An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Order and Number of the Passions.

I. Passions are made diffe∣rent from their Ob∣jects. ALthough the Soul depends not upon Corpo∣real Objects, so as to think, and without any material Species, to be able to comprehend all sorts of things: And tho' in the forming of the Passions, it sometimes makes use of its own intelligent faculty alone, and can at pleasure apply it self to conceive sometimes one Object, sometimes another; yet it is manifest from what hath been said before, that the passions may also be excited by Objects which move the Sense: Nay, and that these Ob∣jects are the most especial and common principles: so that to find passions, there needs nothing but to weigh the nature of the Objects, and to take no∣tice of the Effects which proceed from them. But because in man they are many and various, and many times so confus'd among themselves, that they can scarce be distinguisht from each other; we must mind the diversities of Objects which pre∣sent themselves to our Senses, that by the percepti∣on of them, we may the more easily arrive at the knowledge of those affections which are begotten in us. Yet there is no necessity that all the diver∣sities of Objects should be examined; but those alone which can either profit or hurt us, or any other way be relating to us.

II. The Soul is void of partition, and conse∣quently ill divided in∣to Irascible and concu∣piscible. Wherefore the better to enumerate the Passions, we are only to take notice how many several ways Objects may concern us, or may act upon our Senses, so as to profit or hurt us. Nothing is more frequent in Schools, than to take the Soul in pieces and to divide it, I know not by what Art, into Sensitive and Rational, by which they constitute two Appetites in the sensitive part of the Soul; whereof one they call concupiscible, which resides in the Body, and tends wholly to its Conservati∣on; the other Irascible, which comes nearer to Reason, and supplies it with strength and vigor. But hence arose this Error of assigning 2 persons as it were in a Scene, that they did not carefully distingui••h the Functions of the Soul and Body, but attributed to the Soul those Offices which belong to the Body only. For whatsoever opposes Reason, cannot proceed but meerly from the Body, which comes to pass when the Animal Spirits, which are also Bodies, hit by an opposite way upon the Glan∣dule, and by their power endeavour to hinder the effect of the Soul. For in one Body there is to be considered but one Soul, void of all parts, and be∣ing but one and the same, called both Sensitive and Rational.

III. There are divers fa∣culties in the Soul. But if those Authors, who admit 2 Appetites in the Soul, only mean this, that the Soul is indued with 2 Functions, the one of Lusting, the other of being Angry, we shall not gainsay them; but whereas it hath the faculties not only of being Angry, and being Concupiscent, but also the fa∣culty of Admiring, Hoping, Fearing, there seems to be no reason that all affections should be re∣ferred to Concupiscence or Anger; when as Ad∣miration,

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Book. 1. Part. 9. Chap. 9.

G. Freman In••▪

I. Kip Sculp

which is the primary Affection, hath no relation either to Concupiscence or Anger.

IV. Admirati∣on the first Passion that occurs to us. Therefore another way must be found out to enumerate the Passions; and in my mind there can be none more convenient, and more certain, than for all the motions of the Mind, which occur to us, to be considered in their Order. For as soon as any thing presents it self to us, or appears un∣der any species which hath no similitude with any thing we knew before, it causes the Soul to be surpris'd at the sight thereof, and to remain some time in contemplation upon it; and in regard this may possibly happen before we have well consider∣ed whether the said thing represented to us be good or bad for us, it hence follows that Admiration is to be accounted the first of all those Affections which are inbred in us; but since it happens that we either admire the excellency of any admirable Object, or contemn the despicableness of any other, either Esteem or Contempt must needs accompany this Admiration, and by this means Magnanimi∣ty or Abjection of Spirit are created in us; name∣ly, while we either extol our selves for some just cause, or contemn our selves for that pusillanimity which we find to be in us: But when we esteem greatness of Action in other persons, whom we esteem capable of doing Good or Ill to Mankind; from such an esteem as this proceeds Veneration.

V. The next are Love, Hatred, Cu∣••idity, ••ope, and ••he like. In the next place, when the Soul considers un∣der some qualification an Object of Good or Evil, that is, of what is either agreeable or ungrateful to us, having no regard to difference of time therein, it excites either to Love or Hatred; for asmuch as Love is an Affection of Union, as Ha∣tred is of Separation. But when respect is had to time, that is, when a man is more carried on to the Contemplation of the future, than of the pre∣sent or past time; a future Object is expected, ei∣ther as only possible, or moreover as easie or hard to be obtained. From the former consideration is kindled Cupidity, by which not only the presence of an absent Good, and the conservation of what is possest is desired, but also the Absence of an Evil, as well present as in apprehension. But if a thing be represented, not only upon the account of pos∣sibility, but also as easie of acquisition, it begets Hope, the utmost degree whereof is Trust or Se∣curity. But if it be lookt upon as difficult to be obtain'd, it creates Timidity or Fear, the utmost degree whereof is Despair: Hitherto may be re∣ferred Doubtfulness or Fluctuation of Mind, when we dispose our selves to deliberate or enter upon Counsel.

VI. Here fol∣low those Passions which con∣sider Good and Evil as present. Lastly, when Good and Evil, as being consi∣dered to have relation to us, are present, they produce 2 other Effects; the first Joy, the other Sorrow or Sadness. But when we look upon them as relating to others, we judge those persons either worthy or unworthy of so great a Good. If wor∣thy, it producess gladness in the Soul, either Seri∣ous or mixt with Derision: If unworthy, the good which attends upon them stirs up Envy or Heart∣burning in us; and if bad attend them, it stirs up Commiseration, which is a kind of sadness.

VII. Acquies∣cence, Peni∣tence, Glory, &c. In an Object past, or even also present, atten∣tion may be had to the Cause of Good or Evil. A Good which has been done by us, if it relate to opinion we have of it as Good, it begets an in∣ward acquiescence or contentment, which is the sweetest of all passions, and wonderfully delights the Soul; whereas an Evil done, if it relate to the Opinion we have of it as Evil, brings forth repen∣tance, which is the most troublesom of all the passions, and incessantly disturbs and afflicts the Soul. A Good done by us, as it relates to the Opinion which others conceive of it, produces Glory; on the contrary, Evil so relating, Shame and sense of Disgrace. If a Good be conferred upon us by another, we testifie our Gratitude to∣wards him: If the same Good be bestowed upon another, he is the Object of our Favour: On the other side, if an Evil be inflicted on others, it causes our Indignation; if on our selves, our An∣ger; which two last Affections may be said to be species of Hatred or Aversion. A long Duration or Continuance of Good induces Satiety or Loath∣ing; as on the contrary, Duration of Evil dimi∣nisheth Pain or Misery, and renders it more light and tolerable.

VIII. Desire, Hi∣larity, &c. Lastly, from a past Good, upon remembrance of the Joy thence received, there springs up Desire, as from an Evil happily surmounted, Hilarity ari∣seth, which may be referred to Joyfulness. Now altho' we have here enumerated several sorts of Passions, yet if they be each of them well consi∣dered and examined, it will soon appear, that ma∣ny of them are referrible to others as primitive ones, which are reckoned ony 6 in number, name∣ly Admiration, Love, Hatred, Cupidity or sensu∣al desire, Joy and Sadness: The rest are secunda∣ray, being either compounded of many of them, or referrible to them as to their Genus's.