An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

CHAP. XII. Concerning Place.

I. What Place is. HAving examin'd the Rarefaction and Conden∣sation of Bodies, and inquir'd into the Rea∣son of their Heaviness and Lightness, it remains now to consider why Bodies are said to be in a place, and what order they keep amongst themselves. Now Place is nothing else, but a respect of the Situation of a Body, which it hath amongst other Bodies, to which it is either near or far from. So that when we say that a Body is in a place, we on∣ly intimate thereby that it hath such a Magnitude, Figure and Situation amongst other Bodies, with respect to its nearness to them or remoteness from them.

II. What Place is ac∣cording to the opinion of the Com∣mon People▪ True it is, that the Common People distinguish Place from a Body, and suppose Place to be the Space that receives a Body, and contains it. For they persuade themselves that Place is a kind of Space which Exists before the entrance of the Body, and remains after it is withdrawn. But this conceit ariseth from a Popular error, by which they ima∣gine that there were some extended empty Spaces, before that there were any Bodies in Nature, and which were afterwards to receive them. As some Philosophers now since the Creation of the World fancy that there is a kind of empty Space beyond the Bounds of the World, which they call Ima∣ginary Space, because it hath only Extension, with∣out containing any Body at all.

III. Space is the same with a Body. But these Philosophers speak very improperly, since whatsoever is extended in Length Breadth and Depth, and wherein Parts can be assigned, by the intervals whereof Bodies may be said to be near or far off from one another, cannot be said to be a thing Imaginary, but a true and real Body. For the Natrue of a Body consists in Extension, and the Idea of Extension is the same with the Idea of a Bo∣dy. Seeing therefore the Imaginary Space, as they call it, hath Length, Breadth and Depth, it must needs be a Body. Whence it is apparent how im∣properly they speak, who tell us that Bodily things are in a Space; for since every Space, because of its Extension, is distinguisht from the Dimensions of the Body, that is in the Space, and that Penetra∣tion of Dimensions is impossible, should we sup∣pose a Space to receive a Body, this would be a Penetration of Dimensions. Now Bodies are there∣fore

said to be impenetrable, because they have their peculiar Dimensions which exclude any other, and do not suffer them to be contain▪d in the same place; and since a Space is measur'd with the same Dimension as a Body, therefore a Body cannot be said to be in a Space.

IV. In what Sense a Bo∣dy is said ••o be in a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 But you'l say, how then is a Body said to be in a Place, if a Place be extended as well as a Body, and that one of them exclude the other? I answer that a Body is said to be in a Place by the Situati∣on, Magnitude and Figure it hath amongst other Bodies; so that we must not conceive any thing as extended, but only the Body that is in the Place, and all the Space or Expansion that is con∣ceiv'd to be there, must be attributed to the Bo∣dy only. For to speak properly, Place or Space is nothing else, than something that is extended in Length Breadth and Depth, which is the same with Matter; neither can it be distinct from it, but by our way of conceiving. Wherefore when a Body is said to take up a little or great place, the mean∣ing of it is only this, that such a Body hath a greater or less Extension amongst the Bodies that surround it. This gave occasion to St. AUSTIN to say 〈◊〉〈◊〉 52. ad Dard. Take away Spaces from 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and they will be no where, and being no where they will not be at all.

V. Space is not Really distinct from a Body. Wherefore there is no Real Difference between a Space and a Body, but only according to our way of Thinking, viz. because we consider the Exten∣sion of Space as Common and General, but the Ex∣tension of a Body in a Space as Individual and Singular. As for Example, when a Stone is taken up out of its place, we suppose its extension to be removed also, because we look upon it as singular and inseparable from it; but yet we conceive that the Extension of the place in which the Stone was, still continues, and is the same, tho' the Stones Place be now taken up by another Body, viz. Wood, Air, &c. Because this Extension is consi∣der'd in General, and suppos'd to be one and the same, whether of the Stone, Wood, Air, or any other Body, provided it be of the same Bigness, and have the same Situation amongst those Bodies that determine and bound that Space. Wherefore it is evident that the Inward Place, which is taken up by any Body, doth not differ from the Body it self, no more than the nature of the Genus or Species dif∣fer from the Individual. And tho' a Body may be said to change its Place, this is not to be under∣stood of the Inward, but only of the outward Place, that is, of the Superficies of those Bodies that surround it, to the different parts whereof, it may be diversly apply'd.

VI. Place is twofold, Inward and Out∣ward. This will be more evident by distinguishing Place into Inward and Outward; Inward Place is nothing else but the Matter it self extended in Length Breadth and Depth, or the Body it self: Outward Place is the Superficies of the Body, which immedi∣ately surrounds the thing Placed. And this Place is neither a Body, nor any thing of a Body, but only a Mode of it, or the limit wherein the Body is con∣tained. For by the name of Superficies, no part of the Ambient Body is understood, but on∣ly the Boundary or limit▪ that intervenes be∣tween the Ambient Body and the Body surrounded, which is only a Mode. Or we understand thereby a Superficies in common, which is no more the part of on•• Body than of another, only is suppos'd al∣ways to be the same, because it retains the same Magnitude and Figure. For tho' every Ambient Body together with its Superficies be changed, yet is not the thing it surrounds therefore supposed to change its Place, provided it keep the same Situ∣ation amongst other Bodies, which are consider'e as immoveable. Thus we do not say that a Tower changeth its Place, when the Ambient Air leaves it, because we suppose that still other Air comes in the room of it, and accordingly the Superficies is neither a Part of the Body containing, nor of that contained, but only an intermediate term or limit, which indeed is nothing else but a Mode.

VII. A Body in the Imagi¦nary Space, is neither here nor there. Moreover it is evident, that, if there were any such Imaginary Spaces, the Bodies contained in them could not be said to be in a Place, forasmuch as in them there is no outward Place, neither can any parts be assigned to them; and therefore a Body cannot be said to be here or there in them, notwith∣standing that it really takes up a Place. But a Body being consider'd as something consisting of Parts, and consequently contiguous to other Parts of Bodies, according to this Notion there can be no Body, which hath not a determin'd Place, with respect to its nearness or contiguity to some other Body, by which its External Place is designed.

VIII. The Diffe∣rence be∣tween Ex∣ternal Place, and Space. The difference therefore between External Place and Space is only this, that Place more expresly denotes the Situation of a Body, than its Magnitude or Figure; whereas Space refers rather to these two latter. For we often say that a thing comes into the place of another, tho' it be not exactly of the same Bigness or Figure; but at the same time deny it to take up the same Space: And so whenever the Situation is changed, we see the Place is changed, tho' the same Big∣ness and Figure do remain. And when we say that a Thing is in a Place, we mean nothing more than that it hath such a Situation amongst other Bodies; and when we say that it fills such a Space, we understand thereby its being of such a deter∣minate Figure and Magnitude. All which will be further cleared by the following Rules.

IX. The First Rule. When a Place is said to be equal to the thing placed, this is either understood of the Inward Place, and then it is the same, as to say, that a Body is of such Dimensions, or equal to it self; or else of the Outward Place, and then it imports, that the bounds of the Ambient, do exactly answer to the Superficies of the Body surrounded or con∣tained, but not as if they had equal Dimensions: in like manner as the Rule is said to agree with the thing ruled, tho' it do not agree with it every way, as to its threefold Dimension.

X. Second Rule. Two Bodies cannot be in the same place at once, that is, they cannot at the same time have the same respect of distance to the same Bodies; for if so, they must penetrate each other, and there would be a Multiplication of Extension, without supposing any new Parts, which is contradictory to the No∣tion of a Body.

XI. Third Rule. One Body cannot be in two Places at the same time, that is, it cannot be placed between these and other contiguous Bodies at the same time, be∣cause a Plurality of Places infers a Plurality of Bo∣dies; for Place is only the Mode of a Body: Or thus: Space is not distinct from a Body, therefore the Body that is in diverse Spaces, is both another and the same thing at the same time.

XII. The Fourth Rule. Fourthly, a Body is said to change its Place when it changeth its respect to other Bodies; and forasmuch as we can have regard to different Bodies, the same thing may be said to change its Place, and not to change it, under a different re∣gard; tho' most properly a thing is said to change its place, with respect to those Contiguous Bodies, that are considered as immoveable.

XIII. How the Inward Place is distin∣guish'd from the Outward. Whence it appears that the Inward Place of a Body, or the Space it takes up, consists in the Bo∣dy it self, consider'd as bounded by other Bodies, which immediately touch it; and that the Outward Place consists in the first Surface of the Bodies that surround another Body.