error, by putting them in Mind, that by setting this Esti∣mate upon Mans Happiness, they level him with the Beasts, and assign to him no greater Good than Swine themselves do enjoy. Nothing can enter the Constitution of the Supream Good, but what is Eternal, and which affects the Soul in such a manner, as to be hurtful or prejudicial to no Body, and never causing wearisomness or loathing. Whereas Pleasure is inconstant, and soon languish∣eth, and is extinguisht when it delights most. Whatsoever is the true Good of Man, doth not thwart any other Good, but is advantageous to Ver∣tue, and to his Body and Soul; whereas there is no greater Enemy to Prudence than Pleasure; nothing that more overcasts the Mind, and fills it with dis∣quiet and ignorance; being always Rash and Pre∣cipitant, impatient of Advice or Counsel, and not so much the effect of Choice, as of a suddain attack and onset. What agreement can there be betwixt Human Felicity and such a Good as this? The thing must be Immortal and Eternal, that can make an Immortal Soul Happy.

VI. Pleasure is common to Good and Bad Men. Besides, how can the Highest Good of Man con∣sist in that which is common to Good and Bad, to the Criminal as well as the Innocent; that which enticeth Men from Vertue, and clouds their Judg∣ment; the affluence whereof clogs and breeds a loathing, and commonly ends in Sadness and Re∣pentance?

Now that all these things may be truly affirmed of Pleasure, is evident to every one that considers the Nature of it.

CHAP. V. External Good Things are not the Good of Man.

I. The Good things of Fortune are not in our Power, and therefore do not be∣long to us. FOrasmuch as Suitableness constitutes the Na∣ture of Good, and that we always desire that which is most agreeable to our Nature, we do abuse our innate Faculties, when-ever we desire things that are not suitable to us, or which are not in our own Power: which they evidently seem to be guilty of, who rank outward Goods amongst those Good things that are conducive to the Happi∣ness of Man. For such as these pursue Happiness in matters that are foreign to them, and the Acqui∣sition whereof is not in their own Power. Where∣as what can be imagined more foolish than to pro∣secute a Precarious Felicity, and to borrow the means and helps of a Happy State from foreign things? Who ever acquired Riches, Renown or Nobility when he pleased? they being Largesses of Fortune, which she gives, and takes away by chance, and at random.

II. Riches are frequently a Mans greatest Enemy, and most preju∣dicial to his Peace and Quiet. You'l say that Riches are necessary to a Happy Life, forasmuch as they furnish us with many comforts and conveniencies. But for all this, I shall never admit any thing to enter the constituti∣on of the Highest Good, except it be first demon∣strated to me to be Good in it self, or that it be in the possession of such a one, who can vertuously make use of it. But where is he that understands the true value and worth of things, and estimates them accordingly? Where is the Rich Man that is not puft up with his Riches, that doth not de∣spise his Inferiors, and doth not scorn their com∣pany? Riches indeed may conduce to Pomp and Splendor, but not to that state which we require in a Wise Man, viz. a constant calm and sedate∣ness of Mind. For with what racking sollicitude are they tormented in the acquiring of them? What care, what pains do they take to preserve them when got? So that they may truly be said not to possess their Riches, but to be possessed by them. Besides, the possession and enjoyment of Good must needs fill and satisfie the Soul: But where is the Rich Man that is content with his Condition, seeing that they are never satiated with Gold; and that all their acquisitions serve but to enlarge their Desires, and render them insatiable? Lastly, we find nothing more frequent and obvi∣ous than that Riches do debauch men, and corrupt their manners, and tempt the best Natures, some∣times, to the worst of Vices. It was Riches, far more powerful than Swords or Darts, that broke and vanquisht the Roman Vertues, and made Slaves of them, who had mastered the whole World. The Romans were every where Conquerors whilst they were poor, neither could any thing stand be∣fore them; but were conquered and trod upon as soon as they began to wallow in Riches.

III. Riches can∣not make Men happy. Moreover, that which is the Highest Good must needs accomplish and Bless Man in the highest degree, it must needs be constant and permanent, be desirable for it self, belong to Good Men alone, and exclude all Evil; but nothing of all these can be found in Riches. For Riches are not desired for themselves, but for the ornament and conve∣nience of Life; they are more frequently possest by Bad, than Good Men, as daily experience sheweth; they are the Cherishers and Fomenters of Vice; they do not bar or keep off Evil, they do not fill the desire, and they often make a man infamous and corrupt him, instead of making him better.

IV. Honour is a Fickle Good, and depending of another. Neither can Honour, with any greater Right, lay claim to the title of Good, as wanting stability and permanence, and any other subsistence but what they have in the opinion of men. For they do not long follow the same person, but shift continu∣ally, and imitate the inconstancy of the People, whose breath they depend upon. Do not Histo∣ries furnish us with Examples of those who from weilding a Scepter, have been reduc'd to hold the Plough; and who from a state wherein they were raised, not only above the Heads of others, but above the Laws themselves, were forced within Bounds, and had their extravagant Power re∣trencht? Did we never hear of SEJANUS, that most famous Roman Consul, who was the Emperors Deputy and Lieutenant General, and whom TIBERIUS called his Friend, how upon a Letter from that Emperor to the Senate he was cast into Prison, and ignominiously treated, being abhorred and flouted at by those, who wor∣shipt him but a while before? And shall we not conclude from these, and a thousand other instances that Fame and Honour are brittle like Glass, and inconstant as the Wind, which whilst it flatters, doth insnare us, and when it shines strongest, is nearest its setting. Lastly, why should Honour be desired, since it doth not depend on him who is praised, but is wholly in the Power of those who give it? Neither are Men Honour'd because they are worthy, but because others think them so.

V. Nobility be∣ing an ex∣ternal ad∣vantage only, cannot make Men happy. Others again cry up Nobility, and think it very much injur'd by those who reckon it amongst in∣different things, which do not concur either to Happiness or Misery. For they suppose it to be an innate Worthiness, founded upon the Vertue and Atchievments of their Forefathers. But how can this make them better, since the Nobility they value so much is none of their own, but wholly derived and borrowed from others? Every one must have his own Vertues, since it is impossible for any Man to borrow them from another. What, am I to be accounted Noble, because my Parents or Ancestors were Famous and Renowned for their Vertue, and because they deserved well of their Prince and Country? We Pride our selves with that which is anothers, whilst we boast of our Pedigree, and arrogate the Praises of our Ance∣stors, as if due to us? For what else is this but to Rob the Dead, and to expect Glory, for what we never labour'd for? But besides this, how often doth Nobility take its rise from Crimes and Wick∣edness, and how frequently hath an honourable Title been the reward of Murther or Treachery? What more common than to purchase Nobility with Mony or Pimping, and for a man to become illustrious for his Vices? The Posterity of such as these cannot be said to be Noble but Notorious, and the Rise of the Fathers Gentility, becomes the reproach of his Children. But we'll suppose your Ancestors to have been all of them great and Gal∣lant

Men, and to have been beholden to their Vertue only, for their Nobility; yet can they not transmit this worthiness of theirs to you, nor in∣deed any thing besides their Riches, which with∣out any regard to the Vertue of our Forefathers, we do often abuse to the Ruin both of Soul and Body. How often do we meet with Gentlemen by name, who, as to their Manners and Accomplish∣ments, are very mean and inconsiderable? He is Noble, who hath a great Soul, disposed to Vertue and Goodness, who knows things that are Right and Honest, and doth heartily love and pursue them.

CHAP. VI. What is the Highest Good of Man in this Life, and his Ʋltimate End.

I. How the Highest Good Hap∣pines•• and Beatitude may be di∣stinguish•• THO' from what hath been already said, it doth in great measure appear, what that is which we call the Supream Good, yet will it be of use in the beginning of this Chapter, to enquire what Felicity, and what Bliss is, and how they disser from the Chiefest Good. We commonly call them happy, who abound with the Goods of For∣tune, and who without their own Wit and Indu∣stry jump into Riches and Honours. And therefore such are commonly said to be more Fortunate than Wise; forasmuch as the things they possess are on∣ly external, and do not properly belong to them. But Beatitude consists in that Joy of Mind, and Tranquillity of Soul which ariseth from the Posses∣sion of the Chiefest Good; and the Highest Good is that Object, the enjoyment whereof makes us Blissful, and than which nothing higher or better can be desired by us. So that the Highest Good of this Life is that which makes a Man Blessed and Perfect here on Earth, according to the Pos∣sibility of this State. And therefore all other things are only to be desired for the sake of it, and it only desirable for its own sake.

II. The Chief∣est Good of Man in Ge∣neral. It will be useful also for our better understand∣ing of the Nature of the Chiefest Good, to consi∣der Man in a double state, and that is either as a Private Man, and as he is a person that takes care of himself, and refers all things to his own Good and Interest: or as Man-kind, or the Nature of Man in general, which comprehends all Men, and does, as it were, constitute a Body Politick. The Chiefest Good of a Man considered in this latter sense, seems to be no other than a Concurrence of all Perfections whereof he is capable. For so Man cannot be lookt upon as most perfect, with∣out he be furnisht, not only with the Goods of Soul and Body, but also with those of Fortune.

III. The Chief∣est Good of a Private Man. But forasmuch as we do not enquire here what it is that makes Mankind, or all Men collectively ta∣ken, Happy, but what makes every singular Man so; we say that the Chiefest Good of a Private Man, is the right use of his Reason, and which chiefly consists herein, that he have a firm and constant purpose of always doing that, which he judgeth to be best. And this is therefore the Chie∣fest Good, because no Good must be esteemed by us more than it, and all other things undervalued in comparison of it. And then because we enquire here after a Good which is in our Power, and can be obtained by us; and that the Good things of the Body and Fortune are without us, and come to us, and go from us without any contrivance or endeavour of ours; nor can we be said to possess those things which are only borrowed by us, and which we may lose the next moment; therefore it is of absolute necessity that we place our highest Good in our Mind, and that it depend on our Free Will only.

IV. It consists in the due use of his two Chief Faculties. All that belongs to our Soul is compriz'd in 2 Faculities, viz. the Power of Understanding, that is, of knowing Truth and Good, and discern∣ing them from Evil and Falshood: and the Power of Willing, or assenting to those things which we know to be True and Good. And in the right or due use of these 2 Chief Faculties, we say that the Supream Good of Man doth consist. Which is then chiefly done, when we diligently inspect whatsoever is propounded to us, and when we ex∣ert the utmost of the vigor of our Mind to the discerning of that which is best; which is the first Function or Office of our Intellective Faculty. And in the next place, that our Choice exactly follow our Perception, so as to undertake nothing which is not clear and manifest to us. For our Know∣ledge is the Rule of our Actions, and, as it were, the Guide of them, which we are to follow; and as long as we do so, we may be said to be out of the reach of Error: For tho' we may happen to be deceived, and tho' that which we have account∣ed Good may be only so in appearance, or may be indeed Evil, yet notwithstanding we are assured that we have performed what was our Duty, and have omitted nothing, whereby we might discover the true Nature of it.

V. In order to the attain∣ing of Bea∣titude, three things are to be done. The First. Which satisfaction of Mind we shall attain to, by giving heed to, and observing these 3 things which are the Foundations of all Ethicks, or Mo∣ral Philosophy. First, That we, according to our utmost endeavours, strive to attain the Know∣ledge of what we ought to embrace, and what to avoid in all the Circumstances and occurrences of our Lives. For seeing that many and various things happen to us, during the whole course of our Life, which according to the different Circum∣stances of Time, are called by different names, we are constantly to fix our Eye upon the Dictate of Reason, forasmuch as it often happens, that those things which were once Good, are accounted Evil; and that which was Honourable, is now lookt upon as Ignominious and Despicable. Above all, we must take heed of espousing the opinions of the Vulgar, not minding what Men commonly do, but what ought to be done.

VI. The Second. The Second thing is, That we stand firm and constant to what we have once resolved upon and purposed; that is, that we retain an unmoveable Mind and Will, of doing those things which Rea∣son commands, not suffering our Passions and cor∣rupt Inclinations to lead us aside.

VII. The Third. The Third, That we lay this down as an un∣moveable Ground and Principle, that nothing be∣sides our own Thoughts, is in our Power; and that therefore seeing the Goods we want, are without us, they are not to be wished for or desi∣red by us.

VIII. Whatsoe∣ver doth not proceed from our Free Will or Choice, deserves no Praise. The Greatest Good therefore that we can attain to in this Life, consists in the possession of all those Perfections, the obtaining whereof depends on our own Free. Will or Choice; and seeing that

there is nothing, besides the Exercise of Vertue, that is of this Nature, we are to conclude, that our proper Good and Happiness doth therein alone consist. For indeed, whatsoever doth not pro∣ceed from this Principle, neither merits Praise nor Blame; for Praise is the Reward of Good Actions, and can never be deserved, if they be the effect of Necessity, and are not the Fruits of our Free Choice. 'Tis without Reason therefore that we delight our selves in Riches, Honours and such like, seeing that they are things without us, and therefore do not belong to our Happiness. We may be allow'd indeed to have some Value for them, but no Praise is due to us for them, any fur∣ther than they have been acquir'd justly and honestly, that is, in the due use of our Rea∣son.

IX. Wherein the Bliss or Beatitude of a Na∣tural man doth con∣sist. Whence we may easily gather, That the Natu∣ral Happiness of Man, is nothing else, but that Tranquillity or Joy of Mind, which springs from his Possession or Enjoyment of the Highest Good: Which being nothing else but the Right use of our Free-will, we must conclude, that from the Pos∣session thereof our Chiefest Pleasure must proceed. This will be evident as the Sun at Noon-day, if we consider, that all Pleasure and Delight is the Inmate of our Soul; and tho' there be some De∣lights which cannot be communicated to it, but by means of the Body, yet we may assert, that they are intimately present to the Mind: For it is the Soul which perceives all Outward Objects, tho' they be convey'd to her by the Ministry of the Senses; and it is the Soul alone that is affected with, and capable of Pleasure, whilst she perceives her self possessed of the Highest Good, whereof she is capable in this Mortal Life.

X. It is im∣possible, but he must be sensible of the Highest Joy, who lives in the due use of of his Free-will. Moreover, we are to take notice, that Good things are not so much to be rated by us, from the Conveniences or Advantages which accrue to us from them; as from the Relation and respect they have to us. Now seeing that Free-Will is pro∣perly and peculiarly ours, and that it is the Best thing we are Owners of, it follows, that nothing less than the Highest Joy, can be the result of the Right use thereof. For what can be more excellent in Man, than that whereby he is raised above all other Animals; than that whereby he resembles the Great and Glorious God, seems to stand, as it were, on even ground with him, and to be exempt from his Command? Forasmuch therefore as it is manifest that our Free-will is the greatest of all good things, and that the possession thereof is ascertain'd to us, there can be no question, but that the greatest Peace of Mind, and the most solid of all Pleasures, must naturally spring from the due use of it.

XI. The Anci∣ent Philo∣phers were of the same Opi∣nion. And by giving this Notion of the Highest Good of Man, we concur with the Opinions of the Ancients, and embrace the Sentiments of EPI∣CURUS, as well as of ZENO, and the rest of the Stoicks. For tho' EPICURUS placed the Chiefest Good in Pleasure, and ZENO in Vertue; yet they may easily be reconciled by saying, that Vertue is to be accounted the one only Good of Man, forasmuch as it alone depends on his Free-will: And seeing that full Satisfaction of Mind proceeds from the possession of the greatest Good, that therefore Pleasure also must be a concurrent Means to make us Happy.

XII. What that best thing is, we all aspire after. The Highest Good of Man therefore consists chiefly in 2 things, viz. in the Knowledge of the Best Good, and in the constant prosecution of it. If any one enquire what that Best Good is in the knowledge and pursuance whereof we must spend all our Endeavours. I Answer in a word, that the Good of the Universe is, that a Man in parti∣cular be happy, and all others with him. For seeing that the Greatest of any Good, is to be measured by the Relation it hath to us, we are to take heed that whatsoever we undertake, may promote our Hap∣piness, and conduce to our chief and ultimate End.

XIII. We must also do good to others. And forasmuch as we are not born only for our Selves, but for our Country, and the Society and Family whereof we are Members, we are also to endeavour the well-being of others, and be no less solicitous for the Good of the Publick, than for our own. For GOD hath so order'd the World, and hath joyned Men in so close and strait a Band of Society and Communion, that tho' a Man should be so Selfish, as only to mind himself; yet Pru∣dence would move him to do Good, and be kind to others. Besides, it is the Mark of a great and sublime Soul, to do good to others; and the Noblest Minds are always found most carried out to Bene∣ficence, and to have a low Esteem of the Goods they possess: Whereas it is the Character of Low and Little Souls, to have a great Value for them∣selves, and little or no Regard or Esteem for others.

XIV. The Interest and con∣cerns of the Publick, are to be preferr'd before any Private Concerns whatsoever. Wherefore Private men, and such as mind their own Interest, are oblig'd, as well as those who are in a more Publick station, to be helpful and assistant to others; and if they act prudently, will endeavour, to the utmost of their Abilities, to be beneficent to others, doing them all the Good they can. For this is the end and design of Human Policy, or State Government, to settle such Laws whereby we may be helpful and useful to one another, or at least, not be hurtful or prejudicial to our Neighbours. For whosoever shall thus sin∣cerely and heartily obey the Common Laws of the Society, shall without doubt live more happily and safely, than those who pursue their own profit, without any regard to the Publick Good; who tho' sometimes they may seem to prosper, yet for the most part have an unhappy End, and fre∣quently come to their Fall and Ruin, by those selfish and unjust Means, whereby they design'd to raise themselves.

CHAP. VII. Of the Nature of Vertue in General.

The Defi∣nition of Vertue in General. FOrasmuch as Vertue alone can make us happy, we can do no less than treat of it in parti∣cular, to the end we may be fully informed of the Nature of that thing, the possession whereof pro∣cures our Felicity. For tho' all Men own Vertue, yet do they not agree in their Thoughts about the Nature of it. But not to trouble my self about enumerating the Opinions of others, I say, that Vertue consists in a steady Resolution and Vigour of Mind, whereby we are carried to do things we believe to be Good. For Man only is Praise∣worthy for those things that are in his Power, and which depend on his firm Resolution of Well∣doing.

And it is of absolute necessity, that he who would Live well and happily, be constant and un∣moveable in his Resolutions; for he that is wa∣vering, and tost this way and that way by manifold Passions and Inclinations, doth not act, but is a Slave to his Passions; neither follows that which is best, but what is most pleasing to his Lusts and Affections.

II. A firm Purpose is necessary t•• Vertue. The most necessary therefore of the Requisits to Vertue, is a steady purpose and vigour of Mind, by which we are readily and fully carried to the prosecution of that, which after due Examination, we find to be Best, without suffering our selves to be stopt or turn'd aside by any Passions or Appetites whatsoever. For as Vice proceeds from Doubt and Wavering, which are the Consequents of Igno∣rance; so on the contrary Vertue is founded upon a firm and steady Purpose of performing what∣soever Right Reason doth suggest. Which Right Reason is nothing else, but a true Sense and Judg∣ment concerning Human and Divine things, as far as they belong to, or concern us. Wherefore also this is that which is the proper and peculiar Good of Man, whereby, to speak with the Stoicks, he excels Beasts, and follows GOD.

III. The Laws of Vertue are truly Good, and ••••reprove∣able. Nor will this sound strange to us, seeing Reason is no other, but that Power of Understanding and Judging, derived from and communicated by GOD, the Highest and First Reason, which there∣fore we are to follow as a Rule in all our Actions, and to which we are to have a constant Eye, as to our Sovereign Lady, whose Power over us is most Lawful and Equitable, whose Laws are Irrepre∣hensible, and all her Statutes, Beneficial and Perfe∣ctive of our Natures. So that he that Obeys and follows her, cannot go astray, since by keeping her Dictates he obeys the Divine Law, written in his Mind, which is the Source and Rule of all Equity.

IV. A firm Purpose of always doing what is Best, is a necessary Ingredient of Virtue. We have already said in the Explication of Ver∣tue, that it is a firm purpose of doing those things, which Reason tells us are Best; because it is re∣quisite that this Will be firm, and that the things we undertake, be throughly Examined by us. For those who perform the greatest Actions, do not merit any Praise, if they be not done after mature Deliberation, and with a steady Purpose. For Vertue, as SENECA tells us, is not an Action, but the Exercise and Purpose of it. For he who is prepar'd, dispos'd and resolved for the Patient enduring of the hardest Trials, and who is fully purpos'd to relieve and succour the Miseries of others, but is hindred of an Opportunity of exerting his Vertuous Resolutions, is without doubt possest of Vertue, tho' he hath not been able to exert or exercise it. So that seeing it is in our Power to Judge what we ought to do, and what to omit; yet can we not of right be said to be Vertuous, except we have a steady Purpose of doing whatsoever Reason shall propound to us to be Best.

V. Aristotle makes Vertue to consist in the midst of Affecti∣ons. ARISTOTLE, Lib. 2. Ethic. cap. 8. thus defines Vertue; Vertue is an Elective Habit, con∣sisting in Mediocrity with respect to us, determin'd by Reason, and agreeable to the Judgment of a Prudent man. For according to him, Vertue con∣sists in the midst of two Affections, and derives its Excellence from the Mediocrity it observes between them: For perceiving that Liberality, for Example, was attended by Covetousness and Prodigality; and that Fortitude was equally removed from Coward∣liness and Fool-hardiness, he concluded Medio∣crity to be the Formal Cause of Vertue, and to be conversant about the Passions, in which Excess and Defect is found. So that Vertue, according to him, is a kind of Mean betwixt 2 vicious Ex∣cesses.

VI. This Defi∣nition doth not hold good, as to many Vertues. But tho' this may be allow'd, as to some Ver∣tues, yet it cannot be asserted of all, forasmuch as many of them admit of no Mean at all. For what Extreams can we allot to the Affections of Mercy and Benevolence; seeing that they, in what state soever they be consider'd, are always Good, and always Vertues, whether they be in an Intense or Remiss degree. Again, what Mediocrity can there be conceiv'd in Hatred, Envy, Pride, when these Affections, how temperate soever they may be, are ever vicious, and therefore can never pro∣duce any Vertue. For this Mediocrity of Vertue is only to be met with in those Affections which we call Indifferent, which are neither Good nor Evil of themselves, as Anger, Love, Desire, Fear, and the like. For if Anger be moderate, it takes the Name of Vertue, but becomes a Vice, whenever it turns to Rage and Fury, which is the Excess of it; or sinks down into Unconcernedness, which is the defect thereof.

VII. Charity, or Divine Love and Repen∣tance, ad∣mit of no Excess. Moreover, the Love we bear to GOD, and the Grief we have for Sin, are both of them Vertues; and yet neither of them consist in a Mediocrity, since they have no bounds or limits, the one of them having GOD for its Object, who is Infinite; and the other respecting his opposite, Nothing. Now, who can love GOD to Excess? or be over∣much grieved for his Sins, or too much incensed against himself, for having offended his Creatour? No Body questions, but that Adam, in Paradise, was endued with many Vertues, as Justice, Piety, and the like: But what was the Form of these Vertues? It could not be Mediocrity, because he was not subject to any Excess of his Passions. And how could there be a Mean, without Ex∣treams? Conclude we therefore, that the Medio∣crity of Affections, is not the Form of Vertue; and that the same may be, tho' there were no vicious Excesses at all. Besides, all own, even those that are the Followers of ARISTOTLE, that Justice is not the Mean betwixt two Extre∣mities, nothing being oppos'd to it, save Injustice only; and that, because it doth not give to every one his due.

VIII. Mediocrity cannot be the Form of Vertue. But yet I do not deny, but that many Vertues are thus placed betwixt two Vices; for it is evi∣dent that Magnificence is a disposition of Mind between Niggardliness and Sumptuousness: Mo∣desty, betwixt Ambition and a stupid Carelesness, and disregard of Honour: Temperance, between an Insensibility of all Pleasure and Intemperance. All that I contend for is, that this Mediocrity is not Essential to the Constitution of Vertue, and there∣fore cannot be said to be the Form of it: For so Mediocrity, for Example, in Meat or Drink, doth not deserve the Name of Vertue, as it is a Mean between the Excess and Defect of Meat and Drink; but for that it is according to Reason, and in com∣pliance with the Dictates thereof. For the Soul that is under the Governance of Reason, chuseth the Mean between 2 Extreams, because it finds,

that most suitable to it self Neither need we to have recourse to this Mediocrity, since that which is must suitable and convenient for us, as we are Rational Creatures, must of necessity be a Vertue, tho' there be no Extreams between which it medi∣ates. For he that exceeds all other Mort••ls in his Love to GOD, is so far from being blame∣worthy upon that account, that on the contrary he is highly therefore to be praised, because this ex∣cess is conformable to the Precepts of the Natural Law or Reason, which requires of Man the Highest Piety, and commands them to Love their Maker, with their whole Mind, and all their Strength.

IX. All the Vertues are in conjun∣ction. It is a common Saying in the Schools, That all the Vertues are undivided, and link'd together, so that he that hath one, hath all the rest also; which in some Sense may be admitted, that is▪ when we speak of Heroical or perfect Vertue; be∣cause such Vertue is supposed to have all the Excel∣lence it is capable of. Sure it is, that all the Ver∣tues are helpful and assistant one to mother; for it is impossible for any one to be Prudent, without being partaker of Fortitude, T••••peranc••e and Ju∣stice; neither can any Man, as SENECA saith, suffer bravely and boldly, without making use of all the Vertues, tho' Patience be the Vertue, that is most apparent in this case. For it is most cer∣tain, that Fortitude must be there also, Patience and Endurance being only Branches thereof: Nei∣ther is Prudence wanting, without which there can be no Council or Advice, who adviseth us to bear that courageously, which we cannot avoid. Con∣stancy also makes one of this happy Company. And in a word, the whole Chorus of Vertues do meet in that one Action of suffering coura∣geously; for indeed whatsoever is Honestly done, tho' it may be chieflly performed by one Vertue, yet is it not without the assistance of the rest.

X. All the Vertues meet toge∣ther in Prudence. And to evince this beyond Contradiction, let us consider, that there can be no Vertue without Prudence, and that all Vertues meet and are joyn∣ed in her. For every Moral Vertue only executes or performs what Prudence prescribes, and what agrees with the Rule▪ and Line of Right Reason; and therefore it cannot be other wise but that those Vertues, which partake o•• this General Nature, must be linked together, according to that Axiom, That those things which agree in a third, must needs agree with one another. Wherefore no Vertue can be without Prudence, neither can there be any constant or ready Prudence, without the Company of all the other Vertues. For as ARI∣STOTLE informs us, Lib. 6. Ethic. cap. 8. The Judgment of our Reason about practical Prin∣ciples, is subject to be perverced and deceived by the pravity of our Natures; so that it is evident that no Man can be Prudent, except he be a good Man also. And consequently the Vertues that make Man good, cannot be separated from Pru∣dence.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Law of Nature and Right Reason, with the Practical Dictates thereof.

I. Men tho' never so wicked, ow•• the Law of Nature. SUch a deep sense of the Law of Nature is imprest upon the Mind of Man, that even the most Wicked and Perverse do profess ••o own and follow it: For Men in all their Acti∣ons appeal to the Law of Nature, and contend that they act according to it. A Covetous Wretch that with an insatiable desire scrapes and rakes to∣gether Riches, pretends that he acts herein accor∣ding to the impulse of Nature, and follows her Teaching. An Ambitious Person, that by any means, tho' never so wicked and flagitious, makes his way to Honour and Dignities, meanly fawn∣ing upon some, that he may crush others, sup∣poseth himself all this while acting conformable to Nature. He that is a Slave to his Lust, and a∣bandons himself to Luxury and Idleness, brings in Nature to justifie his Lewdness, and contends that his Debauchery is consonant to her Laws: In a word, there is nothing so unworthy and con∣trary to Reason but hath its Abetters, that will prove it to be conformable to the Light of Na∣••••re.

II. Every Na∣tion hates Vice and Wickedness and punish∣eth it. But these Wretches are much mistaken, who take their Lusts for the Law of Nature, and sup∣pose the greatest violation of her, to comport with her own Dictates. For what Nation was ever so far corrupted, as not to condemn Murthers, In∣cest, Theft, Rapin and the like? For Nature, tho' it be greatly deprav'd and weakned in some Coun∣tries, yet for all that cannot patronize Sin; and as long as the least spark of Reason still glimmers in them, they condemn what other Nations forbid and punish. The Laws of Nature preserve and defend Nature, but are not destructive of it. Where∣fore it will be worth our pains to enquire here, whether there be any certain and unalterable Laws of well-living, and doing, to which all Men are obliged, the violation whereof is accounted cri∣minal amongst all Men: In order to the clearing whereof, we shall first consider what the Laws of Nature are, and how they may be defined.

III. What the Laws of Nature are. The Laws of Nature are nothing else but a certain Light or Notices which serve to guid and direct us in all particular occurrences, and which are derived from that general Reason, which GGD hath imprinted in the Souls of all men in their for∣mation. We say in the first place, that the Laws of Nature are certain Notices which serve to guid us, &c. to distinguish the Laws of Nature, from the Rules of Motion, which we sometimes also call Laws of Nature. We say in the second place, that they are derived from that general Reason, &c. to shew that the Laws of Nature, are nothing else but the consequences and effects of the Light of Nature; adding, which GOD hath imprinted on the Souls of all men; to signifie that the Laws of Nature are general and common, and that there is no Man in the World, how wicked and profligate soever he be, but hath some Sense and Knowledge of them, and that from GOD him∣self.

IV. These N tural Laws have GOD for their Author. And therefore ARISTOTLE Lib. 3 Politic. saith, he who will have the Law to bear sway, would have GOD to bear sway. As if he would inti∣mate

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Book. 1. Part. 10. Chap. 8

Aequa Lance.

••••ns Inv.

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To the Worshipfull S^r. Godfrey Kneller of Lubeck in Saxony, and of S^t. Pauls Covint Garden in Middlesex Knight▪ Principall Painter to their Majesties King William and Queen Mary.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

to us, that whatsoever Reason prescribes, ought not to be lookt upon, as the invention of Mans Wit, or the constitution of Nations; but as some∣thing Divine and Eternal, that governs the World by its Commands and Prohibitions. So that whatsoever deviates from this Eternal Law, is to be lookt upon as a Monster, and as a Sacriledge, against GOD, who is the Author of Nature, and of this Knowledge of Good and Evil in us. For what else, saith SENECA, is Nature but GOD and the Divine Reason diffused through the Uni∣verse and all the parts of it; which meets thee whither soever thou turnst thy self: All the Rea∣son that is in material things, is the Gift of GOD who ruleth all things.

V. That there are certain and un∣moveable Laws of Nature, proved from the Nature of things in general. And that there are such Eternals Laws may be demonstrated from the common Nature of things. For the World which imitates the Unity of its Au∣thor and principle, is governed by one Law com∣mon to all Creatures, which as it provides for the good of the whole Universe, so of every particu∣lar Being. For whatsoever is contained in the World, is subject to the Reason of the Divine Mind, who is the Regent of the Universe. For the Beings that are destitute of Reason follow their natural instinct, and like Arrrws shot by an expert Archer, fly directly to the Mark; and the Rational, who are guided by the dictates of their Judgment, tend to their appointed End. So that the former are necessarily, and the latter freely and of choice, subject to this common Law. Hence it is that CICERO L. 10 de legibus, saith, In the constituting of what is Right, we must take our Beginning from that supream Law, which took its rise before all Ages, when yet there was not any Written Law, or Civil society constituted. And notwithstanding that almost in every different Cli∣mate we meet with different Customs and Man∣ners; yet amongst them all, we shall find the Foot-steps of this Universal Law, which binds not only the Inhabitants of one particular Country, but also those of the whole World.

VI. From the Frame and constitution of Man. The same may be also made out from the end and Constitution of Man, whose peculiar privi∣ledge it is to have the use of Reason, and square his Life by it. For the Dictates of Reason are so evidently imprest upon his Mind, that he readily follows what is Just and Right without any Mat∣ter, without any Written Law, without any com∣pulsion of the Magistrate, and discerns betwixt that which is equal and unequal, by the Light of his Conscience only. It is vain and useles to in∣struct Men, that Murther and Adultery are Crimes, and that Theft must be avoided, seeing that the Light of Nature anticipated this their information, and that all these Laws were long before Written, on the Tables of their Hearts. And therefore the Sovereign Legislator in delivering those Laws cuts them short, Thou shall not kill. Thou shall not commit Adultery, without adding any reason of them, as taking for granted that he addrest them to those who knew that already. For a Ray of the Primordial Reason, appears in Man by a twofold preeminence; for being endued with Rea∣son, the light which illuminates other Creatures outwardly and superficially only, is his property and part of his Essence. And in the second place, the Sense of Right and Truth and Affection for it, is most intimately present in his Heart, whereby he is directed both in his Speculation and Practice. The Minds of Men are stored with the Seeds of Vertue and Honesty, which are excited by the least admonition, like a spark of Fire, which be∣ing only assisted with a small Blast, displays it self into a great Flame.

VII. How GOD hath im∣prest these Laws on the Mind of Man. For GOD being concernd for the Preservation of Man whom he hath made, hath of his infinite Goodness and Wisdom engraven in their Minds, when he united it to the Body, a general knowledge of what is Good, that is, an Idea of whatsoever is conducive to the preservation of that Union. And it is this Idea or Knowledge, which we call a Good understanding, Right Reason, the Light of Nature; and the particular Notices deri∣ved from this general Idea, are those we call the Laws of Nature.

VIII. Men that deviate from these Laws are to be herd∣ed amongst Beasts. And tho' some may think themseves very obse∣quious to the Law of Nature whilst they indulge their Flesh, and wholly abandon themselves to their Lusts, whilst they cram themselves like Swine, and are as Luxurious as Goats: Yet most cer∣tain it is that such Men as these do not follow their Human, but Animal Inclinations, and in a word, live like Beasts: For would they but atten∣tively search into their own Bosoms, and consult the Law of Universal Nature written in their Hearts, it would appear a most monstrous and unjust thing to them, thus to disguise themselves with the Manners and Passions of Brutes, seeing that they are reasonable Creatures, and as such are obliged to direct their Lives, not by the compass of Sense, but Reason. They only Live according to Nature, who square their Actions by Reason, and who confine themseves to these three Precepts, to Live Honestly, not to Hurt another, to give every one his due. Which Precepts by the unanimous Suf∣frage, both of the wise and common People, are called the Fountains of all other, and a compen∣dious, but Essential Institution of the Law of Nature.

IX. The certain¦ty of the Laws of Nature con∣firmed from the Rela∣tion Man hath to o∣ther Rati∣onal Agents. These unalterable Laws of a good Life, may be further demonstrated from the Relation Man hath to other Rational Agents; for seeing that Man is a Sociable Creature, and affects the compa∣ny of such as are like him, it is necessary there should be some Laws, whereby they might be engaged to lend their mutual assistance one to ano∣ther, and directed to Love their Neighbours. Ac∣cordingly Men following the impulse of Nature, and entring into Civil Societies, establisht this first Standard of Justice, To live Honestly, to hurt no Body, and to give to every one his Right. It is the Right of Nature, saith the Law l. 206. F••de Reg. jur. that no Body enrich himself with the damage of another. And therefore we find that there is no Nation so depraved in their Manners, which doth not abhor and abominate ungrateful Persons, Mutherers of Parents, Breakers of Covenants, Deceivers, &c. and think them worthy of the worst of Punishments, looking upon them as profest Enemies of Society, and violaters of the Law of Na∣ture. How dismal would the condition of Man∣kind be, if it were lawful for every one to do what he listed, and to make his own Lust and Humour the Rule of Good and Evil? What House, what Palace would be secured from devouring Flames, if any one at pleasure might put Fire to them, and warm himself at the cost of another?

What Wife would be safe within her Husbands Arms, if there were no Laws to secure publick Honesty, and to guard the Enclosure of the Conjugal Bed? Nature hath deeply engraven this precept in the Hearts of all, Do not that to ano∣ther, which thou would'st not have another do to thee; this is that Dictate, which is present to all Mens Minds, and directs them, if so be they do not stop their Ears to its Voice, and listen to their Passions rather than their Reason.

X. Man is furnisht with the Idea's of Good and Evil, which are such of their own Nature. From what hath been said, may be gathered, that there are some certain and immutable Idea's of Good and Evil, whereby, under the sole guid∣ance of Nature, we distinguish things that are just, from those that are unjust, and things honest, from filthy and unbecoming: Like as by the differ∣ent notations of Figures, we distinguish Mathe∣matical Schemes, and separate them from one ano∣ther. For as we define Figures, not by Sense, but by Reason; so we perceive what is right or un∣just by Reason; which teacheth us that Good is to be desired, and Evil to be avoided. The ground whereof is this, because Good and Evil from whence our Idea's are taken, do not depend on the Judgment of any private person, or of any mul∣titude of Men how great soever, but are such of their own Nature, and therefore necessarily to be embraced, or avoided by Intellectual Creatures. For as the Understanding of Man doth not enquire what appears to some to be Truth, but what is Truth simply and in it self: So likewise the Will of Man, doth not embrace that for Good, which seems to be so to some private persons, or to most Men, but what is really and immutably so, and which is to be chosen and embraced in spite of, and notwithstanding all the Reluctance of our Animal propension. And therefore as there is some∣thing in Nature which is absolutly and simply True; so likewise must there be something that is good in its own Nature, and for its own worth and loveliness to be desired by the Will of Man. And therefore as he abuseth his faculty of Under∣standing, who being imposed upon by the decep∣tions of Sense or Imagination, doth not perceive what is naturally True; so in like manner he also abuseth his faculty of Willing, who suffers himself to be so blinded by his Animal Appetite, as not to chuse that which is good of its own Nature, and for want of due attention fails of his end and aim.

XI. Some Sen∣tences into which Mo∣ral Reason may be re∣solved. Now what Method or Order a Man is to follow in his choice, and what Good he is to em∣brace in such Circumstances, will appear from the subjoyned Axioms, into which the whole Nature of Vertue may be resolved.

1. That is accounted Good, which is agreeable to Intellectual nature, and is commensurate to its State and Condition, and is some way or other con∣ducive to the Conservation of the perceiver.

2. On the contrary, that is accounted Evil, which is inimicitious or opposit to an Intellectual Nature with respect to its Condition, and causeth grief and aversion to it; and if it threaten its destruction, then is it esteemed to be the worst of Evils.

For one Evil supervening to another, is there∣by made the more Heavy. For it is seldom seen saith ALEXANDER ab ALEXANDRO, that a Commonwealth shaken at once with inte∣stine and forein War, can hold out long; for the superadded danger by dividing their Councils and Subsidies, which otherwise were scarce sufficient to stem its double Tide, makes them still weaker, and so at last over-throw the tottering Com∣monwealth.

3. All Good is not equal, as the Stoicks held, but some preferable to other, since it is certain that that Good is more excellent, which exceeds another in Nature, Duration, or both.

For it cannot be questiond but that GOD, who is Eternal, and who by his Nature includes all o∣ther perfections, must needs be a more excellent Good than the Creature, how perfect soever. And that an Angel in Goodness excells Man and Beasts. So that the value of Good may be considered after a twofold manner; either Intensively, as it affords the greatest satisfaction to the Mind; or Extensi∣vely, according to its more ample diffussion of the same, and its greater tendency to the Good of the Universe. From whence afterwards follows its Duration; for the more durable any Good is, the more excellent it must be also, and is so to be esteemed.

4. It is the peculiar property of Good to move the Will to the choice and embracing of it; whereas Evil produces the contray effect; and even as a greater Good kindles a greater Love of it self; so a less Evil is to be born, to avoid a greater.

Because a less Evil, with regard to a greater has the appearance of Good. Whence came that com∣mon Axiom amongst Moralists, that of 2 Evils the least is to be chosen. For seeing that Nature doth always what is best, therefore it also avoids the greater Evil; for a less Evil comes nearer to Good, and is accounted comparatively Good. Hence it is that Men to avoid being burnt, cast themselves from a Precipice, or leap into a River to avoid the Jaws of a Wild Beast, or the Sword of a Robber, and to keep themselves from perishing there, lay hold of Thorns or Briars or any thing how painful soever, to save their Lives.

5. If any thing happen to us, whose nature we are ignorant of, we may safely trust those, who profess themselves skilful in that matter; in case we are fully persuaded of their skill and faithful∣ness, and that it be evident to us, that there is no deceit in the matter, or desire of particular gain or advantage.

6. Tho' the event of things be doubtful, yet when ever we apprehend that any Good thing will happen, we ought to take as much pains to obtain it, as if it were present; since if we do so, it shall certainly come to be our lot at last.

7. In the judging and discerning of things, we are to take care that the Mind may be free from all the Prejudices of Infancy, and Enticements of our Passions; for the Understanding being clouded with the dark smoak of the Passions, cannot dis∣cern the Good, and the Will following its gui∣dance, mistakes in her choice.

XII. Our Duty to others. These few Sentences or Axioms, are sufficient for the forming of Ethical Demonstrations, and for the begetting in us the 4 Vertues hereafter to be explained. And as to the Duty we owe to others, the same is comprehended in this general Axiom, Whatsoever thou wouldst not have another do to thee, neither do thou to him. Which is of as great extent and force in Morals, as Charity or Divine Love, (which comprehends all Vertues and Graces)

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Book. 1. Part. 10. Chap. 9.

G Freman. Inv.

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To the Worshipfull Francis Lane of Glen∣don in the County of Northampton Esq^r. And to Elizabeth his wife, eldest Daughter, and Coeheyre of Andrew Lant of Thorp-vnderwood in the said County Esq^r. dec^eased

This Plate is humbly dedicated by Richard Blome.

is in Divinity. Thus a Man, from the Command of GOD, considers his Neighbour, and learns to love him as himself: For in a like case, and in a like respect to GOD and his Law, a like Judg∣ment must be made. If you think it unjust, that you should be robb'd or opprest by one more pow∣erful than your self, by parity of Reason neither must thou thy self possess thy self of the Goods of one, who is too weak to resist thy Violence. And therefore this Law prevailed amongst the Romans, That the Right a man vindicates to himself against his Neighbour, the same may his Neighbour use against him. Because it is but just, that the same Measure a man measures out to another, should be measur'd to him again.

CHAP. IX. Of Prudence; and the Parts of it.

I. The Divisi∣on of Ver∣tue. VERTUE is commonly divided into 4 Species, Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude and Justice, which Ethical Writers call Cardinal, because they consider them as the Hinges upon which all other Vertues turn, and from whence they proceed as so many Branches.

II. The Nature of Pru∣dence, and what it is conversant about. The first Rank amongst these is given to Pru∣dence, which makes use of all the rest, and as the Eye of the Soul doth point out to them their Or∣der and Manner; and accordingly may be defined a firm and constant Will, heedfully to look out, and diligently to examine what is best. For it is the Office of a Prudent man, not to undertake any thing, which he hath not first weighed in the Ba∣lance of Reason, and found, that according to the present Circumstances of Place and Time, wherein he undertakes a thing, there is no truer, or at least more probable Reason, than that which he is re∣solved to follow. For Prudence is not a certain Science, which contemplates things necessary, and which can be no otherwise than they are; but a kind of knowledge that is conversant about Con∣tingent matters, which are not only mutable, as to their Manner, but as to their Existence. For tho' the Object of Prudence generally consider'd be something common, viz. whatsoever ought to be done according to Right Reason; yet Prudence, as consider'd in every particular Man, is conver∣sant about Singulars, which may, or may not be; or may be thus, or otherwise.

III. The Three Duties or Offices of Prudence. There be 3 Offices or Chief Acts of Prudence; Good and wary Consultation, Right Understanding or rather Judgment, and Sentence or Command. Consultation, or Deliberation, doth above all the rest belong to Prudence, whilst it considers what Means are most proper and best to obtain her End; to which is oppos'd Precipitancy, when we do things rashly and inconsiderately. And to the end this Consultation be such as it ought, it must be done with due Consideration, and aim at a good End; for otherwise it will be only Cunning and Craftiness. Right Understanding, or Judg∣ment, is that whereby we pass a dextrous Judg∣ment of the Means, by a reflex Act, approving of them. And is therefore called by ARISTO∣TLE, a quick and ready Understanding; to which is oppos'd dulness of Mind, or Folly: So that a Prudent man seems in some sort to keep the middle Station, betwixt a Block-head or Dull-fellow, and a Crafty Knave. The Sentence, or the Habit of passing a Decretory Sentence, concerning the Goodness of the Means, follows next after Judg∣ment, and is that whereby a Prudent man rightly determines, how to make use of the Means which he hath judged to be best, and with Constancy puts the same in practice.

IV. Of the Parts of Vertue in General. Three kinds of Parts are assigned to every Ver∣tue, the first whereof are Helps or Advantages, which are necessarily required to the Perfect Law of Vertue; the other are called Subjective Parts, which as so many Species do resort under it; and the last are called Potential, which Potentially are contained in the chiefest Vertues, and which do not comprehend their whole Natures, but belong to some secondary Laws.

V. Of the Con∣stituting Parts of Prudence. The Constituting parts of Prudence are,

1. To know the Laws of Nature, according to which we ought to live.

2. To compare them together, that we may know what place they must take, or which of them hath the Precedency.

3. To consider, and have regard to the Circum∣stances of place, time and persons, in all our Actions.

4. To have an Eye to our Chief End, and to pursue the same by all honest and lawful Means.

VI. The Inte∣gral Parts of Prudence The Helps required to Prudence are reckoned 8 in number, viz. Memory, Understanding, Fore∣cast, Teachableness, Quickness of Wit, Reason, Circumspection, and Cautelousness. Of which some are helpful to Consultation, others to Judg∣ment or Discerning, and lastly, others to Sentencing or Determining.

VII. Sharpness of Wit. Sharpness or Quickness of Wit belongs to Con∣sultation, or Deliberation; by means whereof a Prudent Man finds out the Means, which con∣duce to the obtaining of his proposed End. This Help is of kin to Sagacity, which speaks a dispo∣sition in the Soul, whereby it readily and dexte∣rously discovers what lies hid, and finds out the Ways which are the shortest and surest to the de∣sired End.

VIII. Intelligence or Under∣standing. Understanding, or Intelligence, is a Help to our Judgment or Discerning; and it is not here taken for a Habit of the first Principles; but for a knowledge of the things that ought to be done, whereby we perceive and judge rightly of things that offer themselves.

IX. Teachable∣ness. Teachableness is a Promptitude of the Mind, for the Learning of the things we are ignorant of: For seeing it is the part of a Prudent man to know many things, and to be able to distinguish the Honest Good, from the Pleasant and Profitable, it is necessary that he be Teachable, so as to improve himself by the Discourses of others, or in the Reading of Books.

X. Memory. Memory is that, whereby a Prudent man calls to Mind things that are past, and represents to him∣self several Actions and Events, from whence, as from the Premisses, he concludes what Judgment he ought to pass of the future.

XI. Reason. Reason is the right use of the Knowing Faculty, whereby a Prudent man, from fore known and prae∣consider'd things, argues aright, gathering and judging what he ought to do in present Circum∣stances.

XII. Forecast, Circumspe∣ction and Cautelous∣ness. In order to Command, or the passing of a De∣cretory Sentence, a Prudent man is assisted by Fore∣cast, Circumspection, and Cautelousness: Fore∣cast is that Habit whereby he diligently considers Future things, and from things that are past, ga∣thers what will be, and accordingly resolves what to do. Circumspection is that Habit, whereby the Circumstances of Affairs are heedfully and dili∣gently minded. And lastly, Caution, or Heedful∣ness, is that whereby Obstacles that might happen are removed, and all Impediments that might hinder the obtaining of our intended End.

XIII. The Subje∣ctive Parts of Prudence The Subjective parts of Prudence, according to the School-men are 4, viz. Private or Soli∣tary Prudence, Oeconomical, Political, and Mili∣tary.

XIV. Wherein Private Prudence doth consist. Private Prudence, tho' it be frequently con∣founded with the Monastick, yet is it not pecu∣liarly to be restain'd to those that lead a Monastick Life; and separating themselves from the Multi∣tude, betake themselves wholly to Contemplation and Devotion; but is that which belongs to every Singular Man, who, whether he hath none to take care of but himself, or whether he takes care also for others, stands in need of Prudence, to di∣rect and assist him in his several Actions.

XV. The First Office of Private Prudence. The Office of Private Prudence is twofold; the First, That every one do chuse some kind of Profession or Way of Living, wherein he may spend the rest of his days: For no Man can be happy that keeps no certain Course of Life, but being unresolved and wavering, is ever deliberating what Condition of Life he had best embrace, and to what Order of Men he had best joyn himself. Prudence therefore adviseth every man to consult his own Genius and Ability, and to chuse for him∣self such a State of Life as comports with his Natural Gifts, and the Temper of his Mind, and wherein he may with Pleasure and Satisfaction, continue throughout the Course of his whole Life.

XVI. The other Duty of Private Prudence. The other Duty of Private Prudence is, that having once pitch'd upon a set State or Condition of Life, he use all possible Industry that he square all his Actions by the Rules of Vertue, according to the Dictates of Reason; and take heed to commit nothing that may necessitate him to Re∣pentance. All which he may, without any great difficulty obtain, in case he undertake nothing without mature Deliberation, and be constant and firm in his Purpose, when once he is assur'd of the Goodness and Honesty of them. For the chiefest part of Human Beatitude consists in Acting con∣stantly, and never turning aside from the Right path of Vertue.

XVII. What Oeco∣nomical Prudence is Oeconomical Prudence is, that whereby a man orders the Concerns of his Family. Its Dictates are, that no man rashly or inconsiderately cast himself into the indissoluble Band of Matrimony; but that he consider well of it before he enters a State, which he cannot quit again at his pleasure. That the Woman he takes to be his Wife, be adorned rather with the Embelishments of Mind, than of Body; and that she be more recommend∣able by her Chastity and good Manners, than by her Riches or Portion. Also, that there be an Equality between him and her, since it is a com∣mon thing for a Wife, who is above her Husband in Nobility or Riches, to despise him, and look upon him rather as her Servant; than her Husband. Prudence also adviseth, that he seriously weigh and consider the Temper of Women, the defects and weaknesses they are subject to, and that their Will is commonly much stronger than their Reason, and their Phansy and Humour the Law of their Actions: That many Husbands have only 2 good and plea∣sant Days, as HIPPONACTES saith by STOBAEUS, the one, that of their Marriage, and the other, that of their Wives Burial: That being once married, he must treat her as his Wife, by communicating his Secrets unto her; especi∣ally if he knows she can hold her Tongue, and conceal what ought not to be divulged; lest she should conceive her self to be slighted or neg∣lected, and by this means becomes careless of her Duty.

XVIII. How Chil∣dren and Servants are to be ordered and Governed. Prudence also prescribes Rules, how Children ought to be Educated, and Servants kept to their Duty; which it would be too prolix to insert here, and may be seen set down at large in a Treatise which I have written in French, concerning Ver∣tue, conformable to the Sentiments of Epicurus, entituled L'Epicure Spiritual.

XIX. The Pre∣cepts of Po∣litical or State Pru∣dence. Political, or State Prudence, imitates the Oeco∣nomical, and differs from it only in this, that its Subjects are more numerous: For as the former is concern'd with governing ones Wife, Children and Servants; so Political Prudence consists in Ruling a City, Province, or Nation. In order to the discharging of which Function aright, it is first necessary that he who bears Rule over others, does himself excel in Vertue, that his Actions may serve for Examples to his Subjects. For Subjects think it their Glory to imitate the Manners of their Prince, and to express him in all their Actions, Words and Gestures. Hence it is, that the Crimes and Vices of Princes spread like a Contagion, and infect the whole Body of their Subjects: For they think, that what their Princes do, is not only lawful for them, but even Praise-worthy also; so dangerous are great Examples, and so effectual for the promoting of Vice and Wickedness. He there∣fore that Governs others, must carry a Majesty, and command Respect, not by his Big and Severe Looks; but by the Rectitude of his Manners and Heroical Vertue.

XX. Princes must be Re∣ligious, and true to their words. As it is highly commendable for Princes to be Religious, and Eminent in their Piety towards GOD; so must they also excel in punctual Faith∣fulness and Truth towards their Equals. For a Prince that doth not keep his Word and Promise, makes himself Vile and Despicable, because it is a mark of Fearfulness and Impotence to break his Word, and to elude the Execution of his Treaties. Prudence therefore adviseth, that a Prince be exact in performing of his Word, and just and equal in his Actions. For Rulers are not exempt from, or above all Laws, for Justice is above them; and if it be in their power to do what they please, yet are they not to will any thing, but what they ought. It must be also a great part of their Care, to have an Eye to the Great Officers and Magi∣strates under them, to see that they perform their Duties, to the end that the Judges may be Ho∣noured, the Laws Reverenced, and they themselves Loved and Dreaded.

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Book. 1. Part. 10. Chap. 10.

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To the Right Worshipfull S^r. Edmund Turnor of Stoke-Rochford in the County of Lincolne Knight.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

XXI. What Mi∣litary Pru∣dence is. Military Prudence, which chiefly belongs, and is necessary to the Commanders in Chief of Ar∣mies; teacheth how to undertake a War, carry it on, or bring it to an happy Issue: First, by instructing them not to enter upon it rashly, and without good Advice; having first well weighed their own strength, and being moved to it by a just Cause. For if they find, that the Power they in∣tend to oppose will prove an over-balance for them, Prudence will advise them to desist from the Thoughts of attacking a too Potent Enemy, and to conclude a Peace with them, rather than hazard the Loss or Ruin of their Kingdom. But if Peace cannot be had but upon unreasonable Conditions, then a War is to be hazarded; and after having implor'd the Divine Favour by Prayers, and en∣couraged the Souldiers, they are to give Battle, and to dye rather, than to lose their Right and Liberty.

XXII. What things are necessary for the wa∣ging of War. In the waging of War, great care is to be taken, first, to List strong and couragious Souldiers, Exer∣cis'd in Arms, and hardned to Labour and Ser∣vice. Secondly, That they be well Arm'd, not only with Defensive, but also Offensive Arms. Thirdly, That a sufficient Quantity of Provisions be provided, and ready at hand, for the supply of the Army, seeing that for want thereof, not only Castles and Towns are often lost, but whole Ar∣mies sometimes miscarry. Fourthly, That there be store of Mony, which is the Sinews of a War, and without which the Souldiers cannot be kept to their Duty, nor restrain'd from Robberies. These 4 things being well fore-cast and provided, Princes or Generals may safely undertake a War, and Invade their Enemies, since this is all that Military Prudence requires, in order to the Successful carry∣ing on of a War.

XXIII. Prudence is acquired two several ways. From what hath been now said, it is easie to conclude, that the ways of acquiring this Vertue of Prudence, are reducible to 2 only, viz. to Pre∣cepts and Experience. The latter of which is two∣fold, viz. ones own Experience, and that of ano∣ther. Proper Experience is the knowledge of things, that we our selves have seen or done; and the other is the knowledge of things, that have been seen or done by others, and which we have only by Relation. The Prudence we get by Expe∣rience and Use, is much more sure and certain, than that which is attain'd by Precepts, or by the knowledge of History; but as it is more excellent, so likewise it is more difficult to be obtained.

CHAP. X. Of Temperance.

I. About what things Tem∣perance is conversant. TEMPERANCE is so nearly ally'd to Prudence, that it always accompanies it, and seconds it in all-its Laws; and was therefore called by the Ancients, the Conservatrix of Prudence, because it preserves the Soundness of the Mind, and is very conducive to Consultation and Judg∣ment. For an Intemperate person seems to have suffer'd Shipwrack of his Reason, and therefore ought to be serv'd as Mad-men are, in order to the Recovery of it. For Temperance imports no∣thing else, but the Moderation of Reason, and the absolute Command of the Soul over all its Passi∣ons: For it suppresseth Concupiscence, stifles vain Hopes, moderates Love, and keeps the Mind from being ruffled by any other Perturbations what∣soever. But being taken in a stricter Sense, it signifies the restraint only of those Pleasures which belong to the Taste and Feeling, which are com∣mon to us with the Beasts; and to which, accord∣ing as Men either addict themselves, or bid defi∣ance, so they are termed Temperate or Intempe∣rate.

II. The Defini∣tion of Temperance We may therefore define Temperance, A firm and constant VVill or Resolution, to resist and re∣strain Bodily Lusts and Pleasures, especially those that belong to the Taste and Touch. By which words it appears, that those Pleasures are excluded which belong to the Senses of Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling; and that Temperance in this Sense, is only conversant about the pleasures of the grosser Senses of Tasting and Touching.

III. Decency and Bash∣fulness do constitute Temperance The Parts which in some sort may be said to constitute Temperance, are Honesty or Decency, and Bashfulness. For there is a kind of Comliness beaming forth from Temperance, which allures men by its Loveliness, and makes them to restrain and repress flattering Pleasure, and ••o deny what∣soever is most pleasing to the Body. For it is a commendable thing to avoid all Immoderateness, and to follow Temperance only for the Comliness and Loveliness of it. Bashfulness also is a great help towards the exercise of this Vertue; whereby we fear Infamy, lest by indulging our Lusts, we should expose our selves to shame, and lose our Fame and good Repute by our Intemperance: for Shamefac'dness or Bashfulness, is not here taken for a Passion, but for a kind of Fearfulness of incurring Reproach and Disgrace, by commit∣ting any shameful Action; which Fear of Shame may well be called the Guardian of Vertue, as being always accompanied with a laudable Mode∣ration.

IV. Sobriety and Chasti∣ty are the two Species of Tempe∣rance. There be 2 Species of Temperance, viz. Sobriety and Chastity, the former whereof moderates our Eating and Drinking; the latter sets Bounds to the Enjoyment of a Conjugal Bed.

V. The Pre∣cepts of So∣briety. Sobriety teacheth us, that our Bodies are con∣tented with a little, and cannot without Pain and Prejudice bear what is superfluous. And accord∣ingly hath given us a Measure, by which every one may be informed what quantity of Meat and Drink he ought to use. For Nature being a Careful Mother of her Children, condemns all those things that serve to tempt and provoke an Appe∣tite, and which are taken rather for Pleasure, than for Necessity; and teacheth us by daily Experi∣ence, that Diseases and Infirmities of the Body, are the Fruits of Intemperance, and that Pains and Dulness of the Head, Crudity of the Stomach, Griping of the Guts, would be in a great measure unknown to Men, if they did not by Drunkenness and Gluttony pull them down upon themselves. Whereas on the contrary, Sobriety secures the Body, restores decayed Strength, and by reducing the Humours to a due Temperament, easily subjects the Passions to Reason. Do we think that he is wholly depriv'd of Pleasures, whose Diet are the Fruits of the Earth, and contents himself with Viands that are prepared without the need of a Cook? Such an one as he enjoys a vigorous and healthful Constitution of Body, in which his Soul exerciseth her Functions freely and expeditely:

So Abstinence to him is instead of the most deli∣cious Liquor, as preserving his Health, and forti∣fying it against all Infirmities. Wherefore we must accustom our selves to a Moderation in Diet, if so be we would enjoy a sound Mind, in a Healthful and sound Body. And this will be our portion, if contenting our selves with Common Food, we shall despise Dainties, except only so far as may be necessary for the Recovering of our Health, and to comply with the Advice of our Physician: Since nothing is more sure than, that Meats are spoiled and adulterated by too much care and exquisitness in Dressing; and that the Art of Cookery, for the most part, leaves them more unwholsom than it found them.

VI. By what means Chastity may be pro∣cured. First by a Spare and Abstemious Diet. And as for Chastity, which permits no Pleasures, besides those that are enjoyed in Lawful Wedlock, it will be of use to set down some Preservatives, whereby a Man may secure himself against the violent Attacks of Carnal Lust, and render Cha∣stity easie and familiar to himself. The First and Chiefest of these Preservatives is, that he use a slender Diet, and carefully avoid all Meats and Drinks that are enflaming. For it is very hard, or rather impossible, for a man to indulge himself in Gluttony, and not to be tormented with Lustful motions. For Gluttony and Carnal Lust are so closely ally'd, that, as TERTULLIAN hath it, Lust without Gluttony, may well pass for a Prodigy or Monster. Let the Body therefore be fed with that Caution, that the strength of it only may be preserved, without furnishing Copious Matter to increase a Passion. Food is afforded us for the maintenance and support of our Bodily Lives; and tho' it be necessary to our Nature, yet is it to be taken with care and anxiety, lest it should supplant our Chastity, and excite us to Uncleanness.

VII. Secondly by Business and Em∣ployment. The Second Preservative is, that he be always busied and employ'd in some honest Calling, with∣out indulging Sloth or Idleness: For continual Business or Study wasts the Animal Spirits, which invigorate us; or at least by taking up the Mind, divert it from Lustful Thoughts and Imaginations. Idle persons are most haunted with this Spirit of Luxury, and such who by doing nothing, learn to do Wickedly. We must take Care therefore to eschew Idleness, and to entertain our Minds with such Thoughts, as are so far from being Incen∣tives to Lust, that they are destructive of it.

VIII. Thirdly by avoiding the Tempta∣tion. Thirdly, It will be of good use to avoid and fly from the Temptations, which may come from the Sight of, and too free Discourse with Women, left by handling Pitch we be dawbed with it. For Lust is better conquer'd by Flight, than by Fight.

IX. Fourthly an obstinate Resolution of Resisting Temptati∣ons. Fourthly, A full Resolution and long contracted Habit and Custom, to repel the Assaults and On∣sets of Lust, is very advisable: For as he is easily overtaken with Lust, who hath been often con∣quer'd by it: So he who makes it his business strenuously to resist its Temptations, becomes there∣by the more strong and vigorous to resist them. I confess, it is a Master piece to overcome so smiling and fawning an Enemy, which whilst she ruins, seems to Caress us. But what is all this, if compared to our Strength? Nothing is impossible to a Soul that is resolved to conquer: They are Cowards that upon the first Onset give way, without ever putting their Strength to the Trial. But you'l say, It seems impossible, all on a sudden to quit a Habit of long standing: Suppose it so, Disaccustom your self by little and little, contain your self for a few Days at first, and afterwards by degrees protract the said Time, and question not, but that by frequent Fights and Resistings, you will at last become Conquerour. Call to mind, how great and sincere a Joy thou hast been sensible of, whenever thou hast shewed thy self a coura∣gious Combatant, in resisting and putting by these Assaults; and on the contrary, how thou hast been cast down; what Shame, what Repentance, what Anguish have pinch'd and rack'd thy Soul, when∣ever thou hast weakly and cowardly made thy self a Slave to thy Beastly and Inferiour Nature. In a word, thou wilt soon be Chaste, if thou canst once heartily Will to be so.

X. The Poten∣tial Parts of Tempe∣rance. Temperance likewise hath its Potential Parts, viz. Meekness, Clemency, and Modesty. The business of Meekness is, to restrain Anger, and to refrain the Mind from Revenge. For by means of this Vertue a Man becomes truly Human, and lovely in the sight of others. For as he is Hateful and Troublesom to all, who is easily provoked to Anger; and who, upon the least occasion, becomes enflamed with Wrath; so on the other hand, we love and delight in the Company of those, who, tho' highly provok'd are easily reconcil'd, and for∣give the Injury done to them.

XI. The Horrid Effects of Anger. Wherefore we must take care to moderate the impetuous Flame of Anger, and to quench it by Meekness, that we may come to our selves again, and recover the possession of our Minds, whence that violent Passion had turn'd us out. Wherefore, as soon as any one finds himself mov'd to Anger, let him consider how contrary this Passion is to Humanity, and how shamefully it disguiseth his Body, and casts down the Soul from its Throne of Power and Command. Consider the Looks of an Angry man; his Eyes flame, the Blood comes up into his Face, boyling up from his Heart, he Faulters in his Speech, his Face is distorted and dreadful; so that it is a great Question, whether this Vice be more detestable in its Nature, or more ugly in its outward Appearance. Let a man con∣sider also, what a Man gains by all his Rage and Wrath; whereas by refraining his Anger, he deli∣vers himself from this dreadful Commotion and Concussion, which has prov'd fatal to many, whilst they have endeavour'd to wreak their Spleens upon others. How much more glorious is it, to bear Injuries patiently, and to contemn Affronts, rather than to meditate a Revenge; and whenever we perceive this Enemy creeping upon us, to have that of MARK ANTONINE the Empe∣rour always before the Eyes of our Mind. Behold one thing here that is highly to be valued, to Con∣verse courteously with Truth and Justice, amongst a Company of perverse and lying Men.

XII. Clemency. Clemency is near of Kin to Meekness, which is that Vertue whereby the Mind is inclin'd to For∣bearance and Forgiveness, rather than to Punish∣ment, and that according to right Judgment. This is a Vertue that well becomes a Prince, who like GOD ought to be ready to Forgive the Offences of Men; as it is exprest L. Imperialis de Nupti••s. For as the Top of the House does keep off

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the Assaults of Wind and Weather; so it is the Duty of him, who is the Head of the Government, to provide for the Safety of the whole Body. Kings indeed have the Superiority and Dominion, but it is for the sake of Men; not as meer Arbi∣trary Governours, but rather as Guardians and Administrators, to whom the Commonwealth is committed by GOD, to cherish and defend it, and take care fot the Safety of it.

XIII. Modesty. Modesty is conversant about the moderation of the desire of Dignity and Honour. He deserves the name of a Modest Man, who doth not boast of his Merits, or vaunt of his Endowments; but owning himself to be a man, thinks lowly of him∣self, and esteems nothing properly to belong to him, besides that which he hath attained to. And accordingly a Person adorned with this Vertue, is more solicitous about rendring to others the Honour that is due to them, than desirous to receive the same from others; and is much more carried to the performing of good and great Actions, than concerned to obtain the name and esteem which gallant Atchievements bring along with them.

XIV. The Duty of a Modest Man. Whosoever thou art therefore, that art raised to great Honour, entertain no high thoughts of thy self, but being conscious of thy Human Frailty, and mindful of thy Mortal Condition, suspect and reject every thought that would flatter thee into a high conceit of thy self. A man famous for his worth and merit, and whose Soul is embellisht with Vertue, must resemble an heavy Ear of Corn, which sinks its Head by so much the Lower, as it contains a greater number of Grains. For the least Boasting lessens Merit; and as praise, com∣ing from a mans own mouth, is nauseous, so the proclaiming of ones own vertue, obscures the Glory that is due to it. When CATO was asked why the Senate had refused to erect his Sta∣tue in the publick place, he answered, that by their refusal they had taken more care for his Glory, than they would have done in allowing him a Statue, for that he would much rather, that men should enquire why the Senate had not erect∣ed his Statue, than demand why they had honour∣ed him with one in the Market Place. For Ho∣nour, like a Shadow, follows those that flee from it, and is most found in their company who do not pursue it. Wherefore, a Wise Man that placeth his happiness in the exercise of Vertue, is always unmoveably resolv'd, never to prefer himself be∣fore any one, forasmuch as by this neglecting of Honours, he both secures his own Peace, and ac∣quires the most solid and greatest satisfaction. But then this Modesty, or rather Humility, must be sincere and without di••••imulation; and far from that Ambitious Lowliness of some Philosophers, who by their despising of vanities, sought for vain Honour, and as STOBAEUS saith of them, trampled upon the Pride of others, with a greater Pride in themselves.

CHAP. XI. Of Fortitude.

I. Fortitude exceeds all other Ver∣tues: The Definition of it. THO' all the Vertues be worthily esteem'd by Moralists, and engage Spectators to love them; yet there is none amongst them all, which more insinuates it self into their hearts than FOR∣TITUDE, or that shines with a more distin∣guishing Beauty and Lustre. Justice is had in great Honour, and the Princes and Magistrates that pursue it, do by this means attain to a high degree of Veneration. Prudence is the very Soul of Statesmen, and is industriously studied and sought for by all who have the care of Families, or the Government of a Commonwealth committed to them. Temperance hath many that praise and love her, because of the Pleasures she affords her followers, as well as by reason of her Comeliness, whereby she recommends her self to the Eyes and Hearts of her very Enemies. But yet all these Vertues do in a manner vanish and disappear when Fortitude presents her self, as the Stars at the rising of the Sun; for her powerful Beauty, at first sight, charms and ravisheth our Hearts, which, as SE∣NECA saith, consists in her not dreading the Fire, in her receiving of wounds, and being so far from avoiding the Darts level'd at her, that she meets them, and exposeth her Breast to them. So that Fortitude may be de••ined, a Constant purpose of Mind to undergo Dangers, and endure Pains and Labour, when-ever we think them to be best. Its chief Laws are two, the one whereby she com∣mands us to Undertake, the other whereby she teacheth us to Endure: For seeing that this Vertue is conversant about Boldness and Fearfulness, which are 2 extreams of it; it suppresseth Fear by enduring Difficulties; and moderates Boldness, by a cautious undertaking.

II. About what things For∣titude is▪ conversant. Wherefore to this Vertue in general, is required, first a kind of Firmness or constancy of Mind against all those ills, which we look upon as hard or difficult to undertake or endure. For a man cannot be lookt upon as possest of this Vertue for excelling in Bodily Strength; forasmuch as those who want that, may nevertheless be adorned with this Vertue, which consists chiefly in a firm pur∣pose of performing those things we judge to be honest, and of wrestling against all Adversities without being discouraged by them, with an even temper and firm resolution.

III. Who it is that de∣serves the name of a Valiant Man. It hath been said already, that the ills which a Valiant Man is to cope with, must be great and difficult; for if they be matters of no trouble, they are not so much the object of this Vertue as of Ex∣pectation only. The Second thing required to Fortitude is, that it be not the effect of Rashness, but that it be done for a good end. For he is un∣deservedly called a Valiant Man, who by a blind impulse, and without any regard had to his own strength, ventures upon any thing, and who ra∣ther dares and provokes Dangers than fears them: but he, who after a due weighing of the Dangers he is about to engage in, tho' he doth not love them, yet undergoes them with an undaunted Heart, and endures all things when, and how it best becomes him. Hence it is that SENECA defines Fortitude to be the Science of distinguish∣ing what is Evil, and what is not. Forasmuch as this Vertue is not any inconsiderate Rashness or Foolhardiness, nor a love or desire of Dangers, but the knowledge of undergoing and overcoming Dangers. So that Fortitude is made up of these 2, viz. Honesty, which this Vertue must always have for her end and aim; and Cautelousness, or weighing of the Danger, before she undertake to grapple with it.

IV. Magnani∣mity, Mag∣nificence, Constancy and Pati∣ence are commonly confounded with Forti∣tude. Moralists commonly divide Fortitude into 4 Species, viz. Magnanimity, Magnificence, Con∣stancy and Patience. But all these have so great an agreement with Fortitude, that they differ from it by some conditions and circumstances only. For Magnificence imports only a circumstance of the Danger, that is to be ventur'd upon, as being supposed to be illustrious, and to the overcoming whereof Glory and Splendor is annext. Magna∣nimity intimates that generosity and greatness of Soul, which is necessary to the undertaking of dan∣gerous enterprizes, or the enduring of Labour. Constancy implies a kind of Perseverance, whereby the mind is confirmed to stick to its intended pur∣pose, and never basely or cowardly to give it over. Lastly, Patience superadds nothink to Fortitude, save only that it is rather conversant about the en∣during of Evil, than in the undertaking of difficult and dangerous performances, and rather suffers, than acts. Wherefore not to insist any longer on these, we proceed to the consideration of those ills, in the overcoming whereof the Glory of Fortitude doth chiefly consist; and these are either Publick or Private.

V. How Pub∣lick Ills are to be born and over∣come. Publick Evils are, the Destruction of ones own Country, Famine, Plague, War, &c. which we shall be enabled to overcome, by considering that they are not Evils in their own nature, but are made such only by our opinion of them: that Empires and Commonwealths are subject to Vicissi∣tudes, and that nothing is Eternal in this World. That we are to be affected towards our Country, that when we find we can no longer serve it, or be of any advantage to it, we do not hurt our selves; and that when we see the whole cannot possibly be saved, that at least we endeavour to rescue a part of it. What reason have we to be so much surprized and astonished at any such change, since it is natural for that thing to have an End, which had a Beginning. It is the Eter∣nal decree of Heaven, that all Temporal things must fall, all corruptible things haste away, and all changeable things perish. We shall no longer be amazed to see a Kingdom overthrown, when we consider that the whole frame of this World must be dissolved. Wherefore when we see that we can no ways procure our Countries Liberty, let us at least endeavour to secure our own, and that if we must dye with it, its ruin may oppress us undaunted and without pusillanimous fearfulness. And Lastly, forasmuch as we are assured that all things are ordered by an unerring decree of Pro∣vidence, the Love of our Country, must give way to our Love of God; and our Human Wisdom become subject and captivated to the Eternal and Infallible Decree of the Great Creator of all things.

VI. A Man en∣dued with true Forti∣tude, doth easily over∣come Pri∣vate Ills. As to Private Evils, such as Imprisonment, Poverty, Shame or Ignominy, &c. tho' they may seem to some to be hard to bear, yet doth a Vali∣ant Man easily despise them, as knowing that these things are only Evil, according to the opinion of the Vulgar, and that they are afflicting, be∣cause we take them to be so. For what great Evil is there in a Prison, that it should afflict a a truly great Soul? Is it because he is kept from the company of his Friends, and, as it were, ex∣cluded from the Society he is a member of? But a Wise Man knows that a wrongful Imprisonment, is much better than undeserved Liberty; and that it is infinitely more eligible to suffer for Equities sake, than, by wicked means, to abound with Riches and Honour. Others consider a Prison, as a Retirement, where, tho' the Body be kept in, the Mind may have its unrestrained Flight, and take its unbounded walks in the infinite spaces of Eternity. Who would think himself to be a Pri∣soner, as long as he may betake himself to the Market, to the Senate, to Heaven it self, and di∣vert himself amongst the Stars? Have not some writ Books in Prison, and others attain'd Learn∣ing? If to wicked and foolish men it be the De∣vils House, in which he keeps his Family; to a wise man it becomes the School of Vertue, where, without impediment, he dedicates himself to Piety and Probity. Why should a man abhor a Prison, who hath been conceived in a Dungeon, and thence borrowed the beginning of his Life; and who, after he is born, is confined to the Prison of his Body, till it return to the Earth from whence it was taken?

VII. A Valiant Man en∣dures the loss of out∣ward things, and a Wise Man wishes for it. The loss of outward Goods seems to inflict a deeper wound, which yet a wise man is very little sensible of; who considers all the things of this World, as the furniture of a Lodging in an Inn, the use whereof, for a short time is afforded him, with∣out any right of Possession. The loss of Riches is frequently the happy Mother of Peace and Quiet, and a Tranquility of Mind, which is seldom en∣joy'd but by a Soul free from Earthly Cares. ZENO, the Father of the Stoicks, called that day the happiest day of his Life, wherein he lost all his Goods by Shipwrack, and profest himself extreamly engaged to those Winds, which, by ••ashing the Ship wherein his Estate was contained, against the Rocks, had driven him into the safe Haven of Philosophy, where he spent the rest of his Life at the furthest distance from the Storms and tossings of this World. A truly Valiant man therefore knows that he hath no Right to any of these outward things; no more than the Earth can lay claim to the Light, which ariseth and dis∣appears again in a moment. He calls to mind, that all the conveniencies he enjoys here are the Divine Benefits, which as they are freely grant∣ed, so are they taken away again, for just tho' hid∣den causes.

VIII. The loss of a Good Name or Repute may be ea∣sily over∣come like∣wise. But your Enemies take away your Good Name, and endeavour by all means imaginable to obscure and blacken your Reputation. Neither can this reach any but weak and Pusillanimous Persons, who not considering the Talkativeness of wicked and perverse men, are too much concern'd with their Babbling. But the man that is possest of true Fortitude, undervalues all these things, and as he despiseth Pride, so he is little concern'd at what men say of him, as long as he is conscious to his own Probity: He is a sufficient Theatre to himself, who esteems it to be a Kingly part to do well, and to be ill spoken of. Was there ever any Good man that escaped the Slanders and reproaches of men? The Tongue of Backbiters creeps in every where, not sparing Sanctity it self. Let every one therefore that is assaulted by the Tongues of malevolence consider with himself, whether he be guilty of the Evil that is reported of him, or not; if he be not, what reason hath he to be concern'd at the imputation of this Slanderer, or to vex himself,

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Book. 1. Part. 10. Chap.

G. Freman. In.

I. Kip. Sculp

To the Worship∣full Henry Portman of Orchardiny County of Somerset Esq.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Rich: Blome

because a malevolous person useth the liberty of his Tongue, and complies with the perverseness of his own Nature? But if he be guilty of the Reproach laid at his Door, let him immediately take occasi∣on thereby to amend his Fault, and by changing his Life, prevent, as much as in him lies, all oc∣casions of Reproach for the future. Let him seri∣ously consider, that all that is said is without him, and cannot enter his Breast, except that he him∣self admit it, since no man is, or can be offended but by himself.

IX. How all other Evils are to be obviated by us. And because the limits I have confin'd my self to, do not allow me to reckon up all particular Evils; I shall only prescribe this general Remedy for them all; that a man throughly persuade him∣self, that the Peace and Tranquillity of his Mind doth not depend on Riches, Honours, Friends, Health, and other good things so accounted; since many are miserable notwithstanding the enjoyment of all these, and many are happy without them. How inconsiderable is the loss of Mony to him, who hath laid up his Treasure in Heaven? And how little is he concern'd with being banisht from his own Country, whose Heart is ••ixt on a Hea∣venly? What hurt is it to have ones Body bound, as long as the Mind is at full liberty? A truly va∣lian man is always the same; and as a Hand that is spread, or clutch'd into a fist, continues still the same Hand; so he bears the same Mind, and looks too, in the blustering dark Storms of Adversity, as in the serene Sunshine of Prosperity: For Death, Diseases, the loss of Goods, Fame and Friends, and other such-like that appear so terrible to some, are the Tributes due to Nature or Fortune, and are to be paid by us, whensoever they are demanded. How much more glorious therefore is it, to put a difference between our Soul and Body, and to keep our Soul free and unconcerned, tho' our Body be pain'd with Aches, shut up in a Dungeon, torn by an Executioner, and assaulted by Death it self.

X. Some kinds of false or seeming Fortitude. As there are 4 kinds of true Fortitude, so there are 5 of that which is False and Appearing. The First whereof is the Political or Civil, which by fear of Punishment or Shame, or the hope of Ho∣nour, prompts Citizens to the undergoing of Dan∣gers. 2ly. Military, whereby men relying upon their strength or skill, or for hope of reward, cast themselves upon hazarding their Lives and Limbs. 3ly. Angry or Wrathful, whereby men, inflamed with Anger, venture upon the most des∣perate and dangerous attempts. The 4th. is Ex∣perimental, being proper to those, who having escaped many great and eminent Dangers, are confirm'd in a hope of a like good luck in the most dangerous undertakings they set upon. The 5th. is a Blind and Ignorant Fortitude, where∣by men continue undaunted, because they are not sensible of the danger they are in. But none of all these is that true Fortitude, whereof we treat here; for a truly valiant man acts witting∣ly, knowingly, constantly, only out of Love to Vertue.

CHAP. XII. Of Justice.

I. Of the Nature of Justice, and whence it hath its Rise. THO' JUSTICE be esteemed the Splen∣dor of all other Vertues, and the Root of all Duties or Offices whatsoever, yet doth it derive its excellency only from the Corruption of men, and takes its rise from their Vices. For as we must first discover the Disease, before that we can be in a condition to Cure it; so Laws are made use of for a Check and Curb to Vices, and to bind depraved mankind to their good behaviour. For Justice, according to the account the Lawyers gives us thereof, is nothing else but a constant and perpetual Will, of giving to every man his due, L. 10. F. de Just. & Jur. By the word Will, in this de∣finition, we do not understand that Faculty of the Mind, whereby it determinates it self to act, and assents to a thing clearly perceived by it, but rather the Affection or Pnrpose of constantly exercising Justice. Because he is not said to be Just, who simply doth that which is Just, when his chief motive is either Fear, or to obtain the favour of Friends, or the hope of Reward, or other such like; but he only who performs such actions from his own free will, and out of Love to Justice.

II. The Will or Purpose of a Just Man, must be perpe∣tual. It is also added, that this Will or Purpose must be perpetual; for it is not sufficient for obtaining the Title of a Just Man, now and then to render to another his due; but it is of absolute necessity that he be in full and constant Resolution of doing the same whenever occasion shall offer.

III. Two things are re∣quired to the exer∣cise of Justice. There are 2 things wherein the whole requi∣ring or duty of Justice is contained; the first whereof is to do Good, that is, to pay ones due; and the other to avoid Evil, that is, to hurt no body, and to decline all those things that may prove hurtful or incommodious to others. Not as if this latter part of Justice did consist in not doing any harm, but in a desire of the Mind to keep off evil from others, and to remove it as far as lies in our Power.

IV. The Divi∣sion of Justice into Legal and Special. Justice, universally considered, is divided into General or Legal, and Special. General is that which considers the Good that is common to ma∣ny; and its business is to make good Laws, and observe them when they are made. So that its Object is not every Good that is common to many, but that which conduceth to the advantage of the whole Commonwealth. Special Justice is that which we have before defined to be a Firm Will of giving every one his due, or a Vertue in∣clining the mind always to render to every man his Right, and that according to Equality.

V. Justice di∣vided into Commuta∣tive and Distribu∣butive. Special Justice is subdivided into Commutative and Distributive; whereof the former is conver∣sant about Compacts, Exchanges, and Contracts; but the latter consists in distributing Rewards or Punishments, amongst those that are the Members of a Civil Society. The former of these considers things, and the latter Persons; the first belongs to all, the second only to Princes and Magi∣strates.

VI. These two sorts of Justice are distinguisht from their End. They are also distinguisht by their End, be∣cause the end of Distributive Justice is to consti∣tute an equality between Proportion and Propor∣tion; so as that there may be the same Proportion between the things that are distributed, as there is

between the condition of the Persons, to whom the Distribution is made. As for Example, when after a Victory obtained, some Rewards are to be distributed according to the desert and condition of the Persons; here an exact regard must be had to the merit and dignity of each, so as that the reward which is given may be greater or less according to the Dignity or Worthiness of the Person. But in Commutative Justice, the equality only of the thing received and rendred is considered, so as that the return must be equal, according to Arith∣metical Proportion, to that which hath been recei∣ved, without any respect had either to Merit or Person.

The following Vertues are annexed to Justice as its Species, viz. Religion, Piety, Observance, Friendship and Gratitude.

VII. What Re∣ligion is. Religion is the Top and Principal of all Ver∣tues, whereby we worship and honour GOD with the highest Love and Veneration. For this must be the chiefest affection of Man to adhere firmly to his Author, and to own him as the principle of all Good. For the first business of Religion is to discover GOD, as far as human Frailty will per∣mit, and to persuade Men that he is, or doth exist. For the due worship and honour we pay to GOD, is derived from the knowledge we have of him; that is, that we are certain that the World was made by him, and Rul'd and Govern'd by his peculiar Providence. And in the next place, that nothing happens to us without his command or permission; so that all things are design'd for our Good, and whatsoever befalls us, must be believed to have a tendency to our Salvation. For seeing that his knowledge is most perfect, his Power infi∣nite, and his Will most Loving and Beneficent, it is impossible that any thing should befall us, at his disposing, but must needs be for our Good. And tho' we cannot always perceive or understand this, yet we are to consider him as a Physician, who oft displeaseth his Patient, and puts him to Pain, that he may heal and make him sound.

VIII. We must resign and submit our selves with all our con∣cerns to GOD. Relying upon this assurance we must submit all our concerns to him, and acknowledge that we are come into this World, not to prescribe Laws to o∣thers, but to follow those that are already esta∣blished, and to yield a strict obedience to thosewhich we are surely persuaded proceeded from him. More∣over we are in such a manner to order our Pray∣ers we offer to him, as that we may obtain what is consonant and agreeable with this Providence, and to what he hath from Eternity decreed should come to pass. For he attempts, as it were, to cor∣rupt the great Judge of all the World, who begs any thing of him, but what is the purpose of his Will. And above all things we are to remember, that we can never offer any more acceptable Prayers to him, or profitable to our selves, than those whereby we entreat him to moderate and subdue our Affections, and to captivate and over∣rule our Will, that we may always embrace what is best. We must also be assured and fully per∣suaded, that no Sacrifices are more pleasing to him, than such as proceed from a pure Heart, and which are accompanied with an Innocent Life. Let us therefore consecrate and dedicate our Minds to be his Temple, where we may offer Sacrifices to him, breath forth our pure Affections, and pre∣sent to him the Oblations of our Love, Worship, Veneration and Subjection. And after we have done all this, let us not be ashamed to make a frank and open profession, that we have done nothing worthy of his Divine Majesty, or that is worth his acceptance.

IX. Piety or Love to our Coun∣try. Having given to GOD the Honour due to him, we must proceed to the Reverence that is due to Parents, who are the Channels, whereby we have been conveighed into this World, And under this notion our Native Country first presents it self, which under a feigned name requires a true Love of us; forasmuch as of all Societies and Fellow∣ships, as CICERO saith, none is more grateful and pleasing, than that which we have with the Commonwealth whereof we are Members. Our Parents are Dear, our Children, Relations and familiar Friends are Dear, but it is our Country alone that comprehends all these Endearments, for which no good Man would make any question to hazard his Life, to procure its Weal and Hap∣piness. Indeed our Country contains all that is near or dear unto us, so that as long as that is safe, they are so too, but if that miscarry, all these are lost together with it.

X. Observance to Parents. Next to the Love we owe to our Country fol∣lows the observance and Love which is due to our Parents, who by special Providence have been destinated to bring us into the World, and who have been in stead of GOD, by imparting Life to us. Who, if they be Godly and Vertuous, deserve a double Honour at our Hands, as promo∣ting and leading us by their Example, Exhorta∣tions and Precepts, to Vertue and good Manners, and make it their utmost endeavour that we may be Happy in this Life. If they be harsh and per∣verse, yet we must always remember that still they are our Parents, and that we are beholden to them for our Lives. And accordingly by na∣tural instinct we are led to relieve our Parents whensoever they are reduc'd to any necessity; and for the saving of them, not only to hazard the loss of all we have, but also of our very Lives. Hea∣thens have done no less, who with the danger of their own Lives, and neglecting their Riches, have only made it their business and care to save their Parents Lives. Hence it was that AENEAS obtained the name of Pious, for having carried his Father safe out of the Flames of Troy, and through the midst of his Enemies, Aeneid. 6.

Him I through raging Flames did on my Shoul∣ders bear, Through Armed Troops, and Darts that clogd the Air.

Let us not disdain herein to imitate a Heathen, and to learn from those who by the sole instinct of Humanity exposed their own Lives, to save their Parents.

XI. Observance towards superiors. Observance is a Species of Justice, whereby we Honour and Reverence those that are our Superi∣ours in Age, Condition or Gifts; for to all these Honour is due, as a reward of their Labor and Dignity: For seeing that they take care for the publick Good, and endeavour to promote the Hap∣piness of their fellow Citizens, nothing can be rendred to them in lieu hereof but Honour and Re∣spect; for should they demand any thing else, they would be so far from being honourable, that

they would appear to all, to be mean and cove∣tous.

XII. Friendship between Equals. Forasmuch as Friendship is a kind of Equality, it must also belong to Justice, as being nothing else but a mutual Benevolence, by which some per∣sons mutually desire to do good to each other. This is the best of those things that can be ob∣tained in this Life, as being the ground and foun∣dation of our Happiness. This is that which takes away all the bitterness of this Life, and exalts all the sweets and pleasures of it. In Prosperity it furnisheth us with an object for our Beneficence, in Adversity and Misery it affords us an object which we may relieve and comfort. Friendship teach∣eth us when we are young, comforts and cherish∣eth us when we are old, and being never forget∣ful of her Duty, doth at all times help and assist us. Wherefore it is only to be lookt for amongst good Men, and they only are to be beloved with this Love of Friendship, whom of a long time we have known to be honest Men, and are far more considerable for their Vertus than for their Riches: And accordingly we are to endeavour to gain such as these by all occasions, and to preserve their Friendship when gained by all good Offices.

XIII. Gratitude or Thank∣fulness. Gratitude is a Vertue that preserves a pleasing and acceptable Memory of Benefits received. This part of Justice seems to comprehend all other Vertues, forasmuch as no Man can be Pious, Friendly or Observant, that doth not live in the exercise of Gratitude. For what else is Piety, according to TULLY, but a grateful Affection and inclination towards our Parents? Who are good Citizens, and deserve well of their Country both at home, and in the Wars abroad, but such as are mindful of the Benefits they have received from their Country? Who are Holy and Godly, but those who with a thankful Heart and Mind full of ac∣knowledgement, give GOD the Glory of all his Benefits? What Pleasure can there be in this Life without Friendship? And what Friendship can there be betwixt ungrateful Men? Who amongst us, that hath been liberally educated, doth not with Joy and Gratitude entertain the Memory of those who have educated us, and been our Masters to instruct us in good Literature and Manners? Who is, or ever was so Rich, that his Wealth was equivalent to the Love and good Offices of many Friends? Which cannot subsist without Gratitude, and a thankful remembrance of Benefits received. Wherefore it is the Duty of every one to endeavour to carry himself thankful towards all, and never to forget any Kindness done to him, if ever he desire to please and satisfie himself or others.

There be also some other Vertues, that are con∣tained within the compass of Justice, viz. Cha∣rity, Humanity, Civility, Affability, Hospitality and Liberality.

XIV. Charity. Charity is that Vertue which incites us to Love all Men, and to succour and relieve them accor∣ding to our ability. For seeing that the Happiness of this Life consists in Action; we are not only to bear a good Will to our Neighbours, but must endeavour to assist and help them by our Works and Actions. For as the Sun is beneficial to all, and doth not pick and choose some only, to whom he may communicate his Light; so likewise must our Love be extended to all, and being dila∣ted by this Vertue of Charity, embrace all, and do good to all.

XV. Humanity. Humanity is that Vertue whereby with a kind of Benevolence, we express and restifie to all Men our readiness to serve and oblige them, from a due sense of the Dignity of Man, and our common Bond of Consanguinity.

XVI. Civility. Civility is a Vertue, whereby a Man from the Sense of common Humanity, doth speak courte∣ously to all those that have any business with him, or that he meets with; and makes use of such Words and Gestures, as do express a kind of Be∣nignity and Benevolence.

XVII. Affability. Affability is that Vertue, whereby a Man in his discourse with others, as well by his readiness and easiness to hear, as by the sweetness and agre∣ableness of his Speech, doth gain the Hearts of those he hath to do with.

XVIII. Hospitality. Hospitality is a Vertue, which makes us kind and obliging to Strangers, by giving them kind and free Entertainment; not only because they are Men, but because being Strangers and out of their own Land, they may want many things, which at home and in their own Country they plenteously enjoy.

XIX. Liberality. Liberality is a Vertue, which prompts us to be beneficial to others, freely and spontaneously ac∣cording to our Abilities. This Vertue hath 2 extreams, for if our Beneficence be deficient, that is, less than it ought, we deserve the name of Co∣vetous; but if we exceed in our Gifts and Kindnesses, so as to give more than we ought, to others, then we ought, or at another season, or for other reasons than we ought, we fall into a Vice, and are justly called Prodigal. And accor∣dingly, saith CICERO, those Men are Prodi∣gal who by Feastings, Doles and Shews, or by the vast charges of Plays and Publick Huntings, squander away their Mony upon such things, the memory whereof is either none at all, or very short lived. But such are truly Liberal, who redeem Slaves, pay the Debts of their Friends or Poor Men, or assist them in the bestowing of their Sons or Daughters, or for the getting of an honest live∣lyhood.

CHAP. XIII. Of the usefulness of the Passions or Affecti∣ons of the Soul.

I. The Opin∣nion of the Stoicks. FOrasmuch as the Vertues do arise from the Affections of the Soul, and that they are wholly conversant and taken up about the Ruling and managing of them, I should be wanting to the design of this Discourse, if I did not examin the usefulness of them, and shew how many seve∣ral ways they may be advantageous to Men. It is very notorious with what Virulence the Stoicks inveigh against the Passions, who being too solici∣tous for the Tranquility of their Wise Man, have supposed them to be altogether Evil, and therefore to be avoided by him, whom they will have to be exempt from all Vices, and not subject to any Per∣turbations. I confess my self formerly to have pleaded their Cause in my Discourse entitled, L' Homme sans Passions, and not only to have main∣tained SENECA'S Opinion, but also accor∣ding to my slender Ability, endeavour'd to ad∣vance and exalt it. But forasmuch as I now fol∣low the sentiments of DES CARTES, and

my business is not to explain the Opinions of others, but only to lay open Truth, no understanding man will reproach me of Lightness or Inconstan∣cy, for going about to unfold the usefulness of the Passions, and leaving the Stoicks, consider Man, not as Translated amongst the Glorified Saints in Heaven, but as placed amongst his Mortal Bre∣thren here on Earth.

II. Vertues without the Passions are weak and languishing. For the clearing of what I intend to deliver on this Point, it will be of use to call to mind that the Passions of the Mind, are certain Sensations or Perceptions of the Soul, which have a special Re∣lation to the same, and are produc'd and maintain∣ed by the motion of the Spirits: As hath been declared more at large, in the foregoing part of this Institution. Now it is apparent, that these Commotions of Mind do greatly assist, corroborate and invigorate all Human Functions. For doth not daily experience teach us, that all Human Actions are dull and liveless without them, and that the vigor of the Mind, where they are absent, ceaseth and fails? Reason it self in many cases appears dull and heavy, if it want the brisk com∣pany of Affections, and becomes stupid, when not excited with the Spurrs and Goads of the Passions? Where shall we meet with Fortitude, that under∣takes the most hardy and difficult attempts? Which pursues Dangers? Which dares and pro∣vokes the most terrible Evils, except it be assisted by Anger, which excites it to revenge the injuries and affronts done to ones Country, Parents or Friends? Prudence perisheth, where Fear is wan∣ting to put it upon making provision for the Fu∣ture: For it is this Monitor puts Prudence in mind of what Evils may happen, how she may obviate them, and by what means repel them? Who ever attempted any thing that was Great or Generous, without a strong and exalted desire? What Emin∣ent Orator, or Famous Philosopher ever conceived or brought forth, any thing that was Rare and Excellent without it? Why are so many toilsome and expenceful Travels undertaken, to visit un∣known Nations and Countries, but from an ardent desire of Seeing and Learning things unknown? Who loves Vertue, that is not accompanied with Joy and Gladness: For bare and naked Vertue is neglected and despised, except it promise, and actually bestow pleasure and satisfaction upon its Followers.

III. Two things are requi∣red to make the Affecti∣ons good. The Affections therefore are good, and contri∣bute to the Perfection of Human Life, as long as they observe these 2 following Rules. First, that the Object they are conversant about be lawful: For Affections seem to have been bestowed upon us by the Author of Nature, that they might ex∣cite us to the pursuit of Vertue, and the declining of Vice. The Second is, that our Passions be pro∣portioned to their Objects, and comport with the Light of Reason in all their motions. For such is the force and power of Reason, that it throughly searcheth into, and contemplates the nature of Objects, perceives the Qualities of each of them, and distinguisheth them from others: He who fol∣lows her, is safe and secure from Error, and fore∣armed against all deceptions whatsoever. So that he has his Ears open to the instructions of Reason, who loves the best Good with the Highest love and Affection, and all other things according to their several degrees of worth and merit.

IV. Passions are useful to the Actions of Life. The Passions therefore are very useful to the Actions of Human Life, as long as they are sub∣ject to the command of Reason, and attempt no∣thing contrary to its Dictates. For they are the Master of Vertue; and as Fire becomes extinct, when it wants fewel, so without the Affections Vertue remains idle, and unactive. For what great thing can it ever attempt, as long as it continues fixt in its own mean or middle Point, and is not spurred on by the Passions? As long as the timor∣ous Thoughts of Human Wit, are not excited to some choice or other? As long as Fortitude is not stirr'd up to gallant Actions? As long as Justice is not Arm'd with her Sword? And lastly, as long as Temperance is not kept within its due bounds by Fear, Shame and the Emulation of our Perfidious Nature? How are all Human Functions over-whelm'd with a deep Sleep, where for want of the awakening motion of the Passions, Men are not rowzed from Rest and Idleness, to Briskness and Activity?

V. An Obje∣ction a gainst the usefulness of the Pas∣sions. But you'l object that most of the Passions are Evil, and lead us headlong to Vice: For as they break forth suddenly upon the Soul, so they hurry her away without expecting the advice and coun∣sel of Reason, and reduce her to the blind and wild condition of Beasts; like unruly Horses that will not be restrained, running headlong into the Precipices of unlawful Lusts, accursed Envy and Hatred, and mad Superstitions.

VI. The Obje∣ction an∣swered. To which I answer, that what I have said con∣cerning the usefulness of the Passions, must only be understood of them, in asmuch as they are subject to the command and guidance of Reason, and proportion'd to their object and end; which then only takes place when those things are Loved that ought to be Loved, and when such Objects are loved in a higher degree, which because of their greater worth deserve more of our Love. For Love and the rest of the Affections, are never Evil, as long as they keep within their Bounds, and pursue only those Objects, that are agreeable to Reason. But as there are some Passions that are of no use at all to Men except they be moderated, and redu∣ced to Mediocrity, to the end they may be sub∣servient to the acquisition of Vertue: So some of them are so very good of their own Nature, that the more they exceed the better they are; for in asmuch as they always follow the Guidance of Reason, they cannot but be upon all occasions, fruitful and advantageous.

VIII. A twofold excess is to be consider∣ed of in the Passi∣ons. For there is a twofold excess in the Passions, the one whereof changeth the nature of a thing, and of Good makes it become Evil, and by this means hinders it from continuing in subjection to Reason. So we find that some Affections do to that degree oppose the motions of Reason, and depress the force of the Mind, that being wholly abandon'd by it, they degenerate into down right Vices. The other excess is, whereby the degree or mea∣sure of the Passion only is encreased, and of a Good one is made Better. Thus Boldness, or as others rather express it, Rashness, is not said to be an excess of Fortitude, save only when it trans∣gresseth the Bounds of Reason. But yet Fortitude is also capable of another kind of Excess, even whilst it continues within the said Bounds; which consists in this, that it is not subject to be shaken or moved by any Doubt or Fear: Which Excess is

so far from being Blame-worthy or Reproachful, that the Tongues of all Orators are not sufficient to extol and commend it, this being the peculiar Vertue of Heroes, whom the Antients ranked amongst the Gods.

CHAP. XIV. What is the use of Wonder or Admiration.

I. Some con∣demn Ad∣miration. MOST of the Antients had but a mean esteem for Admiration, as looking upon it to be the Vice of Ignorant Persons; and there∣fore took it to be an Enemy to Human Felicity, and the fruitful Mother of Sorrow, Fear, Desire, and other Passions that are the Tormentors of Man∣kind. And accordingly HORACE supposeth that Men would be exempt from all these, if once they could leave their wondring, Lib. 1. Epist.

Nothing t' admire is th' only thing that can Make and preserve a Blest and Happy Man.

II. Wonder or Admira∣tion is necessary for the acquiring of Sciences But these men do not seem to have rightly un∣derstood the nature of Admiration, but rather to have confounded it with Fear, which beholds eve∣ry thing with Trembling, and is affrighted at all the unusual Objects it meets with. But forasmuch as Admiration is nothing else but a suddain Occu∣pation of the Mind, whereby it is strongly carried to the attentive consideration of those Objects, that appear rare and strange unto it, no body can deny but that it must needs be very conducive to the Learning and Remembring of those things we were ignorant of before. For it is evident, that there are chiefly 2 Principles which concur to the in∣vention of every Art, viz. Admiration; because as soon as any new thing is suddainly presented to our Understanding, our Mind is presently struck with Admiration, and is powerfully rowzed to the searching into the Nature of it; and Experience, because the Mind, being allured by the Admira∣tion of a Rare and Uncommon Object, never rests till it have found by Experiment, what the Nature of it is, and the Cause of it. So they who first observed the Eclipse of the Sun, being seized there∣at with extraordinary wonder, it ingaged them to search into the Cause of this unknown Effect, till after many repeated experiments, they found that the same was caused by the Moons moving be∣tween the Sun and the Earth; whence they ga∣ther'd this Proposition of certain and undoubted Truth, that a Solar Eclipse is produced by the in∣terposition of the Moon betwixt the Earth and the Sun.

III. Those who are not apt to Wonder, are gene∣rally un∣learned. The necessity of Admiration, in order to the attaining of Knowledge, is very apparent from this one instance, that commonly those who are desti∣tute, or not apt to be touch'd with this Passion, are commonly unlearned, and very ignorant. For, notwithstanding that many things present them∣selves to our Understanding, or offer themselves to our Senses, yet will they never be fixt in our Me∣mory, except by some Passion they be imprest in our Brain, or by the intent application of our Un∣derstanding, being determined by our Will to a se∣rious Attention. For rare and unusual Objects en∣crease our Attention, because by their Novelty they leave a deeper impress of themselves; and the Spirits flowing thither, do encrease the appli∣cation of the Mind; by which means we frame more lively and lasting Idea's of things. Moreo∣ver, Admiration is of great use for our attaining of the knowledge of things which formerly we were ignorant of: For a Man that is seized with Ad∣miration, compares the unknown Object, with things that he hath formerly known; by which means he sees it to be different, and enquires why it differs from them. Hence it is that Admiration is called the Beginning of Philosophy, the Seed of Knowledge, and Abrupt Science. To admire, saith PLATO, is much the Affection of a Philoso∣pher; neither indeed can any other Original or Be∣ginning of Philosophy be assigned but this.

IV. The Esteem and due Value of ones self, how it may be profitable. The esteem of ones self, which is a Species of Admiration, is conducive to every man, in as much as it shews him, that he hath something that is his own, and possesseth some Perfections, in considerati∣on whereof he may respect and love himself more intimately than all other things. For Self-Love is a Lawful Affection, it being allowed to every man to consider himself before others. Moreover, a man by loving himself, imitates GOD, who, like a Circle, turns into, and terminates in himself, and loves himself with the Highest and Essential Love. This is the Property of Wise Men, who, subduing all foreign things to their Mind, do so highly esteem the dignity thereof, that they ac∣count it the highest Sacriledge to defile it with filthy and vain thoughts. Hence it is that they have an awful regard for themselves as for Deities; and abhor to commit any thing that might make their Consciences to condemn them. And to this purpose ARISTOTLE in the Second Book of his Politicks, proves that a due Esteem of our selves is a Vertuous Quality; and if at any time Self-Love is blamed, that is only so far as it ex∣ceeds its Bounds, and makes us to love our selves over-much.

V. The under∣valuing of ones self is a great help to Humility. On the other hand, the Contempt or Low esteem of ones self, by which a man despiseth his own worth and merit, is very conducive to Humility, and makes him refuse the Honour others render to him. This Vertue teacheth him, that the praises of others are useful to him, as long as he continues vile in his own Eyes; and that he is not to mind what others say of him, as long as he is conscious to his own defects and meanness, and that he wants those very Vertues which others extol him for. This Passion, moreover, hath this good effect, that it makes us to despise no man; but owning our selves to be men, prompts us to measure their Vices with the same Equity wherewith we censure our own. For it is but Reasonable and Equitable, that know∣ing our own weakness, we should take pity on others, and according to the command of Charity, think better of them than of our selves: For in∣deed what do we know, but they may far exceed us in Vertue? and tho' they have fallen as Sinners▪ yet may have risen again as Saints. We may lawfully contemn our selves, but cannot despise any other without Sin, and being injurious to our Neighbour.

VI. Venerati•••• teacheth as, to re∣spect every one accord∣ing to his Merit. VENERATION, whereby the Soul is engaged to esteem the Object it respects and ho∣nours, and to subject it self to the same, teacheth us to Reverence those Powers that are above us, and to render unto them the Honour that is their

due. For seeing that Authority is various, and that the Persons that are above us, are not all of them of equal Dignity, Veneration prompts us to honour every one of them, according to the different Power and Order they have in the World, ren∣dring them a various Respect and Worship, accord∣ing to the difference of their Merit and Dig∣nity.

VII. Our Pa∣rents. In the first place therefore, it puts us in mind of the Reverence we owe to our Parents, as to GOD's Vicegerents, who have brought us forth into the World, who with anxious and sollicitous care have educated us, who have instructed us in the Duties of Religion, framed us to Vertue, and furnisht us with Knowledge and Learning. For since it is most agreeable to Nature, to Love those who Love us; how great is that Love which we owe to our Parents, seeing that our Love, be it never so intense, will not equal their most ten∣der Care and good Will towards us?

VIII. Magistrates In the next place, it adviseth us to honour Ma∣gistrates, and such as are in publick places of Trust and Authority. For seeing that they watch for the Weal and Welfare of the Commonwealth, and are set over the People, to the end they may assist and help them, procure their safety, and se∣cure their Estates, they certainly deserve Honour and Respect from all whose happiness and welfare they contribute to.

IX. Wise men. This Affection also teacheth us to Honour and esteem those that excel in Wisdom and Vertue, and do recommend them, by the Examples to all others.

X. Disdain. Neither is the Passion of Disdain altogether use∣less, whereby the mind of man contemns some persons, and accounts them so much below it self, as to know that it is not in their Power to do him either Good or Evil. For this Passion is not a little conducive to the Quiet of the Mind, by raising it above the reach of any Mortal Power, making it to be unconcerned at their Promises, and fearless of their Threats. Especially in cases where the Cause of Vertue is to be appear'd for, or Vertue to be maintain'd.

CHAP. XV. Of the End or Ʋsefulness of Love and Hatred, and the Interpretation of them.

I. Love teaches us to do good to others. IT is an in-born instinct of the Will of Man, to desire that which is Good, and to testifie its displeasure, when it cannot attain it. Thus we see that a Covetous Man desires Riches, and an Ambitious Person pursues Honours, because they look upon these things as Good for themselves, and are with earnest desire carried towards them, as to things perfective of their Nature. For Love is nothing else but a Thought or Cogitation of the Mind, by which it is stirred up to join it self in Will to those Objects which appear agreeable to it. So that this Passion puts us in mind to do good, not only to our selves, but to others also: For∣asmuch as all men are united to us by a likeness of Nature, and constitute but one Politick Body or Society; wherefore also we are drawn by a natu∣ral impulse to bestow Benefits upon them, and to procure their profit and advantage, as far as lies in our way. For Love is a Beneficent Passion, and rejoyceth to diffuse it self, to a vast variety of Objects. Hence it is that PLATO feigns it to be the medium between that which is Deformed or Ugly, and that which is Beautiful and Lovely; between that which is Mortal and that which is Immortal, because it cherisheth and maintains Hu∣man Society; and joyning contraries together, links the Proud with the Humble, and the Poor with the Rich. We shall therefore make a good use of this Passion, by assisting and relieving our Neighbours, and by desiring and promoting the good and welfare, not only of our selves, but of others also.

II. And to hurt no Body. But forasmuch as some, under pretext of help∣ing their Neighbours, do injure them: The In∣terpretation of this Affection is, that in doing good we take care that we be not hurtful or prejudicial to any: but that we assist them willingly and heartily, and endeavour to promote their good from a pure instinct of Charity, and be to them as Light which penetrates all Diaphanous Bodies, without any hurt or prejudice, either to them or it self.

III. Devotion excites us to love GOD. By Devotion, which is a Species of Love, where∣by the Lover esteems the Beloved Object more than himself, we are taught to love GOD, and embrace him with the utmost extent and strength of our Affections. To which Divine Love we may arrive, by considering that GOD is a Spirit, or a Thinking Being, upon which account, seeing that our Soul is of affinity with his Nature, we are persuaded to believe, that it is an Emanation from his Supream Intelligence, and, as it were, a Particle of the Divine Breath. Moreover consi∣dering the Immense Power whereby he created the World, and all the things that are, without any praeexistent matter; the infinite reach and extent of his Providence, which, with one view, be∣holds whatsoever is, was, or is to come, yea, or can be: the unerring certainty of his Decrees, which tho' they be absolutely unchangeable, yet do not in the least prejudice the liberty of Man's Will. And lastly, by making a deep reflection upon our own great weakness, and on the other hand, on the Amplitude of the Universe, and all Created Beings, how at first they proceeded from GOD, and do still so depend on his Power, that they can∣not subsist a moment without his Care and Provi∣dence. For the due consideration of all these things, will kindle a desire in us to be joyned to him in Will, make us to venerate his Decrees, as judging them most necessary and equal, and to wish for no∣thing more than to obey his Will, and for his Glory make no difficulty to hazard the loss of all things, even of our Lives, and in a word, to un∣dertake or suffer any thing that may be offered to us.

IV. Compla∣cency is a help to the Love of Vertue. Complacency is another Species of Love, where∣by the Soul is carried out in desire towards Beau∣tiful Objects, being greatly taken, and charmed with their aspect. For Beauty hath something whereby it powerfully recommends it self, so as to allure the Eyes of Spectators, and force an ad∣mittance into their Hearts. Hence the Antients were pleased to call it a silent Imposture, and a Dominion which needs neither Arms nor Guards, such as persuades without words, and makes all men readily to submit to its Imperious Yoke. This Passion prompts us to desire the Beauty of Worldly

things, and wholly to betake our selves to the Love of Vertue, and by trampling upon all Earth∣ly Enjoyments, to aspire after Coelestial Objects. For if a comly shape of the Body, if a sweet and beautiful Aspect, if the sparkling lustre of a brisk and lively Eye be of force enough to astonish, ra∣vish and surprize, what a degree of Love, think we, will not Vertue be able to enkindle in the Hearts of its Contemplators, who, if we will be∣lieve SENECA, sends her Light, as a Harbin∣ger before her, into the Hearts of all Men, so as that even those who do not follow her, are con∣vinced of her Beauty? What can be compared to the Life and Vigor which Fortitude communicates to the Eyes, to the Intention they derive from Pru∣dence? to the Reverence wherewith Modesty adorns them? to the Briskness and Serenity which Joy affords them? and lastly to the Awfulness which Severity puts upon them? What can be imagined more Beautiful than Justice, which makes Princes most like to GOD? What more comly than Temperance, which sets bounds to Plea∣sures, and never embraceth them for their own sake? What more sweet and lovely than Huma∣nity, which is affable and courteous to all, and doth so far only desire its own Good, as the same may be serviceable and profitable to others? What more grateful and pleasing than Clemency, which spares the Blood of another as its own, which by by its kindness turns and overcomes the minds of the wicked, and sweetly comforts the afflicted and miserable? So that by beholding of Beautiful Ob∣jects, we are insensibly led to the love of Vertue, and taught to despise and neglect these frail and changeable Beauties, and to pursue the Eternal Excellence and Comliness of Vertue and Good∣ness.

V. Hatred makes us to abhor Vice. Neither is the Passion of Hatred altogether use∣less, where it meets with Objects, on which it may justly discharge its fury. For we hate all those things that hurt us, or injure our Soul or Body; and therefore we have good reason to abhor our Vices, and to avoid all those things that disturb our Peace and Tranquillity. For if it be natural to the Soul to separate it self by hatred from the things that are hurtful to it, what Evil ought she more to detest, than that which, in a manner, de∣stroys and annihilates it? For the Soul dies whilst it commits Sin, and lays violent hands upon it self, as oft as it transgresseth the Commands of GOD, and thwarts the Dictates of its Conscience. Wherefore it is but justice to hate our selves upon the account of Sin, and to be inflam'd with an holy Anger against our Defects and Transgressions, forasmuch as by means thereof we are turned aside from our Chiefest Good, and depart from him, with whom to be united by Love is the Sovereign Bliss of Man.

VI. Horrour or Abhor∣rence makes us to avoid Bad Com∣pany. The Horror we are seiz'd with at the behold∣ing of ugly and deformed Objects, teacheth us to avoid all manner of Wickedness and Pravity, and to eschew the company and familiarity of those, who are likely to infect us with their cor∣rupt manners. For seeing there is nothing in Nature more ugly and deformed than a wicked and perverse Man, we have all the reason in the World to avoid such a one, as we would do the Plague, lest we should be corrupted by his fami∣liarity, and his Vices insensibly should get ground of us. Drunken Companions easily draw in their Associates to the same Excess; and Lustful and Unclean Persons infect those they converse with, and effeminate the Minds of those that keep them company. Covetous Persons inspire their familiar Friends with a Stingy Humour. But what Body can be so deformed and monstrous, what Skin so scabby and ulcerous, as to compare with the ugliness and filthiness of Vice, which changes Men into Beasts? This Passion therefore will be of great good use to us, if it prompt us to detest the depraved manner of wicked men, or whatsoever can defile or weaken our Innocence.

CHAP. XVI. Of what use the Passion of Desire is.

I. Desire reacheth after the Things it wants. THE End and use of Desire is manifest from its Definition, which declares it to be a Pas∣sion, whereby the Soul is carried towards a Good, considered as Future. Which words sufficiently shew that this Passion aspires after those things which it wants, and wishes the conversation of those which it enjoys. The Soul by Desire, is carried to the Possession or enjoyment of some Good, like an Arrow driven from a Bow, and being raised upon the wings thereof, flies to the Mark.

II. Hope en∣ticeth the Soul to de∣sire Beati∣tude. Accordingly the Soul by Hope, which is the first Species of Desire, is stirred up to desire Hap∣piness, and to enjoy that Good, which alone can satiate it. For as Bodies, by motion, approach nearer to their Centers; so the Soul, through Hope, tends to Happiness, and by its earnest wishes and desires, hastens that, which it so much longs for. Where∣fore it looks upon these days, during which it is compelled to live here amongst Mortals, as al∣ready past and gone; and neglecting things pre∣sent, esteems them as past, before ever they are come. And by this means it is neither corrupted by the Prosperity of this World, nor cast down by Adversity; applying the whole drift of her intent to this only, that none of these things may be a hinderance to her in her Progress to Bliss and Fe∣licity. O Thrice Happy and Blissful Hope! whose Promises are so great and glorious, that they make a Man Happy and Blessed, even before he is in full possession of it.

III. Fear teach∣eth Cir∣cumspection and Cau∣telousness. On the contrary, Fear adviseth us to undertake nothing without Heedfulness and Circumspection, and to avoid Rashness in all our Actions. In the first place it teacheth us to examin all those things that may any way hinder or stop our intent, and to deliberate maturely and at leisure, about all those matters that are liable to change. For Prae∣cipitancy is without foresight, and cannot but fre∣quently have Repentance for its Companion. And in the next place, that we foresee things to come, and with great exactness and diligence, consider the Evils that may possibly happen to us: For foreseen evils are less afflictive, and we bear those things much more easily, that have been our con∣stant expectation. Fear therefore warns us, that standing in our Watch-Tower, we should keep a watchful Eye upon things to come; and as far as Human Foresight permits, anticipate the mutabili∣ty of Fortune, the endeavours of our Enemies, and the insultings of Men in Power. For

Afflictions and Hardships are only intollerable to him, whom they seize all on a suddain and at unawares, and whom they strike before they are discern'd.

IV. The Useful∣ness of Jealousie. Jealousie will stand us in good stead, when by it we are stirr'd up to endeavour to secure the Possession of those things which we count the best and most excellent of all others. This Passion moves and actuates the Philosophers, when they contend for the Truth, which they suppose them∣selves to have espoused, as for their nearest and dearest Interest, and endeavour to vindicate it from all Suspicion of Errour, in opposition to all the Attacks and Assaults of their Adversaries. Hence it is that Controversies about Religion are maintained in the Minds of People, whilst every one is jealous, lest the Religion he professeth should suffer any thing by his slackness or indiffe∣rency, or that he should be forced to desert it. Thus Princes and others, that have an Honourable Name in the World, are extreamly Jealous of their Good Name and Reputation, and leave no Stone unturn'd to preserve the same in its full Luster and Glory; because they look upon the Opinion which others have of their Vertue, to be above all things most conducive to their Honour and Esteem, as well as the safest and strongest guard, against the Assaults of their Enemies. In a word, Jealousie may be of use to all, if the Good, the loss whereof they apprehend, be of great Concern to them, and such as they cannot be deprived of without great Shame or Loss. For as no Body faintly and carelesly Endeavours the obtaining of Riches or Honour; so it is no wonder to see Men strangely moved and concern'd, whenever they are threatned with the loss of either of them.

V. Despair is sometimes of use to Lovers. Altho' Despair be the most odious of all Passi∣ons, and be generally accounted the Common Enemy of Mankind, yet is it not altogether with∣out its Usefulness. For inasmuch as it considers the desired Object as Impossible, and excludes all hope of ever obtaining it, it may be of advan∣tage to Lovers, when they find themseves neg∣lected and despised by the beloved Object; because then this Passion strongly persuades them to give over their vain pursuit, and to cease their frustra∣neous Endeavours, and to quit themselves of their Ill-advised Desires. It tells Men, that it is Mad∣ness to doat upon an ungrateful and insensible Object, and to cast away our Love upon that which cannot, or will not love us again.

VI. Despair makes Souldiers Valiant. As Despair proves advantagious to Lovers, so likewise it is useful to Souldiers, in cases where they are prest with Difficulties, and see no way open to escape their Enemies: For then it prompts them, since they are necessitated to engage those that are much stronger than themselves; and that in all pro∣bability they must dye, to sell their Lives as dear as they can, and in some kind make amends for their Loss, by causing a greater Loss to their Enemies. For Necessity often steels Cowards with Valour; and Despair hath often made weak and fearful Troops to triumph over Conquerours. This Passion inspir'd LEONIDAS, when with a small Handful of Souldiers, he set upon Xerxes, whose Fleet the Sea, and whose Army the Land was scarcely able to contain. For having posted himself with 300 Men in the Narrow-passage of the Thermopylae, he stood the shock of that prodigious Power, and died valiantly with his whole little Army.

VII. Fluctuati∣on, or Doubtful∣ness of Mind, use∣ful in the Choice of things. Fluctuation of Mind is necessary, when we are engaged in the Election of Good things; for seeing that one Good is preferrable before another, and that all are not of the same Value, we have need of time before we can certainly know, whether the Judgment we frame concerning Things, be conformable to them, and consonant to all the Circumstances that concur to their Perfection. For we cannot, like Angels, understand things that are offer'd to us, in an Instant; our Knowledge is successive, and as the Sun from the Dawning in∣creaseth to the perfect Day, so some time is to be allowed to our Soul, that after a mature Reflexion of Judgment, she may deliberate of things, and consider what she ought to determine concerning them. For seeing that things are various and manifold, and not equal in degrees of Goodness, their Nature must be diligently examin'd by us, that we may come to know what is Good, what Better, and what Best of all, For Men are very apt to favour their first Thoughts, and either from an Affection for Novelty, or too great In∣dulgence and Love for the Off-spring of their own Brain, to embrace that which first presents it self to their Minds. Wherefore Delay, which Flu∣ctuation of Mind doth suppose, is very ne∣cessary to discern Truth from Falshood, and to make a due distinction betwixt Good and Bet∣ter.

VIII. Cuorage and Bold∣ness are grent Helps to Forti∣tude. Courage and Boldness are good Helps to For∣titude, and superadd both Force and a Spur to that most Generous Vertue. For Fortitude, with∣out the Company of Boldness, is but faint and languishing, and stands in need to be excited by its Heat, to the attempting and undertaking of Great and Worthy Atchievements. This Passion may lawfully and worthily be employed, in re∣pelling the Enemies of our Country, and in de∣fending the Life and Honour of our Prince. Nature teacheth us to venture the loss of our Hand, for the saving of our Head; and to expose any part of our Body, to save the whole. This is that which Boldness performs, and when Necessity requires, does not only meet Dangers, but pro∣vokes and contemns them.

IX. Emulation is condu∣cive to Vertue. Emulation spurs us on to imitate the glorious Actions of Famous Men, by studying and eying the Examples of such as do exceed us in Vertue and Learning. It sets before our Eyes their Atchiev∣ments, as so many Originals for us to express, and to take Copy by, suitable to the Requirings both of Reason and Nature. For there is an inborn Inclination in all Men, to become like their Supe∣riours and Betters. This makes us to be always in the pursuit of those Vertues and Perfections, which we see shining so illustrious in others, and enflames us with desire to imitate the Manners and good Qualities of those who excel us, especially in Intel∣lectual Endowments.

CHAP. XVII. Of the Ʋsefulness of Joy and Sorrow.

I. All pursue Pleasure. IT is not without Reason that some Physicians tell us, That the desire of Pleasure is Natural to man; for it is subservient to the Mind, and fills and satiates the wants of the Body. Young men are inclined to Pleasure and Oblectation, because it is serviceable to the ready and vigorous performance of all Bodily Functions and Exercises, and con∣duceth to the increase and good state of it. Melancholy Persons addict themselves to Pleasure, because otherwise the Humour that predominates in them would consume their Body, and by its malig∣nity make all the Humours thereof eager and cor∣rosive. Old men delight in Merriment; for seeing that the digestive Faculty of their Stomach is slow and weak, and that the Blood and other Humours move but slowly through their Bodies, they are with great eagerness push'd forwards to Pleasure, as to the only Remedy against all these Distem∣pers.

II. Joy is grateful to the Mind. What Pleasure is to the Body, that Joy or Glad∣ness is to the Mind; for it always is a Consequent of its Tranquillity, and doth in a manner perfect and compleat all its Operations. For even as by a Natural Instinct we are carried to that which is Good, and have an Aversion for that which is Evil; so we pursue Joy and Pleasure under the Notion of its being Good, and hate Sorrow, be∣cause it appears to us to be Evil. But because Joy may be infected by its Objects, and be conversant about those things which are unworthy of our Esteem or Regard, we must examin what is the right use of it, and to what Matters it may lawfully be applied.

III. Joy always doth ac∣company good Acti∣ons. And indeed Joy and Gladness are not to be found, but in the Exercise of Vertue, and in the pursuit of Honesty; seeing that all other Good things, which we do so solicitously look after, do not bring forth any true Joy, but only some false and feigned Chearfulness and Mirth, which is always accompanied with Anxiety or Repentance. For there can be no true Joy, but that which springs from the Consciousness of Vertue and Good∣ness.

IV. Derision is useful for the Reproof of Faults. Derision, which consists of Joy and Hatred, and is occasion'd by the deprehending of some slight or Venial fault or defect, is frequently of good use for the amendment of Faults and lesser Immorali∣ties, making him who is derided, to be more watchful over his Actions. For finding his Immo∣ralities, or undecent Manners, to be exposed to Jest and Laughter, and that they furnish others with Matter of Raillery and Merriment at his Cost, he resolves to correct the same for the future, and so to prevent the like Errours, that he may no more become a Laughing-stock to others.

V. Envy is troubled at the Exaltation of the Wicked and Un∣worthy. Envy, forasmuch as it is a Passion and a Species of Sorrow, is not without its usefulness, it being that Affection whereby a man is displeased at the Prosperity or Elevation of another, because he is unworthy of it. For it seems but reasonable, to be moved with Envy and Indignation against those, who without their Merit are raised to ample Fortunes and high Employs. For whatsoever is conferr'd upon Unworthy persons, is look'd upon as a piece of Injustice, when that which should be the Reward of Vertue, is made an Encouragement to Vice and Wickedness. From all which it is apparent, that this Affection is distinct from that Envy which is a Vice, because this latter hath not for its Object a Person unworthy of the Good he enjoys, but rather conceives a Joy and Gladness from the Miseries of the Good and Vertuous; whereas the former is only offended at the Pros∣perity of such as are Unworthy, but reaps no pleasure at all from the Misfortunes of those that are Good and Vertuous. The Good things for which we commonly Envy others, are Riches, Honours, and other such like, depending on the Gift of Fortune: For no Body is Envied for his Vertue, nor for his Nobility, Beauty, or other Endowments or Embellishments, whether of Body or Mind; forasmuch as they do not depend of his Industry, but were bestowed upon him by Heaven, be∣fore ever he was capable of committing any Evil.

VI. Compassion relieves such as are in Misery. Compassion, or Pity, on the contrary, provokes us to assist and relieve such as are in Misery, and to shew Kindness to those whom we suppose to be Unhappy, without any of their desert or merit. For it is not a Vice of the Soul (as some Philoso∣phers have supposed) to pity the Miseries of others; but rather a kind of Pious Sorrow and Blessed Misery: Because this Affection doth not only move the Mind conformably to anothers Calamity, but also strongly excites it, to endeavour the easing and removing of it. For it is a Duty we owe to Nature and Humanity, to condole with those that are Afflicted, and to endeavour to lend a Helping-hand to those that are opprest with Cala∣mities, and who without Speaking, strongly cry to us for help. It is no Relief to a miserable Wretch, that we are touch'd with Grief and Com∣passion at the sight of his Affliction, except also we do help and assist him to the utmost of our Power.

VII. Satisfa∣ction, or Content, produceth Peace of Conscienc••. Satisfaction, or Content and Acquicscence in ones self, doth greatly conduce to Security and Peace of Conscience, when we call to mind any good Action that hath been performed by us. For as, according to HOMERS Fiction, the Herb Ne∣penthe added to their Cups, banisht all Sorrow and Sadness from the Banquet of the Gods; so a Good Mind secur'd and guarded by the Rectitude and Uprightness of its Conscience, extirpates all solici∣tous Anxiety, and begets the highest Joy and Pleasure. For the Soul that is always accompa∣nied by Innocenoe, seems, as it were, to applaud it self, and to be rais'd above this Earth, being Conscious to its self of no Crimes, nor distracted by the Guilt of Sin. Hence it is, that those who are safe and secure by reason of the Purity of their Conscience, are always of an even Temper, and tho' in the presence of a Tormentor, that stands ready to Torture them; of Fire, that is ready to consume them; and of a Funeral Pomp, to appall and terrifie them, continue unmoveable, fixed on the Rock of a good Conscience, being unconcerned at the raging Waves and Winds that roar about them.

VIII. Repentance is necessary for the Effacing of Sin. But Repentance, which supposeth Guilt, and which torments the Guilty with the Checks and Stings of Conscience, puts them upon bewailing of what is past, and to get rid of the Burthen that presseth them. For as nothing is more pleasant and joyful, than a good Conscience; so nothing is more tormenting than a Bad one: No Wild Beast

tears and rends more Cruelly, no Flame burns more smartly, or Torments the Body more excessive∣ly, than a Guilty Conscience racks and tears the Soul, whose Inmate it is. Whosoever Sins, hath his Punishment immediately attending him, and his Crimes make him sufficiently miserable, without the Ceremony of a publick Condemnation. Punish∣ment is the individual Companion of Wickedness, and never to this day was there any Man found that sin'd on free cost. Repentance therefore makes a Man after the Commission of Sin to hate himself, and from a serious abhorrence of his Crimes, to amend what is amiss, and enter upon a new course of Life.

IX. Favour makes us to Love the follow∣ers of Ver∣tue. Favour, which makes us wish well to those that are Vertuous and do worthy Actions, is a great incentive to the Love of Vertue, because it inclines us to Love the same in others, and to bear good will to all the followers of it: Whereas on the contrary we do hate perverse Men; and tho' we do not abhor their persons, yet we do always ab∣hor their Vices. It is inborn, and natural almost to all Men, to be angry with, and have indigna∣tion against Evil doers, and those who tho' they be never so criminal do go unpunished. But yet we are to take heed, that we do not imitate those Peevish and Morose persons, who are moved at things of little or no moment, and confounding slight fooleries, with the highest Crimes do abhor, the one as much as the other. It is the property of a Morose temper, to inveigh bitterly against small Faults, and to condemn all things that are not suited to his Temper and Apprehension.

X. Gratitude prompts us to the ren∣dring of Benefits. Gratitude, which preserves the pleasing memory of Benefits received, incites us to the endeavour of repaying them with like good Offices: Which may be done by us 2 manner of ways; the first when by Gifts, or otherwise, we acknowledge the Favour or Benefit we have received. Thus we read, that AUGUSTUS CAESAR rewarded the good Office done to him by a Veteran Souldier, in rescuing him from imminent danger, at the Bat∣tle of Actium. For when he being accused at Law, and in danger of being condemned had de∣sired AUGUSTUS to appear for him, CAESAR would not suffer his Attorny to plead for him, but himself appeared, and pleaded, that he might not seem ungrateful to him, who had saved his Life. The other way of shewing our selves Thank∣ful is, when we receive a Benefit with a grateful Mind, and are ready at all times to acknowledge it. For indeed the returning of a good deed, does not so much consist in our recompensing it by good Offices, as in a grateful temper of Mind, whereby we are ready to acknowledge the favour bestowed upon us. For a Debt may soon be paid, and what hath been Stolen restored; but he properly repays a Benefit, who keeps it always in grateful Memory, and owns himself under Obligation for it.

XI. Anger is of use to Princes and Magistrates Anger, which the Stoicks do so much inveigh against, calling it a short Fury or Madness, hath also its use, as long as it continues within the Bounds of Reason, and does only moderately move and affect the Soul; for being thus qualified, it is serviceable to Kings and Judges, to the remo∣ving of Lenity and Fear, which may oppose themselves to the Strictness and Severity of the Law, and incline them to over much Clemency. Thus it is lawful for Judges to be exasperated against the Crimes of Malefactors, who violate the Laws, and infect others by their wicked Exam∣ples. It is also serviceable to Kings in Governing of the Commonwealth; for it is necessary for Kings, to avenge the Injuries and Indignities of∣fer'd to themseves, and to be as ready to punish Traitors, as to resist and oppose their Enemies. For who will say, but that it is a just anger in Princes, which engageth them to inflict the worst of Punishments upon Traitors, who are guilty of the worst of Crimes?

XII. Glory and Shame of what use they are, and to whom. Glory and Shame are of extraordinary use, and advantage to those who are taken with the desire of Vertue; for these 2 Passions naturally lead to her, and tho' they go different ways, yet tend to the same end. For Glory is as it were a Spur, egging us on to great and generous Actions, and to the undertaking of the most hazardous Exploits. It was under the conduct and command of this Af∣fection, that the Romans procured their Great∣ness, and subdued all their Neighbouring Nations. It cannot be denied but that the Love of their Coun∣try, was a great and strong motive in the accom∣plishing of those brave Actions, but yet their desire of Glory, was a much stronger incentive to them. For indeed Vertues Vigor and Force seems to lan∣guish and expire, when it is not kindled with the desire of Praise and Honour; and the whole strength and Briskness of the Soul is very rarely exerted, but in the midst of Spectators, that are ready to applaud and extol it.

XIII. Shame keeps a man from the Commis∣sion of Sin. And Shame on the other hand deterrs a Man from Vice, and makes those things odious, which otherwise would appear delightful. This Passion may well be called the Guardian of Vertue, be∣cause it makes us to flee from the Face of every shameful and filthy Act. This keeps Judges to their Duty, and compells them to do Justice, for fear of making themselves infamous. This Passi∣on furnisheth Women with Arms, wherewith to defend themselves against the attempts of Lewd and Lustful Men. And therefore SYNESIUS calls Shamefac'dness the second Good of Man, be∣cause it keeps them innocent, and doth not only hinder them from committing Wickedness in pub∣lick, but also in private.

XIV. Chearful∣ness assists us in the bearing of Adversity. Chearfulness teacheth us to bear Afflictions and Adversity with a pleasant Mind, and to under∣value and despise the Calamities we lye under. It informs us that it is Prudence, to despise the Evils and Calamities of this World, and to re∣joyce in the midst of those troubles, wherewith we are continually tost in this Life. For as Gold shines bright in the Fire, and by all the violence thereof loseth nothing of its weight or Splendor, so a Chearful Mind is of proof against the In∣juries of Fortune, and turns its Calamities and Afflictions into Pleasure: It considers that nothing is more sweet, than the remembrance of past La∣bours and Miseries, and that that prosperity is sweetest, for which we have been prepared by the Bitterness of Suffering.

CHAP. XVIII. Of the Government of the Passions, and of their more general Remedies.

I. The parti∣cular Re∣medies of all the Pas∣sions are not to be here ex∣pected. FOrasmuch as the Happiness of Mans Life, depends on the right governing of the Pas∣sions, and that they may be accounted truly hap∣py in this World, that have attained to a full Do∣minion over them; we are to consider, how their Excesses may be best avoided, and the ill use of them prevented. Not that I do intend here to pro∣secute the particular Remedies of all the Passions, which Reason prescribes for the subduing or mo∣derating of them, because that would be a greater Task than I can here undertake, in this short Dis∣course of Ethicks; but only to set down the more general Remedies, to repress their force, and to over come their Excesses.

II. We are to examine things be∣fore that we give way to any Passion a∣bout them. And here the First thing we meet with is, that we cautiously and diligently enquire into the na∣ture of the thing that is presented to us, and that we abstain from passing a Judgment concerning it, as long as we find our selves moved by any Pas∣sion, so as to be byas•• thereby to one Object more than towards another. For since all the Inclina∣tions that proceed from them, are only the effect of a confused Perception, they cannot offer any thing, that is clear or distinct to our Mind: And therefore we must endeavour, if the time permit, to turn our Thoughts to some other Matters, for a Season, until the Commotion of our Blood be over.

III. Whilst a Passion pres∣seth upon ••s, the contrary reasons are to be noted. I said, if the time permits, because when the Passion is violent, and the case requires, that with∣out any delay, a present Res••lution be taken; the Will must consider and weigh the Reasons, that oppose the said Passion, tho' it may be they ap∣pear inconsiderable and of small moment to us. For we are to lay this down for a certain truth, That the Passions are deceitful, and that their main drift is to impose upon us, and lead us into Errors. And tho' it may seem to be a very difficult thing, after that a Passion hath made its onset upon us, and put our Blood into a Commotion, to put a stop to the Course of the Animal Spirits into the Muscles, in order to execute the command of our Passions; yet is it not a thing impossible, but may be performed, by diverting our Mind from the thoughts it is upon, by representing to it the con∣trary Reasons. Thus when an Enemy sets upon us at unawares, such a suddain event affords us no time to deliberate: Wherefore in this case, if we find our selves seized with Fear, our business must be to turn our thoughts from the consideration of the danger we are in, by listning to those Rea∣sons that tell us, that there is both more Safety and Honour in resisting an Adversary, than in gi∣ving way to him, or turning our back upon him. And on the contrary, when Anger seizeth us, and that we find our selves provoked to Revenge, and rashly to rush upon our Enemy, we must call to Mind, that it is a piece of great Imprudence to cast our selves away, when as we may preserve our Lives without Shame or Infamy, and that it is no Shame for a Man to recant, or to submit himself where the match is unequal, rather than to rush on rashly upon apparent Death.

IV. We must examin the nature of things whilst we are Tran∣quil and Sedate. It is also very conducive to the governing of our Passions, to accustom our selves, whilst we are in a sedate and tranquil temper of Mind, to weigh and examin all the Good and Evil things, that any way may happen throughout our whole course of Life, and to discuss their nature and va∣lue, that afterwards upon occasion, we may be able with more readiness to form true Judgments concerning them, and certainly and without any hesitation discern, what ought to be avoided, and what to be embraced by us, whatsoever any rising Passion or Supervening reasons, may insinuate or sug∣gest to the contrary. For if we direct and govern all the Actions of our Life, according to some certain and premeditated Judgments, it will not be difficult for us to repress the Violence of our Boyling Passions, and to break the force of them. For how weak soever we may be, and how easy soever to be overcome by our Passions; yet if we do but apply our selves to such thoughts as these, and often revolve them in our Minds, we shall at last come off Conquerors, and attain to an absolute Dominion over our Passions.

V. He that can over∣come desire will soon get the Do∣minion o∣ver all the rest of his Passions. It will be of great use also towards the taming of our Passions, to curb our Desires, and not suf∣fer them to Rove beyond the requiring of Na∣ture. For tho' Desire be a peculiar Passion, yet it mingles some way or other with them all, so that he who can tame its unruliness, will easily cure the Distempers of all the rest. For all the motions of Desire as they are Solitary, and by themselves, are dark and languishing, except they receive light from abroad, and chiefly from the Goodness and Excellence of the Object, about which they are conversant. And forasmuch as some of the things that are desired by us, do altogether depend upon our selves, and some upon others, and some also partly upon our selves, and partly upon o∣thers, we ought very narrowly to examine, how we ought to carry our selves with relation to these se∣veral things, and what curbs are best to be made use of to restrain the great variety of our desire.

VI. How far we may de∣sire the things that are in our Powers. As to those things which are in our Power, these may lawfully be desired by us, as long as our desires of them are well grounded, and pro∣ceed from Good and Vertuous motives; for see∣ing that they proceed from a perception of Good, and only tend to our Complement and Perfection, to endeavour the satisfaction of them, is to act conformably to Nature, and to follow the Di∣ctates of Vertue. But who dares say, that any one can with too great eagerness pursue Ver∣tue?

VII. We must not desire any thing that is in the Power of another. But as to things that are forein to us, and in the Power, and at the disposal of others, our de∣sires towards them can never be faint and weak enough: Yea we must strive, as far as lies in us, altogether to abstain from the prosecution of them, having our Mind fix'd on the Contem∣plation of the Great GOD, by whose Provi∣dence all things are governed and dispensed, and whose Boundless Goodness, Infinite Wisdom, and Infallible Decrees are only worthy of our conti∣nual Thoughts and Attention. Wherefore we must consider, that all whatsoever happens to us is ne∣cessary, excepting only those things, which it hath pleased GOD, should alone depend upon our Wills, and which by his Decree he hath ordain'd, should by such and such ways be conveighed to us.

And being thus persuaded, as we shall not desire the Goods of Fortune, so neither shall we fear its Evils, forasmuch as they are only such, by rea∣son of our Opinion of them, and the Error of our Understanding; but shall rather willingly submit to them, as being designed for us by his unerring Providence, and infallible in their Con∣tingency. And accordingly giving way to Time and Chance, we shall undauntedly expect whatso∣ever may happen to us, as being undoubtedly as∣sured, that they cannot deprive us of the least part of any true Good we are in possession of; yea, moreover that they are very conducive to our Beatitude, if we know how to make use of them as we ought, and as becomes a Philosopher.

VIII. We are to moderate our desires about those things which part∣ly depend on us, and partly on others. And as to those things which partly are in our Power, and partly at the dispose of others, such as Health, the Government of our Families and Administration of State Affairs, we must take care that we do not too eagerly desire the same, or be too earnestly carried out towards them, when they seem to be in our reach; but that we remem∣ber always so to curb our desires, that we only extend them to those things that are in our Power, and depend on our Free-will: So that if our en∣deavours chance to succeed, we shall obtain the thing we desire; but if not, at least we shall have the comfort that we have performed our Duty, and done what was in our Power; and therefore shall look upon them as Impossible, and since the obtaining of them is not in our Power, we shall suppose them not at all to belong to us.

IX. Generosity is a great Remedy of the Passions Generosity may be considered as another general Remedy of our Passions, which being as it were the Key to all Vertue, so it is a powerful means to subdue and moderate our Affections. Now Gene∣rosity consists in this, that a Man do value and esteem himself to the utmost of his worth; for having this respect and consideration for himself, it will engage him not to omit any thing he ought to do, as well as from undertaking any thing un∣worthy the excellence and Dignity of his Nature. For considering that nothing properly belongs to him, besides the free disposal of his Will and Choice; and that nothing is praise-worthy or commenda∣able in this Life, save only the due use thereof, he will suppose himself to have attained the highest step of Felicity, if he find in himself a fixt and constant Resolution and purpose to make good use of them; that is never to want a Will, to under∣take or execute all those things, which he judgeth to be best, which in a strict and proper Sense is to follow Vertue. For tho' he hath this due esteem of himself, he does not therefore despise others, but rather persuades himself, that all other Men have the same Thoughts of themselves: And there∣fore he never undervalues other Men, and if by chance he discover any defects or weakness in them, he is more ready to excuse than carp at them, and to persuade himself, that they commit those Fail∣ings, not for want of a good Will, but for lack of knowledge, and due Information.

X. The high∣est remedy against our Passions is the Love GOD. But the most powerful Antidote against our Affections, is the Love of GOD, which natural knowledge implants in our Souls. For this being the most pleasant and delightful of all the Passions, we can be affected with in this Life, and the most strong and prevalent also, it must consequently have the Power of ridding us from the Dominion of all other Passions, and not only of curing all the Vices of the Mind, but also of removing all the bitterness of Bodily Sickness, and of sweetning all the Troubles and Afflictions of this Life, which are the inseparable Companions of all States and Conditions whatsoever. And how this Divine Love may be obtained by us, DES CARTES informs us in the 35 Epistle of his first Volume, to which I refer the Reader.

CHAP. XIX. Of the Liberty of Mans Will.

I. How those who deny the free-will of Man may be convin∣ced. AFfter having spoken of the Vertues, and shewed the use of the Passions we might ••eem to have performed little or nothing towards a Blessed Life, if we should not now proceed to de∣monstrate, that Man is endued with a Free-will, and that it is in his Power to exercise Vertue, and make good use of his Affections. For there be some, that are so ignorant of themselves, and such negligent searchers into the source of their own A∣ctions, that they attribute all things to a Blind Necessity or Fatality, and suppose Men to act from an imprest instinct, and that nothing is done by them which is not necessarily determined. But these Men do very well deserve to be tied to a Stake, and there lasht so long, till they beg those that beat them to stop their Hands, and confess that it is in their Power, to cease from beating of them, when they please.

II. Human A∣ctions shew that there is a Liber∣ty of acting For what is more contrary to daily experience than to believe, that it is not in our Power to Speak or hold our Peace, to stand still, or to walk, to reach forth our hand to a poor Beggar, or to pass him by unregarded? This is so notoriously mani∣fest, that as St. AUSTIN saith, it is Sung by Shep∣herds on the Mountains; by Poets on Theaters, by Balladmongers in their Rings, by the Masters in Schools, and by all Mankind in the World. For if Men have no Free-will, to what purpose are Laws made? Why are Rewards promised to those that are Good, and Punishments threatned to the Bad, if the things for which they are reward∣ed or punished, were never in their Power, and that they sinned against their Will, or by the force of necessity performed some good service to their Country? Why are Exhortations used? Or why do we endeavour to excite men to Vertue, if we have no Strength of our own so to obtain it? And if like Children and Madmen, we want the power of chusing or refusing?

III. He that takes away mans Li∣berty of Will takes away Sin. Moreover, if we do all things by a kind of fatal necessity, what will become of Prevarication and Sin? Or where shall we find any Transgres∣sion of the Law, if uncontrolable force be the source of our Actions, and if they be the result of Nature, and not of our Will? Necessity, say the Lawyers, makes void an Action, and he that Go∣verns, must not be in the Power of any one. It is evident therefore that Men are free, and so far at their own dispose, that when Good and Evil are set before them, they may choose that which is Good, if it be represented to them under that No∣tion; or Evil, yet always under the appearance of something that is Good, if the said appearance do more strike their Understanding and attract their Will: Or when two good things are pro∣pounded

together, they can chuse the one and leave the other, if it appear more suitable to them, and more excellent and worthy in it self.

IV. If there be no Li∣berty of the Will, all Delibe∣ration is in vain. But what need is there of so many words to make out a thing that is so Notorious and obvious almost in all Human Actions? There is nothing more common amongst men, than to deliberate and take Counsel in doubtful Affairs; not only the Common People, but even Kings themselves have recourse to this Expedient. For seeing that every one is more dull-sighted in his own business and concerns, than in those of another, Princes must make use of Counsellors, that may be unto them instead of Hands and Eyes, and may help them in all things. But pray, to what purpose are these Counsellors, if it be not in the Power of the King to take their Advice, or to change his Purpose? Nature hath made us Teachable Creatures, and bestowed upon us an Imperfect kind of Reason, which can be amended and perfected by good Institutions. And accordingly there is nothing that more strongly induceth men to love Vertue, and recalls wicked Men to that which is Right, than the Conversation of good Men, by whose Example Vertue is recommended and learn'd, and by degrees takes root in the Heart. But alas! how useless would it prove to Converse with good Men, if it be not in our Power to imitate their Actions; and if for want of this Free-will, we cannot follow that which is Best? We must therefore be possest of a Free-will before any of these things can be advantagious to us; and as it is in our Power to recall our Eyes or Mind from any Object, so it is likewise in our Freedom to withdraw our Affections; except we will confess, that Knowledge was given us to no purpose at all, and that it is of no use to the governing or direct∣ing of our Actions.

V. He that takes away the Free∣dom of Man's Will, banisheth Vertue out of the World. Human Society cannot subsist without Vertue, which being taken away, the Beautiful Order of the VVorld must be overthrown, Government must degenerate into Tyranny, and all the Concerns of Mankind be expos'd to the tumultuous Motions of the Passions. Wherefore it is necessary, that Vertue be seated like a Judge over all, and to render to every one his due; to GOD, by Religion; to our Country and Parents, by Love and Obedi∣ence; to our Fellow Citizens, by various Offices of Justice and Charity. But take away the Liberty of our Actions, and all these things vanish, and there remains nothing in the VVorld, but confusion and corruption of Manners. For how shall Temperance be able to contain her self, and suppress all inordinate Desires? What shall put Fortitude upon difficult and dangerous Exploits? By what means shall Justice pay what is due to another, and observe the Rules of Equity? If so be it is not in their power to abstain from Plea∣sures and Lusts, to avoid things difficult and dangerous, or to keep what is anothers by force. We must therefore of necessity conclude, that the Power of Free-will hath been vouchsafed to man by GOD, and that in all his Actions he is not driven by Necessity, but led on by his own VVill. For otherwise, why might not all the Failures and Sins of Nature and Men, be imputed to GOD, if he be the only Agent in the VVorld? Or, why might not he be said to commit all Evils and Crimes that abound therein? It was therefore necessary, that Man should be endued with Li∣berty, to the end that his own Actions might be recompensed unto him, and he receive the Reward or Punishment due to his VVorks.

VI. The Free-will of Man de∣pends upon GOD. But tho' every one doth experience this power of choosing in himself, and find that his Will in its determinations, doth not depend upon any created Agent; yet neither must it be conceived to be ut∣terly independent; for tho' Free Will, as DES∣CARTES saith, if we give heed only to our selves, cannot but be conceived as Independent; yet if we consider the infinite Power of GOD, we must of necessity believe, that all things depend on him, and that consequently our Free Will can∣not be exempt from his Dominion. For it implies a contradiction to say, that GOD hath created Men of such a Nature, that the actions of their Wills are independent of his Will; because this is the same, as if we should say, that his Power is both finite and infinite. Finite, because there is something that does not depend on his Will; and Infinite, in that he could make that thing in∣dependent.

VII. The Liberty of our Will, doth not make the Existence of GOD, doubtful. But as the Knowledge of the Divine Existence must not take away the certainty of our Free Will, so must neither the Knowledge of our Free Will, make the Existence of GOD doubtful to us. For the Independence which we experience, and are sensi∣ble of in our selves, and which is sufficient to make our Actions worthy of Praise or Reproach, is not repugnant to a dependence of another kind, according to which all things are subject to GOD.

VIII. An Obje∣ction an∣swer'd. If any one should object here that Passage of the Romans, The Good that I will, I do not; but the Evil I will, that I do; and should from thence infer, that he who does not what he Wills, and does what he Wills not, cannot be said to be free. I Answer, that this saying of the Apostle is to be understood of the first motions of Concupiscence, which are not in our Power, neither are imputed to us as Sin; and therefore the Apostle subjoins, Now if I do that which I would not, it is no more I that do it, but Sin that dwelleth in me; which, since it took its birth from the first Sin of Man, and that it is the Cause, and as it were, the Mother of all the Sins we fall into, is there∣fore by the Apostle called Sin. Wherefore also the Apostle afterwards adds; O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the Body of this Death, that is, from the hard Yoke of Concupiscence; and presently after answers his own Question, the Grace of God through Jesus Christ.

CHAP. XX. How, presupposing Gods Omnipotence, Men can abide Free in their Wills; and whe∣ther the Free Will of Man can be hinde∣red.

I. An Objecti∣on against the fore∣going Chapter. FROM what hath been said in the foregoing Chapter, no small difficulty seems to arise, which must not be omitted by us. If it be true, will some say, that all things are subject to the Di∣vine Power, and consequently, that all the works of our Will do depend on him, how then shall we be able to secure Human Liberty, when all things

that proceed from us are ordained by him, and cannot happen without his Praescience.

II. God is said to be a to∣tal Cause two several ways. We shall resolve this Difficulty by saying, that GOD indeed is the Total and Universal Cause of all things, so that nothing can be done by any of his Creatures that doth not depend on him: yet is not this Causality of his exerted in all after one and the same manner. For in the Production of those things, to which neither our Free Will, nor that of any other Created Agent doth concur, we must say that GOD only had regard to his own VVill, according to which he absolutely de∣termined to produce them after such a certain man∣ner, and such a determinate time. But as to those things which the VVill of Man hath some power over, he did not singly regard his own VVill; but had regard also in his Decree to the consent of our VVill; and would have nothing absolutely to come to pass, without the presupposing of our De∣termination. For it doth not follow, that because the certain order of all Causes is manifest to GOD, that therefore nothing is left in the power of our Free VVill, seeing that he himself could not be ignorant of our VVillings; which he foreknew were the Principles of our Actions.

III. How God acts in Con∣currence with our Liberty. DESCARTES illustrates this by the Exam∣ple of a King in an Epistle of his to Elizabeth, the Princess Palatine. Suppose we a King to have forbidden all Duels, and that he certainly knew that 2 of his Nobles, the inhabitants of 2 different Cities, had a quarrel together, and to be so incenst against each other, that in case they should chance to meet, they would certainly fight one another; if I say this King should command one of them to take a Journey towards that City, where the other dwells; and at the same time give the other a com∣mand to go towards that place where the former is supposed to inhabit, he certainly knows that they cannot but meet one another, and consequent∣ly fight and break his Command or Proclamation; but yet for all this he doth not force them to it; neither doth his Knowledge, no nor his VVill nei∣ther of thus determining them to this Action, any way hinder them from fighting as freely, as they would have fought, if he had known nothing of all these particulars, or if by any other occasion they had chanc'd to meet with one another; and therefore he may with as much justice punish them for violating his Edict.

IV. Gods know∣ledge and will do not destroy mans Li∣berty. Now what is lawful for a King to do, with re∣spect to some of the Free Actions of his Subjects, the same GOD, whose Knowledge and Power is infinite, doth, with regard to all the actions of men. For before ever he sent us into this VVorld, he exactly knew how all the Propensions of our VVills would be, because he himself put them into us; and also disposed all things without us in such a manner, that these and the other Objects, should present themselves to our Senses, this or that time, by occasion whereof he knew that our Free VVill would determin us to this or the other thing. And this he would have to be so; but yet he would not force us to this. And as in the foresaid King, 2 different degrees of Will may be determined; the one whereby he would that these 2 Nobles should fight together, in as much as he was the cause of their meeting together; and another whereby he would it not, or was against it, in that he had forbid Duelling by his Proclamation: in like man∣ner our Divines distinguish 2 VVills in GOD, the one Absolute and Independent, whereby he will have all things to come to pass as they do; the other Relative, which respects mans me∣rit, or Guilt, by which he will have his Laws obeyed.

V. There be 3 things that hin∣der the use our Free Will. Three things are commonly reckoned up by Heathen Philosophers, which may hinder the use of our Free VVill, viz. Fear, Ignorance and Force. Fear seems to be an Impediment or Bar to Liberty, when it is not the fear of a vain man, as the Lawyers speak, but such as is grounded, and may light upon a constant and well resolved person, because it makes him do those things which he would never do, if he were left to himself, and were not shaken with fear.

VI. Mans Li∣berty may consist with Fear. But I do not at all approve of this Opinion, for∣asmuch as Fear, whether it be great or small, doth not so oppose Liberty as that it should wholly de∣stroy it: Yea, if we heedfully mind the matter, we shall find that it is always in conjunction with a kind of VVillingness, whereby it willingly per∣forms that which Fear seems to extort from it. For 2 things are considered in Free VVill; First, That we do it spontaneously, or of our selves: And Secondly, That we do it freely. The for∣mer of these Modes of Acting seems in some sort to be hindred by Fear; because we do that, which we would not, if we were not forced to it by the Fear of some impending Evil. But the latter is not at all hindred by it, because the nature of Free VVill doth not consist in Indifferency, seeing that we do nothing so voluntarily and freely, as we do those things to which we are determined by an ur∣gent Cause. As we see it happens to us when we are egg'd on by Fear; for though the Object then be displeasing to us, and that we would rather, if we might, choose the contrary; yet because of the impending Evil or Punishment we do greedily embrace it, and choose a lesser Evil before a greater. And therefore Lawyers are of opinion, that all Contracts are not made void by Fear, ex∣cept they be accompanied with Injustice as appears Instit. de Except. in Initio. Ex L. Mulier, §. finali quod metus causa. Ex L. ultima C. de iis quae vi, and innumerable other places.

VII. Of the two∣fold Igno∣rance Vin∣cible and Invincible. As concerning Ignorance, we shall the better be able to determine, how it may be said to hinder the use of our Free VVill, by supposing a twofold Ignorance, Vincible and Invincible. Vincible Ig∣norance is that, which by the use of moral and due Diligence may easily be overcome. Now a due Diligence is that which ariseth from Vertue, or the Love of Reason, and not from any other ground or motive. As by Example, a Merchant having an usual Contract or Bargain offer'd him, doth not examin it, only seeing that he is like to gain by it, embraceth it, without any more ado, or concerning himself any further about it: and forasmuch as he hath not examined it, he doth not know it to be unjust. Now this Ignorance of the Merchant in Vincible, and doth not consist with Vertue; for if he had loved Reason above all things, he would have diligently examined the said Contract, and having found it to be offensive to Reason, he ought never to have consented to it, how gainful soever it might appear to be other∣wise. But Invincible Ignorance is when a man cannot know that he is ignorant of, in the circum∣stances

wherein he is for that time. As for Exam∣ple, suppose we that SEJUS hath writ to his Friend CAJUS to assist him in such a Business, and that the Letter chance to miscarry, and never come to his Hands; in this case CAJUS will be under an Invincible Ignorance, tho' he hath used no diligence to the removing of it.

VIII. How or in what case Ignorance doth excuse a Trans∣gressor. Ignorance, with respect to a Free Act is found to be threefold. 1. Antecedent, which is before any consent of the VVill, and this without doubt is invincible, neither can any blame be imputed to it: As if a man that is a Hunting should kill a Man, taking him to be a Beast; because 'tis sup∣posed that he never intended any such thing. The other is Concomitant, which exists together with the Act, and doth accompany it, insomuch that it is the Principle of that Action; and the Action would have follow'd, tho' the said Con∣comitant Ignorance had not been: As if a man supposing himself to kill a Beast, should ignorantly kill his Rival, whom he hates from his Heart; and whom, if that Ignorance had not been, he would have kill'd notwithstanding. The Third sort of Ignorance, is Consequent; so called, because it follows the Consent of the Will, and therefore Voluntary, and therfore is somewhat of the same Nature as Invincible Ignorance: As when a man forbears going to Church, because by Neglect he never minds or enquires about the Time when he is to go. From these things thus briefly stated, it is apparent, that it is only Invincible Antecedent Ignorance that can make an Action Involuntary, since whatsoever follows from it was altogether unknown. For nothing is desir'd of Man, which is not first known by him: For the Understanding is like a Servant, that carries a Torch before his Mistress, the Will.

IX. Ignorance of the Law of Nature cannot be Invincible. But here we are to observe, that there can be no Invincible Ignorance of the Law of Nature, which by Natural Instinct is known to all; and therefore whosoever he be that transgresseth the same, can never be blameless. Whence is that Common Saying of the Philosophers, Ignorance of the Law excuseth no man: But that the Ignorance of Po∣sitive Law, whether Human, Ecclesiastical, or Divine, may render an Action Involuntary.

X. The Elicit Acts of the Will cannot be forced. It remains next to be explained, whether there can be any Force or Violence that is capable of making the Actions of our Will Involuntary. To the better solving whereof, we are to suppose that Human Actions are twofold, Elicit and Imperate: Those are called Elicit Actions, which are imme∣diately produced by the Mind, as from their Prin∣ciple; such as are the Acts of Nilling and Willing. Others are Imperate, which proceed from another Faculty than the Will, tho' not without the Com∣mand of the Will, as sensible Perceptions, the motions of the outward Members. As to the first of these, it is evident that the Will cannot suffer any Violence, or that the Elicit Acts of the Will should be forced; for seeing that they proceed from the Will, as from their Active Cause, they cannot be subject to any Violence that proceeds from an Outward Principle, as ARISTOTLE saith, which can add no Force to the Action, since it is evident that the Will is an Active Principle, and adds or contributes to its own Acts.

XI. But Impe∣rate Acts may. But as for the Imperate Acts of the VVill, they may be said to be Involuntary; for tho' they de∣pend on the Command of the VVill, and follow its Inclination, yet the Faculties, especially the outward Members, may be so hindred by the Force of an External Agent, that they cannot execute the Command of the VVill; and accordingly we frequently find some motions produc'd in our Bodies, contrary to our VVills.

CHAP. XXI. Of Human Acts, and of the Goodness and Pravity of them.

I. What an Human Action pro∣perly is, and what Principles concur to it. BY the Name of Human Act, every Action is not be understood that proceeds from Man, but that alone which is the effect of a Free Prin∣ciple of Acting, or which is caused by the Under∣standing and VVill. So that that is only to be accounted as an Human Action, whereof a Man is the Absolute Lord or Disposer, or which he hath in his free Power.

II. Two things are requir'd to a Hu∣man Action. There be 2 Principles that concur to every Hu∣man Action, viz. Understanding and VVill. The Understanding that shews the Way, and, as it were, carries a Light before his Mistress. For tho' the Will be an Elective Faculty, by which the Mind freely determines it self to doing, or not doing; yet it is first required, that the Under∣standing do before represent or propose the thing to her. For as nothing in general can be willed, except it be known; so nothing can be freely Will'd, except it be fore-known by the Under∣standing. Wherefore every Errour that befalls our Actions, is chiefly caused from the wrong Per∣ception of the Intellect: For if she never did ex∣hibit ought to the Mind, but what was clear and evident, neither would the VVill ever mistake in her Choice.

III. Of the Twofold Goodness that is found in Human Actions. In every Human Action a twofold Goodness may be observed; the one Natural, which some call Entitative, which is in all things, inasmuch as they are partakers of Nature and Entity. The other Moral, which is nothing else but the Con∣formity of a Human Action, with Right Reason. As on the contrary, the Moral Evil or Pravity of an Action, is its deformity or swerving from Right Reason, that is, when it wants any Perfe∣ction, which according to Right Reason it ought to have. By Right Reason, I understand here a true Judgment of every thing, free from the Paint or Fucus of any Opinions, whereby the Laws of GOD and Nature are understood, and every thing rightly and prudently discerned, ac∣cording to the Prescript of the Law. Whence it appears, that many Actions which agree with regard to Nature, do extreamly differ with respect to Manners. As for Example, To kill a man, when it is done of a Mans own Will and Autho∣rity, is not distinguishable from that Action, whereby a man is put to Death by Publick Autho∣rity; but they vastly differ in a Moral respect, seeing it is lawful to Kill a man by Publick Autho∣rity, because of the Justice which is exercised in that act, whereby it comes under the Notion of Good; whereas to Kill a man by the impulse and instigation of ones own Will, is unjust and pro∣hibited by the Law of GOD▪

IV. What makes any Action Morally Good. An Action therefore is accounted Morally Good, if it respect or have an Eye to Good, desired ac∣cording to Right Reason. For Human Actions derive their Goodness from their Object, when it is supposed to be such as Right Reason prescribes and allows of: Forasmuch as an Action is not ac∣counted Good, because the Understanding knows it, and the Will rightly desires it; but rather be∣cause the Object of it is good and honest, therefore the Will that is carried towards it is Right. Where∣fore Right Manners do not make the Object Good and Honest; but on the contrary, a Good Object and agreeable to Reason, makes good Manners, and consequently Human Actions derive the formality of their Goodness or Pravity from it. And the same is to be said of Evil Actions, which owe their Evil to a shameful and dishonest Object; and accordingly the more shameful the Object, the more wicked is the Action. And forasmuch as all Objects are not Equal, but some excel others in Pravity, so neither can it be said that all Sins are Equal, it being certain that some far exceed others in Evil.

V. The Good∣ness or Pravity of Actions depends on certain Circum∣stances. Neither doth the Good or Evil of Human Actions, solely depend upon the Object, but also on certain Circumstances; which are so called, because they always accompany, and as it were, guard and encompass our Actions, especially those that are outward, and are, as it were, so many Accidents observable in them. Of these there are commonly reckon'd up Seven, which are contained in these Verses.

Who, what, where, by what means; why, how and when, These make or Good or Bad all Acts of Men.

VI. Who. Who, denotes the Person and Quality of the Agent; as whether, he who hath committed a Rape be a King or a Subject, a Citizen or a Stranger, a single or a married Man.

VII. What. What, intimates the Quality of the Object, about which the Action is conversant, whether the party on whom the Rape hath been committed, be a Virgin dedicated to GOD, or one at her own dispose.

VIII. Where. Where, shews the place where the Wickedness hath been committed, whether in the Church or in a Profane place.

IX. By what means. By what means, points us to the Instruments or Companions a Man hath made use of in the com∣mitting of this Wickedness. As, whether he struck with a Sword, or with a Stick; whether he had any to assist him, and whether they were Clergy-men or Laicks.

X. Why. Why, makes out the Intention of the Agent; as whether a Man set upon another meerly for gain, or to revenge an Injury.

XI. How. How, holds forth the manner of the Action; as whether a Man did hurt or wound another, be∣ing provoked by Wrath, or in ••his right Wits; whether he assaulted him basely and treacherously or fairly and openly.

XII. When. When, considers the Time when the Action was done, whether in the Night or in the Day time.

XIII. Circum∣stances do often change the very kind of the Action. Which Circumstances are therefore said to con∣cur to Human Actions, forasmuch as some of them do very signally increase the goodness or pravity of them, yea, and sometimes quite change the kind of them. As for Example, when that which is stolen is something dedicated to GOD, or his Worship; this is not simply Theft, but Sacriledge, which differs in kind from Theft, as being suppos'd forbid by a Special Precept. And in such a case as this they lose the Nature of Circumstances, and take upon them the Nature of an Object, whence, as we said before, Human Actions derive their Pravity, and becomes worthy of Punishment.

XIV. Of the Duties and Offices as well of Man in common, as of a good Chri∣stian in particular. Tho' the Duties of a Man and Citizen might seem to require a particular Place wherein to be treated of and so to constitute the Eleventh Part of this Institution; yet forasmuch as they belong to Human Actions, and presuppose Free-will, I have thought fit to subjoyn them here; and keep∣ing my self within the Number of these Ten Parts, to Treat of them by way of Conclusion. For this Work might well seem to be deficient, if after having explained the Nature of Vertue, (which according to the common Division we have distinguish'd into 4 Heads) and having en∣enquir'd into the Nature of Human Actions, we should omit the Offices and Duties of Men, and not amply and distinctly Treat of these, which are the Consequents of his Liberty. Wherefore we shall now set down, what are the Duties of Man in General, and afterwards proceed to the Offices of a Good Citizen, and show what either of them ought to embrace as Good and Vertuous, and to reject as Shameful and Wicked, according to the Prescript of Nature; which I shall endeavour to perform with all the Brevity possible, and as far as the Bounds of this Institution will per∣mit.

CHAP. XXII. Of the Rule of Human Actions.

I. What things are to be fore∣known in this mat∣ter. SInce to the end a Man may act aright, it is necessary that he be Conscious of his Actions, or, which is the same, that he assent to his own Reason in the Chusing or Avoiding what is pro∣pounded to him; it will be of use to us to know what Conscience is, and by what Denominations it goes: As likewise what Obligation is, to whom it agrees; and how it comes to pass, that Mankind is bound to observe some Institutions.

II. What Con∣science is. By the Word CONSCIENCE we here understand, that Testification or Witnessing to Good or Evil, which every one experienceth in his own Mind: Or, as some describe it, it is that Act of the Intellect whereby a Man judgeth, that a thing ought, or ought not to be done. And this Act or Conscience, is denoted by several Names, according to the Motives or Reasons, whereby it is egg'd on.

III. A Right Conscience. It is called Right, when the Human Under∣standing is so well informed of things that are to be done or omitted, that it can give clear and distinct Reasons of its Perceptions, and such as cannot be doubted of or call'd in Question. Or, to express the same in fewer Words, which dictates that to be Good, which is Good; and that to be Evil, which is really so. And such a Conscience as this, is but rarely found amongst men, there being but very few that know the Causes of things, and that are so happy as to be able to reduce them to their Principles.

IV. A Probable Conscience. We call that a Probable Conscience, when tho' we do truly assent to the thing offer'd to us, and do think that the same ought to be embraced or declined; yet we are not able to make out our Judgment by Reasons, but only derive the same either from the Authority of our Superiours, or received Custom, or the common tenour or course of a Civil Life.

V. A Doubtful Conscience. A Conscience is said to be Doubtful, when it hangs, as it were, in equal poize or wavering, and doth not know which part to assent to: Which more especially is found in singular Cases; where Reasons on both sides present themselves, and we cannot discern which are to be preferr'd. Now in such a case as this, we do well to suspend our Judgment without determining any thing till the Darkness of our Mind be dispell'd, and that it clearly appear to us, what is consonant to the Law before us, and what is contrary to it.

VI. An Erro∣neous Con∣science. Lastly, We call that an Erroneous Conscience, when our Understanding embraceth Evil, instead of Good, or declines Good instead of Evil. And this either through Vincible or Invincible Errour. Vincible Errour is that which we may avoid by a diligent and careful Examination of the Case. Invincible, is that, which we cannot avoid by any care or diligence that it is possible for us to take. But this last Ignorance happens only in particular Affairs, which depending of many Circumstances, it frequently comes to pass, that we are deceived about them, or about the Object it self, and so fall into Errour against our Wills.

VII. What Ob∣ligation is. By the word Obligation, we are to understand nothing else, but that Tye of the Law, whereby we are of necessity compell'd to do something. For by it we do, as it were, gird up our Free-will, and tho' we very well know our selves to be free, and that we can chuse the contrary to what is propounded to us: Yet there is a kind of Co∣active Power that sticks to our Minds, by means of the Obligation, which doth not suffer us to incline to it, and puts us in mind, that we shall sorely repent of it afterwards, in case we do not act according to the Prescript of the Law.

VIII. Man alone, of all other Animals, is capable of Obliga∣tion. Amongst all Animals, Man only can be the Subject of Obligation: For Beasts being devoid of Reason, and destitute of the Faculties of the Will, can exert no free Actions; and therefore it would be in vain, to prescribe any Form to their Actions, seeing they can neither understand it, nor adjust their Actions by it. Man only therefore is capable of Obligation, and of receiving a Rule prescrib'd by his Superiour to Live by. I say, by his Supe∣riour; for if a man were of such a Condition, as to be wholly at his own dispose, without being obnoxious to the Command of any, he could not be obliged to the performing of any thing by any Law; and if in that state he should follow the dictates of Reason, and abstain from some things; this would be imputable rather to his most Free-will, than to any Obligation lying upon him.

IX. How a Superiour is to oblige those that are under his Com∣mand. Now to the end that this Obligation may be the more firmly imprest upon the Mind of man, besides the Authority of the Superiour, it is sometimes fitting that Just Causes should be pro∣duced by him, which induce him to put this Curb or Restraint upon the Liberty of his Subject. For he that only shews his Power, and will always have his Will to stand instead of Reason, may indeed strike Fear into a Man, and make him rather chuse to obey him, than to expose himself to danger: But when once this Fear is gone, and that the Superiour ceaseth to be frightful to him, he will soon return to his own Inclinations, and follow the Motions of his own Will, rather than those of another. But when the Reasons are dis∣cover'd, why he thinks fit to circumscribe the Liberty of his Subject; and that he makes it out, that it is his Interest that such Laws should be Enacted; yea, that many Advantages will thereby accrue to him, he will readily submit himself to them, and shew himself ready to obey his Princes Commands.

X. The Rule of Human Actions. The Rule therefore which every man is to follow in his Actions, is the Law or Decree, whereby the Sovereign, in whom the Publick Power is lodg'd, binds up his Subjects, to order and regulate their Actions, according to his Pre∣script. Now that such a Law may be able to compel men, and exert its Force upon their Minds, it is necessary that the Legislator and his Laws should be known to them. For how will any one be able to pay Obedience to them, if they have no certain Knowledge, neither of the Person to whom they are to render it, nor to what they are obliged? True it is, that the Laws of Nature are engraven on the Hearts of all men, and are so many Precepts that are common to all Na∣ture, and that no Man in his Right Understanding can be ignorant of the Author of them: But Civil Laws are not alike Notorious, as depending upon the Free-will of Superiours, as being such to which only some peculiar People are obliged; and therefore in order to their being of Force, they must be promulged and made known to all their Subjects. Which Promulgation is performed, either by the Voice of the Legislator himself, or by some of his Deputies, whose Authority is un∣questionable; or any other way, according to the various Customs of different Provinces and King∣doms.

XI. There are two things in every Law. Every Law, if it be perfect, contains 2 Parts: The one which determines what is to be done or omitted; the other, which declares the Punishment to be inflicted upon those that neglect to perform what is prescribed, or commit what is forbid. For seeing that Human Nature is prone to Evil, and is apt to be carried with more vehemence to things that are forbid, it would be to little purpose for any man to declare what is to be done, if there were no Punishment to follow the Contemner of the said Command: And so in like manner, it would be altogether to no purpose to threaten any Punish∣ment, if there were not cause specified before, for which the said Punishment is to be in∣flicted.

XII. Laws are to be En∣acted for the Publick Good. Notwithstanding that Laws seem to restrain the Liberty of the Subject, yet they are so to be ordered, as that whatsoever is prescribed, may ap∣pear to be profitable and advantagious to the Pub∣lick Good. For it would seem unjust to oblige Subjects to the Observance of any thing that is not advantageous thereunto. Forasmuch as Laws are like Remedies, which ought always to be con∣ducive to the good State of the Body, because they are appointed for that end: And in like manner, there ought to be nothing in the Laws, which doth

not contribute to the good of the Community, be∣cause it is for that Reason that they were En∣acted.

XIII. The Legis∣lator may dispense with the observance of the Law. Tho' the Law be suppos'd a Common Precept, and a common Contract or Agreement (as the Lawyers express it) of the Commonwealth, ac∣cording to the Prescript whereof those that live in the Commonwealth are to regulate themselves; yet some Persons may be peculiarly exempted from the observance of it; and this is exprest by the word Dispensing. The Power whereof belongs only to the Legislator, who as he hath the Power of En∣acting Laws; so he only hath the Power of Abro∣gating or Dispensing with them, that is, delivering any one from the obligation of them. But above all things, it is the Duty of the Sovereign never ordinarily, or without urgent Cause to free any of his Subjects from the obligation of the Law; to avoid the Envy and Indignation this would be apt to cause amongst their Fellow Citi∣zens.

XIV. The Diffe∣rence of Actions. From what hath been said, may be gather'd, that Human Actions, as they have a relation to the Prescript of Laws, do take to them several Qua∣lities and Denominations. For those which the Laws pass by, without determining any thing concerning them, are called Permitted or Lawful, as long as they are not contrary to the Law of Nature, or the Reason that is in man. The Actions that are conform to the Laws, and follow the Rules prescribed by it, are called Good; and those Evil, which are contrary to it.

XV. When A∣ctions are said to be Good. Now to the Goodness of an Action, it is requisit not only that it agree with the Law in some part, but that it be in all things conform to it: Whereas it is sufficient to the Pravity of an Action, if it be deficient in some one part only, and does not in all respect, agree with the Law.

XVI. The Divine and Human Law. The Law, as it is a Regulation of Reason, shewing Man what he ought to do, and what not is twofold, Divine and Human. That is called the Divine Law, which is instituted immediately by GOD himself. And therefore ARISTOTLE saith, in his Third Book of Politicks, He who com∣mands the Law to bear Rule, commands that GOD should bear Rule. Human Law is that which is Enacted by men, and is different according to the different Form of the Government Politick. Of which I have treated more at large in the Chapter of the Law of Nature.

CHAP. XXIII. Of the Duty of Man towards GOD.

I. Of the three gene∣ral Duties, or Offices of Man. THe Action, which according to the Nature of the Obligation that lies upon us, we are to regulate according to the Praescript of the Laws, is divided into 3 Chief Parts, according to the several Object•• it respects. The first whereof shews, how according to the sole Guidance of Nature, we are to carry our selves towards GOD; the other, how we are to demean our selves with regard to our selves; the last, how we are to comport our selves towards other men. For the whole Obligation of Man is compriz'd in these 3 Duties; so that he may be said to have per∣formed whatsoever appertains to him, if he car∣ries himself Pi••usly towards GOD, Prudently to∣wards Himself, and Equally towards his Neigh∣bour. Wherefore seeing that the Duties we owe to GOD, do precede the other 2, we shall first speak of them, and afterwards proceed to the other.

II. What is Man's Duty to∣wards GOD. The Laws wereby Man is obliged towards GOD, may be reduced to 2 Heads: First, That he have right Thoughts concerning GOD, and a a true Idea of his Nature and Perfections. In the next place, that he resign and conform his own Will to the Divine; and that he look upon it as the greatest of Crimes, to deviate in the least from his Good Pleasure. And from these two parts of Man's Duty towards GOD, many Propo∣sitions, both Theoretical and Practical, may be de∣duced, whereon Natural Religion is founded, and by which, according to the Etymology of the word, Religion, a man is ty'd and obliged.

III. The First thing we are to hold concerning GOD. The First thing we are to hold concerning GOD is, that he Exists; that is, that he hath an Actual Existence, and is the Principle of all other things. This being no more, but what is demonstrated to us by the Amplitude and vast Extent of the Universe, the unconceivable Va∣riety of it, and the Beauty and Harmony of its Parts; since none of all these could have the constant Continuance and Regularity they are found in, except the World were at the Command of a most Wise Governour, and did persevere by an immutable Law. By this Contemplation alone of the World, the Philosophers of old attain'd to th Knowledge of GOD, as being fully convinc'd, that such an Exquisit and most absolute Work, could not proceed from less than an Omnipotent and most Perfect Being. If some Modern men, that aspire to that Name, seem to be of another Opinion, it is to be attributed to their Ignorance. For as a confus'd Perception of things, and Super∣ficial Knowledge incline men to Atheism; so a clear and profound Knowledge of things, raiseth the Mind to the Veneration of GOD, and not only excites it, but even strongly compels it thereto. 'Tis the Fool only that saith in his Heart, there is no GOD. For whole Mankind, from the very Beginning, ever was in perpetual possession of this Truth, seeing there was never any Nation, (as TULLY expresseth it) so Bar∣barous or Savage, that did not own a GOD, tho' it may be they were not able to determine what kind of Being he must be. And accordingly JUSTINIAN, 2 F. de Just. & Jur. reckons Religion towards GOD, amongst the Laws of Nature, and the Right of Nations; forasmuch as all Nations agree in a general Worship of GOD, and, as it were, by the Attraction of this com∣mon Principle, are united and reconciled.

IV. The Second thing is, that GOD is the Creatour of the World. The Second is, That GOD is the Creatour of the World, and that nothing is to be found in it, whereof he is not the Author. For since this glorious Fabrick of the Universe could not be its own Cause, what Contrivance, what En∣gins, what Leavers, what Servants could be em∣ploy'd in the Production of it, but the Omnipo∣tence of GOD himself? Hence appears the Ridi∣culous and stupid folly of the EPICUREANS, who suppose that so many Miracles were the product, not of the Divine Reason, but of the fortuitous concourse of Atoms. For how could these Atoms, in those immense Spaces, meet in such

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Book. 1. Part. 10. Chap. 23.

G. Freman. Inv.

I. Kip Sculp

To the Right Worshipfull S^r. James Edwards of the Citty of Yorke Baronet

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome

a manner, and be adapted together, as to compose Animals and Man, whereas we see they cannot be produced without the mediation of Seed? What Cause was there to dispose them rather to the forming of this Body, than another? What was there to determine them to the constituting of Bones, Flesh, Marrow, Veins, Arteries, Nerves, Humours, Tendons, &c.? We must therefore ac∣knowledge a Special Principle, by whose Power this World was framed, and all the parts of it digested in the comly Order in which we see them.

V. Thirdly, That He is the Preserver of the World. The Third thing we are to hold concerning GOD, is, that he is the Governour and Preserver of the Universe. As is evident from the admirable Order and Agreement of the Parts of it, which could not continue so long invariable, if they were not by some Supream Cause preserved in the same Condition. For daily Experience teacheth us, that whatsoever is made up of different Things, and are endued with different Powers, do stand in need of an Upholder, and will easily run into Confusion, except they be supported by an Ex∣ternal Agent, and their Parts kept in their due Stations. And therefore the Ancients were of Opinion, that GOD had somewhat of the same place in the World, as a Coach-man in a Coach, the Singing-Master in a Choir, the Steers-man in a Ship, the Father in a Family, and a King in his Kingdom. And that consequently, those who deny that GOD takes care of this World, and that all things therein are managed by his Conduct, are as Criminal Delinquents against his Divine Majesty, as they who say, there is no GOD at all.

VI. And, that he hath a Special care of Man∣kind. We are likewise to consider, that GOD not only Governs the whole World; but that he also Exerciseth a more Special Conduct towards Man∣kind, and that he is the Immutable Cause of all the Actions which depend on the Free-will of Man. For since it cannot be demonstrated, that he doth Exist, except that he be considered as a most Perfect Being; and that he could not be so, if there were any thing in the VVorld that did not proceed from him; consequently we can prove from Na∣tural Philosophy alone, that not the least Thought can enter into the Soul of Man, without the Will of GOD, and except GOD had Will'd it should from all Eternity.

VII. Fourthly, That he is most highly Perfect. The Fourth thing we are to be persuaded con∣cerning GOD, is, that he is Sovereignly Perfect, and that no Attribute belongs to him that implies the least defect. For seeing that he is Infinite, he must of necessity include all those Perfections which the Mind of Man is capable of Conceiv∣ing; and consequently we must own him to be So∣vereignly Good and VVise, Eternal, Omnipotent, Im∣mense, and so Perfect, that it is equally impossible to addany thing to Him, or take any thing from Him. But forasmuch as the Divine Perfections cannot be comprehended by any Human Understanding, in order to the Expressing of them, we shall make use of such Terms, as shall more magnificently un∣fold his Supream Excellence, and impress upon us a greater Veneration. For when we hear that GOD is One, Immense, Incorporeal, Immortal, Infinite, Incomprehensible, &c. we seem to launch into a Boundless Ocean of Perfections, and are forc'd to confess, that the Amplitude of such an Essence can by no means be reached by our Intellect.

VIII. Nothing must be attributed to GOD, that in∣cludes ei∣ther De∣pendance or Imperfe∣ction. And accordingly they Sin against the Law of Nature, who say, that GOD sees things, before ever he did determine himself to Will them; that he consults the Order of his Acting, before he Acts; that his VVill indeed is, that there should be no Monsters; but that the simplicity of the Laws of Motion doth necessitate him to suffer them; and other such like, which import Depen∣dance and Imperfection in GOD.

IX. We must remove from GOD every Im∣perfection. Wherefore we are to remove from Him what∣soever implies any Limitation or Defect, and all those Affections which imply or suppose the want or absence of any Good. And if we find, that Passions are sometimes attributed to GOD, as when the Scripture speaks of his Favour and Munificence towards those that are Good, and his Vengeance against the VVicked; we are to remember that the Scripture in these Expressions, accommodates its self to the Capacity of our Human Understanding. In like manner we find, that Holy VVrit attributes to GOD, VVrath, Jealousy, Indignation, &c. by a Metaphorical way of Expression accommodated to our Weakness, and rather designing to represent to us the Effect of that Affection, than the Affection it self.

X. Such a•• Figure, Motion, Parts, Place, &c. In like manner, those also Sin against the Law of Nature, who attribute to GOD any Figure; because every Figure is determined and bounded: Those who say, that GOD is composed of Parts, or that he is a VVhole; because all these ways of Speaking import Attributes▪ that belong to Finite things; and those also who say, that GOD is in a Place, because nothing can be in a Place, but must have its Greatness or Bulk bounded on every side. Those also Sin against the same Law, who assert, That GOD Moves himself, or that he Rests, be∣cause both these suppose the being in a Place, which is inconsistent with GOD.

XI. GOD is to be Honoured by Man. Neither is it enough for Man to know GOD, but he must also worship and celebrate him. For the Practical Propositions whereof Natural Reli∣gion doth consist, are conversant about the VVorship that is due to GOD, which is partly in the Mind of Man, and partly without it; that is, either Inward or Outward. By the Inward VVorship, we understand the Honour that is to be given to GOD, in consideration of his Power, in Conjunction with Goodness. For Veneration, as was said before, is an Inclination of the Soul, not only to have high Thoughts of GOD, whom it worships; but also to submit and resign it self to him, with a kind of Awful Fear, to obtain his Favour. And there∣fore no Man Honours GOD more, or serves him with a purer VVorship, than he, who by the Holi∣ness and Innocence of his Life endeavours to become like him, and would rather dye a thousand Deaths, than to suffer that Holy Image of GOD, which he discerns and owns within himself, to be defiled by any Crimes, or stained with any the least Vice or Immorality. And from the Consideration of his Glorious Majesty, he is stirr'd up to desire him, as his Author or Maker; to love and call upon him, as his Father; to honour him, as his King; and ••o fear and reverence him, as his Lord.

XII. After what manner GOD is to be beloved by us. In order to the easie acquiring of this Habit of Loving of GOD, and the having a most profound Fear and Reverence for him; we must frequently reflect, that GOD commands us nothing, but what is for our Profit or Advantage, and that his Power

and Goodness are so Great, that He hath Created an infinite Number of Beings, which serve for our Preservation; which Consideration will fill us with so much Admiration, Respect and Gratitude for our Great GOD, that knowing him to be the Source of all True Good, we only and above all things shall desire to be united to him with our VVills, and to love him in the most perfect manner pos∣sible.

XIII. With Out∣ward Worship. Neither are we only to render unto GOD the Inward worship of our Hearts; but we must also give unto him that which is Outward; which we then do, when in Thankful Remembrance of his Benefits, we render Thanks unto him, and ac∣knowledge him to be our Beneficent Father, GOD and LORD; and by our Hearts or Eyes also lifted up unto Heaven, do admire his Power and praise his most Holy Majesty. When in a deep sense of our own Infirmities, we pray unto him, implore his Assistance, and humbly beseech him to help and succour our Infirmities; and that he would be pleased to bestow upon us those things he knows to be good for us, and to turn away from us all things that are hurtful. Whilst we abandon and resign our selves wholly to his VVill, and in all things complying with the same, and embracing whatsoever happens to us, as that which from all Eternity was Decreed concerning us. Wherefore let our Modern Upstarts take heed, that they do not too curiously search into the Nature, Decrees and Government of GOD: But rather entirely persuade themselves, that he is most intimately acquainted with what is most Expedient for us; and that it is impossible, but that he who Loves all things, Does all things, Perfects all things, and Contains all things, should not always do the best of all in all Cases whatsoever.

XIV. And in Publick places. Neither is it sufficient for us, to offer Innocent and Holy Hearts to GOD, and to pray unto him in the secret Retreats thereof; but it is moreover required, that we pay him our Devotions openly, and in Publick places. For who is there that be∣lieves GOD, and can be asham'd to pray unto him, to praise him, and to offer Himself, and all his Powers and Faculties, for a whole Burn••-Offering unto him? Fear or Shame in this case, is a mark of Degenerate Souls; neither can he be said truly to worship GOD, who is asham'd to render him the Veneration that is due to him, and openly to pro∣fess, what in the most inmost Recess of his Heart he owns and adores. And on the contrary, when in the Churches and Publick places of worship, we render him the Glory that is due to his Divine Majesty▪ testifie our Devotion, and are Zealous for his Honour; we by our Presence and Examples do also incite others to exhibit the like Honour and Reverence to him.

CHAP. XXIV. Of the Duties of Man towards himself.

I. The First Duty is, That he be a good Member of the Society. MAN being most dear unto himself, and having his Eyes fix'd upon his own Good and Welfare, as the Center from whence all his Operations flow, and to which they return: It seems altogether superfluous to prescribe Laws unto him, to take care of himself, procure his own good, and advance his own interest. But forasmuch as man was not born for himself only, but made by GOD for the good of Human Society, he ought so to behave himself as to be a fit Member of the Body Politick, and that as far as his state and condition permits, he be of use and service to the same. For no body is exempt from this Law; for how dull and stupid soever a man may be, and unfit for business, yet he makes himself obnoxious to the Laws, when he is not serviceable to the Community by some Art, Employment or other∣wise. Every one must take care therefore that he be furnish'd with Vertue, Good Manners, and a sense of what is Good and Right: for as the Soul excells the Body in Dignity, and commands the whole man; so great care is to be taken in the improvement of it, to the end the Body may be obedient to its conduct, and perform its motions according to the Rules of Reason: wherefore eve∣ry one is bound according to his fortune and na∣tural gifts, to betake himself to some Profession, Art or Science, and choose to himself such a way of living, that he may not for the future, be bur∣thensome to himself or others, or a useless member of the Society he belongs to.

II. How our Body is to be Go∣verned. And as we are to take care to furnish our Minds with Arts and Learning, so we are to bind our Body to its good Behaviour, lest being pamper'd it become unruly, and prove refractory to its Lord and Master the Soul. Accordingly we must take heed to feed it with necessary food on∣ly, and exercise it with labour, lest by intempe∣rance in eating or drinking it run headlong into filthy Lust; and being dull'd and stupified by Idleness and inactivity, it become a clog and dun∣geon to the Mind. And forasmuch as the Passi∣ons do arise from the conjunction of the Soul and Body, and derive their force and strength from that unequal Society, all diligence must be used for the restraining and moderating the same, and timely quelling their first motions. For the Passions are like Souldiers that attack a place, who except they be beaten off at their first coming on, easi∣ly make themselves Masters of the Place, and take Prisoners, or cut down all they find in it.

III. It is not lawful for a Man to kill him∣self. Yet it is not lawful for any man to lay violent hands upon himself, to be delivered from the vio∣lence of his Passions, or from those Evils that are incident to the Body. For he sins against Nature, who being impatient of the Evils he groans un∣der, cuts off the Thread of his Life, and because he cannot live as he would, will not live at all. Man must remember that he is appointed by God to be, as it were, the Guardian of his own Life, not the Executioner or Tormentor of it; to whom he proves faithless, when-ever he treache••ou••ly surrenders himself to the Calamity that assaults him, which he ought couragiously to resist and overcome; or else at the apprehension of shame or danger, or being wearied out with pain or trouble, puts an end to his Life. For by this Despair, not only GOD is offended by the destruction of his Workmanship, but the Commonwealth suffers also by the loss of one of her Members. And there∣fore it is that the Laws take up Arms against these their profest Enemies, and order them to be cast out without Burial, forbid any Pious Remem∣brance to be made of them; and if they fail'd in their design of dispatching themselves, brand them

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Book. 1. Part. 10. Chap. ••

Lens. Inv.

I. Kip S

To the Worship∣full Thomas Raulins of Kilreeg in Hereford shire Esq^r.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

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Book. 1▪ Part. 10. Chap. 25

L•••••• Inv.

I. Kip

To the Right Worship∣full S^r. Gilbert Gerard Cossine of Brafferton hall in the North Rideing of Yorkeshire Baronet Grandson of the Right Revernd Father in God John Cossine late Lord Bishop of Durham.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome

with a mark of perpetual Infamy. VALERIUS MAXIMUS tells us, that it was a Custom amongst the Athenians to make those who were sentenced to death to drink Poison, which after∣wards was for good reason abrogated, for that it seems to be an unbecoming and unnatural thing, that a man, who above all things loves himself, should be made to hasten his own death, and contrary to the natural Law of self-preservation, should prove his own Executioner. We are to wait therefore till he who hath placed us in the Post where we are, do call us away, and dismiss us from the Theatre of the World.

IV. A man is bound to resist him that sets upon him. Man therefore being bound to preserve himself, it follows that he ought to defend himself from the Assaults of an Aggressor, and to repel his force by force, if there be no other way left for him to avoid it, or to f••ee from the danger. For tho' by killing of our Enemy, the Commonwealth suffers loss, and the same as if he who defends him∣self were killed; and that every man is bound to procure the common Good, Safety and Prosperity of the Commonwealth, and of every one of the Members thereof; yet this is only supposing that his person be not endanger'd thereby. For no Law can oblige us to betray our own safety, and conspire our own Ruin, to save a wicked person. Yea, every one hath a natural and inborn right, to stave off any violence done unto him, with all his might. For if it were otherwise, who could be said to be the Possessor of any thing he had, if it were lawful for Robbers to deprive him thereof, without his daring to oppose them, and to rescue his goods out of their hands? For what is it else to prohibit a mans defending of himself and his own Goods, but to drive Justice out of the World, and to bestow upon Thieves and Robbers that which is the property of other men?

V. That we ought to spare even the Life of our Enemy Yet must not we in this just defence of our selves endeavour to take away the Life of our Enemy, if there be any other way for us to avoid his fury; as for Example, by hindring his access to us, by getting into a safe place, or by exhorting our Enemy to desist from his intended Cruelty.

VI. Especially if he re∣pents and cries Par∣don. And if it happen that the Aggressor do repent of the Injury he hath done us, begs our Pardon, and promiseth to make amends for the hurt he hath given us; in this case, he that is affronted or set upon, ought to be reconciled to him, and leave all thoughts of Revenge. For his Repen∣tance shews him to be changed, and that he is no longer an Enemy: And the very Law of Nature commands us to forgive the past faults of those who repent that ever they have affronted or of∣fended us, and who ask Pardon for it. Except it should be made manifest that this Repentance was only the effect of force, and that the Offender did not desire Pardon, and to be reconciled, but only be∣cause his Arms or his strength fail'd him: For in this case, we ought to lay hold of him, lest re∣covering his strength he should set upon us un∣awares.

VII. How he is to behave himself who lives under a Magi∣gistrate. He who is obnoxious to the Laws, may law∣fully be made an Example, whensoever time or place will permit a man to have recourse to his Superior, for his safeguard and protection against the violence and assaults of his Enemy. Hence it is that Thieves and Robbers are lawfully kill'd, ne∣cessity putting Arms in our Hands to defend our selves, and what belongs to us. But where we can have recourse to the Magistrate, we are to bring them before him, that offer us any vio∣lence or injury; it being only for want of this, that we may make use of the Right which the Law of Nature gives us, and by repelling force with force, take away the Life of the Aggressor.

VIII. Thieves may be lawfully killed. As we may kill a violent Aggressor, so likewise do the Laws of Nature permit us to kill a Thief, that endeavours to rob us of our Goods. For these external things are the means whereby our Lives are maintained, and in the preservation whereof our State and Honour depends. Hence Lawyers call these outward Good things the Life and Blood of Men, which may be defended at the hazard of another mans Life, as well as Life it self. And tho' in Cities sometimes the thing stolen may be recovered by the help of the Magistrate, yet no man is bound to suffer the taking away of his Goods, because he may probably afterwards reco∣ver them; forasmuch as he hath not only a right to recover them when stolen from him, but also to preserve and keep them from the vio∣lence of others. And if this be so, that a man may defend his Goods at the peril of the Aggressor, I see no reason why a Woman, whose Chastity is attempted, may not kill the Ravisher; seeing a Vertuous Woman hath nothing that is dearer to her in this World, than her Honour and Chastity, and that no greater loss can happen to her, than to be by force deprived of the same.

CHAP. XXV. Of the Laws we are to observe with respect to other Men.

I. The Duty of Man to∣wards others con∣sists i•• two things. THE whole Duty of a Man is contained in behaving himself Reverently towards GOD, Prudently towards Himself, and Justly towards his Neighbour. The two foregoing parts of Mans Duty we have already spoken to, and now proceed to the last. The Duty therefore of a Man to∣wards others, First of all consists in this, that he observe an Equality, and do not prefer himself before others. Secondly, That he hurt no man. For the peculiar Law of Man, as he is a Rea∣sonable Creature, according to JUSTINIAN § Instit. de Just. & Jur. is reduced to these thre•• Precepts, To live Honestly, not to hurt another, and to give to every one his Right. Now he gives to every man his Right, that doth not prefer him∣self to any; but being mindful of his Human Con∣dition, embraces all with an equal Love in the like Circumstances. For tho' a man excel others in Ver∣tue, exceed them in bodily Strength, be above them in gifts and endowments of Mind, and do more abound with Goods of Fortune; yet is he for all this never a whit the less bound to observe the Laws of Nature, nor hath he therefore any more Right to hurt others, than they have to in∣jure him. For as Nature is benign and kind to all, and equally dispenseth to all the desire of Truth and Right; so likewise there ought to be an equal Charity maintain'd amongst men, and the same common Offices of Good-will one to another. For there is nothing more conducive to the preserving of a Sociable Life, than for men to do by others,

as they would have others do by them; and for them not to expect or require any thing from o∣thers, but what they would as willingly, that others should demand of them.

II. Equality is to be pre∣served a∣mongst all Men. In order to the putting of this Equality in pra∣ctise, it will be very conducive well to weigh and consider our Nature and Original, viz. that we were all formed out of the dust or mould of the Earth, and came all of us into the World after one and the same manner; and that being nourish'd by the same Aliments, we after some years arrive at Old Age, and at last all of us alike submit to Death.

III. We are to return one good turn for another. This Equality amongst men thus supposed, it follows, that if we desire the helping hand of others, and their assistance in any of our affairs, we must be every whit as ready to lend them ours, and to procure their good and advantage. For he would be unjust, that should make use of ano∣thers help for the promoting of his own Interest, and looking upon it as his due, should not be rea∣dy to do the same service to the party that had ob∣liged him by his assistance. Wherefore as they take most care for the good and advantage of the Society, who do not allow themselves any more than they would gladly allow to another: so that person ought to be lookt upon as an overturner of the Society, who affects a superiority, and ex∣pects honour or Service from others, and in the mean time disdains to return the same again to them. Hence by the Law of Nations this Per∣mutation or Exchange hath been introduced, whereby I willingly grant unto thee the thing thou dost demand of me, upon condition, that thou in like manner do grant unto me, another thing I ask of thee, having first made a tacit estimate of the value of both things with our selves.

IV. No Man hath Right to prefer himself be∣fore ano∣ther. Those are defective in the performance of this Duty, who, because of their Riches would be pre∣ferr'd before others; and despising the Equality whereby Nature hath level'd all of us, and set us upon even ground, do conceit a vast distance be∣twixt themselves and others: whereas it would be much more becoming them to call to mind the manifold weaknesses incident to human nature; the Errors and faults they have formerly committed, and are still obnoxious to; the Passions that domi∣neer over them, and to whose motions they are as much enslaved, if not more, than others. More∣over, forasmuch as there is nothing Praise-worthy in man, save only what proceeds from his Free Will, there is no reason why any one should pre∣fer himself before another, since they may as duly make use of their Reason, and with equal constan∣cy continue in the purpose of doing those things which Reason persuades and recommends to them. For in this firm purpose doth the very Essence of Vertue consist, and which may be found as well in a Commoner as in a Prince, in a Poor Beggar as in a Rich Man. Nothing more becomes a man of a generous temper, than vertuous Humility, which consists in this, that a man seriously consi∣der Human frailty and weakness, which he finds in himself as much as in others.

V. No Body is to be despi∣sed or flout∣ed at by outward marks of contempt o^r derision. But their fault is yet more gross and inexcusa∣ble, who undervalue and trample upon others, not only by inward disesteem and contempt, but also by some outward signs, as by Words, Looks▪ Laughter, do flout at and vilifie others. Which offence is the more criminal, forasmuch as this be∣haviour is exceeding provoking, making the party so derided to be inflamed with Anger, and to be strongly moved to seek for Revenge. For so im∣patient is the Mind of Man of Affronts, that ma∣ny are not affraid to hazard their Lives to revenge them, and will rather violate a long continued Bond of Friendship, than to bear an open and petulant abuse. For a Mans Reputation and Good Name is wounded thereby; as we find daily, that he is oft undervalued by others, who suffers himself tamely and cheaply to be abused.

VI. No Man must be hurt by us. Another Duty every man is to practise towards his Neighbour, is to hurt no Body. For it is the Law of Nature, 206 F. de Regul. Jur. That no Man make himself Rich at anothers Cost. The Equity of this Precept may be gathered from the consi∣deration of Man, both as he is a Singular Person, and as he is a Member of the Commonwealth. For as it is contrary to Heat, to be the cause of Cold; and to Moisture to cause Driness; so it is contrary to the Nature of a Just Man, to offend his Equal, or to provoke him by doing any hurt or injury. Thus DEMONAX, the Philoso∣pher in Lucian, boasts himself, that he never went to Law, never was troublesom to any, but al∣ways was a Friend to all, and an Enemy to none. In like manner it is also the property of a Good Man not to hurt any. For Nature hath ordained a kind of Alliance and Consanguinity between Men; whence it is criminal and highly unjust for a Man to lie in wait for another, to betray or cheat him, or to invade what belongs to his Neighbour; because by this means the Communion between Mankind is dissolved, as the soundness and health∣ful state of the Body is overthrown, when a stron∣ger part attracts the sustenance that belongs to all the rest to its self, and instead of only taking its due, usurps that which appertains to the whole Body.

VII. What Harm or Damage is, and how is must be made good. When it is said that we are not to do any harm or damage to any: By the word Damage is to be un∣derstood, whatsoever may cause any detriment or in∣convenience to any one; such as are the Taking way of what belongs to another, Depravation, Di∣minution, intercepting of the Rent or Income pro∣ceeding or hoped from any thing. Because it is not only the Possession of things that is rated or valued at a Price, but also the future perception of the Rents and Incomes of it, in case they are sure∣ly to come to our Hands. Wherefore every one that harms another, either in his Goods, or in his Good Name, is bound to make Reparation of the Damage he hath done to his Neighbour. For a Good Name is the greatest of all outward Good things; which being once lost, all other Enjoy∣ments are lost together with it. Now a Man may damage another, either by himself, or by the help and assistance of others: but which way soever it be done, it is always imputed to him that is the Agent, and he is bound to make Reparation for it. Because it is agreeable to Reason, that he that hath done the Hurt, should make amends for it, and make good the Damage he hath been the cause of, tho' he did it by another; for he that does any thing by the ministry or help of another, does the same as if he acted it himself. But if many per∣sons do equally concur to the doing of any Harm or Damage, they are all of them bound to make

good the same, according to their several Degrees of concurrence to it. In like manner he who by his Counsel, or Advice incites another to a Crime, or gives him the occasion of committing it, that himself may get profit by it, is bound to restore whatsoever damage or hurt this means may happen to the party offended. But the case is not the same with respect to him, who hath only given occasi∣on to the doing of a thing, or assisted the Delin∣quents with his Counsel, without any advantage thereby accruing to himself.

VIII. Whosoever by his Neg∣ligence is the cause of the spoil∣ing of any thing, is bound to make it Good. Neither is he only bound to make good the Damage done to his Neighbour, who by falseness and design hath harmed another, but also who by his Carelesness or Laziness hath suffered this harm to come to him. For it is necessary in order to the preserving of Human Society, that every one do carry himself with such Caution, that he may be useful to the Society, and that he may not by his Idleness be a Burthen to any. He who by chance, and without set purpose doth hurt another, as when a Man Fighting among the thickest of his Enemies, doth by chance wound his Fellow Souldier that stands near him, without any such intent, or knowing him to be so, cannot be com∣pell'd to the making good of the hurt he hath done him. For seeing that the fault was committed without his Will or consent, therefore neither can it be imputed to him; for there seems to be no suf∣ficient reason, why he who hath committed a fault against his Will should be lyable to be amerced, rather or more than he who is Wonded.

IX. Masters are bound to make Good the Damage or Hurt done by their Ser∣vants. Neither are we only obliged to repair the Damage we our selves have done to others, but al∣so that which hath been caused by our Servants, Cattle or other Living Creatures. For seeing that Servants are parts of the Commonwealth, they are bound to the same Laws as their Masters are; and whereas they possess nothing whereby they might be in a condition, to make good the hurt they have done; it is but just that their Masters should be bound to repair it, or else to deliver them into the Hands of those whom they have in∣jur'd. For otherwise a Servant, especially a Slave, would be at Liberty to hurt whom he pleased, if no reparation were to be had neither of him, nor of his Lord and Master. And the same may be said of our Cattle, or other Living Creatures that belong to us, as when our Cattle Trespass up∣on other Mens Ground, or when they chance to Kill or Wound any Man. For seeing that the owner of any Living Creatures, makes use of them for his own profit, and that they are gainful to him, it is but just that Reparation be required of him, if he hath a mind to keep them still; or if so be that he doth not value the said Creatures so high as the damage is rated, that then they be Killed. It is fitting that he who knowningly hath done any prejudice to his Neighbour, do freely of∣fer Reparation to him, lest his Neighbour being offended and provoked, should think of returning like for like: So in like manner he who hath received the injury, ought to wink at it, and be ready to be reconciled with him that hurt him. He who doth otherwise violates the Laws of the Society, and breaks that Peace which is the Foun∣dation and support of the Commonwealth.

CHAP. XXVI. Of the Laws of Mutual Humanity.

I. Every one is bound t•• be helpful to his Neigh∣bours. GOod-will is a Quality, that is inborn in the Minds of all Men; so that he seems to have shaken hands with Humanity, who is not ready to do good turns to his Neighbour. For it is a Law of Nature, that every one should bear Good-will towards others of his own kind, and, as far as his condition and circumstances will per∣mit, endeavour to procure their Good. For since Nature hath made an Affinity and Kindred be∣tween all Mankind, joyning them together in a Brotherly Band, it is not enough for them that they do not hurt one another; but it is over and above necessary, that they assist and succour each other. Now Men become useful to others, either in their own persons, or by imparting such Con∣veniences or good things to them, as are benefici∣al and advantageous to them.

II. Who are useful, and who useless to the Com∣monwealth. By our selves, or in our own persons we become useful to others, when from our very Child-hood we are educated in good Manners and Literature, and acquire those Accomplishments of Body and Mind, the fruits whereof may afterwards redound to the good of others, and our Actions procure Honour or advantage to the Commonwealth. And therefore they are injurious to Human Society, who lead a lazy and slothful Life, and indulging their Body only, consider none but themselves: And who with the Riches they have got, or in∣herited do Fat themselves like Hogs, minding no∣thing else, but to Live as long as they can, and to Glut themselves with Pleasure, and wallow in all manner of Luxury.

III. Who are to be hon∣oured in a Common∣wealth. But they who lay out themselves for the Ser∣vice, Honour and Advantage of the Common∣wealth, ought to be had in high esteem by all the Members of it, whose Duty it is to promote as far as in them lies, all their good endeavours, and to take heed lest being moved by Envy, they de∣spise the things they understand not, or which they themselves despair of attaining to. For what can be imagined more unjust, than to think ill of them, who are of use to their Country, and to hate those who lay out themselves in doing good to others, and make it their Business to promote the publick Good?

IV. We are freely to give those things, the bestowing whereof is no detri∣ment. The things that we may bestow upon others are, such especially as we can part with, without any damage or prejudice to our selves, but are of great advantage to the Receiver. And according∣ly the Law saith, whatsoever is of advantage to me, and is not at all hurtful to thee, the same it is not fitting that thou shouldst hinder me of; for this is the Dictate of Equity, tho' it be no due of Justice. It is a piece of a Malicious Nature in any one, to forbid others to draw Water at his Well standing by the way side; or to envy others that are in darkness to enjoy the light of his Can∣dle; or who will not permit his Neighbour to kin∣dile a stick of Wood in his Fire; forasmuch as all this may be done without dimminishing of the Water in the Fountain, the Light in the Candle, or the Fire on the Hearth. Wherefore, when any one undervalues the possession of any thing be∣longs to him, and intends to make no further use of it, it is not only inhuman, but unjust to deny the same to another, and rather suffer it to be

spoiled, than that it should be of use and advant∣age to others. Wherefore according to the Law of Nature, tho' outward Laws ••e silent, all things that are of no use, belong to the Poor, and Rich∣men are bound at the least, to bestow all those things on the Poor and Needy which they leave off, as likewise the superfluous Meat of their Tables.

V. We must be Noble and Generous in the Relie∣ving of our Neighbour. But forasmuch as this last mentioned, is the least piece of Humanity we can express to others, they act more generously, and shew themselves more to be Men, who are ready to do good to others, tho' with some detriment or prejudice to themselves. Only we must take care, that these our Charitable Offices, be not hurtful to those who receive them, and instead of being beneficial to them prove their Bane. Thus it is with good reason, that we refuse putting Arms into a Madmans Hands, deny one that is Sick of a Dropsy cold Water, are importu∣nately troublesome to one that is Sick of a Lethar∣gy to hinder him from Sleep, and keep Mony from him, who we know will go and throw it away at Dice. Because in the bestowing of Be∣nefits, we are not so much to mind the Will of those who desire them, as of what use and ad∣vantage they will be to them.

VI. Gifts or Benefits are to be be∣stow'd free∣ly. In our bestowings of Benefits, there must be no hope of receiving the like in lieu thereof; because Vertuous Actions carry their Reward along with them, and therefore are to be practised without any respect of gain, or advantage to be reaped from them. Thus we give to Poor Seamen, that have been Shipwrackt, whose Faces we shall never see again, and relieve and succour the miserable, meerly because they are so, and because it is a Duty of Humanity incumbent upon us, to take Pity on the Calamitous and Miserable. By the same motive, we sometimes bestow our Benefits secretly, without making our selves known to those whom we relieve, to comply with their Shamefacedness, and that they may rather seem to find it, than to receive it.

VII. The Duties of those who receive Favours or Benefits from others. In the receiving of Benefits it is required, that we be thankfully affected towards our Benefactors, and express our acknowledgment to them, and how ready we shall be upon occasion to return their kindness with advantage. Not as if it were necessary, that our return should be always of the same value, and estimate with the benefit received, for in many cases it is sufficient if only with a sincere Will, and grateful Mind, we acknowledge our Obligation, and are ready to make a return, tho' it may not be in our power to do it. Tho' indeed where Men are able, it is better to express their Gratitude, by returning the like good Offices and Benefits, besides the testifying of our thanks by words. For the great use of Benefits, is to beget a nearer Union and Love amongst Men, and to be an occasion for the exercising of Bene∣volence and Liberality. But if any one is unwil∣ling to be engaged to another, he may refuse the offered kindness, or at least so handsomely decline it, as that he that offers it, may not take it ill, that his Good-will or Kindness is slighted.

VIII. There is no Vice more abomina∣ble than is that of In∣gratitude. A Man cannot be guilty of a more shameful Vice, than that of Ingratitude; insomuch that there are no Nations so Barbarous, no Manners so Sa∣vage, but do condemn and detest it. For tho' an unthankful person be no•• injurious to another, yet is he no less infamous than a Thief, a Mur∣therer, or a Traitor; seeing that the very Wild Beasts themselves, when engaged by our care and kindness, are not wanting to express their thankful∣ness, not only in acknowledging it by their ge∣stures, but often by defending their Benefactors in time of danger. And accordingly the Law of Nature ordains, that we never receive any Bene∣fit, but with such an inward Disposition, that the Benefactor may never have any occasion to repent himself of having bestowed it upon us. The rea∣son of which Law is, because if we receive a Benefit with a Disposition contrary to this, there will be no more Kindness to be found amongst Men, and all Amicableness will be banisht from amongst them.

IX. Why we cannot bring an Action a∣gainst an ungrateful person. But you'l say, if the abominableness of this Crime be such, why are not ungrateful Men im∣pleaded, and why may not an Action be had a∣gainst them?

To which I answer that the reason is plain, be∣cause a Benefit is a free Gift, and being a Vertu∣ous Action must not be omitted, because of the unthankfulness of the Receiver. Besides, Gratitude cannot be lookt upon as a strict due, because it was not agreed upon contract, tho' there might be some hope of it. Moreover, if an Action might be had against an ungrateful Man, seeing there be so many of them in the World, all Courts of Justice would not be sufficient to hear or de∣termin them, and the rather because of the mani∣fold Circumstances which alter the Benefit, and encrease or diminish it.

CHAP. XXVII. Of the Laws that are to be observed in Covenants and Contracts.

I. What a Co∣venant is, and the Original thereof. BY the word Covenant is meant the Consent, or Agreement of 2 or more to the same thing. And it takes its original from hence, be∣cause there are many Benefits and Good turns, to the Performance whereof we are obliged by the Laws of Humanity, which yet cannot be exerci∣sed without some Injury to our selves, and there∣fore it was necessary, that Covenants should be entred into, by which every one might demand his own, or require and expect what is anothers, but without his Damage or Prejudice.

II. Covenants are to be faithfully kept and performed. It is required in all Covenants, that they who enter into them, stand to the Agreements they have made and consented to, and inviolably ob∣serve what they have promised. For otherwise, there would be an end of Human Society, Friend∣ship would be banisht out of the World, and mi∣serable Men would have no Refuge, whither to betake themselves in their Calamity. For what would become of all the good Offices of Huma∣nity, and the freedom that is between Friends, if Promises should be broken, and Mens Actions should not agree with their Words? Besides, where Men are not as good as their Words, endless mat∣ter is furnisht for Dissensions, Quarrels and Con∣tests, because we cannot break our Words, with∣out being Injurious to the other party concerned. And accordingly the Law hath so ordered it, that Men may be forc'd to perform their Covenants, and to pay what by their Promise they are obliged to.

[illustration]

Book. 1. Part. 10. Chap. 2••

To Francis Forbes of the Citty of London Gentleman

This Plate is humble Dedicated by Richard Blome

* 1.2 We Oblige or Bind our selves 2 several ways, viz. by Promise and Covenant. A Promise is the Willing or Spontaneous Obligation of a single per∣son to perform something; whereas a Compact or Covenant, is that whereby 2 or more do oblige themselves, to do something or other. A Promise may be divided into a Complete, or Incomplete Promise. We call that a Complete Promise, when he who promiseth any thing to another, is willing to be so far obliged, as to give him liberty to force him to perform his Promise. An Incomplete Pro∣mise, is that whereby a Man promiseth to per∣form something, yet without giving the other any Right to compel him to the performance of it. So that they who thus engage themselves to do any thing, are not so much bound by the Laws of Justice, as by those of Veracity. Tho' indeed Generous and Vertuous persons, without any such annexed Obligation, are always ready to perform their Promises, choosing rather to suffer some inconvenience, than not to be as good as their Word.

IV. Consent is required to a Promise. It is requisit to the validity of a Complete Pro∣mise, that the pleading of ones word be Deliber∣ate and Spontaneous; for seeing that he who pro∣miseth, may be forced to be as good as his Word; he is inexcusable if afterwards he should complain of it: Because it was in his Power either to agree to it, or to refuse his Consent. Now a Man is judged to have consented, not only by External Signs, as by his Words, Handwriting, Nod, or other motions of his Body; but even by his Silence, if other Circumstances concur; because according to that common Saying, amongst the Lawyers, He who is silent, seems to consent.

V. Who are in a condition to give their con∣sent. To the end a Man may be in a condition to give his consent, it is required that he be in his right Wits, and in the use of his Reason, so as to be able to discern, whether the thing in Question be accomodate and fit for the end intended, and whether, what he agrees to can be performed by him. Hence it is, that the Covenants of Mad∣men and Fools, are looked upon as void and in valid; as also of Men in drink, if it be made appear that they were so far overcome by it, as not to be throughly sensible of what they did. For Consent supposeth a clearness of Perception; and he may rather be said to be seized or hurried away, than to consent or agree, who by a precipitant impulse, without consideration is driven to the do∣ing of any thing. So that he would be lookt up∣on as a Shameless and Unjust Man, who should go about to compel a Man to the standing to such alike Agreement, which at first was entred into by an invalid consent.

VI. A mistake invalidates a Coven∣ant. As Reason asleep or overwhelmed makes void a Contract; so Error or Mistake doth weaken and invalidate it. For whosoever promiseth any thing to another upon condition, is not bound to keep his Word, in case the condition do not fol∣low; because the want thereof makes void the Obligation. And if there be a Mistake in the thing, about which the Covenant is made, it thereby becomes invalid, not only because of the mistake that is found in it; but also because it is a contravention to the constitutions of Covenants and Agreements. For in order to the Selling, Letting, or Exchanging of any thing, it is neces∣sary that the Buyer, &c. be fully acquainted with the Condition and Qualities of the thing; foras∣much as without this knowledge, there can be no full consent; and accordingly he who is about to buy or hire a thing, if any faults therein be dis∣covered, may break the Bargain, or force the o∣ther party to make good the defect, or allow a consideration for the Damage.

VII. Agreements are made void by deceit and falseness. Covenants are also made invalid by Deceit or Malice, when a Man is Circumvented by some fraudulent trick, and drawn into Agreement. Therefore he who by Deceit is drawn in to Pro∣mise ought to another, is not bound to perform the same, except of his own Free-will, and with∣out any fraudulent enticement he do agree to it; for then he is bound to stand to his Agreement, as long as there is no flaw in the thing, and that its true value be declared. For otherwise the Co∣venant becomes invalid, and it is in the power of him who finds himself agrieved, to break the A∣greement, or to demand a Compensation of the Damage he sustains by it. But if another, who is not concern'd in the matter, about which the Agreement is made, do mingle any thing of De∣ceit with it, neither of the Parties agreed being partakers with him, then the Agreement stands firm notwithstanding. But so as it is in the power of him that suffers by it, to demand Reparation of the loss he sustains by his Malice.

VIII. Fear doth not always break con∣tracts. Fear, as it doth not take away the freedom of the Will, as hath been said in the 20th Chapter of this part; so neither doth it dissolve Contracts. The suffering or punishment that is threatned by the Sovereign or Magistrate, if we will not con∣sent to such an Agreement or Covenant, cannot invalidate the same, except they should go about by any unjust force to compel us to it; because in this case the Injury they do unto me by the unjust fear they cast me into, makes them incapable of having any Right over me. And seeing that the Damage caused by another, ought to be repassed by him, by way of Compensation, that Obligation is supposed to be taken away, if no satisfaction be made for the thing, which ought presently to have been restored.

IX. About what things A∣greements may be made. As to the nature of the things that are agreed upon, or are promised, many things are required. First, that they be such as are in our Power; for otherwise it would be an Argument of Mad∣ness or Dishonesty, for a Man to Promise or Co∣venant that which is not in his power to perform. For no body is bound to perform Impossibilities, according to that common Rule, There can be no Obligation to Impossibles. For tho' at the first, when the Covenant was made the thing was possi∣ble, if afterwards by chance, without the fault or neglect of the party bound, it be made impossi∣ble, the Obligation is dissolved, and the Covenant becoms void.

X. They must be things lawful or permitted. Secondly, they must be things that are Lawful, for otherwise we cannot be obliged to the per∣formance of them. For he that promiseth to give a Whore the meeting; or hath past his Word to Maim or Kill another, is not bound to keep his Oath or Promise. Because no Man can bind him∣self to any thing which it is not in his power to perform: Now the Laws have absolutely depriv'd him of any such power, nor will suffer him to execute that, which they plainly prohibit. So that if he be guilty, who promises that which the

Law forbids, he is doubly so, who having Promis'd such things, does stand to his word.

XI. They must be such as we have a Right to. Thirdly, They must be Our things, that is, we must have a Right and Propriety to them; because we cannot Promise any thing which belongs to another. But in case we have Promised to take care, that what we have Promised shall be per∣formed by another, over whom we have no Com∣mand; we are bound to use our utmost Diligence, and to omit nothing (as far as in a Civil way we can) that he may make good what we have so Pro∣mised.

XII. Promises are made two several ways. A Promise may be made 2 several ways, either Absolutely, or upon Condition. Now a Condition may be 2 ways consider'd, either as Possible or Impossible. An Impossible Condition is either taken Physically or Morally. A Condition is Physically Impossible, when considering the Nature and Or∣der of Things, the Matter cannot be done; and Morally Impossible, when they are forbidden by Law, or contrary to the Laws of Honesty. And these Promises are either made by our selves, or by some Intervening Persons; which we likewise are bound to perform, in case they have carried themselves honestly and faithfully, and have done nothing, but according to our Order.

CHAP. XXVIII. Of Special Compacts or Agreements.

I. What a Contract is THo' a Covenant and Contract be often con∣founded by Authors, and include, as ULPI∣ANUS saith, the Consent or Agreement of two or more Persons; yet to speak more exactly, a Contract seems chiefly to consist in an Interchang∣able giving and receiving; or to be chiefly conver∣sant about things of Commerce.

II. Of Con∣tracts No∣minate and Innominate. Of Contracts, some are called Nominate, as Selling, Buying, Lending, Letting, Pawning, &c. which have a particular Name whereby they are distinguisht from others. Others Innominate, that have no particular Name belonging to them, but are only signified by the common Name of Con∣tracts. And these are reducible to 4 kinds: I give that thou mayst give; I give that thou mayst do: I do that thou mayst give; and I do that thou mayst do. In all which Contracts, an Action is allowed in any Form of words, when a certain one cannot be assigned: For we find by Experience, that there is a greater plenty of Business or Affairs, than of Words.

III. Some are Gratuitous, others Bur∣thensom. Secondly, Contracts are divided into Lucrative, otherwise called Gratuitous, that is, such by which Profit accrues to one of the Parties concerned, without the Intervening of a Merchandize or Price: And Burthensom or Chargeable, in which both Parties have an Equal burthen charg'd upon them, and in which there is a kind of Recompen∣sation. For it is the property of all burthensom and chargeable Contracts, that the Parties con∣cern'd in it, have an equal Advantage by it, and undergo a like Burthen. Insomuch as if it other∣wise happen, the Party who finds himself fru∣strated, hath Right to demand what is wanting to him, or else to break the Contract. And ac∣cordingly, it is usual in well-governed Cities, to have the prizes of every thing set and stated, to prevent all common Abuses in such cases.

IV. Gratuitous, or Lucra∣tive Con∣tracts are Lending. Gratuitous, or Lucrative Contracts, are com∣monly reduc'd to these three; a Loan, a Com∣mission or Charge, and a Depositum or Trust. A Loan is, when the use of a thing is granted to another, without any recompence therefore received or appointed. It is his concern who bor∣rows any thing, that he be very careful of the thing that is Lent him, that it may not be put to any other use, than what is prescrib'd by the Lender; and accordingly is oblig'd to restore the same whole and sound; excepting so much only as it may be the worse for so long using. If the thing Lent, whilst it is yet in the custody of him that hath borrowed it, come to be lost or spoil'd, the Value of it must be restor'd by the Borrower to the Owner: But if it be of such a Nature, that it could not have been better kept, if it had been in the Owners keeping, the Borrower is not bound to make it good. Yea, if it so happen that the Borrower hath laid out any thing towards the mending or improvement of it, it is but Just that the Owner should repay it, besides those Expences which always attend the ordinary use of any thing.

V. A Charge or Com∣mand. A Charge is, when a Man takes upon him to perform a Commission he is charg'd with, without any hope of Reward. And he who undertakes any such Charge at the Instance of another, or of his own accord, must take care to be punctual in performance thereof. For seeing that no Body trusts his Affairs, but with a Friend of whose Faithfulness he is assured, the Undertaker ought to be very Solicitous to shew himself an honest and true Man, and that in all things he answer the Expectation of his Friend, and the Confidence he puts in him. Now he who undertakes any Com∣mand or Charge, must be allow'd for all the Ex∣pences or Damages that may be in the Executing of the said Commands.

VI. A Pledge or Trust. A Trust is a Contract, whereby something is entrusted with another to be kept. The Person with whom the thing is entrusted, is called the Depository; who is to take great care, that the thing he is entrusted with, be not lost or spoil'd, and that he be always ready, at the Will of the Deposer, to restore it. Except it should be more for his Advantage to want it for some time, and that it be found better; because of some imminent Danger, to defer the restitution of it till a later date. But yet the Depository may not make use of the same, except with the Owners permission; if either it be such a thing as grows the worse for using; or if it be the Owners Concern that it be hid, and be not exposed to the Sight of others.

VII. Burthen∣som or Chargeable Contracts, are Per∣mutation. The most Ancient of all Chargeable Contracts, and received by all Nations, is Permutation or Ex∣change, used before Mony was Coyn'd, to be the indifferent Price of all things. The Formality whereof is prescribed §. Item ••retium de Empt. & Vendit: I willingly graunt you the thing you desire of me upon this Condition, that you likewise do, graunt me another thing which I ask of you, ac∣cording to the tacit Estimation of both the things made by our selves. Opposit to this Contract is Donation, whereby a thing without any Compul∣sion of the Law, and out of meer Benevolence and Good-will is bestowed upon another; forasmuch as it is not necessary that any Equality should be observed therein.

VIII. Buying and Selling. To Permutation belongs also Buying and Sel∣ling, whereby a thing is either purchased or let go for a Price: For by the former there lies an Obligation on the Buyer, to deliver the Price agreed on for the Commodity; as by the latter, the Seller is bound to let go the Commodity for the Pri••••▪ Which is done many ways: As First, When there is a mutual Agreement, and the Buyer immedi∣ately offers his Mony, and the Seller his Merchan∣dize. Secondly, When tho' the Merchandize be immediately deliver'd, the Price is not to be paid till such a set time after. Thirdly, When after that the Parties are Agreed about the price, the Mer∣chandize is not to be deliver'd till a certain Time. In which last Contract, it is consentaneous both to Reason and Justice, that if the thing should come to be lost or spoil'd before the prefixed time, the Seller should bear the loss of it. But if after that time expired, the Buyer neglect the taking of the Commodity, if any damage happen to it, it must be at his Loss.

IX. Letting and Hiring Letting and Hiring, are near of Kin to Buying and Selling, whereby, for an appointed Price, the use or worth of a thing is granted. I said, for an appointed Price: For if (saith JUSTINIAN, Inst. l. 3. Titul. 25.) I give a Fuller Cloth to be dressed, or to a Botcher Cloaths to be mended, without the appointment of a Set price; but only that afterwards I shall give as much as shall be agreed upon between us; this Contract cannot be called Letting or Hiring, but allows an Action set down in a precise Form of Words.

X. What is to be observ'd in Hiring. About this Contract it is to be observed, that if in the Time of Hiring the thing be spoiled or perish, he who hires it, is not bound to pay the Price of it. In like manner, when a thing de∣sign'd to a certain use, which the Owner is bound to deliver safe and sound, does chance to suffer any loss or detriment, whereby it is made less proper for the use it is appropriated to: He who Hires it, may with Justice detract so much from the Price of it, as it is become less fit for its intended use; tho' this cannot be where the increase or incom of the thing is uncertain. As for Example, If a Man have hired a Field, whose Fruits have been spoiled by the Unseasonableness of the Wea∣ther; he is bound notwithstanding to pay the Hire he hath agreed for, tho' the Incom he has from it, for that Year, be little or nothing: For as a plentiful Incom doth not increase the Hire, neither doth it seem Equal, that a scarce Increase should diminish it; since it frequently happens, that one Years Barrenness, is compensated by the Fruitfulness of the next following.

XI. Things lent. Lending is a Contract, whereby a Man delivers something of his Goods to another, upon Condi∣tion that he, after some Space of Time, do restore to him as much of the same kind and goodness. Things lent, are such as are spent or consumed by using, and do consist in Number, as Mony; in Weight, as Gold, Silver, &c. in Measure, as Wine, Oil, &c. The Gospel Law Commands us to lend, without expecting any Gain or Advantage to our seives there from: Which Law is transgrest by the Usurer, who tho' he be bound to relieve the Wants of his Neighbour, doth by Usury gain thereby, and enriches himself out of the miserable Remains of Shipwrack, by an unnatural Cruelty to those of his own kind. I am not ignorant of the Di∣stinction the Lawyers make here, of the Ceasing Gain and Emergent Damage. And indeed his Case is different, who lends Mony to one that de∣sires it, not to deliver himself from his present Ne∣cessities, but that he may Negotiate therewith, and make a great advance of Gain to himself from the Mony he hath borrowed; and of him, who being shut up in a Prison, and miserably Poor and opprest by a Cruel Creditor, desires to borrow a Sum of Mony: For in this case, what he desires ought either to be given to him freely, out of Pity to his Condition, or at least be lent to him, without demand of Use for it.

XII. The Con∣ditions of the Con∣tract of a Society. There is also another sort of Contract, which is called a Society Contract, or a Partnership, and is the Agreement of 2 or more Persons, whereby something proper to make Gain with (as Mony, Work, Industry) is contributed in order to a Com∣mon Use or Advantage. Now, to the end that such a Society or Partnership may be Just, 3 things chiefly are required▪ First, That the Trade or Dealing they intend be Just and Lawful; for no Man can be bound to that which is Unlawful. Secondly, That their Shares in Gain and Loss, be equally proportion'd to the Shares of the Stock laid in by the several Members of the Partnership; so as that his Gain may be greater that hath a greater Share in the Stock, as his less that hath a less; because by this means every ones Due is given to him. Thirdly, That the Loss in like manner be Common, and be equally divided amongst the Partners; tho' sometimes the Contract be so, that one contributes Mony, and another his Work or Labour only; which frequently is Equivalent to Mony. Wherefore the Origial Contract is to be heeded, and how the Parties are agreed about their Shares of Loss and Gain.

CHAP. XXIX. How many ways the Obligation, arising from Covenants, may be dissolved.

I. How Obli∣gation may be taken away, by Solution of Payment. SEeing that Obligation is a kind of Tye or En∣gagement laid upon us by Law, whereby, as JUSTINIAN saith, We are of Necessity bound to pay some thing, according to the Laws of the Society we live in, the same is readily and Natu∣rally taken away by paying or satisfying of the same. For thereby the Duties thence arising cease, as also the Action whereby a Man before was Bound. To the end this Payment may be duly made, it is not necessary that it be done by the Debtor himself, but it is sufficient if it be done by another, in his Name. For a Debtor is quitted of his Obligation, if the Mony be paid by another, tho' without the Knowledge, and contrary to the Will of the Debtor. Neither is it necessary always to pay the Debt to the Creditor; but it is sufficient if it be paid to any one appointed by him.

II. By Dona∣tion. Secondly, An Obligation is dissolved by Dona∣tion, that is, by Remission, or Forgiving of the Debt; which is commonly done either by Accepti∣lation or Imaginary Payment, with the use of some Signs intimating a Consent or Agreement, which of old was in use amongst the Greeks; the Debtor speaking these Words, You have received so much Mony: To which the Creditor delivering his Bond or Note, answer'd, I have received them.

III. By Com∣pensation. Thirdly, Obligations are taken away by Com∣pensation; as when the Creditor by a former En∣gagement was a Debtor, to his Debtor, owing him something of the same kind and value. For in things deliver'd for use, an Equivalent is rec∣kon'd as the same thing. Hence it is, that in Actions at Law of this kind, Compensation was always allow'd of; viz. an Exception, whereby any Man rids himself of his Creditor, by shewing that he is his Debtor; for a Debt is Compensated with a Debt, Fraud with Fraud, and a Fault with a Fault, and this very very Justly too, saith the Law; for we are rather not to pay, than to re∣demand what we have paid.

IV. By a con∣trary Will. In the Fourth place, Obligations that are entred into by Consent or Agreement, are dissolved by a contrary Will: For suppose TITIUS and SEJUS have agreed together, that SEJUS should have a piece of Ground for 100 Pieces of Gold; and that before the Mony be paid down, or the Land delivered, they should agree together to break their Contract; it is evident, that by this means that Contract would be dissolved. And this is common to all Contracts, which are made and ratified by Agreement and Consent, especially that of Partner∣ship, which continues only so long as the Parties abide in the same Mind.

V. By the in∣tervening of a New Agreement Obligations also are dissolved by the Intervening of a New Obligation, as if the Debt which John owes me, should by Agreement be made payable to me by Paul; because this intervening of a new Person, makes a new Obligation to take place, and annuls the former. Neither is it necessary, that this latter Agreement be advantageous; for tho' it were quite otherwise, yet would it notwithstand∣ing make void the former.

VI. By urgent Necessity An Obligation is likewise made void by urgent Necessity; and therefore a Debtor that is reduc'd to extream Want, is not bound to pay his Creditor, tho labouring under the same Extremity of Want; because in Extream Necessity all things are com∣mon, and the Condition of him who is in Posses∣sion is accounted the better of the two.

VII. By breach of Word or Articles. He that breaks his Promise, and doth not perform his Articles, doth rather break off the Obligation, than make it to cease. For seeing that all Contracts are mutual, and that the Parties are equally bound to perform what they have agreed to, when one breaks his word, there is an end of the Contract: For the Pledging of our Faithful∣ness, supposeth the Faithfulness of the other party, and is as a Condition in reference to the other. I shall perform what you require of me, if you do first what I require of you; and I will stand to my Promise, as long as you inviolably observe the Agreement we have made.

VIII. By Death. Lastly, An Obligation is annull'd by Death, and any Contract ceaseth, when it rests only upon one Person, whereas the Agreement was made by two. For where the Subject is destroy'd, the Accidents which do attend it, must of needs perish likewise. Except that the Heir of the deceased Party, of his own inclination, or out of his respect to the De∣ceased, do take upon him to satisfie the said Obliga∣tion: Or, if by the Last Will of the Dead, he be bound to pay the Debts of the Deceased out of his Estate, and that he is made his Heir upon that Condition.

CHAP. XXX. Of the Laws that concern Speaking and and Swearing.

I. Deceitful∣ness in Speech is to be a∣voided. FOrasmuch as Covenants and Contracts are performed by Words, and that it is necessary for the maintaining of Human Society, that mens Minds be made known by Speech, we shall add something here concerning the Duties to be ob∣served in Speaking in general, and afterwards of those that are to be heeded in Swearing. The first thing to be observed in Speech is, that we do not deceive any one by our Words, or by other Signs used instead of them, for the expressing of the Sense of our Minds. For the Truth of our Speech or Words must be constant and inviolable, after the same manner as we find that amongst Animals, some outward Species do remain, where∣by they discern things Friendly or Inimical to them.

II. Conditions to be ob∣served in Speech. To the end the Praescript of this Natural Law may be the better understood, we are to take No∣tice, that a double Obligation lies upon those that speak, with Relation to their Words or Speech. First, That those who use the same Speech or Lan∣guage, do make use of certain and determinate Words, to signifie such certain and determinate Things, according to the use of the Language that is received in the Country or City where a Man lives. For it is not lawful for any one, at his own pleasure, to Coin new Words, but must make use of those, which have been long approv'd of by Use and Custom, and signifie things according as they are taken and understood by all. Secondly, That every one do so open his Mind to another, as clearly to manifest what he intends, and so as that the same may be clearly apprehended by him he speaks to. This Obligation may arise, either from a particular Agreement a Man hath made with ano∣ther, to discover unto him what he knows about such a business. As when one Agrees with one that is Master of any Art, to be taught the same by him: Or, from the Precept of the Common Law of Nature, whereby a Man is bound to impart his Science to another; either for his Profit and Ad∣vantage, or to prevent some Evil that threatens him: Or, when by Law, whether Perfect or Imperfect, a man is bound to discover those things, concerning which he is Interrogated.

III. When we may dissem∣ble our Thoughts. But if those to whom we speak be of such a Temper, that an open and simple Declaration may be prejudicial to them, or that it may give them occasion of hindring and opposing what we are about; it may be lawful for us to dissemble our Minds at that time, and to palliate our Intentions. For though it be our Duty to do good to others, yet are we not bound to do it, when we have good Reason to believe, that in so doing we shall be crost in the thing we intend. Neither is this to be call'd Lying; for tho' our VVords do not exactly repre∣sent the Sense of our Mind, yet do they not of set purpose carry another Sense, than our meaning really is; nor hath he to whom we direct our Speech, any Right to understand or know them: Neither are we bound by any means to cause him to appre∣hend our Intentions. For it is frequently Expedi∣ent in Human Society, that the Truth should be hid, and that the thing which is about to be undertaken, should be kept from the Knowledge of ma••y.

IV. Fiction is no Lie. From what hath been said, may be gathered, that he is not to be lookt upon as a L••ar, who at play, by set Words and Gestures, endeavours to conceal his Intentions, to deceive the party he plays with, and to inveigle him to do that whereby he may lose the game. Nor he, who by feigned Stories and Fables deceives the Minds of Children, who are not yet capable of down-right Truth, with a design to excite them to the Love of Ver∣tue and the Hatred of Vice. Nor he who imposes upon an Angry Person, comforts one that is sor∣rowful, or by colour'd Speeches persuades a sick person, that the Medicin he is to take is very grateful and pleasant. Because none of these are done with a design to deceive or wrong, but on the contrary, to do them good, and to ease them of that Passion which afflicts them. But the case is quite different where a man is bound to declare his Mind to another; because by using doubtful Speeches, or discovering only one part of the Truth, he becomes unfaithful, and sins against the Rules of Justice.

V. What an Oath is. Our Speech is capable of being ratified and con∣firmed by an Oath. For an Oath is the calling of GOD to wi••n••••s to the Truth of what we do as∣sert: Or as others will have it, It is a Religious Act, whereby we call upon GOD as the Supream Truth, in witness to a thing, that is not suffici∣ently known to others. And accordingly the very Heathens themselves knew of no stronger tie whereby to engage to be faithful and to speak the Truth, than that of an Oath. For they who take an Oath, do bind themselves by the Aw and Re∣verence they have for GOD, to be as good as their Word, and to stand to their Covenants. And for∣asmuch as they own that GOD, whom they wor∣ship, to be Omnipotent and Omniscient, it is to be believed, that no Man is found so wicked, as to dare to provoke his Indignation, and to engage his Revenge. Wherefore he also who swears by false gods, supposing them to be true, is bound to perform what he hath sworn, and if he breaks his word, he is Perjur'd.

VI. Three kinds of Oaths. An Oath is either Assertory, when we make use of it to confirm an Assertion about a thing pre∣sent or past; when no better way is found to dis∣cover the Truth. And such an Oath as this is re∣quired of Witnesses before a Judge, or from others, who some other way have any knowledge of the Fact. There is another Oath, which is called Promissory, when one by Oath promises any thing to another, and binds himself to the performance thereof. And lastly, there is another Oath of De∣cision, where 2 are that are in contest together, and presenting themselves before the Judge, one of them by taking an Oath, doth decide the mat∣ter in contest.

VII. Of the Con∣ditions to be observed in every Oath. That there may be an Obligation upon a Man, to keep his Oath, it is requisit, First, That he know the thing to be true or false, which he as∣serts or denies by Oath; or whilst he speaks, ac∣cording to what he thinks, and is persuaded there∣of, whether it be so or not. For he that swears to any thing which he judges to be so, his Oath cannot be blamed, because he speaks according to what he thinks and is persuaded. Secondly, It is requisit that he take his Oath Seriously and with mature Deliberation. And therefore he who re∣peats the words of an Oath to another, is not bound thereby; but he that speaks them seriously, and with the posture and formality of those that take Oaths, tho' it may be, he intends nothing less in his Mind, than to be true and faithful to what he swears.

VIII. We must not swear contrary to our Consci∣ence. Wherefore I cannot assent to their Opinion, who suppose that a Man who is brought before a Judge, about a Debt of 100 pieces of Gold which he owes to another, may swear falsly, in case he knows that the payment of that M••ny should cast him into extream Difficulties. For they seem to suppose, that GOD, the Sovereign of Truth, may be produced as the witness to a Lye; as if he did not behold, and in due time would Judge and Revenge those, who, in so daring a manner, do affront his Majesty. For what else is it to deny a just Debt, but to deny GOD to be Just and Equal, and to promise impunity to perjured Persons? For if▪ it be lawful for a Man to forswear himself, and to think one thing, and speak another, the validity and reverence of Oaths, and of all Covenants and Contracts will be banisht from the Societies of Men, and nothing but Fraud, Deceit and Iniquity will be found in all their agreements and dealings together.

IX. What is t•• be consider∣ed in him. that swears or takes an Oath. Yet must not every Oath be taken for such, except that we be assured that it hath all the Con∣ditions requisit to a Valid and Lawful Oath, and which ought to be rigorously, and not perfuncto∣rily examined. For he, who out of hatred swears against another; or he, who being tertified by the Threats of an Enemy, doth conform his Pro∣mise with an Oath, is supposed not to have sworn at all, seeing that he never did it with any volun∣tary Deliberation, but being hurried on by fear and Passion only. In like manner he, who pro∣miseth somewhat to another indeterminately, and confirms his Promise with an Oath, is not bound thereby to grant to another what is dishonest, ab∣surd or hurtful; because it is supposed, that he who hath made the demand is led by reason, and consequently would not desire any thing that is morally impossible or unjust.

CHAP. XXXI. Of Dominion, and the Duties thence ari∣sing.

I. The State and Condi∣on of the First Men. NOthing is more celebrated in the Writings of the Antient Poets, than their state of the First Men in the World.

The Golden Age was first, which uncompel'd, And without Rule, in Faith and Truth excel'd. As then there was nor Punishment, nor Fear; Nor Threatning Laws in Brass, prescribed were. Nor suppliant Crouching Pris'ners shook to see Their Angry Judge; but all was safe and free.

For they tell us, that at that time all things were common, and that the Terms of Mine and Thine, now too familiar, were not known. So as that the care and thoughts of all Men conspir'd only for the good of the Publick, and every one neglecting his own particular concerns, was only solllcitous for the Interest and Welfare of the whole Society. But whatsoever they may talk of this Community, it appears, that from the Beginning of the World,

things were, accounted, as of right, belonging to him who was the first Occupant, and that every one did challenge that to be his own, which by his Labour, Industry, or Good Fort••ne 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had got possession of. As it is evident in Abel and Gain•• who, tho' they were Brethren, yet had each of them their distinct Families and distinct Possession▪ for how else could they have offered▪ Sacrifice to GOD? Or how could that which was offered in common by them, be accepted and rejected? Wherefore we must conclude, that every one by an instinct of Nature, out of the love he hears to himself doth affect the Possession of Goods, and is ambitious of a Lordship or Dominion over other things.

II. What Do∣minion is. Dominion is the Power or Right which a man hath ••v••r a thing, to dispose of it, as of a sub∣stance belonging to him. Whence it is that a Possessor or Owner, can dispose of the things that are his, as it best pleaseth him, by giving them away, Exchanging or Selling them, and hindring any one ••lse from making use of them, except they be such things as are proper to many, and belong to the City, or some other Society.

III. Dominion is acquired originally by occupa∣tion of what never belonged to any. There are 2 General ways of acquiring Domi∣nion, vi••. Originally and Deriv••tively. By the former of those ways we acquire the Dominon of a thing▪ by Occupation, when it did not belong to any one before, but was by the profuse Bounty of Nature exposed to the first Occupant, or him who first challengeth it for his own. For seeing that all things, at the Beginning, were produced for the Good of Men, and therefore may fall un∣der then Dominion, it was ordered by a just Right, that things should be his who first claimed them, and that he should safely enjoy them, who had got them into his possession before all others. Wherefore, because under this name of Occupati∣on, are understood Fowling, Hunting and Fishing; the Birds of the Air, the Beasts of the Earth and Fishes of the Sea, according to the Law of Na∣tions, begin of right to belong to him who first takes them. For what before belonged to no man, that by Natural Right becomes his who first oc∣cupies or seizeth it, Justinian Inst. l. 2. de Rer. Divis.

IV. By Occupa∣tion of what the Owner hath relin∣quisht. Things also may be acquired by Occupation, if they be derelinquisht by the Lord or Owner, with the design of never esteeming them for his own any more, and consequently ceaseth to be L••rd over them. But the case is not the same in ••hings which during a storm, are cast into the Sea, with a design to lighten the Ship; for these do still con∣tinue to be the owners; because it is manifest that he did not cast them overboard, because he had a mind to be rid of them; but that by the casting of them into the Sea he might save the Ship, and consequently his Life.

V. Dominion is by seve∣r••l ways Deriva∣tively ac∣quired. The second way of acquiring Dominion is, ei∣ther by Tradition or Delivery, as when a thing passeth from one to another. For nothing is more conformable to Natural Equity, than that his Will should stand, who has a mind to translate the Dominion of a thing that belongs to him, to ano∣ther. And therefore of whatsoever nature a cor∣poral thing may b••, as the Lawyers say, it may be passed over to another, and being thus past over by the Lord or Owner, it thereby becomes alie∣nated. Or by Emption or Purchase; and things so acquired, by paying unto the Seller the sum agreed upon, or satisfying him some other way▪ as by Promise or giving him a Pledge. Or by a hare signification of ones Will▪ as if a man who hath lent, let, or deposited any thing with me, should afterwards sell me the same, or bestow it upon me: for in that he suffers it to be mine▪ Lim∣mediately acquire a right to it, as effectually as if he had by deed past it over to me▪ Or by Succes∣sion, as when a Man dies Intestate, for then all his Goods are devolved to his next Heirs. For it is agreeable to Reason, and conducive to the Peace of Human Society, that what a Man hath in his Life▪time acquired by his Labour and Industry, should not be lookt upon as things derelinquisht, and so left to the first Seiser, but that they should be the Heirs of him who dies Intestate, that are nearest in Blood to him.

VI. By long Possession or Prescripti∣on. There is also another way of acquiring Domi∣nion by long Possession or Prescription; when a Man hath honestly acquired a thing, and hath possest the same without Interruption, the Term of time set by the Law. Because according to the Law of Nations, that is lookt upon as relinquisht and forsaken, which for so long a time hath not been challenged by any Man. And therefore after the Term appointed by the Law is expired, he who is in Possession is not bound to restore the thing he hath been so long possest of; but the Dominion or Propriety thereof is devolved upon him, and he may lawfully keep the same, not ••n∣ly in the outward Court, but also in the Court of Conscience, because the Sovereign Magistrate is supposed to have Power for the Publick Good to enact, that after a long continued Possession, the Goods of one Man should be transferred to ano∣ther, lest continuing so long doubtful, it should perpetually give occasion to fresh suits at Law.

VII. The first Law that is to be ob∣served af∣ter Domini∣on acqui∣red. The following Laws seem to have taken their Rise from the acquiring Dominion of Corporal things. The First whereof is, that no body di∣sturb the Possession of another, but that he suffer him with Peace and Quietness to enjoy his acquired Goods: so as not fraudulently to be the cause of any decriment or damage to him, or by any way contribute to the taking of them away from him. By which Law, These, Rapin and other unjust S••bstractions of Goods are forbid. So that not only the violent taking away of another mans Goods must be avoided, but also those which are clandestine, and the Owner is ignorant of.

VIII. The Second Law. Secondly, If the Goods of another be honestly fallen into our hands, without any fault of ours, we are to do our Endeavours to find out the true Lord and Owner of them, that they may be sent back to him, as soon as he shall be known to us. But yet there is no obligation upon us, to restore the same at our own Cost and Charges; but we may justly demand the Charges we have been at in keeping or restoring the fame, and keep the Goods till the same be repaid us. But as to those things which we have honestly purchased, and have a clear Title to, these we are not bound to call in question before him, and▪ as it were, make known to all, whether he will account it amongst things that are loft▪ because we are assured of the Equity of the Contract or Bargain whereby they are be∣come ours. Yet when we have certain know∣ledge, that any stolen Goods, have been deposited

[illustration]

[illustration]

[illustration]

Book. 1. Part. 10. Chap. 32

Lens. Inv.

I. Kip Sculp

To the Right Wor∣shipfull S^r John Leveson Gower of Trentham in the County of Stafford Baronet

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome

with us▪ without our knowledge, we are bound to restore the same, not to the Thief, but to the t••••e Owner.

IX. The Third Law. Thirdly, If we have spent any Goods belonging to another, which we honestly came by, then only the Obligation lies upon us, of restoring so much to the Owner, as we have profited thereby; and if ••e have not profited by them, neither are we bound to restore any thing. The Reason is, be∣cause he who is honestly possest of a thing, is not bound to restore the thing, upon the account of any unjust coming by it, since he both came by it and spent it honestly. Nor by reason of the meer receiving it, seeing that no more of it is left. Only he is bound to make restitution, if he be grown more Rich by it, that is, if thereby he have spared those charges which otherwise he would have been necessitated to; or have something, which otherwise he could not have.

X. The Fourth Law. Fourthly, If any thing that belongs to another be acquired by a chargeable Title, it is the duty of the Possessor, to restore the same to its true Lord; neither hath he any Right, to demand of the Owner, the Mony he hath laid ou•• for the Purchase of it; but can only demand it of him, from whom he hath purchased the thing. Except it be made ap∣pear, that in all probability the Owner could ne∣ver have recovered his Goods without being at some Charges, or that he hath of his own accord pro∣mised ••t reward to him, that should find them, or tell him news of them.

CHAP. XXXII. Of the Duties of Married Persons.

I. Why Ma∣trimony was insti∣tuted at first. THE first Divine Institution appointed for the Good of Man, was that of Matrimony, which accordingly hath been celebrated and esteem∣ed in all Nations. For the order of Nature, and the necessity of Life do require, that Men should by Propagation preserve their kind; and by a conti∣nual Succession secure Mankind from utter perish¦ing. Hence it is that Men take to themselves Con∣jugal Companions, and by means of the said mee••∣helps, at once provide for their Posterity and Wel∣fare. For seeing that Matrimony is nothing else but the Lawful Conjunction of a Husband and Wife, accompanied with individual intimacy and familiarity; whosoever enter upon the same, do it with intention of passing the whole course of their lives sweetly and pleasantly, by means of this mu∣tual consent of Souls and Bodies: forasmuch as they would never desire it, but out of an inclina∣tion to propagate a Succession, and from hope of the Happiness they shall enjoy in that State.

II. All Impu∣rity and Filthiness is contrary to Nature. About Matrimony we are to observe, that this vehement desire of the other Sex, was not put into Man by GOD, for the satisfying of his voluptu∣ousness, which is base and infamous, and always drags Repentance after it; but to the end that married persons might live more happily together, and propagate Posterity, which is of absolute ne∣cessity for the continuation of Mankind. Whence it follows, that it is contrary to the intent of Na∣ture to defile ones self by Lust, and to desire any other pleasures, but what the Nuptial Bed affords.

III. There is a kind of ob∣ligation upon Man to enter up on Matri∣mony. Forasmuch as Man is placed in this World, not as an absolute Lord, but only with permission to use and enjoy the things that are in it, without de∣stroying or hurting the substance of them; an Obli∣gation seems to lie upon him, to enter upon Mar∣riage, that he may render to Nature, what he hath received from her, by begetting Childring to sup∣ply the room of his Parents and Ancestors. For Human Society cannot, without great inconveni∣ence, permit the Propagation of Human kind any other way than by lawful Marriage; all other promiscuous and wandring Lusts being condem∣ned, and punisht by it, whereby either an unjust Heir is clapt upon an Estate, or a Virgin is vitia∣ted. Yet is not every one therefore bound to Marry; seeing that the Nature of some is repug∣nant to it, and the habit and constitution of their Body does not comport therewith. But those only who cannot well live without a Wife, or who think they shall be more useful Members of the Commonwealth, by marrying, than if they should continue in a single state.

IV. Married Persons are bound to keep the Faith they have pled∣ged to each other. They who are married must stedfastly resolve never to break the Conjugal Bond, by any un∣lawful Lust; for by means of the said Marriage knot, the Husband belongs to his Wife, and the Wife to her Husband: so that he who separates them, ought to be lookt upon no better than a Murtherer▪ and to be as severely punish'd. The Savages, who live in America, do prove this to be a law of Nature, by the keeping of their Nuptial Beds ••••defiled, Adultery being scarcely known amongst them; and if ever any be found guilty thereof, they have borrid punishments infli∣cted upon them. And tho' after Marriage the Husband be the Head of the Wife, and that by the Prerogative of his Sex he is to have the Domini∣on, and that all Domestick Affairs are to be order∣ed according to his Command and Direction; yet he is never a whit less obliged to keep his Conjugal Promise, than the Wife 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and if he happen to break the same, he need▪ not think strange if his Wife take the same course, and write after the Copy he sets her▪

V. The Duty of a Husband Forasmuch as a House or Family seems to be perfect and compleat in a Husband and Wife, and that the welfare of a Family consists in their Con∣cord and Harmony; it highly concerns them dili∣gently to mind their Duties. Now the Duty of a Husband is to love his Wife, and to be tender of her, as of a part of himself; according to that of Genesis, and they two shall be one Flesh. Neither is it sufficient that he make her the Companion of his Bed, but also of his Counsell, lest she should conceive her self to be contemned and slighted, and thereupon, out of Indignation, neglect her Fa∣mily Affairs. If he admit her into Partnership of a••l his concerns, this will make her chearfully to u••∣dergo any pains or trouble, and ready to comfort, assist and help him in any occasion of Grief of Mind, Bodily Sickness, or outward Losses. But if a Man hath had the ill luck to meet with an ill natur'd Wife, he ought first of all to use his utmost industry to engage her to her Duty, by sweetness and fair means. And if after all, she continue in her perverseness, he may have recourse to a Divorce, or some other way the Law allows; or else by Patience endure what cannot be mended, especially seeing that he cannot divulge the faults

or his Wife, without the hurt of his Children, the infamy of the Mother, and the disgrace of his Family.

VI. The Duties of a Wife. 'Tis the Duty of a VVife, not only to love her Husband, but to Honour him, to subject her sel•• to his Command, as to her Head and Lord▪ And be∣cause she is more fit for the managing of Houshold Affairs, her business must be to take care of them, and to provide for the Convenience and welfare of all those that belong to the Family. And on either side is required union and concord of Mind and Body, that they may have but one will be∣tween them, and never be divided by any diffe∣rence or contest. According to that of HORACE, Carm. 1. Od. 13.

O Happy thr••ee and more, that Faithful Pair, In Bands of lasting Love that joined are; VVho without Angry Broyls their days do spend, VVhose Love no sooner than their Lives shall end.

VII. Matrimony is to be ce∣lebrated between Equals. To the begetting of this Concord, it is very conducive, that there be a Parity between the mar∣ried Couple, and not too great an inequality of con∣dition between them. For seldom are these Mar∣riages found to be happy, where there is a great difference between the parties conjoin'd. Seeing that great disparity of Fortune, Age and Manners, are frequently the cause of as great differences and dissentions: but those above all other are frequent∣ly found the most unfortunate, that are contracted between persons of a different Religion. For as TERTULLIAN saith, how can i•• be imagi∣ned, but that the Faith must be weakned and ob∣literated, by continual and intimate commerce, with one of a contrary Belief: Wicked Discourse is apt to corrupt good manners, how much more the individual intimacy of Conjugal Cohabitation? How can a Believing VVife serve two Masters, Christ, and her Unbelieving Husband? Neither hath a Husband less cause to fear the Snares of an Infidel VVife, which SOLOMON himself, tho' the wisest of Men, could not avoid, and Children also being mostly left to their Mothers care, are in great danger to be inveigled with her sentiments. And what is worst of all, from the different Reli∣gions of Father and Mother, as from two Ani∣mals of a different Species, monstrous Births are commonly produced, being of no Religion at all, and such as prove unhappy Prodigies in the Church and Commonwealth.

CHAP. XXXIII. Of the Duties of Parents and Children.

I. Of the Caution that is to be used in Cojugal Co∣habitation. FOrasmuch as from the Individual Society, and Cohabitation of Man and Wife Children do proceed, and by means thereof the succession of Families, Kindred, Estates and Titles ar•• perpetu∣ated; it highly concerns Parents, that they be∣have themselves prudently in the Conjugal Union, lest by their intemperance their off-spring be vitia∣ted. For it was not without Reason, that some have been reproached with this stinging Taunt, Thy Father begot thee when he was drunk. For the Vices of the Parents, are frequently transferr'd to their Children; and the very temper of their Bodies, is a cause either of the commendable, or nerverse Manners of them.

II. The Duty of Mothers. The Duty of the Mother; is to take care that the Child in her Womb do not come to any hurt, and when Born, that she sollicitously cherish it, and suckle it her self, and that she do not put it out to a Nurse, without urgent necessity. As soon as it comes to the use of reason, she must also endeavour to form its tender and pliable Manners, according to the rules of Vertue and Piety, and to instil into it the first Principles of Religion.

III. The Office of Fathers. But because it imports little to have given Life to Children, and thereby to put them into a State, that is indifferent to either Vertue or Vice, except due Instruction be superadded, and the Hatred of the one, and Love of the other be inculcated into them; it is the Fathers Duty, to take care that they be timely taught, according to his Ability and Condition, and he must omit nothing, that may conduce to their advancement in Learning and Good Manners. If he be able, let him put them out to School, to the end that being out of their Mothers sight, and rid from her fondling of them, they may mind their Learning the better: But he must so resign the care of their Instruction to others, as not wholly to neglect it himself, but must have an Eye to the Progress they make, by prescribing what they ought to learn, and judg∣ing what may be omitted: Except he be assured of the Ability, Care and Prudence of the Ma∣sters, with whom he hath intrusted them.

IV. Parents are bound to main∣tain their Ch ildre. Another Duty of Parents is, that they take care of the Bodily Sustenance of their Children; and in case they want wherewith to maintain them, that then they take care to teach them such Arts, whereby they may be able to maintain themselves, without being burthensome to them. Neither must only Legitimate Children be maintained by Pa∣rents, but Natural also, that is, such as are Born without Wedlock. For according to the Law of Nature, they ought to be provided for by their Parents; and tho' they cannot be said to be Mem∣bers of the Commonwealth, yet they are like Warts and Corns, which tho' they be no parts of the Body, yet are fed from the substance of the Body to which they adhere. And therefore l. 3. de inof. Test. Bastards are allow'd an Action at Law, whereby they may oblige their Parents to give them a Maintenance, as well as if they were Le∣gitimate.

V. Parents must love their Chil∣dren ali••e. Parents likewise are obliged to bear an equal Love to all their Children, without putting any difference between them; for seeing they all of them stand in the same relation to their Parents, they ought also to be cherished with the same Love and Affection; neither is any difference to be made between them, as to their right of Inhe∣ritance, except the particular Prerogative of Pri∣mogeniture, and where the Laws of the Society, wherein they livedo require it. Wherefore the Civil Law gives the Children power of bringing an Action of an inofficious Testament against a Fa∣ther, who by his last Will bequeaths his Estate to others, passing by his Sons and lawful Heirs; and the Falcidian Law allows them the fourth part of the Estate to be equally shar'd amongst them. But yet it is lawful, and permitted to Pa∣rents to love them more, and bestow more upon them, in whom they discern more Obedience and Vertue; because this is no more than is due to their worth, they being no otherwise preferr'd

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To the Right Worshipfull S^r. Robert Clayton of Marden in Surrey▪ and of the Citty of London Knight and Alderman Lord Mayor thereof Anno Domini 1680, And to Martha his Lady Daughter of M^r. Perient Trott of London Merchant.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

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To the Worshipfull Peter Rycaut of King Stephens Castle in Ospring in Kent Esq^r., only Son and heyre of Collonell Phillip Rycaut, And Nephew to the Right Worshipfull S^r. ••aul Rycaut Knight, Envoy Extraordinary to their Majesties of great Brittaine in Hamburgh; And to Chorlotte his Wife, Daughter of S^r. Gilbert Gerard Baronet deceased.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

before the rest of their Bretheren or Sisters, but as they are more worthy.

VI. Children are under the Power of their Parents. Parents by a natural right have power over their Children, for seeing that the care of them is by nature committed to the Parents, they would never be able to exercise the same, except they had Authority over them, to direct their Actions for their Good. And accordingly the best of Pa∣rents, do without any injury to them, force their Children to follow their Studies, to behave them∣selves as they ought, to leave the vicious inclina∣tions of their Nature, and to do those things which for the future, may make them good, and profitable Members of the Commonwealth. Now whilst the Father is in this exercise of his power over his Children, there is besides a great Obli∣gation incumbent upon him, that as he is the head of the Family, he take care also to impart Health and Strength to the rest of the Members of it; that is, that he recommend Vertue to them by his Example; and that he excel all the rest by his Life, more than by his Tongue or Instructions. That he deny and force himself, and that like an Eagle he provoke his young ones to fly; that he curb his Passions, that he may the more effectually excite them to follow the Footsteps of Vertue; and in a word, that he omit nothing whereby their tender springing Vertue, may thrive and flour∣ish.

VII. The Power of Parents over their Children is limited. The power of Parents over their Children is bounded: For it is not lawful for them to kill the Birth of their own begetting in its Mothers Womb; nor when it is Born, may they neglect, much less destroy it. For tho' their Children pro∣ceed from them, and be form'd out of their very Substance, yet are they born in the same condition as themselves, and are capable of being injur'd by their Parents. True it is, that of antient time, Parents had the Power of Life and Death allow'd them over their Children, that they might be the more encouraged to take care of them. But this absolute Power to chastise the Vices of their Man∣ners, that it might not lash out too far, was re∣strained by Law; It being taken for granted, that Children are not only born to the Parents, but to the Commonwealth; wherefore l. 4. ff. de re milit. it is enacted, that whosoever in time of War, shall refuse to send his Son to serve the Common∣wealth, or that shall any way maim him, that he may be uncapable to bear Arms, shall be ba∣nished.

VIII. What are the Duties of Chil∣dren. The Duties, or rather the Debts which Chil∣dren owe to their Parents are: First, that they Honour them, with all possible Observance and Obedience, and with an awful Veneration sub∣mit themselves to them. For it is their Duty to acknowledge their Preeminence, and their Domi∣nion over them; from whence the Royal and Ci∣vil Power are originally derived. And this Ho∣nour is in a twofold manner exhibited unto them; Inwardly, by the Affection and Esteem they have for them; and Outwardly, by their Words in Speaking to, and of them with all Reverence and respect; by Signs and Effects, as by rising up to them, serving them, staving off Harms, and pro∣curing their Good and welfare; by obeying their Commands, by submitting to their Will in all things, and by undertaking nothing without their Authority and Counsel.

IX. Children are bound to maintain their indi∣gent Pa∣rents. In the Second place, Children are bound to succour and relieve their Parents, if they be Poor and necessitous, as being Debtors to them. This is that which Nature teacheth, and which obtains amongst all Men, by the Law of Nations. It is an ancient Law, quoted by SENECA, Contro∣vers. 1. Let Children maintain their Parents, or else be cast into Prison. Because Parents here on Earth, are instead of GOD to their Children, tho' they may labour under Adversity and Poverty. They are as Creditors, to whom tho' they be im∣pious and contemners of the Laws, the Debt that is due to them must be paid notwithstanding. They are like so many Sovereign Princes, whose Actions and Counsels the Subjects may not pry into. And therefore Divines determin, that if a Man should meet with his Father and his Son in the same danger, and that he can only save one of them, he is bound to rescue his Father, rather than his Son. For to this he is bound by the tye of Blood, Reverence and Gratitude he owes to his Father; since he may have another Son, but can∣not have another Father.

CHAP. XXXIV. Of the Duties of Masters and Servants.

I. The Origi∣nal of ser∣vitude. AFter that Men were multiplied by Genera∣tion, Servitude was introduced into the World, and they who were born free, were forc'd to own Superiors. For after that Dominion and Government, was come into the Hands of a few Men, many being compell'd by Poverty, or by the Dulness of their Intellectuals, did proffer their Labour and Service to great Men, upon condition of being maintained by them, and supply'd with necessaries. Afterwards by the occasion of Wars arising between several Nations, and the longest Sword carrying it, it so happened that they who were taken in War, were made Slaves to those who had conquered them. And therefore the La∣tin word Servus, which signifies a Slave or Ser∣vant, is derived from Servo, which signifies to Save, because they were such as in War, were saved alive by the General. §. 3. Just. de Jur. Per∣son.

II. How Chri∣stians be∣come Ser∣vants. But this Custom is antiquated amongst Christi∣ans, and it is a received Law amongst them, that no Christians may be made Slaves. Tho' when Christians wage VVar against Infidels, and are taken by them, they make Slaves of them, because this is the Common Law of Nations; and this Servitude is a kind of Permutation for the Death, to which it was in the power of the In∣fidels to make them submit. For tho' it be con∣trary to Nature, to enslave a Man that is born free; yet it seems consentaneous to Naturalright, that he who rashly takes up Arms against one that is more powerful than himself, and will not hearken to Peace, being taken Captive by the Conqueror, should be obliged to serve him, and be subject to his Command.

III. Two sorts of Servants The are 2 sorts of Servants; the one, of those who contrary to the Law of Nature, are entirely at the VVill and dispose of a strange Lord or Ma∣ster: Another are such, as let themselves to others for Hire, and give them their Labour for Re∣compence or Reward.

IV. The mutual Duties of Masters and Ser∣vants. The Master is bound to pay to his Temporary Hired Servant, the VVages he hath agreed with him for, and be as good as his VVord to him; as the Servant on the other hand is obliged to per∣form the VVork and Service he hath agreed to, and diligently effect whatsoever else he hath engaged himself to do. And forasmuch as in this their mu∣tual Contract and Agreement, the condition of the Master is above the Servant, an Obligation ariseth thence in the VVorkman, to carry himself with all Reverence to his Master, according to the degree of Dignity, wherein he is placed above him. If he have not been faithful in performing, what he had engaged himself to do, or not dili∣gent enough in his VVork, that he willingly sub∣mit himself to his Correction, to receive the re∣ward of his Negligence or VVickedness. If a Servant either driven by necessity, or of his own accord, have put himself into any ones Service, his Master is bound to provide for him accord∣ingly. Neither can the Ingratitude, or Obstinate humour of the Servant deliver him from his Ob∣ligation herein; tho' for a Punishment of his Of∣fence, he may diminish his allowance of Food, to chastize his negligence or sturdy humour. Yea if he should neglect the Commands laid upon him, and should refuse to go through the work he had undertaken, the Master may withold part of his Wages, which he had agreed with him for.

V. A Master is bound to pay for his Ser∣vants. A Master is bound to make Good the Dam∣age done by his Servants: Because the fault of his Servant is imputed to be his; and according to the Lawyers, an Action may be had against the Master of the Bondslave, for any Damage Culpa∣bly committed by him: And accordingly the Ma∣ster must either make good the Damage, or deli∣ver his Slave to him who hath suffered the Dam∣age. Thus the Master of a Ship is bound to make good the loss of it, in case it chance to mis∣carry in a Tempest, for want of a good Steers∣man. I added Culpably committed by him, be∣cause if the loss happen without his fault, neither the Servant nor Master are bound to make it good, except that it can be proved, that he is grown Richer by means of the said loss.

VI. The care of Masters to wards their Servants. A Master must not suffer his Servants to be Sau∣cy or Idle, and if he finds them remiss and neg∣ligent in their Work, he ought to reprove and chastise them. If they commit any Crime, he may punish them according to the quality of it, yet not over-cruelly. I call a too cruel Punish∣ment, Maiming, Wounding, or such grievous beat∣ing whereby the Lif•• of the Servant would be endanger'd, or at least the loss of one of his Mem∣bers. It is only permitted therefore to a Master, to correct his Servant by a lighter sort of Punish∣ments, as by beating him in such a manner, whence no hurt can redound to his Body. For seeing that Servants are subject to their Masters Chastise∣ment••, they ought to submit to that Punishment, he thinks fit to inflict upon them.

VII. Servants can enter into Coven∣ants. Servants notwithstanding the tye they are un∣der, yet can enter into Covenants or Contracts, so that by this means they may be under an Active, as well as passive Obligation. For tho' Servitude do restrain the Power of Servants, and almost de∣prives them of Civil Rights; yet it leaves them in full possession of the Law of Nature, which by no means can be abrogated. And accordingly JUSTINIAN tells us, Inst. de Jur. Nat. Gent. & Civil. That Natural Laws which are equally observed by all Nations, are the constitutions of the Divine Providence, and as such do always continue firm and immutable. Whence it follows, that both Servants, and those with whom they have contracted, are in the Court of Conscience bound to the Observation of their Agreements, and the faithful performance of what they have engaged themselves to do.

VIII. Servants cannot ali∣enate the Goods of their Ma∣sters. Servants have no power to alienate their Ma∣sters Goods, no not so much as to give an Alms; for seeing that no Administration of their Goods is committed to them, and that it is a piece of In∣justice to relieve the Poverty of the Indigent out of the substance that belongs to another, it is clear that they cannot bestow any thing upon the Poor; without it can be probably supposed, that they have their Masters consent for it; or that the ne∣cessity of the Indigent be so extream, that it may seem to plead an excuse for the irregularity of the fact.

IX. Servants are not bound to obey their Masters in any thing that is E∣vil. Servants are not bound to obey their Masters, in those things that are Evil in their own Nature, that is, which are contrary to the Laws of Na∣ture or Nations, or to the Law of GOD, what∣ever advantage either themselves or their Masters might hope to reap from it. Because we are never to do any Evil that Good may come of it. Where∣fore they who either by their command or advice, do intice their Servants or others to Evil, or that put an occasion of doing mischief into the Hands of others, to the end that they may get some ad∣vantage thereby, do greatly Sin in so doing, they making themselves guilty of the Crime, who per∣suade or command it.

CHAP. XXXV. Of the Right of Sovereign Dominion, and the different forms thereof.

I. When So∣vereign Power had its rise. THE Right of Sovereign Dominion, besides what is Paternal, took its Beginning, when Men like Beasts, lived in the Fields, Woods and Caves of the Earth: for being wearied with this irregular kind, they began to think of entring into Societies, and voluntarily divesting themselves of their Liberty, committed themselves to the dispo∣sal of the whole Company, preferring the Judg∣ment of the Community before their own. The Power being thus placed in the Hands of the Mul∣titude, they took care for the particulars belong∣ing to it, that the great and powerful might not oppress the weak and needy, and that all the Members of the Society might enjoy the same Freedom of Living. But forasmuch as in process of time, it was found very inconvenient, both as to the deliberating about, and deciding of Affairs, to gather the suffrages of the whole Multitude be∣longing to the Society; they agreed that this Power should be setled on one Person only, or on a few. Whence a threefold form of Government took its Rise; so that now, as TACITUS ex∣presseth it, all Nations and Cities are Governed by the People, or the Great and Chief Men, or by Sovereigns; so that the Supream Power is some∣times in the Hands of a single Person, or of a few, or in the Hands of the Body of the People.

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To his Sacred Majestic William by the Grace of God, King of England, Scotland, France, and Jreland, Defendor of the Faith &c.^a.

This Plate in all humility is most humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome

* 1.3 When the Sovereign Command is in a single Person, this is call'd Monarchy, because he Governs the whole People, and himself is commanded by none; as the Kingdom of France, Spain, &c. When the Supream Power is lodg'd in a Council of a few select Citizens, this is call'd Aristocracy; such as obtains in the Commonwealth of the Vene∣tians. And lastly, When the Command is in the Hands of the whole Body of the People, it is called Democracy, or a Popular Government; such as is in Holland. Every one of these Forms of Go∣vernment, hath its own Peculiar and Fundamental Law, which it more particularly insists upon; Democracy, that of Liberty; Aristocracy, Security and defence from the Common People and Tyrant; and Monarchy, Sovereign Power, employ'd for the safeguard of the Publick Good.

III. The Wor∣thiness of Monarchy. Monarchy therefore is, when the Supream Power is lodg'd in one Person, on whom all the rest do depend. Altho' this Form of Government may agree with the other two, yet doth it excel them both, as possessing more Advantages than either of them. For Monarchy hath this Peculiar to it self, that it is more free in the Exercise of its Power, and can deliberate and determine without any set Time or Places, it being at the Kings Liberty to Deliberate or Determine at any time, or in any part of his Kingdom. Moreover it is obvious, that in Kingly Government, Counsels are carried on, as well as resolved, with greater Secrecy; Executed more readily; Factions and Seditions more easily prevented and crush'd; and Safety and Liberty, which the other Forms of Government so much affect, doth more abound, and is more lasting than in the two other Forms.

IV. In it all things are better ad∣ministred. If there be any Deliberation concerning the Peace, Union, and the Highest Good and Interest of the People, the Power concentred in One, will be able better and more readily to effect it, than the resemblance only of this Unity in many can possibly do it. Besides, that Form of Government must needs be the best, which most resembles the Eternal and Undivided Government and Empire of Almighty GOD: As also, because he whose Com∣mand continues as long as his Life, doth thereby become perfect in the Art of Ruling, and looks upon the whole Body of the People as his own Family, and embraceth and cherisheth them with a Paternal affection and tendermess.

V. What a Tyrant is. The opposite of such a Prince as we have now described, is a Tyrant, who either gets into the Throne contrary to the Laws and Customs of the Kingdom; or, who being lawfully advanc'd to it, doth only mind his own private Good, and fills the Society with Dread, Poverty, and Calamity. He who, contrary to Law, aspires to the Sovereign Dignity, and leaves nothing unattempted to obtain the Kingdom he has in his Eye: He who by the Massacres and Destruction of the People, the Pro∣scription of the Grandees, and the taking away of their Lives, makes his way to the Throne; without being asham'd of oppressing and grinding the People, or of destroying the Innocent, so he may but obtain what he hopes for. For Monarchy is not always such as it ought to be, but by the Vices of wicked Princes, is often turned into Tyranny. But certainly, the State of a Tyrant, whatever he may think of himself, is very miserable, who dreads those whom he oppresseth, and flees those whom he persecutes, the Fear he puts his Subjects into, recoyling back upon himself. Seeing, that as SENECA saith, it is unavoidable, but that He whom many fear, must fear many.

VI. The Defects of Aristo∣cracy. Neither is Aristocracy subject to less Inconve∣niences than Monarchy; whilst Wicked Men out of an ambitious desire of Rule, do by unjust Means endeavour to get into the Senate; following that Maxim, If Right be to be violated, let it be done for the obtaining of Rule and Government. Whilst by the Prevalency of a Faction, unworthy Persons are Elected, and Vertue and Desert post∣pon'd: Whilst those few that have the Power in their own Hands, do only mind the enriching and aggrandizing of themselves, and without being solicitous for the Good of the Subject, do treat them no otherwise, than if they were their Slaves.

VII. The Incon∣veniences of Demo∣cracy. Neither is Democracy subject to less dangerous Distempers; as when the People in whom the Power is lodg'd, manages the Government in a turbulent and tumultuary manner; when the more Rich and Powerful part of the People, do oppress and devour the lesser Fry, contemn the Magi∣strate, violently seize the Goods of others, without having the least regard to those that are Good and Innocent: When they make Laws from an itch∣ing desire of Novelty, and soon after as inconside∣rately annul them again: When they Enact and Decree that one day, which they abrogate the next; and exauctotate, what but a while ago so highly pleased them: Or, when Men unfit and of no Capacity, are raised to the highest Charges: And, when Men of an insolent and insulting Temper, do pronounce unjust Sentences, and enact burthensom Decrees, and afterward maintain and execute them by unjust Rigour.

CHAP. XXXVI. Of the Duties of Sovereign Princes.

I. Knowledge of Affairs is necessary to a Prince. IT is very much for the Interest of the Common∣wealth, that He who either by Nature or Chance is destinated to the Government and de∣fence of Society, should not only excel others in Vertue, but also in Knowledge of Business, espe∣cially of those which appertain to his Function. For how shall a Man be able to perform that he doth not understand? Or prescribe Laws to them, whose Temper and Inclinations he is not at all acquainted with? Wherefore it ought to be his great concern to mind this only, and contemning his Pleasure and Divertisments, to exercise himself in those things which conduce to this end.

II. The great aim and design of a Prince, must be the Publick Good. The first thing therefore that is to be minded by him that has the Sovereign Power, is, that the same has not been committed to him for his own sake alone, but for the Publick Good. For as the great End, as CICERO tells us, of the Master of a Ship, is a prosperous Voyage; that of a Phy∣sician, the Recovery of his Patient; that of a General, Victory: So the End of a Governour, i•• the happiness and welfare of the whole Commu∣nity, that so his Subjects may abound with Riches, be expert at their Arms, Renowned abroad, and Vertuous at Home.

III. Vertue and Wisdom is requisite in a Prince. A King will the more readily obtain this End, if he endeavour to excel all others in Vertue and Wisdom, as he is above them in Place and Dig∣nity. For seeing that the whole World are apt to imitate the Manners of their Prince, and his Ver∣tues or Vices, are commonly the Copies his Sub∣jects write after; it is his greatest Interest to pur∣sue Vertue, and lead a Good Life, that he may not be the Cause of Corrupting his Subjects, and en∣couraging them to Sin and Wickedness. Besides, how will a Prince ever be able to keep up his Authority and Dignity, if he be accounted Flagi∣tious and Vicious? Or with what Face will he be able to prescribe Laws of Temperance to others, who lives in the continual breach of the Laws he prescribes?

IV. Piety, Ju∣stice, Va∣lour and Clemency, are the necessary Vertues of a Prince. Of all Vertues, none is more necessary to a Prince, than that of Piety, to the end he may obtain of the Great GOD, by whom Princes Rule, Ability and Wisdom for the bearing of the Great Burthen that lies upon him; as well as that by means thereof, he may more powerfully engage to himself the Hearts of his Subjects, by their being persuaded, that he must needs be the peculiar Care of that GOD, whom he serves with so much Religion and Devotion. He must likewise be adorned with Justice, that he may Administer the Affairs of his Kingdom with Equity, Punish the Wicked, Reward those, who by their good Ser∣vices have defended or promoted the Interest or Glory of the Commonwealth, and with a constant and unchangeable Will, give to every one his due. He must also be qualified with Valour and Cle∣mency, that by the one he may keep Ill-men to their Duty, and by Fear restrain those who are apt to be Factious and Seditious, and to disturb the Peace of the Commonwealth: And that by the other, he may be ready to Forgive, and gain the Hearts of his Subjects by his Goodness and Benignity. Liberality also is a Vertue that well becomes a Prince, as being of use to him, not only for the obliging and rewarding of his Good Subjects; but also to acquire the Reputation of Bountiful, which is so generally taking, and so highly esteem'd amongst Men. But yet a Prince must be prudent in the Exercise of this Vertue, so as to make choice of Worthy Persons, on whom to bestow his Muni∣ficence, lest by gratifying Base and Undeserving Men, he stir up Envy and Hatred in the Hearts of his Subjects, and expose himself to their Re∣proaches and Contempt. In a word, There is no Vertue which is not necessary for him, who is plac'd on high to be an Example to others, and whose private Sins, by their spreading Contagion, come to be Epidemical Vices of the whole Com∣monwealth. For who stands in greater need of Prudence, than he whose Function it is to deliberate concerning things of the highest moment? Who hath occasion for a more unchangeable Truth and Faithfulness to his Word, than he, who is greater than the Laws? Who ought to be so qualified with a more resolved Constancy, than he who is entrusted with the Concerns and Welfare of all? Who wants a higher degree of Continence, than a Person to whom every thing is subject? Or whom doth Vertue become better than him, who hath all Men to be his Spectators and Wit∣nesses?

V. A Prince ought to be well ac∣quainted with the Nature of his King∣dom. Another Duty of a Prince is, that he be well acquainted with the Temper and State of his Kingdom and Cities: Because the way of Govern∣ing is not every where alike, and according to the different Condition of Kingdoms, different Laws are to be Enacted accordingly. In the First place therefore, he ought to know what are the Funda∣mental Laws of his Kingdom; whether the Go∣vernment, to which he is elevated, be purely Mo∣narchical; or whether it have an allay of Aristo∣cracy and Democracy? What part the Nobles have of the Government, and what the Commons? And in the next place he ought to know the Large∣ness of his Kingdom, the Situation, Commerce, and Strength of it: Who are the Neighbours that bound upon his Kingdom, and what Profit or In∣convenience may accrue to him from their mutual Friendship or Discord.

VI. As also with what passeth in Foreign Countries. A Prince also ought to be well informed con∣cerning what passeth in Forein Countries, that he may be the more ready to counterwork and oppose their Designs, to the prejudice of his State. For seeing that Civil Societies are as in a perpetual State of War and Hostility, and that in this State Men are not obliged to keep their Treaties: When one of the Parties gives occasion to the other, to distrust his Faithfulness; it is highly necessary, that a Sovereign have good Intelligence concern∣ing the Enterprizes and Designs of Strangers against his State, to the end, that if he find they intend to break their Treaties with him, he may not think himself obliged to keep his. And so to be always ready, either for Peace or War.

VII. A Prince stands in need of Faithful Counsell or It is a great Argument of the Prince's Prudence, to make choice of Wise Counsellors, Men Eminent for their Honesty, Great Experience, Faithfulness and Prudence. He must also take care, that he be not offended with Truth, if any thing be spoke or advis'd by them contrary to his Mind; but let him embrace and encourage Sincerity, and con∣temn and hate Flattery wheresoever he meets with it.

VIII. Must have an Eye to the Admi∣nistration of his Chief Ministers and Great Officers. He ought also to take great heed, that his Offi∣cers and Lieutenants keep within the bounds of their Duty, and that they may not be injurious to any. That those who are the Governours of Cities and Provinces, do not enrich themselves by op∣pressing of the Subjects: That the Chief Com∣manders of his Army, keep their Souldiers within the bounds of due Discipline, not suffering them to violate the Martial Laws without present Punish∣ment: That the Judges exercise Justice, and render to every one what belongs to them. Of all which things, I have handled at large in my Treatise of the Best Government, to which I refer my Reader.

IX. The Duties of a Prince in time of Peace, is to take Care of Religion But forasmuch as the Duties of a Prince do relate either to a Time of Peace or War, we must also treat of them in particular. His first Duty therefore in Times of Peace is, that he take care to promote the Honour of GOD, and encourage Religion and Godliness, and suffer no Innovation in Matters of Worship. By which means he will have GOD to favour him in all his Undertakings, and will engage his Subjects to have a great Esteem and Veneration for him.

X. To encou∣rage Arts. In the Second place, he ought to be careful in encouraging and promoting all Arts; not only those which are surnamed Liberal or Ingenuous, and which are of great Advantage and Honour to the Government; but others also, which we call Mechanical, and especially those that are of greatest use to the Commonwealth, and bring the greatest Profit and Riches to the Kingdom; as are those of Agriculture and Navigation, whereof the former furnisheth his Subjects with the Necessaries of Life; and the latter carries on Trade with Foreign Na∣tions, and is a means of enlarging his Dominions, and bringing Treasure to his Coffers. And what is more, He that is Master of the Sea, may in some sense, be said to be Master of the Land also.

XI. To keep and per∣form his Treaties faithfully and pun∣ctually. Thirdly, A Monarch must be careful to observe the Peace, and other Treaties he hath made with other Nations, so as never to suffer the same to be violated. For nothing is more shameful or hazar∣dous to a Sovereign, than to break his Word; because by this means he teacheth his Subjects, upon occasion, to serve him after the same manner, and to revolt from him.

XII. To have an Army al∣ways in a readiness. Fourthly, He must make it his business to be always provided of a good Army, to prevent the Faction of any of his Nobles; or to suppress the Conspiracies or Rising of any other of his Subjects. I understand by Faction, a Company of Seditious Persons, which have united themselves for the carrying on of some design, without the permission of him who governs the State.

XIII. To curb all Ambitious and Aspi∣ring Spi∣rits. He must also be mindful to curb and restrain Ambitious persons, and such who have a disposi∣tion to Rebel, and to put the State in confusion. For seeing that there are in all Governments, Per∣sons who suppose themselves more wise and able to manage the Publick Affairs, than those who are charged with them, they will not be wanting by all manner of ways to defame and reproach their Conduct; and not finding their Ambitious desires satisfied in the present state of Affairs, would be ready to overthrow the Settlement, if the Prince were not always in a readiness to oppose and crush their Designs.

XIV. To restrain Factions. Fifthly, In case it happen so, that he be not in a condition, to break the grown Faction in his Kingdom, that then he make use of Men esteemed for their Piety and Worth, before that he have recourse to Arms, that by their Authority and Favour they may appease the Minds of these Mu∣tineers, and bring them to Reason. And in case they are stubborn, and will not acquiesce in their Reasons, no•• give ear to their Exhortations, that then he resolve to vindicate the Contempt of his Authority by force of Arms, and to crush the Rebellion in the Egg, lest being grown strong, it prove troublesom to him, and render the Sore incurable. To this end it will be very conducive, if the Sovereign take care, by all means, that his Subjects may be eminent for Vertue, and abound with Riches, and be plentifully stored with all the Conveniences and Necessaries of Life, but yet without Excess. For as Physicians tell us, that Diseases are caused by Intemperance or Excess in Eating or Drinking: So the Corruption of Man∣ners, the Contempt of the Laws, and the Inso∣lence of the People, is often caused by the too great affluence of Riches; except the Prince takes care to prevent it, by engaging the Rich to contri∣bute liberally to the Necessities of the Poor, and by the abundance of their Wealth, relieve the Wants of their Indigent Neighbours.

XV. What are the Duties of a Prince in reference to War. But because the Sovereign Majesty, as JUSTI∣NIAN saith, must not only be armed with the Laws, but also fenced with Arms, that he may be in a condition to govern his Kingdom successfully in times of War, as well as Peace; he is to take care, that he do not engage himself in any War rashly, nor indeed without urgent Necessity. As a Physician, who hath no recourse to actual Caute∣ries or Amputation, till he hath in vain attempted all other Means: Whether therefore a Prince de∣sign to engage himself in an Offensive War against any, or that he resolves only to be on the Defen∣sive, he ought to make an exact estimate of his Force, and duly consider whether he be in a condition to execute the Exploit he intends, or to resist the Force of him that attacks his State. For if he find himself too weak for his Adversary, it will be great Imprudence for him to attack his Enemy, lest by being worsted, he give an occasion to his Adversary to Invade that rightfully, which before he could not do without great Injustice. Wherefore in this case, it will be his Wisdom by Mediation, to prevent the Invasion of his Enemies, and chuse rather to lose something of his Right, than to hazard the Loss of his whole Kingdom. For Right Reason teacheth a Man, to seek for Peace by all possible means, and that he never ought to prepare for War, till he find that there is no hopes of obtaining a Just and Honosurable Peace. But on the other hand, when a Prince, after extream Provocations, hath taken up Arms, and driven the Invader out of his own Kingdom, let him enter that of his Enemy, and endeavour to make them repent of their Folly, and bring them to Reason: But yet so, as that he may do nothing contrary to the Requirings of Religion and Reason.

XVI. What a Prince is to do after Victory. After that he hath gotten the Victory, let him take care to spare the Innocent, and those who have not shewed themselves Inhuman and Cruel in the VVars. It is the part of a Man of Valour, saith TULLY, to look upon them as Enemies who contend for the Victory, but to consider those that are Conquer'd, as Men; to the end that Valour may put an end to VVar; and Humanity, on the other hand cherish and promote Peace. Whereas, on the contrary, it is perfect madness to destroy those Things or Persons, that do not diminish the strength of the Enemy, nor increase that of the Conquerour: For he who thus inconsiderately and barbarously wastes all before him, doth not look upon the things he destroys to be his own, but to belong to another.

CHAP. XXXVII. Of the Duties of Citizens.

I. Whence Cities had their Rise. MAN is so great a Lover of Society, and doth so much delight in the Company of such as are like him, that he can scarcely frame himself to live alone. But forasmuch as Society cannot be long preserved without Peace; and Peace is the Fruit of Union, and Union supposeth Order; Order, Distinction; Distinction, Dependance; and Dependance, Authority: Hence it came to pass,

that Men came together, and first lesser Societies and afterwards greater were formed which gave name to Cities.

II. The Duties of Citizens are either General or Special. The Duties of a Citizen may be reduc'd to two kinds, viz. General, or Particular. The for∣mer of these, take their rise from the common Obligation, by which they are obnoxious to the Civil Government: But the latter proceed from the particular Duty, to the performance whereof e∣very one is bound, according to the calling he is in, or the Function impos'd upon him. The General Duty of Citizens respects either the Ma∣gistrate, that is, the Governours or Rulers of the City; or the Body of the City, that is, the Members thereof.

III. It is the Duty of Citizens to Honour the Magistrate. A Citizen is bound not only to obey the Magi∣strate, but also to be faithful to them, and shew all Honour and Reverence. For it is but reason∣able and becoming that he should express his Re∣spect to those, whom he knows do excel him in Dignity. Since Dignity took its name from the latin word Dignus, because they were thought worthy to bear Rule over others, and to take care of the Government. And accordingly it is very agreeable to reason, that those who are subject to their Command, being content with their condi∣tion, be Enemies to all novelties or innovations in the State, and acquiesce in their Decrees, rather than in those of any other. That they put a good interpretation upon all their Actions, and be not too curious searchers into their Lives and Actions, but in all things willingly submit to their Com∣mands.

IV. The Duty of a Citi∣zen with respect to the whole City. A Citizen peforms the Duty he ows to the whole City, whil'st he prefers the Weal and welfare of it, before his own, and desires nothing more, than that it may enjoy full Safety and undisturb'd Hap∣piness. Whilst he chearfully contributes his Wealth and Fortune for the preservation of it; being ready to expose his Life to mortal dangers for the Defence of it, and to hazard a Part for the Preservation of the Whole. Whilst he omits nothing, that may serve to advance the Glory and Honour of it, and lays out all the Strength of his Soul and Body, to render it Illustrious and Magni∣ficent.

V. How he satisfies his Duty to∣wards his Fellow Ci∣tizens. A Citizen dischargeth his Duty towards his Fel∣low-Citizens, whilst he behaves himself Kind and Benevolent to all, and makes it his business, to maintain and preserve the exercise of Peace, and mutual good Offices between them. Whilst he shews himself Affable and Courteous to all, and difficult to no body, being always ready to succour, help and assist them, whenever any occasion pre∣sents it self, or Necessity requires it. For seeing that the Laws of Cities are design'd and intended for the common Good and advantage, every one promotes his own Interest, whilst he endeavours that of the Publick, and takes the ready way to procure his own welfare and Prosperity, whilst he lays out himself for that of the Commonwealth▪ and every particular Member of it. Wherefore he doth not torment himself, to see the more splen∣did Fortunes his Fellow-Citizens enjoy, nor the high degree of Dignity to which they are exalted▪ nor that affluence of Riches wherewith they a∣bound: But remembring himself to be a Member of the City, considers all that to be his own, which he sees the rest of his Fellow-Citizens enjoy.

VI. The special Duties of a Citizen. The Special Duties are such as belong to every particular Citizen, or are peculiar to some only. As to the first of these, it is a Duty incumbent upon all, that no Citizen take upon him any Publick Office, or stand for it, but what he is fit for, and able to discharge. For what Man, that is altogether ignorant of Chirurgery, will be so mad as to undertake those Operations, whereon the Life of other Men depend? Or where is he, that being altogether ignorant in the Art of Naviga∣tion, will undertake to carry a Ship to the East-Indies? But the place is offered me, without any of my own seeking. What then, is it to be sup∣posed that others are better acquainted with my abilities than I my self am? A Blind Man will never be able to guid and lead the Blind, and he who by his presumption, makes himself the cause of the hurt and damage of the whole Society, draws the Guilt of the Publick Ruin upon himself.

VII. The Duty of Coun∣sellours. Counsellours, and those who with their advice assist the Rulers of the City, ought to use their ut∣most diligence, that nothing may be hid from them, that is conducive to the Good and welfare of the City. They must freely and boldly declare, what they know to be necessary for the safety and flourishing condition of it; but without being byast by any corrupt Affections, and without be∣ing dazled with the Fortune and Dignity, mind on∣ly the persons of those they speak to, lest by flat∣tering their Rulers they make themselves vile and contemptible, and by being led aside by their de∣praved Affections, they dishonour and abuse the Majesty of their Function, and poison and taint the Minds of their Governours. Let them solicitously keep themselves from being corrupted by Gifts and Bribes, and shew themselves upon all occasions, as impenetrable and immoveable as a Wall of Brass, against all the Attacks of the most powerful and insinuating dint of Mony. Let them also be the greatest contemners of Pleasure, and being wholly intent on the good and advantage of the Common∣wealth, prefer the safety and interest thereof, be∣fore any of their private concerns.

VIII. The Duties of Priests or Mini∣sters. Those persons who are dedicated to the Service of GOD and his Worship, must above all things take care to lead an Innocent and Holy Life, and converse amongst their Parishioners with all Gra∣vity, always mindful of the Character they are invested with, and that they are taken from a∣mongst Men, to transact their concerns with GOD; to be as it were Intercessors with GOD, and Mediators to interpose between Men and the Divine Wrath: That they be careful to avoid all novel Doctrins, and never deliver any thing to the People that is contrary to sound Doctrin, and primitive Christianity.

IX. The Duty of Profes∣sors. Professors, whose Duty it is to teach and instruct others, must take care that their informations be built on good and sound Principles, and that with their utmost endeavours they avoid Falsehood and Errors. Let them also decline the Perverse Hu∣mors of some, who pretending to be free, and enga∣ged to no Mans Opinion, are ready to teach and defend the most opposit Opinions, and to blow Hot and Cold from the same Mouth. They must also be very cautious, that they broach no Opi••i∣ons that are inconsistent with the Peace of Soci∣ety, or that may occasion any difference betwixt the Citizens. Let them also shun all discord

amongst themselves; and consider that they go the ready way to expose the Respect due to their Function, by being divided in their Sentiments, and sowing the Seeds of dissension and Discord in those places, which should be the seminaries of Vertue and ingenious Literature. Besides, what credit can be given to their informations, if all that they teach be no better than Problems, and where the Affirmative and Negative are equally made void? Wherefore, it is their Duty to neglect all those Doctrins and Opinions, which are of no use or advantage to the Commonwealth, and dero∣gate from the honour due to their Profession.

X. The Duty of Generals or Com∣manders of Armies. Generals, who are entrusted with the Command of the Forces of the State, ought to take care that the Souldiers that are listed be strong and vi∣gorous, both as to their Age and Constitution, and must provide for their being well exercised and versed in Military Discipline, and to harden them to all Warlike Labours and Difficulties. As like∣wise to fu••nish them with Arm••, Offensive▪ and Defensive; and a••ove all things provide sufficien•• Magazines, and Stores of Provision and Ammu∣nition, that their Designs may not miscarry for want of these necessaries. They must also have Spies at hand, to discover the condition and de∣signs of the Enemy, and by this means be able to choose fit ••••••••sions to set upon them, or intercept their Recruits or Provisions. They must also have an Eye, that their Souldiers be not defraud∣ed of their Pay, by the extorsion of the under Officers, for otherwise they will never be able to restrain them from Plundering and Robbing, nor to keep them from Tumultuous Insurrections.

XI. The Duty of Soul∣diers. The Duty of Souldiers, on the other hand is, that they be content with their P••y, and ab••tain from Plandering and Spoiling, or vexatious oppres∣sing of the Country People, with whom they are Quartered. That they willingly endure the trouble and wearisomness of Marches, and the Labours of the Camp, considering that they do all this for the good and safety of the Publick, wherein their own is included. That they take heed of running Rashly and Headlong into dangers; as well as of Cowardly declining them, when they are called to face them; that they never stir from the Post as∣signed to them, for the greatest danger, and ra∣ther choose to dye Honourably, than to live re∣proached.

XII. The Duty of Ambas∣sadors. They who are sent to Negotiate the concerns of the State to Forein Courts, must be persons of a quick Wit, and very Circumspect; not easily giving credit to Rumors, but being able by their Sagacity to discern vain and false Reports, from true and solid; neglecting the talk of the Com∣mon People, and above all things, taking great heed not to discover any thing, which it is their Masters interest should be kept Secret. Whilst they are in Forein Courts, let them never lend an easy Ear to the Suggestions of great Men, and be impenetrable by any thing of Bribe or Corrup∣tion.

XIII. The Duty of Recei∣vers and Treasurers. They who are the Receivers and Treasurers of the Publick Monies, must take heed of oppressing the Subject in their gathering of it; must not be too exact and rigorous in the le••ying▪ or by their Ava••••ce exto•••• more from their Fel•••••••• Citizens, than is their due to pay. When by the Authority of their Superior, they are charged to pay any Sum, that they do it readily, without putting the Expectants to any expence of Time or Mony, be∣fore they can receive it: And never defer the pay∣ment of any Salary 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Re••ard, tho' to their grea∣test Enemies, after they have received orders for it.

XIV. How long Citizens are under the Obligation of these Special Duties. All these Special Duties Citizens are obliged to perform, as long as they continue in the exer∣cise of those Functions, to which they are annext, and from whence they proceed; and cease upon their discontinuance, viz. when either the Officer i•• put out of his place▪ or resigns it▪ or that the Charge it self be discontinued, as be••ng thought no longer necessary. In like manner the General Duty of Citizen ceaseth, when leaving the City, and setling elsewhere, he ceaseth to be a Member of it: O•• when for some Crime a p••••son is ••••∣nis••••t from the Society; or when bein•• taken P••••∣son••r by a Conquer••••, he i•• carried away to a strange Country.

☞ Fol. 177. for Chap. XXVI. Read XXIV.

The End of the Institution.

Notes

• * 1.1

  III. Ethicks ••••rts the Diseases of the Soul.
• * 1.2

  III. What a Promise is.
• * 1.3

  II. Of the three kinds or forms of Govern∣ment.