When the Sovereign Command is in a single Person, this is call'd Monarchy, because he Governs the whole People, and himself is commanded by none; as the Kingdom of France, Spain, &c. When the Supream Power is lodg'd in a Council of a few select Citizens, this is call'd Aristocracy; such as obtains in the Commonwealth of the Vene∣tians. And lastly, When the Command is in the Hands of the whole Body of the People, it is called Democracy, or a Popular Government; such as is in Holland. Every one of these Forms of Go∣vernment, hath its own Peculiar and Fundamental Law, which it more particularly insists upon; Democracy, that of Liberty; Aristocracy, Security and defence from the Common People and Tyrant; and Monarchy, Sovereign Power, employ'd for the safeguard of the Publick Good.
III. The Wor∣thiness of Monarchy. Monarchy therefore is, when the Supream Power is lodg'd in one Person, on whom all the rest do depend. Altho' this Form of Government may agree with the other two, yet doth it excel them both, as possessing more Advantages than either of them. For Monarchy hath this Peculiar to it self, that it is more free in the Exercise of its Power, and can deliberate and determine without any set Time or Places, it being at the Kings Liberty to Deliberate or Determine at any time, or in any part of his Kingdom. Moreover it is obvious, that in Kingly Government, Counsels are carried on, as well as resolved, with greater Secrecy; Executed more readily; Factions and Seditions more easily prevented and crush'd; and Safety and Liberty, which the other Forms of Government so much affect, doth more abound, and is more lasting than in the two other Forms.
IV. In it all things are better ad∣ministred. If there be any Deliberation concerning the Peace, Union, and the Highest Good and Interest of the People, the Power concentred in One, will be able better and more readily to effect it, than the resemblance only of this Unity in many can possibly do it. Besides, that Form of Government must needs be the best, which most resembles the Eternal and Undivided Government and Empire of Almighty GOD: As also, because he whose Com∣mand continues as long as his Life, doth thereby become perfect in the Art of Ruling, and looks upon the whole Body of the People as his own Family, and embraceth and cherisheth them with a Paternal affection and tendermess.
V. What a Tyrant is. The opposite of such a Prince as we have now described, is a Tyrant, who either gets into the Throne contrary to the Laws and Customs of the Kingdom; or, who being lawfully advanc'd to it, doth only mind his own private Good, and fills the Society with Dread, Poverty, and Calamity. He who, contrary to Law, aspires to the Sovereign Dignity, and leaves nothing unattempted to obtain the Kingdom he has in his Eye: He who by the Massacres and Destruction of the People, the Pro∣scription of the Grandees, and the taking away of their Lives, makes his way to the Throne; without being asham'd of oppressing and grinding the People, or of destroying the Innocent, so he may but obtain what he hopes for. For Monarchy is not always such as it ought to be, but by the Vices of wicked Princes, is often turned into Tyranny. But certainly, the State of a Tyrant, whatever he may think of himself, is very miserable, who dreads those whom he oppresseth, and flees those
whom he persecutes, the Fear he puts his Subjects into, recoyling back upon himself. Seeing, that as SENECA saith, it is unavoidable, but that He whom many fear, must fear many.
VI. The Defects of Aristo∣cracy. Neither is Aristocracy subject to less Inconve∣niences than Monarchy; whilst Wicked Men out of an ambitious desire of Rule, do by unjust Means endeavour to get into the Senate; following that Maxim, If Right be to be violated, let it be done for the obtaining of Rule and Government. Whilst by the Prevalency of a Faction, unworthy Persons are Elected, and Vertue and Desert post∣pon'd: Whilst those few that have the Power in their own Hands, do only mind the enriching and aggrandizing of themselves, and without being solicitous for the Good of the Subject, do treat them no otherwise, than if they were their Slaves.
VII. The Incon∣veniences of Demo∣cracy. Neither is Democracy subject to less dangerous Distempers; as when the People in whom the Power is lodg'd, manages the Government in a turbulent and tumultuary manner; when the more Rich and Powerful part of the People, do oppress and devour the lesser Fry, contemn the Magi∣strate, violently seize the Goods of others, without having the least regard to those that are Good and Innocent: When they make Laws from an itch∣ing desire of Novelty, and soon after as inconside∣rately annul them again: When they Enact and Decree that one day, which they abrogate the next; and exauctotate, what but a while ago so highly pleased them: Or, when Men unfit and of no Capacity, are raised to the highest Charges: And, when Men of an insolent and insulting Temper, do pronounce unjust Sentences, and enact burthensom Decrees, and afterward maintain and execute them by unjust Rigour.