An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

CHAP. XII. That GOD is most highly Intelligent, or Omniscient.

I. Omnisci∣ence is in∣cluded in the Con∣ception of a most Perfect Being. IT will not be any hard matter to make out, that GOD is Omniscient or All-knowing, and that at one view he comprehends all things, if we re∣member him to be the Most perfect Being, in whom no defect or limitation can be conceived, which would not be if his Knowledge were finite, and that any thing could escape his Understand∣ing. Therefore the Ancients called GOD, the Mind, or Soul of the World; not only for that he was diffused throughout the Universe, and did animate all Things; but also because he knows them all, and pierceth their most Secret parts. For Ignorance is a mark of Weakness of Soul, and that Being cannot but be Imperfect, whose Under∣standing is bounded by any Bound or Limit, be∣yond which it cannot reach.

II. This Point further made out out by Reason. But because Discourse and Reason serve to illu∣strate the Truth of Things, I shall make use of this Argument: Either GOD understands all things, or some things only, or nothing at all. If he only understand some things, then his Understanding is supposed imperfect, which no body will say of God, that is persuaded of his absolute Perfection. But if he knows nothing, then certainly he cannot be supposed to be God. Wherefore it follows, that as God contains all Perfections, so he is endowed with knowledge in the highest and most transcen∣dent degree.

III. How the Divine Knowledge is distin∣guish'd from the Knowledge of Men. I say, in the most transcendent degree, because Human Cogitation is very different from the Di∣vine. For the Idea's of Men are bounded by the Objects that are without them, and according to the diversity of things which it contemplates, are said to be either clear or obscure. For it does not depend of us, that our Idea's do represent this or the other thing to us, they being only Modes of Cogitation, and as such are all of them equal, all their difference proceeding from the Objects they represent; so that some hold forth to us an Extended Substance, others a Mind; some Simple things, others Compound; all which variety the Idea's borrow from the Things themselves. For it cannot be question'd, but that those Idea's which represent some particular Substance to us, contain more objective Reality, than those which only exhibit Modes to us, which are only the determinations or limitations of Substance. But the Divine Knowledge doth not thus depend on the Creatures, neither are his Conceptions bounded by any things without him; but all Created Be∣ings derive their Essence from his Understanding, and according as they are determin'd by the same, do obtain divers degrees of Entity. For the Di∣vine Intellect, whereby God knows the Creatures, is the same thing with his Will and Power that does determine them, and are only distinguish'd by us, according to our various ways of considering them.

IV. There is no Object of God's Knowledge, that is without himself. Wherefore we are not to suppose any Object of the Divine Science to be without himself, who is alone the Object of his own Knowledge; or to speak more properly, He is himself his own Know∣ledge. For should we suppose, that Created Be∣ings were before the Divine Intellect, and that as Objects they did terminate his Idea's, they must be supposed to have a Nature and Essence independent

on God, as being at least by Nature before him. Which to assert would be as foolish, as to say that a Pourtrature drawn by a Skilful Limner, is the Object of that Art: For a Limner stands in need of Pencils and Colours, to perform his Work•••• whereas GOD did not stand in need of any thing for the Creation of the World, but all Created things did proceed from his Understanding and Free Will; not only as to their Existence, but as to their Essence also.

V. Indifferency in God is the Highest Perfection. Whence it appears, that Indifferency which is an Imperfection in Man, and is held to be the Iowest degree of his Liberty, is the Highest Perfection in God, as being a sign of his Sovereign Empire and Power, who is unbounded by any Laws or Rules, and the sole Author of all Order, Truth, Justice and Goodness. For it implies a Contradiction, to suppose that the Divine Will was not indifferent to all things, that have been or shall be made. Be∣cause no Goodness or Truth can be imagined, the Idea whereof was in the Divine Intellect, before that his Will had determined to make it so.

VI. How God knows Sins, and those things which are called En∣tia Ratio∣nis. Enti∣ties of Rea∣son. Some Question whether the Divine Knowledge doth extend it self to all things, and whether God besides Positive things, that is, real Substances, doth also know things Privative and Fictitious▪ such as are Sins, entities of Reafon, &c.

VII. Answer. For Answer I say, that God knoweth all things whereof he is the Efficient Cause, because as was said in the Chapter of Gods Immensity, all things are continually procreated by him, as not being able to continue one Moment without his Con∣course: But Sins being no real things, and depen∣ding on the Will of Man, are not known by him without the Minds of Men. And as for Entities of Reason, forasmuch as they are nothing else but Modes of Thinking, which are used for the easier Explication of the things we know, or the better retaining of them; these are no otherwise understood by God, than as he is the Procreator and Conserva∣tor of our Minds. For if we enquired what is meant by an Entity of Reason, we shall find it to be a meer Nothing, without the Understanding. But if we have regard to the Modes themselves of Think∣ing, they may be said to be real Entities. Thus, when I enquire what is Genus, I demand nothing else but the Nature of that Mode of Thinking, which is truly considered as a Being, and differs from a Species, which is another Mode of Cogitation.

VIII. God under∣stands En∣tities of Reason on∣ly foras∣much as they are conceived by us. Now God doth not contain any of these Enti∣ties of Reason or Notions, as if he stood in need of these Modes of Cogitation, to retain the things that he understands; but only inasmuch as the Mind of Man, whose Modes they are, is perceived by us to be preserved and maintained in its Being by God. We conclude therefore that God is All knowing, and that he contemplates all things by one only most Simple Idea; for to speak properly, God for no other Reason is called Omniscient, but because he has his own Idea, which being nothing else but his Essence, is therefore inseparable from him, and consequently extends it self to all positive or real Objects.