An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

CHAP. XV. Of the Immortality of Human Mind, and of its State after Death.

I. Human Mind being Spiritual, cannot be destroyed. THat Human Mind is uncapable of Death and Destruction, its Nature and Functions clearly demonstrate: For whereas it is evident from what hath been often said, that the Soul is a Spiritual Essence and separate from all Matter, it must consequently of necessity be free from all Destruction and Corruption; since nothing but what is Concrete and Compound can be separated, divided, or taken asunder. For Destruction is, as it were, a Separation, Dividing, or Parting asunder of those Parts, which before the said Destruction were held together, as it were, by a certain Link or Tye.

II. Which is also made evident from its Functions. Nor do the Functions of the Soul less argue its Incorruption, as being Effected by no Organ of the Body, as is sufficiently made out almost throughout this whole Work; forasmuch as it forms and pro∣portions the Universal Natures of things abstra∣cted from Matter, which cannot be the Work of a Corporeal Faculty. For a Power or Faculty sub∣jected to a Material Organ, receives the Qualities and Forms of things after a certain Corporeal man∣ner What therefore comprehends Forms in a Spiritual manner, u••es no Instrument of the Body. Neither indeed are the Principles imprest upon the Mind, or the Rudiments of Cogitation assign'd to out Intellect, Mathematical Demonstrations, or Certain and Fix'd Judgments, any Corporeal Acts or Productions of Imagination. But nothing In∣commutable or perfectly Single; nothing Eternal, nothing Universal and Abstract is perceived by the Power of Imagination; whereas all Bodies are subject to mutation, place, and time.

III. How Com∣pounds and Simples are said, to lose their Existen••••▪ Now the better to support this Verity with Reasons, we must suppose, that of those things which perish or cease to be, some are Simple, and some Compound. The Compound are said to lose their Existence, when the Parts which concur to their Composition are separated from each other. As a Man is said to Cease, when Soul and Body, of which he is compos'd, are separated. Whereas the Simple can no other way cease to be, but by Annihilation, as they could no other way be pro∣duc'd but by Creation. And since Creation, as also Annihilation, are both beyond the power and ability of Nature, they can no way be destroy'd by any Creature. But it is evident, that the Soul is a thing purely Simple, since it is the only Subject that entertains Cogitation or Thought, together with the various Modes of Cogitation, and conse∣quently the Capacity of being destroy'd, is Natu∣rally repugnant to it.

IV. Since the Body pe∣rishes not, much more must the Soul have an Existence And this will appear more evidently, by com∣paring the Soul with the Body. Certain it is, that the Body which gives place in dignity and perfe∣ction to the Soul, is not reduc'd to Nothing, when the Soul is separated from it: How therefore can the Soul, which is more noble and more perfect

be thought to be annihilated when the Body is separated from it? Since indeed, no Reason can be brought for the duration of a Material Sub∣stance, which may not, by a more forcible Right, be apply'd to Human Mind. If we have recourse to the Evidence of Sense for the Consistence of Body, it cannot be maintain'd of all its Parts, since very many of them, into which it is resolv'd, are undiscernible to our Senses. Neither is the per∣ception of our Senses so efficacious a means to demonstrate the Existence of Bodies, as the Rea∣sons henceforth to be produc'd, are for asserting the Immortality of the Soul.

V. Human Mind can be destroy'd by no Cre∣ated Being. If it be Objected, That GOD by his Power can annihilate all Souls whatsoever, and that it is through his Preservation alone that Souls are said to be Immortal. This we are ready to confess, as acknowledging that GOD alone is a Being wholly Independent, Eternal, Necessary, &c. and that there is nothing Existent in Nature, but only so long as he pleases. So that we have nothing now to do, but to make it out plainly, that Human Mind is of such a Nature and Quality, that it cannot be corrupted or destroy'd by any Crea∣ted Being, which is a sufficient Ground for it to be call'd Immortal. For it being Undeniable, that GOD is all Wise, all Good, and all Constant; and Human Soul, the Noblest Workmanship of so great a Maker, and the Image of him: Who can imagin or believe, but that it must needs be far from the Mind of so Wise and Constant a Maker to Create so Glorious a Work, and afterwards to de∣stroy it? True it is indeed, and not to be gain∣said, that GOD by his extraordinary Power, can destroy the Human Soul consider'd, according to its absolute Esse or Being: But it is repugnant to Reason, that he should destroy it by his ordi∣nary Power, which is sufficient to make the Soul Immortal. For when we treat of the Immortality of the Soul, the Question is not, Whether GOD, by his Extraordinary Power can destroy it; but whether it can be destroy'd by Natural Causes, and by the ordinary Power of GOD.

VI. The Cor∣ruption of the Soul, follows not from the Cor∣ruption of the Body. Moreover, when a Man dies, Death happens to the Body upon this occasion only, namely, because some of its Parts are divided, and its figure changed. But the division of Members, or change of Figure, no way concern the Mind, in regard it is indivisi∣ble, and affected with no Figure. Who therefore can believe that the Soul, which is Inextense, can, for so slight a Cause, as is the Change of the Body, perish or be annihilated? In the next place, this sort of Annihilation hath not yet been found in Nature: Nor can it be made out by any Argu∣ment or Example, that Substance can perish Wherefore, seeing that Human Mind is a Sub∣stance Independent of the Body, and not any way subject to the Mutations which are made in it, we conclude, that it may Exist separated from it, and by consequence, that it is Immortal.

VII. There is no Cause ca∣pable to destroy a separate Soul. As to what some say, That hence may indeed be inferr'd, that the Soul may possibly subsist sepa∣rate from the Body; but that it will not last so Eternally. To this I Answer, that admitting one, the other must of necessity follow, in regard no Cause can be assign'd, which can destroy it in its state of Separation, since at time it is free from Matter, which alone is obnoxious to Change.

VIII. Arguments of Lucre∣tius against the Souls Immorta∣lity. I know that there are many Arguments heap'd up by LUCRETIUS against the Immortality of the Soul. But they are of no weight against those who distinguish Soul from Body, and assign them contrary Functions. For if the Soul seem to be affected with the Diseases of the Body, to be di∣sturb'd in immoderate Drink, Epilepsy and Phren∣sie, to be as it were lost in swouning Fits. This happens, because it is joyn'd to the Body, and makes use of it as its Instrument in performing most of its Actions. For as a Scribe furnish'd with a well-made Pen makes neat Letters or Characters; but that Pen being worn out with long use, he can no longer Cut his Letters, as before: So the Soul lighting upon a weak and infirm Body, ceaseth to perform its wonted Office, and remains as it were benum'd, sluggish and altogether un∣active.

IX. Diseases are not to be attri∣buted to the Soul, but to the Body. This change therefore is not to be imputed to the default of the Soul, but of the Body, by whose help, so long as it is tyed thereunto, it operates. So that in a Phrensie or Lethargy, it is not the Soul which is distemper'd, but the Brain: The Instru∣ment fails, so the Functions are at a loss. In like manner Drunkenness is not to be attributed to the Soul, but to the Body; forasmuch as the Brain being unloaded of its Vapours, the Soul is recover'd and comes to it self again, and performs its Offices, as before.

X. The State of the Soul, after its Depar∣ture from the Body is unknown. But the state of the Soul, after its Departure from the Body, is altogether unknown to us, since it wholly depends upon GODS good Pleasure; nor can we know, but by Conjecture, how it will then use its Faculties. It is but a rash Conceit in those, who ascribe such Perfections to it, as they are uncertain of, and measure its Felicity by their groundless Apprehension, since without Revelation we can have no assurance thereof, except that it follows necessarily from its Nature: Only thus much we may know, viz. that it will be Immortal, by reason that since it is a Substance distinct from the Body, its destruction follows not from the dissolution of its Mate, so that it will always persevere in its Nature, that is, will always Think.

XI. The Soul after Death, will not be sen∣sible, nor remember. We may likewise know, that it will have no commerce with External Objects, and that nothing of Body whatsoever can act upon it, because only its Union with the Body renders it capable of receiving the Species and Actions of Objects; so that it must needs be depriv'd of all Sensibility, and be destitute as well of Memory, as Imagination, in regard those things depend of the Body, and are chiefly conducible for the safeguard and knowing of the State thereof. Altho' it is not to be denied, but that it will perceive many Objects, by the force of Intellect, which will render their Notions more distinct and clear, than those which it had, when it was conversant in the Body. And there will be no Obstacle, but that the Soul may re∣produce those Notions of things, which it had in this Life; by which it will come to pass, that it may the more easily remember them, foras∣much as it will occur to it, that once it had them.

XII. The Soul will more clearly know Ob∣jects. So that in regard no Bodies can any longer act upon it, there will be an evident consequence, that in that State and Condition, it will be absolute Mistress of its own Thoughts, and will not think,

but of such things as its own Will and Pleasure shall be to think of; except by chance the Al∣mighty Maker of All things, or other Minds or Intelligences with which it converseth, create a new Thought in it. But so long as the Soul is separated from the Motions of the Body, and nothing hinders, but it may remain employed in its own Cogitations, it will the more diligently, and with greater attention perceive things Objected to it, and will the more acutely advance in Sci∣ences.

XIII. Will every where accompa∣nies the Mind. The like may be said of the Souls Will and Faculty of disposing it self. By reason that when it shall be free from all Commotions, to which before, because of its Commerce with the Body, it was obnoxious, it will with the greater liberty execute its own own Affairs, and will the more easily expel the Doubts, which are an Obstacle to its Determination. Yet of it self it will not be altogether free from Errour; because in regard its Intellect is Finite, and penetrates not into all things, it may be deceiv'd in its Perceptions, tho' it be not so prone to Errour as before. Forasmuch as being no longer possest by any Prejudices, and being free from Affections, it will the more easily gain this Point, not to be obliged to give assent to those Things which it knows not clearly and distinctly, and by this means it will be less liable to Deception.

XIV. It is Doubt∣ful whe∣ther the Mind can, after Sepa∣ration, move ano∣ther Body. But it is not so apparently determin'd, Whe∣ther the Mind will, after the said State of Sepa∣ration, retain the Power which before it had of moving a Body; since indeed such a Faculty doth not necessarily follow the Nature of a Finite Being, neither indeed is the said Faculty granted to its Will, except so far as it hath pleas'd its Maker, that is, so far as he hath Decreed, that its Moving Power must depend upon his Will. But since it highly conduceth to the extolling the Clemency of Almighty GOD, that his Works should be manifested to his Creatures; it is most probable, that he will conserve this Moving Power in Souls, and give them Capacity to joyn their Cogitations at pleasure to certain Bodies, and in such a manner, as it shall desire to move and know them.

XV. The Soul, after Sepa∣ration, will be capable of no Pain, as from the Body. As the Mind or Soul is all Spirit, it will no more after Separation be capable of Joy or Pain, according as they sprung from the Affections of the Body; but only of Joy and Pain, which pro∣ceed from the Intellect. But if ever the Mind chances to suffer any thing from a Corporeal thing, it must be acknowledged, that it must conse∣quently of Necessity be United thereunto by the Divine Power, as it was upon Earth; so as that its Cogitations must be connex'd to the Mo∣tions of the said Body, and according to the Mea∣sure of that Impulse, it must suffer from it more or less. And upon this account it is not impro∣bable, but that the Fire of Hell may act upon the Body of the Damned.

XVI. Other things are hid from us, except what is revealed by Faith. Other things which are attributed to the Soul, after its Departure from the Body, are uncertain and altogether depend upon the Goodness and Mercy of Almighty GOD, whose Arcana or Secret Counsels, to go about to search into, is both Rash and Profane. Hence it is that our Illustrious Philosopher, in his Epistle to the Princess Elizabeth, thus utters his Mind about the State of the Soul separated from the Body. But as to the State, saith he, of the Soul, after this Life, I know far less, than Sir KENELM DIGBY: For omitting those things which Faith instructs us in, I confess indeed, that we may Conjecture many things by the meer Dint of Reason, upon which we may sufficiently flatter our selves, and build mighty Hopes; but can gather nothing of Certainty.