CHAP. IX. That GOD is Infinite, and how we are to understand, that he is Circumscrib'd in no Place.
I. All things are not contain'd in some place. AMongst those Prejudices, which we have taken in from our Childhood, and which some to this day hold for Truth, there is none more dangerous in Philosophy than that which ARIS∣TOTLE teacheth in the Fourth Book of his Natural Philosophy, the First Chapter, viz. That all things are somewhere, that is, contained in some certain Space; because he supposed whatsoever is not, to be no where; which he takes to be so notorious and evident, that he is not afraid to rank it amongst Common Notions, and to esteem it an in∣dubitable Truth. Wherefore also in his First Book of Heaven, the Third Chapter, he assigns the Highest place to the Gods, as most becoming their Dignity, and whence with greater ease they may take a View of all Things. And in the same Book, Chap. 2. he disputes against the most ancient Philosophers, and denies God to be diffus'd through all Things, as supposing it most unworthy the Divine Majesty to be present with the Earthly World.
II. Immaterial things can∣not be said to be in a Place. But that this is an Erroneous Opinion, appears from the Immensity of GOD, and the Existence of Spiritual Things: For it is evident that God and Immaterial Substances are, or have a Being, and yet they are not comprehended in any deter∣minate Place. For to be in a Place is the Property of Extended Beings, and cannot be attributed to an Immaterial Substance void of all Extension. If at any time Places be attributed to the Soul, this is not with respect to its own Essence, which consists only in Cogitation, but with respect to the Body, to which it is joyned; because it cannot be, but that the Body being limited to a certain Space, the Soul, which is intimately present with it, may be said to be included in one place, rather than in another. But if the Soul be considered by it self alone, forasmuch as it is a Thinking Sub∣stance and void of all Extension, it cannot fill any Space, nor have any situation amongst Bodies; for otherwise it would be Divisible and Mensurable, which is repugnant to the Nature of an Intellectual Being.
III. God is com∣prehended in no Place. And as for GOD, he is much less comprehended in any Place: For tho' he be said to be every where, yet may he also be said to be no where; forasmuch as his Immensity is unbounded and dif∣fus'd through all Places. But because all do ac∣knowledge, that the most Perfect Being hath no Bounds, either of his Duration or his Presence, the only difficulty will be in the Explication of the Divine Immensity, viz. in what sense God is said to be Infinite, and so diffused through all, as to be every where.
IV. Some falsly suppose God to be every where by his Pre∣sence. Some, whom I call Vulgar Philosophers, derive the Immensity of God, from his Presence in every place, supposing God to be every where, because there is no place in which he is not present, or which is not filled by him. But these seem to Attri∣bute Extension to God, by conceiving to partake of Quantity, as Occupying all places: And therefore would think his Greatness to be Finite, if there could be any place, in which he were not present, and coextended with it.
V. God, before the Crea∣tion of the World, was not in any Space. Whereas we know that God was, before there was any Space; for what Place did God fill before the Creation of the World? If God therefore did Exist before there was any Space, it is evident that being in a Space is not Essential or Proper to him.
VI. God is said to be every∣where, be∣cause all Created things per∣petually depend upon him. Wherefore to leave this gross way of Philosophi∣zing, we say, that God is precisely Infinite, fornsmuch as all Created things, are every moment as it were anew Created, and cannot Exist without his con∣tinual Influx: For the perpetual dependence of the Creatures, doth clearly Evidence Gods Omnipre∣sence; because those things which are in Nature, are not preserved by any Force or Virtue of their own, but only by the Essence of God, and by this Favour continue in their Beings. Neither is a less potent Cause required to the Preserving of things, than was to the Creation of them. For from this that a thing now Exists, it doth not follow, that