An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

CHAP. XIV. Of the Omnipotence of GOD.

I. It is an inborn No∣tion with all Men, that God is Omnipo∣tent. NO Man that ever own'd a GOD, deny'd him to be Omnipotent: This is a Notion all Men brought into the VVorld with them, who therefore when they are in any affliction or danger, lift up their Hands to Heaven, and send up their Prayers to him for the thing they wish for, and thereby tacitly acknowledge his Omnipotence. Yet there are some Philosophers who seem to destroy this Notion, who assert the Essences of Things to be Eternal, as if without the Power of God they had some Nature of their own, to which God at a certain time did vouchsafe Existence, and made them to be Actual Beings. And therefore they say, that Possible things only, that is, such as are so in their own Nature, can be produc'd by God, and that his Power doth not extend it self any fur∣ther.

II. What a Possible, Necessary and Con∣tingent Being is. But because this Doctrin seems to derogate from God's Omnipotence, we will endeavour to shew the Falsity of it, by declaring what the true Nature of a Possible, Necessary, and Contingent Being is, and whence they take these Affections. A Necessary Being is said to be such with a twofold respect, either with respect to its Essence, or to the Effective Principle whence it proceeds. After the first man∣ner, we know that God only doth necessarily Exist; and therefore he is said to Exist so, as that he cannot but exist; because Existence is involved in his Conception, so that his Essence cannot be under∣stood without it. But after the Second manner, that is, with respect to the Effective Principle, Corporeal things are said to be Necessary, foras∣much as they can be produced by God; but not with respect to their own Essence, because we can clearly and distinctly understand the same without Existence, and therefore they can never exist by virtue of their Essence. That is call'd a Possible Being, whose Efficient Cause is known to us; but yet we do not know, whether he be determined to produce it or no; and therefore is commonly descri∣bed, That which hath not been, but might have been; and in this sense all things besides God are said to be Possible. But if we consider only their Natnre, and not their Productive Cause, we shall call all things Contingent; because with respect to their Natures, no necessity of Existing is found in them, as in God: Neither is there in them any Repug∣nancy or Impossibility, but that they may be; and therefore in case they do exist, they exist so, as that they may not exist.

III. All things present, and things to come, de∣pend on God. We will now shew, That all things that are now, or are to come, have their Dependence on God; and that there is nothing in Nature, that doth not proceed from his Decree. For seeing no Creature exists by the necessity of its Essence, it follows, that they must all borrow their Being from the Divine Decree. For it is evident by the Light of Reason, that it is impossible a thing should exist, which hath no Internal or External Cause of its Existence: Now no Creatures can exist by the Power of their own Nature, and therefore we must have recourse to one only External Cause, viz. the Divine Decree, for their Existence; in which Di∣vine Decree, if their Existence be not found, they are to be look'd upon as Impossible, forasmuch as they cannot be produc'd by any Cause. From

whence it evidently follows, not only that the Ex∣istence of all Creatures doth depend of God, but also their Nature and Essence: for seeing there is no perfection which is not in God, there can be no Essence in the Creatures, which should be the cause of Gods knowledge. Wherefore we must conclude that all Creatures before Gods Decree were nothing, and consequently that of themselves they have no necessity to exist.

IV. God is the Efficient Cause not only of sub∣stances, but also of their Modes. When I say that all things have their Being from the Divine Good Pleasure, this to be under∣stood not only of Material Substance, but also of Thinking or Spiritual; because not only the proper∣ties and Modes of Bodies derive their reality from the Will of God; but also the Modes of Minds. For it is a meer prejudice of our Youth to imagine that the Modes of Cogitation, Knowledge, Judg∣ment, Affections, and other inward Acts of our Mind do less depend on the Divine Power, than the Modes of Material and Bodily things. Because whatsoever is not God, is of it self altogether no∣thing; neither can it exist but by his will; for since nothing can be the cause of its own Existence, save God alone, it follows that whatsoever exists, must derive all its reality from God as its first Prin∣ciple.

V. In what sense the Natures of things may be said to be immu∣table. If it be objected that the Essences of things are commonly said to be Immutable and Eternal. I an∣swer, that the Essences of things are only said to be immutable, forasmuch as they are exprest by Defi∣nition, and are consider'd Universally, as is com∣monly done in Sciences, whose certainty requires firm and stable Definitions. So the Definition of a Mind that it is a Thinking substance, is always the same, neither is lyable to any change, tho per∣haps there may be a further degree of perfection in the Mind of one Man, than of another. And whereas they are said to be Eternal, or that their Essence was known from Eternity in the Divine Intellect, this does not argue any Eternity in them, but in God; since to be known in the Mind of God, with respect to the Creatures, is only an Ex∣trinsecal Denomination, or an Entity of Reason, which superadds no reality to things.

VI. No things are Contin∣gent with respect to God. As for Possible and Contingent Things, there are none such with respect to God; Because there are none that of themselves can Exist, and not Exist, or that have real Contingency. For surely there is no less Power to the creating of a thing, than to the Conserving of it; and since no created thing acts any thing by its own Power, so neither can it give it self Existence by the same. It remains there∣fore that all things must have their Dependence on God, and that the things that are, be produced by vertue only of the Divine Decree. And foras∣much as there is no Change or Inconstancy in God, we must conclude that the things which he creates, have from Eternity been decreed to be created by him; so that all Creatures from Eternity had a kind of necessity of Existence; And therefore that no Things are Possible, Necessary, or Contingent of their own Nature, but by the Divine Decree, which is the only Cause of all things.

VII. Nothing can be sup∣pos'd ante∣cedent to Gods De∣cree. Neither doth it contradict what we have said, that God might have decreed otherwise concern∣ing his Creatures, and that upon that score they may be said to be contingent; For since in Eternity there is no Before or After, first or last, it is a Vanity to search after those Moments in which God existed before those Decrees, and in which it is supposed that he might have determin'd otherwise. Where∣fore since God without any necessity resolved to make Creatures, they are all of them said to exist Contingently, because they include no Necessity of Existing; tho with respect to the will of God they exist Necessarily: Forasmuch as no greater necessi∣ty can be conceived in Things than that whereby an Effect follows from an Efficacious Principle and a Determinate Efficient Cause.

How the Will of Man is said to depend on God. There is one difficulty more remains to be discust, and that is since all Creatures are predetermined by God, and that there is a kind of necessity of Ex∣istence in them from Eternity, how the Will of Man can be said to depend of God, seeing that it is free, and indetermin'd. But notwithstanding this, we must say that the Will also is conserved by the Divine Concourse, so that it is not in the Power of Man to Will or Act any thing, which is not preordained by God. But how these two things may be reconciled, that God hath decreed all the Acts of our Will from Eternity, and yet our Will remains undertermin'd, is I confess more than I do clearly perceive. I do acknowledg my Mind to be but of a finite capacity; and the Power of God, whereby he hath not only foreknown all present and future things from Eternity, but hath also decreed and determin'd them, to be infinite and unbounded: Yet cannot this consideration make us doubtful of the Freedom of our Will, since in all our actions we experience our selves to be free, and that it is in our Power to give or with∣hold our Assent; which is so manifest that we have good reason to rank it amongst first and common Notions.

IX. It is a diffi∣cult thing to reconcile the Divine Decree with the Liberty of Mans Will. Hence is it that the Famous Philosopher in the Ninth Epistle of his l. Volume, saith. As to Free will, if we only consider our selves, I must confess we cannot but think it to be Independent: But when we cast an Eye on the Infinite Power of God, we cannot but believe that all things must depend on him, and therefore that our free will is not exempt from his Command. For it implies a contradiction that God should have created Men of such a nature, that the Actions of their will should not depend on his will: Because that is the same as if one should say that his Power is both Finite and Infinite: Finite since there is something that doth not depend on it; and Infinite, in that he was able to create this thing Independent. But as the knowledg of the Divine Existence, must not take away the certainty of our free will: So neither must the knowledg of our free will, make us to doubt of the Divine Ex∣istence. For the Independency we experience and find in our selves, and which makes our actions blame or praise worthy, is not opposite to a depen∣dence of another kind, whereby all things are sub∣ject to God.

X. God is no less a cause of the Crea∣ture when it is made than when it is a making. Gods Omnipotence does not only appear in the Production of things, but also in their conservati∣on: for God is not only the Principle of created Beings when they are making, but also when they are made. Hence it is that he preserves them by a continual Influence; and should he cease from his Concourse, whatsoever he hath produc'd would fall to nothing; Because before they were created and he afforded them his Concourse, they were no∣thing. Neither doth it contradict this, that all things that are produced by God are substances, to

whom it does agree to subsist; for they are not call'd Substances as if they could subsist without the Divine Concourse, but because they are such things, as do not need the assistance of any creature towards their being. In which Preservation of the creatures, the infinite Divine Power is evidently exemplified, in that he hath produc'd all things so, as that they cannot subsist one moment without him, like as the Image of the Sun reflected in the Water, or in a Look∣ing-glass, doth depend on the Sun, not only as to its being, but as to its Preservation or continuance.