An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

CHAP. XVI. Concerning Gods Government of the World, and Providence.

I. Supposing God to be All know∣ing and All power∣ful, he must also be Pro∣vident. FRom what hath been already said of the Di∣vine Attributes, we may easily conclude that God is Provident, and the Ruler and Governour of all the World, and all things that are in it. For seeing that he hath Created all things, and by his alone Power, brought them into a State of actual Existence, it seems to be Repugnant to his Good∣ness and Omnipotence, that he should neglect the care of them, and leave them to the Government and disposal of others. For since he is All-know∣ing, All-powerful, and supremely Good, he cannot but keep his Eye upon his Creatures, and govern and dispose of them for their good. For Will and Power, with respect to things without them, are not distinguisht from the Divine Understanding; and since God hath decreed that at some certain time, Creatures should exist, he also determined them to exist so, as that their Essence and Existence might depend on his Will and Power, without being able to attain any Ends without his special Provi∣dence.

II. What Pro∣vidence is. By Providence, Divines understand that Eternal disposal, by which God doth Efficaciously direct all his Creatures to certain ends foreseen by him, so as that in time they come to attain them. For Pro∣vidence doth not only denote the operation of the Intellect, by which a thing is foreseen before it be brought to pass; but also that of the Will, or the Decree and Counsel, whereby, before the work is done, it is disposed to the end appointed for it. And that such a Providence as this appertains to God, may be proved by several Reasons.

III. God would not be the most per∣fect Being in case he did not take care of his Creatures. For First, it belongs to the Nature of God to be∣most perfect; but how can he be said to be so, without being present to his Creatures, and taking care for them? For it is without doubt a greater perfection to provide for the Universe, and to govern and dispose all things for the best, than to leave them to themselves, or to be disposed of by others. For by so much the more perfect, any one is, by how much the more he excells others in Com∣mand, Wisdom, Goodness and Liberality: But if the care of the World should be supposed taken away from God, we shall make him an Idle and Unactive Being, as EPICURUS doth; and by this means shall be able to conceive a more perfect Being, who toge∣ther with the highest Felicity has the Sovereign command over, and disposeth of all things, and whose Tranquillity is not disturbed or interrupted by the Multiplicity of the Affairs he manageth. Wherefore, since nothing can be admitted to be more perfect than God, we must conclude, that he takes the care of, and disposeth all things. For it is not becoming, as DAMASCENUS saith, that there should be one Builder or Architect of this World, and another that takes Care of it, foras∣much as this would Argue a disability in them both; in the one of Making or Effecting, and in the other of taking Care for and Disposing of it.

IV. Gods Pro∣vidence is proved from his Eternity. Secondly, Forasmuch as God is Eternal, having no Bounds of his Existence, it is necessary that his Understanding should be Eternal also, because it belongs to his Essence to be conceived by us as Su∣premely Intelligent: Now his Understanding is not distinguisht from his Will or Decree, but only by Reason, or our meer Conception; therefore when we say that God understood, or knew all things from Eternity, we at the same time assert, that he also from Eternity provided for all things, and design∣ed them to their appointed ends; seeing that his Will is Supremely Efficacious, and never fails of the ends he intends.

[illustration]

Book I. Part 2. Chap 16.

M Vander Gu••••t. Sculp.

G. Freeman Invent:

To the Worship-full Ieffrey Ieffreys of the Priory in Brecknockshire & of the Citty of London. Esq.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome

V. The same is made out from his other At∣tributes. The same may be confirmed from the rest of his Attributes: For if God be Sovereignly Intelli∣gent, he must also be most Wise; and will not he be accounted more Wise by governing the World, and administring all things, thereby not only Spe∣culatively, but Pratically understanding them? If God be most Powerful, he must be able to do all things, so as that nothing may be in a condition to resist his Will, or escape his Power. But how can this be, except he govern the things he hath produced, and concur to their Actions? If he be most Good, sure it is necessary that all Crea∣tures experience his Goodness: But how can that be, if he takes no Care of them, nor Provides for them? Therefore we must own the Divine Pro∣vidence; forasmuch as without it, his chiefest At∣tributes are destroyed, and nothing is left whereby we may demonstrate his Sovereign Power, Wisdom and Goodness.

VI. God's Pro∣vidence, and Go∣vernment of the World, may be proved from the things themselves. Another Argument may be taken from the Crea∣tures themselves. For whosoever considers the frame of this World, and the order of its Parts; whoso∣ever takes a view of the Earth, the variety of its Seasons, the different Shapes of Living Creatures, the manifold Virt••es of Plants; whosoever scans the Fabrick of the Microcosm, MAN, the multiplicity of his Members, with their admirable Connexion and Harmony: Whosoever takes a Prospect of the Heavenly Bodies, their Lustre, Beau∣ty, constant Motion and Proportion, will be forced by his Conscience to acknowledge, that these Won∣ders could not be the product of Chance and For∣tune, but the Effect of the Great GOD. And there∣fore CICERO, in his Book de Natura Deorum, speaks thus: Shall we call him a Man, who behold∣ing the certain Motion of the Heavens, the won∣derful Order of the Stars, and all so fitly link'd and suited together; shall suppose that all this is ma∣nag'd without any reason, and by Chance; when indeed we can never have any Conceptions of the greatness of that Wisdom and Counsel which dis∣poseth all these things? When we see any thing moved by Springs and Engins, as a Sphear or Watch, have we any the least doubt of their being the Effects of Reason? and when we see the Hea∣vens moving with admirable Swiftness, and con∣stantly to persist in their Motions, sinishing their Anniversary Revolutions, for the Health and Con∣servation of all Things; shall we question whether these Things are order'd and directed by a most Excellent and Divine Reason?

VII. How any thing can be said to be by Chance, if all things be rul'd by Providence. Tho' no body that owns a God, can doubt of his Providence; yet this Difficulty remains to some, How any thing can be said to be by Chance in the World, if God governs all Things, and directs them to their certain Ends? And besides, How comes it to pass, that God taking Care of all things, his Thunder often spares the Wicked, and strikes the Innocent? Or, if every Motion, and all other things that keep their certain Periods, be called Divine, must we not also suppose Tertian and Quartan Agues to be such, whose Motion and Re∣turns are so certain and constant?

VIII. With re∣spect to God, no∣thing hap∣pens by Chance. There is no question, but that many things hap∣pen by Chance in the World, with regard to Se∣cond Causes; but nothing at all with respect to the First Cause, who disposeth and fore-ordains all things from Eternity. For Chance and Fortune are only in respect of him, who is ignorant of the In∣tention of the Director: And forasmuch as the Di∣vine Intention is hid from Man, till the thing be done; therefore the same, with respect to Man, is said to happen by Chance, but not with respect to the First Cause. How many things seem to happen in a Commonwealth, which with reference to us are fortuitous; but not so with respect to the Prince who governs it, who order'd things so on purpose, and made use of such Ministers and Means, so as that things could not happen otherwise? And whereas it is further objected, That sometimes Thunderbolts pass by the Wicked, and light upon the Inno∣cent.

IX. How things come to be so turbu∣lently car∣ried in this World. We are to consider, that all these things happen by God's particular Direction, for very good ends, which tho' they be unknown to us, yet are not we therefore to deny them: For it is too great a pi••ce of Rashness, to have so great an esteem for our own Wit, as that whenever we cannot find out the True Cause of any thing, we should presently suppose the World to be without a Ruler, and that the Concerns of Men are committed to the manage∣ment of Blind Chance.

X. Why wic∣ked Men prosper in this World. But you will say, If there be a Cause that presides over Inferiour things, why do we perceive such Confusion in the World? Why are the Good neg∣lected and oppress'd by Poverty, Slavery, and Dis∣eases; whilst in the mean time the Wicked flourish, and abound with Honour and Riches?

XI. Answer. This is the Complaint of most Men, who being ignorant of the True Good, are taken with the out∣side of Things: For if we attend to the Nature of Good, we shall find that Vertue alone deserves that Name, which whosoever wants, is worthily esteem'd Miserable. Hence it is that Wicked Men, being devoid of Vertue, do not make use of those outward good things with that Moderation of Mind as they ought, but in the midst of their Riches suffer Want, and in the midst of their Pleasures, Pain and Tor∣ment; so that they are not True good things to them, but in appearance only. But if on the other hand, Evil things happen to those that are Good, forasmuch as they are conducive to the exercise of their Vertue, they▪ ••re rather to be accounted Good things, because by them their Minds are estranged from Worldly Lusts, and raised to the love and de∣sire of Heavenly things. This therefore is the greatest Instance of Providence, when we see Good things bestowed upon Ill Men, that they may grow the worse; and Evil things upon Good Men, that thereby they may grow better.

XII. Why God Created Men and Angels, whom he foresaw would be corrupted by Sin. But you will say, That God created Angels and Men, whom he foresaw would fall and continue in Evil or Wickedness. St. AUSTIN Answers, That GOD would not have created any Angel or Man, whom he foreknew would fall into Sin, if he had not known, at the same time, to what good Ends he could make use of them, and so compose the Harmony of this Universe, as a pleasant Song of Discords mix'd with Concords: For as these make the Sweetness of Musick, so the Beauty of this World is made up of these Contraries. And therefore in the Third Book of Free-Will he plainly teaches, That GOD ought not to have abstained from Cre∣ating of the Creature, whom he foresaw that by his own Fault (not by any of his Creator) should lose that Beauty in which he was created: For as a lost and wandring Horse is better than a Stone, which cannot wander, because it wants sense and motion;

so that Creature is more Excellent, which sins by its Free-will, than that Creature which doth not sin; because it hath no Free-will. And as I would com∣mend Wine as good in its kind, tho' I blame the Man that is made drunk by it, and yet would prefer this drunken and blamed Man before the praised Wine that had made him drunk: So likewise a Bodily Creature is to be commended in its degree and kind, whereas they are Blame-worthy, who by the immo∣derate use thereof, are turned aside from the Per∣ception of Truth.