An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

CHAP. II. By the Inborn Idea that is in us, we know that GOD exists.

I. What we are to un∣derstand by the word Idea. BY the word IDEA, we understand that form of our Cogitation, by the immediate appre∣hension whereof we are conscious of the said Cogi∣tation: So that we can express nothing, without having formed an Idea before of it in our Minds. Or to express it shorter, An Idea is nothing else but the thing it self perceived or thought of, as it is Objectively in the Understanding. Wherefore every Idea includes two things, the one Formal or Proper, inasmuch as it is an Operation of the Mind; the other Objective, as it is the Image of a Thing thought, or is instead of it.

II. What di∣stinction there is betwixt Idea's. In the Second place we are to tak notice, That tho' there is no inequality in the Idea's of our Mind, as they are Modes of Thinking; yet are they very different with respect to the things which they re∣present. For it cannot be question'd but the Idea, which represents Substance to me, contains more Objective Reality, than that which represents a Mode, or any thing else adventitious to a perfect or compleat Substance. And so that Idea which re∣presents to me an Infinite Being, All-powerful, All-wise, Eternal, &c. doth undoubtedly contain more Objective Reality, than that which expresseth Sub∣stances that are Created, Dependent, Mortal, &c. For seeing that these Idea's are something, they must have a Cause of their Existence, and conse∣quently have so much the more Reality, as the things they represent have of Entity.

III. Whatsoever is in the Effe••t, is formally or eminently in its Cause. Thirdly, we are to observe, That there is nothing found in any Effect, which is not Formally or Emi∣nently contain'd in its Cause. A thing is said to be Formally in its Cause, when it is such there as we perceive; but Eminently, when the Cause can supply its stead. Thus Fire, when it produceth heat in a Body, is said to contain it formally, because it hath the very same thing in it self, which it hath produc'd in the Body; but the Sun and the Earth, when they produce Fruits, do not comprehend the thing caused by them Formally, but Eminently only. This Notion is the First of all others, and is as evident, as that Nothing can be made out of Nothing: For should we admit that something is contained in the Effect, which is not contained in the Cause, we must own that Something may pro∣ceed from Nothing. Neither can we give any other Reason, why Nothing cannot be the Cause of any thing, but because in it there cannot be found what is in the Effect.

IV. From the Idea we have of God, we conclude that God is. Wherefore we conclude from the Idea we have of God, that he exists; which is, First, thus de∣monstrated: Every thing represented by an Idea must have a Cause, in which it is either Formally or Eminently contained; but we have an Idea of God, as he is a Most perfect Substance, excluding all Limitations: Therefore this Idea must have GOD for its Cause. The Minor is thus proved: There is nothing found in all Created Beings that can afford us this Idea: For tho' I can form the Idea of a Substance, because I my self am a Substance; yet will this Idea never represent an Infinite Substance, because I my self am Finite and of bounded Perfections; wherefore it is necessary that if I have an Idea of an Infinite Substance, it must proceed from God alone, who is Infinite.

V. An Obje∣ction an∣swer'd. If you argue, that this Idea may be formed from the several Perfections scattered up and down in the several Parts of the Universe; after the same manner as from the Notion of an Angel, and my own Mind, I can frame an Idea of a Divine Understanding. I answer, How can I from the several Endowments of diverse Things, frame a Being that is absolutely Perfect? Shall I do it by enlarging and extending those Images? But whence have I the Faculty of enlarging all the Perfections of Created Things, and concerning something that far exceeds them all? We ought rather to conclude, that this is, because the Idea of a most Perfect Being is impress'd upon my Mind. Moreover, the supream Perfection of God consists in this, That all his Perfections are not separate, as in the Creatures, but in conjunction with the most absolute Simplicity and Unity.

VI. No Idea of an Infinite Being is contained in the Idea of a Finite Being. And tho' the Idea of an Infinite Substance, which most perfectly includes all the Perfections our Mind can conceive, may also contain the Idea of a Finite Substance, (as a Multitude contains an Unity, and a greater Number a lesser;) yet is not the Idea of an Infinite Being, contain'd in that of a Finite Being. And therefore Des Cartes in his Third Meditation says thus: I manifestly under∣stand, that there is more Reality in an Infinite Substance, than in a Finite; and therefore that the Perception of an Infinite Being, is in some sort precedent in me, to that of a Finite Being, that is, the Idea of GOD, to that of my Self. For how could I understand that I Doubt, that I Desire, that is, that I want something, and am not alto∣gether Perfect, if there were not in me the Idea of a more Perfect Being, by comparing my Self with whom I discern my own Defects?

VII. That which is Perfect cannot pro∣ceed from that which is Imper∣fect. Secondly, That which is perfect cannot proceed from that which is imperfect, as from its Total and Efficient Cause: But we, as all other Creatures, are Imperfect; and the Perfections which are in God, are neither Formally nor Eminently contained in us: So that the Idea of GOD, which contains all his Perfections, cannot be thought to proceed from us, and consequently God must be the Cause of it; and because He cannot be the Cause of it, except He do exist, we may undoubtedly conclude that He doth so.

VIII. The Idea of God is in∣born in us, If any one ask, whence we have this Idea, since it doth not proceed from our Senses, nor from any Created Being? My Answer is, That it is born with us, as the Idea of our Selves also is: For God impress'd it upon every Man in his Creation, and hath so order'd it, that every one should understand and know God by the same Faculty whereby He knows himself. For it is impossible that any one should understand himself to be imperfect, de∣pending on another, and of uncertain Duration; but that at the same time he must also understand Him, with whom compared, he is imperfect, and on whom he depends; so that reflecting upon him∣self, he concludes that God is, and by the Idea which he hath of him, is convinc'd of his Ex∣istence. I say, by reflecting on himself; for by the impression made upon us by God, we are not to understand that this Idea is always actually represented to us; for were it so, we should al∣ways think of God: But by this Impression is meant nothing else, but that God hath vouchsafed such a Faculty to Man, whereby he can excite this Idea in himself, without the help of any other Idea's whatsoever.

IX. The Idea of God cannot be said to be invented by us. It cannot be said, That this Idea is framed ••r invented by us, as many Notions are, which ha••e no other Existence, but what they have in our Understanding; because nothing can be added or taken away from this Idea, for the Essences of things are indivisible: So that if any Thing could be added to any Idea, representing the Na∣ture of a Thing, it would be no more the same, but another Idea. And tho' new Perfections may still be perceived in God, which were not known before; yet doth not this change the Idea of God, but only makes it the more clear and distinct; no more than the Idea of Man is increased, when some new Properties are discover'd in him, which before were unknown, because they ought to have been inclu∣ded in the Idea which we had of him befor e.

X. An Objecti∣on to prove, that the Idea of God is framed by us. But you will farther urge, That Man who has this Idea is a free Agent, and that consequently he can frame the same at pleasure. And Des Cartes seems to hint as much in the Beginning of his Fifth Meditation, where after he hath said, That innu∣merable Idea's of Things are found in his Mind, adds, Which tho' they be in some sort thought by me at pleasure. Now if we can think of Objects according to our pleasure, why may we not say, that the Idea of God is framed by us, whilst we are thinking of it?

XI. Many things ••o∣cur to our Thoughts, which tho▪ they do not Exist, yet have their Nature. I Answer, That Idea's do indeed depend on us, as far as they have a formal and proper Being in our Mind; but not as they are considered in their objective Being; because in that respect they have a necessary Cause. I own it to be in our power, to think, or not to think of any particular Object, and that we are thus free by a liberty of Contra∣diction, or by a liberty as to the Exercise of the Act, as the Schools express it; but that it is not in our power, to think differently of the same thing that is true, that is, we have no liberty of Contrariety, and as to the Specification of the Act. For it doth not depend on our Will to think the Number Nine to consist of three Ternaries, and not to consist, or to be an Even or Uneven Number, &c. Neither can we conceive a Substan••e absolutely perfect, as Existing or not Existing, Wise or Ignorant, Merciful or Cruel; but must necessarily conceive him neces∣sarily Existing, All-wise, and All good. Where••ore when Des Cartes faith, That many Idea'l are found in him, which it may be have no Existence, besides his Cogitation, he presently subjoynd; yet are they not feigned or inven••ed by me, but have their true and unchangeable Natures.

XII. The Idea we have of God, is not derived from our Parents. Neither doth it contradict our Assertion, what some say, That we have deriv'd all the Know∣ledge we have from our Parents, who having receiv'd the same from the first Men, afterwards commnicated the same to us, and that conse∣quently the Idea we have of GOD is not in∣born, seeing that this Objection seems rather to confirm the Idea of GOD to be inborn in us: For let us ask them, from whom those first Men had this Idea; if from themselves, why may not we have it as well? If from GOD revealing the same to them, then they must own GOD to Exist.