CHAP. IX. Of Prudence; and the Parts of it.
I. The Divisi∣on of Ver∣tue. VERTUE is commonly divided into 4 Species, Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude and Justice, which Ethical Writers call Cardinal, because they consider them as the Hinges upon which all other Vertues turn, and from whence they proceed as so many Branches.
II. The Nature of Pru∣dence, and what it is conversant about. The first Rank amongst these is given to Pru∣dence, which makes use of all the rest, and as the Eye of the Soul doth point out to them their Or∣der and Manner; and accordingly may be defined a firm and constant Will, heedfully to look out, and diligently to examine what is best. For it is the Office of a Prudent man, not to undertake any thing, which he hath not first weighed in the Ba∣lance of Reason, and found, that according to the present Circumstances of Place and Time, wherein he undertakes a thing, there is no truer, or at least more probable Reason, than that which he is re∣solved to follow. For Prudence is not a certain Science, which contemplates things necessary, and which can be no otherwise than they are; but a kind of knowledge that is conversant about Con∣tingent matters, which are not only mutable, as to their Manner, but as to their Existence. For tho' the Object of Prudence generally consider'd be something common, viz. whatsoever ought to be done according to Right Reason; yet Prudence, as consider'd in every particular Man, is conver∣sant about Singulars, which may, or may not be; or may be thus, or otherwise.
III. The Three Duties or Offices of Prudence. There be 3 Offices or Chief Acts of Prudence; Good and wary Consultation, Right Understanding or rather Judgment, and Sentence or Command. Consultation, or Deliberation, doth above all the rest belong to Prudence, whilst it considers what Means are most proper and best to obtain her End; to which is oppos'd Precipitancy, when we do things rashly and inconsiderately. And to the end this Consultation be such as it ought, it must be done with due Consideration, and aim at a good End; for otherwise it will be only Cunning and Craftiness. Right Understanding, or Judg∣ment, is that whereby we pass a dextrous Judg∣ment of the Means, by a reflex Act, approving of them. And is therefore called by ARISTO∣TLE, a quick and ready Understanding; to which is oppos'd dulness of Mind, or Folly: So that a Prudent man seems in some sort to keep the middle Station, betwixt a Block-head or Dull-fellow, and a Crafty Knave. The Sentence, or the Habit of passing a Decretory Sentence, concerning the Goodness of the Means, follows next after Judg∣ment, and is that whereby a Prudent man rightly determines, how to make use of the Means which he hath judged to be best, and with Constancy puts the same in practice.
IV. Of the Parts of Vertue in General. Three kinds of Parts are assigned to every Ver∣tue, the first whereof are Helps or Advantages, which are necessarily required to the Perfect Law of Vertue; the other are called Subjective Parts, which as so many Species do resort under it; and the last are called Potential, which Potentially are contained in the chiefest Vertues, and which do not comprehend their whole Natures, but belong to some secondary Laws.
V. Of the Con∣stituting Parts of Prudence. The Constituting parts of Prudence are,
1. To know the Laws of Nature, according to which we ought to live.
2. To compare them together, that we may know what place they must take, or which of them hath the Precedency.
3. To consider, and have regard to the Circum∣stances of place, time and persons, in all our Actions.
4. To have an Eye to our Chief End, and to pursue the same by all honest and lawful Means.
VI. The Inte∣gral Parts of Prudence The Helps required to Prudence are reckoned 8 in number, viz. Memory, Understanding, Fore∣cast, Teachableness, Quickness of Wit, Reason, Circumspection, and Cautelousness. Of which some are helpful to Consultation, others to Judg∣ment or Discerning, and lastly, others to Sentencing or Determining.
VII. Sharpness of Wit. Sharpness or Quickness of Wit belongs to Con∣sultation, or Deliberation; by means whereof a Prudent Man finds out the Means, which con∣duce to the obtaining of his proposed End. This Help is of kin to Sagacity, which speaks a dispo∣sition in the Soul, whereby it readily and dexte∣rously discovers what lies hid, and finds out the Ways which are the shortest and surest to the de∣sired End.
VIII. Intelligence or Under∣standing. Understanding, or Intelligence, is a Help to our Judgment or Discerning; and it is not here taken for a Habit of the first Principles; but for a knowledge of the things that ought to be done, whereby we perceive and judge rightly of things that offer themselves.
IX. Teachable∣ness. Teachableness is a Promptitude of the Mind, for the Learning of the things we are ignorant of: For seeing it is the part of a Prudent man to know many things, and to be able to distinguish the Honest Good, from the Pleasant and Profitable, it is necessary that he be Teachable, so as to improve himself by the Discourses of others, or in the Reading of Books.
X. Memory. Memory is that, whereby a Prudent man calls to Mind things that are past, and represents to him∣self several Actions and Events, from whence, as from the Premisses, he concludes what Judgment he ought to pass of the future.
XI. Reason. Reason is the right use of the Knowing Faculty, whereby a Prudent man, from fore known and prae∣consider'd things, argues aright, gathering and judging what he ought to do in present Circum∣stances.