An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

(Book 2)

[illustration]

Books. 1. Part. 2. Introduction

To the Honourable D^r. John Fielding Arch-Deacon of Dorsett &c.^w.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome

(Book 2)

The Second Part OF THE INSTITUTION OF PHILOSOPHY. Viz. Natural Theology, OR, A TREATISE CONCERNING GOD. (Book 2)

An Introductory Discourse Of the Definition of Natural Theology, and its Certainty.

I. Why Natu∣ral Theo∣logy is set before the other parts of Philo∣sophy. SOME, it may be, will find it strange that I have given NATURAL THEO∣LOGY the precedence before other Parts of Philosophy, and that I betake my self to the demonstration of the Existence of GOD, and of his Perfections, before I have handled the Nature of Corporeal Things. But their Wonder will cease, if they consider how necessary Natural Theology is to other Disciplines, and of how great concern the knowledge of the Divine Existence is, for attaining a firm and evi∣dent Knowledge of all other Things. For seeing that GOD is the Author of the VVorld, and all things that are in it, and the Original of all Truth, the Knowledge of him is to be premised, of whom all Certainty and Truth of Science doth so closely depend, as that without it no Evidence or true Knowledge at all can be had. For since Science cannot be had but from First Causes, how will the same be attainable by us, if we do not know them? Seeing it is the Nature of First Principles to be Clear and Evident; and that the Knowledge of other things do so depend upon them, th••t tho' Principles may be known, tho' the things be unknown; yet the things themselves can never be known, except the Principles be known: Seeing therefore that GOD, the Author of All Created Beings, is (according to S. Austin) the Light of all things knowable, and the Good of all things to be done; we must Know him, before other Causalities can either have a Being, or be exactly known by us.

II. All Geome∣trical De∣monstrati∣ons derive their Evi∣dence from the Ex∣istence of GOD. Notwithstanding that Geometrical Demonstra∣tions be of that Evidence as to force our Assent, and being once clearly perceived, do no longer leave any place for doubting, as long as we attend to them; yet will they cease to appear such, if we be ignorant of the Existence of God. For how can we know, but that we are made with such Natures as to be deceived in those things that appear most evident to us? For we cannot be convinc'd to the contrary, except we first know God to Exist, and that He is the Fountain of all Truth, and hath not given us such Understandings, as to be deceived in the Judgment we make of things that we do most clearly and distinctly com∣prehend.

III. We cannot be certain that any Conclusions are true, but only so long as we do give heed to the Premisses. True it is, that our Mind is conscious to several Idea's in it self, in the Contemplation whereof it never finds it self deceived, as long as it neither affirms nor denies ought concerning them. It is certain also, that it finds in it self Common Notions, whence it frames several Demonstrations, which it persuades it self to be very true, as long as it gives heed to the Premisses from whence it deduceth its Demonstrations. But because it cannot con∣tinually give its attention to them, and often for∣gets them, it may afterwards easily come to doubt

of their certainty, if it have not a clear and distinct Conception of God, that is, except it be assured that God is True, and that it is repugnant to his Nature to be a Deceiver. For as Cartesius saith in his Fifth Meditation, Tho' I am of that Nature, that as long as I clearly and distinctly perceive any thing, I cannot but believe it true; yet because I am also of that Nature, as not to be able always to fix the intention of my Mind, upon one and the same thing, in order to my clear perceiving of the same; and that I oft call to Mind a Judgment I have made before, when I no longer attend to the Reasons, upon which I judged it to be such, other Reasons may be alledged, which might remove me from my Opinion, if I were Ignorant of the Existence of God; and consequently should never have any true or certain Science concerning things, but only Fleeting and Mutable Opinions.

IV. This con∣firmed by an Exam∣ple. Thus he who considers the Nature of a Trian∣gle, is indeed forced to conclude, that its Three Angles are equal to Two right ones, neither can he think otherwise as long as he attends to its Demon∣stration: But yet as soon as he turns the bent of his Mind from it, tho' he remembers that he hath clearly perceived it, yet he may easily que∣stion the truth of it, if the Existence of God be unknown to him.

V. An Objecti∣on taken from A∣theists. If it be said that Atheists, who deny the Exi∣stence of God, do notwithstanding clearly under∣stand general Axioms, such as these, Equal Quan∣tities added to Equal, make the whole Equal▪ Those things which agree in a Third, do agree amongst themselves; and such like: From which they easily Demonstrate, that the Three Angles of a right Angle, are Equal to Two right ones. And that it is a thing apparent to all that are skilled in the Principles of Geometry, that the Square of the Basis of a Triangle, is equal to the Square of the Sides: So that it is possible to have true knowledge, without supposing the knowledge of God.

VI. Answered. I Answer, That it cannot be denied, but that Atheists have a clear knowledge of Geometrical Demonstrations, and that they are so evident, as to force their assent: But yet this knowledge of theirs cannot be said to be true Science, founded upon certain Principles: Because no knowledge deserves the name of Science, that can in the least be called in doubt, and whose certainty doth not depend on an evident Principle. Now forasmuch as these Men are supposed to be Atheists, neither can they be certain that they are not mistaken in those very things, which they think themselves to have most clearly apprehended. And tho' it may be this doubtfulness do not trouble them at present, yet it may hereafter, upon their examining of the matter, or upon its being started by others; neither can they ever be secured from this Hesitation, without owning God to be ••he Author of their Being.

VII. Natural Theology influenceth all human Disciplines. NATURAL THEOLOGY Transcends all the Parts of Philosophy; and as the Sun, that Enlightens all the World, is diffused through all Arts, and Sciences: For who is there, that consi∣dering the Works of God as he ought, doth not ad∣mire his Power, Goodness and Wisdom, and is not raised thence to the Knowledge of Him? Do not the Earth, the VVater, Vegetables, Animals and Stars, all lead us to the Understanding of Him? For all things have relation to God, as to their First Principle, and proclain him to be the one Supream cause of their Being. For how is it possi∣ble for him, who attentively considers the Connex∣ion of Bodies, the Motion of the Stars, the Vicisi∣situde of Seasons, the Succession of Generations, the orderly Disposition of the Parts of the VVorld, not to discern the Wise Author and Orderer of all these?

VIII. The rest of Bodies proves an Intellectual Principle. Bodies have no power to move themselves; how can therefore their so orderly Motion be per∣form'd, but by some Intellectual Being, by which as their Effective Principle, they are disposed, and directed to their appointed end? Wherefore Lactan∣tius was of Opinion, that no Man could be so Ig∣norant or Savage, but that, lifting up his Eyes to Heaven, tho' he may not know by whose Pro∣vidence all these things are govern'd, yet must needs understand from the Motion, Disposition, Constancy, Usefulness, and Contemperation of things, that they are under a wise conduct; and that it is impossi∣ble, that what is so wonderfully framed and order∣ed, must be managed, by the highest Counsel and Wisdom.

IX. What Na∣tural Theo∣logy is. From what hath been said it appears what Na∣tural Theology is, viz. the Knowledge or Science of God. For Theology is divided into Natural and Su∣pernatural; Supernatural is called that which is fetched from Holy Scripture, and which, by the assistance of Supernatural Light, attains Divine Truths: Natural, is that, which declares and de∣monstrates the Existence and Attributes of God, from the Book of Nature, and from Principles, derived from the Light of Nature.

X. How useful the same is to Atheists and ungod∣ly M••n. Wherefore, this Natural Theology is very pro∣fitable for Unbelievers, and Wicked Persons, that are Theoretically so, who cannot be brought to any Religion, except it be first demonstrated to them, that God Exists. As also for those who are Practical Atheists, that is, who live, as if there were no God, no Providence, no Reward after this Life, nor any Punishment; for how will these be able to defend this their Opinion, after that they are once convinced, that there is a God, and that his Attributes, are not only shadowed out in all things throughout the whole VVorld, but besides are most clearly represented in their own Souls?

XI. The Cer∣tainty of Natural Theology. The Certainty of Natural Theology doth plainly appear, in that it is required to the laying of the Foundations of Human Disciplines, and in that without the knowledge of God, no solid Knowledge can be had of any thing whatsoever. He cannot be called a Philosopher, who is destitute of the knowledge of God, and who doth not worship him as he ought. Hence Des Cartes 1. Princ. Artic. 29. proves the certainty of the Natural Light given to him by God, by this Argument, because God is True, and that he is the Original and Principle of our Intellect.

CHAP. I. What God is, and how he may be reached by us.

I. We are to enquire what God is, before we enquire whether he is. FOrasmuch, as according to the Rules of Logick, we are never to enquire, whether a thing be, before we conceive what it is: I suppose it needful to examin, what the Nature of God is, and what is included in the Essential Conception of him, be∣fore that I proceed to the Discussing of the Point, how his Existence comes to be known to us.

II. All Men agree in the know∣ledge of God. The first of these will not be difficult, if we only follow the Judgments of Men, that ever had any Opinion of God: For I believe, that Men do less disagree in this, than in any other Opinion whatsoever. There is no Man that ever heard any thing of God, but doth acknowledge him to be a Sub∣stance Infinite, Independent, of the Highest Under∣standing and Power, and the Creator of all things that are. Or if he doth not distinctly conceive thus much, yet at least must own, that all Perfecti∣ons that can possibly be conceived by Man, do be∣long to him in the highest and most perfect manner that can be.

III. Tho' God be infinite, yet doth he not therefore exclude all Finite Be∣ings. It may be some will here Object, that if God be an Infinite Being, or such a one as comprehends all manner of Perfections whatsoever, he must neces∣sarily exclude every Finite Being, and so nothing would exist besides him. But the Falsity of this Reasoning is apparent; for we cannot conclude, that, because a Man hath a more excellent Wit than others, that therefore others have no Wit at all. Or supposing his Wit to encrease to Infinity, would this diminish the less Portion of Wit possest by others? Thus, tho' God be consummate in all man∣ner of Perfections, yet doth not he therefore exclude all other Beings; except we should con∣ceive God to be Corporeal and Material; for indeed if he were Corporeally Infinite, he must exclude all other Bodies. But if we should conceive God to be Corporeal, we cannot suppose him Infinite, that is, comprehending all manner of Perfections, because then he would be Divisible, and lose his highest Simplicity and Unity.

IV. Gods Per∣fections are only Infi∣nite. But some will urge further, that it is of the Nature of a most perfect Being, to include all man∣ner of Perfections, and therefore it is necessary for him, formally to comprehend whatsoever Per∣fection is in the Creatures. To which I Answer, That the Antecedent is false, for seeing that the Perfections of the Creature are Finite and imperfect, they cannot be in God, because otherwise God could not be the most Perfect Being, as containing imperfections in himself. Wherefore we ought rather to say, since God is the Highest Being, he in∣cludes only Infinite Perfection, and excludes all other.

V. How God is said to be Infinite. God is said to be Infinite, because he is without all Bounds, not only as to his Essence, but also as to his Duration, as being a necessary Being, and Subject to no Change or Mutability.

VI. God is In∣dependent. He is said to be Independent, because he derives his Being, from none besides himself. Which yet is not so to be understood, as if God did depend of himself, as of an Efficient Cause, since it might be still further enquired, whether that Cause had its Being from it self or from another. But that he is possest of so great and immense a Power, that he doth not stand in need of the help of any Being, for his Existence and Conservation; and that there∣fore in some Sense, God may be said to be the Cause of himself.

VII. In what Sense God is said to be Positive∣ly of him∣self. You will say, that Divines will not allow this way of Speaking, as abhorring to admit the notion of Causality in God; and therefore when they would explain How God is from himself, they say, that that ought only to be understood Nega∣tively, that is, God is not of another, but by no means positively of himself, as of a Cause.

I Answer, That it is true, that God is of himself Negatively, or which is the same thing; that he is not beholden to any Cause for his Existence; but withal do assert, that this Negation is not suffici∣ent to explain the Nature of God, without admit∣ting something that is positive, by which he con∣tinues to be or exist; and this we say is nothing else but his Inexhaustible and Incomprehensible Power; for it is certain that the Power, Efficacy and Vertue which we conceive in God, is the most Positive, Perfect and Real that can be: And therefore, for∣asmuch as God exists by reason of his Nature, or the Perfections that are in him, who can question but that he is positively of himself? For if the first Man had been from Eternity, so as nothing had been before him, yet forasmuch as the Parts of Time in which he Exists, may be separated from each other; and because from his Being to Day, it doth not fol∣low that he shall be to Morrow, except there be some cause to renew him, and as it were, to pro∣duce him anew every Moment; we make no dif∣ficulty to assert that the Cause which thus preserves is something Positive. Thus notwithstanding God hath been from Eternity, yet because he himself preserves himself, we may conclude he is of himself, not only Negatively, but Positively, inasmuch as his Immensity is the Cause of the Perseverance of his Being.

VIII. This Argu∣ment fur∣ther urged. But you will say, if God be positively of him∣self, he will be his own Cause, or the Cause of himself, since he does the same with reference to himself, what the Efficient Cause doth with respect to its Effect. Now to say, that God is the Cause of himself, sounds harshly in the Ears of some Divines, and is looked upon as an Error.

IX. Answered. I Answer, that God may be said, in some manner to be the Cause of himself, inasmuch as he is posi∣tively preserved by himself, as long as by the word Cause we do not understand the Efficient, but only the Formal Cause; so that the meaning of that Ex∣pression will be no more than this, that the Immen∣sity of the Divine Essence, is the Reason why he doth not stand in need of any Cause for his Ex∣istence or Conservation; or that the Divine Per∣fection is so great, that he his the Reason of his own Existence, not diverse, but inseparable from himself. Which is not so to be understood, as if God by a Po∣sitive Influx did conserve himself, as all Created Be∣ings are conserved by him; but only that this supreme Power, and the Immensity of his Essence is such, that he stands in need of no Conservator. But now who will pretend, that this Immensity of the Divine Power is not a most positive thing? When there∣fore it is demanded why God Exists, we must not answer, by an Efficient Cause; because that is pro∣perly called an Efficient Cause, where the Cause is distinguisht from the Effect, and where the Effect is supposed different from the Cause; but we are to Answer, by the Essence of the Thing or the For∣mal Cause, which bears some Analogy with the Efficient.

X. God is con∣ceived by all as su∣premely In∣telligent. GOD is also acknowledged to be a Being of Soverening Wisdom and Understanding, because no∣thing is hid from him, and because al past, present and future things are Naked, and open before him.

XI. As most Powerful. Moreover God is acknowledged to be most Pow∣erful, because he Rules over all, and can produce whatsoever doth not imply a Contradiction.

XII. In what sense God is said to be the Cre∣ator of all things. He is also owned to be the Creator of all things, because all things depend on Him, not only to their Being, but also with regard to their Conservation. For since Infinite Power is included in the Idea we have of God, it is a Contradiction, that any thing should Exist, which is not produced by him.

XIII. God may be known by us, tho' not com∣prehended. Under these Attributes it is, that God may be known by us: For we have a clear and distinct knowledge of God as he is. A Being Infinite, Om∣nipotent, Eternal, Omniscient, and the effective Principle of all things. And he may be thus defi∣ned by us: A Being thinking in Perfection (or most perfectly thinking) Simple, Unchangeable, Eternal, Consummate, Necessary, Immense, Incomprehensi∣ble, Omnipotent, and of which all things depend, not only with regard to their Nature and Existence, but also to their Order and Possibility. Neither is it any Contradiction to what hath been said of our know∣ing him, that he is declared to be Incomprehensible: For it is one thing to know a thing, and another to comprehend it: I own that we who are Finite can∣not comprehend the Infinite Essence of God, since it is of the Nature of Infinity to be Incomprehen∣sible: But it is no Contradiction to say, we may know that which is Infinite, that is, clearly and distinctly apprehend a thing to be such, that no bounds or limits can be found in it, or set to it.

XIV. A Objection fetch'd from the Divine Incompre∣hensibility. You will oppose, That if the Weakness of Man cannot aspire to the comprehension of that which is Infinite, he will never be able to conceive the Notion of that which is so, but only of that which is Finite: For who will say that he sees a Man, when he sees only one Hair of his Head? Now there is less proportion between a Finite thing and an Infinite, than there is between one Hair of a Man's Head, and his whole Body.

XV. We may have an Idea of God, with∣out com∣prehending of him. I Answer, That it is not at all needful, in order to our having the Notion of an Infinite thing, than we should comprehend all its Perfections, this being sufficient if we find no bounds or limits in it; because then we understand the whole Infinite, tho' not Totally, as the Schools term it, and as to every one of its Parts. Who dare say that I have not the Idea of a Triangle, when a Figure com∣prehended within three Lines is represented to my Mind; tho' it may be I am ignorant, that its three Angles be equal to two right ones? And so in like manner I may have an Apprehension or No∣tion of God, without comprehending all his At∣tributes. For if it were otherwise, I should un∣derstand nothing at all, when mention is made of the Worship of God, his Works, Mercy, or Justice. For it is not of the Essence of an Image, that it be in all things the same with the thing it repre∣sents, but only that it be in some degree like it.

XVI. The word Cogita∣tion is Equivocal. But yet we are to observe, that the word a Thinking-Being, or Substance, is Equivocal when attributed to God and the Creatures; because the Cogitation, which constitutes the Nature of God, is Independent and Perfect, and that which consti∣tutes the Nature of a Created Spirit is Imperfect, and dependent of God: Wherefore to mark this difference, I say, that the Cogitation, which con∣stitutes the Nature of God, subsists by it self; whereas that which constitutes the Nature of a Created Spirit, subsists indeed in it self, but not by it self.

CHAP. II. By the Inborn Idea that is in us, we know that GOD exists.

I. What we are to un∣derstand by the word Idea. BY the word IDEA, we understand that form of our Cogitation, by the immediate appre∣hension whereof we are conscious of the said Cogi∣tation: So that we can express nothing, without having formed an Idea before of it in our Minds. Or to express it shorter, An Idea is nothing else but the thing it self perceived or thought of, as it is Objectively in the Understanding. Wherefore every Idea includes two things, the one Formal or Proper, inasmuch as it is an Operation of the Mind; the other Objective, as it is the Image of a Thing thought, or is instead of it.

II. What di∣stinction there is betwixt Idea's. In the Second place we are to tak notice, That tho' there is no inequality in the Idea's of our Mind, as they are Modes of Thinking; yet are they very different with respect to the things which they re∣present. For it cannot be question'd but the Idea, which represents Substance to me, contains more Objective Reality, than that which represents a Mode, or any thing else adventitious to a perfect or compleat Substance. And so that Idea which re∣presents to me an Infinite Being, All-powerful, All-wise, Eternal, &c. doth undoubtedly contain more Objective Reality, than that which expresseth Sub∣stances that are Created, Dependent, Mortal, &c. For seeing that these Idea's are something, they must have a Cause of their Existence, and conse∣quently have so much the more Reality, as the things they represent have of Entity.

III. Whatsoever is in the Effe••t, is formally or eminently in its Cause. Thirdly, we are to observe, That there is nothing found in any Effect, which is not Formally or Emi∣nently contain'd in its Cause. A thing is said to be Formally in its Cause, when it is such there as we perceive; but Eminently, when the Cause can supply its stead. Thus Fire, when it produceth heat in a Body, is said to contain it formally, because it hath the very same thing in it self, which it hath produc'd in the Body; but the Sun and the Earth, when they produce Fruits, do not comprehend the thing caused by them Formally, but Eminently only. This Notion is the First of all others, and is as evident, as that Nothing can be made out of Nothing: For should we admit that something is contained in the Effect, which is not contained in the Cause, we must own that Something may pro∣ceed from Nothing. Neither can we give any other Reason, why Nothing cannot be the Cause of any thing, but because in it there cannot be found what is in the Effect.

IV. From the Idea we have of God, we conclude that God is. Wherefore we conclude from the Idea we have of God, that he exists; which is, First, thus de∣monstrated: Every thing represented by an Idea must have a Cause, in which it is either Formally or Eminently contained; but we have an Idea of God, as he is a Most perfect Substance, excluding all Limitations: Therefore this Idea must have GOD for its Cause. The Minor is thus proved: There is nothing found in all Created Beings that can afford us this Idea: For tho' I can form the Idea of a Substance, because I my self am a Substance; yet will this Idea never represent an Infinite Substance, because I my self am Finite and of bounded Perfections; wherefore it is necessary that if I have an Idea of an Infinite Substance, it must proceed from God alone, who is Infinite.

V. An Obje∣ction an∣swer'd. If you argue, that this Idea may be formed from the several Perfections scattered up and down in the several Parts of the Universe; after the same manner as from the Notion of an Angel, and my own Mind, I can frame an Idea of a Divine Understanding. I answer, How can I from the several Endowments of diverse Things, frame a Being that is absolutely Perfect? Shall I do it by enlarging and extending those Images? But whence have I the Faculty of enlarging all the Perfections of Created Things, and concerning something that far exceeds them all? We ought rather to conclude, that this is, because the Idea of a most Perfect Being is impress'd upon my Mind. Moreover, the supream Perfection of God consists in this, That all his Perfections are not separate, as in the Creatures, but in conjunction with the most absolute Simplicity and Unity.

VI. No Idea of an Infinite Being is contained in the Idea of a Finite Being. And tho' the Idea of an Infinite Substance, which most perfectly includes all the Perfections our Mind can conceive, may also contain the Idea of a Finite Substance, (as a Multitude contains an Unity, and a greater Number a lesser;) yet is not the Idea of an Infinite Being, contain'd in that of a Finite Being. And therefore Des Cartes in his Third Meditation says thus: I manifestly under∣stand, that there is more Reality in an Infinite Substance, than in a Finite; and therefore that the Perception of an Infinite Being, is in some sort precedent in me, to that of a Finite Being, that is, the Idea of GOD, to that of my Self. For how could I understand that I Doubt, that I Desire, that is, that I want something, and am not alto∣gether Perfect, if there were not in me the Idea of a more Perfect Being, by comparing my Self with whom I discern my own Defects?

VII. That which is Perfect cannot pro∣ceed from that which is Imper∣fect. Secondly, That which is perfect cannot proceed from that which is imperfect, as from its Total and Efficient Cause: But we, as all other Creatures, are Imperfect; and the Perfections which are in God, are neither Formally nor Eminently contained in us: So that the Idea of GOD, which contains all his Perfections, cannot be thought to proceed from us, and consequently God must be the Cause of it; and because He cannot be the Cause of it, except He do exist, we may undoubtedly conclude that He doth so.

VIII. The Idea of God is in∣born in us, If any one ask, whence we have this Idea, since it doth not proceed from our Senses, nor from any Created Being? My Answer is, That it is born with us, as the Idea of our Selves also is: For God impress'd it upon every Man in his Creation, and hath so order'd it, that every one should understand and know God by the same Faculty whereby He knows himself. For it is impossible that any one should understand himself to be imperfect, de∣pending on another, and of uncertain Duration; but that at the same time he must also understand Him, with whom compared, he is imperfect, and on whom he depends; so that reflecting upon him∣self, he concludes that God is, and by the Idea which he hath of him, is convinc'd of his Ex∣istence. I say, by reflecting on himself; for by the impression made upon us by God, we are not to understand that this Idea is always actually represented to us; for were it so, we should al∣ways think of God: But by this Impression is meant nothing else, but that God hath vouchsafed such a Faculty to Man, whereby he can excite this Idea in himself, without the help of any other Idea's whatsoever.

IX. The Idea of God cannot be said to be invented by us. It cannot be said, That this Idea is framed ••r invented by us, as many Notions are, which ha••e no other Existence, but what they have in our Understanding; because nothing can be added or taken away from this Idea, for the Essences of things are indivisible: So that if any Thing could be added to any Idea, representing the Na∣ture of a Thing, it would be no more the same, but another Idea. And tho' new Perfections may still be perceived in God, which were not known before; yet doth not this change the Idea of God, but only makes it the more clear and distinct; no more than the Idea of Man is increased, when some new Properties are discover'd in him, which before were unknown, because they ought to have been inclu∣ded in the Idea which we had of him befor e.

X. An Objecti∣on to prove, that the Idea of God is framed by us. But you will farther urge, That Man who has this Idea is a free Agent, and that consequently he can frame the same at pleasure. And Des Cartes seems to hint as much in the Beginning of his Fifth Meditation, where after he hath said, That innu∣merable Idea's of Things are found in his Mind, adds, Which tho' they be in some sort thought by me at pleasure. Now if we can think of Objects according to our pleasure, why may we not say, that the Idea of God is framed by us, whilst we are thinking of it?

XI. Many things ••o∣cur to our Thoughts, which tho▪ they do not Exist, yet have their Nature. I Answer, That Idea's do indeed depend on us, as far as they have a formal and proper Being in our Mind; but not as they are considered in their objective Being; because in that respect they have a necessary Cause. I own it to be in our power, to think, or not to think of any particular Object, and that we are thus free by a liberty of Contra∣diction, or by a liberty as to the Exercise of the Act, as the Schools express it; but that it is not in our power, to think differently of the same thing that is true, that is, we have no liberty of Contrariety, and as to the Specification of the Act. For it doth not depend on our Will to think the Number Nine to consist of three Ternaries, and not to consist, or to be an Even or Uneven Number, &c. Neither can we conceive a Substan••e absolutely perfect, as Existing or not Existing, Wise or Ignorant, Merciful or Cruel; but must necessarily conceive him neces∣sarily Existing, All-wise, and All good. Where••ore when Des Cartes faith, That many Idea'l are found in him, which it may be have no Existence, besides his Cogitation, he presently subjoynd; yet are they not feigned or inven••ed by me, but have their true and unchangeable Natures.

XII. The Idea we have of God, is not derived from our Parents. Neither doth it contradict our Assertion, what some say, That we have deriv'd all the Know∣ledge we have from our Parents, who having receiv'd the same from the first Men, afterwards commnicated the same to us, and that conse∣quently the Idea we have of GOD is not in∣born, seeing that this Objection seems rather to confirm the Idea of GOD to be inborn in us: For let us ask them, from whom those first Men had this Idea; if from themselves, why may not we have it as well? If from GOD revealing the same to them, then they must own GOD to Exist.

CHAP. III. That it belongs to the Nature of God to Exist.

I. Whether Existence doth apper∣tain to God. I Have evidently enough, as I suppose, Demon∣strated in the foregoing Chapter, that because I find in my self the Idea of a Being absolutely Per∣fect, therefore that Being must Exist. Now I proceed to shew whether the Existence of God, can be proved from the consideration of his Nature, and whether a Possible only, or a Necessary Existence do belong to him.

II. The Ex∣istence of any thing may be en∣quired into after a two-fold manner. Two Questions may be formed of a thing that Exists in Nature, the one with respect to our Knowledge, the other with repect to the Thing con∣sidered in it self. By the First, the Reason is sought, why any thing, suppose God or the Soul, is affirm∣med by us to Exist: By the Second we enquire, how it comes to pass, that the said thing is not only Possible, but really Existent. By either of these ways we may enquire after the Existence of God, for we have Reasons that not only assure us that God Exists, but also that this his Existence is ne∣cessary.

III. The Idea of an Infinite Being prove its Ex∣istence. Neither will it be hard to Demonstrate this, if we attend to the Idea we have of God, viz. that he is Infinite, all Powerful and all Perfect: For we argue thus: Whatsoever we clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the Essence of any Thing, the same we know to be true as we perceive it; but we clearly and distinctly understand, that it belongs to the Essence of God that he Exists; there∣fore it is true that God Exists. The Minor is thus proved; It is a contradiction for a most perfect Being, to want any Perfection; but Existence is a Perfection; therefore God cannot be conceived, but Existent. For since where a Multitude is, there must needs also be a Unity; therefore since God posses∣seth all Perfections conceivable, he must of neces∣sity also have Existence.

IV. The Ex∣istence of God is ne∣cessary. Neither doth it oppose the Truth of what hath been said, that in all other Created Beings, the Essence is distinguisht from their Existence; and that it doth not follow, that a thing doth exist be∣cause we have a Notion of it. For the Reason thereof is, because in the Idea of all other Things only Possible, and not actual Existence is contained, whereas the Nature of God includes actual, neces∣sary and Eternal Existence: So that it is as impossi∣ble for us to conceive a Hill without a Valley, as to conceive an absolutely perfect Being, to whom any Perfection is wanting, or who is not Existent: For as Cogitation supposeth the Existence of a thing Thinking, for if it had no Being, it could not Think: So absolute Perfection presupposeth neces∣sary Existence, since nothing can be conceived ab∣solutely perfect, except it Exist.

V. Existence is a Per∣fection without which the nature of God cannot be concei∣ved. Wherefore in this point, we differ from Gassen∣dus, who denies Existence to be a Perfection, or the Propriety of any thing, but that which adds nei∣ther Perfection nor Imperfection to a thing. Be∣cause when we attend to the Notion of God, we per∣ceive, that Existence is a Divine Property, and no less belongs to God than Omnipotence or Immen∣sity, &c. or that an equality of Angles belongs to two Right ones. Because it belongs to the Nature of God to be; neither can he be conceived with∣out Existence. For would not something be want∣ing in God, in case he did not Exist? Or how other∣wise could he be said to be a Being absolutely per∣fect? Since Existence is nothing else but the Rea∣lity of any thing, whereby it is placed out of Nothing, which therefore no Being absolutely perfect, can be supposed to be without. For as Cogitation presup∣poseth the Existence of the thing that Thinks; so likewise, absolute Perfection requires Existence; be∣cause an absolutely perfect Substance cannot be con∣ceived, but as actually Existent, and unchangable from Eternity.

VI. Objection. You will say: Tho' we cannot conceive a Moun∣tain without a Valley, yet it doth not follow thence, that there is any Mountain in Nature, since a Moun∣tain doth not include Existence: And therefore neither doth it follow that God Exists, because I conceive him as Existent. For there is no neces∣sity laid upon things to Exist, from my Thought or Apprehension.

VII. Answered. I Answer, That this Argument doth not proceed aright; for tho' a Valley enters the Conception of an Hill, and neither can be apprehended without the other, yet is it not inferred thence, that either a Mountain or Valley doth Exist; but that whether they Exist or do not Exist, they cannot be separa∣ted from each other. But seeing I cannot conceive God without Existence, I must conclude, that Ex∣istence is inseparable from him, and that therefore God cannot be conceived, but as Existing.

VIII. An instance urged a∣gainst this Answer. But you will further urge, that the Sun Exist∣ing doth essentially involve two things, viz. the Sun and the form of Existence, so that Existence be∣longs to this complex Notion of the Sun Existing. But Gods knowing this complex Notion from Eter∣nity, doth not impose a necessity of Existing upon the Sun, without presupposing its actual Ex∣istence in the World. So likewise tho' Existence be contained in a Being absolutely perfect, yet cannot we conclude thence that it actually Exists, except we suppose it to include Existence, as well as the other Perfections.

IX. The instance Answered. I Answer, That in the Idea of an Existing Sun there is only a Possible, but not a necessary Ex∣istence contained; because we do not understand that actual Existence must of necessity be joyned with the Properties of the Sun; for tho' it be con∣ceived as Existing, yet doth it not follow thence that it doth Exist; forasmuch as this complex No∣tion, the Existing Sun, may be framed by the Un∣derstanding; and that these two Notions may be separated, not only by Abstraction, but also by a clear and distinct Operation, so as that the Sun may be conceived without Existence. Whereas, in the Idea of God actual and necessary Existence is in∣volved, which hath an inseperable Connexion with the rest of his Attributes. So that it is impossible to conceive an Infinite Being to have all Perfecti∣ons, except it do actually Exist. For necessary Existence is the Property of God, which agrees to him alone, and makes a part of his Essence.

X. The Idea of every thing doth not argue actual Ex∣istence. Wherefore, when we enquire, whether the Ex∣istence of a thing absolutely perfect can be inferr'd from its Idea, the Question is not, whether out of every Conception or Idea of a thing, we can De∣monstrate its Existence; but only whether from the Idea we have in our Mind of a Being abso∣lutely perfect, we may rightly conclude its Existence. For it is a Fallacy, when we bestow an Attribute, that agrees only to one Subject, upon all. Where∣fore I do rightly and demonstratively conclude, that if necessary Existence be contained in the Idea

of God, that is, if by a clear and distinct Perception, I cannot divide actual Existence from his Nature, God must necessarily Exist; by the same necessity that the Nature of Man doth consist of Soul and Body, and that a Valley includes the Conception of an Hill.

XI. The Essence of God is not a Fig∣ment of our Understan∣ding. Some with whom I have Discoursed about this Point, deny the Essence of God to subsist any where but in our Mind, and that it is nothing else but a figment or thing feigned by the Understanding. But this is easily overthrown by shewing, that necessary Existence is not included in any Fiction of our Understanding. Besides, the Essence of God is either Possible, or Impossible; if they grant the first, it must necessarily Exist; for what other thing can impart Existence to a thing that is Possible? If they say it is Impossible, it will lye upon them to prove the Contradiction it implies.

XII. The Ex∣istence of God may be proved from the Conserva∣tion of us. The Existence of God may also be proved from our continued Preservation. For seeing that a Crea∣ture hath no power to preserve it self, we must have recourse to some Cause that preserves it. Time we know is divided into many Parts, which are inde∣pendent of one another; since a Thing under Duration, may every particular Moment cease to be; neither doth it follow, because it was yester∣day, that it must be to day; wherefore there must be some Cause to preserve it, and as it were to pro∣duce it anew every Moment, which its self cannot do, no more than it could at first give its self a Being. For Conservation is not distinguishable from Creation, but only by Reason; neither is there any less power required to Conserve a thing, than to produce it: Neither can Parents do this, since they only procure some Dispositions in the Matter, to prepare it for the Reception of the Soul, and we may Live after they are Dead: Wherefore there must of necessity be some first Cause, which may not only create and produce us, but also keep and preserve us.

XIII. How it is to be under∣stood that things can∣not preserve themselves. If you oppose to what I have here alledged, the Law of Nature set down by Des Cartes: That every thing, as far as in it lies, endeavours to continue in the same State, neither is ever changed, except it be forced to it by a foreign Agent; and that according to this Law, every thing which Exists, must continue always to Exist, neither stands in need of any new force, whereby to be sustained in its Essence. I Answer, That whatsoever is besides God, is a Being depending on another; and whatsoever once essentially depends on another, must of necessity, for always so depend on it, be∣cause what is Essential admits of no change; and so great a Virtue is required in an Independing Be∣ing, that all things depend on it, as in the First Moment, so also in the Second, Third, &c. Where∣fore when it is said, that every thing, as much as in it lies, continues in the same State; this must be understood with regard to the Perfection or Nature which hath been given to it, to which God who is constant and unchangeable, is supposed to afford his continual concourse.

XIV. An account of what is to be hand∣led in the following Chapter. Tho from the Idea we have of God, and from the Contemplation of him, and our own Conserva∣tion, his actual Existence is evidently deducible; nevertheless we will also endeavour to make out the same from all Sensible Objects. This was not under∣taken by Des Cartes, forasmuch as he being chiefly intent on the Idea of God, had not yet disco∣vered Material things, and therefore could not properly alledge any Argument from their Pro∣duction.

CHAP. IV. The Contemplation of the World proves the Existence of God.

I. The first Argument for the Ex∣istence of a God from the Fabrick of the World. ALmost all the Philosophers that ever duly considered the Miracles of Nature, con∣stantly acknowledged an Eternal Godhead, by whose out-breathing all things are Quickned, and receive Life and Heat. For who is there so stu∣pid, who from the Stupendous Structure of the World, the continual Rotations of the Heavens, and the never discomposed order of Nature, doth not necessarily infer, that there is a Supreme Crea∣tor, who doth govern the World, as Boethius saith, by Perpetual Reason, at whose command Time is, and who being Stable, and Immoveable himself, imparts Motion to all things? What else doth the vast extent of this World, the variety of things therein contained, the Beauty of its Parts, the constancy of its Motions Preach to us, than that there is a great Moderator, who is the Author of this Transcendent Structure, and the Original dis∣poser of this Harmonious Order?

We all are link'd to God, a silent Breast, His Temple is.— What is the Place of God but Heaven and Earth The Air and Seas, to which he's given Birth? What but a Vertuous raised holy Mind? Where if we can't, we'l scarce him elsewhere find. All that thy Gazing Eye doth see, and all That doth thee move, is that which God we call. Lucan. lib. 9.

II. Order sup∣sposeth an understand∣ing Arti∣ficer. I will own that some mean Philosophers, may rest in the Contemplation of Second Causes, and ••••••tertain their Minds with the consideration os Natural Objects, without looking further. But it is impossible, that he who attentively considers their Subordination, and diligently weighs their Connex∣ion, should not be forced to own a Creator of Heaven and Earth, and acknowledge his perpe∣tual Providence, except (as Aristotle saith) he be so unhappy, as to be fallen into the deepest Gulf of Blindness and Misery. But that we may illustrate this a little by an Example, Let us suppose that Pro∣tagoras, or some other Atheist, had got a view of Archimedes his Glassy Sphear, in which the Heavens, I say, perform their several Motions; where the Sun and Moon do by degrees with∣draw themselves towards the East, and being hurried along by the Primum Mobile, are whirld about, within the space of Twenty four hours; Do you think that Protagoras would have believed this Machine, to have been jumbled together by Chance, by a Fortuitous Concourse of the Parts, and not much rather that it was the effect of Art, and of the Brain of a most Subtil and Accomplisht Mathema∣tician? For seeing it doth chiefly belong to an In∣tellectual Agent, fitly to adapt divers things, and to dispose them according to his designed end, he will be forced to confess that such an accurate and in∣genious

piece of Work, must have proceeded from Reason, and not from a Chance-medly of Atoms.

III. Never were any Mira∣cleswrought for the Con∣viction of Atheists. But if it be lawful to compare Great things with Little, and Weak things with such as are Perfect, what is Archimedes his Sphear in comparison to this Universe? How much more Perfect is the Original, than the Copy? And shall we believe that Archimedes, in his Imitation of the Motion of the Wandring Stars, made use of Reason, and at the same time suppose, that this infinite num••er of Stars, this wonderful adorning of the Heavens, this excellent Order of an unutterable variety of Works were the product of casually jumbled and justled Atoms? This can never be supposed by any one in his right Wits: And he that hath either outward Eyes to see with, or an Ʋnderstanding to discern, can never submit to what is so contradi∣ctory to Sense and Reason. For this cause I sup∣pose it is, that GOD who disposeth all things in Number, Weight, and Measure, and who takes so great Care for Mankind, yet hath never been known to work any Miracles in favour of Atheists; because the Workmanship of Nature is not only a convincing Argument of his Power, but doth also strongly invite and persuade us to the highest Ad∣miration of all his Divine Perfections. And to speak the truth, I could much more easily believe all the Fables of Aesop for true Histories, and that Mice had conferences together, and that a Weesel entertain'd a witty Discourse with the Fox, than that the Rising and Setting of the Stars, the Vi∣cissitudes of Day and Night, the variety of Seasons in the Fourfold divided Year, the two Aequino∣ctials, and as many Solstices, could ever have been so ordered, without the Divine, that is, the most Perfect Reason; or preserv'd in the same, by an invariable and uninterrupted Succession. For do not all these, and all the other Wonders, with a constant and never ceasing Voice seem to proclaim, that they are the Off-spring of an Invisible So∣vereign Power, and by no means their own Artificers? He hath made us, and not we our selves.

IV. The vari∣ous Species of Animals prove the Being of a GOD. But that I may not insist too long in laying open the Beauty of the Universe, I will pass by the vast Globe of the Earth, poised in the midst of the Air, the Mountains lifting up their Heads towards Heaven, the Rivers that water and fru∣ctifie the Earth, the prodigious variety of Vege∣tables, which grow of themselves, and the vast number of Mines and Quarries, from which Gold, Silver, and the rest of the Metals, with several sorts of Earths and Stones are dug. Let us only consider, the almost infinite differing kinds of Li∣ving Creatures, whose opposit outward shape, and the great and many Conveniences and Necessaries they afford to Mankind, declare them to be the effect of the One only First Principle or Author of all things. For who can imagin that the diffe∣rence of Male and Female, the desire of Mutual Embraces, and of perpetuating themselves by their Posterity, and Organs fitted for that purpose, were design'd and contriv'd by any thing less than a Wise Omnipotence? Who is there, that upon a diligent view of the several sorts of Birds, their astonishing Artifice in making their Nests, their Hatching and care of Feeding their Young, their dexterousness in teaching them to Fly, doth not presently discover the Supream Cause of them, who with wonderful Wisdom and Artifice hath contriv'd and order'd all things, and hath imparted several virtues and forces to different Animals, according to their various use and capacity? How exquisitely is their whole frame suited to the use for which they are design'd, and how accurately are their Organs adapted to their several Actions? Thus Bulls are furnish'd with Horns; Lions with their Paws; Elephants with their Teeth and Snout; and the Rhinocero's with his close Armour, as well in order to the attaining of their designed End, as to defend themselves, and offend their Ene∣mies.

V. The vari∣ous Facul∣ties in Beasts, plainly prove a Sovereign or Supream Power, or∣dering and designing all things. Shall any one be so weak as to think, that broad and flat Feet were given to Water Fowl without any design, and by meer hap hazard, when the use of them in Swimming is so apparent? Can any one suppose that Herns, should by chance, have long Legs and Necks, and Beaks sharp∣pointed like Daggers, wherewith they pierce the Fishes, and draw them out of the Water for their prey? Whench hath the Pike his prominent Saw-like Teeth on each side his Jaws, and the Roof of his Mouth thick set with Hooks, that the slippery Prey might not escape his greedy Jaws? Is it by chance that the Woodpacker is furnish'd with Claws, wherewith it runs up the side of Trees like a Cat, and a forked Tongue, wherewith it robs the Ta∣rantula of her Prey? Consider the Arts and In∣dustry of the Bees, Pismires, and other Beasts, about their Food, begetting of their Kind, breeding of their Young, and fighting with their Enemies, and it will appear self-evident, that none of these can be supposed the fruit of an Accidental and Confused motion of Atoms, forasmuch as nothing more excellent, more apposit or useful, can be conceived by the Mind of Man.

VI. The behold∣ing of Man, leads us to the know∣ledge of▪ GOD. But to make no longer stop here, let us take a view of Man, Nature's Masterpiece, and behold all the Excellencies dispers'd up and down in all other Living Creatures, united in this Microcosm, or Little World. Can any one behold his comly Form, the erect posture of his Body, his Face looking upwards, and (as it were) directed towards Heaven, and the Beautiful symmetry and propor∣tion of his whole Body and Parts, and suppose him to have had no Author of his Being? But to leave the Wonders of his Outside, if we pro∣ceed to take a view of his Inward Parts, their structure and situation, the Nerves and Sinews de∣riving their Original from the Brain, the Arteries from the Heart, the Aethereal ever moving Spirit that fills them, and imparts motion to all the several Joynts and Members of the Body, and vigour and strength to perform all manner of Actions, we shall find still stronger Arguments to persuade us, that there must be a First Cause, who is the Prin∣ciple of all Human Perfection.

VII. The descri∣ption of the Eye, as to its Exter∣nal parts. But forasmuch as Vulgar Wits are more apt to be taken with Examples than Discourse, let us take to task some one Part of the Body of Man; for Example, the Eye, and scan the Miracles it contains. And here at first sight we meet with so many Wonders in its most curious Make and Con∣trivance, that it is impossible for a Man, not wholly bereft of Reason and Understanding, to doubt of the Sovereign Perfection of the Artificer. In running over its outward Parts, we meet with the

Bony Orbit, or round Ossea Orbita, together with the Eyelids, the Hair of the Eyelids, and the Eye∣brows, as also the Glandules or Kernels, with the Excretory Vessels and Passages, all which serve either to defend that tender Part, or assist and facilitate its motion. The Eyelids are as Curtains to the Eyes, and are assisted with the ministry of several Nerves, which by insertion into the Mus∣cles, become useful for the opening or shutting of them. The Eyebrows and Hair on the Eyelids, are like Ramparts, to secure the Eye from things that are hurtful to it, and to prevent their sudden and unexpected eruption. The Excretory Passages serve to carry off the superabounding Humor, that the Eye may not be clog'd by the affluence of serous Matter, or the Eyesight dimmed by the acrimony thereof.

VIII. The In∣ward Parts of the Eye consider'd. If we proceed to the Inner Parts, which Nature hath hid from, but Anatomy lays open to us; we shall first find the Muscles, wherewith this miraculous little Globe continues hung up and equally pois'd within the Orbit, and performs its various mo∣tions. In the Midst of it is the Pupilla, or Sight, of a round Figure, that the visible Species or Rays proceeding from Objects, might be the better re∣ceived by it, from what part soever of the Hemi∣sphere they come. After these appear the Coats, or Membrans of the Eye, and next the Humors, which like a Dioptrick-Glass do refract and con∣center the Rays that represent the Images of Bo∣dies. For the Watry Humor distending the Mem∣bran, and making it gibbous, doth ampliate the Convexity of the Eye: And the Crystalline Hu∣mor placed within the opening of the Grape-like Coat, Tunicâ Uvea, like a piece of Glass set oppo∣site to a Hole, in which the Rays coming from all parts are collected and refracted. And behind the Crystalline Humor is placed the Glassy Humor, by means whereof the Tunica Retina, or Network Membrane is at a fit distance separated from the Crystalline Humor, so that when the Rays with due refraction have past the same, they attain their proper place and center.

IX. The stru∣cture of the Ear examin'd. Tho' the EAR be not of equal use and con∣cern to the convenience and necessities of Life, as the Eye, and is only design'd for the perceiving of Sounds; yet is it for the Excellence of its stru∣cture very little inferiour to that of the Eye, espe∣cially if we consider its Inner parts, and the mu∣tual connexion of them. For from the Lappet of the Ear, which is narrowed by degrees, we see that the Hollow of the Ear goes slanting inwards, to the end that the Sounds, by passing its crooked Windings and Turnings, might be encreased. For the thin Membrane, placed near the Hole of this inward Cavity, being struck by the impuls'd Air▪ doth affect the Fibres and Auditory Nerve with the same motion. There are also three small Bones fitly disposed and tied together with a Ligament: The first of these is call'd the Hammer, because of the resemblance it bears with that Instrument; the second is call'd the Anvil, which is somewhat roundish; and the third, the Stapes or Stirrop; they are moveable, and seem to be of good use to defend the Drum of the Ear, and prevent its be∣ing too much slackened, or too stiff bent. From the fore-mention'd Hollow of the Ear, the Passage (commonly called by Anatomists the Oval Hole, or Window) opens into the Labyrinth, and so leads to the last Inner Cavity, called Cochlea; because in its Spiral Windings it resembles a Snails Shell, which if well view'd, appears to be the work of admirable Artifice; for being form'd with such Turnings, it renders the Sounds more distinct, and causes that there be no confusion of them. Besides, there are many other Parts not here to be insisted on, whose wonderful Contrivance does much con∣duce to Hearing.

X. The stru∣cture of the Eye and Ear, cannot be the effect of a Fortuitous Concourse of Atoms. Now who can be conceived so stupid and void of all Judgment, as to think that the Organs of these two Senses were made by a fortuitous jumb∣ling together of small Bodies; and not rather ac∣knowledge the most High God, who by his inimi∣table Wisdom has so curiously framed, and orderly disposed all these several Parts, that nothing can be imagin'd more adapt, and better suited to the uses for which they were designed.

XI. Living Creatures could ne∣ver be by Chance. I could never approve of Democritus his Opinion, which attributes the Original of the World to a company of justling Atoms, as if their Roaming vagaries were an adequate Cause to produce all the Bodies in the Universe. For how can we suppose, that in that infinite Space, wherein he asserts his Atoms to be toss'd, they should come together and unite, to the framing of all the Parts of Living Creatures? Can we imagine, that by the hudling concourse of like Bodies so many Nerves and Muscles, so many Ligaments and Tendons, so many Filaments and Fibres, could be formed? Can we think that the Legs, Shins, Feet, Toes, Joynts, with all the other Organs of the Body, were the effect of blind and impotent Chance? Can we conceive that the Heart, that Noble Muscle, and the Breast in which it is contain'd, together with its Ribs, Muscles, the Lungs, and the Midriff, were made without a Cause and at Hap-hazard? Or that such a vast number of Veins, Arteries, Grissels, and Membrans had no other rise, but meer Chance and the Heaviness of Bodies? Who can force himself to imagine, that an infinite number of Blind Men plac'd in an open Field, by a confused running in amongst one another, should at last produce an Army orderly drawn up in Bat∣tle, according to the most exact Rules of Military Art and Discipline? Or why may not we as well with CICERO, suppose that a vast number of Alpha∣betical Characters, being casually thrown upon the Earth, should all rank themselves into Lines and Words, making the Annals of ENNIUS the Poet? Now as no Man can so much over-bear his Reason as to think this possible, how much less will he be able to believe, that the curious Structure and Or∣der of the Parts of Animals, is the effect of Chance, that is, of no Cause at all?

XII. Atoms can∣not produce any t hing of them∣selvee. And to deduce this matter from the Beginning of the World; If it be so that Atoms have a Power to produce and generate things, why do they not now produce or renew the same Things they framed so long ago; why are there no Moun∣tains raised anew? How is it that they do not constitute another Sun? How it comes to pass that all Living Creatures keep to their kinds, and that no new ones do arise from their Sensless Jumbling together? Neither will it be of any advantage for the Atheist to alledge here, that Flies, Mice, and other Insects are daily generated without the Union of both Sexes; because the Question here is not concerning the Production of Things, but

concerning the inborn Power of Nature, or Seeds, out of which Living Creatures are Born, and are endowed with a Virtue fit for the Generating of them. And seeing they have not this of themselves, since it is a contradiction for a thing to be pro∣ductive of it self, it must follow that they are the effect of the All-wi••e God, by whose power they act whatfoever they do.

CHAP. V. Concerning Fate and Will, or the Divine Decree.

I. The Anci∣ents took great Pains to reconcile the Divine Preordina∣tion with the Liberty of Mans Will. THe Ancients were so solicitous of Preserving Human Liberty, that when they found they could not reconcile them with some of the Divine Attributes, they chose rather to acknowledge their own Ignorance, than to deny it. For when they found that all our Actions must be pre-ordained by God, forasmuch as he is the All-knowing Govern∣our of the World; and on the other hand experi∣enced in themselves a Freedom of Will, they ad∣mitted both to be True, viz. that God doth pre-ordain all our Actions, and that we nevertheless enjoy Liberty of Will. But when they afterwards proceeded to enquire further, how it could be, that Mans Liberty standing, God could have fore-or∣dained all things from Eternity, they ingenuously profest their Ignorance, and that it was no wonder, that an Infinite Being could not be Comprehended by a Created Understanding. This acknowledg∣ment of Human Frailty was certainly praise-worthy in them: But forasmuch as all are not satisfied with this Answer, many being solicitous to know how the Liberty of Man may be reconciled with Gods De∣cree, I suppose it will not be useless to make out, that Gods Foreknowledge of and Foreordination of Human actions, doth not take away the Liberty of them.

II. What Fate or the Di∣vine Decree is. And here if we consider the Nature of Fate, or the Divine Decree, we shall find it to be nothing else, but what God hath determined concerning every one of us: Or it is the Eternal Decree of his Providence, by which he Sees, Knows and Governs all things. And as BOETHIUS expresses it; Fate is an Order or Disposition, Inherentin change∣able things, by which Providence links them to their due Ranks and Orders.

III. Fate lays no necessity upon Hu∣man Acti∣ons. Now that this Order or Disposal doth impose no necessity upon Human Actions, is apparent, because we find that it is in our Power, to give our Assent to, or to Dissent from many things, and after have∣ing ballanced both parts, to choose one, and reject the other. We see likewise that Men frequently change their Minds at the Persuasions of their Friends, and do refuse what first they had embra∣ced. And indeed were it otherwise, all Prudence and Reason in Mens ordering of their affairs would be taken away; for if they had no Freedom to chuse that part, to which they are inclined by Rational motives; they would not act by the direction of Wisdom, but by Chance and Fortune.

IV. It is an Argument of our weakness, that we cannot re∣concile Gods omnipo∣tence, with the liberty of our will. And what can be more absurd than to go about to deny our Liberty, which we experience in our selves, and whereof we are so fully Conscious, that nothing can be more illustrious by the Light of Nature than it is, because we can scarcely recon∣cile it, with the Divine Omnipotence and Provi∣dence? We ought ever to remember that we are Finite, and that God is Infinite; and that our Li∣berty must not presently be denied, because we cannot conceive it inconsistence with the Will of God, which is without us, and which our Minds are not able to comprehend; forasmuch as this only proceeds from the weakness of our Wit and Understanding

V. The Decree of God doth suit it felf and com∣port with things. 'Tis true indeed that Fate is immoveable, but yet so as that it inheres in things that are moveable; because it doth not take away the Nature or inbred Motions of things, but moves them sweetly and without any manner of constraint; according to the Requirings of the different Nature of things, so as to act necessarily, with things necessary, and freely with free and voluntary Agents.

VI. Gods Fore∣knowledge lays no ne∣cessity or force upon Mans will. Neither is this Assertion overthrown by that common Objection: If God foresees that I shall Sin, seeing that his Foresight cannot be deceived, it follows that I must necessarily Sin. For God doth not foresee my Sinning necessarily, but freely and voluntarily; and his Knowledge imposeth no necessity upon my Actions, no more than my knowing that Peter will walk to morrow, doth lay a necessity upon him of doing so: Or than the knowledge I have of the Suns Existence in the Heavens, doth cause the Sun to be there.

VII. The know∣ledge of God being external to the thing known, cannot hin∣der its Li∣berty. For what can be more Childish than to think, that the Foreknowledge of God, which is altogether External to the thing known, should put a force upon the Will of Man? But you will say, God cannot be deceived. And what then? Consequent∣ly, you'l say, it was either true from Eternity, that you were to recover of this Sickness, or else false: Therefore it is in vain to make use of a Phisician, since neither the necessity of Fate, nor Eternal Truth can ever be changed. This is worthily stil'd by CICERO to be a lazy Question, because by the same Argument you may overthrow all Human Actions. But that Gods Foreknowledge, doth not import any necessity is evident from this; that a Contingent thing is of its own nature Indefinite, and of a doubtful event, tho' with respect to the Di∣vine Foreknowledge, it be Definite and determined. AMMONIUS illustrates this by the Example of a Globe, resting on the Plain of the Horizon, the in∣differency whereof as to Rest or Motion, doth well express the indifferency of our Will; but if this Plain be never so little inclined, then it must move of necessity: So likewise when the Will is inclined to any thing, this makes a kind of necessity, upon Sup∣position only, that the Will turned it self this way; or that God did foresee this inclination from Eternity.

VIII. The cer∣tainty of Gods Fore∣knowledge is no Argu∣ment for a force upon our will. You will say, Gods Prescience is most certain; therefore its Object cannot but come to pass; and that which cannot but come to pass, is therefore ne∣cessary: Therefore, Gods Foreknowledge impos∣eth a necessity on the Will. I Answer, by distinguish∣ing the Consequent; I grant that the thing which is the Object of the Divine Foreknowledge, cannot but happen upon Supposition, that it is to happen so, from a necessity of Consequence; but I deny that it cannot but come to pass absolutely, and by a ne∣cessity of Antecedence.

IX. There is a two-fold necessity. There is a two-fold necessity, the one Antece∣dent, and that is that which is the Cause of the Action, which necessity the Will cannot resist: The other is Consequent, which is not the Cause of the Action, but doth presuppose it, and is consequent to it. And it is this latter only which is brought upon Human affairs, by the Divine Prescience:

[illustration]

[illustration]

Books. 1. Part. 2. Chap. 5.

G. Freman Inv.

I▪ 〈◊〉〈◊〉

To the Wor∣shipfull Cap∣taine Richard Cheyney of Ham∣erton in the Parish of Hack∣ney in Middle∣sex Esq^r.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

Forasmuch as a futurity is not the Consequent of Gods Fore-knowledge, but his Prescience is the Con∣sequent of that which is future; and in this Sense only it is, that the Object of Gods Prescience is called Infallible and Eternal.

CHAP. VI. How God is said to be the Cause of Proposi∣tions of Eternal Truth.

I. How the Essences of things are distinguisht from their Existency. FOr the better understanding of this Question, we are briefly to presuppose, that the Essences of things are modally distinguisht from their Existency: For we understand the Essence of a thing after one manner, when we abstract it from Existence or non Existence; and after another when we conceive it as Existing. For a thing is under∣stood to be Existent, when it is without our Under∣standing: But a thing that doth not Exist, is obje∣ctively in our Understanding, and is not without our Thought. Of this kind are Eternal Truths, viz. That a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two right ones: Six and Four make Ten; and such like, which are considered as Ideas in our Mind. And forasmuch as these Idea's cannot be said to be no∣thing, but something, the Questions is, what is the cause of them, that is, whether they depend on the Understanding of Man forming them, or whether they owe their production to some other Prin∣ciple.

II. God is the cause of Propositions of Eternal Truth. I Answer, that all Eternal Truths are from God, as from their efficient and total Cause; for he is the Cause of all Creatures, not only as to their Existence, but also with regard to their Essence. Forasmuch as he being Infinite Goodness, could not be im∣pulsed by any other Reason of Goodness, to do that which is best: But on the contrary because he determined himself to produce the things that are, therefore they deserve the Title of being Good. As for Example, he did not therefore will the three Angles of a Triangle to be equal to Two right ones, because he saw, that they could not be other∣wise; but on the contrary, because according to his Free-will he had determined the three Angles to be necessarily equal to Two right ones, therefore they could not be otherwise. For in God to Will, to Understand and Create are one and the same thing: Wherefore because he knows a thing, therefore it is true.

III. The non-Existence of God being supposed nothing is less true. Neither can we say, that these Truths would be no less true, whether God be supposed to Exist or not: For this is most false; because all Truths de∣pend upon the Existence of God, who is the first Eternal cause of them, from whence they all flow as from their Fountain. Neither is this difficult to be conceived, if we consider God as an Infinite, Eternal, Incomprehensible Being, the Author of all Good, and on whom all things depend. And therefore they are in a great Error, who think that any thing can be independently of his Will.

IV. That twice four make eight is from God. Neither doth it oppose what we have said, that the Mind of Man cannot conceive the three An∣gles of a Triangle not to be equal to two right ones; or that twice four should not make Eight: For to prove this, it is sufficient to shew, that there can be no Being which does not depend on God, and was not freely constituted by him: For this being laid down, it evidently follows, that it was not always necessary, that the three Angles of a Triangle should be equal to two right ones, or that twice four should make eight, but that it was ••o consti∣tuted by God.

V. God being of himself there is nothing independent of him. For seeing God is positively of himself, he is en∣dowed with such an Essence and Nature, that from the consideration thereof we can assign a Reason for Eternal Truth, without need of having recourse to any other Object, for the clearing of their Evidence and certainty. This Attribute would agree to some other besides God, if we should suppose some Na∣tures, Truths and Essences to be such as to be inde∣pendent of God. Because if any one should demand why they were such, and whence they had their Truth, it might be answered, that they were Eter∣nally so of themselves, and that for that Reason, they became the Objects of the Divine Knowledge, as being of themselves Antecedent to it. Which is so derogatory to the Divine Omnipotence, that it is a wonder to me how any can assert such a thing, who consider well the Divine Independency upon any things whatsoever. Forasmuch as it would follow from hence, that the Complement of the Divine Cogitation would not depend on the sole understanding of himself, but also of some other thing, which was not of the Nature of God, and which is conceived as independent on his Will.

VI. In what Sense the Essences of things are said to be immutable and Eter∣nal. If you Object that the Essences of things are Eternal and Immutable; I answer, That they are so indeed, if it be understood concerning the Im∣mutability and Eternity, which God hath prefixt to them, whilst by his Free-will he has determined some things to be unchangeable. Or else it may be said according to the Sense of the Vulgar, that the Natures of things are Eternal, because there was no Time before them; or rather because the Eternal God, doth conceive them without Successi∣on, neither will suffer them for ever to cease or be changed.

VII God is tho Cause of Truths, as a King is of his Law••. GOD therefore is the Efficient Cause of all things; not only of such as Exist, but also of Pos∣sibles, and of all Truths that we call Eternal: In like manner as a King is the Maker of all the Laws in his Kingdom. For all these Truths are inborn in us from him; as a King also woul•• have them so in his Subjects, if he had Power enough to write his Laws in their Hearts.

VIII. Objection. If any one say, That this would make God inferiour to a King, who can at his Pleasure annul the Laws he has made; which if God should do, those Truths would lose their Essence, and conse∣quently would be no longer True or Immu∣table.

IX. Answer. I Answer, That the Case of God and a King are very different. A King can change his Laws, because his Will is changeable, but God's Will is unchangeable; for it is his Perfection, that he acts in a most constant and invariable manner. Neither doth it hinder this that his Will is free; for as his Will is free, so likewise is his Power Incompre∣henfible. Wherefore tho' I cannot comprehend how it should not be true, that One and Five are Six; yet I understand clearly enough, that it is impossible there should be any thing in the whole Universe of Things, which does not depend on him. And therefore it is contrary to Reason to think that any thing cannot be otherwise, because we cannot understand how it can be. It is indeed true in the general, that GOD can do all those things, which are clearly and distinctly known by

us; yet doth it not follow from thence, that he cannot do those things that we cannot conceive: For our Imagination, or Understanding, cannot be the Rule of his Power. Therefore we must con∣clude, That the Essences of Things, and Mathe∣matical Truths are from God, because he so con∣ceived them, so ordered, and so commanded them: According to that of S. Austin; Because thou seest them, (or rather, because it listeth thee) therefore they are.

CHAP. VII. Concerning the Divine Attributes; and, First, Of the Ʋnity of GOD.

I. What the Attributes of GOD are. ALtho' GOD be One meer Cogitation, and all his Perfections or Attributes indivisibly United; yet the Acts of Cogitation that we have of him, stirr'd up from several Occasions, which frequently involve many Objects, are Many. For when I consider, that my Mind doth not exist of it self, neither can do all, nor understand all things, &c. I turn my self to the Divine Cogitation, which comprehends all Perfections. And these Reflexions, whether as referr'd to God, or to the various Conceptions of Objects, are called Attri∣butes. Whence it comes to pass, that one of my Cogitations I have of God, as Existing, is different from another Cogitation I have of him, as All-powerful, or Eternal: Because the occasions of these my Thoughts are different; and one Object which I refer or apply to God, is different from another which I can likewise apply to him. Where∣fore seeing I do not find my Mind to be one only, but perceive also the Idea's of other Minds of the same Nature with mine, I cast my Eye on the Divine Cogitation, and thence take an occasion of considering its Unity.

II. The Divine Attributes aro indivi∣sibly united. If therefore we consider the Essence of God in it self, it appears to us to be one Simple, Uniform Cogitation, exempt from all Order, Distinction, Priority, or Posteriority. Forasmuch as all the Perfections that are, or we can think of in God, are not only actually present in his Nature, and inseparably united with it; but are so intimately joyned, that the one is the other; yea, that one of them is all the rest, and All are most properly One in their Essence: So as that his Eternity is his Om∣nipotence, his Life, his Spirituality. In a word, All his Attributes are his Life, and his Life is all his Attributes.

III. The Unity of GOD was known to the An∣cients. It was the constant Opinion of the Ancients, That GOD is One only, the Sovereign of the Universe, whom all things obey. Both Poets and Philosophers own'd this, who frequently call him, The Maker of all things, The Ruler of the World, and The Mind diffus'd through all things. Wherefore also they gave him no peculiar Name, as supposing that no Title could be given to him, who was singular, and had nothing common with other things; for that Names were only necessary where Plurality is to be distinguish'd, and persons discriminated by certain Marks.

IV. The Divine Unity is to ••e explain∣ed. But because the word Unity is taken in divers Senses, we are to enquire first, in what respect God is said to be one, before we can come to know, that there can be no more than one.

V. A thing is said to be One, three several ways. A Thing is said to be one, First, when its Parts are united; yet so as that it may be divided into them; as a Body is said to be One, because of the Union of its Parts, tho' they be separable. Se∣condly, A Thing is said to be One, because it hath one single Essence, which cannot be divided into Parts; tho' the Attributes and Modes wherewith it is diversified, may be separated from it, such as Knowledge and Vertue, without which the Soul of Man may be. Thirdly, a Thing is said to be One, which is so undivided, that it can in no respect be divided, nor hath any Attributes, or Modes, that are separable from it, but all things appertaining are most simply one.

VI. How God is said to be One. In this last meaning God is said to be One, because all that is in him is One, neither hath he any Attributes that are not Essential to him, and Inse∣parable from him. And therefore according to our Philosophy, the Divine Attributes are only Modes of Thinking. For when we distinguish his Will and Understanding, that distinction is only made by our Minds, as we conceive him to be conver∣sant about Goodness or Truth. But Real Modes are found in the Things themselves, which they affect and distinguish from others; as Figure and Motion in Bodies; Willing and Understanding in the Mind. And are therefore call'd the Modes of Things, because they agree to mutable Things, such as all Created Beings are; but not to a Being that is constant and ever-abiding, such as God alone is. Wherefore whatsoever is in God is only distin∣guishable by reason.

VII. God is one in such a manner, that there can be no more be∣sides him. Having shewed what manner of Unity agrees to GOD, it may further be queried, Whether God be one in such a manner, as to suffer or admit none besides him. To which I answer, That God is One in such a manner that he cannot be multiplied: For seeing by the Name, GOD, we understand a most Perfect Being, it is necessary that it compre∣hend all that is most Real; so that supposing him to exist, all conceivable Perfection must be placed in him, so as by his Idea and Essence formally to exclude every most perfect Being besides himself. For indeed how can any be equal to him? Or how can all conceivable Perfections be in two several Subsistences; seeing that whatsoever admits of Division is subject to dissolution, which is the most remote from the Nature of God, who is In∣corruptible and Eternal.

VIII. Multipli∣city of Gods implies a Contradi∣ction. If it be said, That this Division is no hindrance to their Immortality, as long as the one doth not arrogate any thing that belongs to the other, but each of them follow their own work. It will still come to the same thing; for this distribution of their Work or Business, is an evident Instance of great Imperfection; because this supposeth them to stand in need of one anothers assistance, being unable all alone to govern the World; which is contradictory to the Divine Essence, which is known to be Omnipotent, Insinite, and All-wise.

IX. If there were more Gods than one, they could not be equal. Moreover it is most certain, that supposing a Plurality of Gods, they cannot be every way equal, but that some Perfections would be found in the one, which are not in the other, which is altoge∣ther incompetible to the Supream Being. For let us suppose two Gods, whom for the greater clearness of Discourse, we will call Saturn and Jupiter. Now these two Gods, forasmuch as they severally include all Perfections, they must of necessity be All-knowing, so as not only to know themselves, but others also; and because in the Idea of either

of them, necessary Existence is included, it will follow, that the Cause of the Necessity and Truth of the Idea of Saturn, which is in Jupiter, will be Saturn himself; and the Cause of the Truth and Necessity of the Idea of Jupiter, which is in Saturn, will be Jupiter; and therefore some Per∣fection will be found in Saturn, which is not in Jupiter; and in Jupiter, which is not in Saturn. The reason whereof is this, because the Perfection of the understanding of either of them, will de∣pend on the other; and so must be both of them Imperfect, which is repugnant to the Nature of a most perfect Being.

X. Neither could they be Omnipo∣tent, or All-knowing, It belongs also to the Idea of a most perfect Being, that he be All-powerful and All-knowing; but it is a Contradiction, that more Beings than one should be endowed with these Perfections: For either they would be able to hide their Thoughts from each other, or not be able; if the first, how could they both be Omniscious? If the latter, how could they be Omnipotent?

IX. If God exist, he must be One. Lastly, Necessary Existence is included in the Idea of God, because he is Independent of, and before all other Beings. Now whatsoever doth necessarily exist, must of necessity be Singular, since Singular Being is nothing, but actually to exist, which is so peculiar to God, that he cannot but exist: Wherefore seeing Singularity and U∣nity are one and the same thing, it is evident that the Divine Nature excludes all Multiplicity, that is, cannot be divided into more Gods; and conse∣quently, as God is Undivided in himself, so neither can he be partible into others.

XII. The Hea∣thens did not own many Gods. But may some say, How comes it to pass then that the Heathens worship'd many Gods, if it be so that more Gods than one implies a Contra∣diction? I answer, That the Heathens never had any Idea of many Beings absolutely perfect, as is evident from their Writings; because they made one to Rule in Heaven, another in Hell, a third over the Winds, a fourth over the Fire, and distri∣buted the Government of the Universe amongst many Gods: But they did not suppose any of them to contain all manner of Perfections, and to have the Power and Dominion over all Creatures; but took them to be much of the same Nature as we conceive the Angels. And Marsilius Ficinus tells us as much, Argument. in Cratylum: Neither let it trouble you, saith he, that Plato doth frequently make mention of many Gods: For he proves in his Parmenides and Timaeus, that there is but One God; and that the rest are only his Angelical and Hea∣venly Ministers; and by calling them Gods, doth not so much imply their being Gods, as their being Divine. For indeed the Philosophers do so much abhor a Plurality of Gods, that it would be more easie to persuade Euclid, that many Centers may be found in a Circle, than to make Philosophers believe that there are more than one God in the World.

CHAP. VIII. That GOD is Eternal, or without Beginning and End.

I. The Error of some, who say, that God was the Efficient Cause of himself. THo' almost all Philosophers agree in this, that there is a GOD, and that he governs the World; yet don't all of them conceive his Exi∣stence after one and the same manner. Some of them are of Opinion, that GOD had some kind of Beginning, and tho' the same were before all Ages; yet that he was born or produced as all other Things. But forasmuch as it was unbecoming the Divine Majesty to proceed from any other, and that he who is the Author of all Good, should derive his Being from another, they asserted himto be his own Efficient Cause, and that he so proceeded from himself.

II. This Opi∣nion de∣stroys the Nature of God. But this Opinion does not so much oppose Rea∣son, as it destroys the very Nature of God: For how could God produce himself, since this supposeth that before his Production he was not, because he was then to be produced, and yet was at the same time, forasmuch as he did then influence his own Production, which are absolute Contradictions. And whatever may be said in this case, we must allow some Principle of the Divine Production, which is absolutely repugnant to the Nature of God. For we no sooner consider the Nature of GOD, but we find him to be the Most perfect Being, which excludes all Imperfections, that is, any bounds or limitation of his Perfections, and includes all Per∣fections, and consequently also Existence, by which he is distinguish'd from all other things.

III. Necessary Existence is contain'd in the Na∣ture of God. For tho' whatsoever we conceive be apprehended by us as Existing; yet we find that Existence doth not belong to God and the Creatures in the same manner. For in the Conception of Crea∣tures, whose Perfections are finite, only Contingent and Possible Existence is contained; whereas in the Notion of God, Necessary Existence is included, as being an Eternal Perfection; insomuch that it is as obvious to our knowledge that GOD exists, as it is to a Mathematician, that a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two right ones. For as it is the Nature of a Triangle to have three Angles equal to two right ones; so likewise it is the Nature of God, to be necessarily Existent, and therefore as he exists now, it must be acknowledg'd that he hath existed from all Eternity.

IV. They who distinguish God's Es∣sence from his Exi∣stence, takes away his Eternity. They who do not mind this, are very liable to Error, and to ascribe to God simple Duration instead of Eternity: For by distinguishing Exi∣stence from Essence in God▪ as in other Created Beings, they imagine Succession of Time to have place in him, and by this means divide that which is Infinite, into Parts, and assign differences of Duration to it. Hence it is that some demand, Whether God hath not existed longer now, than when he first Created the VVorld; or whether he did not exist longer before the Creation of the VVorld, than the Time that has run from the Beginning of the VVorld till now. Which Que∣stions are occasion'd by their separating the Essence of God from his Existence, and supposing that the Eternity of God may be understood, without the contemplation of his Essence; or because they have not distinguish'd Duration from Eternity, but have concluded them to be confounded together. For Duration is an Attribute of the Existence of things, not of their Essence. Who will not say that the Propositions, Twice three make six; Nothing is made out of Nothing; which are only said to be true according to their Essence, that they have con∣tinued longer now than at any other time? Where∣fore Duration is only an Affection of Existence; whereas Eternity cannot be conceived without the Divine Essence; and forasmuch as the Existence of God is contain'd in the Conception of his Es∣sence, we are also to attribute Eternity to him, and not Duration.

V. The Nature of God in∣cludes no Conception of Futurity. Therefore we say, that all Creatures Enjoy Existence, forasmuch as it doth not belong to their Essences, but is in a manner foreign to them. But this cannot be affirmed of God, because his Exi∣stence is not distinct from his Essence, and is GOD himself. Besides, all Creatures, whilst they enjoy the present Time and Existence, may be said to have it to come, forasmuch as their Existence is without them, and only successively bestowed upon them: Whereas we cannot say of the Divine Ex∣istence, that it will be, or is to come, because he has now the same Existence he will have for ever; Actual Existence in him being like all his other Attributes, which denote no difference of Time in Him.

VI. Whether the Mind of Man hath a per∣manent Existence, as God hath. It may be Objected, That some Philosophers and Divines hold, that the Duration of the Mind of Man is Permament, and as they express it, All at once, and ye none of them attribute Eternity to it: So that accordingly, tho' the Existence of God have no Parts whereof some are before the other; yet for all that Duration may be attributed to him.

VII. An Answer to this Doubt. I answer, That Permanent Duration can only improperly be attributed to the Mind of Man, be∣cause we find a manifest Succession in our Thoughts, whereof nothing is to be found in the Divine Per∣ception. But to explain my Mind more fully, I think that Permanency is very improperly attri∣buted to Creatures, forasmuch as the most Perfect of them, cannot all at once admit all the Attributes and Modes it is capable of. For as it implies a Contradiction for a Body at one and the same time to admit several Figures, as to be Square and Round, to Move and Rest, so neither can a Created Spirit affirm and deny the same thing, or comprehend all those things with one Thought, which it is capable of knowing. But GOD pos∣sesseth all Perfections, and all Attributes, at one and the same time, neither is any of them before or after the other. And therefore Permanence apper∣tains only to GOD, and Duration to all other Beings. Besides, since all Creatures are Created by God with equal dependency, and have their Preservation no longer than he pleaseth to con∣tinue it; it follows, that their Duration is not per∣manent, but successive, and can indeed be nothing else but a continual Reproduction, by which they persevere in their Beings.

CHAP. IX. That GOD is Infinite, and how we are to understand, that he is Circumscrib'd in no Place.

I. All things are not contain'd in some place. AMongst those Prejudices, which we have taken in from our Childhood, and which some to this day hold for Truth, there is none more dangerous in Philosophy than that which ARIS∣TOTLE teacheth in the Fourth Book of his Natural Philosophy, the First Chapter, viz. That all things are somewhere, that is, contained in some certain Space; because he supposed whatsoever is not, to be no where; which he takes to be so notorious and evident, that he is not afraid to rank it amongst Common Notions, and to esteem it an in∣dubitable Truth. Wherefore also in his First Book of Heaven, the Third Chapter, he assigns the Highest place to the Gods, as most becoming their Dignity, and whence with greater ease they may take a View of all Things. And in the same Book, Chap. 2. he disputes against the most ancient Philosophers, and denies God to be diffus'd through all Things, as supposing it most unworthy the Divine Majesty to be present with the Earthly World.

II. Immaterial things can∣not be said to be in a Place. But that this is an Erroneous Opinion, appears from the Immensity of GOD, and the Existence of Spiritual Things: For it is evident that God and Immaterial Substances are, or have a Being, and yet they are not comprehended in any deter∣minate Place. For to be in a Place is the Property of Extended Beings, and cannot be attributed to an Immaterial Substance void of all Extension. If at any time Places be attributed to the Soul, this is not with respect to its own Essence, which consists only in Cogitation, but with respect to the Body, to which it is joyned; because it cannot be, but that the Body being limited to a certain Space, the Soul, which is intimately present with it, may be said to be included in one place, rather than in another. But if the Soul be considered by it self alone, forasmuch as it is a Thinking Sub∣stance and void of all Extension, it cannot fill any Space, nor have any situation amongst Bodies; for otherwise it would be Divisible and Mensurable, which is repugnant to the Nature of an Intellectual Being.

III. God is com∣prehended in no Place. And as for GOD, he is much less comprehended in any Place: For tho' he be said to be every where, yet may he also be said to be no where; forasmuch as his Immensity is unbounded and dif∣fus'd through all Places. But because all do ac∣knowledge, that the most Perfect Being hath no Bounds, either of his Duration or his Presence, the only difficulty will be in the Explication of the Divine Immensity, viz. in what sense God is said to be Infinite, and so diffused through all, as to be every where.

IV. Some falsly suppose God to be every where by his Pre∣sence. Some, whom I call Vulgar Philosophers, derive the Immensity of God, from his Presence in every place, supposing God to be every where, because there is no place in which he is not present, or which is not filled by him. But these seem to Attri∣bute Extension to God, by conceiving to partake of Quantity, as Occupying all places: And therefore would think his Greatness to be Finite, if there could be any place, in which he were not present, and coextended with it.

V. God, before the Crea∣tion of the World, was not in any Space. Whereas we know that God was, before there was any Space; for what Place did God fill before the Creation of the World? If God therefore did Exist before there was any Space, it is evident that being in a Space is not Essential or Proper to him.

VI. God is said to be every∣where, be∣cause all Created things per∣petually depend upon him. Wherefore to leave this gross way of Philosophi∣zing, we say, that God is precisely Infinite, fornsmuch as all Created things, are every moment as it were anew Created, and cannot Exist without his con∣tinual Influx: For the perpetual dependence of the Creatures, doth clearly Evidence Gods Omnipre∣sence; because those things which are in Nature, are not preserved by any Force or Virtue of their own, but only by the Essence of God, and by this Favour continue in their Beings. Neither is a less potent Cause required to the Preserving of things, than was to the Creation of them. For from this that a thing now Exists, it doth not follow, that

it shall Exist the next moment, since there is no necessary Connexion of the Parts of time, but one of them is alway distinct from the other; so that God must influence his Creatures in the same man∣ner for their Conservation: In which Conserva∣tion, and presence in every thing, the Immensity of God doth consist. Thus God is said to be pre∣sent to our Minds, because he is with every one of our Thoughts, and concurs to every determina∣tion of our Wills. And he is said to be present to our Bodies, because he doth dispose, move and make them rest. Lastly, he is present to all other things, because he doth as it were continually produce them anew, cherishing and preserving them by a way that surpasseth our Understanding.

VII. God is not present e∣very where by his Pow∣er, but by his Essence. Neither can I assent to those who say, that God is present every where, not by his Essence, but by his Power only, by which they seem to divide his Power, from his Essence and other Attributes; whereas indeed all things that are in God, are one with his Essence; nor are his Attributes any thing else, but divers Modes of Thinking. For they must be fain to confess that this Power is some∣thing that is Created, or something that is only accidentary to the Divine Essence, without which he may be understood or conceived. Now it is the most absurd thing to make it a Creature, since whatsoever is Created doth stand in need of the Divine Power for its Existence; and since this Di∣vine Power it self is supposed to be a Creature, it will stand in need of some other Power to pre∣serve it, and by this means we shall make a Pro∣gress to Infinity. Or if they will rather make this Power to be accidental to God, and distinguisht from his Essence, then they must be forced to ad∣mit, that God is not a most Simple Substance; be∣cause, according to their saying, he would be com∣pounded of his Essence and that Power. Where∣fore we conclude, that God is present to all things by his Essence, and that he is in every Place, foras∣much as he continually procreates and conserves the things which he hath Created.

VIII. The Im∣mensity of God is only an Exter∣nal Deno∣mination. Hence we may perceive the false way of Rea∣souing used by the Peripateticks, who to make out the Doctrin of Gods Immensity, have invented immaginary Spaces; as if the Immensity or Omni∣presence of God were any thing else, but an Ex∣trinsecal Denomination, taken from his Works; for∣asmuch as he Works in all Created things, and by Reason of that Operation is said to be present with them. For Immensity in God, seems to have some Affinity with Creation; and as Creation is Attri∣buted to God, from the Action of Creation, since before the Creation he could not be called a Cre∣ator: So likewise Immensity is Attributed to God, with respect to his Creatures, since he could not be present with them, before they were Created.

CHAP. X. That God is the most Simple Being.

I. What Com∣position is, as it is op∣posed to Simplicity. As things are more clearly and distinctly per∣ceived by comparing them by their contraries; so I suppose it will be of great use for the Explain∣ing of the Simplicity of God, to unfold what Com∣position is, and to what distinction of parts it an∣swers. Now Composition is the Coalition or Union of many things, which presupposeth a distinction of Parts, since nothing can be united to it self, but to another. And it is various according to the di∣versity of the Parts, of which things are com∣pounded.

II. There is a three-fold Composition Real, Mo∣dal and that of Rea∣son. For one Composition is Real, which consists of Parts really distinct; as a Man is compounded of Soul and Body, because we can clearly and distinct∣ly perceive the Mind without the Body, and the Body without the Mind. Another is Modal, which consists of a Subject and Antecedent or Mode; as a Prudent Man is compounded of a Man and Pru∣dence; and is known by this Mark, that tho' a Sub∣stance may be clearly perceived without the Mode, by which it is diversified; yet on the contrary, the Mode cannot be clearly understood without the Subject, whose Mode it is. The third sort of Com∣position is called, a Composition of Reason, which consists of the Genus and Difference, as when Man is said to be compounded of an Animal, and Rati∣onality. Which consists in this that we cannot per∣ceive a thing clearly, if its Attribute be exclud∣ed from it: As Extended Matter or a Body, is said to differ only by Reason from Extension, because we cannot conceive a Bodily Substance, if Extension in Length, Breath and Depth be separated from it. And therefore, such kind of Attributes as these are not called the Modes of Things, but only Modes of Thinking, forasmuch as by the help of Reason only, they are distinguisht from those things, with respect to which they are so called.

III. God does not consist of Parts These things presupposed, it will not be difficult to shew that God is no Compound, that is, that he hath no Parts that are Really or Modally distinct from each other. For there is no more certain Argument of a real Distinction, than that the Idea of one thing is perceived, not to be the same with the Idea of another thing; or to speak in School Terms, that the one can Exist without the other: But it is manifest, that no such distinction is to be found in God, forasmuch as all his Attributes are Essential, and not Separable from him, but by the Operation of our Mind.

IV. Nothing in God is be∣fore other, and there∣fore no Composition Moreover the things that go to the making up of any Compound, must at least by Nature be be∣fore the thing Compounded, or that is made up of them: Thus every Cause is said to be before its Effect; Substance before Accidents; and Subjects before Adjuncts: And therefore those Substances, by the Union of which God is supposed to Exist, must of necessity have been before him, since we understand them to be, before they constitute the Divine Essence. Thus Matter and Form, which are considered in Natural Philosophy, as the two Principles of a Natural Compound, are apprehend∣ed to be, before they do constitute their Compound. And in like manner, if really distinct Substances were found in God, they would be intelligible to us, before that they were Attributed to him; yea tho' they should never be Attributed to them.

V. God is not Compound∣ed either of Corporal or Spiritual Parts. And forasmuch, as we acknowledge only two general heads of things, viz. Material and Spiri∣tual, we must of necessity suppose, that the things of which God should be composed, must be Cor∣poral or Intellectual. If the first, it will follow, that seeing a Body is the immediate Subject of Lo∣cal Motion, God is Divisible and Limited, yea, Subject to Passion and Alteration, all which in∣clude Imperfection, and consequently are repug∣nant to the Divine Nature. If they be supposed to be Spiritual, since there is a real distinction be∣tween

them, and one of them according to the Rules of Logick, can Exist separate from the other, consequently there will be as many Gods as there are Substances, that are supposed to constitute God. For seeing they can Exist by themselves, and need no assistance from any other to their Conservation, they will also have power to confer upon themselves all the Perfections, which belong to God alone. Than which nothing more absurd can possibly be imagined by the Mind of Man.

VI. There are no Modes in God, out of which he may be said to be compounded We say therefore, that there are no Substantial Parts in God, into which he can be divided, or from the Union and Coalition whereof he doth consist. Nei∣ther is there any Composition in God, out of a Sub∣ject and Accidents or Modes; because Modes arise only from the various Change of the Substance, which therefore cannot be supposed in God, because in him there is no Change or Variation. Where∣fore it follows, that whatsoever is in God, is only distinguishable by our Thoughts, because every At∣tribute of God may be called his Essence, and have the name of supreme Perfection: And therefore are neither more nor less than the one God, in the Unity of Nature. So that we must conclude God to be the most simple Being, utterly devoid of all Parts, or Divisibility.

CHAP. XI. God is true, and as he cannot be deceived, so neither can he deceive.

I. If God was not true, we could not be assu∣red of any thing. THo' Human Cogitation be commonly held to be the Rule of Truth, and whatsoever, we clearly and distinctly perceive, is supposed to be true; yet all this certainty would come to no∣thing, if God were not true, and most remote from the least suspicion of deceiving us: For how should we believe Revelation, if it were possible for God to deceive us? For he having bestowed upon us our Intellectual Faculties, it might be questioned, whether it was not his pleasure to make us such, as that in the use of them, we should be deceived, and against our will fall into Error.

II. Truth is a necessary Ingredient of a Being absolutely Perfect. But this Doubt will be easily removed, and the Divine Veracity cannot but be manifest, by con∣sidering that all Perfections that can be conceived by us, do belong to God. For, forasmuch as he is the Highest Being, he must also of necessity, be the most Soveregin Good and Truth: Now it is as much a Contradiction, that any Falsity should proceed from the Highest Truth, as that any Evil should come from the Highest Good: Which yet would be, if in the use of our Faculty of know∣ing, that is, in assenting to things that are clearly and distinctly perceived by us, we should fall into Error. And indeed seeing that whatsoever is real in us does proceed from him, and that the Faculty we have for the knowing of Truth, and distin∣guishing it from Falsehood, is Real, we could not but take him for a Deceiver, in case our Faculty could not reach the Object, but should always take Falsehood for Truth. Than which nothing can be imagined more injurious to the most Perfect Be∣ing and the Fountain of all Good.

III. That the Most Per∣fect Being should de∣ceive us, implies a Contradi∣ction. Besides by the Name God, we understand the most perfect Substance; and Imposture or Deceit is a manifest Imperfection, because it has a non En∣tity for its End, that is, something that is not true; for all Deceit includes Falsity, which being op∣pos'd to Truth, it must be carried to that which is no Truth, that is, a non-Entity: So that from hence it will follow that God cannot without a contradiction be said to deceive us.

IV. Deceit it an Argu∣ment of Fear or Malice. Lastly, Tho' perhaps amongst Men, it may be accounted a piece of Cunning to deceive others, yet Falseness or a will to deceive others, proceeds from Fear or Malice: And forasmuch as Fear sup∣poseth Weakness, and Malice the want of Good∣ness, neither of these can be admitted in God; and consequently neither can a Will to deceive be ascribed to him; yea, he must be supposed to be the Highest Truth, and not thought a Deceiver upon any account whatsoever.

V. An Obje∣ction from the Con∣course of God. You will object that he who concurs to those Actions of the Will, or those Judgments by which a Man is deceived, he is to be looked upon as the Cause of that Man's Error: But God so concurs to those Judgments of Men, by which they are deceived; therefore God is the cause of Men's Errors.

VI. God doth not concur to the For∣mality of Error. This Objection is easily answer'd by distinguish∣ing between the Material and Formal, or be∣tween an Act and its Privation. For all Acts are true and Good, forasmuch as they depend on God; and as it is a greater Perfection in Man, that he can exert them, than if he could not. But Privation, wherein alone the Formal Reason of Falsity doth consist, doth not stand in need of any Divine Concourse, because it is No thing, and with Relation to God, is not to be call'd a Privation, but only a Negation.

VII. Whether God may be said to deceive the Devils and Damned Souls in Hell. I know that some Divines seem of a different Opinion, who think that God can deceive Men, by inspiring them with Idea's that deceive them; and that he does this of his free Will, as being the Supream Lord of all, and therefore may deal with his Creatures, as he listeth. So as that they are clearly persuaded that they feel something, which indeed they do not, according as it happens to the Devils and Damned Souls, who think they are tormented with Fire in Hell, when indeed there is no Fire there at all; or if there be any, it is Material, and so cannot affect Pure Minds.

VIII. The fore∣going Douts answer'd. I Answer, That GOD does not deceive, or by false Apparitions delude the Devils or Damned Souls; because the Fire wherewith they are tor∣mented, is not only an Idea of Fire impress'd on them by God, but the true substance of Fire where∣with they are tormented, and sensibly affected. For why may we not suppose, that God can joyn the Soul of Man with some Body, and so unite his Thoughts to the Motions of that Body, that ac∣cording to the greater or lesser force of the one, a greater or lesser sense of Pain may be excited in the other? For as we see that the Soul of Man is kept link'd to the Body, so it may as well, by the Divine Power, be detained and suffer by Corporeal Fire (as we suppose that in Hell to be) seeing that this is consonant with the Scripture, and establisheth the Truth of GOD.

IX. In what sense God it said to Blind the Minds of Men. If any one urge further, That GOD doth sometimes harden the Hearts of Sinners, and so blind their Minds, that they contemn his Com∣mands, and run headlong into the greatest Sins, as appears by PHARAOH, whose Mind the LORD did so incline to Evil, that it was not in

his Power to obey his Precepts. Besides, we read in Scripture, That GOD put the Prophets upon foretelling Things that did not come to pass; as appears from the History of Jonah the Prophet, who declar'd from God to the Ninevites, that their City should be destroyed within forty days, which never came to pass.

X. Answer. I Answer, That tho' Pharaoh, by the Pervers∣ness of his Will did refuse to obey God, and to dis∣miss the Children of Israel, notwithstanding the frequent Warnings he had from above; yet is not this so to be understood, as if God by any positive Influx had hardened his Heart, and forced him to despise his Commands; but only that he withheld Efficacious Grace from him, and left him to his own wicked Will. And as for Jonah, who foretold the ruin of the City Nineveh, that is not to be called a Lye, but rather a Threatning or De∣nunciation, the Execution whereof depended on their Obstinacy or Conversion, as appear'd by the Event: For the Ninevites Repenting in Sackcloth and Ashes, and earnestly deprecating the Divine Displeasure, did escape the Prophet's Commina∣tion.

XI. God may sometimes deceive us for our Good. Tho' it be a most undoubted Truth, that it is repugnant to the Divine Perfections to deceive any one; yet this does not hinder, but he may make use sometimes of a Prudent Deception towards us for our profit, in like manner as Physicians and Parents sometimes deceive their Patients and Chil∣dren for their good and advantage. Neither can God properly be said to deceive us, when things appear to us otherwise than they are; because God is not the cause of that Deception, but we our selves, who judge of Bodily things according to their External appearance before that we have sufficiently examin'd them; forasmuch as in these and the like Appearances we should suspend our Judgment, before we do determine any thing concerning their Truth.

XII. We cannot be said to be deceiv'd when we imagine the Sun to move, and the Earth to stand still. Thus GOD cannot be said to deceive us, when by the Earths whirling about its Axis, the Sun seems to us to rise and set; but we rather deceive our selves, when we attribute Motion to the Sun, and Rest to the Earth, before we have fully dis∣cuss'd the Point: When indeed we ought to sus∣pend our Judgment until having weighed the Reasons on both sides, we did clearly and distinctly perceive, to which of these Bodies the motion we perceive were to be ascribed. Neither are the Common People look'd upon to be absolutely in an Error, when they suppose the Sun to move ev••ry day about the Earth, tho' it be not true, because herein they follow what seems probable, which is sufficient to free them from the imputation of be∣ing deceived.

XIII. From God's Veracity we may conclude, that what∣soever is clearly per∣ceived by us, is true. Hence it follows, that whatsoever is clearly and distinctly known by us, is true: For since the Light of Nature, or our Faculty of Knowing, hath been given us by God, it can reach no Object which is not true, so far as it is reached by it; that is, foras∣much as it is clearly and distinctly perceived. For God might with reason be look'd upon as a Deceiver, in case he had given us a Faculty that embraced Error instead of Truth: Wherefore for∣asmuch as Mathematical Truths are most clear and evident, so as to thrust themselves upon our Under∣standings, we ought not in the least to suspect them, but receive them as undoubted Truths.

CHAP. XII. That GOD is most highly Intelligent, or Omniscient.

I. Omnisci∣ence is in∣cluded in the Con∣ception of a most Perfect Being. IT will not be any hard matter to make out, that GOD is Omniscient or All-knowing, and that at one view he comprehends all things, if we re∣member him to be the Most perfect Being, in whom no defect or limitation can be conceived, which would not be if his Knowledge were finite, and that any thing could escape his Understand∣ing. Therefore the Ancients called GOD, the Mind, or Soul of the World; not only for that he was diffused throughout the Universe, and did animate all Things; but also because he knows them all, and pierceth their most Secret parts. For Ignorance is a mark of Weakness of Soul, and that Being cannot but be Imperfect, whose Under∣standing is bounded by any Bound or Limit, be∣yond which it cannot reach.

II. This Point further made out out by Reason. But because Discourse and Reason serve to illu∣strate the Truth of Things, I shall make use of this Argument: Either GOD understands all things, or some things only, or nothing at all. If he only understand some things, then his Understanding is supposed imperfect, which no body will say of God, that is persuaded of his absolute Perfection. But if he knows nothing, then certainly he cannot be supposed to be God. Wherefore it follows, that as God contains all Perfections, so he is endowed with knowledge in the highest and most transcen∣dent degree.

III. How the Divine Knowledge is distin∣guish'd from the Knowledge of Men. I say, in the most transcendent degree, because Human Cogitation is very different from the Di∣vine. For the Idea's of Men are bounded by the Objects that are without them, and according to the diversity of things which it contemplates, are said to be either clear or obscure. For it does not depend of us, that our Idea's do represent this or the other thing to us, they being only Modes of Cogitation, and as such are all of them equal, all their difference proceeding from the Objects they represent; so that some hold forth to us an Extended Substance, others a Mind; some Simple things, others Compound; all which variety the Idea's borrow from the Things themselves. For it cannot be question'd, but that those Idea's which represent some particular Substance to us, contain more objective Reality, than those which only exhibit Modes to us, which are only the determinations or limitations of Substance. But the Divine Knowledge doth not thus depend on the Creatures, neither are his Conceptions bounded by any things without him; but all Created Be∣ings derive their Essence from his Understanding, and according as they are determin'd by the same, do obtain divers degrees of Entity. For the Di∣vine Intellect, whereby God knows the Creatures, is the same thing with his Will and Power that does determine them, and are only distinguish'd by us, according to our various ways of considering them.

IV. There is no Object of God's Knowledge, that is without himself. Wherefore we are not to suppose any Object of the Divine Science to be without himself, who is alone the Object of his own Knowledge; or to speak more properly, He is himself his own Know∣ledge. For should we suppose, that Created Be∣ings were before the Divine Intellect, and that as Objects they did terminate his Idea's, they must be supposed to have a Nature and Essence independent

on God, as being at least by Nature before him. Which to assert would be as foolish, as to say that a Pourtrature drawn by a Skilful Limner, is the Object of that Art: For a Limner stands in need of Pencils and Colours, to perform his Work•••• whereas GOD did not stand in need of any thing for the Creation of the World, but all Created things did proceed from his Understanding and Free Will; not only as to their Existence, but as to their Essence also.

V. Indifferency in God is the Highest Perfection. Whence it appears, that Indifferency which is an Imperfection in Man, and is held to be the Iowest degree of his Liberty, is the Highest Perfection in God, as being a sign of his Sovereign Empire and Power, who is unbounded by any Laws or Rules, and the sole Author of all Order, Truth, Justice and Goodness. For it implies a Contradiction, to suppose that the Divine Will was not indifferent to all things, that have been or shall be made. Be∣cause no Goodness or Truth can be imagined, the Idea whereof was in the Divine Intellect, before that his Will had determined to make it so.

VI. How God knows Sins, and those things which are called En∣tia Ratio∣nis. Enti∣ties of Rea∣son. Some Question whether the Divine Knowledge doth extend it self to all things, and whether God besides Positive things, that is, real Substances, doth also know things Privative and Fictitious▪ such as are Sins, entities of Reafon, &c.

VII. Answer. For Answer I say, that God knoweth all things whereof he is the Efficient Cause, because as was said in the Chapter of Gods Immensity, all things are continually procreated by him, as not being able to continue one Moment without his Con∣course: But Sins being no real things, and depen∣ding on the Will of Man, are not known by him without the Minds of Men. And as for Entities of Reason, forasmuch as they are nothing else but Modes of Thinking, which are used for the easier Explication of the things we know, or the better retaining of them; these are no otherwise understood by God, than as he is the Procreator and Conserva∣tor of our Minds. For if we enquired what is meant by an Entity of Reason, we shall find it to be a meer Nothing, without the Understanding. But if we have regard to the Modes themselves of Think∣ing, they may be said to be real Entities. Thus, when I enquire what is Genus, I demand nothing else but the Nature of that Mode of Thinking, which is truly considered as a Being, and differs from a Species, which is another Mode of Cogitation.

VIII. God under∣stands En∣tities of Reason on∣ly foras∣much as they are conceived by us. Now God doth not contain any of these Enti∣ties of Reason or Notions, as if he stood in need of these Modes of Cogitation, to retain the things that he understands; but only inasmuch as the Mind of Man, whose Modes they are, is perceived by us to be preserved and maintained in its Being by God. We conclude therefore that God is All knowing, and that he contemplates all things by one only most Simple Idea; for to speak properly, God for no other Reason is called Omniscient, but because he has his own Idea, which being nothing else but his Essence, is therefore inseparable from him, and consequently extends it self to all positive or real Objects.

CHAP. XIII. That God is Good, and doth Good.

I. In what Sense God is said to be Good. SEeing that no Creature exists by its own Power, and that all thing derive their Essence from God, we must conclude that God is Good and Beneficent. For as by his comprehending all things he is All∣knowing, and by his Power to do all things, Om∣nipotent: So because he hath Created all things, he is said to be Good, and because he preserves the same, Beneficent.

II. Good and Evil are Respective Terms. This will more clearly appear, if we consider what Good and Evil is, and wherein precisely the Nature of both doth consist. A thing considered by it self apart, cannot be said to be Good or Evil, but is denominated such with respect to an other thing, to which it is profitable or hurtful. And accordingly, the same thing may at the same time, be said to be both Good and Evil. So the Punish∣ment inflicted on a Criminal is Good, forasmuch as it conduceth to the Safety of the Commonwealth, and to deter others from committing the like Crimes: And yet it is Evil to the Criminal, be∣cause by the same he suffers Death, which deprives him of Life, being the dearest thing he enjoys. So likewise the Sea is of great use for the carrying of Ships, and in that regard is a Good to the Mer∣chants; but Evil when raging by a Storm it Swal∣lows and Shipwracks their Vessels. Yea, there be many Good things, which are not such to all: Thus, to be in Heaven and to enjoy the company of the Blessed, is a Good, yea the greatest Happiness to Man, but yet to Brutes and Plants it is neither Good nor Evil, as having no Relation to them.

III. God is said to be Good, as being beneficial to all. GOD therefore is said to be supremely Good, because he does God to all, and is the Conservator of all things, for all things are preserved by his Omnipotence. Moreover, forasmuch as there is no Connexion between the parts of Durations; and it doth not follow, that because the Creatures exist to day, they will continue to morrow: We may say that Gods Conservation of his Creatures, is a con∣tinual production of them. Neither doth it oppose this Truth, that the Will of Man is free, and is oft determined by things without it: Because even those very Actions are determined by God, and are not exerted but by his Good-will, as will be said more at large in the following Chapter. For it implies a contradiction, that any thing should determine the Will, and that the Will it self should not be determin∣ed by God, to whom all created things are Subject.

IV. The Love of God to Mankind is from E∣ternity. Gods Beneficence doth not only appear in the Creation of the World, and the preserving of all Creatures; but he hath also from Eternity testified his Love unto us, by electing us from before the Foundation of World, and by loving us with an everlasting Love. For as Heat cannot but warm, and Light illuminate, so the highest Love cannot but in he highest degree love it self, and all things pro∣ceeding from him. And this Eternal Love of God is manifested by a two-fold effect, viz. the Mortal Life we Live here, and the Immortal Life we hope for, hereafter. With reference to the present Life, he hath adornd the Heaven with Stars, that they might assist inferior things with their Light, and promote the innumerable Generations of Natural things; he hath distinguisht the Elements in their proper Place, endowed them with Qualities, and made them by their inborn Virtues, to concur to the Mixtion and Production of all things; he hath appointed the Fire for Action, the Air for Respi∣ration, the Water and Earth for Fruitfulness, and the Production of so many kinds of things for ne∣cessity and delight, but the chiefest Pledge of Gods

Love towards us; is, that he hath predestinated us to the Adoption of Children in Christ Jesus, so as that we have Redemption by his Blood, and the Forgiveness of Sins, according to the Riches of his Grace. For Grace hath preceded Merit; neither doth Grace come from Merit, but Merit from Grace. He gave for Nothing, or out of meer Grace, who found Nothing why be should Save, and Much why he should Damn: He prevented us by the Blessings of his Sweetness; for that Grace tastes sweeter, which helps even those that have ill-deserved, and entertains Thoughts of Peace towards us, whilst we do the VVorks of Death. S. Austin, Serm. 15. de verb. Apost.

VI. God is said to be Good and Infi∣nite, respe∣ctively onely. But you will say, What shall not GOD be good then, except he do Good to Mankind, and pre∣serve the Universe? What can be imagin'd more absur'd, than not to acknowledge GOD Good, as well as Immense, VVise, and Powerful?

Notwithstanding this Objection, we must assert, That the Attribute of Goodness did not belong to God before the Creation of the VVorld; because a Thing considered in it self, and without respect to others, cannot be said to be either Good or Evil: Neither needs this seem strange or absurd to any one, forasmuch as the Goodness we speak of here, denotes a Respect between God and his Creatures, as his Immensity does, which consists, as we have seen, in that Operation whereby he continues them in Being. So that as supposing they were not, tho' he would be present to Himself; yet Ubiquity, or Omnipresence could not be attributable to him; so before the Creation of the VVorld, tho' GOD be Good by his own Essence, yet because there was nothing on which he could exercise his Beneficence, he was only Potentially Good, Merciful, a Judge, a Creator, &c.

VII. How it coms to pass that God being Good, permits Sin. But some will say, If GOD be Good, why doth he permit the Corruption of Nature, and the Sins of Men to offend his Divine Majesty?

VIII. The First Answer. To which I Answer, First, That it is not re∣pugnant to the Divine Goodness that there are Sins, and that Men swerve from their Duty; yea, it seems more to comport with his Omnipotent Good∣ness to bring Good out of Evil, than not to suffer Evil. But yet it is not our business to enquire over∣curiously, why God permits Sin, lest we should seem to endeavour with the scanty Line of our Reason, to fathom the depth of the Divine Wisdom.

IX. The Second Answer. In the Second place I Answer, That it is not contrary to the Divine Goodness, that he hath not made his Creatures so perfect, as to place them out of the reach of Error, or danger of Falling; and that he hath pitch'd upon such an Order, in which Sins take place; forasmuch as Man Sins without any force put upon him; neither can the Guilt of it be imputed to God: For God did not from Eter∣nity decree Sin, neither did he decree, that Sin should be possible; for seeing Sin is no positive thing, but a deficiency of Reality, it cannot be of God, but he only hath established that Order, in which he sees the possibility of Sin before his De∣cree and Will concerning it. And therefore upon this Hypothesis only it follows, that having esta∣blish'd such an Order, and making positive Things possible, he can be said the Author of Sin; foras∣much as by the said Order, Sin is made Possible, which in this sense is not repugnant to the Goodness and Holiness of GOD.

CHAP. XIV. Of the Omnipotence of GOD.

I. It is an inborn No∣tion with all Men, that God is Omnipo∣tent. NO Man that ever own'd a GOD, deny'd him to be Omnipotent: This is a Notion all Men brought into the VVorld with them, who therefore when they are in any affliction or danger, lift up their Hands to Heaven, and send up their Prayers to him for the thing they wish for, and thereby tacitly acknowledge his Omnipotence. Yet there are some Philosophers who seem to destroy this Notion, who assert the Essences of Things to be Eternal, as if without the Power of God they had some Nature of their own, to which God at a certain time did vouchsafe Existence, and made them to be Actual Beings. And therefore they say, that Possible things only, that is, such as are so in their own Nature, can be produc'd by God, and that his Power doth not extend it self any fur∣ther.

II. What a Possible, Necessary and Con∣tingent Being is. But because this Doctrin seems to derogate from God's Omnipotence, we will endeavour to shew the Falsity of it, by declaring what the true Nature of a Possible, Necessary, and Contingent Being is, and whence they take these Affections. A Necessary Being is said to be such with a twofold respect, either with respect to its Essence, or to the Effective Principle whence it proceeds. After the first man∣ner, we know that God only doth necessarily Exist; and therefore he is said to Exist so, as that he cannot but exist; because Existence is involved in his Conception, so that his Essence cannot be under∣stood without it. But after the Second manner, that is, with respect to the Effective Principle, Corporeal things are said to be Necessary, foras∣much as they can be produced by God; but not with respect to their own Essence, because we can clearly and distinctly understand the same without Existence, and therefore they can never exist by virtue of their Essence. That is call'd a Possible Being, whose Efficient Cause is known to us; but yet we do not know, whether he be determined to produce it or no; and therefore is commonly descri∣bed, That which hath not been, but might have been; and in this sense all things besides God are said to be Possible. But if we consider only their Natnre, and not their Productive Cause, we shall call all things Contingent; because with respect to their Natures, no necessity of Existing is found in them, as in God: Neither is there in them any Repug∣nancy or Impossibility, but that they may be; and therefore in case they do exist, they exist so, as that they may not exist.

III. All things present, and things to come, de∣pend on God. We will now shew, That all things that are now, or are to come, have their Dependence on God; and that there is nothing in Nature, that doth not proceed from his Decree. For seeing no Creature exists by the necessity of its Essence, it follows, that they must all borrow their Being from the Divine Decree. For it is evident by the Light of Reason, that it is impossible a thing should exist, which hath no Internal or External Cause of its Existence: Now no Creatures can exist by the Power of their own Nature, and therefore we must have recourse to one only External Cause, viz. the Divine Decree, for their Existence; in which Di∣vine Decree, if their Existence be not found, they are to be look'd upon as Impossible, forasmuch as they cannot be produc'd by any Cause. From

whence it evidently follows, not only that the Ex∣istence of all Creatures doth depend of God, but also their Nature and Essence: for seeing there is no perfection which is not in God, there can be no Essence in the Creatures, which should be the cause of Gods knowledge. Wherefore we must conclude that all Creatures before Gods Decree were nothing, and consequently that of themselves they have no necessity to exist.

IV. God is the Efficient Cause not only of sub∣stances, but also of their Modes. When I say that all things have their Being from the Divine Good Pleasure, this to be under∣stood not only of Material Substance, but also of Thinking or Spiritual; because not only the proper∣ties and Modes of Bodies derive their reality from the Will of God; but also the Modes of Minds. For it is a meer prejudice of our Youth to imagine that the Modes of Cogitation, Knowledge, Judg∣ment, Affections, and other inward Acts of our Mind do less depend on the Divine Power, than the Modes of Material and Bodily things. Because whatsoever is not God, is of it self altogether no∣thing; neither can it exist but by his will; for since nothing can be the cause of its own Existence, save God alone, it follows that whatsoever exists, must derive all its reality from God as its first Prin∣ciple.

V. In what sense the Natures of things may be said to be immu∣table. If it be objected that the Essences of things are commonly said to be Immutable and Eternal. I an∣swer, that the Essences of things are only said to be immutable, forasmuch as they are exprest by Defi∣nition, and are consider'd Universally, as is com∣monly done in Sciences, whose certainty requires firm and stable Definitions. So the Definition of a Mind that it is a Thinking substance, is always the same, neither is lyable to any change, tho per∣haps there may be a further degree of perfection in the Mind of one Man, than of another. And whereas they are said to be Eternal, or that their Essence was known from Eternity in the Divine Intellect, this does not argue any Eternity in them, but in God; since to be known in the Mind of God, with respect to the Creatures, is only an Ex∣trinsecal Denomination, or an Entity of Reason, which superadds no reality to things.

VI. No things are Contin∣gent with respect to God. As for Possible and Contingent Things, there are none such with respect to God; Because there are none that of themselves can Exist, and not Exist, or that have real Contingency. For surely there is no less Power to the creating of a thing, than to the Conserving of it; and since no created thing acts any thing by its own Power, so neither can it give it self Existence by the same. It remains there∣fore that all things must have their Dependence on God, and that the things that are, be produced by vertue only of the Divine Decree. And foras∣much as there is no Change or Inconstancy in God, we must conclude that the things which he creates, have from Eternity been decreed to be created by him; so that all Creatures from Eternity had a kind of necessity of Existence; And therefore that no Things are Possible, Necessary, or Contingent of their own Nature, but by the Divine Decree, which is the only Cause of all things.

VII. Nothing can be sup∣pos'd ante∣cedent to Gods De∣cree. Neither doth it contradict what we have said, that God might have decreed otherwise concern∣ing his Creatures, and that upon that score they may be said to be contingent; For since in Eternity there is no Before or After, first or last, it is a Vanity to search after those Moments in which God existed before those Decrees, and in which it is supposed that he might have determin'd otherwise. Where∣fore since God without any necessity resolved to make Creatures, they are all of them said to exist Contingently, because they include no Necessity of Existing; tho with respect to the will of God they exist Necessarily: Forasmuch as no greater necessi∣ty can be conceived in Things than that whereby an Effect follows from an Efficacious Principle and a Determinate Efficient Cause.

How the Will of Man is said to depend on God. There is one difficulty more remains to be discust, and that is since all Creatures are predetermined by God, and that there is a kind of necessity of Ex∣istence in them from Eternity, how the Will of Man can be said to depend of God, seeing that it is free, and indetermin'd. But notwithstanding this, we must say that the Will also is conserved by the Divine Concourse, so that it is not in the Power of Man to Will or Act any thing, which is not preordained by God. But how these two things may be reconciled, that God hath decreed all the Acts of our Will from Eternity, and yet our Will remains undertermin'd, is I confess more than I do clearly perceive. I do acknowledg my Mind to be but of a finite capacity; and the Power of God, whereby he hath not only foreknown all present and future things from Eternity, but hath also decreed and determin'd them, to be infinite and unbounded: Yet cannot this consideration make us doubtful of the Freedom of our Will, since in all our actions we experience our selves to be free, and that it is in our Power to give or with∣hold our Assent; which is so manifest that we have good reason to rank it amongst first and common Notions.

IX. It is a diffi∣cult thing to reconcile the Divine Decree with the Liberty of Mans Will. Hence is it that the Famous Philosopher in the Ninth Epistle of his l. Volume, saith. As to Free will, if we only consider our selves, I must confess we cannot but think it to be Independent: But when we cast an Eye on the Infinite Power of God, we cannot but believe that all things must depend on him, and therefore that our free will is not exempt from his Command. For it implies a contradiction that God should have created Men of such a nature, that the Actions of their will should not depend on his will: Because that is the same as if one should say that his Power is both Finite and Infinite: Finite since there is something that doth not depend on it; and Infinite, in that he was able to create this thing Independent. But as the knowledg of the Divine Existence, must not take away the certainty of our free will: So neither must the knowledg of our free will, make us to doubt of the Divine Ex∣istence. For the Independency we experience and find in our selves, and which makes our actions blame or praise worthy, is not opposite to a depen∣dence of another kind, whereby all things are sub∣ject to God.

X. God is no less a cause of the Crea∣ture when it is made than when it is a making. Gods Omnipotence does not only appear in the Production of things, but also in their conservati∣on: for God is not only the Principle of created Beings when they are making, but also when they are made. Hence it is that he preserves them by a continual Influence; and should he cease from his Concourse, whatsoever he hath produc'd would fall to nothing; Because before they were created and he afforded them his Concourse, they were no∣thing. Neither doth it contradict this, that all things that are produced by God are substances, to

whom it does agree to subsist; for they are not call'd Substances as if they could subsist without the Divine Concourse, but because they are such things, as do not need the assistance of any creature towards their being. In which Preservation of the creatures, the infinite Divine Power is evidently exemplified, in that he hath produc'd all things so, as that they cannot subsist one moment without him, like as the Image of the Sun reflected in the Water, or in a Look∣ing-glass, doth depend on the Sun, not only as to its being, but as to its Preservation or continuance.

CHAP. XV. That God is the Creator of all things.

I. Some At∣tributes agree to God from Eternity, others in Time. THO all the Divine Attributes be Eternal, and undistinguisht from his Essence, yet do not all of them in a like manner agree to him. For some of them constitute his Nature, and can only by the operation of our Minds be separated from it, such as are his Eternity, Omniscience, &c. Others again presuppose creatures, and are only attributable to him since the beginning of the World, as to be a Judge, a Creator, &c. Which from Eternity did only Potentially belong to him. But because the Power to create the World was in God from Eternity, and that it appertains to his Nature to be Omnipotent, it is as easy to prove God to be the Creator of all things, as it is to evince him to be Immutable.

II. Whatsoever hath a Be∣ing, hath it either from it self, or from ano∣ther. For whatsoever is besides God, either hath the Principle of its Existence from it self, or from ano∣ther: For natural light evinceth that things can not be made of nothing. If any thing was of it self, it would want nothing; Yea, it would give it self all those Perfections it hath any Idea of; but nothing hath the Power of bestowing those perfections on it self, for otherwise it would actually be possest of them; for the Will is infallibly carried to the Good it knows; and consequently it hath not the Power of giving it self a Being. If it hath its Being from another, we may then demand whence that other hath his Being, whether from it self or from another, till we come to the last Cause, who is the Author of all things that Exist.

III. Forasmuch as the Parts of Time have no necessary connexion, it follows that Crea∣tures are not preser∣ved by themselves. Besides, the Parts of time have no necessary de∣fendence on each other; neither doth is follow that because a thing is now, it will be the next Mo∣ment: Therefore to the end it may continue to exist, there must be some Power, which may each Moment reproduce it: But no such Power is in the Creature, and therefore there must be some Being, whose Nature includes Existence, and which is the Cause why the thing that hath existed hitherto, doth continue so to do. For tho' a thing have be∣gun to Exist, yet doth not its Essence any more involve necessary Existence, than it did before its Existence; and therefore it stands in need of the same Virtue to continue to exist, as it had to begin to exist.

IV. The Essences of things are clearly known by abstracting them from Existence. Moreover we clearly understand, that the Soul of Man is a Thinking Substance; that a Body con∣sists of three Dimensions, and that Man is a com∣pound of Mind and Body, without any Existence: Wherefore we ought not to ascribe to Man any Power whereby he can exist, and therefore he must be created by God, before he can exist. For eve∣ry Effect we know is contained in its Cause, either formally or eminently, and seeing neither the Soul nor the Body, nor Man that consists of both, can be the Causes of themselves, they cannot be con∣tain'd in themselves as in their Cause; and there∣fore we must look out for a higher Cause that may eminently contain whatsoever is formally found in the Creatures; and that is that which we call God.

V. Abstracti∣ons do more clearly ex∣plain the nature of a thing. And forasmuch as the Form, according to ARI∣STOTLE gives Being to a thing, and Concretes are more perspicuously understood by their Abstracts; for a Confirmation of what we have said, it will be worth our enquiry what Creation is, and whether the name of Creator could be attributable to God from Eternity.

VI. What Crea∣tion is. As to the first, the received Definition of Crea∣tion is, that it is the Production of a thing out of Nothing; Which may be admitted without Hesi∣tation, if by Nothing we understand a Negation of all Reality, and not any thing Imaginary, which some do suppose to be that out of which all things are produc'd. For some do conceive this Nothing to be, as it were, a matter shut up in an Imaginary space, from whence all things do proceed. Wherefore, lest I should seem to favour their Error, I will take away all Ambiguity and de∣fine it thus, viz. That it is an operation, where∣by things are produc'd by an efficient Cause, no other Cause concurring with it. So that a thing is said to be created, which besides God needs no other Cause towards its Existence. Where it ap∣pears that neither Modes nor Accidents are created, since they depend on the Substance, in which they are, and without which they cannot be conceived: As we have shewed in our Logick, in the Chapter of substance.

VII. What we are to un∣derstand by the Name Creature. A thing Created is that whose nature or Essence can clearly be understood without Existence. As the Soul of Man, of which we have a clear and distinct Notion, for as much as it is a Thinking substance, abstracted from its Existence. And solikewise we have a distinct conception of a Cor∣poreal Substance, as including three Dimensions, without considering its Existence: And therefore these must be Created by God before they can exist, and when they do so, must be preserved by his con∣tinual Influx.

VIII. Before the Creation of the World there was no Time. It remains now to enquire whether God, could be call'd a Creator from Eternity, or whether the things created by him could have their Original before all Time. Before we can resolve this clearly, we are to take notice that before the Creation of the World, no Time can be understood by us, seeing that Time is nothing else but the measure of Duration; or to speak more clearly, is nothing else but a meer Mode of Thinking. For as the Modes of Material things serve for the easier explication of their Natures, so we make use of Time to express Duration, so that it is necessary that before Time could be, there must have been, not only Creatures, but Men also, that might compare the Duration of things Existing, with the Duration of other things, that had a determinate Motion. Now Duration, seeing it is not distinct from the Ex∣istence of things, save only by Reason, begins as soon as they began to exist, and ceaseth when they cease to be; because it supposeth them to be Crea∣ted. Wherefore they who imagine Duration or Time before the first Production of things, are as deeply prejudic'd as those are who fancy an Exten∣sion

of Space, without any Bodily Extension. To enquire therefore, whether a Created thing could be from Eternity, is as much as to demand whe∣ther there can be a Duration without any Begin∣ning, and which cannot be expressed by any Num∣ber whatsoever.

IX. God cannot produce E∣ternal Du∣ration. That such a Duration as this cannot be created by God, appears from hence, that no Duration can be mentioned, but that God is still able to produce a greater. For such is the Nature of Duration, that assign what Duration you please, a greater or lesser can still be conceived, seeing that it is, as it were composed of Parts, and always may be con∣ceived as Divisible into them: For as there are no parts in a Body, altogether Indivisible; so neither are there any Moments in Duration, but may still be divided into lesser parts to Infinity.

X. No Dura∣tion can be understood to be in God. Neither can we say, that because God hath been from Eternity, and is still, therefore we ought to attribute to him the greatest Duration that can possibly be conceived; for it is evident from what hath been already said, that no Duration consisting of Parts can be ascribed to God, but Eternity only, which is not an affection of Existence, but of Es∣sence: And therefore that we cannot conceive any Duration in God, except we have a mind to destroy the Idea we have of him; forasmuch as it is essential to the notion of Duration that none can be conceived so great, but still greater may, which in no wise can be attributed to God, who is Infinite, and admits no Division of Parts.

XI. Whether God could have Cre∣ated the World from Eternity. You will say that God is as Powerful, whilst he acts freely, as if he did act necessarily, since liber∣ty or necessity of acting, doth not alter the pro∣perty of Power. But if God acts by necessity of Nature, he must have Created the World from Eternity, forasmuch as his Power is Infinite, and consequently it is no contradiction, that a Creature should be Eternal, that is, be produced without a Beginning of Duration.

XII. Answer. I Answer, that this Argument is deduced from a false Hypothesis, viz. that if God should act neces∣sarily, he might for all that be of Infinite Power, which is very false; because it is the Property of a most perfect Being to act freely, which is so essen∣tial to it, that it can never be separated from its Idea: since there is but one only Being, that by us is conceived to be such.

XIII. God can produce still greater and greater Du∣ration. Besides, it is the Nature of Duration that how great soever any is supposed, it may be still suppo∣sed greater; and therefore God who is of Infinite Power and a free Agent, may always produce a greater or lesser Duration than the supposed Dura∣tion is. But if God did act according to the neces∣sity of Nature, no such Duration would be possi∣ble, because God acting necessarily, would only produce that which did follow from necessary Action; and consequently being unable to produce a greater, his Power would be Bounded, which is destructive of the Idea of God.

CHAP. XVI. Concerning Gods Government of the World, and Providence.

I. Supposing God to be All know∣ing and All power∣ful, he must also be Pro∣vident. FRom what hath been already said of the Di∣vine Attributes, we may easily conclude that God is Provident, and the Ruler and Governour of all the World, and all things that are in it. For seeing that he hath Created all things, and by his alone Power, brought them into a State of actual Existence, it seems to be Repugnant to his Good∣ness and Omnipotence, that he should neglect the care of them, and leave them to the Government and disposal of others. For since he is All-know∣ing, All-powerful, and supremely Good, he cannot but keep his Eye upon his Creatures, and govern and dispose of them for their good. For Will and Power, with respect to things without them, are not distinguisht from the Divine Understanding; and since God hath decreed that at some certain time, Creatures should exist, he also determined them to exist so, as that their Essence and Existence might depend on his Will and Power, without being able to attain any Ends without his special Provi∣dence.

II. What Pro∣vidence is. By Providence, Divines understand that Eternal disposal, by which God doth Efficaciously direct all his Creatures to certain ends foreseen by him, so as that in time they come to attain them. For Pro∣vidence doth not only denote the operation of the Intellect, by which a thing is foreseen before it be brought to pass; but also that of the Will, or the Decree and Counsel, whereby, before the work is done, it is disposed to the end appointed for it. And that such a Providence as this appertains to God, may be proved by several Reasons.

III. God would not be the most per∣fect Being in case he did not take care of his Creatures. For First, it belongs to the Nature of God to be∣most perfect; but how can he be said to be so, without being present to his Creatures, and taking care for them? For it is without doubt a greater perfection to provide for the Universe, and to govern and dispose all things for the best, than to leave them to themselves, or to be disposed of by others. For by so much the more perfect, any one is, by how much the more he excells others in Com∣mand, Wisdom, Goodness and Liberality: But if the care of the World should be supposed taken away from God, we shall make him an Idle and Unactive Being, as EPICURUS doth; and by this means shall be able to conceive a more perfect Being, who toge∣ther with the highest Felicity has the Sovereign command over, and disposeth of all things, and whose Tranquillity is not disturbed or interrupted by the Multiplicity of the Affairs he manageth. Wherefore, since nothing can be admitted to be more perfect than God, we must conclude, that he takes the care of, and disposeth all things. For it is not becoming, as DAMASCENUS saith, that there should be one Builder or Architect of this World, and another that takes Care of it, foras∣much as this would Argue a disability in them both; in the one of Making or Effecting, and in the other of taking Care for and Disposing of it.

IV. Gods Pro∣vidence is proved from his Eternity. Secondly, Forasmuch as God is Eternal, having no Bounds of his Existence, it is necessary that his Understanding should be Eternal also, because it belongs to his Essence to be conceived by us as Su∣premely Intelligent: Now his Understanding is not distinguisht from his Will or Decree, but only by Reason, or our meer Conception; therefore when we say that God understood, or knew all things from Eternity, we at the same time assert, that he also from Eternity provided for all things, and design∣ed them to their appointed ends; seeing that his Will is Supremely Efficacious, and never fails of the ends he intends.

[illustration]

Book I. Part 2. Chap 16.

M Vander Gu••••t. Sculp.

G. Freeman Invent:

To the Worship-full Ieffrey Ieffreys of the Priory in Brecknockshire & of the Citty of London. Esq.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome

V. The same is made out from his other At∣tributes. The same may be confirmed from the rest of his Attributes: For if God be Sovereignly Intelli∣gent, he must also be most Wise; and will not he be accounted more Wise by governing the World, and administring all things, thereby not only Spe∣culatively, but Pratically understanding them? If God be most Powerful, he must be able to do all things, so as that nothing may be in a condition to resist his Will, or escape his Power. But how can this be, except he govern the things he hath produced, and concur to their Actions? If he be most Good, sure it is necessary that all Crea∣tures experience his Goodness: But how can that be, if he takes no Care of them, nor Provides for them? Therefore we must own the Divine Pro∣vidence; forasmuch as without it, his chiefest At∣tributes are destroyed, and nothing is left whereby we may demonstrate his Sovereign Power, Wisdom and Goodness.

VI. God's Pro∣vidence, and Go∣vernment of the World, may be proved from the things themselves. Another Argument may be taken from the Crea∣tures themselves. For whosoever considers the frame of this World, and the order of its Parts; whoso∣ever takes a view of the Earth, the variety of its Seasons, the different Shapes of Living Creatures, the manifold Virt••es of Plants; whosoever scans the Fabrick of the Microcosm, MAN, the multiplicity of his Members, with their admirable Connexion and Harmony: Whosoever takes a Prospect of the Heavenly Bodies, their Lustre, Beau∣ty, constant Motion and Proportion, will be forced by his Conscience to acknowledge, that these Won∣ders could not be the product of Chance and For∣tune, but the Effect of the Great GOD. And there∣fore CICERO, in his Book de Natura Deorum, speaks thus: Shall we call him a Man, who behold∣ing the certain Motion of the Heavens, the won∣derful Order of the Stars, and all so fitly link'd and suited together; shall suppose that all this is ma∣nag'd without any reason, and by Chance; when indeed we can never have any Conceptions of the greatness of that Wisdom and Counsel which dis∣poseth all these things? When we see any thing moved by Springs and Engins, as a Sphear or Watch, have we any the least doubt of their being the Effects of Reason? and when we see the Hea∣vens moving with admirable Swiftness, and con∣stantly to persist in their Motions, sinishing their Anniversary Revolutions, for the Health and Con∣servation of all Things; shall we question whether these Things are order'd and directed by a most Excellent and Divine Reason?

VII. How any thing can be said to be by Chance, if all things be rul'd by Providence. Tho' no body that owns a God, can doubt of his Providence; yet this Difficulty remains to some, How any thing can be said to be by Chance in the World, if God governs all Things, and directs them to their certain Ends? And besides, How comes it to pass, that God taking Care of all things, his Thunder often spares the Wicked, and strikes the Innocent? Or, if every Motion, and all other things that keep their certain Periods, be called Divine, must we not also suppose Tertian and Quartan Agues to be such, whose Motion and Re∣turns are so certain and constant?

VIII. With re∣spect to God, no∣thing hap∣pens by Chance. There is no question, but that many things hap∣pen by Chance in the World, with regard to Se∣cond Causes; but nothing at all with respect to the First Cause, who disposeth and fore-ordains all things from Eternity. For Chance and Fortune are only in respect of him, who is ignorant of the In∣tention of the Director: And forasmuch as the Di∣vine Intention is hid from Man, till the thing be done; therefore the same, with respect to Man, is said to happen by Chance, but not with respect to the First Cause. How many things seem to happen in a Commonwealth, which with reference to us are fortuitous; but not so with respect to the Prince who governs it, who order'd things so on purpose, and made use of such Ministers and Means, so as that things could not happen otherwise? And whereas it is further objected, That sometimes Thunderbolts pass by the Wicked, and light upon the Inno∣cent.

IX. How things come to be so turbu∣lently car∣ried in this World. We are to consider, that all these things happen by God's particular Direction, for very good ends, which tho' they be unknown to us, yet are not we therefore to deny them: For it is too great a pi••ce of Rashness, to have so great an esteem for our own Wit, as that whenever we cannot find out the True Cause of any thing, we should presently suppose the World to be without a Ruler, and that the Concerns of Men are committed to the manage∣ment of Blind Chance.

X. Why wic∣ked Men prosper in this World. But you will say, If there be a Cause that presides over Inferiour things, why do we perceive such Confusion in the World? Why are the Good neg∣lected and oppress'd by Poverty, Slavery, and Dis∣eases; whilst in the mean time the Wicked flourish, and abound with Honour and Riches?

XI. Answer. This is the Complaint of most Men, who being ignorant of the True Good, are taken with the out∣side of Things: For if we attend to the Nature of Good, we shall find that Vertue alone deserves that Name, which whosoever wants, is worthily esteem'd Miserable. Hence it is that Wicked Men, being devoid of Vertue, do not make use of those outward good things with that Moderation of Mind as they ought, but in the midst of their Riches suffer Want, and in the midst of their Pleasures, Pain and Tor∣ment; so that they are not True good things to them, but in appearance only. But if on the other hand, Evil things happen to those that are Good, forasmuch as they are conducive to the exercise of their Vertue, they▪ ••re rather to be accounted Good things, because by them their Minds are estranged from Worldly Lusts, and raised to the love and de∣sire of Heavenly things. This therefore is the greatest Instance of Providence, when we see Good things bestowed upon Ill Men, that they may grow the worse; and Evil things upon Good Men, that thereby they may grow better.

XII. Why God Created Men and Angels, whom he foresaw would be corrupted by Sin. But you will say, That God created Angels and Men, whom he foresaw would fall and continue in Evil or Wickedness. St. AUSTIN Answers, That GOD would not have created any Angel or Man, whom he foreknew would fall into Sin, if he had not known, at the same time, to what good Ends he could make use of them, and so compose the Harmony of this Universe, as a pleasant Song of Discords mix'd with Concords: For as these make the Sweetness of Musick, so the Beauty of this World is made up of these Contraries. And therefore in the Third Book of Free-Will he plainly teaches, That GOD ought not to have abstained from Cre∣ating of the Creature, whom he foresaw that by his own Fault (not by any of his Creator) should lose that Beauty in which he was created: For as a lost and wandring Horse is better than a Stone, which cannot wander, because it wants sense and motion;

so that Creature is more Excellent, which sins by its Free-will, than that Creature which doth not sin; because it hath no Free-will. And as I would com∣mend Wine as good in its kind, tho' I blame the Man that is made drunk by it, and yet would prefer this drunken and blamed Man before the praised Wine that had made him drunk: So likewise a Bodily Creature is to be commended in its degree and kind, whereas they are Blame-worthy, who by the immo∣derate use thereof, are turned aside from the Per∣ception of Truth.