An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

CHAP. XXX. Of the Laws that concern Speaking and and Swearing.

I. Deceitful∣ness in Speech is to be a∣voided. FOrasmuch as Covenants and Contracts are performed by Words, and that it is necessary for the maintaining of Human Society, that mens Minds be made known by Speech, we shall add something here concerning the Duties to be ob∣served in Speaking in general, and afterwards of those that are to be heeded in Swearing. The first thing to be observed in Speech is, that we do not deceive any one by our Words, or by other Signs used instead of them, for the expressing of the Sense of our Minds. For the Truth of our Speech or Words must be constant and inviolable, after the same manner as we find that amongst Animals, some outward Species do remain, where∣by they discern things Friendly or Inimical to them.

II. Conditions to be ob∣served in Speech. To the end the Praescript of this Natural Law may be the better understood, we are to take No∣tice, that a double Obligation lies upon those that speak, with Relation to their Words or Speech. First, That those who use the same Speech or Lan∣guage, do make use of certain and determinate Words, to signifie such certain and determinate Things, according to the use of the Language that is received in the Country or City where a Man lives. For it is not lawful for any one, at his own pleasure, to Coin new Words, but must make use of those, which have been long approv'd of by Use and Custom, and signifie things according as they are taken and understood by all. Secondly, That every one do so open his Mind to another, as clearly to manifest what he intends, and so as that the same may be clearly apprehended by him he speaks to. This Obligation may arise, either from a particular Agreement a Man hath made with ano∣ther, to discover unto him what he knows about such a business. As when one Agrees with one that is Master of any Art, to be taught the same by him: Or, from the Precept of the Common Law of Nature, whereby a Man is bound to impart his Science to another; either for his Profit and Ad∣vantage, or to prevent some Evil that threatens him: Or, when by Law, whether Perfect or Imperfect, a man is bound to discover those things, concerning which he is Interrogated.

III. When we may dissem∣ble our Thoughts. But if those to whom we speak be of such a Temper, that an open and simple Declaration may be prejudicial to them, or that it may give them occasion of hindring and opposing what we are about; it may be lawful for us to dissemble our Minds at that time, and to palliate our Intentions. For though it be our Duty to do good to others, yet are we not bound to do it, when we have good Reason to believe, that in so doing we shall be crost in the thing we intend. Neither is this to be call'd Lying; for tho' our VVords do not exactly repre∣sent the Sense of our Mind, yet do they not of set purpose carry another Sense, than our meaning really is; nor hath he to whom we direct our Speech, any Right to understand or know them: Neither are we bound by any means to cause him to appre∣hend our Intentions. For it is frequently Expedi∣ent in Human Society, that the Truth should be hid, and that the thing which is about to be undertaken, should be kept from the Knowledge of ma••y.

IV. Fiction is no Lie. From what hath been said, may be gathered, that he is not to be lookt upon as a L••ar, who at play, by set Words and Gestures, endeavours to conceal his Intentions, to deceive the party he plays with, and to inveigle him to do that whereby he may lose the game. Nor he, who by feigned Stories and Fables deceives the Minds of Children, who are not yet capable of down-right Truth, with a design to excite them to the Love of Ver∣tue and the Hatred of Vice. Nor he who imposes upon an Angry Person, comforts one that is sor∣rowful, or by colour'd Speeches persuades a sick person, that the Medicin he is to take is very grateful and pleasant. Because none of these are done with a design to deceive or wrong, but on the contrary, to do them good, and to ease them of that Passion which afflicts them. But the case is quite different where a man is bound to declare his Mind to another; because by using doubtful Speeches, or discovering only one part of the Truth, he becomes unfaithful, and sins against the Rules of Justice.

V. What an Oath is. Our Speech is capable of being ratified and con∣firmed by an Oath. For an Oath is the calling of GOD to wi••n••••s to the Truth of what we do as∣sert: Or as others will have it, It is a Religious Act, whereby we call upon GOD as the Supream Truth, in witness to a thing, that is not suffici∣ently known to others. And accordingly the very Heathens themselves knew of no stronger tie whereby to engage to be faithful and to speak the Truth, than that of an Oath. For they who take an Oath, do bind themselves by the Aw and Re∣verence they have for GOD, to be as good as their Word, and to stand to their Covenants. And for∣asmuch as they own that GOD, whom they wor∣ship, to be Omnipotent and Omniscient, it is to be believed, that no Man is found so wicked, as to dare to provoke his Indignation, and to engage his Revenge. Wherefore he also who swears by false gods, supposing them to be true, is bound to perform what he hath sworn, and if he breaks his word, he is Perjur'd.

VI. Three kinds of Oaths. An Oath is either Assertory, when we make use of it to confirm an Assertion about a thing pre∣sent or past; when no better way is found to dis∣cover the Truth. And such an Oath as this is re∣quired of Witnesses before a Judge, or from others, who some other way have any knowledge of the Fact. There is another Oath, which is called Promissory, when one by Oath promises any thing to another, and binds himself to the performance thereof. And lastly, there is another Oath of De∣cision, where 2 are that are in contest together, and presenting themselves before the Judge, one of them by taking an Oath, doth decide the mat∣ter in contest.

VII. Of the Con∣ditions to be observed in every Oath. That there may be an Obligation upon a Man, to keep his Oath, it is requisit, First, That he know the thing to be true or false, which he as∣serts or denies by Oath; or whilst he speaks, ac∣cording to what he thinks, and is persuaded there∣of, whether it be so or not. For he that swears to any thing which he judges to be so, his Oath cannot be blamed, because he speaks according to what he thinks and is persuaded. Secondly, It is requisit that he take his Oath Seriously and with mature Deliberation. And therefore he who re∣peats the words of an Oath to another, is not bound thereby; but he that speaks them seriously, and with the posture and formality of those that take Oaths, tho' it may be, he intends nothing less in his Mind, than to be true and faithful to what he swears.

VIII. We must not swear contrary to our Consci∣ence. Wherefore I cannot assent to their Opinion, who suppose that a Man who is brought before a Judge, about a Debt of 100 pieces of Gold which he owes to another, may swear falsly, in case he knows that the payment of that M••ny should cast him into extream Difficulties. For they seem to suppose, that GOD, the Sovereign of Truth, may be produced as the witness to a Lye; as if he did not behold, and in due time would Judge and Revenge those, who, in so daring a manner, do affront his Majesty. For what else is it to deny a just Debt, but to deny GOD to be Just and Equal, and to promise impunity to perjured Persons? For if▪ it be lawful for a Man to forswear himself, and to think one thing, and speak another, the validity and reverence of Oaths, and of all Covenants and Contracts will be banisht from the Societies of Men, and nothing but Fraud, Deceit and Iniquity will be found in all their agreements and dealings together.

IX. What is t•• be consider∣ed in him. that swears or takes an Oath. Yet must not every Oath be taken for such, except that we be assured that it hath all the Con∣ditions requisit to a Valid and Lawful Oath, and which ought to be rigorously, and not perfuncto∣rily examined. For he, who out of hatred swears against another; or he, who being tertified by the Threats of an Enemy, doth conform his Pro∣mise with an Oath, is supposed not to have sworn at all, seeing that he never did it with any volun∣tary Deliberation, but being hurried on by fear and Passion only. In like manner he, who pro∣miseth somewhat to another indeterminately, and confirms his Promise with an Oath, is not bound thereby to grant to another what is dishonest, ab∣surd or hurtful; because it is supposed, that he who hath made the demand is led by reason, and consequently would not desire any thing that is morally impossible or unjust.