An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Law of Nature and Right Reason, with the Practical Dictates thereof.

I. Men tho' never so wicked, ow•• the Law of Nature. SUch a deep sense of the Law of Nature is imprest upon the Mind of Man, that even the most Wicked and Perverse do profess ••o own and follow it: For Men in all their Acti∣ons appeal to the Law of Nature, and contend that they act according to it. A Covetous Wretch that with an insatiable desire scrapes and rakes to∣gether Riches, pretends that he acts herein accor∣ding to the impulse of Nature, and follows her Teaching. An Ambitious Person, that by any means, tho' never so wicked and flagitious, makes his way to Honour and Dignities, meanly fawn∣ing upon some, that he may crush others, sup∣poseth himself all this while acting conformable to Nature. He that is a Slave to his Lust, and a∣bandons himself to Luxury and Idleness, brings in Nature to justifie his Lewdness, and contends that his Debauchery is consonant to her Laws: In a word, there is nothing so unworthy and con∣trary to Reason but hath its Abetters, that will prove it to be conformable to the Light of Na∣••••re.

II. Every Na∣tion hates Vice and Wickedness and punish∣eth it. But these Wretches are much mistaken, who take their Lusts for the Law of Nature, and sup∣pose the greatest violation of her, to comport with her own Dictates. For what Nation was ever so far corrupted, as not to condemn Murthers, In∣cest, Theft, Rapin and the like? For Nature, tho' it be greatly deprav'd and weakned in some Coun∣tries, yet for all that cannot patronize Sin; and as long as the least spark of Reason still glimmers in them, they condemn what other Nations forbid and punish. The Laws of Nature preserve and defend Nature, but are not destructive of it. Where∣fore it will be worth our pains to enquire here, whether there be any certain and unalterable Laws of well-living, and doing, to which all Men are obliged, the violation whereof is accounted cri∣minal amongst all Men: In order to the clearing whereof, we shall first consider what the Laws of Nature are, and how they may be defined.

III. What the Laws of Nature are. The Laws of Nature are nothing else but a certain Light or Notices which serve to guid and direct us in all particular occurrences, and which are derived from that general Reason, which GGD hath imprinted in the Souls of all men in their for∣mation. We say in the first place, that the Laws of Nature are certain Notices which serve to guid us, &c. to distinguish the Laws of Nature, from the Rules of Motion, which we sometimes also call Laws of Nature. We say in the second place, that they are derived from that general Reason, &c. to shew that the Laws of Nature, are nothing else but the consequences and effects of the Light of Nature; adding, which GOD hath imprinted on the Souls of all men; to signifie that the Laws of Nature are general and common, and that there is no Man in the World, how wicked and profligate soever he be, but hath some Sense and Knowledge of them, and that from GOD him∣self.

IV. These N tural Laws have GOD for their Author. And therefore ARISTOTLE Lib. 3 Politic. saith, he who will have the Law to bear sway, would have GOD to bear sway. As if he would inti∣mate

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Book. 1. Part. 10. Chap. 8

Aequa Lance.

••••ns Inv.

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To the Worshipfull S^r. Godfrey Kneller of Lubeck in Saxony, and of S^t. Pauls Covint Garden in Middlesex Knight▪ Principall Painter to their Majesties King William and Queen Mary.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

to us, that whatsoever Reason prescribes, ought not to be lookt upon, as the invention of Mans Wit, or the constitution of Nations; but as some∣thing Divine and Eternal, that governs the World by its Commands and Prohibitions. So that whatsoever deviates from this Eternal Law, is to be lookt upon as a Monster, and as a Sacriledge, against GOD, who is the Author of Nature, and of this Knowledge of Good and Evil in us. For what else, saith SENECA, is Nature but GOD and the Divine Reason diffused through the Uni∣verse and all the parts of it; which meets thee whither soever thou turnst thy self: All the Rea∣son that is in material things, is the Gift of GOD who ruleth all things.

V. That there are certain and un∣moveable Laws of Nature, proved from the Nature of things in general. And that there are such Eternals Laws may be demonstrated from the common Nature of things. For the World which imitates the Unity of its Au∣thor and principle, is governed by one Law com∣mon to all Creatures, which as it provides for the good of the whole Universe, so of every particu∣lar Being. For whatsoever is contained in the World, is subject to the Reason of the Divine Mind, who is the Regent of the Universe. For the Beings that are destitute of Reason follow their natural instinct, and like Arrrws shot by an expert Archer, fly directly to the Mark; and the Rational, who are guided by the dictates of their Judgment, tend to their appointed End. So that the former are necessarily, and the latter freely and of choice, subject to this common Law. Hence it is that CICERO L. 10 de legibus, saith, In the constituting of what is Right, we must take our Beginning from that supream Law, which took its rise before all Ages, when yet there was not any Written Law, or Civil society constituted. And notwithstanding that almost in every different Cli∣mate we meet with different Customs and Man∣ners; yet amongst them all, we shall find the Foot-steps of this Universal Law, which binds not only the Inhabitants of one particular Country, but also those of the whole World.

VI. From the Frame and constitution of Man. The same may be also made out from the end and Constitution of Man, whose peculiar privi∣ledge it is to have the use of Reason, and square his Life by it. For the Dictates of Reason are so evidently imprest upon his Mind, that he readily follows what is Just and Right without any Mat∣ter, without any Written Law, without any com∣pulsion of the Magistrate, and discerns betwixt that which is equal and unequal, by the Light of his Conscience only. It is vain and useles to in∣struct Men, that Murther and Adultery are Crimes, and that Theft must be avoided, seeing that the Light of Nature anticipated this their information, and that all these Laws were long before Written, on the Tables of their Hearts. And therefore the Sovereign Legislator in delivering those Laws cuts them short, Thou shall not kill. Thou shall not commit Adultery, without adding any reason of them, as taking for granted that he addrest them to those who knew that already. For a Ray of the Primordial Reason, appears in Man by a twofold preeminence; for being endued with Rea∣son, the light which illuminates other Creatures outwardly and superficially only, is his property and part of his Essence. And in the second place, the Sense of Right and Truth and Affection for it, is most intimately present in his Heart, whereby he is directed both in his Speculation and Practice. The Minds of Men are stored with the Seeds of Vertue and Honesty, which are excited by the least admonition, like a spark of Fire, which be∣ing only assisted with a small Blast, displays it self into a great Flame.

VII. How GOD hath im∣prest these Laws on the Mind of Man. For GOD being concernd for the Preservation of Man whom he hath made, hath of his infinite Goodness and Wisdom engraven in their Minds, when he united it to the Body, a general knowledge of what is Good, that is, an Idea of whatsoever is conducive to the preservation of that Union. And it is this Idea or Knowledge, which we call a Good understanding, Right Reason, the Light of Nature; and the particular Notices deri∣ved from this general Idea, are those we call the Laws of Nature.

VIII. Men that deviate from these Laws are to be herd∣ed amongst Beasts. And tho' some may think themseves very obse∣quious to the Law of Nature whilst they indulge their Flesh, and wholly abandon themselves to their Lusts, whilst they cram themselves like Swine, and are as Luxurious as Goats: Yet most cer∣tain it is that such Men as these do not follow their Human, but Animal Inclinations, and in a word, live like Beasts: For would they but atten∣tively search into their own Bosoms, and consult the Law of Universal Nature written in their Hearts, it would appear a most monstrous and unjust thing to them, thus to disguise themselves with the Manners and Passions of Brutes, seeing that they are reasonable Creatures, and as such are obliged to direct their Lives, not by the compass of Sense, but Reason. They only Live according to Nature, who square their Actions by Reason, and who confine themseves to these three Precepts, to Live Honestly, not to Hurt another, to give every one his due. Which Precepts by the unanimous Suf∣frage, both of the wise and common People, are called the Fountains of all other, and a compen∣dious, but Essential Institution of the Law of Nature.

IX. The certain¦ty of the Laws of Nature con∣firmed from the Rela∣tion Man hath to o∣ther Rati∣onal Agents. These unalterable Laws of a good Life, may be further demonstrated from the Relation Man hath to other Rational Agents; for seeing that Man is a Sociable Creature, and affects the compa∣ny of such as are like him, it is necessary there should be some Laws, whereby they might be engaged to lend their mutual assistance one to ano∣ther, and directed to Love their Neighbours. Ac∣cordingly Men following the impulse of Nature, and entring into Civil Societies, establisht this first Standard of Justice, To live Honestly, to hurt no Body, and to give to every one his Right. It is the Right of Nature, saith the Law l. 206. F••de Reg. jur. that no Body enrich himself with the damage of another. And therefore we find that there is no Nation so depraved in their Manners, which doth not abhor and abominate ungrateful Persons, Mutherers of Parents, Breakers of Covenants, Deceivers, &c. and think them worthy of the worst of Punishments, looking upon them as profest Enemies of Society, and violaters of the Law of Na∣ture. How dismal would the condition of Man∣kind be, if it were lawful for every one to do what he listed, and to make his own Lust and Humour the Rule of Good and Evil? What House, what Palace would be secured from devouring Flames, if any one at pleasure might put Fire to them, and warm himself at the cost of another?

What Wife would be safe within her Husbands Arms, if there were no Laws to secure publick Honesty, and to guard the Enclosure of the Conjugal Bed? Nature hath deeply engraven this precept in the Hearts of all, Do not that to ano∣ther, which thou would'st not have another do to thee; this is that Dictate, which is present to all Mens Minds, and directs them, if so be they do not stop their Ears to its Voice, and listen to their Passions rather than their Reason.

X. Man is furnisht with the Idea's of Good and Evil, which are such of their own Nature. From what hath been said, may be gathered, that there are some certain and immutable Idea's of Good and Evil, whereby, under the sole guid∣ance of Nature, we distinguish things that are just, from those that are unjust, and things honest, from filthy and unbecoming: Like as by the differ∣ent notations of Figures, we distinguish Mathe∣matical Schemes, and separate them from one ano∣ther. For as we define Figures, not by Sense, but by Reason; so we perceive what is right or un∣just by Reason; which teacheth us that Good is to be desired, and Evil to be avoided. The ground whereof is this, because Good and Evil from whence our Idea's are taken, do not depend on the Judgment of any private person, or of any mul∣titude of Men how great soever, but are such of their own Nature, and therefore necessarily to be embraced, or avoided by Intellectual Creatures. For as the Understanding of Man doth not enquire what appears to some to be Truth, but what is Truth simply and in it self: So likewise the Will of Man, doth not embrace that for Good, which seems to be so to some private persons, or to most Men, but what is really and immutably so, and which is to be chosen and embraced in spite of, and notwithstanding all the Reluctance of our Animal propension. And therefore as there is some∣thing in Nature which is absolutly and simply True; so likewise must there be something that is good in its own Nature, and for its own worth and loveliness to be desired by the Will of Man. And therefore as he abuseth his faculty of Under∣standing, who being imposed upon by the decep∣tions of Sense or Imagination, doth not perceive what is naturally True; so in like manner he also abuseth his faculty of Willing, who suffers himself to be so blinded by his Animal Appetite, as not to chuse that which is good of its own Nature, and for want of due attention fails of his end and aim.

XI. Some Sen∣tences into which Mo∣ral Reason may be re∣solved. Now what Method or Order a Man is to follow in his choice, and what Good he is to em∣brace in such Circumstances, will appear from the subjoyned Axioms, into which the whole Nature of Vertue may be resolved.

1. That is accounted Good, which is agreeable to Intellectual nature, and is commensurate to its State and Condition, and is some way or other con∣ducive to the Conservation of the perceiver.

2. On the contrary, that is accounted Evil, which is inimicitious or opposit to an Intellectual Nature with respect to its Condition, and causeth grief and aversion to it; and if it threaten its destruction, then is it esteemed to be the worst of Evils.

For one Evil supervening to another, is there∣by made the more Heavy. For it is seldom seen saith ALEXANDER ab ALEXANDRO, that a Commonwealth shaken at once with inte∣stine and forein War, can hold out long; for the superadded danger by dividing their Councils and Subsidies, which otherwise were scarce sufficient to stem its double Tide, makes them still weaker, and so at last over-throw the tottering Com∣monwealth.

3. All Good is not equal, as the Stoicks held, but some preferable to other, since it is certain that that Good is more excellent, which exceeds another in Nature, Duration, or both.

For it cannot be questiond but that GOD, who is Eternal, and who by his Nature includes all o∣ther perfections, must needs be a more excellent Good than the Creature, how perfect soever. And that an Angel in Goodness excells Man and Beasts. So that the value of Good may be considered after a twofold manner; either Intensively, as it affords the greatest satisfaction to the Mind; or Extensi∣vely, according to its more ample diffussion of the same, and its greater tendency to the Good of the Universe. From whence afterwards follows its Duration; for the more durable any Good is, the more excellent it must be also, and is so to be esteemed.

4. It is the peculiar property of Good to move the Will to the choice and embracing of it; whereas Evil produces the contray effect; and even as a greater Good kindles a greater Love of it self; so a less Evil is to be born, to avoid a greater.

Because a less Evil, with regard to a greater has the appearance of Good. Whence came that com∣mon Axiom amongst Moralists, that of 2 Evils the least is to be chosen. For seeing that Nature doth always what is best, therefore it also avoids the greater Evil; for a less Evil comes nearer to Good, and is accounted comparatively Good. Hence it is that Men to avoid being burnt, cast themselves from a Precipice, or leap into a River to avoid the Jaws of a Wild Beast, or the Sword of a Robber, and to keep themselves from perishing there, lay hold of Thorns or Briars or any thing how painful soever, to save their Lives.

5. If any thing happen to us, whose nature we are ignorant of, we may safely trust those, who profess themselves skilful in that matter; in case we are fully persuaded of their skill and faithful∣ness, and that it be evident to us, that there is no deceit in the matter, or desire of particular gain or advantage.

6. Tho' the event of things be doubtful, yet when ever we apprehend that any Good thing will happen, we ought to take as much pains to obtain it, as if it were present; since if we do so, it shall certainly come to be our lot at last.

7. In the judging and discerning of things, we are to take care that the Mind may be free from all the Prejudices of Infancy, and Enticements of our Passions; for the Understanding being clouded with the dark smoak of the Passions, cannot dis∣cern the Good, and the Will following its gui∣dance, mistakes in her choice.

XII. Our Duty to others. These few Sentences or Axioms, are sufficient for the forming of Ethical Demonstrations, and for the begetting in us the 4 Vertues hereafter to be explained. And as to the Duty we owe to others, the same is comprehended in this general Axiom, Whatsoever thou wouldst not have another do to thee, neither do thou to him. Which is of as great extent and force in Morals, as Charity or Divine Love, (which comprehends all Vertues and Graces)

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Book. 1. Part. 10. Chap. 9.

G Freman. Inv.

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To the Worshipfull Francis Lane of Glen∣don in the County of Northampton Esq^r. And to Elizabeth his wife, eldest Daughter, and Coeheyre of Andrew Lant of Thorp-vnderwood in the said County Esq^r. dec^eased

This Plate is humbly dedicated by Richard Blome.

is in Divinity. Thus a Man, from the Command of GOD, considers his Neighbour, and learns to love him as himself: For in a like case, and in a like respect to GOD and his Law, a like Judg∣ment must be made. If you think it unjust, that you should be robb'd or opprest by one more pow∣erful than your self, by parity of Reason neither must thou thy self possess thy self of the Goods of one, who is too weak to resist thy Violence. And therefore this Law prevailed amongst the Romans, That the Right a man vindicates to himself against his Neighbour, the same may his Neighbour use against him. Because it is but just, that the same Measure a man measures out to another, should be measur'd to him again.