CHAP. III. How Human Mind is Ʋnited to the Body.
I. Th••••e Notions which usually present themselves to us. THere are Three principal Notions which commonly offer themselves to us: The No∣tion of Body, which we have maintain'd, consists in Extension, from whence the Idea's of Figure and Motion proceed: The Notion of Mind, whose Essence we place in Cogitation, and to which the perceptions of Intellect, and propensions of Will do tend: The third Notion is of Soul and Body, as they are united; from which Union we understand, that Mind hath the force of moving Body, and on the contrary, the Body hath the power of Acting upon the Mind, as shall here∣after be more clearly made out: For it is not to be imagin'd, that the Soul is only present with the Body, as a Mariner is present in his Ship, or as a Rider is seated upon his Horse; but that it is intimately united to it, so as to make one Com∣pound with it: I say, the Notion of Soul and Body; because the Soul is properly so called, inas∣much as it is destin'd to Inform the Body, or inasmuch as it can be United to a well-disposed Body, as hath been formerly mention'd.
II. Human Mind is to be consi∣der'd, as United to the Body. For the Soul of Man is not to be consider'd as a Spirit in it self, and as it is Absolute and a Sub∣stance which Thinks; but according to the Rela∣tion which a Spirit hath to a Body well dispos'd, and to which it is United. For Experience plainly teacheth us, That all the Functions of the Soul, consider'd in Quality of a Soul, depend absolutely on the Body, to which it is United, and which ren∣ders this Union altogether necessary.
III. It is diffi∣cult to conceive, how the Soul is United to the Body. The only difficulty is to apprehend this sort of Union: For our Intellect can hardly conceive, how Body, which is a thing Extense, moves the Mind; and Mind, which is a thing Immaterial and In∣extense, can impel the Body; and tho' by Expe∣rience we find it is so, yet no Comparison or Dis∣course drawn from other things is sufficient to de∣monstrate and evidence it to us. Those Philoso∣phers who admit Real Accidents, and judge that they are Entities distinct from Substance, produce a Similitude of a Stone tending downward, by the force of Gravity. Now since, according to these Philosophers, this Quality of Grave things tending downwards, is not Substance, but Accident, this may serve for a sufficient Explication, how a thing not Extended, may act upon a Body Ex∣tended.
IV. To this difficulty the Preju∣dices of Infancy, and the Opinions of a School conduce. Yet because we maintain, that there is no such Quality in Nature granted, another way is to be found out; but before we fix upon a Mode, by which the Body is annex'd to the Soul, it will be worth our while to note, that all the difficulty in conceiving that Union, arises chiefly from our selves; who following the Prejudices of our In∣fancy first, and afterwards the trite Opinions of Philosophy in Schools, have thought it impossible for Human Intellect to conceive, how a thing Material and Incorporeal can be United, and how a thing Unextended can be associated to a thing Extense, unless that be taken also for Ex∣tense. This Prejudice hath exercis'd the Wits of many; and because they could find no Mode of Union, by which things so distant in Nature could be United, were compelled to have recourse to certain Virtual parts; and to assert, that the Soul is not indeed really, but only virtually Ex∣tense, and that it hath Virtual parts, by means whereof it may the better be adjoyn'd to the Body, and so compose one Total with it.