An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

(Book 1)

[illustration]

Booke i. Part i. Chap 1.

G. Freman Inv.

I. Kip Sculp

To the Right Honourable John Lord Cutts, Baron of Gowran; Captain-Generall and Governour of the Isle of Wight; Constable of Carisbrooke Castle; Brigadieer Generall over all the Infanterie in their Majestyes Service; and Collonell of a Regiment of Foot &c.^a.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

(Book 1)

The First Part: OF THE INSTITUTION OF PHILOSOPHY. CONCERNING LOGICK. (Book 1)

INTRODUCTION.

CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Constitution of LOGICK.

I. What we are to un∣derstand by the word LOGICK. FOrasmuch as the Mind of Man is ob∣noxious to many Errors, as well in the searching out of Truth, as in the pur∣suit of that which is Good, in both which it is frequently mistaken; two Arts have been found necessary, where∣of the former might direct the Will in the choice of the True Good, and the latter assist the Under∣standing in the discovery of Truth. The first of these, called ETHICKS, is an help to human Infirmity, directing the Mind of Man in the pro∣secution of Good, and shewing it what it ought to embrace, and what to avoid; the other called LOGICK, is the Rule of Man's Thoughts, which he is to observe in the framing of them, and by means whereof he may communicate his Per∣ceptions and Judgments to others.

II. The Defini∣tion of Logick. For LOGICK is nothing else, but the Art of right Thinking, or of using our Reason aright; where by the word Thinking we do not only understand simple Idea's or Notions, but also Judgments and Discourses: For he who Reasoneth or Judgeth, thinks as well as he, who only attends to simple Notions. So that Logick extends it self to all kind of Thoughts, and gives Rules to all the Actions of the Mind; because Discoursing, Judging and Conceiving, are but so many different Modes of Thinking.

III. Why Lo∣gick is called the Art of right Thinking. It is to be observed, that LOGICK is not simply said to be the Art of Thinking, because Thinking is Natural to us, and the spontaneous products of our Mind; but the Art of Thinking aright. For since Thinking may be performed well or ill, there is need of an Art that may rightly direct the Actions of the Mind, and prescribe Rules for the discerning of Truth from Falshood. For as the Art of Husbandry teaches the convenient or∣dering and disposing of those Plants, which other∣wise grow of themselves and at random: So Logick furnisheth us with Rules to define Things, to sort them under their General Heads, and furnish them with their Adjuncts.

IV. How Lo∣gick assists the Mind. Wherefore LOGICK may be said to be the Art of Knowing each Knowable that can be the Object of Human Understanding: Not that it in∣forms the Mind of the Things themselves, for that is the Duty of Natural Philosophy; but because it discovers the Ways of right knowing in general, and delivers those Rules by which the Mind of Man may be directed, whilst it endeavours to know any thing, so as not to wander from the Path of right Reason.

V. Four things required to the use of right Rea∣son. Now, that a Man may use right Reason, and be able to frame his Thoughts aright, and interpret them to others; it is necessary for him to Perceive aright, Judge aright, Reason aright, and Order aright.

VI. First, to Perceive. We are said to perceive a thing, when we clearly and distinctly conceive the Object offer'd to us: As when we represent to our Thoughts God, an Angel, a Circle, a Triangle, and stop there, without forming any Judgment concerning them. And the Form, by the immediate perception where∣of we are conscious of our knowing any Object, is called an Idea.

VII. What we are to un∣derstand by the word Idea, or Species. For by the word Idea we are not to understand any Representations imprest upon our Senses; but those Images of Things, which the Mind frames by Thinking. For the easier apprehension whereof we are to observe, that in the Idea or Notion of a

Thing two things are to be consider'd: First, That it is a Modus inherent in the Mind, from whence it proceeds: The other, That it shews or represents something. The former of those proceeds from the Mind, as its effective Principle; the latter from the Object, or thing apprehended▪ as from its Ex∣emplary cause. So that when we name the Species of any thing by Thinking, that first view of-our Mind, by which it represents and conceives the Thing as present, is called Perception, or in other words, The first operation of the Mind, or Simple Apprehension. So that this Perception is said to be Simple, not with reference to the Object, which often is complex (as when the Sun is considered as a Light or Lucid Body;) but with respect to the Modus, under which the Thing is conceived.

VIII. The Second, to Judge. We are said to Judge, when we affirm or deny any thing of the said known Objects; or when we by the Action of our Mind joyning two Idea's, assert the one to be the other; or deny the one of the other. As when considering the Idea of the Sun and that of Fire, we affirm the Sun to be Fire, or deny the Sun to be Fire.

This way of Thinking is different from the fore∣going, forasmuch as this is not the Simple apprehen∣sion of a thing; but a Compound, viz. an Affir∣mation or Negation, and is commonly called a Proposition, because the Mind thereby propounds its Sentiment of Things. It is also called Judg∣ment; forasmuch as by this Mode of Perceiving, we do not barely apprehend a thing, but also judge or determine what it is, or is not.

IX. The Third, to Dis∣course. To Reason or Discourse is that Action of our Mind, which frames a Judgment of many others, or which from two Propositions, or from one, infers another: As for Example, After it hath judged that a Body is a Substance extended in Length, Breadth and Depth, and that Heaven is a Body; infers the Heaven to consist of three Dimen∣sions.

So likewise observing that the Idea of a Man agrees with that of an Animal, but doth not agree with the Idea of a Plant, concludes, That therefore neither can the Idea of a Man, suit with that of a Plant. Wherefore finding that Man is an Ani∣mal, and that an Animal is not a Plant, it infers this Third Proposition, that therefore Man is not a Plant. This way of Thinking is call'd Discourse, because by running from one Proposition to another, it comes to a Third.

X. The Fourth, to Order. To Order is an Action of the Mind, whereby many things found in the same Subject, are disposed in a fit and congruous manner: As when the Mind, after it has fram'd several Idea's, Judgments and Argumentations, digests them in the most conve∣nient and fit manner, for the ready and distinct conceiving of them.

XI. Of what use the ob∣serving of these Rules is. So that he that would proceed according to Order, must begin with those things that are more known, passing on to such as are less; and in the same manner proceed all along from one thing to another, so as that which goes before may always afford light to what follows.

If any one saith, That all these things may be done by the conduct of Nature only, since Expe∣rience shews, that such Persons sometimes perform them more exactly, who are wholly ignorant of the Rules of Logick, than they who have studied them: We freely grant as much, nor do we pre∣tend this Art to consist, in prescribing the Modus how those Operations are to be done, since Nature alone is sufficient to make us Perceive, Judge, Dis∣course and Methodize, without any foreign as∣sistance. Yet is not Logick therefore to be judged useless, because it helps us to examine our Actions, and observe those Things which we do by Natural instinct.

XII. The Three∣fold use of Logick. As, First, that we may be assur'd that we use our Reason aright. Secondly, That we may with more ease discover the Mistakes, or supply the Defects, that may intervene in our Mental Ope∣rations. For it oft happens, that by the sole Light of Nature we are aware of some Falshood, and yet are ignorant where that Falshood lurks. As we find that Men ignorant of the Art of Lim∣ning, are often offended with a Fault they see in a Picture; tho' they cannot make out what properly the Defect is wherewith they are displeased. Thirdly, That the Nature of our Mind may be the more distinctly known by us, whilst we observe and give good heed to those Actions that are proper to it, and which vastly raise it above all Bodily things. Wherefore seeing that the Mind suffers it self sometimes to be impos'd upon by false Repre∣sentations, it has been found necessary to prescribe some Rules by which it might be assisted in its Operations, in order to a more certain reaching of Truth. And accordingly the whole aim of Logick is to inform us, how we ought to make use of our Reason, and what Evidence we ought to have, be∣fore we give our Assent or Dissent to things, which by Idea's are presented to our Understand∣ing.

XIII. Logick di∣vided into Four Parts. Whence follows, that LOGICK is to be divided into Four Parts, according to the divers Reflections we have of these Four Operations of our Mind. The First, concerning Idea's, or the simple Perception of Things: The Second, of Judgment, or of Propositions, wherein is Truth or Falshood: The Third, of Discourse or Syllogism: The Fourth, of Method, or the Orderly digesting of our Thoughts, by which, as by so many Steps, we arrive to the Modus or Way of Knowing. Forasmuch as by the first we are led from Incon∣siderateness to Attention; by the second delivered from Doubts and Errors; by the third we are accustomed to Reasoning; and by the last, we infallibly prove some Truth, or demonstratively persuade the same to others.

CHAP. II. Of the true Ʋse of LOGICK, shewing that Logick is useful and necessary to the Con∣duct of a Rational Life.

I. The Opinion of the An∣cients, con∣cerning Logick. LOGICK was always in so great esteem amongst the Ancients, that some of them admir'd it as a thing inspir'd from Heaven, and look'd upon them as rais'd above the Condition of Men, who understood the Rules of it, and were dextrous in the practice of them. Wherefore Ci∣cero tells us, that the Contemplation and Knowledge of Nature is, as it were, by a Wall or Rampart secured and defended by the way of Reasoning, by the Judgment of what is True or False; and by a kind of Art of knowing what is agreeable and comporting with every thing, and what is contrary to them. And for this Reason the Philosophers of

Old have bestowed several Names upon it, and mea∣suring the dignity of it by its Necessity; have called it, the Medicine of the Soul, the Organ or Instru∣ment of Sciences, and the Eye of the Mind.

II. The Logick taught in the Schools hath its use. True it is, that LOGICK seems to have de∣clined from its primitive Majesty, since it now chiefly considers Forms, and is in a manner wholly taken up with the Resolving of unprofitable Que∣stions: Yet neither is it wholly to be undervalued upon that account, since those Questions exercise the Wit of Men, and are not a little conducive to the examining of the Difficulties we meet with in other Sciences. As Geometricians, by exercising them∣selves in the crabbed Questions of Algebra, which are altogether Abstracted, and of no use for the Con∣duct of Life, are nevertheless thereby disposed for the understanding of other difficult Problems, that are of great use in the Life of Man. In a word, which way soever we consider Logick, we shall find it to be of use, and in that regard not inferiour to other Arts or Sciences.

III. As Physick cures the Body, so Logick does the Mind. This will be evident, if we consider Man in him∣self, and the Diseases he is subject to. For a Man consists of Body and Soul, which both of them have their Infirmities and defects. So that as Physick takes care of the Body, by removing Sicknesses that afflict it; so there is need of Science, that may assist the Mind, by dispelling of its Darkness. Wherefore Logick takes care for the Souls health, and conse∣quently is as necessary to the Intellectual Life, as Physick is to the Body: Nay, and is by so much the more excellent and necessary, by how much the Nobleness of the Soul exceeds that of the Body, and by how much its Diseases are more hidden and more difficult to be cured.

IV. Why Phy∣sicians are more e∣steemed than Lo∣gicians. Neither is there any great reason of Wonder, why Physicians are so much respected every where, and favour'd with Honour and Riches; whereas Logi∣cians are commonly very despicable: For the reason of this is, because the Diseases of the Body do affect the Soul; whereas the Disorders of the Mind do only afflict it self, and communicate little or nothing of their Smart to the Body; whence it happens, that in a manner all Mankind choose to lead an A∣nimal Life, and but very few do follow a Spiritual or Mental Life. To which may be added, that the greatest part of Men are little concerned about the Vices of the Soul, and being only intent on the Care of their Bodies, think themselves most happy as long as they are in health; and all this, because they are drowned in the flesh, and wholly addicted to sense.

V. That Na∣ture alone is not suffi∣cient to direct the Operations of the Mind. It is Notorious, that we brought no Science into the World with us, but that the same is acquir'd by Industry, or received from Masters: But seeing there are few that are able to Teach us, and that they who undertake it are frequently deceived themselves; we must find out a Method, whereby we our selves may correct our Errors, and endea∣vour to mend our Faults.

VI. The force of Human Reason. If you say, that our Reason is sufficient for this, whose property it is to know the Natures of Things, and to discern Truth from Falshood. I answer, That indeed NATURAL LOGICK, or the very force and strength of Reason, which we have by Nature, doth not a little conduce to the attaining of Truth: For it consults those Rules Nature her self has prescribed, and being informed thereby, examins its Operations and Discourses by them▪ For to speak truth, we naturally follow almost all those Rules, which after long study and great pains taking, Logicians have delivered to us; so that Na∣ture it self seems to have taught us the Art of Rea∣soning; but yet we find, that she is not sufficient to furnish us with all necessary Knowledge, except she be assisted by Precepts, and perfected by Art. Who can deny, but that the Faculty of Painting is born with Man; and yet Art is necessary for the right forming of Images. All Men are endued by Na∣ture, with a power of Speaking and framing of Words, which yet will never be reduced to Art without Use and Exercise; since it is clear beyond doubt, that should an Infant from his Birth be left alone, it would continue Dumb all its Life, unless it were taught to Form Words and give them their due Sound.

VII. The Neces∣sity of Lo∣gick, pro∣ved by Galen. Thus Galen proves the Necessity of Logick a∣gainst Erasistratus by this Argument; Either every thing follows from every thing, or not: If you assert the former, then it will follow, that because a Crow is black, and a Swan white, Erasistratus is a Fool and mad; if the latter, then you must grant there is need of Art, that may inform us what follows and what not. For we cannot make out that a Consequence is right, or a Demonstration good, without the assistance of Logick.

VIII. Natural and Arti∣ficial Lo∣gick. LOGICK therefore is to be distinguish'd into Natural and Artificial. Natural Logick is that force of the Mind, by which it rangeth its Thoughts and reduceth them to order, or else Discourseth sponta∣neously without observing any order. Artificial Logick is that which is acquired by Use and Pra∣ctice, and at first took its rise, and increase afterwards from various Observations taken from the Actions of the Mind.

IX. The Use of Artificial Logick. Wherefore tho' we bring Natural Reason along with us into the World, yet is not that sufficient to direct the Actions of our Minds: For we find that notwithstanding the Use of Reason we fall into ma∣ny Errors, and labour under the Prejudices of In∣fancy; and therefore must conclude, that Artificial Logick is not only useful, but necessary to cure the Diseases of the Soul, and to direct and guide its Operations: Where, by the Souls Diseases, I do not mean Sins and Moral delinquencies, the Cure whereof is endeavoured by Divines and Moralists; but the Weakness of our Mind in the Perceiving of Things; viz. all manner of Errors, Confusions and Obscurities of our Conceptions; False and un∣certain Judgments, and undue Consequences in our Reasonings, the discerning and removing whereof is the whole business of Logick.

X. Doctrinal and Pra∣ctical Lo∣gick. There is another common Division of LOGICK into Doctrinal and Practical. Doctrinal Logick is that which delivers the several Rules, directing us in Perceiving, Judging and Reasoning. Practical, is that which applies those Rules to Use and Pra∣ctice: For which reason the Ancients called the former Abstracted or Separate from Things; but this latter, Concrete or joyned to the Things them∣selves we are discoursing of.

The First Part. Of the Clear and Distinct Per∣ception of the Mind.

SEing it is evident from the foregoing Dis∣course, that there are Four Parts of LO∣GICK, correspondent to as many distinct Operations of the Soul, about every knowable Ob∣ject: We will here begin with the First Part of it, which directs the simple Perceptions and Appre∣hensions of our Mind. And to perform this the more effectually, we will endeavour to take out of the way the several Hindrances of Science.

CHAP. I. What the Hindrances of Science are, and how to be removed.

I. The chief Causes of our Mi∣stakes. THere are Two things by which we are easily led aside into the By-way of Error and Fals∣hood, viz. Prejudice, which makes us take up any thing for Truth, before sound Reason hath con∣vinced us of it; and Slavishness, by which we are so addicted to the Opinions of others, that we think it a Crime to differ from them.

II. We are very sub∣ject to be seduc'd by the Preju∣dices of Infancy. Wherefore it is no wonder that we find so few Men truly Wise, and who know the Causes of Things aright, seeing they scarce consider any Thing well and duly throughout their whole Life, and do not so much give their assent to Right Reason, as to their Prejudices and the Testimony of their Senses. For the force of Prejudices is so prevalent with some, that they cannot admit any thing for Truth, which is not grounded on those false Opinions they have suck'd in from their Cra∣dles. Wherefore it will be worth our while to shew, how vain the Things are we then know, and that we ought to distrust and suspect whatsoever proceeds from such weak Causes. For what did ever any Infants perceive, which they did not wholly refer to their Bo∣dies, and which they did not desire or dread, accord∣ing as they fancied them hurtful or grateful to the same? Thus we see they are pleased with the Light and Shining things, because Refulgency with its Beau∣ty pleaseth their Eyes; whereas they dread a Rod, because with it they are chastis'd and put to pain. Wherefore Children judge of things, as they appear to their Senses; As that the Earth is far bigger than the Sun, and the rest of the Heavenly Bodies; because the Earth is nearer to them, the other be∣ing at a great distance from them. Thus likewise they think, that there is more Matter in Lead and other Metals, than there is in Fire or Air; because they find more Weight and Hardness in the one than the other. And again, because they perceive no more Brightness from the fix'd Stars than from the small Light of a Candle, they are apt to think that the Stars do not exceed the bigness of a Can∣dle, and therefore fancy them as so many bright and shining Studs fix'd in the Firmament of Hea∣ven; whereas there is no Natural Philosopher but knows, that the fix'd Stars are equal to the Sun both in Bigness and Brightness.

III. The Preju∣dices of Childhood hinder us after we are come to the use of Reason. Now these Errors are not only to be found in Infancy, but in process of Time they get strength, and become so rooted into Mens Minds, that they accompany them the whole course of their Lives. Hence it is that we meet with some that have the Gravity of Old Age, but at the same time are subject to the Weakness of Children. Which Mistakes arise from hence, because they suppose that the Opinions they have taken in during their Childhood and Youth, are inborn Notions, and common to all Mankind. Whereas they ought to consider, that they have admitted many things for Truth, without any sufficient Examination, and that therefore they ought rather to think them to be false than true. But the case is the same with them, as with those that have Sore-Eyes, who delight in Darkness and are offended with the Light; for they hug their Errors, and are loath to part with them.

IV. Some only give cre∣dit to the report of their Senses. Some of the Philosophers of Old were not free from this Weakness, who asserted the Sun not to be above two Foot over, because they had never seen it greater. And it was to no purpose to persuade them by Astronomical Arguments, that it was not only far greater than so, but many times bigger than the Earth; because their preconceived Opi∣nion was so rooted in them, that they could no otherwise apprehend it. Thus likewise when they were Children, and thought of nothing but what was Bodily, they thought nothing could be Cor∣poreal, but what must be Sensible also, from which Prejudice they concluded afterwards, that there could be no Insensible parts. If one argues against this, that such Parts must of necessity be admitted to avoid a Vacuum in Nature, and for the Explica∣tion of many Natural Appearances; they have no∣thing else to answer, but that they cannot see them, and that they are not certain of any thing, except it fall under their Senses. From the same Prejudice it is, that they conceive all Immaterial things after the manner of things Sensible, and apprehend the Mind of Man, not as a Thinking Being, void of all Matter, but like a Wind or Fire infus'd into the Grosser parts of the Body, to which tho' they at∣tribute the Name of Spirit, yet conceive of it under a Bodily likeness. Wherefore also they gree∣dily embrace that Maxim of Aristotle, That there is nothing in the Understanding, which was not first in the Senses.

V. And there∣fore assert, that God cannot be known but by sensible things. If we go further and tell these Men, That God doth not fall under any of our Senses, and there∣fore cannot be conceiv'd of under any sensible Form; yet by reason of their Inveterate Custom of false Judging, they rather chuse to frame several Distinctions, than to forsake their beloved Maxim, tho' only supported by Childish Prejudices; saying, That God is made manifest unto us by his Effects, or by some Signs, as by his Creatures and Words that signifie his Nature unto us. Which Prejudices do re∣ally divert the Mind from the knowledge of Things, and hinder it from ever attaining the true way of Philosophizing. For how can we think ever to attain it, if we always Judge after the manner of Chil∣dren, and only believe those Things to be true, which through the Senses are conveigh'd to us? How can we ever think to make a right use of our Reason, if we only take those things to be good which are of Profit to us? If we think the Air, Cold and Heat to be nothing, when they do not sensibly affect us? Or, if we judge the World to end where our Sight is bounded, and innume∣rable other Things, which the Love of Antiquity, or the Authority of some Men have induced us to maintain.

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Booke 1. Part 1 Chap 2 Rule ••.

G. Freman Inv.

I. Kip Sculp

To the Worship∣full John Emmerton of the Middle Temple London Esq.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome▪

[illustration]

[illustration]

Book. 1. Part 1. Chap▪ •• in the Introduction▪

G. Freman Inv.

I. Kip Sculp.

To the Right Honourable William Legge Baron of Dartmouth &c.^w. son of the Right Honourable George Lord Dartmouth, Master Generall of the Ordnance, Master of the Horse, Admirall of his Majestys fleet of ships, and one of the Lords of his Majestys most Honourable Privy Councell &c.^w.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome

VI. Education and Cu∣stom lead us into Error. Now all these Prejudices are much increased, by those Words which are in common use, and which the illiterate Multitude hath imposed; as having more reference to the Use of the Body, than to the Contemplation of Things. Moreover Education, Custom, and Converse with other Men, the Autho∣rity of those we reverence, the Consent of Man∣kind, and many other such like, hinder us from scanning of Things purely and sincerely, and lead us into many Errors. What hath once been prov'd to us, or believed by us, we scarcely ever reject, insomuch that the Vices and Affections of our Will, do communicate their contagion to our Mind and Understanding.

VII. Hard and difficult things are apt to please us more than things easie and obvious. Sometimes it happens on the contrary, that those Things which are clear and perspicuous of them∣selves, are suspected by us; because Things obscure and liable to dispute do more affect us. Thus we are apt to contemn Experiments, as being too despicable, and our Mind desirous to take a higher flight, and hating to be confin'd to the narrow bounds of an Experiment, chooseth rather to please it self with some General Notions, which for the most part are of no use at all; and so prefer swelling Words of Vanity, which fill the Fancy, before things real and solid. Hence it is, that the High-flown Expressions of the Platonists and Chy∣mists do allure so many. Besides, we are apt to suffer our selves to be deceived by the respect we have for Antiquity as well as by our affectation of Novelty, as if a thing were therefore true, because it is either New or Old, as if True things had not always been so, as if in this old Age of the World we might not expect the discovery of many Things heretofore unknown, or as if we might not look for a riper Judgment, and more knowledge from Old Men, that daily Experience many things, than from others.

VIII. We must first exa∣min our Opinions, before we lend an assent to them. We are therefore to examine our Opinions by the Standard of Reason, before we give our assent to them; and must judge those things to be True, not which the Authority of the Ancients, or the Judgment of most Men doth approve, but which are evidenc'd to be so by the strength of Reason. For the obtaining of which the following Rules will be helpful to us, if we seriously mind them, and judge of Things propos'd to us, according to their direction.

CHAP. II. Some Rules for the Attainment of Truth.

The First Rule. We are to admit of nothing that involves any thing of Doubtfulness.

I. Doubts hin∣der us from the attain∣ing of Truth. THe Light of Nature assures us, that Doubting is an obstacle to Science; and that we can never attain it, as long as the thing we apprehend is not clearly and distinctly represented to our Mind. Wherefore we shall do well to esteem all Doubtful Matters, as if they were false, and despise them as hurtful Images, that are apt to lead us into Error. For seeing that all Things that are built on any Principle, derive all their Certainty from the same; if that Principle be weak and tottering, the superstructure must partake of the same Conditions.

II. Yet must not this be too scrupu∣lously ob∣serv'd in matters of daily busi∣ness. But tho' this Rule be of use for the clear knowing of Things, yet must we not extend the same to Human Prudence, or the use of Common Life. For it often happens, that we are forced to embrace what is least suspected; and to esteem that as Good, which doth least hurt another. Thus the Laws wink at the Toleration of Whores, to prevent the greater Evils of Rapes and Adultery. Thus in Human Actions we are forc'd to choose that which seems probable, and to leave that which is more true. But in the Search of Truth, what∣soever hath the least Doubt in it, is to be rejected, and is no more to be regarded than if it were a thing feigned at pleasure. For whatsoever doth not con∣duce to the attaining of Truth, must be look'd upon as a straying from it.

III. The reje∣jecting of things Doubtful, is a help to the at∣tainment of Science. Wherefore he that would Philosophize in good earnest, must rid himself of all the Prejudices of his Infancy, forasmuch as they have crept into our Minds, without any foregoing Examination of Reason; and therefore are to be consider'd by us, as false, rather than doubtful. Hence it is that our Philosopher saith, I have now for some years con∣sider'd how many false things from my first Child∣hood, I have taken up for True; and how uncer∣tain and doubtful all those things are I have built upon them; and therefore that it were best once in my life to overthrow them all; and to begin again from the first Foundations, if ever I would desire to establish any thing in Sciences that might be firm and lasting.

IV. There is no danger in this Doubt∣ing of things. Neither need we to fear, lest by taking all things for false, we should be in danger of being de∣ceived; because this Doubting is only indulg'd for to attain to greater certainty, and that we may the more evidently distinguish Falshood from Truth. For whatsoever includes the least Doubt, destroys Science, as hath been said, and leads to Error as well as Falshood it self. Is it not lawful for the Philosophers to suppose many Things, that by this means they may find out what is most certain and easiest to be known? Thus the Astronomers ima∣gin an Aequator, a Zodiack, and other Circles in the Heavens, that by the help thereof they may the more accurately describe the Sun's Course. Geo∣metricians also make use of the like Suppositions, when with new Points they measure Lines, and to the Figures given add other Lines. Wherefore it will be of advantage to those who search after Truth, to reject all things that occur to them, and to give their assent to those things only, which they understand to be Certain and Evident.

V. The way of Doubt∣ing appro∣ved by Aristotle. This way of Proceeding in the attainment of Sciences is not peculiar to Descartes, for Aristotle himself hath followed the same, as may be seen in the First Chapter of his Third Book of Metaphy∣sicks, which bears this Title; Of the Usefulness of Doubting, and what things we ought first to doubt of: Where he speaks thus; In order to our attain∣ing the Science we desire, it is in the first place needful to take a view of those things we are first to doubt of; now such are all those things about which Men are divided in their Opinions, with other things besides. It being an Industry well worthy the pains of those who desire Know∣ledge, to Doubt aright. Wherefore we need not think strange, that our Philosopher begins his Phi∣losophy with Dubitation, and requires us to reject all those Opinions wherein we meet with the least cause of Doubting, that by this means we may at last find out a true and unshaken Principle.

The Second Rule of Truth. We are not to rely too much on our Senses.

I. The Senses are subject to mistake on several accounts: As, Forasmuch as our Senses are deceivable, and we are frequently imposed on by them▪ Common Rea∣son will tell us, that we must not overmuch trust to them, but rather suspect whatsoever they offer to us; for it is a sign of Rashness and Imprudence, to trust them that have once deceived us. Now how apt our Senses are to deceive us, daily Experi∣ence teacheth. For it happens often, and for divers Reasons, that things appear otherwise to our Senses than they are indeed.

First, By reason of their Distance, as when the Object is so far from us, that all the Reflex Rays proceeding from it, cannot whole and entire reach us: As for Example, The Sun, and a Square Tower at a distance seem less, and otherwise figured than indeed they are.

Secondly, By reason of the Medium, as when the Rays are variously refracted in the same: Thus a Stick and other Bodies seen through the Water, appear Crooked.

Thirdly, By reason of the Surface, which as it appears to the Senses, doth not represent the Essen∣tial position of the Parts of the Body whose Surface it is: Thus the outside or superficies of a Bean, which falls under our Senses, represents a Figure very unlike that of a Plant; whereas the Micro∣scope discovers to us, That it hath the same Essential disposition of Parts with the whole Plant, whose Seed it is. So likewise the Spawn of Frogs appears to our Eye, to be an Unorganical Mass; whereas the said Magnifying Glasses assure us, that they are distinguish'd into several Members. And the same may be proved by many more Instances. Neither is it to be doubted, but that there be many Bodies; the Essential Constitution of whose Parts were ne∣ver yet discovered to us by any of our Senses, which if they were, we should judge otherwise of them, than the Vulgar do.

Fourthly, By reason of the Impression made upon our Senses, when the Vibration (caus'd by the Ob∣ject) doth for some time continue; As when the Sun appears to our Eye after it is shut; or as when a Torch is with great swiftness turn'd round, whereby a fiery Circle is represented to the Eye, tho' the Torch be not in all the Points of the Circle.

Or when the Impression proceeds from some∣thing else besides the Objects; as in Dreams and strong Imaginations, &c. or when an Angel (by moving the Organ of Sight) doth represent himself to us.

II. This Rule is not to be extended to the Actions of Life. Which deception doth not only frequently hap∣pen to our External Senses, but even our Internal Sense is not free from it. Thus we see, that those who are troubled with the Vertigo, think that all the Bodies about them turn round, and suppose the Air to be darkned: Thus likewise Drunken Men see all things double. Now when it is said, that we are not to trust the Testimony of our Senses, but are to look upon them as if they were false; we are to observe that this Rule must not be transferr'd by us to the Actions of Life. For it is contrary to Rea∣son, not to trust our Senses in the conduct of our Lives: For by this means we shall make our selves guilty of the Folly of those Scepticks, who out of a foolish distrust of their Senses were ready to ex∣pose themselves to eminent danger of their Lives, but that their Friends hindred them. Tho' indeed, when the Question is about the bare knowledge of Things, then it is on the other hand every whit as Irrational, not to reject whatsoever is in the least doubtful, because things that are so, are as opposite to the attaining of Science, as those which are alto∣gether false or unknown.

III. Our Senses having once decei∣ved us, are to be look'd upon as always li∣able to de∣ceive us. And tho' our Senses sometimes may represent to us Things as they are, yet must not this hinder us from suspecting their Evidence: For having once deceiv'd us, they may always deceive us; or how can we rely upon them, which have once led us into Error? And therefore Plato in his Phaedrus tells us, That Men who are desirous of Science, know, that Philosophy having once undertaken the Care of their Mind, does by little and little inform it, and loose it of its Bands; representing to it, how deceiving the Judgment of the Eyes, Ears, and other Senses are, persuading it to leave them, as far as absolute Necessity does not oblige us to close with them, and to recall it self, and to recollect within it self, without giving credit to any thing besides it self.

IV. Our Senses are of no use, for the discerning of the Ob∣jects of Sciences. For our Senses are not given us by Nature for the searching out of Truth, or to contemplate the Principles of Things: Because if we take an exact view of the Objects of Sciences, we shall find that most of those things that occur to our Mind, are not represented by any Bodily Figure: As for Ex∣ample, All the Objects of Metaphysicks and Natu∣ral Divinity, which admit nothing of any Corporeal Form. For we have in our Mind an Idea of God himself, whose Authority we believe, and whose Dominion over all we firmly are persuaded of. For how could we demonstrate so many things con∣cerning God, if his Idea were not inherent in us? But do any of our Senses hand this Knowledge of God to us? What Phantasm manifests to us the General Notions of Entity, Unity, Truth and Goodness? What Species represents to us the Idea of Angels, or our own Soul, since there is nothing like them in the whole Universe of Material Be∣ings, and with which they have not any thing in common, save only the Name of Substance? Wherefore it is very absurd to go about to derive all Knowledge and Idea's from the Senses. And if from these we pass to Physical or Natural Be∣ings, we shall find that not only the Beginning of them are hid from our Senses; but that not so much as their Figures are represented to us, such as they are indeed, but very different from what our Souls upon enquiry find them to be. Do not we reach the Nature even of those thing that most strongly affect our Senses, as Light, Heat and Cold, far bet∣ter by our Understanding than by Sense? And are not many times the most sensible Objects the least perceptible to our Intellectual Sight?

V. To what end our Senses are given us. The Senses therefore are bestowed upon us by Nature to discover to us, who consist of Soul and Body, what things are good or hurtful for us; and we pervert the order of Nature when we put them to another use, and apply them to the knowledge of Truth, which are only design'd for the Preser∣vation of the Compound. Wherefore also this may be reckon'd amongst the chief Causes of Error, wherewith we are possest from our Childhood, that we are apt to judge of things, not as they are in themselves, but only as they gratifie or offend the Body.

VI. Objection, That the Senses in∣form us of many things. If any one object, That we attain to the know∣ledge of many Things by our Senses; that by our Feeling we perceive Bodies, as Stones, Wood and other things that come within the reach of our Hands; by our Sight, things at a distance, as the Sun, Moon, Stars, Heaven, &c. and that without them we could never have any knowledge of these Objects.

VII. The Senses do only accidental∣ly discover things to us. To this I answer, that I do not wholly reject the Service of the Senses; but only assert, that they are insufficient and inadequate for the knowledge of Truth. For tho' the Senses may inform us that Bodies exist; yet cannot they discover to us what those Bodies are, or what their Nature and Essence is; because this is not necessary for the Conserva∣tion of the Compound. And if ever they inform us what they are in themselves, this is only some∣times and by accident. For seeing that our Senses cannot perceive Corporeal things but through the intervening Medium, it is evident, that according as that is variously disposed, so their Judgment con∣cerning them must vary accordingly. Thus we see that for this Reason the Stars appear to us of various Colours, sometimes more red, and sometimes paler, according as the Air that comes between our Sight and them is clearer or thicker. And therefore, as Lucretius saith, Lib. 4. we have great reason to suspect, that the Inferences we fetch from our fal∣lible Senses, must be false and deceivable.

VIII. How our Senses are said to be deceitful. But when we say, that our Senses are deceitful or subject to Mistake; we must not so understand this, as if there were an Error in the Motion it self, or in the affecting of the Corporeal Organ, because that is done by a kind of Natural Necessity; but because the Mind of Man, by reason of its inti∣mate Union with the Body, doth from that Affection or Motion take occasion, to apprehend or judge of the thing amiss. And forasmuch as this precipi∣tancy and inconsiderateness in Judging is commonly attributed to the Senses, and not to the Mind, the Senses are said to deceive us, because our Judg∣ments follow those Perceptions that are attributed to our Senses.

The Third Rule of Truth. Whatsoever we Perceive, we perceive with our Minds.

I. Our Under∣standing is the searcher out of Truth. Forasmuch as Divine Revelation, or Human Tradition, have no admittance in Philosophy, and that according to the fore-going Rule, we are to suspect whatsoever comes from the Senses; it re∣mains that the Understanding alone must be the sole searcher out of Truth, whose property it is to investigate the Natures of Things, and so judge of them according to the Attributes that are found in them.

II. Not only common or general Natures, but parti∣lar also, are known by the Un∣derstand∣ing. Neither is this only to be understood concerning Essences, or Abstract Natures, as the Metaphysicians call them; but of every particular Object that strikes our Senses. For it is the Mind alone which sees, hears and feels through the Organs. For Gold, by Example, that is newly dug out of the Mine, doth at first sight look like Earth, and before Coa∣gulation is more like Sand, than a Metal: But after it is once cast into the Furnace, it loseth the form of Earth, its parts run together and shine like a Star; and what before lookt so much like Dirt, now delights and pleaseth all Men. So that my Senses at first perceived nothing of the Nature of Gold; for whatsoever my Sight or Touch before discovered of it, is quite changed, the substance of Gold still remaining.

III. 'Tis by the Mind alone we know Objects. Wherefore, it is the Mind alone that knows the Nature of Gold, neither can we discern what it is, but by our Faculty of Judgment. We make no scruple to say, we see a Man, when we see one walking in the Market, tho' indeed we see nothing but his Cloaths, under which possibly a meer Ma∣chin might be conceal'd. It is plain therefore, that we do not make this Judgment by our outward Eyes, but by our Faculty of Judging, which is Internal.

IV. It is by our Under∣standing alone we know that there are Pores in our Body. To explain this by another Example; Our Skin appears to us to be a continuous Body, without any Holes in it that our Eyes can perceive; but yet our Mind, by the Transpiring Sweat, concludes there must be Pores in it, by this way of Reasoning: The Moisture that is sent forth through my Skin, is a Body; now a Body cannot pass from one place to another without passing through a Medium; where∣fore it must follow that my Skin is like a Sieve or Strainer; that is, of such a Texture, as to be full of little Holes, through which the Moisture may pass.

V. Many things cannot be discovered to us by our Senses. This Rule is so certain, that whosoever denies it will never be able to attain any thing distinctly or by Reflex knowledge, which is necessary to Science. And though some relying upon Aristotle, suppose all our Idea's to arise from our Senses, and that there is nothing in our Understanding, which was not first entertain'd in our Senses; yet it is evident, that this Opinion, tho' common, is directly opposite to Divinity and true Philosophy. For first, there is nothing we perceive so distinctly as our Thoughts, neither is there any Proposition that shews it self to our Mind with fuller Evidence than this, I think therefore I am; and yet neither of these Idea's of Cogitation, or Being, were ever discover'd to us by any Sense: Not by our Sight or Hearing, as being without Colour or Sound; nor by any other of the Senses, because they have no Sensible qua∣lities, or if they think they have, let them declare them. But if they cannot satisfie us herein, what remains but for them to own our Assertion, That the Notions of Thinking and Being do not depend on the Senses, but that our Mind forms them by its own proper virtue or efficacy; tho' we do not deny but the Mind may be sometime excited to the forming of them by outward things that affect our Senses.

VI. GOD can∣not be re∣presented by any out∣ward Ap∣pearance. Who can believe that the Idea of GOD, which is in us, doth proceed from our Senses? Or shall we think so, because some Ignorant persons conceive him under the form of a Venerable Old Man, as Gassendus tells us. But this is to confound and de∣prave Idea's, when we go about to imagin Spiritual things under a Bodily form: And he is in as great a Mistake, who would imagin Immaterial Substances as he is, who would hear Colours and see Sounds. It is apparently false therefore, that the Notions which we have of Spiritual things do proceed from the Senses; nay, what is more, it is certain that no Representations of Material things come to our Mind, save only occasionally; that is, forasmuch as the Motions made in our Brains (for nothing but Motions can affect our Senses) do give the Soul occa∣sion of forming several Notions, which without them it would not do. Which Notions are also

wholly distinct from those Motions and Represen∣tations, which are in the Brain or Senses. For they who are Blind and Deaf, tho' they receive no Species or Sounds from the Objects, yet are not without the Idea's of Cogitations, especially when they reflect upon the things they are thinking of.

VII. How the Idea of Im∣material things are said to be inbern in us. Wherefore seeing we can perceive nothing by our Sense or Imagination but what is Material, it follows that the Idea's of all other things that are not Material, are inborn with us; for by what other means could they be convey'd to our Minds? Yet when I assert that these Notions were put into the Mind in its first beginning, I would not be so understood, as if they did actually exist there, and were continually obvious to our Thoughts; but only that God hath vouchsafed a Faculty to our Mind, of exciting and producing such Notions; as shall be more largely treated in the Ninth Part, con∣cerning the Mind of Man.

The Fourth Rule of Truth. That is True which we know clearly and distinctly.

I. Cogitation is the Rule of Truth. Wherefore there can be no more certain Rule of Truth than our Cogitation, so that the same be but distinct and clear, and without the least Doubtful∣ness; because it is impossible for us to mistake, as long as the Judgments we frame of any thing do correspond to our Perceptions. It being an un∣doubted Axiom with us, That our Knowing of a thing is a sure Argument of its Essence. Not as if because we perceive the Essence of any thing, that from thence we should presently conclude that it exists: But because it is impossible that any thing which is clearly known by us, should not be such as it is known by us; that is, the thing must exist, if its Existence be perceived by us, or must be of this or the other Nature, if its Nature be repre∣sented to our Mind.

II. From this Principle the Exi∣stence of GOD is proved. From this Principle Descartes evidently demon∣strates the Existence of GOD. For if upon the account only (saith he) that I have such an Idea in my Mind, it doth follow that whatsoever I perceive clearly and distinctly to belong to it, doth really do so; may I not from hence fetch an Argu∣ment for the Existence of God? Yes surely: For the Idea of GOD, represents a Being absolutely Perfect: Now it is every whit as repugnant to a Being absolutely Perfect, to want any Perfection, as for Example, Existence, as it is for a Triangle not to have three Angles equal to two right ones.

III. Provided it be clear and di∣stinct. I said in the Beginning, provided our Cogitation be clear and distinct; because no Certainty can be expected from a thing, whose Knowledge involves the least degree of Obscurity or Confusion. And therefore Plato in his Timaeus tells us, That when we discourse of a firm, stable, and intelligible thing, our Reasons also must be stable, immutable, and insuperable. For seeing that clear and distinct Knowledge is something which we our selves are not the Authors of, it must follow that GOD is the Author of the Connexion there is between clear and distinct Knowledge, and the assent which the Will infallibly yields to it. So that it is absolutely impossible, that what I thus apprehend to be true, should be false: As for Example, When I perceive Two and Four to be Six; that in a Triangle there be three Angles equal to two Right ones; and the like. It is impossible these should be false; not be∣cause they are so conceived by me, but because except they were true, I could never have clearly or distinctly perceiv'd them.

IV. It is im∣possible that what we clearly and distinctly perceive should be false. For if any thing thus apprehended by me could be false, this would destroy all Human Knowledge; neither could any of us be sure of any Truth, no not of the Existence of God, nor of any of those things which are related to us in Holy Writ: Since it might still be objected to us, that those very things may be false which we most clearly and distinctly perceive.

V. Knowledge arising from the Senses is Doubtful. But we cannot attain the same certainty of Know∣ledge in those things which are only perceived by the Senses, forasmuch as they are liable to Mistake: As when a Man, whose Eyes are deprav'd by a suffusion of Gall, takes all things he sees to be Yellow; and perceives the same as clearly, as those who see the true Colour of every thing.

VI. The cer∣tainty of our Percep∣tion de∣pends on the Under∣standing. It remains therefore, that all the Certainty we have, is only of those things which we apprehend with our Understanding. Neither doth it destroy this Rule, that some tell us they have sometimes been deceived even in those things which they thought to be most true, and which they were con••••dent they had clearly perceived. For this happens to them, because they derive the clearness of their Cogitation, not from their Mind, but from their Senses, or from some preconceived Opinion: For we can never doubt of those things which we clearly and distinctly know. As will be evident to those who by frequent Meditation, and earnest Study, have acquir'd a habit of Judging between a clear and dark Conception.

VII. The fore∣said Rule is not to be extended to Believers. We are also to take Notice, that when we assert that to be true which is evidently and distinctly known by us; and therefore that we are not to give our Assent to things that are not so known by us, this is not to be understood of Matters of Faith; forasmuch as they are not accompanied with any such Evidence, neither have we any clear No∣tions of them, as we have of the Subjects of Na∣tural Sciences. For there is a vast difference betwixt the Mysteries of Faith and Natural things, because in these Evidence, but in the former Authority com∣mands our Assent. That a Man may be a Believer, he must believe without Evidence; but to be a Philosopher, he must have a clear and distinct Per∣ception.

VIII. How a man may be cer∣tain that he clearly knows a thing. If any Man demand, How he may be sure of his knowing a thing clearly and distinctly? I answer; If he follow the Order prescribed by right Reason; if he do not precipitate his Judgment, be∣fore he be enlighted with the Truth of Evident Perception. So that the Judgment of our Under∣standing must always go before, as it does when we never assert or deny any thing, except it be of Things we have clearly and distinctly perceived; that is, when our Judgment is exactly conform to our Perception. For it is not a sufficient Argument for us to embrace any Opinion, because there is Truth in it, except the same do appear to us; so as that our Perception may be the Rule and Line of Truth to us.

A Transition, containing the substance of what hereafter follows, concerning the clear and distinct Perception of Things.

IX. The Order or Series of things to be handled in the first Part of Logick. Forasmuch as it hath been made out, that the clear and distinct Perception of the Mind, is the one and only Rule for the attaining of Truth; it remains now that I shew, how the Mind may ar∣rive to the same: Which that I may the more easily accomplish, the following Points are heed∣fully to be minded.

First, What Cogitation it self, or Perception is, and what be the Modes of it.

Secondly, What be the Objects of our Percep∣tions, whether Universal or Singular.

Thirdly, How our Mind may arrive to the knowledge or Perception of Things, with respect had to the Things that are to be known; such as are the Common Attributes, Causes, Effects, Sub∣jects, Adjuncts, &c.

Fourthly, Whence the clearness and distinction of Idea's do depend, as likewise the Agreement and Disagreement of Things.

CHAP. III. Concerning the various Modes of Perception; viz. Pure Intellection, Imagination and Sense.

I. We must never give our Judg∣ment of a thing un∣known. FOrasmuch as Natural Instinct teacheth us never to judge of a Thing unknown; and since nothing is known to us but what our Mind clearly perceives, we will first treat of the Nature of Cogi∣tation, before we examine that of Simple Notions, to the end we may be able to discern what things are confusedly, and what distinctly apprehended by us.

II. What is to be under∣stood by Perception. By COGITATION in General, I under∣stand all those things which we experience in our Selves, and whereof we are Conscious: Which Description comprehends all the operations of our Understanding, Will, Imagination and Senses; for to Understand, to Will, and to Imagine, is nothing else but to represent to our selves the thing whereof we have an Idea. And accordingly from these va∣rious ways of Perceiving, is deduc'd that first Truth, which we meet with in an orderly way of Philoso∣phizing: For because I Think, that is, because I Perceive, Imagine and Feel, it necessarily follows that I exist: And therefore that Proposition, I Think, therefore I am, is of undoubted Truth; since it is impossible that I should Think, and yet be Nothing. And so in like manner when I say, I walk, I write. Not as if Walking or Writing, which are perform'd by the Organs of the outward Senses, did infer my Existence, because I may think I perform them in a Dream; but only because the Conscious∣ness which is in my Mind, of my Walking and Wri∣ting, could not be there without I did exist.

III. Our own Existence is before any other Truth. I have said, that this Proposition, I Think, there∣fore I am, is the first Truth we meet with in our orderly Philosophizing; because the Existence of our own Soul, which we gather from our Cogita∣tion, is more known to us than the Existence of any other Beings. For the Thinking Mind, which is understood by this word, I, doth know it self before it knows any thing else; and the word, am, which imports the first Person, is before the word, is, which is only applied to the Third Person. For who is there who doth not first Think of himself as of a particular Being, before he doth of Man in general? It is natural to our Mind to think of a singular Being, which is proposed to our Sense or Understanding, before we think of a Being taken in general; and therefore this Proposition may well be esteem'd by us as a first Principle, since from this proof of our own Existence, we confirm the Existence of God, of Material things, and in a word, of all Creatures whatso∣ever.

IV. It is im∣possible for the same thing to be, and not to be, is not the first Principle. I am not ignorant, that this is commonly taken to be the first Principle, It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be. But I see not how this Proposition can be of any use to us, in order to the attaining of Knowledge, since it doth not prove the Existence of any thing, and doth seem to suppose that something is, which ought to have been prov'd before. For it presupposeth its Division into Ens and Non Ens, or Being and Not Being; whence that Maxim is derived, Every thing either is, or is not. But our Prin∣ciple, I who think do exist, presupposeth no∣thing at all; and when all other things are liable to be question'd and doubted of, yet it is absolutely impossible, that I who think shonld not be some∣thing; that is, that I should not exist.

V. Three Spe∣cies or kinds of Perception. There be Three Species of Cogitation; Pure Intellection, Imagination and Sense: For by these Three Modes or Ways the Mind of Man perceives or thinks.

VI. Pure Intel∣lect. The Mind is said to Understand purely, when by her self alone, and by turning into her self, she perceives a thing only by attending to the Idea she hath of it; or when she perceives a thing, whereof there is no Footstep in the Brain. And in this manner the Soul apprehends things Spiritual and Universal, Common Notions, the Idea of Perfection, and finally, all her own Thoughts: Or likewise when it understands Material things, Extension with its Affections: For it is with the Ʋnderstand∣ing alone, that a Perfect Circle, a Thousand Cor∣ner'd Figure, &c. can be conceived.

VII. Imagina∣tion. The Mind is said to Imagin, when it applies its Knowing faculty to the Body, as intimately present with it; or when it applies it self not to the Thing it self, which is present to the outward Sense, but to the Phantasm impress'd by it in the Brain: As when it perceives a Figure, a Circle, a Triangle, the Stars, a Machin, &c. And these Perceptions are called Imaginations, because the Mind by representing these Things to her self, doth-form Images in the Brain; and forasmuch as it cannot frame any Ima∣ges of Spiritual things, it follows that neither can they be imagined.

VIII. Sense. Lastly, The Mind of Man, by Sense, only perceives sensible Objects and things that are more obvious, as being present, and affecting the outward Organs. Thus it perceives Steeples, Fields, Animals, &c. and these Perceptions are called Sensations.

'Tis by these Three ways only that the Mind of Man perceives things: For whatsoever is repre∣sented to it is either Spiritual or Material; if Spiritual, it can be apprehended by the Under∣standing only; if Material, then it is present or absent: If absent, the Soul represents it to it self by the Imagination; if present, it perceives it by Impres∣sions made on the Senses. So that there are only Three ways by which the Soul apprehends any

thing, viz. by Pure Intellect, Imagination, or Sense.

IX. The Object of the Un∣derstand∣ing is more common or general, than the Object of Imagina∣tion. Hence it is manifest, that the Object of the Un∣derstanding is of a larger extent, than the Object of Imagination: For by our Understanding we do not only conceive the Nature of Spirits and of a Body in general; but also the Proprieties of parti∣cular Bodies, which cannot be discovered by the Senses, nor by the Imagination neither, being only perceivable by the Intellect. Thus, tho' the Un∣derstanding perceives that the Diagonal Line of a Square, is to that degree incommensurable with the side of it, that tho' a Division into infinite parts should be supposed, yet we could never come to a Particle that might be the common Measure of them both: Nevertheless this Truth can never be reached by the Imagination, but rather seems re∣pugnant to it: Because we can imagin nothing but some particular determinate Body, the Species whereof is imprest on our Brain, as hath been said.

X. No Corpo∣real Species are requi∣red to Pure Intellection And tho' the Mind doth sometimes contemplate Material and Corporeal things; yet it doth never admit any Corporeal Species, which are only re∣ceived into the Brain, on which the Mind doth not depend in its Operations. For in order to Pure Intellection, we have no need of the Brain, but only for Sensation or Imagination. Whence it fol∣lows, that we can Understand many things which we cannot Imagin. I perceive by the Light of Nature that GOD exists, tho' I cannot represent him to my self by any Image. So likewise I have a clear perception of a Chiliogon or Thousand Corner'd Body; which yet I cannot imagin, that is, presentially behold its Thousand Sides; because the vast number of them confounds the Imagina∣tion. Now that I have a clear Perception of a Thousand Corner'd Body appears, because I can demonstrate many things concerning it, as that all its Angles together are equal to 1996 right Angles; which could not be, if I had only a confus'd Con∣ception of it.

XI. Truth or Falshood is not in the Under∣standing. It is to be noted, that no Error can be in the Understanding or Imagination, as long as they con∣tinue purely in the Contemplation of things: For if the Idea we have of those things it represents be conform with them, it is true; and if it disagree, then is it no representation of them. Moreover, since Falshood or Error consists in our attributing to a Subject what doth not belong to it, or denying of it what doth, it is plain that since the Under∣standing or Imagination do neither affirm nor deny, there can be no Falshood in them. Neither doth it contradict this, that the Understanding some∣times apprehends a False thing, as when it conceives a Non Entity, or Repugnant terms; as when the Mind conceives one that is no Physician, to be a Physician; in which Conception there can be no Falshood, because it truly conceives a Physician, tho' it apply that Conception to a wrong Sub∣ject.

XII. But only in the Will. Wherefore all danger of Mistake is from our Will, when we give our Assent or Dissent to any thing we have not clearly perceived. Yet is not this to be understood, as if we did wilfully embrace Error; but because we do not restrain our Will sufficiently, but reach it forth to those things we do not perfectly understand. For it is another thing to be willing to be deceived, and to assent to those things in which Falshood is involved. And tho' few be so careless of themselves, as to desire to fall into Error, yet many are willing to give their Assent to those things in which Error is hid. For all Assent belongs to the Will, and is to be numbred amongst its Perceptions. For we see it is in our Power, tho' we perceive a thing, yet to suspend our Judgment, which restraint is the Determina∣tion of the Will; as likewise are Desire, Aversion, Dubitation, &c. For to the Understanding only belong Pure Intellection, Imagination, and Sensa∣tion.

XIII. Sometimes the Under∣standing is the cause of Error. Since therefore FALSHOOD consists in the hasty Consent of the Will, it can by no means be imputed to the Intellect, because Error is not to be found in Perceptions, neither is it any way intel∣ligible. Yet forasmuch as the Understanding com∣monly hath imperfect and confused Conceptions of things, it may be said to be an occasional Cause of our Errors. For as our Bodily Sight frequently leads us into Mistake, by representing Objects con∣fusedly and imperfectly to us; so the Understand∣ing having for the most part only a confused Per∣ception of things, is a cause of the Wills falling into many Errors, by assenting to those things which are obscurely perceived by the Understanding.

CHAP. IV. Of the Five Ʋniversals, or Predicables.

I. There is a twofold Genus of Beings or Entities. WE are to suppose in the first Place, that there are Beings that have some reality in the Nature of things; and whose Attributes belong to them, whether the Understanding think so or not. Such are all Substances, and all Attributes or Modes, which denominate or vary them. Others again derive all the Being they have from the In∣tellect, on the operation whereof they so depend, as to vanish away upon its Cessation; as are all those which are called Entia Rationis (Entities of Reason) in the Schools.

II. Universals are only Modes of Thinking. In the Second place we are to suppose, that no∣thing else is to be understood by the word Uni∣versal, than that which agrees or is attributable to many things; as the word Substance, which agrees to Body and Spirit. Wherefore all Universals are in our Understanding, and to speak properly, are only Modes of Thinking. For seeing all Na∣tural things are Singular and distinct from each other, these Universals can have no Unity, but what our Understanding gives them. By Example, Two Lines if separately consider'd, cannot be said to agree in the Notion of a Line; because in the Conception of the one, is included the Negation of the other; wherefore to the end they may agree, we must first frame an Idea, which may serve us for the conceiving of all Lines that are like one another. Thus we put some Common Name upon all those things which are represented by an Idea, which Name is commonly called an Universal. And thus that famous Number of Universals, which hath rack'd so many Brains, may easily be salved.

III. How Uni∣versals are formed. For Example, When we consider Substance extended in Length, Breadth and Depth, we frame an Idea of it, and call it the Idea of a Body, which afterwards is of use to us for the representing of all Bodies to our Mind. But seeing that many of them are distinguish'd by Species, as into Living Bodies

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Booke 1. Part 1. Chap 2 Rule ••

G. Freman Inv.

I. Kip Sculp

To the Right Worshipfull S.^r Thomas Mompesson of Bathampton in Wilt-shire Knight

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Rich: Blome

and Inanimate, the Universal Name with relation to them is called GENUS. And since many of them differ only in Number; as two Lines of the same Magnitude, or two Spherical Bodies, we con∣ceive an Universal Idea, which may represent all Lines that are measur'd by the same length, and all round Bodies contain'd within the same Surface; which Idea, with reference to them, as Numeri∣cally distinct, is called SPECIES, which is the Second Universal.

IV. An Univer∣sal as con∣sidered as a Whole, or as a Part. Whence it follows, that one and the same Uni∣versal, with respect to the self-same Inferiour, may be considered either as a Part; or a Whole: For both the Genus in respect of the Species, and the Species in respect of the Individuals, is called a WHOLE: Thus Animal contains a Man and Beast. Universals also may be look'd upon as Parts of their Inferiours; so a Man is conceived as consisting of his Genus and Difference, that is, of an Animal and Rationality.

V. The Origi∣nal of Dif∣ference and Proprium. Neither hath the Universal, called Difference, any other Original; for when we consider that there is some difference between those things which we understand to be under the same Genus, or Species; we apprehend this variety under some common Notion, which we afterwards attribute to every Difference: As Streightness or Rectitude, whereby a Line is distinguish'd from one that is of another Figure. Roundess, whereby a Globe is di∣stinguish'd from an Angular Body, &c. The Pre∣dicable Proprium is made, when we abstract one Notion from those that are peculiar to Things, and to which alone it agrees, and to no other: As Partition or Divisibility, and Mobility to a Body.

〈…〉〈…〉 called Ac∣cident is framed. Accident is framed by us, when after we have considered that many things may happen to, or be taken from Things, without the destruction of their Nature, we conceive the Idea of an Entity separable from them, which we call Accident: Which Name we make use of for the conceiving of all those things, which fortuitously happen to Things. And this is sufficient for the Explication of the Nature of Universals, especially to those who do not love to spend their time in vain Que∣stions, or to confound the Notions of Things with fruitless Disputations.

VII. The Parti∣tion of an Universal into five Species is a compleat Division. Now that this Division of an Universal, is Adaequate; that is, that there are neither more nor less Members of them than these Five, appears thus: The Idea which we frame in our Mind, and make use of to conceive many Things, either represents many Things distinguish'd by Species, and then it is Genus; or only Numerically distinct, and then it is Species; or it represents the Diversity, whereby many Singulars differ amongst themselves, and from other things, and then it is Difference; or the Pro∣perty which belongs to them alone, and then it is Proprium; or some Contingency separable from their Essence, and this makes Accident, or the first and last Predicable.

VIII. What Pre∣dicables are. These Five Universals are otherwise called Praedicabilia, Predicables, because they are Modes of conceiving Universal Notions, which are af∣firmed of many things Truly, Properly, Naturally and Immediately. They are said to be Modes of Conceiving, to intimate to us, that Predicables are Second Notions. For Genus is nothing in it self, but only with respect to those things with which it is compared; neither is there any Species, but with respect to the Genus to which it is subjected: neither can Difference, Property or Accident be conceived, but with relation to the Subjects they belong to.

CHAP. V. Ʋniversals singly examin'd, as to their Na∣ture, Properties, and Ʋse.

I. It is of use to take a review of these Uni∣versals. THough I have in the foregoing Chapter suf∣ficiently made out, that there are Five Uni∣versals or Predicables, and that they are distin∣guish'd from each other by their Differences; yet I suppose it may be of use to give a more par∣ticular Explication of them, and set down how they are predicated of their Inferiours.

II. Genus takes the first place amongst Univer∣sals. GENUS deserves the first place amongst Uni∣versals, both in order and dignity; for from it, as from their Head, the other Members depend and are maintain'd, and upon its ceasing perish and vanish. Genus therefore is an Universal, which is predicated of many things distinct by Species, in the Question what it is. As Substance is a Genus in respect of Substance extended, called a Body, and Substance Thinking, which is called a Mind or Spirit; and a Quadrilateral or Square Figure, is the Genus with respect to a Parallelogram and a Trapezium. To be predicated in the Question What, is when en∣quiry is made into the Nature of any thing, what it is. Thus when I enqnire what a Body, or what a Mind is, the Answer is properly made by their Genus, viz. Substance; and herein it differs from Difference, Property, and Accident: For tho' Dif∣ference be predicated by What, or Essentially, of those things whose Difference it is; yet it is not simply predicated so, but with the addition of Quale, which denotes the Form or Quality of a thing; and Property and Accidents are only predi∣cated in Quale.

III. What it is to be distin∣guish'd by Species, in the definiti∣on of Genus Wherefore in the foregoing Definition of Genus, to be distinguish'd by Species, is to differ Essentially, so as that some Essential part is found in the one and not in the other. Thus Man and Beast are said to be distinct by Species▪ because a Mind or Rational Soul is found in Man, which is not to be met with in a Beast.

IV. Genus is twofold, one supream or the highest. Genus is twofold: One, the most General or Highest, which hath no Genus above it: As a Cor∣poreal Being amongst extended Substances; and an Intellectual or Thinking Being, amongst those that are endow'd with Knowledge and Understand∣ing.

V. The other, Subaltern. The other Genus is called Subaltern, which inter∣venes betwixt the highest Genus and the lowest Species; or which with respect to the things above it is a Species, and with respect to the Inferiour is call'd Genus. Thus Living Thing, if it be re∣ferr'd to Body, under which it is sorted, is called a Species; but if to Animal, it is a Genus. And consequently, Body is a remote Genus of Animal, but Living Thing the nearest Genus.

VI. What Spe∣cies is, and how i•• is divided. The Second Universal is SPECIES, which is predicated of many, only Numerically distinct in the Question, what a thing is. By the last part of this Definition of Species we find it agrees with Genus, in that they both of them answer to the Question, what a Thing is: As when I ask, What is Peter? I answer aright by saying, that he is a Man.

VII. The Divi∣sion of Species. Species is twofold: The one called the Lowest or most Special; the other, Middlemost or Inter∣vening: The latter of which, tho' with respect to the Genus under which it stands, it be called Spe∣cies; yet with respect to the Inferiours, of which it is predicated, it is a Genus▪ So Animal which is the Species of Living Thing, is the Genus in respect of Man or Beast.

VIII. What the m••st Speci∣al, or Lowest Species is. The most Special, or the Lowest Species, is that which is immediately predicated of Indivi∣duals: As Man of Charles and James; a Circle of all particular Circles: Which is therefore call'd the most Special or Lowest Species, because it hath no Species under it, but only Individuals. Where∣fore also it is commonly defined, that which is pre∣dicated of Many, differing only Numerically in the Question which asks, What a thing is?

IX. How many ways Dif∣ference is to be under∣stood. The Third Universal is DIFFERENCE, which may be variously considered: First, foras∣much as it is the Constituent of Species; and then it may be defined to be that whereby the Species doth exceed, or is more worthy than the Genus: As Man exceeds an Animal or Sensitive Creature by Rationality. Secondly, As it is something Predi∣cable, and so it is commonly defined to be an Uni∣versal, which is predicated of many different in Specie, in the Question, Quale quid, or of what kind of Essence a thing is. And this Definition agrees only to the intermediate Difference. Third∣ly, Inasmuch as it divides the Genus into differing Species; thus Rational and Irrational divide Ani∣mal, and constitute two Species, viz. Man and Beast. So the Equality of the Sides constitutes an Equilateral Triangle, and determines the Idea of a Triangle, which before was common to a certain Species. Fourthly, As it is an Essential part of the whole Compound, and so it makes a part of its Essence, and belongs to its Definition: Wherein it differs from a Property and Accident, as being an Actual part of the things to which it is attri∣buted.

X. The Species includes more than the Genus. For in every Species there must necessarily be something more than there is in the Genus; for otherwise there would be no distinction at all be∣tween the several Species, seeing they all agree in the Genus; and therefore if there be any diversity betwixt them, the same is to be fetch'd from the Difference. For Example; The Body and Mind are two Species of Substance, and therefore it is necessary that in the Idea of Body there should be somewhat more found than in the Idea of Sub∣stance; and the same must be said of the Idea of the Mind. Now whereas the first thing we meet with in a Body, is Extension; and in the Mind or Soul, Cogitation; we may say, that Extension is the Difference of Bodies, and Cogitation the Dif∣ference of the Soul: Or in other words, That a Body is a Substance extended, and the Soul or Mind a Thinking Substance. Wherefore Difference, as it is the Third Predicable, may be thus defined: That which is predicated of the Species, and of the things contained under it by the Question, Quale quid, or of what kind of Essence the thing is.

XI. The four∣fold divi∣sion of Property. PROPRIUM is taken in a Fourfold Sense or * 1.1 Acception: First, That which agrees alone to the Species, but not to all the Species; that is, to all the Individuals resorting under it. As, to Cure by Art, is attributable to Man alone, but not to all his Indi∣viduals.

XII. The Second. Secondly, That which agrees to the whole Species, but not to it alone. As it agrees to Man to walk on two Feet; for the same may be also said of other Animals yet not of all. So Divisibility is the Property of Extension, because every extended Being can be divided; tho' Duration and Number be also divisible.

XIII. The Third. Thirdly, That which is attributable only and to the whole Species, yet not always, but only at a cer∣tain time: As to grow ••grey-headed is peculiar to a Man; not in his Childhood or Youth, but in his Old Age: For if it happens otherwise, it is look'd upon as a Prodigy.

XIV. Proprium▪ in the 4th Mode. Fourthly, That which is attributable only, and to the whole Species, and at all times: As it is the property only of a Circle, of every Circle, and at all times, that all the Lines drawn from the Cir∣cumference to the Center, are equal. And this last sort of Property is that which constitutes the Fourth Universal; the other three Modes being rather re∣ferrable to Accidents, because they do not agree ne∣cessarily, nor always, nor to the whole Species, but contingently, sometimes and in part only. And thus Proprium in this last Sense may be defined, that which is predicated of many things by them∣selves, and necessarily, yet not essentially. I have added the word Necessarily, because Property doth so agree with a thing, that it cannot so much as by Thought be separated from it; forasmuch as it is a necessary consequent of its Essence, and is conver∣tible with it. Thus it is the essential Property of a Triangle, that two of its Sides taken together, are bigger than the third, and that its three Angles be equal to two right ones; because these do necessa∣rily agree to a Triangle, inasmuch as it is a Figure bounded by three right Lines.

XV. What an Accident is, and how many ways it is taken. In the last place, we call all that Accident, which is not Substance, neither doth necessarily agree to it, but doth only contingently follow the same; or is that which without the destruction of the Subject may be present or absent. As Roundness, Hardness, &c. are common Accidents with respect to a Body, as Sorrow and Fear are Accidents with regard to the Soul or Mind. An Accident is two∣fold; Separable, which may easily be separated from the Subject in which it is conceived to be, as sleep, from Man; or Inseparable, which cannot be separated from the thing in which it is by the force of Nature, as whiteness from a Swan, blackness from a Blackamore: Tho' they may be abstracted by Cogitation; for we can conceive a Swan with∣out whiteness, and a Man without blackness. Wherein, as hath been said, it is distinguish'd from a Propriety, which cannot so much as by Cogita∣tion be removed from its Subject.

XVI. The defini∣tion of Ac∣cident is true in a divided Sense, not in a Conjunct. When an Accident is said to be present or absent without the destruction of the Subject; this is not to be understood in a Conjunct Sense, as if the same Accident could at the same time be present and absent from the same Subject: But in a Divided Sense, so as that the Accident which is now pre∣sent may be absent, and on the contrary. For it is a Contradiction that two opposit Predicats, should at the same time be predicated of the same thing, though they may at divers times.

XVII. The Series of Genus's and Species To the end that the Order of the Highest Genus, and those that are Subaltern, as also of the Species, may be the better known, it will be of use to sub∣joyn here a Series of Universals, by which we may

be able to descend from the highest Genus, to wit, Substance, to Individuals; and remount back again from the Individuals to the highest Genus. For by this Scheme the Mind is much enlightned, and avoids that Confusion, which otherwise is apt to arise in the Defining, Dividing, and Enumerating of things.

	A Substance,
Corporeal,		Intellectual.
	A Body,
Living,		Void of Life.
	A Living Thing,
Sensitive,		Void of Sense.
	An Animal, or Sensitive Creature,
Endued with Mind,		Void of Mind.
	A Man,
This, Another,		Plato.

XVII. Which Se∣ries may be made after an Analytical way. The Words which follow from Substance to Man, are called Intervening Genus's, and those on the Right and Left are the Differences, which are said to be placed in an Indirect Line. From those words which are disposed in a Direct Line, we make the Series in a twofold manner; either by Analysis or Division descending, beginning from the Highest Genus, which is Substance, and distri∣buting it, and all other the Genus's that resort under it, into their Species by their Difference, till we come to the Individuals. As if one should divide Substance into Corporeal and Intellectual; and then a Body into Living and Void of Life; and then a Living Body, into that which is Sensitive and devoid of Sense; and a Sensitive Creature or Animal, into that which hath a Mind, and which is destitute of it; and at last, an Animal endued with a Mind, viz. a Man into Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, &c.

XVIII. Or by a Syntheti∣cal. The other is by way of Synthesis ascending, be∣ginning from the Individuals, and from them mounting to the Subaltern Genus's, and lastly to the Highest Genus, viz. Substance. As when considering all particular Men, and finding them all to agree in the Nature of Man, we place Man as the Species above the Individuals. Then com∣paring Man with Animals or Sensitive Creatures, and finding in them the common Nature of Ani∣mals, we place Animal as the Genus above Man. Afterwards making a Comparison of an Animal with Plants, and finding them to agree in the common Attribute of Life or Living; we put Living above Animal: And then if we compare Living things with those that are destitute of Life, we shall find the common Notion in them both; and therefore place Body above Living. Lastly, If we compare Bodily things with Angels and the Mind of Man, we shall find the common Notion of Substance in them both; and therefore will place Substance as the Genus above Body, by which means Substance will be left the Highest Genus.

XIX. What an Individual is, and its division. A Singular or Individual is opposed to an Uni∣versal, because it cannot be common to many Inferiour; as this Man, this Sword. It is twofold, either Indeterminate, which without difference may signifie this or the other Individual; as a certain Man, a certain Woman: Or Signate and Deter∣minate; as Julius Caesar, which is called Deter∣minate by its Signification; or by Demonstration, as when a common Word is determined by a de∣monstrative Particle; as this Colledge, this Court or Yard: Or by Circumlocution; as the Son of Sophroniscus for Socrates, or the Son of the Blessed Virgin for Christ: And are therefore called by Ari∣stotle, Individuals, Singulars, and Things differing in Number, because they cannot be divided as the foresaid Universals; and because we in a manner point at them, as if we were counting of them one by one, when we say this, that, the other, &c.

XX. The first Use of U∣niversals. Hence it appears what is the Use of Universals, and how far they conduce to the Knowledge of Things: For seeing that a thing considered under an Universal Notion▪ is a thing; as it is appre∣hended common to many Inferiours, or as it is predicable of many; we shall find that the consi∣deration of Universals, is a great help to clear and distinct Perception, the obtaining of which is chiefly aimed at by all that is handled in this LOGICK. For by the help of these Univer∣sals, or Praedicables, we are enabled to discern the Attributes which constitute the Essence of a thing, from those which are Consequent to, and to know which are the Properties and Accidents of every thing: As for Example, it belongs to the Consti∣tution of Socrates his Nature, that he be a Man, a Sensitive Creature, and Rational: Which Three in their Universality are distinguish'd; Man being the Species, Sensitive Creature or Animal the Genus, and Rational the Difference. Which tho' in So∣crates they are all one and the same, yet are distin∣guish'd according to our Mode of Thinking. But the Faculty of Laughing, or Laughter it self, is consider'd as a consequent of Socrates his Essence, who is already constituted a Man, by his being an Animal and Rational. And the Faculty of Laugh∣ing is the Property of Man, but the Act of Laugh∣ing an Accident.

XXI. The second Use of U¦niversals. The Consideration of Universals is also of great Use to the more clear Perception of Things, whe∣ther they be Singular or Common. Of Singulars, whilst we enquire under what Species they are placed, what Genus's they have, ascending by de∣grees to the Highest. Of Common or Universals, when we examine what Differences they have, and what Species they contain, descending in this man∣ner to the very Individuals. Thus by ascending, I know Socrates to be a Man, a Man to be an Animal, an Animal to be a Substance: And again by descending, I learn that Substance is either Intellectual or Corporeal; the Intellectual to be either Infinite, as God; or Finite, and that either without a Body, viz. an Angel, or joyned to a Body, as Man's Soul; under which Species the Mind of Socrates, as a Singular or Individual doth resort.

XXII. Our Mind frames a general Idea two several ways, the one by joyn∣ing or ag∣gregating. The Second thing which follows from the Con∣sideration of Universals is, that there are two ways of framing General Idea's, the one by Aggregation, the other by Abstraction. The Mind forms an Universal Idea by Aggregation, when it joyns many Singular Idea's of a like Nature together into one complex Universal Idea, which is called Genus. Thus making a Congeries or Collection of all Brute Beasts, as of Lions, Horses, Bears, &c. we find them all to agree in the Idea of a Brute Beast, which we therefore call the Genus of them.

XXIII. The other by Abstra∣ction. Again, we may form an Universal Idea by Ab∣straction, when we attribute the Attributes which constitute the Essence of a thing into several ranks or degrees, as if they were so many Parts. For tho' the Idea's of Singular things do agree in some one thing, yet they differ in more; wherefore when the Mind doth abstractedly and severally consider

things, in which many like Idea's are found, neg∣lecting those wherein they differ; this abstract Consideration is called an Universal Idea or Genus. As for Example, If I take from John, Peter, James, all the Particularities that determine them, as that the one is a Physician, the other old, the third young, &c. and that I only confider them as being all endued with Sense and Reason: This affords me the General Idea of a Man, forasmuch as there∣by not any particular Man is represented to me; but Man in Common, or the Nature of Man as such.

CHAP. VI. Of Substance, and its Affections or Modes.

I. The diffe∣rence of our Per∣ceptions. THe difference of Perceptions or Idea's is taken either from the Things themselves which we understand, or from our different ways of Per∣ceiving them, or lastly proceeds from the Words or Signs whereby we express our Notions. Now whatsoever is understood by'us, is either conceived as a Thing, or Substance, existing by it self; or as the Attribute of a Thing, or Mode of Substance; or as something made up of a Thing and Mode; or a Modified thing; or lastly, Propositions of Eter∣nal Truth residing in our Mind.

II. What Sub∣stance is. Substance is a thing, which does not need any other Substance for its existence; that is, which hath an Essence really distinct and separable from others. By this means is a Substance distinguish'd from an Accident, which is not really distinct from a Substance, nor can exist separate from it: Nay, an Accident cannot be clearly and distinctly conceived without a Substance, because its very Essence is to be in another; and nothing can be clearly and di∣stinctly conceived without its Essence.

III. Substance is known by its At∣tributes. Tho' it be sufficient for the Explication of the Notion of Substance, to say, that it is a thing which exists independently of another; yet we cannot distinctly understand it, but by means of some At∣tributes that belong to it; and the more of these are found in any Substance, the clearer it is said to be known. For the Attributes or Properties of Things are, as it were, certain Forms that actuate them, and distinguish them from others: For we more easily know a Rational Soul, by conceiving it as a Thinking Substance, than as a thing Ex∣isting; because if it thinks, it must of necessity ex∣ist. So in like manner we have a clearer knowledge of a Body, by considering it as a Thing extended, than only as a thing existing, as is evident to him that considers it.

IV. A Substance is either Created or Uncreated. SUBSTANCE is twofold, Created or In∣created. Increated is a Substance independent of all other things whatsoever, as GOD: A Created Substance is that, which tho' it do not stand in need of another Substance for its Existence, yet wants the Divine Concourse, without which it cannot exist; and therefore is not an absolute, but only a dependent Being.

V. Created Substance is divided into Intel∣lectual and Corporeal. Of Created Beings, some are Intellectual, others Corporeal. An Intellectual Being is a Thinking Substance, as the Mind of Man: A Corporeal, is a Substance extended in Length, Breadth and Depth; or is the immediate Subject of Local Extension, and of all Modes that presuppose Extension, as Magni∣tude, Motion, Figure, Position, and all other such like, which cannot be conceived without Local Ex∣tension, as the foundation of them. And to the Mind or Soul belong all Acts or Modes of Cogi∣tation, as to Understand, Imagin, Feel, and what∣ever else agrees in the universal Notion of Cogi∣tation.

VI. There be only two Genus's of Things. Whence follows that there are only two Genus's or General Heads of Things, viz. of Material and Intellectual, or Cogitative: All others being reducible to these as Modes or Affections; now what these are, and how related to their Subjects; we shall next proceed to explain.

VII. What an Attribute or Modus is. There be many Attributes we may conceive in every thing; some of which constitute the Nature and Essence of a thing, and distinguishes it from all others; as Extension, which constitutes a Bodily Substance, and distinguishes it from a Cogitative Being: Others again presuppose the Nature con∣stituted, and do only diversly affect or vary the same, as Volition doth the Mind, and Figure the Body; and these are called the Modes of Sub∣stances. Because tho' they affect or vary the Sub∣stance, yet it may be conceived without them, tho' they themselves cannot be understood but as inherent in some Subject; for herein properly the Nature of a Modus doth consist, that it cannot be conceived without including the Conception of the thing whose Mode it is. Thus I clearly perceive that a Body is an extended Substance, without Mo∣tion or Figure: But it is impossible for me to con∣ceive Motion or Figure, except it be in an extended Being. So likewise I clearly perceive the Mind to be a Thinking Substance, without Imagination or Sense, because tho' these were absent it would be Cogitative notwithstanding: But Sense and Ima∣gination cannot be conceived, but in a Cogitative Being.

VIII. How Modes are distin∣guish'd from Ari∣stotelical Accidents. Wherefore a Modern Philosopher calls a Mode, the Appendix of a Being; because it cannot exist without the thing whose Appendix it is. Which we are to observe in opposition of those, who suppose that the Modes of things differ not at all from Real Accidents; forasmuch as these, according to them, may be conceived separate from their Subjects, and can exist so by the Divine Power: Whereas Modes can neither be separated from their Subjects, nor conceived without them; for other∣wise they would be Substances, whose Nature it is to be Things subsisting.

IX. What a Substance is. Substance therefore is a thing that subsists by it self, and is the Subject of all the Attributes that are conceived to be in it.

X. Whas a Mode is. A Mode is that Attribute or Quality, which is conceived to be in the Substance it self, which de∣terminates it to be such like. And this Mode is called by us an Imperfect Being, because it belongs to the Nature of it, that it cannot be by it self, and without some Substance in which it is; and whose Being, as the Schools express it, is nothing else but Inbeing; so that it is a contradiction for a Mode to be, and not to be or exist in a Substance. Where∣fore neither can a Modus pass from the Substance, which is its Subject, and does support and uphold it, into another; for this would argue it not to have been dependent on the Substance wherein it was before, which implies a Contradiction.

XI. The divi∣sion of Modes into Internal and Exter∣nal. Of Modes, some are Internal, others External: Internal are such as are conceived to be in the very Substances, as Figure, Motion, Rest, &c. External are such as depend on other Things, and are not

in the Substances themselves, as to be Beloved, Desired, &c. which are Modes depending on the Action of another; and the Expressions we make use of to signifie the said Modes, are called Extrin∣secal Denominations; because they only express the Modes under which things are conceived.

XII. What a thing Mo∣dified is. A Theng modified is the Substance it self, which is determined by a Modus.

XIII. These Three things ex∣plain'd by an Exam∣ple. As when I consider a Body, the Idea I have of it represents to me a Body or Substance, because I apprehend it as a Self-subsisting thing, which needs no outward thing to its existence: But when I consider that Body Round or Square, the Idea which I have of its Roundness or Squareness represents no∣thing else to me, but a certain Mode of Existence, which I find cannot naturally exist without a Body, to which the Roundness or Squareness belongs: And lastly, when I joyn the Mode with the Thing, that Idea represents to me the Thing modified.

XIV. Modes make no Compound of the thing whose Modes they are. From what hath been said, it follows, First, That the Modes of Things are no hindrance to their Simplicity: For Extension, by Example, with the various Modes of Extension, as Figure, Motion, &c. is not a Compound, but a Simple thing. For that is said to be a Compound which contains two, or more Attributes, whereof the one may be di∣stinctly perceived without the other; and since the Modes cannot be considered without the Substance in which they are, it cannot be said that they make a Compound of it. A Simple Being is that in which one only Attribute is found; whence it fol∣lows, that that Subject in which Extension alone, with its various Modes is understood, is a Simple Being; and that wherein we only apprehend the Cogitative Faculty, with the various Modes of Willing, Understanding, Imagining, is likewise a Simple Being: But that which comprehends both Extension and Cogitation is a Compound, viz. Man, who confists of Soul and Body.

XV. Substance is some∣times con∣sider'd as a Mode. Secondly, Hence it follows that a Substance may sometimes be applicatble to another in manner of a Mode. So Cloaths, when a Man is said to be Cloathed, must only be called a Modus, notwith∣standing that they are Substances; because Man is then considered as a Subject, to which Cloaths are added in the manner of a Mode.

XVI. The distin∣ction be∣twixt an Attribute, a Mode, and a Quality. Thirdly, From what hath been said we may gather, that we may conceive some difference be∣tween an Attribute, a Mode, and a Quality: As that an Attribute is that which is generally con∣ceived to be in a Substance; so he who thinks of the Duration of the Sun doth contemplate an At∣tribute, under which the Sun is understood, foras∣much as it continues in its being. And thus all Attributes are then distinctly understood by us, when we take care to affix no Conception of a Substance to them. We call that a Mode, which any way affects or varies a thing: So Wax is diver∣sified by Figures. And a Quality is that whence a Substance is denominated Talis, or such like; as Wax, that is, soft, cold, white, &c. so softness is the Quality of Wax.

XVII. With what Names Sub∣stances and Modes are exprest. The Names whereby we express Substances, are called Nouns Substantive, as Mind, Body, &c. The Names which express Things modified, and which primarily and directly signifie Substances, and Modes indirectly, are also Nouns Substantives: As the Earth, the Sun, &c. But Words that primarily and directly, but confusedly signifie Substances, and which indirectly, but distinctly express Modes, are called Nouns Adjective; such are round, white, just, &c.

XVIII. What Pro∣positions of Eternal Truth are. The other things which fall under our Know∣ledge, are Propositions of Eternal Truth; which are not understood as Existing things, or the Modes of things; but as Eternal Truths abiding in our Understanding: As, That which is, whilst it is, cannot be nothing: I am, because I think: What is once done, cannot be undone; which are there∣fore called Common Notions, because they are so simple and clear, that they cannot but be perceived by all Men. Neither must it be look'd upon as an Absurdity, that we call any thing Eternal and Im∣mutable, besides GOD; because we do not speak here of Existing things, but ••only of Notions and Axioms which are in our Mind.

XIX. The same are per∣ceived by all, except their Pre∣judices hinder them. Neither doth it hinder the Truth of these Pro∣positions, that all of them do not appear equally evident to all Men; for the Reason of this is, be∣cause they are not all conceived after the same man∣ner, and consequently not with the same Evidence. Not that I think the Minds of Men to be divers, and that the Knowing Faculty of one Man is larger than anothers; but because probably these Common Notions may thwart the prejudicate Opi∣nions of some Men, who therefore cannot so easily apprehend them; tho' others that are free from such Prejudices, do perceive them with the greatest Evidence.

CHAP. VII. Of the Common Attributes of Substance.

I. The Attri∣butes by which Substance is known. FOrasmuch as Things are understood by their Attributes, and are the more distinctly con∣ceived by us, by how much the more Attributes we apprehend in them; I thought it needful to reckon up all the Attributes of Substance, that so nothing that belongs to the Nature of it, may be concealed from us.

II. There are two Genus's of Attri∣butes. The Attributes of Substances are either Primary or Antecedent, or Originate and following from the Antecedent. The Primary are those which are considered by us as certain Principles (not Effective, but Formal) as well of the Substance, as chiefly of all the rest of the Attributes; seeing that when they are supposed, the others immediately follow, and are therefore called the Principles of Being or Substance; and they are two, viz. Essence and Existence.

III. Essence. ESSENCE is the first Radical and inward Principle, Foundation, and Root of Substance, and all its Properties and Operations: For it is the Entity or Form whereby it is something, and that which it is. Thus a Spiritual thing, fuppose an Angel, by means of its Essence is not only a thing, but also such a Being that is Intelligent, and not a Material Substance. And so likewise a Body hath not only from its Essence that it is something, but also that it is Material, and void of Understanding. And therefore the Essence is by the Schools called, the Metaphysical Form, because it is the Chief thing whereby a Thing is distinguish'd from all others. When I say, the Chief Thing, it is not to be understood as if there were something in Sub∣stance, besides Essence, but only with respect to our Perception, which commonly proceeds by Parts, tho' the Thing it self be Simple, without any Composition.

IV. Existence. Having inform'd our selves what the Thing is that is in question, the next enquiry is, Whether it be; that is, whether such a thing be to be found in the Nature of Things; to which the foresaid Essence doth belong; and to this Question Ex∣istence belongs, by which a Being is said to subsist, or by which the Essence is constituted in the Na∣ture of Things: And therefore is called Actus En∣titativus, an Entitative Act; as if Existence were only understood by the operation or acting of Things. A Being in Potentia, or a Possible Being, is opposed to a Being in Act. So a Lilly in Summer is said to be an Existent Being; but in Winter, a Possible Being, Ens in Potentia; because tho' it do not then exist, yet it is not repugnant to it, to be or exist in Time. Whence it appears that Essence and Existence cannot be separated from each other, since (to speak properly) they are nothing else but two different Modes of Thinking: For we do otherwise conceive the Essence of a thing, when we abstract Existence or Non-existence from it, than when we conceive it Existing. So when we ap∣prehend Possible and Actual Being in one and the same thing, by different Conceptions, we do in∣deed conceive the thing as in a twofold State, but do not therefore divide it into more things. Thus the Sun that now appears in our Heaven, is the same that has continued from the beginning. Therefore the Power by which things that are not yet, are said to be Possible, is called Objective; forasmuch as such Things are the Objects of some Cause, by which they may be produced in due place and time.

V. Attributes Originate, or proceed∣ing from others. From these two first or primary Attributes, other Attributes follow, which are likewise common to all Substance, and are called Originate, or Conse∣quent; and are either Absolute, which belong to the Substance considered by it self; or Respective, which agree to the Thing with reference to others. The Absolute Attributes are Duration, Unity, Truth, Goodness; &c.

VI. Duration. Duration is nothing else but an Attribute, under which the Existence of Created Things is under∣stood, with reference to their perseverance in their Actual existence. So that Duration agrees to all Existent Beings, as long as they exist. With re∣spect to Duration, some things are called Corrup∣tible, and others Incorruptible. A Corruptible Be∣ing, is that which can perish and cease to be, or lose the Existence it hath: As the Individuals of every Species, which may be corrupted and changed into another Species. An Incorruptible Being is that, whose Existence cannot be destroyed, and is either Simply such, as GOD, who is subject to no Change or Corruptibility; or in certain re∣spects only, which is preserved by the Power of GOD, so as to suffer no diminution or increase. So Matter which continues one and the same in the World, is said to be Incorruptible; tho' second or singular Matters, as to their Forms, be subject to Generation and Corruption.

VII. Unity. Another Attribute of Substance is Unity, by which every thing is said to be Undivided in it self. Thus those things are said to be One, which are of the same Subaltern Genus or Species, because they are considered by us under one and the same No∣tion, and for that we make use only of one Con∣ception, to represent all those Things to our Minds which agree together: And this Unity is called Universal. But Singular Unity appertains to those Things, which without the Operation of our Mind are undivided, or to whose Nature it is repugnant to be divided into more Entities; whereby is veri∣fied that Common Saying of the Philosophers, That whatsoever is, is Singular; because that which is not One, cannot be esteemed to be. Some Things again are One by themselves, and others by Acci∣dent: Things One by themselves are such as have an Undivided Nature, whether they be Simple or Compound. For the multitude of Parts is no hindrance of Unity, so the Parts, which constitute a Third thing, be but closely joyned together. For Man is said to be One by himself, notwithstanding that he consists of Parts of a different Nature, and separable from each other. Whereas those things are called One by Accident, which consist of dis∣joynted Parts, and between which there is only a very slight Union. So an Army is called One Body by Accident, because it consists of a great number of Men joyn'd by an Imperfect Union.

VIII. Truth. In Substance we also consider Truth, which is commonly called Metaphysical, or Transcendental; and is nothing else but the correspondence of the Name with the Thing signified by it. For in this Sense the Nature and Essence of every thing may be said to be True. So that to enquire into the Na∣ture of any Thing, is the same as to search what a Thing is, and of what kind it is: And to find out Truth is nothing else, but to comprehend whether a Thing be, and of what Nature a Thing is. Wherefore, since it is not in the Power of Crea∣tures, to change the Natures and Essences of Things, no more than they can Eternal Truths, it follows, that there is nothing opposed to Transcendental Truth. For tho' Justice be opposed to Injustice, Truth to Falshood, and true Gold to false Gold; yet the Things which are opposed to true Vertues have no Nature, neither have we any positive Idea of them: For that which is opposite to true Gold hath no Essence at all; and in like manner, that which is contrary to True Faith, or True Forti∣tude.

IX. What things are said to be true Meta∣physically. To Metaphysical Truth are referred not only those Things which have, or may have an Ex∣istence without the Intellect, as all Natural Beings; but also whatsoever is Positive, and consequently hath an Essence or Nature, tho' it have no Ex∣istence without the Intellect. For not only those Things which are the Object of our Senses, as Heaven, Earth, the Sea, Sound, Colour, &c. do enjoy a True and proper Essence; but Fortitude, Justice, a right Line, a Triangle, Cause, Effect, and in a word, whatsoever we apprehend as Positive, or in the manner of an Entity. For we say, True Justice, a True Triangle, &c. because their Nature is True, and because we can demonstrate many things of them; as of Justice, that it gives to every thing its own: Of a Triangle, that its three Angles are equal to two Right ones.

X. Goodness. Goodness follows Truth, and is likewise reckoned amongst the General Affections of Substance: For if a Thing have that Essence which it ought to have; that is, if it be True, it must of necessity be Good also. And therefore we frequently confound the Denominations of True and Good; as when we call a True Syllogism, Good, because the thing which agrees with our Understanding, cannot dis∣agree with our Will, in case the Will be right,

and that it be carried towards it after clear Per∣ception. Thus GOD, after he had Created the World, and all things contain'd in it, he declar'd them all to be very good, because they agreed with the Idea's he had of them, and therefore were such as he would have them to be. Wherefore Ari∣stotle defines Good to be that which all do desire; forasmuch as nothing is desired, but what agrees with the Will. As there are many degrees of Truth, so also of Goodness, whilst we account some more excellent than others, which we more especially do, when we measure the Goodness of any thing from its Actions, or the strength and force of its Acting. Thus we say, that the Mind excels the Body, and the Fire the rest of the Ele∣ments.

XI. Relation. Thus much for the Absolute Attributes of Sub∣stance; we proceed now to the Relative, which agree to a Substance as related to another, and not as considered in it self. Now Relation is nothing else, but a Mode of our Understanding, com∣paring one thing with others, because of some Properties or Acts that are found in them: So a Father is Related to his Son, because he hath begot him; and the Son to his Father, as being begotten of him. If we consider a Father and Son Materially, without their Relation, we shall call them Subject; but if we consider them with respect to one another, we shall call the one the Relate, and the other the Correlate; because as the Father is related to the Son by Paternity or Fatherhood; so is the Son to the Father by Filiation or Sonship. Upon which account it is that Relatives are said to be or exist Naturally both together; because you cannot sup∣pose the one, without supposing the other: For supposing a Husband, you must suppose a Wife too; and supposing a Master, he must have a Servant.

XII. Relation is manifold. Relation is manifold; viz. a Relation of Origi∣nation, of Negation, of Affirmation, of Compa∣rison, of Composition, of Accession, and of Substi∣tution.

Relation of Origination is, between a Principle and that which proceeds from it; as between the Day-break and a Day, a Point and a Line, a Sub∣stance and its Properties.

Relation of Negation, is between distinct Things, or between Things going before, and those that follow after. The former of these is called a Relation of Distinction, the latter a Relation of Order.

Relation of Affirmation is, whereby one thing is affirmed of another.

Relation of Composition, is between the Whole and the Parts, the Simple and the Compound, the Per∣fect and Imperfect,

Relation of Accession, is between the Subject and the Adjunct.

Lastly, Relation of Substitution, is that which intervenes betwixt the Sign, and that which is signified by it; the Measure and the thing Mea∣sured; the Image and the Original.

XIII. Opposition. As one Substance is related to another, so likewise it is opposed to another: As when we so conceive of Two things, as that they cannot consist toge∣ther. So white and black Things are said to be opposed, and these are called Contraries, because the Essence of one is different from the Essence of the other; yet not wholly and altogether, but because there is something in the Nature of one of them, which is not in the other. Those things are called Disparate, or Disagreeing, when one thing is op∣posed to many after one and the same manner▪ As white is opposed to green, yellow, blew; because white is not only opposite to green, but also to yel∣low and blew, and all Middle Colours. But when one Opposite altogether denies the other; as a God, No God; they are commonly called Contradictories. And this is the greatest of all Oppositions, foras∣much as it denies every where, and always. But if it deny the same only in a certain Subject, as Sight in a Sensitive Creature, then they are called Pri∣vative Opposits: Because by Privation is under∣stood the absence of some Entity in a Subject ca∣pable of receiving it, as Blindness in the Eye, which is capable of Sight.

XIV. Order. Order is another Attribute of Substance, con∣sisting in first and last, or former and latter. It is various, according to the diversity of Place, Time, Dignity, Knowledge, and Perfection, which we conceive to be in things. Order of Knowledge, is taken from the Things themselves; and by this Causes are before Effects; Simple Terms are more known than Complex. Order of Dignity, is fetch'd from the Essence of things; thus the Mind is more worthy than the Body: Or from Accidents; thus a King is more worthy than his Subjects, a Master than his Servants. A Thing is said to be before another in Nature, whose Essence doth precede the other; or from whose Existence the latter is not inferr'd, but on the contrary: So an Animal, or a Sensitive Creature, is said to be by Nature before Man; because tho' an Animal exist, it doth not therefore follow that a Man exists; yet when a Man exists, it follows that an Animal exists also.

CHAP. VIII. How the Name of Substance agrees to GOD and the Creatures.

I. How many ways Names agree to a Thing. FOr the better clearing of this Difficulty, we are to suppose with Logicians, that a Name may after divers manners be communicated to a Thing. First, Univocally, when it agrees to many Things for the same Reason; as when the name Triangle is given to all Figures contained within three Lines. Equivocally, when we call many things that are Essentially distinct by the same common Name, for divers Reasons: As when in Latin we use the Name Gallus, to signifie a Cock and a Frenchman; or when we use the word Pa∣rabola, to signifie an Allegory, or Similitude, and a Geometrical Figure. Analogically, as when we give the same Name to many Things; but to one Principally, and to the other Secondarily: As when we say that an Animal, a Pulse, and Physick are Healthful; for Health principally and chiefly agrees only to an Animal, to the Pulse as it is a sign of it, and to Medicine, because it procures it. Having briefly observed these things,

II. The Idea of Sub∣stance does not agree Univocally to GOD and the Creatures. I say, First, that the Name of Substance doth not agree to God and the Creatures Univocally. Which I prove thus: Different Participation de∣stroys Univocation; but God and the Creatures participate the Name of Substance after a different manner therefore. The Minor is proved, because God is a Substance Independent of any other; but all other Creatures are Substances dependent of

Him: GOD alone is He, who needs no other to his Existence; but all Creatures stand in need of the Divine Concourse for their Existence, neither can they without it be conceived to exist in the Nature of Things.

III. The same exprest in other words. Or otherwise thus: The Idea of Substance, is the conception of a Being subsisting of, or by it self; but there is no Creature so exists by it self, as to be sufficient for its own Existence, or so Powerful, as to be able to keep and preserve it self: Wherefore the Name of Substance cannot Univocally agree to God and the Creature.

IV. A Being from him∣self and from ano∣ther, are absolute Differences. And if with more attention we consider the Matter, we shall find that God and the Creature do not agree in the Idea of any Genus whatso∣ever; and that the word Being, Ens, which is commonly by Logicians attributed to God and the Creature, is perfectly Equivocal; and that the Equivocation is not more plain in the word Dog, when attributed to a Constellation in Heaven, and to a Beast on Earth; or in the Latin word Jus, which signifies Law or Right, and Broth, than in the word Ens, or Being, when given to a Being which is of it self, and to one that is from another and altogether dependent. For to exist of ones self, or to be made by another are meer Differences, which do not admit any common Genus; and as God is distinguished by the former, so are all Crea∣tures by the latter: God being a purely Self∣existent and Independent Being, and the Crea∣tures purely dependent Beings, and existing from another.

V. God is above Substance. Wherefore S. Denys calls GOD Super-substantia, and Super-ens, (Above-substance, and Above-entity) because he is raised above all Substances, and sepa∣rate and distinct from all other Things whatsoever. Accordingly he that would make a true Scheme of the Predicaments, must set down Ens à se, or a Self∣existent Being by it self, and distinct from the Series of other things; and afterwards Ens ab alio, or a Being that is from another, as the Original of Dif∣ferences, placing at the Right hand of it Intelle∣ctual, and on the Left Corporeal, and then put the next Division of Things. Because the Name of Entity, or Being, only agrees with the Being, which is of it self, and can only Equivocally be assigned to Creatures, that have their Being from another.

VI. An Obje∣ction an∣swer'd. If any one say, that the word Substance agrees in common both to God and the Creatures, and that all the Inequality that is found in them doth arise only from the Differences of it? I answer, That this is not true, forasmuch as Dependency is invol∣ved in the Essential Conception of a Creature. Now it is required to the Nature of Univocal Words, that they be equally communicable to all, and not to one Primarily and to the other Secon∣darily, or with dependance on the First.

VII. The Idea or Notion of Sub∣stance is Univocally competent to Crea∣tures. I say in the Second place, that the word Sub∣stance doth Univocally agree to all Creatures. For all Creatures are conceived under this Common Notion, that all of them stand in need of the Di∣vine Concourse for their Existence. Now that Name which is attributed to many for the same Reason, and equally participated by them, is Uni∣vocal; therefore the Name of Substance is di∣stinctly understood to be Common to all Creatures, according to the property of Univocals.

VIII. Why the Genealogy of Things and Modes is here annexed. Having thus explained these Things, I think I have with one and the same labour explained all Metaphysicks, concerning Entity and its Affe∣ctions; yet that no Body may complain, that the same has been left out in this Institution, seeing the consideration of it doth indeed belong to Lo∣gick, I shall subjoyn here such a Genealogy of Things and Modes, by means of which the Student of Philosophy may, as it were at one View, con∣template the whole University of Things.

The Fifth Rule of Truth.

It avails much to the clear and distinct Percep∣tion of Truth, to retain in ones Mind an accurate Genealogy of Things and Modes, that with one cast of an Eye we may be able to take a view of the whole Universe of Things, beginning from the most General, and ending in the most Special.

IX. The Use of the fore∣going Rule. The Reason is, because this will be a great Help towards the thorough Knowledge of Things, as pointing us to what Tribe they do belong, what Affinity they have with some, and what Difference from other Things; neither will it be of less Use to us in the defining, describing, and distributing of Things. And to the end you may have a short Compendium at hand, of all those Things in gene∣ral, which fall under the Perception of our Mind, and consequently also of those Idea's, which the Mind forms to it self, whilst it beholds them: Be∣hold I here furnish you with such a Genealogy, as contains all and every one of the Genera of Things and Modes, each in its proper order and degree.

The Genealogy of Things and Modes.

Whatsoever falls under the clear and distinct Perception of our Mind, is somewhat.

And that Somewhat, is either

• A Thing, A or,
• The Mode of a Thing, B

[A.] I. A Thing, (or an Entity or Substance, for they are Synonymous) is something which hath an Es∣sence and Existence distinct from all other Things. Essence is the Natural and Invariable Constitution of the Thing, by which it is that which it is. Existence is a Consequent upon the Essence of a Thing, by which it now actually is, or is the Essence it self now existing in the University of Things. The Consideration whereof belongs to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by some called First Philosophy, and by others Metaphysicks, which treats of Things Universally, and therefore also is called Catholi••k, or Uni∣versal.

A Thing or Substance in Gene∣ral, is twofold

• Thinking, a or,
• Extended, b

Thinking, or a Mind is either

• [a.] 1. Infinite, as GOD, whence is Natu∣ral Theology.
• 2. Finite, as the Mind of
  • an Angel, whence is Angelography.
  • a Man; whence Psy∣chology.

This part of the Genealogy of a Thinking Sub∣stance is handled in Noetica, that is, Pneumatica, as others term it; the Parts whereof I have just now mentioned.

[b.] A Thing Extended, or a Body, is twofold.

I. An Element; that is, a Principle whence other mix'd Bodies have their Original, and into which they are resolved again at last. Which again is Threefold.

• 1. Subtil Matter, which constitutes the Stars.
• 2. The Heavenly Globular Matter, whence the Light and Heavens are.
• 3. The Grosser Particles of Matter, whence are the Planets and Comets.

II. Elementatum, or Principiatum; that is, all those things that have their Original from the Elements.

And these are again Twofold:

I. Without Life, or Concrete; which branch them∣selves into,

1. Simple Concretes; as the Heaven, which consists of the Globuli of the Second Element; and the Stars, of the Matter of the First Element.

2. More Compound Concretes.

• 1. Those on high, as Planets, Comets, &c.
• 2. Those beneath, as Fire, Air, Wa∣ter, Earth, and things consisting of these: As,
  • 1. Meteors, as Vapours, Wind, Rain, Snow, Hail, Thun∣der, &c.
  • 2. Fossils; that is, Minerals, Me∣tals, and Stones
    • Common,
    • or
    • Precious.

II. Living, or Animated.

• 1. Without Sense, or Vegetable, As all kind of Plants, whe∣ther
  • Herbs,
  • Shrubs, or
  • Trees.
• 2. Endowed with Sense; as an Animal,
  • 1. Rational, as Man.
  • 2. Irrational, as a Beast.

This Part of the Genealogy, concerning Ex∣tended Substance, or Body, is unfolded in Physio∣logy, or Natural Philosophy, which is also called Somatica.

[B.] II. The Mode, (that is, the Attribute, Affection, Accident) of a Thing, is somewhat of an Entity or Being, that is and exists by the assistance of another thing.

These are Twofold,

• General, a or
• Special, b

[a.] I. General; Such are the Modes or Attributes of all Things in General, commonly called Tran∣scendentals: As,

• 1. Unity; by which every thing is always one and the same, and Undivided. Multitude is a Collection of Unities.
• 2. Truth; by which a thing is conformable to its Idea. Falsity contrariwise.
• 3. Goodness; whereby it is fit for Use.
• 4. Perfection; whereby it is whole and entire, and hath whatsoever it ought to have.
• 5. Locality; whereby it is every where, as God; or somewhere, as all other Things besides God.
• 6. Duration; whereby a Thing continues in its Existence either always, or for a certain time:
  • As
    • Eternity.
    • Time
      • Present,
      • Past,
      • Future.

These Things are explained in the First Philo∣sophy, or Metaphysicks, which treats of Things, and of their Modes and Affections Universally.

[b.] II. Special; Such are the Modes or Attributes of Things in Specie.

(1) For the Division of Things: As,

1. The Modes, that is, the Attributes of a Thing Cogitating:

As,

• Intellection, and Volition.
• Power to act of it self, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

2. The Modes or Attributes of a Thing extended, or Corporeal:

As

• 1. Quantity, or Magnitude; which Mathe∣maticks, or Posotica treats of.
• 2. Figure, or the different Termination of Magnitude, handled in that Part of Ma∣thematicks, which is called Geometry.
• 3. Situation, or the certain Position of a Thing in Place and Space.
• 4. The Quiet or Rest of the Parts of any Thing.
• 5. Local Motion, or the Variation of Situa∣tion, whence proceed Active and Passive Qualities; as Rarity and Density, Fluidity and Hardness, Heat and Cold, Moisture and Driness, and the rest; which are treated of in Natural Philosophy.

(2.) From the Conjunction of a thing

• Thinking, and
• Extended.

result the following Modes and Affecti∣ons.

• 1. The Appetite of Hunger and Thirst.
• 2. The Senses
  • Internal; Phantasy or Imagination and Memory.
  • External; Seeing, Hearing, Smel∣ling, Tasting, and Feeling.

And their Affections, as Waking and Sleep.

3. The Affections or Passions; as Love, Joy, Hatred, Sorrow, Hope, Fear, and the several kinds of them, which are also handled in Phy∣siology.

X. The Scope of a Phi∣losopher is, to know the Natures of Things. Hence we may gather in the first place, that Philosophy considered in all its Parts, is nothing else but a Scientifical Explication of this or a like Genealogy. For a Philosopher pretends nothing else, and is content with this alone to understand the Natures of Things, to know their Forms, Differences, Affections, and that from the nearest Causes, if the Mind can reach them. Now this will hardly be obtained by him who is not well vers'd in the Genealogy of Things.

In the next place, That this Genealogy is abun∣dantly sufficient to supply the place of the Com∣mon Categories and Predicaments of the Aristo∣teleans.

XI. What the Peripate∣ticks un∣derstand by Predi∣caments. By Predicaments and Categories, they under∣stand such a Series and Disposition of Things, in which the Superiour is always predicated, that is, affirmed Univocally, that is, according to Name and Thing, of its Inferiours in the same Predica∣mental Line. Taking this for granted, as a thing known to all Men, there are many things which I cannot approve of in the Constitution of those Predicaments.

XII. What is to be dispro∣ved of in the Cate∣gorical Series. First, That they divide Ens into Substance and Accident without any Reason: Forasmuch as an Accident is no Entity, as appears from the fore∣going Definition of Ens (A. I.); but rather is some∣thing belonging to an Ens, according to (B. II.)

Secondly, In that they constitute Nine supream Genera of Accidents, which they thus reckon up; Quantity, Quality, Action, Passion, Relation, When, Where, Situation, and Habit.

Where first they mistake in this, that they make those to be the Supream Genera, and distinct too, which truly are not so; as Quantity, and Quality: For the greatest part of Physical or Na∣tural Qualities arise from Quantity, Figure and Motion. Secondly, Relation doth not in the least belong to the Genealogy of Things, because it is

no absolute thing, but only an Affection framed by Reason, viz. an Opposition, with or under some respect. Thirdly, Action and Passion in Bodies are reducible to Motion, whose Species or Modes they are. Fourthly, The Division of Ens into Substance and Accident, invented by Aristotle, deviates from the Rules of a good Division; because the Parts of it are not opposite. Fifthly and lastly, If any true Attributes of Things be fonnd amongst them, the same may be more fitly deduced from our Genea∣logy: As for Example, Quantity belongs to the first Mode of an Extended Being: Quality, if it be Mental, to the Modes of Intellection and Volition; if it be Physical, or Corporeal, to the Fifth Mode of an Extended Being, or to others: When and Where, to Duration and Place, which are the General Attributes of Things: Situation is the Mode of an Extended thing, or the respect of one Body to others, considered as near to it: And Habit is the Common Adjunct or Accident of some Things; as of a Human Body, or some other.

CHAP. IX. Of the Whole and Parts, Causes and Effects, Subject and Adjunct.

I. Some other things necessary to be known in order to clear Per∣ception. HAving thus Explained the General Attributes of Things, as far as is sufficient for the Knowing of Things in General; if any one fur∣ther desire to Know Things more distinctly and evidently in Specie, and particularly, he must con∣sider the thing either as a Whole, consisting of Parts; or as an Effect, produced by Causes; or as a Subject, furnish'd with various Attributes. For this will be a great furtherance to attain a clear and distinct Knowledge, that is, Perception of any Thing.

II. The Order of Things here to be treated of. It follows therefore, that we explain the Notions of a Whole and its Parts, of a Cause and its Ef∣fects, of Subject and Adjunct; because from these Notions, the Idea of every thing is absolutely and to the Life express'd in the Mind of him that Thinks.

III. What a Whole is, and how manifold. We call that a WHOLE, which consists of many things joyned together, or which hath Parts, into which it may be divided: For a thing which wants Parts, is improperly called a Whole. Where∣fore the Aristotelians are in a Mistake when they say, that the Mind of Man is Whole in the whole Body, and Whole in every Part; because the Mind being an Intellectual Substance, is without Parts, and after an Indivisible manner in the Body. Wherefore also an Immaterial Substance cannot be said to be Whole, save only Negatively, inasmuch as it doth not admit of Parts, or Division. A Whole is three∣fold, Essential, Integral, and Universal. An Essen∣tial Whole, is that which consists of Parts, whereof the one is in the other, as are Matter and Form: Thus Man consists of Soul and Body. An Integral Whole, is that which hath Parts without each other; as a Man's Body consists of Head, Hands, &c. An Universal Whole, is any Genus with respect to its Species; as Animal respecting Man and Beast: Or a Species, referring to its Individuals; as Man to to Socrates and Plato.

IV. What a Part is, and how manifold. We call that a PART, which together with its Copart, or with many of them, doth con∣stitute a Whole; as the Soul and Body make a Man. A Part is either Principal, without which a Whole cannot consist; as is the Head in a Human Body: Or Less Principal, which when sever'd doth only maim the whole, but not destroy it.

V. What is meant by the word Cause. Tho' the Word CAUSE be of it self suffici∣ently known to all, and therefore the Explication of it seems superfluous; yet is it commonly defined, That from whose Being something else follows: Or, That which of it self, influenceth something diffe∣rent from it self. Accordingly, GOD the Father is the Principle, but not the Cause of the Son; for the Son is another Person from the Father, but not another Thing, that is, not of another or different Nature.

VI. The division of Causes. There are Five Genera or kinds of Causes, viz. the Material, the Formal, the Efficient, the Exem∣plary, and the Final.

VII. What the Material Cause is. The Material Cause, is that out of which things are made or formed; as Wax is the Matter of which Tapers are made; Pewter, the Matter of which Pots are made; Gold, of which Guinea's are made. So that whatsoever is agreeing or disagreeing with the Matter, the same also agrees or disagrees with the Things that are made out of it.

VIII What the Formal. The Formal is that which Constitutes another thing and distinguisheth it from all other; as the Soul is the Form of Man. But whether the Forms of other things be Physical Entities, as they talk in the Schools, or only a disposition of Parts, shall be discoursed in the General Part of Physiology, where this Point shall be distinctly handled. Both these Causes are called Internal, because they abide in those Things whose Essence they do constitute.

IX. The Effici∣ent. The Efficient, or Effecting Cause, is that which produceth another thing; and the same is ma∣nifold.

X. A Total Cause. Total or Adequate, which alone doth produce the Effect, excluding other Causes of the same Rank; as God creating Adam, whom he produc'd without the Concourse of any Other.

XI. Partial Causes. But a Father and Mother, or Male and Female, are said to be Partial Causes, with respect to the Child they generate; because they need each others assistance, and can do nothing solitarily.

XII. Proper and Accidental Causes. The Sun is the Proper Cause of Light; but only an Accidental Cause of the Death of a Man, who is kill'd by too great Hear; because the bad Consti∣tution of his Body, was the occasion of his being hurt by the Heat of the Sun.

XIII. The Near and Remote A Father is the Near Cause of his Son; but a Grandfather the Remote.

XIV. The Effe∣ctive Cause. A Mother is the Effective, or Productive Cause of her Son, because she effects a thing which before did not exist.

XV. The Con∣serving Cause. A Nurse is only the Conserving Cause, because she only effects the Continuation of its Existence, and lends her assistance that it may continue in that Existence, which it hath received from its Parents.

XVI An Uni∣vocal Cause. A Father is an Univocal Cause, with respect to his Children; because they are of the same Nature with him.

XVII. An Equi∣vocal Cause. But GOD is only an Equivocal Cause, with re∣spect spect to his Creatures; because they are of a different Nature from His, and in Dignity inferiour to him.

XVIII. A Princi∣pal Cause. An Artificer is called the Principal Cause of his Work, because he acts voluntarily; but Instruments, because they are managed by him, as means subser∣vient to the performing of his Work, are only said to be Instrumental Causes: Because tho' there be some kind of Power to work in the Instruments, as

in the Hatchet to Cleave, in the Knife to Cut; yet can they not produce the said Effects, except they be actuated and applied by another Cause. And therefore are called Passive, because they re∣ceive their acting Power from the Principal Cause.

XIX. An Uni∣versal Cause. The Water that springs up into divers Water-Works in the Gardens of Princes, and which moves variety of Machins, is the Universal Cause of their Motion, because it is indifferently forced up into them all: But the Artificial disposition and figure of the Pipes is the Particular Cause, which determines the Universal, and restrains it to some particular effect.

XX. A Natural Cause. Bodily Things, when they act, are said to be Natural Causes, because they produce an Effect from a Natural Propensity or Necessity, without any fore-knowing Knowledge; as the Sun, Fire, and the like: But Man is the Intellectual Cause of those things which he effects by his Understanding and Will.

XXI. A Volun∣tary Cause. A Man that Walketh is a Free Cause, because he acts spontaneously, and not by force: But a Fire burning Wood is a Necessary Cause; because where those things are present which are required to its action, as dry Wood, application of them to the Fire, and Ventilation or Blowing, it cannot but burn them, neither can it exert any other Action instead of it.

XXII. A Proper Cause, and without which. The Sun, whilst it enlightens a Chamber, is the Proper Cause of the Light that is in it: But the open∣ing of a Window, or taking down of the Shutters, is only a Cause sine qua non, or without which such an Effect would not follow; which Cause is also called the Condition, without which a Thing cannot be.

XXIII. A Physical and Moral Cause. A Fire that burns Houses, is the Physical Cause of that Burning or Consuming, because the Fire properly and of its own Nature burns: But a Man who sets Houses on Fire, or that exhorts or com∣mands others to do so, is only a Moral Cause of this Burning; because he hath only Morally con∣tributed to that effect, viz. by Exhorting or Com∣manding. Thus the Serpent, or the Devil, was the Moral Cause of the Fall of our First Parents.

XXIV. An Exem∣plary Cause. The Form which a Man proposeth to himself in going about to make a Work, is called the Exem∣plary Cause; as the Form which an Architect con∣ceives of a House he is about to build; and gene∣rally whatsoever can be a Cause of an Objective Entity, or of forming any other Image. So he who is the Object of the Eyes or Mind of the Painter, is the Exemplary Cause of his own Effigies or Likeness.

XXV. What the Final Cause is. The Final Cause, is the End for which any thing is; as when a Man applies himself to his Studies, in order to the attaining of Learning: And therefore the End is commonly defined, the Cause for whose sake any thing is.

XXVI. A Primary End. An End is twofold, either Primary, which is principally intended; as the End of a Knife is to Cut; of a Garment, to cover the Body, and to shield it from the Injuries of the Weather.

XXVII. A Secun∣dary' End. A less Principal or Secundary End is, which moves one only in a less degree, and is only considered as something Accessory. Thus the Secundary End of a Garment is to adorn the Body.

XXVIII. The End for whose sake. That which a Man intends to do, or to obtain, is called the End for whose sake: So Learning is the End of Studies, Health the End of the Phy∣sician's Art, as being that which it intends to procure.

XXIX. The End for whom, Adequate and Par∣tial. He for whom any thing is desired, is called the End for whom: So Man is the End for whom of Medicine; because it designs to procure Health to him. To form ones Reason aright, or to direct the Understanding into the knowledge of all things whatsoever, is the Adequate End of Logick: But to direct the Understanding in Natural things, or in the exercise of Vertuous Actions, is the In∣adequate or Partial End of Logick.

XXX. The Num∣ber of Causes. Whence we may gather, that the Material Cause is that out of which Things are made; the Formal, by which; the Efficient, from which; the Exem∣plary, according to which; and the Final, for which things are made.

XXXI. The Causa∣tum, or Thing Caused is fivefold. Whence it follows, that the Effect or Thing caused, which depends on the Cause, and by virtue whereof it is, is Fivefold; viz. an Effect, which proceeds from the Efficient Cause: The Thing de∣signed, or the Means ordained to the End: The Thing materiated, or which consists of the Matter, and is made of it: The Thing formed, or consti∣tuted by the Form. To these you may add the Thing exemplated, in respect of the Exemplar ac∣cording to which it is made.

XXXII What a Subject is. That is called a Subject to which something is adjoyned, or to which something accrues besides its Essence: So Cloaths are put on the Body; the Soul of Man is joyned to his Body; Writing is applied to Paper.

XXXIII. The diffe∣rence be∣twixt a Subject of Inherence and Adhe∣rence. A Subject of Inherence, is that into which some∣thing is received: So a Spunge is said tobe the Matter into which the Water is received: The Outside of the Wall is that which receives the plaister or whiting in it. A Subject of Adherence is, which receives ano∣ther thing upon it self, or to it self, as a Hand that puts on a Glove. A Subject Containing, is that which comprehends any thing within it self; as a Vessel doth Water, or the Sheath doth the Sword: Because by Subject nothing else is understood here, than that to which something is joyned besides its Essence; or to which something supervenes after its production and constitution.

XXXIV. A Subject is some∣times taken for an Object. A Subject is sometimes taken for an Object; as when we say, to subject a thing to the Eyes of any one; that is, to propose a thing to any ones Facul∣ties, that he may act about or in it. So the Ob∣ject of Hearing is a Sound, the Object of Seeing, Colour.

XXXV. What an Adjunct is. We call that an Adjunct, which we consider to be in a thing besides it Essence, as something added, accruing or hapning to it, whether the same bring along with it some proper Reality; as Fire in the Pores of hot Iron, the Soul in the Body: Or whe∣ther it be nothing else but a Mode of Substance; as Love or Science in the Mind; Motton, Figure, Rest, Situation in a Body.

XXXVI. Adjuncts are only attributed to their Subjects in the Con∣crete. An Accidental Adjunct is predicated of its Sub∣ject in Concrete, and not Abstractedly. That is called a Concrete Adjunct, which denotes the Accidental form together with the Subject; as White, Learned, Great, &c. An Abstract Adjunct is that which signifies only the Accidental or Mo∣dal form; as Whiteness, Learning, Greatness. Wherefore an Adjunct is predicated of its Sub∣ject in the Concrete; Snow is white, Socrates is Learned, Great: But by no means in the Abstract; as Socrates is Whiteness, Learning, Greatness.

To these things thus at large explained, we will subjoyn this Rule.

The Sixth Rule of Truth.

XXXVII. The Sixth Rule of Truth. The Idea or Perception of every thing is by so much the more clear and perfect, by how much the more Parts, Causes and Adjuncts of the thing it doth represent.

For from the Parts we have a view of the Whole; from the Causes, what is contained in the Effects; from the Adjuncts, as so many Complements and Ornaments, we perceive the Nature of the Subject, and its Qualifications, especially from its proper inborn Qualities.

CHAP. X. Concerning the Distinctions, whence the Na∣ture and Difference of Idea's is deduced.

I. What is the Consent and Dissent of Things. FOr a more clear understanding of what follows, we will premise something concerning the Consent and Dissent of Things. Now those things seem to me to Consent, which agree in Common Attributes and Logical Notions; and those to Dis∣sent, which do more or less disagree in the same.

The Seventh Rule of Truth.

II. The Se∣venth Rule of Truth. Those Things are to be looked upon as Agreeing, which agree in some common Idea or Reason, or whereof the one is included in the Idea of the other; and they are said to disagree or to be diverse, which are the Objects of Different Idea's, and are apprehended after a diverse manner; or the one whereof is not included in the Idea of the other.

III. Which Things agree, and which do disagree. For those things only do Agree, which have the same Genus or Species, or Parts, or Causes, or Effects, or Subjects, or Adjuncts; or Agree upon some other account: Whereas those which Disagree in the same, are diverse and dissentaneous. But those things do most of all Disagree, which are separated from each other by opposite Differences.

IV. What di∣stinction is, and how manifold. Wherefore Distinction in Common is nothing else, than the Diversity we find, between many things. Which Diversity, to speak properly, is only to be found between Existent Beings: For that which is not, cannot be said to be distinguish'd. Distinction is threefold, Real, Modal, and Distin∣ction of Reason.

V. What a Real Di∣stinction is. Real Distinction is that which is found between two or more compleat Beings or Substances; as between the Soul and Body, which we know to be distin∣guish'd from each other, because we can distinctly know the one without the other: For we can have no more evident sign of Real Distinction than this, that we do distinctly and clearly understand the one without the other. I said in the Definition, that Distinction is a Diversity, and not a Division; because Distinction doth not take away Union, but Identity only. For tho' the Soul be never so closely United to the Body, yet it continues no less distinct from the same, than if it were actually separated from it: For it is sufficient to make a distinction, if the Things may be separated and preserved apart from each other.

VI. The Soul and Body are Really Distinct, as Compleat Beings. But you'l object against the Instance of Soul and Body, that they are only Incompleat Substances, and therefore cannot be really distinguish'd? I answer, by distinguishing the Minor. I grant that the Soul and Body are Incompleat Substances, if they be re∣ferr'd to the Compound which they constitute. But if by calling them Incompleat Substances, you mean that they cannot subsist by themselves: This I deny.

VII. What we are to un∣derstand by these Words, A Compleat thing. For when we say a Compleat thing, we under∣stand nothing else, than a Substance furnished with such Attributes and Forms, as from which we gather it to be a Substance: For it is plain, that we do not know a Substance immediately, but from its Attributes, which because they must be in some∣thing or other, therefore we call the Subject in which they are, Substance. In which respect the Soul and Body are said to be Compleat Beings. The same may be said of all the Parts that concur to the making up of a Whole. Thus an Eye, for Example, is an Incompleat Substance, if it be com∣par'd with the Body, whose Part it is: But is said to be a Compleat Entity, when considered by it self alone; and in like manner the Soul and the Body are Incompleat Substances in reference to the Whole Man; but Compleat, when they are considered with those Attributes by which we know them to be Substances.

VIII. What a Modal Di∣stinction is. A Modal Distinction is that which is found between a Mode and its Subject, whose Mode it is: So Figure is distinguished from a Bodily Substance; the Act of Imagining or Willing from an Immaterial Sub∣stance, or the Soul. For those things we know to be Modally distinguish'd, where the one of them may be conceived to exist without the other, but not on the contrary: As we can easily understand a Corporeal Substance without Motion and Figure, but can by no means conceive Motion or Figure without a Body.

IX. How two Modes are distin∣guish'd. There is another Modal Distinction between two Modes of one and the same Substance: As between the Figure and Motion of one and the same Body, or between a Substance and the Mode of another Substance: But this latter is rather to be called a Real Distinction, than Modal; forasmuch as That Mode may be clearly understood without the other, and hath no dependance on the Sub∣stance, as not affecting or modifying it.

X. Distinction of Reason. A Distinction of Reason, is that which is found between a Substance and some one of its Essential Attributes: Thus Quantity doth not differ from a Bodily Substance, but only by a Distinction of Reason; as Cogitation from the Mind. The Sign of this Distinction is, when we cannot have a distinct Idea of the Thing, if we remove from it that Attribute, as appears in the Examples alledged. And so likewise, two Attributes of the same Sub∣stance are distinguish'd only by Reason, if they be such as that the Notion of the one cannot be clearly conceived without the other; as Justice and Mercy in GOD. And these are said to be Formally distinguish'd, because their Formal Idea's or Defi∣nitions are distinct or diverse.

XI. What the Idea's are which we have of Things. From what hath been said, we may gather first, What the Idea's are which we have of Things; viz. that they are Conceptions, or rather the Things themselves conceived and understood by the Mind; by which Intellection things are said to be Obje∣ctively in the Intellect. So that we can express nothing in Words, if we understand what we say, but there must be an Idea in us of what we express by our Words: Tho' the Idea may sometimes be more clear and distinct, and at other times more obscure and confuse; because it implies a Contra∣diction

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Booke 1. Part. 1. Chap 15.

In Perfecto quiescit

G. Freman Inv.

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To the Worship∣full Thomas Vincent of Fetcham in the County of Surrey Esq.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Rich: Blome.

for me to know what I say, when I express any thing, and yet to have no other conception of it, besides the bare sound of the words. By the word Idea therefore we are to understand, not an Image represented in our Bodily Imagination, and delineated in some part of our Brain, but all that which is in our Mind, when we assert with Truth, that we do conceive a thing, after any manner whatsoever.

XII. The Idea's we have are not the Product of our Senses. In the Second place we infer hence, that the Ideas of our Mind, do not proceed from our Senses: For, as was said before, nothing is so clear an ob∣ject of our Mind, as our Cogitation, neither is any thing more distinctly known to us, than this Proposition, I think, therefore I am: Now we can have no certainty of this Proposition, except we distinctly conceive, what Being is, and what Co∣gitation is; and it would be in vain for any to de∣mand any further Explication of these Words from us, since every one understands them, and cannot be further explained without some confusion. But who will say that these Idea's of Being and Think∣ing are produced by the Senses, and have been convey'd to the Mind, by the help of Bodily things? Wherefore Ideas are not to be attributed to the Senses, but to the Mind, which hath the Power of producing them, and forming them out of it self, without any outward assistance. Tho' indeed the Mind be often excited to the producing of them from things that strike the Senses: Because this is no more, than in the case of an Architect, who may be inclined to Build a House from the Mony which is promised him: But it would be very fool∣ish therefore to assert, that Mony had been the Original of the House.

XIII. Clear Idea's. Thirdly, We may gather that Idea's are of two kinds, clear and confused: Because all of them have not the same Evidence, but exceed one ano∣ther in clearness and distinction. Now those Idea's are called clear, which are evident and manifest to our Mind, when it gives heed to them; in the same manner as we say that Objects are clearly be∣held, when being present to us, they act strongly enough to be perceived by us, and our Eyes are well disposed to behold them.

XIV. Distinct Idea's. Those Idea's are called Distinct, which are so precise, and diverse from all others, that they con∣tain nothing, which doth not manifestly appear, to him that gives heed to them, as he ought. So when a Man feels some great Pain, that perception of Pain, is very clear to him, but is not always distinct: For commonly Men confound it, with their obscure Judgment concerning its Nature, which they suppose to be in the grieved part, and to resemble the Sense of Pain, which alone they clearly perceive. And the reason is the same con∣cerning other Qualities, viz. Sound, Colour, Smell, Cold, Heat, all which they conceive to be in the Objects themselves, and think there is something like these Sensations in the Senses, or the Idea's we have upon their account. These Idea's therefore are called Obscure, because they represent things or Ob∣jects, confusedly or obscurely. Let this therefore be

The Eighth Rule of Truth.

XV. The Eighth Rule of Truth. That Idea, or perception of a thing is clear and distinct, which represents the thing it self to the Mind, according to the foregoing Rules of Truth: And that obscure and confused, which doth more or less depart from the same.

XVI. The Rule explained. For seeing that that Idea is more clear and distinct, which involves least doubtfulness, and which re∣presents more parts and Adjuncts of a thing to the Mind, and distinguisheth it from all other things; it must follow that that Perception is clear and distinct, which represents a thing to the Mind according to the foregoing Rules.

The Ninth Rule of Truth.

XVII. The Ninth Rule. He whose Mind is furnished with most, and most perfect Idea's, is the most knowing and under∣standing Man.

XVIII. The Expli∣cation of this Rule. For seeing that every thing is made manifest by its Idea, and whatever is known of it, is contain'd in its Idea, it is clear that the more Idea's we have in our Minds, the greater must be our Knowledge: And by how much the several Perfections do evi∣dently and distinctly comprehend more particulars, by so much the more excellent and perfect must that Knowledge be.

AN APPENDIX. Of the Imposition, Signification, Definition and use of Names.

I. Of the Things that are handled in this Ap∣pendix. FOr as much as the Names or Words, we use in discourse are Marks and Signs of our Con∣ceptions, and consequently of the things themselves, we have thought fit to add something here con∣cerning their Imposition, Signification, Definition and Use, and this by way of Conclusion.

II. Epicurus was of opi∣nion that the names of things were from Nature. It hath been an enquiry amongst the Philoso∣phers of old, whether the Names or Words we use in Speech, were from Nature, or from Custom, and Consent: Or, which is the same, whether it be natural for all Men to speak those words, by which they utter their Conceptions; or whether they were imposed on things from the free choice of Men, and invented to be put instead of our Con∣ceptions. Epicurus ascribes the original of Names to Nature, and asserts them to be effects produc'd by the force thereof. So that the first Men, when they were struck by the Image, proceeding from the Object, and found several Passions of Love or Hatred stirr'd up in them, broke forth into some Voices, by which they designed them, no other∣wise than if they had pointed at them with the Finger, or some other Bodily Gesture. And accordingly his opinion was, as Proclus tell us, Chap. XVII. That Names are as well from Nature, as are the operations of Nature that go before them, as a Vocal Sound, or the Function of Seeing; for that the same thing that sees and hears, must also name the things it sees and hears; So that the Name Nature, is an effect or work of Nature.

III. Whence the variety of Names pro∣ceeds accor∣ding to Epi∣curus. For the variety of Names according to Epicurus, which is found in divers Nations, is to be ascrib'd to their different Temperaments, who being affe∣cted with different Passions, at the perceiving of things, did express one and the same thing diversly, that is, by a different Voice or Sound. Whence it came to pass that those Nations, who had no Commerce with others, still kept their own Idiom; whereas those that had more Communication with others, did take in some of their Words, which were unknown to their Forefathers.

IV. Names were imposed from Mens free choice. But whatsoever Epicurus may alledge to the contrary, the Names of things do not seem to pro∣ceed from Nature, but from the consent and agree∣ment

of Men. As may be proved first from Ho∣monymy or Equivocation, by which the same word is attributed to divers things; which was occasi∣on'd by Mens joyning the same sound to different Idea's, so that the same Sound agrees to many Things, not according to the same, but different Idea's. As for Example, this word Vacuum or an Empty space, according to the vulgar use signifies, a place in which nothing is contained, of that which we suppose ought to be in it: As when we say that a Ship is empty, because it hath no lading. But according to Philisophers, Vacuum signifies a place in which no bodily thing is contained. In the second place, that Names have their original from the voluntary imposition of Men, is apparent from Polyonymy, and Synonymy which attributes divers words to one and the same thing: As Liber, Codex, both which signifie a Book; Ensis, Gladius a Sword. Thirdly, The same may be proved from the changing of Words, by which sometimes one Word, and at other times another is given to the same thing: as now Aristocles, afterwards Plato; now Tyrtanus, then Euphrastus, and afterwards Theophrastus. Which would not happen so, if words owed their use to Nature, and not to the voluntary institution of Men.

V. Words sig∣nifie di∣versly a∣mongst di∣vers Na∣tions. Moreover we find by Experience, that Words have their signification from the imposition and will of Men, forasmuch as the same Word signi∣fies one thing in this Nation, and another in ano∣ther Nation. For what is more common than for a Name or Word, which before represented no∣thing to your Mind, now to signifie something from the institution of Men? For tho' words must be taken from the People, who have the Power of giving Law concerning them: Yet it is certain, that there is a kind of Speech proper only to those who follow some particulart Art or Calling. And tho' as Philo Judaeus saith, Speech be proper to Man, as Neighing to a Horse, Barking to a Dog, and Lowing to an Ox; yet is not the faculty of speaking Natural, as to the signification of speech, but only with respect to the sound of the Word. For the signification of every word doth not agree to it, by any force of Nature, but wholly depends on the free will of Men.

VI. Names are the Notes or Marks of our Con∣ceptions. WORDS therefore being instituted by Men, are the Notes, and Signs of our Conceptions, and therefore of the things themselves; whether they signifie our conceptions, or the things themselves. That they signifie the inward conceptions of our Mind, appears hence, that whenever we please, we can discover our Secrets, by words to others, they being the Interpreters of our Mind, which repre∣sents the image of our Thoughts. The word that sounds without, saith S. Austin 15 de Trin. Cap. XI. is a sign of the word, that lies hid within. For otherwise, except Words did intimate our Conceptions, there would be no such thing as a Lye, which con∣sists in this, that the Mind of a Man doth disagree with the words he utters; or when we have other conceptions in our Mind, than our words import.

VII. Names do also signifie the things themselves. And that Names do also signifie the things themselves, we can prove by experience; for be∣cause we cannot carry all things with us, we make use of words, for signs whereby to signifie absent things. For it is apparent, when any one calls for some particular Person, as for Example, Socrates, that the Name by which he calls him forth signi∣fies the thing which Socrates is; and when he commands him to come to him, to return answer, that the Thing is meant and not the Words. Hence the Scripture tells us, that GOD set all living Creatures before Adam, that he might give Names to them, conform to the Things themselves. So that it appears that Mankind makes use of Words to manifest their Conceptions, and the Things themselves.

VIII. To avoid the confu∣sion of Per∣ceptions, we ought to de∣fine our Words. But because when Words are wrongly under∣stood by us, it occasions great Confusion in our Idea's, and also in our Discourse, therefore we are used to define what we mean by our Words, and to declare what we would have to be understood by them. For it often happens, that one Word, signifies many Things, by which means, the Mind may be easily confounded, by applying it sometime to the one, and sometime to the other Idea. For example, The antient Philosophers perceiving that there was something in Man, that was the cause of Nutrition and Augmentation, called it the Soul, which Idea they afterwards attributed to Animals and Plants, as finding the same Faculty in them. And discovering also in Man a Principle of Cogita∣tion, they gave to it likewise the Name of Soul. And so from this Sameness of the Name, they took oc∣casion to confound the Principle of Cogitation with that of Nutrition, and Growth, and took Things wholly different to be one and the same: Which confusion can no otherwise be avoided, than by considering the word Soul, only as a Sound, de∣void of any meaning, and afterwards bestowing it upon that Thing alone which Thinketh, Saying, I call that the Soul, which is the Principle of Thinking in us.

IX. What the Definition of a Name is. And this is that which commonly is called the Definition of a Name, and is very familiar with Geometricians, by whom it is rightly made to be a kind of Principle. For it is in the Power of Men, to denote a certain Idea by certain Names or Words, and to apply them to what they have a mind. This being the difference between the Definition of a Name, and the Definition of a Thing, that it is not in the power of the Will of Man, to make the Idea contain what they please. For they must needs fall into Error, who going about to define Things, attribute any thing to their Idea's, which they do not contain. As for exam∣ple, If we deprive the name Parallelogram of its signification, and no longer consider it, as a Figure including Four sides, but consider it only as a naked Sound, or will have it to signifie a Triangle or Figure consisting of Three sides, we may do so, if we please, neither shall we thereby make our selves lyable to Error, as long as we make use of the word Parallelogram only to signifie a Figure contained within Three lines. And therefore we may say; A Parallelogram hath its Angles, equal to two Right ones, and that the greater Angle in a Parallelogram, is subtended by the greater side, &c. But if retaining the signification of the Word, and its ordinary Idea, which represents to us a Figure, whose opposite sides are Parallel, we should still assert that a Parallelogram is a Figure consisting of Three sides, we should fall into Error; for then we should not define a Name, but the Thing; seeing it is a contradiction, that a Figure consisting of Three lines should have its sides Pa∣rallel.

X. How the Definition of a Name, is distin∣guish'd from the Defi∣nition of a Thing. From hence it follows. First, That the Defini∣tion of Names cannot be called in question, be∣cause they depend on the will and choice of Man. For it cannot be denied, but that he who defines a Name, may give such a signification to the sound of the Word, as best pleaseth him, and maintain that signification, which he puts upon it. But this cannot be in the Definition of Things, which fre∣quently are controverted, for as much as they may be false, and represent the thing otherwise, than indeed it is.

XI. The Defini∣tions of things may be doubt∣ful. In the second place it follows, that since the Definitions of Names cannot be questioned, they are therefore to be lookt upon as Principles; which cannot by any means belong to the Definitions of Things, they being Propositions, which can be denied by those who find any obscurity in them, and therefore stand in need to be proved, as other Propositions; neither are they to be taken for grant∣ed, except they be self-evident, and partake of the clearness of Axioms.

XII. Whence Errors do arise in the common Philosophy. Wherefore they who are taught in the Aristotelean Philosophy, do doubly mistake, First, By con∣founding the Definition of a Thing, with the De∣finition of a Name, and attributing to the former, what only belongs to the latter; for after that they have alledg'd several Definitions, not of Names, but of Things, which are altogether false, and neither express the Essence of Things, nor the Idea's which we Naturally frame from them; they will needs have us to consider these Definitions, as so many Principles, or Perspicuous Notions, which no Man is able to gainsay; insomuch that if any one refuse to admit them for Principles, they are incensed, and do not think such a Person fit to be disputed with.

XIII. The necessi∣ty of Defin∣ing Names. Secondly, The common Philosophers are mi∣staken, in that they seldom or never have recourse to the Definition of Names, to rid them of all ob∣scurity, and to addict them to certain and clear Idea's, but leave them in their confusion and ob∣scurity. Hence it is that the greater part of their Disputations are no better than Contests about Words; which would be easily removed, if those Words that involve any obscurity were defined, and whatsoever makes their meaning doubtful and uncertain were removed. This will appear more fully by an Example: Philosophers suppose that nothing is more evident in Nature than that Fire is Hot; but except it be first cleared what we are to understand by Heat, we shall never know, how or in what regard Fire is said to be Hot. By Heat, therefore they do understand either a certain power, wherewith the Fire is endowed, to produce in us the sensation of Heat, and in this case they truly apprehend the thing as it is: Or else by Heat, they apprehend a certain Quality, like to the sensation they perceive, wherein they are mistaken, since that is obscure, neither can it any way be made out how Fire is Hot, after this manner. For tho' it be clear that the cause of that Motion which we experience in our Bodies, be in the Fire, yet have not we the least ground of evidence, that the Fire con∣tains any thing like that which we feel, when we stand near the Fire.

XIV. It is not necessary to defin•• all Names or Words. But tho' the Definition of Names contributs much towards the clear understanding of Things; yet it is not necessary to explain all Names by De∣finitions, because that would be often superfluous, and indeed is utterly impossible. For it is certain that Men have many Idea's that are so distinct, that those who understand the same Language, as soon as they hear the Names of Things, they immedi∣ately form the same Idea's. So they who hear those Names Entity or Being, Cogitation, Existence, Certainty, Equality, and such like, do immediatly apprehend the Things that answer to them in their Minds; and therefore it is superfluous to explain them by Logical Definitions, as being most simple Things, and such as are known of themselves. I said also that it was impossible to define all Names, forasmuch as to the explaining of any Word, we must make use of other Words, to determin the Idea's, to which the Words are addicted, and those Words again stand in need of other Words to explain them, so that it would be necessary to run into in∣finite. For this Reason we must keep to Primitive Words, and not easily change those which Use hath made to pass current amongst Men.

XV. In the use of words we are never to recede from the common re∣ceived Sense and mean∣ing of them. They are much in the wrong, who when any Word is to be defined, do not consider what Sense Men commonly attribute to it, and that as far as may be, they are never to recede from it. So he that would put the Name of Parallelogram upon a Triangle, would be accounted a Mad-man for his Pains, for contradicting the Etymology of the Word, and running Counter to common use and custom. In which regard the Chymists are great∣ly to be blamed, who without the least profit thence ensuing, have changed the Names of Things, and assigned others to them, which have no true Affinity at all with those Idea's to which they affix them. Thus by the Name of Sulphur (Brimstone) they do not understand that Thing, which the Vul∣gar know and call by that Name, but a liquid, odo∣rous, oleous and Inflammable Substance, which is the Glue that joyns the Parts of dry Things together: Neither do they by the word Mercury, understand Quicksilver, but a certain most subtil and clear Liquor, of an Acid or Sourish Taste, which readily Penetrates every where, and easily vanisheth away. And by the name of Water they understand another far more copious Liquor, which dissolves Salt, which cannot be dissolved by Sulphur or Mercury. Hence we infer

The last Rule of Truth.

XVI. The Tenth Rule of Truth. The Names of Things which we use in Philoso∣phizing, must be clear and determinate as to their Signification; not Obscure or Ambiguous.

For seeing that all the Things which we do heed∣fully Interpret, are delivered by us, in External Expressions, the highest excellency whereof is Per∣spicuity, it is necessary that we make use of fit and usual Words for the expressing of Things, and take care to give distinct Names to distinct Things.

The Second Part of Logick. Concerning the Right Judgment of the Mind; or Proposition.

CHAP. XI. Of Judgment, Absolute and Compared.

I. What Judgment is, and that Affirma∣tion and Negation belong to it. HAving thus informed our selves what Idea's are, and how they are distinguish'd from each other, the Order we have set our selves in the beginning of this Treatise of LO∣GICK, requires that we now speak of their Com∣position, whence JUDGMENT, or the Second Operation of the Mind, as others call it, doth pro∣ceed. And herein consists the whole Sum of our Knowledge; because when our Mind hath once past a firm and stable Judgment of any thing, it thinks it self arrived to the very Top of Science. To Judge therefore, is nothing else, than to assent to those Things, of which we have clear and di∣stinct Idea's; or to deny our assent to those things whilst the Idea's that represent them are obscure, and are perceived to be so. And therefore Judg∣ment is a kind of Composition, by which the Mind joyns one Idea with another by Affirmation, or separates it from another by Negation: As when from the Perception of the Sun and Light, he assents that the Sun is Lucid; or from the Perception of the Moon and Cheese, denies the Moon to be Cheese.

II. To Judg∣ment assent or dissent is required. For it is not sufficient to Judgment, to know two Idea's jointly; but it is necessary, that the one be conceived to be in the other, and that assent be given to Truth as soon as it appears: For an Affir∣mation and Negation appertain to the Essence of Judgment; neither can there be any Judgment without Assent or Dissent. Wherefore as long as a Man sticks in doubtful Enunciations, to which the Will doth not yet yield its assent, and being Un∣certain, enquires concerning the Truth of them, he cannot be said to Judge, till after a full determina∣tion of his Mind he affirms the thing to be, or de∣nies it to be such as he perceives it.

III. To the right forming of Judgment, it is first required, that the Under∣standing precede. To the right Forming of Judgment, it is requi∣red, First, That the Understanding do precede, and that the things be known, before that we affirm or deny any thing concerning them; since we cannot attribute ought to another thing, except we have first perceived them both. Wherefore in every Categorical or Simple Proposition, it behoves us to have a distinct Perception of the Terms, viz. the Subject and the Attribute, before we assent to the Conjunction of them; in every Hypothetical, of the Connexion of the Antecedent and Consequent; in a Modal, of the Mode and the Thing said; in a Disjunctive, of the Repugnance between the Ante∣cedent and the Consequent; in a Copulative, of their Simulty or Existing at one and the same time. And the same Caution is to be used in refusing our Assent to any Proposition; seeing that Men for want of this Observance fall into great Errors, and judge preposterously of things. How many are there that judge the Earth to be plain or level; that the Moon has the Figure of a Dish or Platter; that the Stars are very Little things, and that the Sun is much less than the Earth; because they never had a true Perception of any of these things, but trusting to their Infant Prejudices, believe nothing to be True, but what agrees with the re∣port of their Senses.

IV. Secondly, we must examine all things anew. Wherefore it is requisite in the next place, for the avoiding of all Mistakes in Judging, to take a firm Resolution, not to admit any of those things for Truth, which formerly we believed such, be∣fore we have called them to a fresh and accurate Account, according to the foresaid Rules or Precepts of clear and distinct Perception; and that we sus∣pend our Judgment, till we be certain of their Truth. For he who withholds his Assent is there∣by secured from Error; and he who assents to what he hath well understood, is so far from being Mistaken, that he embraces and enjoys Truth.

V. Thirdly, In passing our Judgment, we are to distinguish between Objects and Occasions. In the Third place, To avoid our mistake in Judging, we must distinguish between the Things and Occasions in which we are to pass our Judg∣ment: For either we are conversant about the Search of Truth, or about the things that belong to Life, and which are considered with relation to Practice. If we consider things under the first re∣spect, we must suspend our Judgment, when they are not fully known by us, that is, when any ob∣scurity or confusion appears in the things we have under Examination. If we consider them the Se∣cond way, we need not make use of so great Pre∣caution, especially when the necessity or opportu∣nity of Business doth not allow us sufficient time for an exact Disquisition; for otherwise we should often let slip an Occasion, before we could resolve our Doubts about the matter. Wherefore in cases where delays are prejudicial, it is best to examine the thing only so far as Time permits, and to em∣brace what appears for that time clearest and best to us. And having once past our Choice, we are no longer to consider it as Doubtful in reference to Practice; but as a thing most evident and cer∣tain, as if we had been assured of it by a clear and manifest Demonstration.

VI. What Com∣par'd, or Compara∣tive Judg∣ment is. Compared, or Relative Judgment, is between more things, which we refer to another Third thing; in which, if they agree, they are called the Same; but if they disagree, Diverse. For Com∣parison is not the simple Consideration of one thing, to which we Assent or Dissent; but the Comparing of one thing with another in Quantity or Quality: In Quantity, when we enquire not only of the Dimension, but of the Value, Virtue, or Perfection of a thing; for from hence comes the Equality and Inequality, Greater and Lesser. For things that are compared together in Quantity, are such as have either the same Quantity one as the other, or a greater or lesser.

VII. What things are even or Equal. Things that agree in the same Quantity, are called Even or Equal, because they are compared with respect to something, which is found in the things compared in an Equal Proportion. As at the Equinoxes, the Night is equal to the Day: Hector is equal to Achilles in Bodily Valour, For∣asmuch as by the Name of Quantity is not precisely to be understood Mathematical Magnitude, but any Equality or Inequality, whether it be mea∣surable, or not.

VIII. What Un∣even, or Unequal. What Greater. Things that differ in Quantity, are called Un∣even, or Unequal; and such are either Greater or Lesser. Things Greater, are such as exceed others in Quantity, or which by their Quantity, exceed the Quantity of those things wherewith they are compared.

IX. What Les∣ser. Those things are Lesser, which in Quantity are exceeded by others; For the Lesser is made use of to set forth the Greater Excellence, Dignity, Num∣ber, or Usefulness of the other. Thus Plato is said to be a more Excellent Philosopher than So∣crates: A Dog swifter than a Wolf. A Com∣parison in Quality is, when the Similitude, that is, the Proportion; or Dissimilitude, that is, the Dis∣proportion of things is consider'd. Where by the Name of Quality, we are not to understand a Physical or Natural, but a Logical Quality; such as is Affection, Nature, Faculty, Action, Passion, &c.

X. What things are Like. Hence those Things are called Like, which agree in Quality; or which being compared together, are found to have some like Affection or Faculty. As when we compare the Sun and the fix'd Stars, with respect to Light which is found in them both, we say they are like one another. For things com∣pared are not alike in all things, but differ also in many Specialties. But when we compare those parts or respects wherein they agree, from one Like we rightly conclude the other, because the Effects and Adjuncts of like Causes and Subjects are alike, and so on the contrary.

XI. What Un∣like. Those things are unlike whose Quality is diverse; or those are diverse Comparates, which differ in Qua∣lities, Actions, and Passions. So, A Wise man is unlike to the Moon; A Constant man is unlike to a Reed shaken with the Wind. Hence from things that are Unlike, Unlike things are concluded; be∣cause the Effects of Unlike Causes are unlike, as are the Adjuncts of unlike Subjects, and on the contrary. Wherefore because a Reed is easily driven this way and that way by the Wind; and S. John is not so easily shaken, therefore in this regard, S. John and a Reed are unlike. Here we are to take notice, that the Unlikeness is to be restrained within the bounds of that Quality, wherein the Comparison is made.

CHAP. XII. What a Proposition is, and how manifold.

I. What things make up a Propo∣sition. A Proposition, or Enunciation, according to Aristotle, is an Oration or Speech, which affirms or denies; or an Oration, that signifies either true or false. From which Definition it clearly appears, that to every Proposition two Forms at least are required; the One, of which something is affirmed or denied, which Term is called Subject; the Other, which is said or denied of another, which Term is called the Attribute: As when I say, God is Existing; God is the Subject, and Existing the Predicate.

II. The word Is, joyns the Predi∣cute with the Sub∣ject. But because it is not sufficient to conceive these two Terms, except by our Cogitation they be joyned together, or disjoyned; the word Is, is the Sign of the Mind's affirming, that is, of joyning these two Idea's of God and Existing, as agreeing together. But when I say, God is not finite, the word Is, joyned with the Negative Particle Not, imports an Action contrary to Affirmation, on denotes, that we look upon these two Idea's as repugnant; forasmuch as in the conception of Finiteness something is included, which is contrary to the Nature of God.

III. A Proposi∣sition doth not always stand in need of an Attribute, Subject, and some∣thing to joyn them both. Yet some times we express Propositions after another manner: As when we say, Charles walk∣eth; Injustice thrives amongst men; because under these words, as well the Connecting word Is, as the Predicate are contained: And therefore these Pro∣positions are the same as if one should say, Charles is walking; Injustice is thriving amonst men: Yea, it is customary with Logicians, as often as the word Is, is used without any Predicate following it, to understand the Predicate to be comprehended under it: For this Proposition, Man is, is resolvable into this other, Man is existing. It matters not therefore whether a Proposition consist of Three words, as Charles is walking, or of Two, as Charles walketh, or One word only, as Ambulo, I walk, the Latin word including all the Parts of a Propo∣sition in it.

IV. A Proposi∣tion is either Af∣firmative or Nega∣tive. From this Explication of a Proposition it follows, that all Propositions are either Affirmative or Ne∣gative: For since the Judgment of our Mind is twofold, viz. Assent and Dissent, Propositions which are the Interpreters of it, must likewise be divided into Affirmative and Negative. Which indeed is the first and chiefest Division of them, as being taken from the Copula or Connecting word it self, or from that Action of the Mind, which either joyns the Attribute with the Subject, or sepa∣rates it from it.

Wherefore concerning the Judgment of an Affirmative and Negative Proposition, let this be.

The First Rule.

V. The First Rule. That is an Affirmative Proposition in which the Subject and Attribute are joyned, or do agree; and Negative, in which they are disjoyned, or dis∣agree.

VI. Explica∣tion of the Rule. For a Thing is then affirmed to be what it is, when the Predicate or Attribute agrees with the Subject, or when it is one and the same thing with it: As when we say, Man is an Animal. But a thing is pronounced not to be, what it is not, when the Attribute differs from the Subject, and agrees not with it: As when we say, Man is not a Beast, because Man is declared not to be such, as indeed he is not. This Division of a Proposition is accord∣ing to Quality; because when any one asks, of what kind the Proposition is, it is answered, Affir∣mative or Negative.

VII. In an Af∣firmative Proposition the Attri∣bute is re∣strained. We are to observe, that in an Affirmative Pro∣position the Attribute is to be taken in all its Com∣prehension, but not in all its Latitude. As when I say, Every Circle is a Figure; whatsoever is con∣tained in the Idea or Essence of a Figure, the same is affirmed of a Circle; but yet the word Figure is not taken in its whole Latitude, for it is of much larger extent than that of Circle; and there∣fore this Proposition cannot be simply converted in saying, Every Figure is a Circle. Wherefore in this Proposition the Attribute is restrained by the Subject, and reacheth no farther than the Sub∣ject doth.

VIII. But not in a Nega∣tive. But the case is different in a Negative Proposi∣tion; as, No Circle is a Square: For here the At∣tribute is taken in its whole Latitude; so as that we may say as well, that No Square is a Circle, and all Squares must be denied of a Circle. But the Attribute is not taken according to the whole Com∣prehension of its Idea, as if all the Attributes of a Square, were to be denied of a Circle: For a Circle and Square agree in the Idea or Notion of Figure.

IX. There are Propositions Universal, Particular and Singu∣lar. There is another Distinction between Propositi∣ons, which ariseth from the Subjects, that go before the Copular according to which they are called, Uni∣versal, Particular, or Singular. An Universal Proposition is that to whose Subject a Note of Uni∣versality is annexed; such as Every or All, None: As, Every Man has a Soul; because Man is a com∣mon Term, which is taken in its whole Latiude. But when a common Term is only taken in an un∣determinate part of its Extension, with these Notes; Some, Some Body, &c. then it constitutes a Parti∣cular Proposition, whether it Affirm, as Some Lo∣vers are miserable; or deny as, Some Courtiers are unjust. But if the Subject of the Proposition be Par∣ticular, it makes a Singular Proposition, as Charles. I. now Reigneth in England. And this Distribution of a Proposition, into Universal, Particular and Singular, is said to be made with respect to Quan∣tity, because when any one asks Quanta (of what extent) the Proposition is, we fitly answer, that it is Universal, Particular or Singular.

The Second Rule. Concerning the Judgment of an Ʋniversal, Particular and Singular Proposition.

X. The Second Rule. The value of these Propositions is to be Estima∣ted, from the Extension and Limitation of the Sub∣ject and Attribute.

XI. Universali∣ty is tow∣fold, Meta∣physical and Moral. That we may the more exactly distinguish Universal Propositions from Particular, we are to take notice of a two-fold Universality, the one Metaphysical, the other Moral. Metaphysical Uni∣versality, is when a thing is taken according to its whole Extension, without any Exception: As, Every Body is Extended: For this admits no Ex∣ception. Moral Universality is that which hath Exception; because in Moral Things, it is only minded whether things be so for the most part, as they are declared to be. As if one should say, All Singers have this fault, that they never will be entreated to Sing, but when not entreated, they can never leave Singing: Because it is sufficient if it commonly be so. For seeing that such Proposi∣tions as these, are not so general but that they ad∣mit of Exception, nothing can be rigorously infer'd from them; since it may be false of this or the other particular Singer, that he will never be Entreated to Sing, and never cease Singing when not Entreated.

XII. Propositions of the Sin∣gulars com∣prehended under one Genus. There are other Propositions that are Universal de Generibus Singulorum, but not de Singulis Gene∣rum, that is, of all the Species contained under one Genus; but not of all the Particulars of the same kind: As, when it is said that all living Creatures were saved in the Ark of Noah, which is not so to be understood, as if all, of all the Species of Animals had been shut up in the Ark, in the time of the Deluge; but only that some of all kinds were there saved.

XIII. Propositions Indefinite. Besides the Universal, Particular and Singular Propositions, there are those which are called Inde∣finite, which tho' they have an Universal Subject; Yet the same is taken neither Universally nor Parti∣cularly, but Indeterminately: As, Man is a Living Creature. A Triangle has Three Angles equal to Two Right ones. Because no Universal Note as Every, None, or Particular, as Some, Some one, is put before Man and Triangle.

XIV. Of Proposi∣tions, some are Simple and others Compound. A Proposition in general is divided into Simple and Compound. That is a Simple Proposition, which consists only of one Subject and Predicate: As, Man is a Living Creature. A Loadstone draws Iron. Compound Propositions are such as con∣sist of more Subjects and Predicats: As, Peter and John, went up at the ninth Hour of Prayer. Where this Attribute went up, is not affirmed of one Sub∣ject, but of more than one, viz. Peter and John. And such Propositions as these are Equivalent to two or more Propositions; for if this Proposition were to be explained, we must do it by these two Proposi∣tions, Peter went up, John went up.

XV. Words Ad∣jective make a Complex or Compound Term. Words Adjective, or Connotative, make a Com∣plex Term, whether they be put alone, or joyn'd with Substantives. For the Word Wise, doth con∣fusedly signifie the thing in which Wisdom is; but denotes Wisdom distinctly. And when I say, a Wise Man, in these two Words a kind of Propo∣sition is contained: For it comes to the same thing whether I say, a Wise Man, or a Man that is Wise. Wherefore every Adjective or Connotative Term, doth include a Proposition, which since it accedes from without, to the Proposition called Principal, it may be rightly called an Adjunct, or Incident Proposition.

The Third Rule. Of the Judgment of a Simple and Compound Proposition.

XVI. The Third Rule. The Simplicity or Composition of a Proposition is taken from the Combination or Disjunction of the Terms, that is, of the Subject and Predicate, whe∣ther the same be single or manifold.

XVII. Compound Propositions are many∣fold. Compound Propositions are of two kinds; for some are such in which the Composition is Evident; others again in which it is more hid, which the Logicians therefore call Exponibiles: Of the first sort are Propositions, Copulative, Disjunctive, Con∣ditional, Causal, Relative, and Discretive.

XVIII. Of Com∣pound Pro∣positions some are Copulative. Copulative Propositions are such as include more Subjects and Predicates, joyned by an Affirmative or Negative Conjunction. As when I say, the Sun and Moon Illuminate the Earth; for here I joyn Sun and Moon together, and affirm of them both, that they Illuminate the Earth. For the parts of a Co∣pulative Proposition, are entire simple Propositions, which have another Predicate or Subject.

XIX. Some Dis∣junctive. Disjunctive Propositions are those in which the Disjunctive Note or, either, whether, and the like is found; As, a Man either has, or has not a Child. Either the Earth is mov'd about the Sun, or the Sun about the Earth. The truth of which Propo∣sitions, depends upon the necessary Opposition of the Parts, between which no Medium can be assigned. And therefore this Disjunctive Proposi∣tion, It is either a Man, or an Animal, is false, because the Parts are not opposite to each other. As is likewise this, It is either Peace or War, because there may be a Truce or Cessation of Arms, which is a Mean between War and Peace. So that to the absolute Truth of Disjunctive Propositions, it is necessary that they have no Mean at all; but to their being Morally true it is sufficient, if com∣monly they have none.

XX. Others Con∣ditional. Conditional Propositions consist of two Proposi∣tions, joyned by the Conditional If, as; If God be merciful, he will forgive Sinners: If that be a

Triangle, it hath three Angles equal to two Right ones. The First, In which the Conditional is put, is called the Antecedent, and the other the Conse∣quent. And it is to be noted, that the Truth of an Hypothetical or Conditional Proposition, doth not consist in the Truth of the Antecedent or Conse∣quent, but in the Union and Knitting of them both by the Conditional If; for a Conditional Pro∣position may be true, tho' both its Parts be false; as If a Tree walks it hath Feet.

XXI. Others Cau∣sal. Causal Propositions, are such as contain two Pro∣positions, joyned by the Causal Conjunctions Because, That; As, A Covetous Man loves no Body, because he confides only in himself. Kings are often raised to a Throne, that they may be miserable. For to the Truth of such Propositions as these it is requisit, that the one of them be the cause of the other, and therefore both of them must be True: For what is false hath no Cause, neither can it be the Cause of another thing.

XXII. Others Re∣lative. Relative Propositions, are known by some Note of Comparison; as Where the Treasure is, there is the Heart also. A Woman is so far to be esteemed, as she is Vertuous.

XXIII. Others Dis∣cretive. Lastly, Discretive Propositions, are such in which we frame different Judgments, and determine the said Difference by such Signs as these, But, Yet; As, Tho' GOD be Merciful, yet he is Just. The beloved thing may be separated from a Lover, but Love not. The Truth of these depends on the Truth of their Parts, and of the separation which is put between them. Tho' both the Parts were true, yet because there is no opposition between them, this would be a ridiculous Proposition: A Covetous Man Loves Riches, and yet cannot endure that any one should be Liberal towards the Poor. A Discretive is the only Proposition that is excluded from the Composition of a Syllogism.

XXIV. Of Proposi∣tions some are Subal∣tern, Con∣trary, Sub∣contrary, and Con∣tradictory. Amongst Propositions that have the same Terms, and disposed in the same Order, but modified with various Quantity or Quality, are reckon'd up the Subaltern, Contrary, Subcontrary and Contradi∣ctory. Subaltern Propositions are an Universal, and particular of the same Quality: As, Every Circle is a Figure; some one Circle is a Figure. Contrary, are two Universal Propositions of divers Qualities: As, Every Man is Rich, No Man is Rich; which may be both false. Subcontrary Propositions, are two particulars of divers Qualities; As, Some one Man is a Physician; Some one Man is no Physician. Contradictory are such as differ in Quantity as well as Quality; As, Every Man is a Living Crea∣ture, Some one Man is no Living Creature: Which cannot both of them be true, nor both false.

CHAP. XIII. Concerning the Truth and Falshood of Pro∣positions.

I. Truth is found in three things TIs commonly said that Truth and Falshood are found in these three Things; viz. In the Mind, in Things, and in Propositions. Truth is in the Mind, as in its Subject: So things are said to be true, in the Divine Intellect, because they had there from Eternity, their objective and known Being: Which does not properly place any Eternity in them, but in God. Things are said to be True, when they have such an Essence as they ought to have, or when they comport with their Idea; and those false which disagree with their Definition or Es∣sence. So GOD answers to that Idea, which he himself hath of a Being, Infinite, Immense, Eternal, &c. But the Sun is no true God, because it differs from that form of Cogitation which we have concerning God.

II. Wherein the Truth and Fals∣hood of a Proposition doth consist. The Truth of a Proposition, consists in this, that it pronounceth a Thing to be such as it is: As when I say, the Earth is Round, it is a true Proposition, because I Affirm that of the Earth, which be∣longs to it, viz. a Round Figure. So likewise when I say, A Beast is not Rational, it is a true Proposition, because I remove from a Brute what does not belong to it. Wherefore Truth is said to be the Property of a Proposition, and to which it pe∣culiarly doth belong. For since a Proposition is either Affirmative or Negative, that wherein the Attribute is affirmed to be in the Subject, is True, that is, con∣formable to the Object, if it be really in it; and False if it be not in it. And so a Negative Proposition, in which the Attribute is denied to be in the Subject, is True if it be not in it; but False if it be in it.

III. Truth is ei∣ther obje∣ctive or Subjective, which is also called Formal. The Truth which consists in the Connexion or dissent of both extreams, is called Objective; but Subjective or Formal Truth, is the Judgment or Act of the Mind, by which the extreams of a Proposition are joyned together; or disjoyned as far as the Judgment agrees with the thing it self.

IV. One and the same Pro∣position can∣not be true and false at one and the same time. The same Proposition cannot be both True and False, for then Contradictories would exist together: For suppose some Affirmative Propo∣sition; if it be true, the Attribute agrees with the Subject; if False, it doth not agree. And there∣fore, if we should suppose it to be True and False at once, then must it at the same time agree and not agree. Now it is a contradiction that the same thing should agree and disagree with the same thing; or that the same Attribute should be, and not be in the same Subject. It follows also, that we cannot at the same time Assent to, and Dissent from the same thing, because both those Judgments are op∣posite, and that the one excludes the other: Which would happen, if the same Affirmative Proposition, were at the same time True and False; for we should assent to it, if the Attribute did agree with the Subject; and should deny our assent, if it did not agree; which plainly implies a Contradiction.

V. An Objecti∣on answer∣ed. If you object, this Copulative Proposition, Clau∣dius and Theophilus Gaze upon the Stars, when only one of them beholds the Stars, will be both True and False; seeing it is True, that the one be∣holds the Stars, and the other not. I answer, that this Proposition to speak absolutely is False, foras∣much as Copulative Propositions import a Sameness of Time, and their Truth depends on both ex∣tremes, so that if one of them doth not agree with its Attribute, it renders the Proposition False. As, suppose any one should say, A Good Life and Riches are necessary to Salvation, this Proposition would be False, because that tho' a Good Life be necessary to Salvation, yet Riches are not. But if we take this Proposition without including any Sameness of time, then it will furnish us with two Mental Propositions, and so it will be True, Clau∣dius Gazeth on the Stars, and Theophilus does not; and on the contrary.

VI. Propositions necessarely true, and necessarily false. Tho' it be necessary that all Propositions be either True or False, yet are not all equally true and certain: Or which is the same, the Attributes do not agree with the Subjects in the like degree of

necessity. For some Attributes are after that man∣ner in their Subjects, that their Subjects cannot be without them: As Extension, with respect to Bodily Substance; Cogitation, in reference to the Soul: And therefore this Proposition, A Body is an extended Substance; A Soul is a thinking Sub∣stance, are called necessary, because their Predicats and Subjects are united by an Indissoluble Band. Whereas other Attributes are at such a distance from those Subjects, that its impossible for them to agree with them, as a Stone with relation to Man; Unevenness with respect to the Number Two; and therefore these Propositions, Man is a Stone; The Number Two is Uneven, are said to be necessarily false; because there is a manifest Repugnance, that the Predicate Stone should agree with Man, and Unevenness with the Number Two. Both these kind of Propositions, by reason of the immutable Consent or Dissent of their Terms, are said to be of Eternal Truth.

The Fourth Rule. Concerning the Judgment, or a Proposition necessarily true or false.

VII. The Fourth Rule. That Proposition, whether Affirmative or Nega∣tive, is true, wherein things to be joyned, because of the immediate and indissoluble Band of the Terms, that is, of the Subject and Predicate, are conjoyned universally of themselves, and recipro∣cally; or are disjoyned, because of the incompossibility or repugnancy of their Terms. And on the other hand, That Proposition is false, wherein Things to be joyned are disjoyned, and things Dissentaneous conjoyned.

VIII. The Rule explained. For seeing that Objective Truth consists in the Agreement or disagreement of both Extreams, viz. of the Subject and Attribute, it must follow that that Proposition in which things consentane∣ous are Conjoyned, because of their indissoluble Connexion, is necessarily true: As, Man is a living Creature; because Man, without a living Creature, cannot be. And, Man is not a Beast, is necessarily true; because it is repugnant that Man should partake of the Nature of a Beast. In like manner these Propositions, Man is not a living Creature, and Man is a Beast, are necessarily false; because it is a contradiction that living Creature should be separate from Man, or that Man should be a Beast.

The Fifth Rule.

IX. The Fifth Rule. That Proposition, whether Affirmative or Nega∣tive, is contingently true, wherein the Subject and Attribute do only sometimes agree, or not agree, because of their separable connexion; and that false, in which the thing is otherwise exprest than it is, whether it be propounded Affirmatively, by con∣joyning things which are to be disjoyned; or Nega∣tively by disjoyning things to be conjoyned.

So this Proposition, The Air is enlightned, or Man runs, is only contingently true; because the Subject in the first Proposition, viz. Air, may be without its Attribute, as being but sometimes en∣lightned: And the Subject in the second Propositi∣on, viz. Man, may likewise be without its Attribute, seeing it is but sometimes that he Runs. But if any one, whilst the Air is enlightned, should say the Air is not enlightned, the Proposition will be false; be∣cause he separates Light from the Air, which then agrees to it: Or if when it is dark, he should say, The Air is Light; because he joyns things that ought to be disjoyned.

X. What Opi∣nion, Science and Error is. Hence it appears, what is a probable Proposition and Opinion, as also what Science and Error is. For seeing that the probability of a Proposition consists in this, that it approacheth more to Evi∣dence than Obscurity, that Proposition is to be ac∣counted probable to which the Mind assents, be∣cause of the likelyhood there is of the Attributes agreeing with the Subject, or on the contrary, of the Attributes disagreeing with the Subject. Whereas Science is, when the Truth of a thing is certainly and evidently perceived by Reason. For since the certainty of a Proposition depends of its Evidence, that Proposition is accounted certain to which the Mind firmly adheres, and whose Attribute it judges doth necessarily agree with the Subject. And lastly, Error is, when the Mind assents to a false Proposition for a false Reason, which it ap∣prehends to be a true one.

XI. Contingent Propositi∣ons, are dis∣junctively necessarily true or false. There are other Propositions, which tho' they be neither necessarily true nor false, yet must needs be either true or false disjunctively; such are those Propositions whose Predicats do only contingently agree with their Subjects, and may be absent or separate from them: As, Rich, Powerful, Married, &c. with respect to Man. Wherefore these Propo∣sitions, Croesus is rich; Caligula is powerful; Tho∣mas is a Husband; are said to be Contingent, that is, they are true in such a manner, as that they may be false; and yet it is necessary for them to be either true or false separately: Because every Pro∣position, in contingent matter, is either true or false disjunctively, that is, cannot be deny'd to be either true or false. It may indeed be deny'd, that such a Proposition is necessarily true or necessarily false; but it cannot be deny'd, but that it must be either necessarily true, or necessarily false disjunctively.

XII. A true Contingent Proposition, cannot be changed into a false one. A true Proposition in Contingent Matter, can∣not be changed into a false one. Which is thus proved; because if this Proposition, for Example, John walketh, be true, tho' but in one instant of time, yet it cannot be said to be false in that very instant wherein it is true: But it is true at one in∣stant; therefore for that instant it cannot be false. Moreover, this Proposition considers John walking such a time, at which time wherein he is supposed to walk, it is always true; or if it signifie another time, in which it may be John doth not walk, in that case the Object is changed, and therefore is not the same, but another Proposition.

XIII. Objection. If you say, That during the Time wherein this Proposition, John walks, is pronounc'd, John, who before walked, may cease from motion, and rest; and thus this Proposition, John walks, which before was true, will be changed into a false one.

XIV. Answer. To this I answer, That tho' at that time wherein this Proposition, John walks, is pronoun∣ced, John may cease to walk; yet the Proposition continues true notwithstanding, if once it was true: Because it either determines the time wherein he walks, or that wherein he did walk, and in this re∣spect the Proposition is true; or else absolutely de∣notes some difference of time in reference to which it is verified, and therefore with respect to that Time wherein he hath walked, is true.

XV. Propositions concerning a future Contingen∣cy, have a determi∣nate truth or falshood. The Difficulty is greater concerning the truth of Propositions of a future Contingent: For it is evident enough, that of opposit Propositions of the Present time, one is true and the other false: As, Peter speaks, and Peter doth not speak: But it may be doubted, whether the same truth be found in those Propositions that respect the Future time; As, Peter will speak to Morrow; Peter will not speak to Morrow. But it seems certain, that Propo∣sitions of a future Contingent, have a determinate truth or falsity: For supposing Peter to exist, these two Propositions, He shall speak, He shall not speak, are contradictory: Now as two Contradictories cannot be together, so it is impossible they should be both of them true, and therefore one or other must be true only; and therefore Peter will either speak, or not speak; if he does, the Proposition is true; if he does not speak, it is false: So that one of them is determinately true, and the other false. Again, such as are the Propositions of the Present or Past time, with respect to Truth, or Falshood, such are the Propositions of the Future: But one of these is determinately true, and the other false; Therefore, &c. The Major is clear: For he that pro∣nounceth that a thing will be, and that it will not be, doth speak as true, as he who pronounceth that a thing is, and that it is not; or that a thing was, or that it was not, because it is necessary that one of them must come to pass.

XVI. Yet is is not necessa∣ry, that it be known which of them is true. Neither doth it hinder, that we know not which of the Propositions be true, and which false: Be∣cause the Truth of Propositions doth not depend upon its being known, or unknown; but upon the Being, or not Being of the thing. Besides, it is certain, that GOD knows which of them is true, and that he can reveal the same to whomsover he pleaseth.

CHAP. XIV. Of Division, and Definition.

I. Transition, or Connex∣ion of the following Matter, with what goes before. HAving explained the Nature of Propositions, and clearly and distinctly unfolded their Affections of Affirmation and Negation, Univer∣sality and Particularity, Truth and Falshood; it only now remains, that we add something con∣cerning Distribution and Definition, which are ac∣counted the most Scientifical, or conducive to Science of all other Propositions; and are nothing else, but Tokens or Instances of a clear and distinct Perception; or, if you will, they are Primary Enun∣ciations, Axioms of solid Judgment, and Maxims worthy of all belief.

II. What Di∣vision is. DIVISION therefore is the Distribution of some Whole into Parts; As, of a Living Creature into Man and Beast; of Number into Even and Uneven. Now Division will not a little conduce to our acquiring a clear and distinct Knowledge of Things, if so be we know how dexterously to make use of it. For seeing that almost in every Object there are many things to be considered, which because of the Difficulties wherewith they are involved, cannot be clearly apprehended by us; it is needful to resolve them into Parts, that so having by Division removed all Confusion, the Particulars may more clearly appear such as they are.

III. Division is either Real, or Mental. Division is twofold, the one Real, the other Mental: The Real is, whereby a Whole is really and indeed divided into Parts; as a House into the Roof, Walls, Foundation, &c. of which it consists. A Mental Division is, when we divide a Whole only by the help of our Understanding: As when we consider in GOD, his Goodness, Omnipotence, Eternity. For it doth not always follow, that the thing which our Mind distributes into Parts, is compounded and divisible; but that only our Conception of it is compounded, and unable to understand so many Attributes under one and the same Notion.

IV. The Pri∣mary Di∣vision of Genus and Species; and of an Integral, and Essen∣tial Whole. Division is manifold, according to the threefold kind of a Whole and its Parts. For it is either of the Whole Genus into its inferiour Species, or of the Species into its Individuals: As the Division of Substance into Mind and Body; of Mind, into an Angel, or Man's Soul: The other is of an In∣tegral Whole into its Parts; which is properly to be called Partition: As the Division of the Body of Man into Head, Teeth, Hands, and Arms. The third and last, is the Division of an Essential into its Essential Parts; as the division of Man into Mind and Body. And these Three are called Primary Divisions.

V. The Diffe∣rence be∣tween the Division of a Genus into Spe∣cies, and of a Whole into its Members. There is this difference between the two former Divisions: In the Division of a Genus into Species, and of a Species into Individuals; the thing Divi∣ded may in the Nominative Case be predicated, of the several Parts that divide it: As when Living Creature is divided into Man and Beast, Living Creature is exprest in the Nominative of Man and Beast; as Man is a Living Creature; a Beast is a Living Creature. But in the Division of an In∣tegral into its Members, the thing divided cannot be predicated of the Dividing Members, but in an Oblique case; as when a Body is divided into Head, Breast, Belly, &c. it cannot be pronounced of the Parts, but in an Oblique: For we cannot say, the Head is the Body, the Belly is the Body, but part of the Body. And the reason of this difference is, because the whole Essence of the Genus is included in the Species, whereas the Nature of the Whole is not in every Part.

VI. The Secon∣dary Divi∣sion of an Accident into Sub∣jects, or contrari∣wise. The other Divisions are called Secondary; as a Division of an Accident into the Subjects, in which it is found. As if we should say of the things that are moved, one is the Earth, another is the Moon, &c. A Second, is the division of a Sub∣ject into its Accidents; as when a Subject is ranged or distributed according to its Accidents. As for Example, Some men are Learned, others Ignorant; some Good, and others Wicked. The Third, of an Accident into its Accidents; by which an Ac∣cident is divided, not by its own Differences, but by other Accidents of a different kind: As when we say of White things, some are hard, others soft, &c.

VII. Conditions of a good Division. The First. Moreover, there are some Conditions required to the constituting of a right Division. First, That all and every one of its Parts be exactly enume∣rated, without omitting any that belong to it; so that the Dividing Members may exhaust the Di∣vided Whole, and neither be more extended or contracted than it: As, Even, and Uneven, do com∣prehend the whole extent of this Term, Number, seeing there is no Number which is not in it self either Even, or Uneven.

VIII. The Second. The Second is, That both parts of the Division, be as far as may be expressed in positive Terms. For the Attributes of a thing that is distributed,

may be better understood by Positive Terms, than by Negative. I add, as far as may be, because it sometimes happens, that the Positive Thing wants a Positive Name, and so we are forced to use a Negative in the dividing of it: As when we divide Living Creature into Rational and Irrational: Or Substance into Material and Immaterial.

IX. The Third. The Third Condition is, That the Whole be distributed into its nearest Parts: According to this Rule, it would not be well done to divide Sub∣stance into Rational and Irrational; because these are not immediately contained under Substance, but under Living Creature.

The Sixth Rule. Of the Judgment of Distribution.

X. The Sixth Rule. That Distribution or Division is the most perfect of all, which doth honestly and equally divide a Whole into its Parts; whether it be a Genus into Species, or an Integral into its dividing Members, or a Subject with respect to its Accidents, or an Accident into the Subject, to which by the Right of Division they belong.

XI. Explication of the Rule. Thus the most perfect Distribution of a Genus is, when all its Species are Enumerated: As if one should say of Living Creatures, some Walk, others Fly, others Swim, others Creep, and others are Plant-Animals. An Integral Whole is well divided, when all the Parts that constitute it are in∣stanc'd: As the Parts of a Man are, Head, Breast, Belly, Arms, Legs, &c. That is a perfect Distribution of a Subject, with respect to its Adjuncts, when the Adjuncts are reduc'd to certain Heads, and these again subdivided into others: As when we say, In Man there are some Adjuncts of the Soul, and others of the Body; those of the Soul, are Knowledge, Virtue, &c. those of the Body are Health, Beauty, Tallness, Strength, &c.

XII. What a De∣finition is, and of what Parts it consists. DEFINITION is that which manifests the Nature of Things, shewing why they are, and how they are distinguisht from others. There are two things principally that constitute a Definition, Genus and Difference. By the first we understand the agreeableness which the Thing Defined hath with others, that are of the like nature with it. By the Difference we are informed, how it differs from the same, and what Rank it keeps amongst Real Beings. As for Example, when we define Man to be a Reasonable Living Creature; by a Living Creature which is the next Genus of Man, we understand something that is common to other things like unto us, viz. the Beasts. And by Reasonable, which is the Difference, we clearly perceive our Distinction from them; forasmuch as no Beasts are partakers of Reason. Definition there∣fore is that, which by exhibiting the Essential Parts of the Thing Defined, expresseth its Nature; as in the foregoing Example.

XIII. In Defini∣tions we must make use of the nearest Ge∣nus. We are to observe, that every Genus is not suffi∣cient to lay open the Nature of a Thing, but the Nearest only: Partly, because it contains all the Genera above it, so that by expressing it we include all the rest: For he that affirms Man to be an Ani∣mal, doth consequently affirm him to be Living, Corporeal and a Substance, and whatsoever else can be imagined higher. Partly, because there is no other Genus can more fitly be joyned with the Specifical Difference, than the nearest, nor which doth more correspond with it.

XIV. Of Defini∣tions some are Essen∣tial, others Accidental. Amongst Definitions some are Essential, which properly deserve the Name of Definition; and are those which are explained by their Essential De∣grees. By Essential Degrees, I mean Essential Attributes, which constitute the Nature or Essence of a thing. And these are only Genus and Differ∣ence, as, Animal and Reasonable with respect to Man. Other Definitions are Accidental and less exact, which express the thing by some Properties or External Causes, as when we define Man, to be a Creature made after the likeness of God. For tho' Property be an Essential Attribute, yet not in that Sense as if it did constitute the Essence or Nature of a Thing, but because it immediately follows the Nature of a thing already constituted: As, Parti∣tion and Mobility with relation to a Body. Where∣fore the first Definition is called a Perfect Defini∣tion, because it consists only of Causes that do con∣stitute the Essence, and by them doth most fully and perfectly lay open the Nature of the thing: Whereas the second Definition is called imperfect, or a Description, because it defines and explains the Thing by other ways, than by its Causes.

XV. What things are required to a p••rfect Definition. Yet we are not to think, that all things that are objected to the Mind, may be comprehended in a Definition; but it is required, that the Thing which is to be defined be One, that is of one Essence; for those Things which involve a manyfold. Nature, cannot be manifested by a Genus and Difference. The Second is, That it be Universal; for seeing that Definition is a Declaration of the Nature of a Thing, it is necessary that we divest it of all par∣ticular Circumstances, that it may be viewed such as it is. Thirdly, No Universal Nature but a Species can be exactly defined; and that because nothing but a Species can consist of a Genus and Difference; and therefore seeing that the Supream Genus does want them, it follows that the Things which are defined must be either Species of the lowest Rank, or Inter∣mediate: Which also will but be obscurely defined, without their immediate Genus and nearest Difference.

XVI▪ Rules of a right Defi∣nition. The First There are Rules and Precepts of a right Definition. First, That the Definition must be of the same ex∣tent with the Thing defined, and agree to all those things which the Thing defined agrees with. As for Example, because Animal agrees to a Man, there∣fore a Corporeal Substance endowed with Life, Sense and Motion, which is the Definition of an Animal, must agree to Man also.

XVII. The Second Secondly, That nothing be wanting or redound∣ing in the Definition, but that only those Words be made use of, that are necessary for the explain∣ing of its Nature: Wherefore this Definition of a Man, That he is a Reasonable, Mortal Animal, is Superfluous, because the Word Mortal is not needful to the Definition of a Man.

The Third. The Third, That the Definition consist of that which is more known: For seeing that a Definition is declarative of the Essence, it must therefore em∣ploy clearer Terms; lest we should be guilty of endeavouring to explain an unknown thing, by that which is more unknown, and so instead of attaining a clear and distinct Perception, should fall into Obscurity and Confusion. Wherefore the common Definition of time, that it is, The Number or Measure of Motion, cannot be good, seeing it is evi∣dent, or apparent, that Time doth as well Measure Rest, as Motion, since we say, as well that a thing hath rested so long, as that it hath been in Motion for that time.

[illustration]

[illustration]

Booke 1. Part 1. Chap 12.

G. Freman Inv.

I. Kip Sculp.

To the R^t. Worshipfull S^r. William Thomson Knight, their Majesties Sergeant at Law, only Son and Heyre of Henry Thomson of Hollin Hall near Rippon in yorkshire Gent, by Elizabeth Daughter and Coheyre of S^r. Henry Blencow, of Blencow in Cum∣berland Knight.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated, by Richard Blome.

The Seventh Rule. Concerning the Judgment of Definition.

XIX. The Se∣veath Rule. That Definition is the most perfect and consum∣mate of all others, which defines the Thing by its Essential Attributes, or constituent causes of its Nature and Essence.

As if one should define the Soul to be a Cogitating Substance, or a Body to be a Substance consisting of three Dimensions. Because Substance as the Genus doth constitute the Soul and Body; and Cogitation as the Difference, distinguisheth the Soul from the Body; As Extension in Length, Breadth and Depth, doth difference the Body from the Soul: Neither is there any thing else required to the understand∣ing of them both.

The Third Part of Logick. Concerning the Minds Ratioci∣nation, Syllogism.

CHAP. XV. Of Reasoning or Argumentation.

I. What it is to Reason or Discourse HAving spoken of Idea's which represent Substance, and their Modes, and concern∣ing the Judgment and Axioms which arise from their Connexion, it now remains to ex∣plain what Reasoning or Ratiocination is, or that Judgment, by which from one Axiom, another is gathered or inferred. For to Reason is nothing else than from a thing known to derive the Knowledge of another: And Reasoning is nothing else, than the Knowledge of one thing deduc'd from the Know∣ledge of another: As when a Man infers the Hea∣ven to be extended, because all Bodies are extend∣ed. And therefore this Judgment is called Diano∣etick or Discursive, because the Mind by it runs from one thing to another, and from the Antecedent is lead to the Consequent.

II. What it is that Argu∣mentation superadds to Judg∣ment. Wherefore as Judgment, or the second Opera∣tion of the Mind, superadds to the first, which is Perception, Assertion, that is, Assent or Adhesion to Truth: So Ratiocination adds to them both, De∣duction, Illation, &c.

III. What thingsare to be minded in Dis¦course. In every Argumentation there are two Things chiefly to be minded, the Question it self, that is propounded, and the Argument or Reason that proves the same, or which confirms that which is doubtful, by those things that are certain and evi∣dent, and from the Question produceth an un∣doubted Conclusion. Accordingly in every Argu∣mentation there are two things, that which infers, and that which is inferr'd; that which is gathered, and that from whence it is gathered, howsoever these parts may be disposed or exprest.

IV. Ratiocina∣tion con∣tains two Parts. Hence it is that every Argumentation consists of two Parts, viz. of an Antecedent and Conse∣quent, or the Part inferring and that which is in∣ferr'd. That goes before for the confirming of something else; this follows and is gathered from the former: As, when I say, An Angel is Imma∣terial; and therefore is Indivisible. For the first Part, viz. An Angel is Immaterial, is the Ante∣cedent, and the other, An Angel is Indivisible is the Consequent: And the word Therefore is the Sign of the Inference, or formal Consecution.

V. The Pre∣misses in is be more known thar. the Con∣clusion. It is requisit to the Notion of an Antecedent, from which a certain Conclusion may be deduced, that it be better known and more evident to us; for otherwise it will not conduce to that which we would infer thence. For the Order of Science re∣quires, that beginning from the Easiest things, we proceed by degrees to those which are more diffi∣cult to be known. Wherefore, to discourse readily, it is needful that we have ready at hand a Stock of many Axioms, Springing from the Complexion of the Things we have clearly and distinctly con∣ceived, that may serve us instead of Principles, and by whose helps we may arrive to the knowledge of things more abstruse. For we must not pro∣miscuously make use of any known and certain Propositions to infer any thing; but it is requisit that between them there be some Connexions by means whereof, this rather than any thing else may be gathered or inferr'd from it. Because there is a Consequence assigned to every Argumentation, yea a necessity of Consequence, which doth not only depend on the Order of Knowledge, but also on the Na∣tural Connexion of the Things that are to be known.

VI. Reasonings or Argu∣mentations differs in Truth. All Argumentations have not the same force; for seeing that the Judgments of which they are com∣pounded, have not the same Connexion, they must needs according to the variety of Propositions, pro∣duce various kinds of Reasoning. For Consequences that are deduc'd from Contingent Premisses, can∣not have so great Truth and Certainty as those, which are inferr'd from Necessary Premisses, and which cannot be otherwise. By Example, this Proposition, Sempronia Loves her Childeren, deduced from this Antecedent, every Mother Loves her Childeren, differs from this, Peter is an Animal, which is deduced from this Antecedent, A Man is an Animal: Because the certainty we have that a Man is an Animal, is Metyphysical; Seeing we cannot conceive a Man any otherwise. And there∣fore this Proposition, A Man is an Animal, is so True, that it can never be false: Whereas the cer∣tainty we have, that Mothers Love their Childeren, is only Moral, since it can happen that some Women may not Love their Children.

VII The Defini∣tion of an Argumen∣tation in general. An Argumentation in general, is a Speech wherein from certain Propositions expressly or tacitly premised, An other Proposition distinct from those premisses is necessarily inferred, by Reason of the due Disposi∣tion of them.

VIII. What the Major Pre∣position is. If there be just three Propositions in the Argumen∣tation, The first is called the Major, because in it the Major Term is disposed with the Mean or Me∣dium. And by some it is called only The Proposition, by way of Excellence, because it propounds the Foundation of the whole Argumentation.

IX. What the Minor is. The Second is called the Minor, in which the Minor Term is disposed with the Medium. It is by some called Assumption, because it is assum'd or taken in as a help, to infer the Third, or Conclusion.

X. What the Conclusion is. The Third is called Conclusion, in which the Minor and Major Terms are disposed. And is by some termed the Question, because it contains that whose Truth was enquired after, as also the Infer∣ence or Consequence, because it is inferr'd and follows from what went before, and that by the illative Con∣junction Therefore, &c.

XI. The two Propositions must go be∣fore in eve∣ry 〈◊〉〈◊〉. The two first Propositions are called Premisses, because they must Precede the Conclusion, at least in our Conception, in as much as it necessarily fol∣lows from them; because it is impossible, supposing

the Truth of the Premisses, that the Conclusion should not be true. Yet it is not necessary, that in every Argumentation the Premisses should be ex∣pressed, since frequently one alone is sufficient, to make the Understanding, tho' somewhat confu∣sedly, to conceive both. For he who from this Antecedent, Every Stone is a Body, deduceth this Consequence, A Diamond is a Body, had a con∣fused Knowledge thereof in the Antecedent, where∣in it is implicitly contained. And he that from this Proposition, A Body is a Substance, infers, that A Diamond is a Substance, by knowing it to be a Body, knows it to be a Substance.

XII. In every Argumen∣mentation are found three Ide∣a's. Every Argumentation consists of three Idea's; the Minor Extream, or Idea, which is the Subject of the Question, or Conclusion, and is also called the Minor Term; because the Subject is of less extent than the Predicat: The Major Extream, or Idea, which is the Predicat, and which is also called the Major Term, because it is of larger extent than the Subject: And the Mean, or Me∣dium, which is twice put in the Premisses, and is that which joyns both Idea's together; as in this Argumentation:

• Every Intellectual Substance is Cogitative,
• The Mind is an Intellectual Substance;
• Therefore the Mind is Cogitative.

Here Intellectual Substance is the Middle Term; Cogitative, the Major Extream; and Mind, the Minor Extream.

XIII. Why there are three Idea's re∣quired in every Ar∣gumenta∣tation. The Reason why these Three are required in every Argumentation is hinted by Aristotle, when he saith, That we meet with Three things in every Science, or Demonstration, viz. the Subject, of which the Attribute is demonstrated: The Pro∣perty it self, or Attribute, which agrees with the Subject; and the Reason, or Principle, which makes out this Agreement of the Affection with the Sub¦ject. So that the Subject, of which the Demon∣stration is made, is the Less Extream; the Attri∣bute, or Affection, which is prov'd, the Greater Extream; and the Common Term, wherewith the Subject and Attribute are joyned together, is the Argument, or Middle Term.

XIV. The matter explained by an Ex∣ample. For Example: This Question is propounded to be explained, whether the Earth be Round; and the thing required is, That from the Doubtful Que∣stion a certain Conclusion be deduced: The Earth ir the Subject or Minor Extream; Roundness is the Affection, or Property, to be demonstrated; and I am to find out a Medium, by which it may appear that the Attribute agrees with the Subject. Which may be this: That the Shadow of the Earth, as appears in a Lunar Eclipse, is Round, for the Shadow inti∣mates the figure of Opaque Bodies: From which accordingly this Syllogism may be framed.

• A Body whose Shadow is round, must it self be round also.
• But the Earth is a Body, whose Shadow is round.
• Therefore the Earth is round.

XV. Somtimes more than three Idea's are found in an Ar∣gumenta∣tion. But notwithstanding that an Argumentation is made up of three Propositions, yet many more may be added to them, without any Redundance or Defect; as long as the Precepts of Ratiocina∣tion are but observed. For if the Third Idea, which we have taken to discern whether the Attri∣bute agree with the Subject, or be removed from it, after having compared it with both the Ex∣treams, do not give us a clear discerning, whether it agree with it or no; we may assume another fourth Term, to procure a further clearness; and if that be not yet sufficient, may proceed to a fifth, until we come to some Term, which may joyn the Attribute of the Conclusion with the Subject. As, supposing a Man should doubt whether Courtiers be miserable, he may consider that Courtiers are subject to many Passions, as Ambition, Envy, &c. and if he thinks this not to be sufficient, to prove them to be miserable, he may further examine what it is to be subject to Ambition, Envy, &c. which if he does, he shall find that it is continually to hanker after Honour, to be grieved at the prosperity of others, &c. and that such a Condition as this cannot but be obnoxious to many Miseries; whence he may form this Argumentation: Courtiers are tormented with Ambition and Envy, and they that are so, are in continual Trouble, and they that are in continual Trouble, are miserable: Therefore Courtiers are miserable.

XVI. The Divi∣sion of an Argumen∣tation into Perfect and Imperfect. Argumentation in General, is divided into Per∣fect, and Imperfect. Perfect Argumentation is a Syllogism, which forasmuch as it consists of Three Propositions, duly disposed, is of a perfect Form, and most proper to persuade. An Imperfect Ar∣gumentation is, either an Enthymeme, an Induction, an Example, a Dilemma, or a Sorites, whose Form is less accurate, and not so accommodate to persuade as the Perfect. We shall first treat of a Syllogism, and afterwards proceed to the rest.

CHAP. XVI. Of Simple Syllogisms; and those either Complex, or Incomplex.

I. What Sim∣ple, and what Con∣junct Syl∣logisms are. OF SYLLOGISMS, some are Simple, others are Conjunct. Simple Syllogisms are such, in which the Medium is only joyned to one Term of the Conclusion at once: Conjunct are those in which the Medium is at once joyned with both Extreams. Accordingly this Syllogism:

• Every Planet is enlighted by the Sun:
• Saturn is a Planet:
• Therefore Saturn is enlightned by the Sun.

Is Simple, because the Medium, viz. Planet is separately joyned with the Term Saturn, which is the Subject of the Conclusion. But for the con∣trary Reason this Syllogism:

• If a Covetous man serves Mammon, he cannot obey the Law of God;
• But a Covetous man serves Mammon:
• Therefore a Covetous man cannot obey the Law of God.

Is Conjunct, because a Covetous man, which is the Subject of the Conclusion, and cannot obey the Law of God, which is the Predicat, are both joyned with the Medium, s••rves Mammon, in the Major Proposition. Of this latter sort we shall speak in the next Chapter.

II. There are two sorts of Simple Syllogisms. A Simple Syllogism is divided into two other kinds: For there are some, in which tho' the Con∣clusion be Complex, that is, composed of Complex Terms; yet one part only of its Subject or Pre∣dicat is taken, to be joyned with the Medium in one Proposition; and the rest, which is no more than one Term, is taken and joyned in the other Pro∣position: As in this Syllogism;

• The Divine Law requires us, to honour Kings;
• Charles the Second is a King:
• Therefore the Divine Law requires us to honour Charles the Second.

There be others again, in which each whole Term of the Conclusion is joyned with the Medium; to wit, the Attribute in the Major, and the Subject in the Minor. The former are called Complex, the latter Incomplex: And of these two kinds of Simple Syllogisms, we shall speak under this Head.

III. The Defini∣tion of a Simple Syllogism, A Simple Syllogism therefore is a Perfect Argu∣mentation, in which from two Propositions premi∣sed in the Antecedent, the Conclusion or Conse∣quent necessarily follows, in case the two fore∣going Propositions have been granted. I have said in the Definition, That the Conclusion necessa∣rily follows from the Premisses; because our assent to the Premisses necessitates the Conclusion, not only as to Species, as they call it, but as to Exercise. For the Knowing Faculty acts necessarily, that is, supposing all Requisites necessary for Operation, cannot chuse but operate: But when the Major and Minor are granted, there is nothing more wanting to infer the Conclusion; therefore the Un∣derstanding cannot but infer it.

IV. The Under∣standing cannot but assent to a Proposition that is clear and evident. Neither is it any obstacle to what hath been said, that the Understanding is subject to the Will: For this is false, whenever the Object is evidently and distinctly propounded to it; because in that case it is forced to assent by the Evidence of of the thing. For we often experience in our selves, that the Understanding cannot be restrained from giving its assent to a Proposition which appears clear and manifest to it; tho' the Will may some∣times indirectly hinder it, by diverring it, and busying it about other Objects: But this it cannot do directly, by commanding it not to assent to the Conclusion; because the Understanding doth not follow the command of the Will in things that are Evident, but only in those that are obscure and doubtful.

V. The Form of a Syl∣logism. The Form of a Syllogism, is the Regular dispo∣sition of the three Propositions, so that the Conclu∣sion may necessarily follow from the Premisses; which consists in this, that the Middle Term be fitly ranked with the two Extreams, that is, with the Major and Minor; and also that the Proposi∣tions be orderly placed, as to Quantity, that is, Uni∣versality and Singularity; and Quality, that is Af∣firmation and Negation. The former of these, which is the Disposition of the Terms, is called Figure; the latter, which is the Determination of the Propositions, is called the Mode of a Syllogism. So that the Figure respects the remote Matter of a Syllogism, viz. the Three Terms, the Middle Term, and both Extreams; whereas the Modus regards the next Matter of a Syllogism, viz. the Three Propositions, the Major, Minor, and Con∣clusion.

VI. The three Figures of Syllogisms. There be three Figures of Syllogisms: The First is, when the Middle Term is the Subject in the Major, and the Praedicat in the Minor. The Second, when the Middle Term is the Praedicat in both Premisses. The Third is, when the Middle Term is the Subject in them both.

VII. Of the Modes of Syllogisms. There are reckoned 21 Modes of Syllogisms, which may be reduced to 14.

The Modes of the First Figure, are Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio.

Of the Second, Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco.

Of the Third; Darapti, Felapton, Disamus, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.

The Modes of the first Figure are called Di∣rect and Perfect, because all manner of Questions, whether Affirmative or Negative, Universal or Particular, may be concluded by it. Whereas in the Second, Negatives only; and in the Third, Particulars only can be inferr'd. In all the fore∣going Artificial Words there are Three Syllables, whereof the first signifies the Major, the second the Minor, and the third the Conclusion; and the Vowel of each Syllable shews what Quantity and Quality the Proposition must be of. For A sig∣nifies an Universal affirming; E, an Universal de∣nying; I, a Particular affirming; and O, a Par∣ticular denying Proposition, according to the com∣mon Distick.

Asserit A, negat E, verum Generaliter ambo: Asserit I, negat O, sed Particulariter ambo.

A affirms, E denies, but Generally both: I affirms, O denies, but Specially both.

For the further clearing of the Figures of Syllogisms, I shall add Examples of the Modes of each Figure.

The First Figure.

• * 1.2* 1.3 Every Body is extended,
• Every Stone is a Body;
• Therefore every Stone is extended.

• * 1.4No Mode is a Substance,
• Every Figure is a Mode;
• Therefore No Figure is a Substance.

• * 1.5Every thing that is mov'd, is moved by another,
• Some Body is mov'd;
• Therefore some Body is mov'd by another.

• * 1.6No Spirit is Material,
• Some Substance is a Spirit;
• Therefore some Substance is not Material.

IX. On what Principles the first Figure is grounded. The force of the first Figure is grounded on the Dictum de Omni, and Dictum de Nullo. The Dictum de Omni is this: Whatsoever is Univer∣sally affirmed of an Universal, is also affirmed of that which is contained under that Universal: As of a Body, it is universally affirmed that it is Ex∣tended; which must▪ therefore also be affirmed of a Stone, which is contained under it. Dictum de Nullo is, when whatsoever is universally deny'd of an Universal, is also deny'd of that that which is comprehended under that Universal: As when every Substance is deny'd to be a Mode, and Figure is contain'd under the Notion of a Mode; there∣fore Figure is denied to be a Substance.

• * 1.7* 1.8 No Stone is a Plant,
• Every Oak is a Plant;
• Therefore no Oak is a Stone.

• * 1.9Every Body is divisible,
• No Point is divisible;
• Therefore no Point is a Body.

• * 1.10No Impenitent person shall be saved,
• Some man shall be saved;
• Therefore some man is not an Impenitent person.

• * 1.11Every ••niversal is communicable to more than one,
• Some Nature is not communicable to more than one;
• Therefore some Nature is not Universal.

* 1.12 The Third Figure.

• * 1.13Every Body is divisible,
• Every Body is a Substance;
• Therefore some Substance is divisible.

• * 1.14No Angel is circumscrib'd by place,
• Every Angel is Finite;
• Therefore something that is finite, is not circumscrib'd by Place.

• * 1.15Some Number may be increased,
• Every Number is an Affection of things;
• Therefore some Affection of things may be increased.

• * 1.16Every one that serves God is a King,
• Some one that serves God is poor;
• Therefore some one that is poor, is a King.

• * 1.17Some Folly is not to be blamed,
• Every Folly is a defect of right Reason;
• Therefore some defect of right Reason is not to be blamed.

• * 1.18No heavy Body tends downward of its own accord.
• Some heavy Body is Matter;
• Therefore some Matter doth not tend down∣ward of its own accord.

XII. Galens Fourth Fi∣gure. The Fourth Figure is said to be Galen's, and is when the Medium is predicated in the Major Pro∣position, and subjected in the Minor; which tho' it concludes necessarily, yet (as Averrhoes saith) with some Machination or difficulty, and besides Expe∣ctation.

General Rules of Syllogisms.

XIII. The Rules of Syllo∣gisms. Forasmuch as all Conclusions cannot be deduced from any Premisses: There are some Common Rules, which are to be observed in all Syllogisms.

XIV. The First. The First is this, The Middle Term must he distributed, that is, it cannot be twice taken par∣ticularly, but must once at least be taken generally.

For should the Medium be twice taken particu∣larly, as it must be when the Premisses are parti∣cular, it may be taken for divers parts of the same Whole; because Particulars are distinct, and so nothing will be concluded, or at least nothing necessarily concluded. Which is sufficient to make an Argumentation faulty, since that only is called a good Syllogism, whose Conclusion, if the Premisses be true, cannot be false. And therefore this Argument,

• Some Body is Triangular,
• Some Body is Spherical;
• Therefore some Spherical Body is Triangular.

For since Body is taken here for divers parts of Bodies, a Spherical cannot be joyned with a Trian∣gular; because the same Body which is Spherical, cannot also be Triangular.

XV. The Second Rule. The Second, From pure Negatives nothing can be concluded. The Reason is, because two Nega∣tive Propositions separate the Subject from the Me∣dium, and the Attribute also: Now from the se∣paration of two things from the same Thing, it doth not follow, that they are the same Thing, or that they are not the same Thing. As for Example, from these Propositions that the Mind, is not the Body, and that the Body is not capable of Percep∣tion, it doth not follow, that the Mind is not capa∣ble of Perception.

XVI. The Third. The Third, The extreams of the Conclusion, must not be more Universally taken, than they were taken in the Premisses.

Wherefore when either of the Extreams is taken Universally, the Argumentation must needs be false, if it be taken particularly in the two first Proposi∣tions. The Reason of this Rule is deducible from the first, because it is irregular to Argue from a Particular, to an Universal. For from this, that some Men are given to Drink Wine, it cannot be con∣cluded, that all Men are given to Drink Wine.

XVII. The Fourth. The Fourth, The Conclusion always follows the weaker part of the Premisses. That is, if either of the Premisses be Negative, the Conclusion must be so also; and if either of the Premisses be Particu∣lar, the Conclusion must be Particular also.

The Reason of this Rule is, because where there is a Negative Proposition in Syllogism, the Medium is removed from one of the extreams of the Conclusion, and therefore can never joyn them together, which is required to make an Affirmative Conclusion; and if either of the Propositions be particular, no Universal Conclusion can be deduced from them. For if the Universal Conclusion be Affirmative, the Middle Term being Universal, must also in the Assumption or Minor Proposition be Universal, and therefore must be its Subject, since the Attribute, in Affirmative Propositions, is never taken Uni∣versally; wherefore the Medium joyned to the Sub∣ject, will be particular in the Minor; and so the Universal will be in the Major; for otherwise it would be twice particular: And therefore it will be the Subject, and therefore that Major, must be likewise Universal. So that there can be no particular Proposition in an Affirmative Argumen∣tation, whose Conclusion is Universal.

Of Complex Syllogisms.

XVIII. What Com∣plex Syllo∣gisms are. From what hath been said, may easily be under∣stood what Complex Syllogisms are: For they are not so called, because they consist of Compound Pro∣positions, but because the Terms of their Conclusi∣ons are Complex, and are not taken entire in each of the Premisset, in order to their being united with the Medium, but only one part of their Terms: As in this Example.

• Gold is an Inanimate Thing,
• Covetous Men worship Gold;
• Therefore Covetous Men worship an Inaminate Thing.

In which Syllogism the Attribute of the Conclusion is, Worship an Inaminate Thing, whereof only some part is put in the Major, viz. an Inaminate Thing, and Worship in the Minor.

XIX. Complex Syllogisms are to be reduced. These Syllogisms in the Conversation and Dis∣courses of Men, are more frequent than Incomplex ones, which are seldom or never used, except it be in the Schools? For who ever in common Speech, heard a Man Discourse at this rate: Every Stone is a Body, A Diamond is a Stone; therefore a Dia∣mond is a Body. And tho' Complex Syllogisms seem at the first sight, to deviate from the Rules of Figures, yet they appear to be true, when they are reduced to Incomplex ones. For this Syllogism,

• The Scripture Commands us to Honour Kings.
• ...

• Charles the Second is a King,
• Therefore the Scripture Commands us to Honour Charles the Second.

Tho' it be in the Second Figure, in which it is repugnant for all the Propositions to be Affirmative, yet it is for all that a true Syllogism, because in this Proposition, The Scripture Commands us to Honour Kings; the word Kings, is taken for all Kings in particular, and therefore Charles the Second is reckoned amongst them, that are to be Honour'd. Besides King, which is the Middle Term, is not the Attribute in this Enuntiation; the Scripture Commands us to Honour Kings, tho' it be united to the Attribute Commands. For that which truly is the Attribute, is affirmed and agrees: But King is neither affirmed, nor agrees, that is, it i•• not here annexed to Scripture, which is the Subject. Again, the Attribute is restrain'd by the Subject, but the term King, is not restrain'd in this Proposition; The Scripture Commands us to Honour Kings, be∣cause it is taken Universally. Wherefore we must say, that it is the Subject of another Proposition involved in it, as if I should say, The Scripture Com∣mands that Kings be Honoured. So that this whole Argument consists in these Propositions,

• Kings are to be Honoured,
• Charles the Second is a King;
• Therefore Charles the Second is to be Honoured.

And therefore this Proposition, The Scripture Com∣mands, which before was look'd upon as Principal, is only incident to this Argumentation, and is joyned to the Affirmation, to which the Scripture is added as a Proof. Whence it is manifest, that this Argu∣ment is of the first Figure, and in Barbara, be∣cause that Singulars are esteemed Universals, when they are made use of in their whole Latitude.

CHAP. XVII. Of conjoynd or Compound Syllogisms.

I. What is required to make a Compound Syllogism. COnjoynd or Compound Syllogisms are those in which the Major is so compounded, that it contains the whole Conclusion. And because the Major Proposition of such Syllogisms is four-fold, viz. Conditional, Copulative, Disjunctive and Proportional or Analogical, therefore they constitute four kind of Syllogisms, Conditional, Copulative, Disjunctive, and Analogical.

II. Conditional Syllogisms. Conditional Syllogisms are those in which the Major Proposition is Conditional, and contains the whole Conclusion, As

• If the Soul of Man be Corporeal, it may be di∣vided into Parts,
• But the Soul of Man cannot be divided into Parts,
• Therefore it is not Corporeal.

The Major consists of two Propositions; the first is the Antecedent, If the Mind of Man be Corpo∣real; the second, the Consequent, it may be divid∣ed into Parts.

III. The twofold Figure of Condition∣als. The Figure of Conditionals may be two-fold; the first is, when the Antecedent of the Major, or Principal Proposition, is put in the Minor or less Principal, so as that the Consequent of the same may be put into the Conclusion; as in this Syllo∣gism:

• If created things cannot subsist of themselves, it is necessary that they be preserved by God,
• But created things, cannot subsist of themselves,
• Therefore it is necessary that they be preserved by God.

IV. The Maxim of the first sort of Con∣ditional Syllogisms. And this sort of Argument is founded upon this Maxim; where the Antecedent is put the Conse∣quent must be put also.

The other Figure is when the Consequence of the said Major Proposition, is taken away, that the Antecedent may be taken away also; As,

• If John doth Marry this Woman, he is unwise,
• But John is not unwise,
• Therefore John doth not Marry this Woman.

V. The Maxim of the other sort of Con∣ditional, Syllogisms. This kind of Argumentation is founded on this Maxim; Where the Consequent is taken away, the Antecedent must be taken away likewise. Now to put the Antecedent or Consequent, is to Affirm that which is Affirm'd, and to Deny that which is Denied: And to take them away, is to Deny that which is Affirm'd, or Affirm that which is Denied. Or to speak more distinctly, to put, is to Affirm the Antecedent that hath been Affirm'd; or to Deny the Antecedent that hath been Denied; and on the contrary to remove, or take away, is to Deny the Affirm'd Consequent, or to Affirm the Denied Consequent. So that he also takes away that Affirms, that which was Denied before. As for Example, If an Angel hath not Organs, he doth not Feel: But he hath not Organs, Therefore he doth not Feel, Is a Syllogism deduced from the Position of the Antecedent, to the Position of the Consequent, notwithstanding that it proceed by way of Negation.

VI. Conditional Arguments may be faulty two manner of ways. Conditional Arguments become faulty, these two manner of ways; the one is when from a true Major, a false Conclusion is deduced: As when the Antecedent is inferred from the Consequent: As if one should say;

• If a Stone be a Living thing, it is a Substance,
• But a Stone is a Substance,
• Therefore it is a Living thing.

And another way, when from the Negation of the Antecedent, is inferred, the Negation of the Consequent; As in the same Example,

• If a Stone be a Living thing, it is a Substance,
• But a Stone is not a Living thing,
• Therefore it is not a Substance.

VII. What Co∣pulative Syllogisms are. Copulative Syllogisms are only of one sort, as when in a Copulative Proposition Negative, one part is put, to take away, or remove the other: As,

• The same Body cannot be at the same time, both Round and Plain;
• But the Earth is Round,
• Therefore it is not Plain.

Because these Syllogisms do not necessarily con∣clude, when one part is taken away, and the other is put in its place; as appears in this Argument, taken from the same Proposition.

• The same Body cannot be both Plain and Round,
• But the Earth is not Round,
• Therefore it is Plain.

VIII. What Dis∣junctive Syllogisms are. Disjunctive Syllogisms are such whose first Pro∣position is Disjunctive, that is, whose Parts are joyn∣ed with the Disjunctive, or, either.

• Death happens to Man either by default of the Soul, or of the Body;
• ...

• But it doth not happen by default of the Soul,
• Therefore by default of the Body.

IX. Their Fi∣gure is twofold. The Figure of Disjunctive Syllogisms is two∣fold; the one, when one part is taken away, that the other may be put; as in the Example before alledg'd: The other, when one part is put, that the other may be taken away: As,

• They who first gave us an account of Antipodes, either spoke the Truth, or imposed upon us;
• But they spoke the Truth,
• Therefore they did not impose upon us.

A Disjunctive Syllogism is grounded on this Prin∣ciple, that two Contradictions cannot be true at the same time. Wherefore it is necessary, that the Parts of a Disjunctive Proposition must be Repug∣nant, so as that when one is put, the other is remov'd; and when one is remov'd, the other is put, as in the alledged Examples. When it happens, that there be more Parts of the Disjunction than two, one of them must be opposed to all the rest; as if one should make this Proposition:

It is either Winter, or Summer, or Spring, or Autumn,

One part only must be put in the Assumption or Mi∣nor Proposition; that so in the Conclusion, the rest may be taken away; As thus,

It is Winter, therefore it is neither Summer, nor Spring, nor Autumn,

Or else the rest must be taken away in the Assump∣tion, that one Member may be put in the Conclu∣sion; thus,

It is neither Summer, nor Spring, nor Autumn, therefore it is Winter.

X. How Ana∣logical Syl∣logisms are formed. To these we may add Proportional or Analogi∣cal Syllogisms, in which the Analogy and Propor∣tion is dilated, or Adjuncts are explained. For Pro∣portions here spoken of is nothing else, than the agreement of Relatives. As when from four Rela∣tives; as for Example, four Numbers, 2, 4, 3, 6, we say that the same is the Relation of the half, and double, between 2 and 4, as between 3 and 6. Or when in a Triangular Figure, considering the two Angles of it, and the two opposit Sides; we assert the Relation of Equality and Inequality to be the same, as there is between Side and Side. The First and Third, are by Geometricians commonly called Antecedents, as the Second and Fourth Con∣sequents, because they follow from the former.

XI. What Ana∣logical Syl∣logisms are. SYLLOGISMS are called Proportional or Analogical, when the Proportion set down in the Major Proposition, is protracted, or dilated: Which then happens, when the Consequents in the Minor, being taken for Antecedents, are further referred to other Consequents: And then conclude, that there is alike Proportion between the first Antecedents, as between the latter Consequents. As when we say, 2 are to 4, as 3 are to 6, and 4 are to 8, as 6 to 12. Therefore 2 are to 8, as 3 to 12. Because in this way of Discourse, it is made clear, that 4 and 6, which are the Consequents in the Major Proposi∣tion, are made the Antecedents in the Minor: And because the Relates are the Middle Terms, to which the Extreams (viz. the Antecedents and Conse∣quents) are joyned, therefore we infer, that the Ex∣treams themselves, agree also. And such Syllo∣gisms as these, are said to conclude equally; foras∣much as in them, both the Relations as they begin in the same manner, so likewise they proceed and end, in the same manner.

XII. The Second way of forming Proportio∣nal Syllo∣gisms. Analogical Syllogisms are also formed in this manner, when after that a like Proportion hath been set down in the Major Proposition, an Adjunct is taken up in the Minor, by which the Proportion is rendred more evident, which therefore so agrees to one Antecedent, with respect to its Consequent, that thence we conclude, that it also agrees with another Antecedent, with respect to its Consequent. For if one should call at Pleasure two Sides of a Triangle, A, B, and the two opposit Angles, C, D, and then argue thus: The Side A is to the Side B, as is the Angle C to the Angle D; but the Angle C is greater than the Angle D; therefore the Side A is greater than the Side B. For by this Term Greater, it is clearly explained wherein the Pro∣portion consists.

XIII. The Third way. Thirdly, Proportional Syllogisms are made by the Commutation of Proportions; viz. when a Propor∣tion being set down in a like manner in the Major Proposition, the Minor is past by in Silence, and the Relates are so inverted, that they are mu∣tually concluded of each other. This way of Ar∣guing is often used by Geometricians, and more especially by Arithmeticians: As when they reason thus; There is the same Proportion betwixt 2 and 4, as betwixt 3 and 6, and therefore 4 are to 2, as 6 are to 3; because that Maxim is impli∣citly understood, that Like things agree with their Like reciprocally.

CHAP. XVIII. Of Imperfect Argumentations.

I. What Im∣perfect Argumen∣tations are. SOme Argumentations are called Imperfect, not with respect to the Matter whereof they are composed; but with regard to the Form, which is not so exact in them, but less digested than that of a Syllogism. For in these the Antecedent consists expresly but of One Proposition, or of Many: Such are Enthymeme, Induction, Example, Sorites, and Dilemma.

II. What an Enthy∣meme is. An ENTHYMEME seems to have taken its Name from this, that it expresseth only One Propo∣sition, and suppresseth the other, as being too clear and obvious, and which is easily understood by those we discourse with. This way of Arguing is very common among Men, who in their usual Reasoning commonly suppress the Proposition, as supposing that they to whom they speak will easily supply it: As when we say,

I was able to save thee,

And therefore also to ruin thee.

In which Argumentation there is only one of the Premisses express'd, and the other supprest or imply'd, which when added it affords this Perfect Syllogism.

• Whosoever was able to save thee, was also able to ruin thee;
• But I was able to save thee,
• Therefore I was also able to ruin thee.

III. Induction. INDUCTION is an Argumentation, which from many Singulars concludes an Universal: As,

This Triangular consists of three Lines, and so doth that likewise, and all the rest; therefore every Triangle consists of three Lines.

To this way of Reasoning it is required, that it contain an enumeration of all the Species and Parts; for if but one be wanting, it admits of an Ex∣ception, and subverts the whole Proposition. Where∣fore nothing can certainly be proved by Induction, except the same be whole and compleat in all its Parts, and so General, as to admit no Exception, which is very difficult, and almost impossible. For who can recollect in his Mind all the Cases of Law? or what Student of Natural Philosophy, can reckon up all the several kinds of Bodies, all Plants, Animals, Stars, &c.? Are not almost all Men of Opinion, that Heat dilates, and Cold con∣tracts? Yet when we search more narrowly into the matter, we find that when Water is frozen, it takes up more space than when it is not frozen? Wherefore in cases where the greatest part of Par∣ticulars is only known, we can infer no more but thus; that for the most part it is so: Tho' some∣times we meetwith some Special Cases, which swerve from the Common Rule. So from many Experi∣ments we conclude, Snow to be white, a Crow black, and Honey sweet; notwithstanding that in some Countries there be found red Snow, white Crows, and bitter Hony.

IV. What Ex∣ample is. EXAMPLE is a kind of Imperfect Argu∣mentation, whereby from one Singular we gather another, because of a likeness of Reason that is be∣tween them. As when from this, That Caesar subdued the People of Rome more by his Clemency, than by his Arms; I gather, that a Prince ought rather to have recourse to Clemency, than to Arms, for the reducing of his Subjects. Or when con∣sidering that others, by serious Meditation have arrived to some degree of Learning; I infer, that I my self also may arrive at the same by closely following my Studies, and by an attentive Consi∣deration of the Things I undertake to examine.

V. Argument from Au∣thority. To an Example belongs that which is called an Argument from Authority; which is, when we make use of the Testimony of one or more, to infer a Conclusion; whose force depends of a con∣cealed, but yet imply'd Proposition: As when a Man saith, Archimedes, and other famous Mathe∣maticians assert, that the Sun is many times bigger than the Earth: Therefore we ought to hold the Sun to be many times greater than the Earth. For here this Proposition is understood, That every man ought to be belived in his own Art and Pro∣fession: Or we are to take that for Truth, which Archimedes, and the most Learned Mathematici∣ans do assert of their own Art.

VI. Sorites. SORITES, is an Argumentation consisting of many Propositions so disposed, that the Predicat of the foregoing Proposition becomes the Subject of the following; whence the last Predicat is in the Conclusion attributed to the first Subject: As in this Example, Covetous persons desire many things, They who desire many things want many things, They who want many things are miserable; therefore Covetous men are miserable.

VII. When a Sorites doth not conclude truly. This Argument doth not conclude truly, but when whatsoever is said of the Attribute, is like∣wise said of the Subject: Wherefore this Ratioci∣nation, Salt-meat excites to drink, and by drinking Thirst is extinguish'd; therefore Salt-meat extin∣guisheth Thirst, is faulty: Because Salt-meat only by Accident invites Men to drink, forasmuch as it caves a dryness in the Throat, which causeth drink∣ing.

VIII. What a Dilemma is. A DILEMMA is made by the Disjunction of many Propositions opposite to one another, whereby the Answerer is so shut up, that there is no way left for him to avoid the dint of it, which part soever he chooseth: As suppose a Man should accuse another of a Crime he hath committed, thus; Either you did know your self to have offended against the King, or not; if you did know it, how durst you violate the Law of Majesty? If you did not, why did you run away?

IX. A Dilem∣ma may be faulty two man∣ner of ways. The First. A Dilemma may be faulty two manner of ways: One▪ when the Disjunctive Proposition wherein it is founded doth not contain all the parts of the thing divided: As if a man would prove, That one ought not to Marry, by this way of Arguing; If you marry a Wife, she will be either Beautiful or Deformed; if Beautiful, she will make you Jea∣lous; if Deformed, you will loath her; therefore you ought not to marry at all. The Mistake is, because there are Women who neither are so Beau∣tiful, as to cause Jealousie; nor so Deformed, as to cause Loathing.

X. The Second. In the Second place, a Dilemma is vicious, when the particular Conclusions of either part are not necessary: Thus it doth not follow that a Beauti∣ful Wife must needs make her Husband Jealous, forasmuch as she may be so Prudent and Chaste, as not to give the least occasion to doubt of her Vertue. Neither is it necessary that a Deformed Wife should be displeasing to her Husband, because her Deformity may be made up by her Vertue and Ingenuity, which may render her very grateful to her Husband.

XI. What is to be observed in a Di∣lemma. He that makes use of a Dilemma, must take care that it be such as may not be retorted upon him∣self, which it is said Protagoras did; to whom Euathlus, his Disciple, having promised a certain Sum of Mony in consideration of his instructing of him, to be paid on that Day when he should first get the better in the Cause he pleaded; and taking that for his first Cause, to plead whether he was to pay that Sum of Mony he had promised him, made use of this Dilemma: Either I shall lose this Cause, or I shall win it: If I lose the Cause, then according to our Agreement, I am to pay you nothing; if I win it, then I shall owe you nothing by the Sentence of the Judges. Which Argument Protagoras thus retorted; Either you will lose this Cause, or win it: If you lose it, you will by Sentence be obliged to pay me; if you win it, you must pay me according to the Tenour of our Agreement.

CHAP. XIX. Of Demonstration, a Topical Syllogism and Sophistical.

I. How Sci∣ence, Opi∣nion, Faith, and Error are distin∣guish'd. FOr the better understanding of the following Discourse of Apodictical, Topical, and Sophi∣stical Syllogisms, it is necessary that we first explain the Nature of Science, Opinion, Error, and Faith; that by exhibiting their distinct Notions, the Prin∣ciples from whence they are derived may be the better known.

II. What Sci∣ence is. SCIENCE is the certain and evident know∣ledge we have of any thing: For whatsoever is so evident to us, that we are certain of it, that we are said to know, or have the Science of. Accordingly the knowledge of a Conclusion is certain and evi∣dent,

when the Premisses, whereon as Principles it doth depend, are so.

III. What Opi∣nion is. OPINION, is a Knowledge that is not alto∣gether certain, but joyned with some fear or wa∣vering of the Intellect, in its assent to it. For Opinion, tho' it be a true assent to the Conclusion, yet is it doubtful and uncertain; and such an assent as this is the Effect of a Dialectical Syllogism, as Science is the Effect of a Demonstrative, or Apo∣dictical Syllogism.

IV. What Error is. ERROR is an Opinion opposite to Truth, that is, a False one.

V. What Faith is. FAITH is a Persuasion founded upon the Te∣stimony of another, which may be either true or doubtful, according to the different Authority it rests upon. So the Faith we have to God is most firm and stable, because we know him to be True, and that to Lye is repugnant to his Nature. But the Faith we have to a Man, hath always some∣thing of Uncertainty joyned with it; since there is no man but can deceive another, if he please.

VI. How we may distin∣guish the several kinds of knowledge. If in considering any Axiom, the truth of it do immediately appear to us, from the Evidence that is sound in it, without any further Proof or Disqui∣sition, this kind of Knowledge we call INTEL∣LIGENCE: And thus we know first Princi∣ples. But if by its own proper Evidence, it can∣not engage the Understanding to assent, then we must have recourse to other Motives, by which the Intellect may be convinced of its Truth: Now these Motives can be no other, but Reason and Authority. If Authority engageth us to assent to the things Pro∣pounded to us, this is that we call Faith: But if Reason sways us, then either that Reason leaves some fear behind it, whereby we are made doubt∣ful of the certainty of the thing, and then this assent is called Opinion: Or the Reason doth satisfie fully the Understanding, and then it is either Seemingly only Evident, for want of due Attention, and thence comes Error in case it be really false; or at least a Rash Judgment, if we take it to be true, before we have sufficient grounds of giving our Assent to it: Or if the Reason proposed to us, be not only seemingly true, but evidently so, and be clearly and distinctly perceived by our Understand∣ing, then the Conviction produced in our Mind by this Reason, is called Science.

Forasmuch therefore as Demonstration begets Science, and that the Conclusion of a Demonstration is Science, we will first Treat of it, and afterwards in order, of those things that produce Opinion and Error.

VII. What De∣monstration is. DEMONSTRATION is a Syllogism con∣sisting of Premisses that are True, Immediate, Prior, more known and causes of the Conclusion. Those Propositions are said to be True and Immediate, which have their Evidence from themselves, and not from any other thing: And which are known by their Terms: As, Every thing is, or is not. For there is an Inborn Power or faculty in us, where∣by we assent to first Principles. Wherefore we should never give our assent to the Conclusion, ex∣cept the Premisses appeared evident to us; neither do we assent to the Conclusion, but because we be∣lieve the Premisses to be true; and therefore it is necessary that the Premisses, be more known than the Conclusion, according to that saying; That for which any thing is such, is more such it self.

VIII. Demonstra∣tion is two fold either à Priori, or from the Cause. Demonstration is twofold, the one à Priori, and the other à Posteriori. Demonstration â Priori (which alone, to speak properly, is Demonstration) is that in which the Effect is Demonstrated by its Cause: As when we prove the Existence of Light, by the Existence of the Sun. Or when Geometri∣cians prove that round Wounds are longer a Heal∣ing, than such as are of a long Figure, forasmuch as in those, the Sides are further distant than inthese.

IX. Demonstra∣tion à Po¦stiriori, or from the effect. Demonstration à Posteriori is when we Demon∣strate the Cause by the Effect: As when from the Existence of Light, we Demonstrate the Existence of the Sun. When we prove the Heaven to be Fluid and Corruptible, from the various Things that are Generated in it; as from the Comets that are found in it; from the Spots about the Sun, and from many Stars, which for some time shew them∣selves there. To this kind of Demonstration may also be reduced the Demonstration which is made from the remote Cause, as when one proves that a Stone doth not breath, because it is not an Animal, when it would have been more proper to have proved it by this, because it hath no Lungs. For the having of Lungs is the near cause of Respiration, and not the being an Animal; nay it will be found that to have Longs is not the property of an Animal, since there are many Animals that have no Lungs, as Oysters, &c.

X. Of Osten∣sive Demon∣stration. Antient Authors make mention of another kind of Demonstration, which they call Ostensive, by which a thing is Demonstrated from proper Princi∣ples, directly and by it self. As if a Man, when a right Line is given, and a Semidiameter made of two Circles, and two other right Lines, to one of the Intersections of the Circles, drawn from their Extreams, and by these three Lines a Triangle is made, should prove Ostensively that this Triangle is Equilateral, or hath all its Sides alike, by shew∣ing that the two last Lines are even, or of the same Length, because they are equal to the same Line given; and that they are equal to the same Line given, because both of them separately proceed from the same Center, to the same Circumference with it.

XI. Demonstra∣tion by De∣duction to an incon∣venient. To this they have added another kind of De∣monstration, which they call Deductive to an in∣convenient; which tho' it be inferiour to the former, yet may be of use, where we cannot have an Osten∣sive Demonstration, as being also of insuperable necessity. And this is when we demonstrate a thing to be so, because if it should be otherwise, either an Absurdity, or an Impossibility, or a contra∣diction must necessarily be granted: Such as is, That the Effect doth not depend on the Cause; And that the thing containing is less, than the thing con∣tained, and the like. As if by Deduction to an in∣convenient he would prove the abovesaid Proposi∣tion from hence, because no Side can be admitted to be equal to another; but at the same time it must be granted, that all Lines drawn from the Center to the Circumference are equal; or that two things which are equal to one thing, are not equal between themselves.

XII. What a To∣pical Syllo∣gism is. A TOPICAL SYLLOGISM, which is also called Suasory, or Opinable, is that which con∣cludes from Probables: Or whose Premisses do not hold forth, a necessary Connexion of the Subject, with the Middle Term, or of the Middle Term with the Attribute. For tho' the Conclusion it proves, partaks more of Evidence than Obscurity, yet it leaves something of doubt or Hesitation be∣hind

it, which makes that the understanding can∣not assent without some Scruple. And therefore 'tis commonly said that a Topical Syllogism doth per∣suade indeed, but doth not force one to assent as a Demonstration doth.

XIII. What things are called prob∣able. Those things are called Probable, which seem to be so to all, or to the most, or to the Wise, or at least to the most, or most considerable amongst them: As it seems Probable to all, that the ap∣proaching Summer will be Hot, yet it is not cer∣tain, forasmuch as it sometime happens that the Summer is very Cold. It appears to most, that Phy∣sick is necessary for the Curing of Diseases, whereas, notwithstanding it often happens, either through the Ignorance of the Physitian, or through Default of the Patient, the Distemperature of the Air, or the Unhealthfuness of the Place, that a Medicin may do more hurt than good. It appears to Wise Men, that Learning ought to be desired by all; when notwithstanding there be many found that despise it, and who prefer their Ignorance before Learning. The most considerable Men, are of Opi∣nion that the Earth is moved, and that the Sun stands still in the midst, and yet there are many that oppose this Opinion, and maintain the contrary.

XIV. How a To∣pical Syllo∣gism is di∣stinguisht from all o∣thers. Wherefore all those Syllogisms, whose Premis∣ses are Contingent, and do not infer a necessary Connexion between the Subject, and the Middle Term; or between the Middle Term, and the Pre∣dicate, are called Topical, that is, Local or Proba∣ble. The former from the Places whence their Proofs are taken, the latter from the likelyhood of them.

XV. What a Sophistical Syllogism is. A SOPHISTICAL or Paralogistical Syllo∣gism, which with one Word is called a Sophism, is a Syllogism consisting of false Propositions, which yet have an appearance of Truth: Or is a Syllo∣gism, that begets Error. As for Example, this Syllogism,

• All Lines drawn from one Point to another are Equal;
• But a Right and a Crooked Line, may be drawn from the same Point, to the same Point;
• Therefore a Right and a Crooked Line are Equal.

XVI. Of the va∣rious ways of deception in Sophiti∣cal Syllo∣gisms; and first of the Fallacy in Words. All Fallacy or Deception, is either in the very Form of the Argument, or in the Words, or in the Things. As to the Form of Argumentation, we have already largly Treated, in Chapter XVI. As for the Cavilling which consists in Words, that is callen Fallacia Dictionis, or Fallacy in Words, which frequently consist in the Homonymy of the Words, when things altogether different are signified with the same Word. Sometimes also in the Ambigu∣ous context of the Speech, and then it is called Amphibology; Examples of which kind, do also occurr amongst the best of Authors.

XVII. The Fallacy from a con∣joyned Sense to a divid∣ed, and on the contra∣ry. There is another Sophistical way of Arguing, from conjoynd Things, to those that are divided; and on the other Hand, from Things divided to those that are conjoynd. This hath given occasion, to that Distinction of a Divided and a Compound Sense. The former is, when a Faculty or Power is joyned with an oppsite Act; as the Faculty of Laughing, with the Act of Weeping; for this Pro∣position, he that Weeps can Laugh, is true in a Divided, though not in a Compound Sense. But a Compound Sense is, when two opposite Acts are united together; and thus, this Proposition, He that Laughs cannot Weep, is true in a Compound, Though not in a Divided Sense.

XVIII. The Fallacy from the second In∣tention to the first. There is a Third way of Cavilling, when we Argue from Second intentions, to First; as thus; A Circle is a Figure; But Figure is a Genus, there∣fore a Circle is a Genus.

XIX. From a Re∣lative to an absolute Expression. The Fourth is à Dicto secundum quid, from a Relative Expression, ad Dictum simpliciter, to an absolute Expression; As if a Man should Argue, that because Blackamoors are White, with repect to their Teeth, therefore they are absolutely White; or because Wine is for the most part Hurtful to Sick Persons, should conclude Wine to be abso∣lutely Hurtful.

XX. Ignorance of the mat∣ter in Que∣stion. The Fifth is that which is called Ignoratio Elen∣chi, or Ignorance of the matter in Question, which is, when another thing is proved, than that which is denied by the Adversary.

XXI. Petition of the Princi∣ple. The Sixth is Petition of the Principle, when the Point indispute is taken for granted. As if one should go about to prove that the Earth doth rest, because the Sun is moved: that being the Principal thing in Question, whether the Sun be moved.

XXII. From a No∣cause to a Cause. The Seventh is taken à Non Causa ad Cau∣sam, from a No Cause to the Cause, as when that is brought in for a Cause, which is no Cause at all: As when we refer the changes of times to the Moon.

XXIII. From a ma∣nifold Que∣stion. The Eighth way of Cavilling, proceeds from a manifold Question, which is, when many Questions are so Propounded, that they look like one only. As if one should ask, whether the Sun and Earth are moved.

XXIV. The man∣ner how to avoid So∣phisms. There is no safer way to avoid these Captious Sophisms, than to define the Words themselves, in case of a Fallacy from Equivocation, or Homony∣my. Neither are we only diligently to consider, what the thing in Question is, but also, what is the Attribute of the Question, and what Relation and Order it hath to the Subject it self. For it is of great importance, whether the Attribute be Uni∣versally by it self, and primarily Attributed to every Subject, or that it agree to some one only, or by Accident. In like manner, whether the Attribute be spoken of the Subject simply, that is, absolutely, or with respect to something: All which particu∣lars may be easily known, from what hath been already said.

The Places from whence the Middle Term is Fetch'd.

XXV. What the Places are from which the Middle Term is fetch'd. We come now to the General Heads, or as the Rhetoricians call them, Places of Arguments, to which the Proofs which we use in any matter, may be reduced. For as some Syllogisms are Demonstra∣tive, others Opinable or Opinionative and Suasory, and others again Paralogistical or Erroneous, so there must be divers Places, whence the Middle Term or Argument may be Fetch'd.

XXVI. The Middle Term in a Demonstr••∣tive Syllo∣gism, may be the Ge∣nus. For in a Demonstrative Syllogism, the Middle Term agrees with the Subject, and the Attribute with the Middle Term, as a Genus, or a Propriety, or a Definition, or a Cause acting necessarily, and the like. As if a Man should have a Mind to Demon∣strate that a Mote in the Sun, is indefinitely divi∣sible, he may take the Genus for his Middle Term, and argue thus: A Mote is a Body, but a Body is indefinitely divisible▪ therefore a Mote is indefi∣nitely

divisible: The Minor is to be suppos'd from Natural Philosophy.

XXVII. Or a Pro∣priety. So to demonstrate a Mans being Rational, we may take his Property, which is the Faculty of Speaking, and Reason thus: The Power of Speak∣ing, that is, the Faculty of expressing ones Mind by Words, Signs, or Gestures, belongs ot Man; But whatsoever enjoys this Faculty doth partake of Reason; therefore Man doth partake of Rea∣son.

XXVIII. Or a Defi∣nition. So likewise a Definition may serve for a Middle Term, to prove that Oysters are Animals, thus: Oysters are Bodily things, endued with life and mo∣tion: But whatsoever hath life and motion is an Animal: therefore Oysters are Animals.

XXIX. Or a Cause. And so also a Cause acting necessarily, may be the Middle Term; for thus a Lunar Eclipse may be proved from its Efficient Cause, viz. the Sun and Moon being placed in opposite Nodes, or in the Intersections of their Orbs, after this manner: It is necessary for the Moon to be Eclipsed, as often as the Globe of the Earth interposeth between the Moon and the Sun, from which the Moon borrows her Light; but then the Globe of the Earth inter∣poseth between the Moon and the Sun, when the Sun and Moon are in opposite Nodes; (because at that time they are Diametrically opposite, and the Earth plac'd in their Diameter) therefore there must necessarily be an Eclipse of the Moon, when the Sun and Moon are constituted in their Nodes, or the opposite intersection of their Orbs.

XXX. The Mid∣dle Term in a pro∣bable Syl∣legism, may be fetch'd first from the Genus. We make use also of like places in a Probable or Suasory Syllogism; yet so as that tho' the Middle Term agree to the Subject, (yet the Attribute does not to the Middle Term, as a Genus, Propriety, &c. as before:) As if a Man to prove Rhetorick to be profitable for Mankind, should argue thus; Rhe∣torick is an Art, but every Art is profitable to Man∣kind; therefore Rhetorick is profitable to Mankind. In which Syllogism, the Middle Term Art, is in∣deed the Genus of the Subject Rhetorick; but the Attribute is profitable, is not its Genus, but only a contingent Adjunct, or common Quality; and therefore neither doth the Mind assent to it without something of Doubtfulness, whether or no Rheto∣rick may not be reckon'd amongst those Arts, which tho' they be accounted Subtil, yet are esteemed by some as unprofitable, or at least indifferent.

XXXI. From a Propriety. In like manner one may prove, from a Propriety of Logick, that Logick is a thing desirable, thus: It is the Property of Logick, to direct the Mind in the knowledge of things; but what directs the Mind in the Knowledge of things, is something de∣sirable; therefore Logick is a thing desirable. This Argument also leaves some hesitation in the Mind, because the directing of the Mind in the Know∣ledge of Things, doth not necessarily conclude the thing to be desirable; because there are many who rather desire to continue in their Ignorance, than to be instructed in Logick.

XXXII. From the Cause. We may also argue from the Cause thus: This Picture is drawn by Apelles; but the Pictures drawn by Apelles are very exact: Therefore this is an exact Picture. Which enforceth only a Pro∣bable, but not a certain Conclusion; because the best Painters do not always Paint alike, nor so exa∣ctly, but that sometimes Faults may be spied in their Works.

XXXIII. Ambiguity is the only place for a Sophisti∣cal Syllo∣gism. A Paralogistical, or Sophistical Syllogism, has but one only place, viz. Ambiguity; which being once detected, its Imposture lies open; and that which seem'd to be a good Syllogism appears to be none at all. Because the Reason of Syllogism requires, that it have only one Middle Term, one Subject, and one Attribute; whereas in a Sophistical Syllogism there are two Subjects, and as many Attributes without a Middle Term: As when a man Argues, some Mountain is Taurus, Taurus is a Lowing Animal: Therefore some Mountain is a Lowing Animal. For the Ambiguity here lies in the word Taurus, which agreeing to two different things, is in the Major taken for a Mountain, and in the Minor for a Four-footed Animal. Whence it appears, that the word Taurus is no Middle Term, foras∣much as it doth not agree with the Subject and Predicate.

XXXIV. Ambiguity is the cause of Decep∣tion in all things. For Ambiguity is that which occasions deception in all things; for he that concludes, that a Man asleep is awake, because it hath been before granted, that it is possible for a man that sleeps to be awake, doth not do it for any other Reason, but because this Proposition may be understood either dis∣joyntedly, with respect to different times; or con∣junctly, with regard to the same time. And he who concludes that the Buyer hath eaten raw flesh, because it may be, he confess'd that he had eaten what he had bought, doth so because of the Am∣biguity of the words, What he had bought; which may either be taken only for the substance of the Flesh; or also for an Accident of it, viz. Rawness. And the like may be said of all Sophistical Places, Amphibology, Composition, Division, Account, &c. forasmuch as they all agree in this, that they have some Ambiguity either in a Word, or in a Phrase; or that one Sense is taken in the Proposition, and ano∣ther in the Assumption. So that it is no wonder, that when both are admitted for True, an Absurdity follows from them.

The Fourth Part of Logick. Concerning Method, or the Orderly Disposition of our Thoughts.

CHAP. XX. Of the General Method of Knowing.

I. Method is necessary to the Right forming of our Thoughts. FOrasmuch as LOGICK was found out for the attaining of Sciences, and that our Thoughts can hardly be rightly formed without its assistance, METHOD seems to be necessary to assist and accomplish our Mind in the Knowledge of Things. For tho' possibly there may be some of such quick and piercing Wits, as without difficulty to dive into the Natures of Things, and to solve the most abstruse Questions; yet will he never be able to attain certain Know∣ledge, except he be first acquainted how he must direct his Mind, and what Order he must observe. Wherefore Method is necessary, as well to assist him in the searching out of Truth, as in the avoiding of Error, Confusion, and Obscurity. Which Method is nothing else, but an Orderly disposition of things to be treated of, suitable and accommodate to the Capacity of Learners. For it

must be of that Nature, as not to put any force upon the Wit of Man, but rather pleasantly allure it, and guide and direct it by the Evidence and Easi∣ness of its Rules and Precepts.

II. Three things are requisite to the manner of Know∣ing. This Mode or manner of Knowing consists in Three things: First, That the thing propounded may be clearly and distinctly Perceived. Secondly, That we judge rightly concerning the Matters we have thus clearly and distinctly perceived. Thirdly, That we commit to Memory the Truths we have discover'd, that is, the things we have rightly. Per∣ceived and Judged. By observing these Three Precepts, we shall relieve all the Weaknesses of our Mind, and prevent those Errors into which it is apt to fall. For seeing that the main Obstacles of Science are, either an over-hastiness of the Mind; the same will be removed by clear and distinct Per∣ception; or else Error and Doubt, which will be cured by Sound Judgment; or lastly, Forgetfulness, which will be prevented by the Remembrance of the Things perceived and judg'd by us. It remains only to enquire, by what means this distinct Know∣ledge may be attained; and how our Mind may be brought to that pass, as never to assent to any thing which it has not before clearly perceived, and so to impress the Things she has judged of in her Memory, that she may never forget them.

III. First, the distinct Perception of the thing. As to the First, it is requisite, that setting aside all Precipitancy, we give heed to the Matter pro∣pounded, and (as it were) scan the same with our inward Eyes. In order to which, it will be proper for us to behold or contemplate one thing only at once, that our Understanding may not be distra∣cted by the multitude of Objects, and lest by minding many things, our attention to Particulars may be the less. For the multiplicity of Objects presented to our Understanding, breeds Confusion; and as they who behold a Field, distinguish'd with variety of Colours, do not distinctly perceive the variety of Colours that is in it, but behold it under the appearance of one Colour only: So they who consider several Objects at once, cannot bestow a due attention upon every particular; and it cannot otherwise be, but that they must be promiscuously confounded in their Mind.

IV. Wherefore we must rather set our selves to examine Simple things, than those that are Compound. In order to attain this due Attention, it will be of good use to undertake the examining of a Simple thing, or of some Attribute or Mode: For these kind of Perceptions, whereby Simple and In∣complex things are represented to us, are more clear and distinct. As for Example, The Soul of Man is more distinctly perceived by us than Man; because the Soul of Man imports one Nature only, viz. a Thinking Being; whereas a Man compre∣hends two Natures, viz. a Soul and Body, which belong to two different Genera, and therefore can∣not be both at once proposed to the Intellect with∣out some confusion.

V. Things Simple are to be exa∣min'd be∣fore those that are Compound. Accordingly Simple things are to be known before Compound, near before remote, and few before many. Thus we attain a fuller knowledge of the things that are born, if we begin the consi∣deration of them from their first beginning. By which means the Famous Harvey perspicuously discovers the generation and growth of a Chicken, by shewing what Parts are daily formed in an Egg, which an Hen hatcheth. In like manner we arrive to a more accurate knowledge of a Plant, when we take a view of its beginning, progress, and per∣fection, considering it in its distinct Stages of its budding, growth, blooming, and bringing forth fruit; and the same may be said of all things that grow and increase.

VI. Things Positive are more distinctly conceiv'd, than Ne∣gative. But forasmuch as Substances are chiefly known by their Attributes, and that many of them are found in every Substance, we are rather to consider those that are Positive, than the Negative. Thus the Nature of the Soul is more easily known by me, when I consider it as an understanding, wil∣ling, and judging Subject, than when I conceive it as Immaterial, Incorporeal, Invisible, &c. because Negative Attributes do not so much declare what a thing is, as what it is not. Wherefore it will also much conduce to the attaining of Knowledge, if we always begin our Enquiries with those things that are more Universal, and from them to proceed to Singulars: Because the knowledge of Univer∣sals doth more accomplish our Minds, than that of Singulars; the reason whereof is, because Uni∣versals are in a manner Eternal, as having no Original, and not being comprehended within any difference of Time or Space of Place, which has given occasion to that noted Axiom of Philoso∣phers, that Science consists in Universals, and not in Singulars.

VII. We must call to Mind, what hath been said in the First Part of this Discourse. We shall the better understand all these Parti∣culars that refer to clear and distinct Perception, by firmly retaining in our Memory, what hath been already handled in the First Part of Logick; because this Fourth Part is founded upon those Rules which are there delivered, concerning the Genealogy of things, their Causes and Effects, Subjects and Adjuncts, Agreement and Disagree∣ment of things▪ &c.

VIII. The Second Precept, about the manner of Knowing, is concerning Judgment. The Second Precept about the Mode of Know∣ing is this, That our Judgment do always follow our Conceptions; that is, that we never assent to any thing which we have not before clearly and distinctly perceived: For the Order of Reason re∣quires, that Knowledge always go before Judg∣ment, and that Simple Terms make way for those that are Complex; but yet so, as that the Judg∣ment we pass of any thing, may exactly answer to the Knowledge we have of it; as I have before hinted in the Fourth Rule for the attaining of Truth. For since the Second Operation of the Mind, or Judgment, doth involve two things, the Subject, and the Predicate or Attribute, it is necessary that the Nature of both be fully known to us, before we can judge whether the one do agree with the other, or dissents from it. Thus we must first have distinctly understood what the Sun, and what Heat is, before we can affirm the Sun to be hot, or (which is the same) that Heat agrees to the Sun. As to which point they do greatly mistake, who too much cleaving to the Prejudices wherewith they have been tainted from their Childhood, do judge according to them; because they pervert the Order of Reason, and do not follow their Perceptions as they ought to do; but anticipate them, and believe them to be true; before they have perceived them to be such.

IX. What is to be done by him who is in doubt about the Matter propounded to him. If a Man chance to doubt of the Truth of the thing he is enquiring into, he may easily avoid falling into any Error, by suspending his Judg∣ment, and not affirming or denying any thing concerning it, until he have exactly examin'd all the Difficulties of it, and by the Rules of Perception

have removed all doubts concerning it. For we must not think it enough, that this or the other thing appears distinctly and clearly to others, except it appears likewise to us. For seeing every one desires Knowledge for himself, it is but reasonable, that he make use of his own Understanding, and not of anothers; and that he pass Judgment so far only, as his own Knowledge guides him. Wherefore, be∣fore we can with any safety give our assent to any thing, we must be certain that the thing be so in∣deed, as it is conceived by us, and not only so, but that it cannot be otherwise.

X. There is a different certainty of Truth in things. Yet are not we to conceive that all things that are true, are of the same certainty; for some things are only Contingently true, that is, such as are taken to be true by us, tho' indeed they may be false; as when I take a Man to be Godly, because he is frequent at Church, and at Sermons, and is liberal to the Poor; all which Signs are sufficient Morally, to persuade me that he is Godly; tho' notwithstand∣ing all this, it may happen that he is not so. Other things again, are altogether Certain and True, as are all Propositions of Eternal Truth, which are true in that degree, that they cannot admit any suspicion of Falshood: Such as are these Proposi∣tions, Twice four make Eight. Three is a number. And therefore such necessary Propositions as these are called Axioms; because their Predicates agree with all their Subjects, and at all times, and according to the different degree of necessity, they partake and admit of several Names.

XI. What Phy∣sical Cer∣tainty is. Some Attributes are said to be joynd with their Subjects, by a Physical certainty, when according to the order of Nature, it is impossible but they must be joyned to them; as when we say, that a Man hath two Feet; because, that tho' a Man may be conceived without Feet, yet Naturally Man is never without them. Other things are called true, by Metaphysical certainty, when an Attribute is so indissolubly attributed to its Subject, that it can∣not be conceived to be otherways: As when we say, Three is a number. And the same may be said of singular Axioms, forasmuch as the same Defini∣tions, Differences and Attributes occur in them as in Universals. As to Judgment, the Reader may have recourse to what hath been said in the second part of Logick, where is treated of Judgment, and the nature of Propositions.

XII. The Third Precept is Memory. And forasmuch as it is of little use to know the nature of things, except we remember them; we are also to be informed, how the things we under∣stand, may be so imprest on our Memories, that we may not easily forget them again. This we may easily procure, by following the Order of our Method; that is, by taking care, that we commit nothing to Memory, which we have not before throughly examined, and passed a right Judgment of. For daily experience shews us, that the more clearly any thing is perceived by us, the stronger it is imprest on our Memories, and that we more ea∣sily remember the things, that are in order pro∣pounded to us, than those which are offered to us confusedly. For the Memory doth of it self, and spontaneously embrace things that are clearly un∣derstood, and, as a Foot-boy, follows right Judg∣ment.

XIII. Helps of the Memory. But yet we may promote and assist our Memory. First, By keeping our Mind still and quiet, with∣out suffering our Understanding to be variously distracted by multiplicity of Objects: Especially if to these we add the desire of Learning some new thing or other, or that we be excited by admira∣tion to insist the longer on the matter we desire to know. For such things as these we are wont more to imprint in our Memory. It is also greatly streng∣thened by moderate Study and frequent Exer∣citation. For as the Fingers by playing upon a Lute, do accustom themselves to such and such Motions, so by Exercise we attain to ability and rea∣diness. To which we may add, that by Study, the Species in the Brain become distinctly ranged and joyned, and by use alone, almost all obstru∣ctions are removed. Thirdly, It will be a great help to our Memory, if the things we commit to it be not only evident, but also connexed, and orderly disposed, and adorned with the Circumstances of Causes, Effects, Time, Place and other such like. This is the first office of Memory.

XIV. The Office of Memory. It is the office of Memory, to retain the things we have committed to it; which we shall obtain by frequently repeating, and a diligent considera∣tion of them: As likewise by endeavouring to re∣duce Compound Things to those that are Simple, and special things to General. For by this means, they will more clearly be represented to our Minds, and more firmly fixed in our Memory: As is appa∣rent in those Sciences, which from simple terms proceed to Propositions and Axioms; which with∣out any trouble, are insinuated into our Minds, and continue with us till our Lives end.

CHAP. XXI. Concerning special Method; and first of that which is called Analytical.

I. Another Method ne∣cessary to the orderly disposing of our Thoughts. THe word Method, is taken more strictly here than in the foregoing Chapter; because it be∣ing there, only our design to inform Beginners, what Order they were to observe in the knowledge of Things; it was sufficient to set down a Method, which might be helpful to them for this end, and point out to them the way, whereby to arrive at the distinct knowledge of Things. But here we are to handle, not only how we ought to form our Conceptions, but also how we ought to order and dispose them, either for the discovering of the Truth we are ignorant of, or for the proving of the Truth we know to others.

II. Method is twofold, Analytical and Synthe∣tical. And accordingly there is a twofold Method, the one called Analytical, or the Method of Resolution, which shews the true way, by which the thing was Methodically and Primarily invented. The other Synthetical, or the Method of Composition, which clearly demonstrates what hath been concluded; but by an opposit way, and fetch'd à Posteriori. For a whole Science cannot be set down according to Analytical Method, but only some particular Que∣stions, about certain Terms or Things.

III. What is to be observed about Terms About Terms we may enquire, what is to be un∣stood by the Word in Question; for seeing that some Words, belong to Notions, that are common to all Men; and other proper or peculiar to some that profess some certain Disciplines: We are to mind, what Men are wont to understand by the Word; or what the Masters of those Disciplines are used to signifie by them; or what he means by them, who makes use of them in Writing or in his Speech. For it cannot be doubted, but that the

most part of our disputes arise from the Ambiguity of Words; whilst one takes them in one Sense, ano∣ther in another; which disputes might easily be de∣cided, if the Parties in contest were agreed about the signification of the Word in question.

IV. What is to be observed about things. About the thing it self, we are to consider what it is, that is, what its Essence and Properties are. Whether it be, that is, whether it exist in the Na∣ture of Things; and if it do, whether its existence be possible or necessary. Whence it hath its Ori∣ginal, whether from it self, or from some other thing; and if it proceed from another, whether by Creation or Generation. Of what Nature it is, Matcrial or Intellectual, and with what Faculties it is endowed, &c. Of what quantity, or bigness it is, and what space it takes up amongst other Bodies, if it be Material; and what if it be Intellectual, what its Powers are. What effects it produceth, that is, whether it be a Principal Cause, or an Instru∣mental only; whether it work voluntarily or neces∣sarily; whether it be Univocal, or Equivocal, &c. How it is distinguished from other things, or what distinction there is between it, and other things, and whether it differ from them really, or Notio∣nally only.

V. What a Question is. Analytical Method being the Art which guides Reason in the Research of Truth, we must before all things, endeavour to know the Nature of the Question, which we are to examin, and to consi∣der afterwards, how many sorts of Questions there may be made. Questions are Propositions, which include something that is already known, and some∣thing that is unknown. For otherwise, they would be rather known Truths, than Truths to be known; and if they did not also contain something that is known, they could not properly be called Questions, because we cannot proceed to that which is un∣known, but by means of something that is known.

VI. There is a four-fold way of searching out the Truth of things: First when by the Ef∣fects we find out the Cause. All Questions concerning things may be reduced to four Species. First, When from the Effects we find out the Cause. As for Example it is Notorious,, that the Sun shining upon a Prism, represents therein variety of Colours; the Question is, what is the true cause of so many divers Effects. It is a known thing, that Air and Water are subject to Rarefaction, and that at one time they take up more space than at another: the Question is, what is the reason of this change, and what there is in Nature, that can encrease the quantity of Bodies.

VII. The second is when from the Causes we enquire in∣to the Na∣ture of the Effects. The second sort of Questions is, when Effects are endeavoured to be discovered by their Causes. It is a known thing, that Wind and Water have great force in them, to move Bodies; but our Fore-Fa∣thers, for want of due attention, not considering duly what Effects might be produced from those Causes, did not make that good use of them, as we now do, by the useful inventions of Watermils and Windmils, and many other conveniences, by which abundance of human labour is spared, which is an advantage of true Natural Philosophy. The first sort of Questions, in which the Cause is searched out by the Effects, are the total Object of Natu∣ral Philosophy; and the second sort, in which the Effects are enquired into by the Cause, are the whole Practise of it.

VIII. Thirdly, when from the Parts we enquire into the Nature of the Whole. The third sort of Questions is, when from the Parts we enquire into the Nature of the whole; as when after having set down several Numbers, by adding them together, we enquire, what Number results from them all. Or when having got two Numbers, we enquire, what they produce by mu∣tual Multiplication.

IX. Fourthly, when from one Part we search into the Nature of another. The Fourth is, when having a whole, and some part of it, we search out the other part of it: As, when having a determinate number, and that part which is to be taken from it, we enquire, what number will afterwards remain to us. By the Word Part in this place, we are not strictly to understand, only the Part of a thing, but whatsoever doth belong to any Substance, such as are Modes, Pro∣perties, Accidents, and in a Word, all the Attri∣butes that are found in any thing.

X. What is required to enable us to an∣swer these Questions. That we may be able to answer these Questions, in the First place, it is requisite, that we clearly and distinctly conceive the point, that is precisely enquired after. Secondly, that we do not precipitate our Answer, till we have discovered whotsoever be∣longs to the Question, by certain Signs and Tokens, and not imitate those, who hearing their Friends Name, presently conceive it to signifie that parti∣cular Person, and give their answer, before they know what he, who asked the Question, means by it. Thirdly, Forasmuch as in every Question, there is something conccaled, we must be careful to denote that which is hid, by some certain Conditions, which may determine us to the seeking of one thing, rather than another, and which may induce us to judge, that that which we have found is the very same thing, that was enquired after. Fourthly, After we have examined the Conditions, let us set our selves seriously to consider, whatsoever in the matter propounded is either hid from us, or clear and evident to us; forasmuch as by means of this, we may arrive to that which is unknown to us. And in this our Attention to that which we know of a thing, in the resolving of a Question, Analy∣tical Method chiefly consists: The whole Art and industry whereof consists in this, by this Examina∣tion to find out several Truths, which may lead us to the knowledge of that thing, which we are endeavouring to discover.

XI. What Ana∣lytical Me∣thod is. Analytical Method therefore is nothing else, but a Particular application of the Mind, to that which is known, of that which is most particular in the Qestion to be resolved; whence it successively deduceth other Truths, which lead it at last, to the thing it desires to know. I say, that Analytical Method is a particular Application of the Mind, to that which is known; to observe that which Analytical Method, hath in common with Synthe∣tical, which also begins with that which is known. And add, of that which is most particular in the Question it would resolve. To intimate the differ∣ence that is between the Analytical and Synthetical Method; and that this latter takes that which is known, of that which is most general in the Questi∣ons; whereas the other takes it of that which is most particular in them.

XII. How by way of A∣nalysis we may prove the Mind of Man to be Immor∣tal. As suppose the Question to be whether the Mind of Man be immortal; and to find out this, we con∣sider the Nature of the Mind, and presently dis∣cover, that Thinking is the property of the Mind of Man, which tho' it might be supposed to doubt of every thing besides, yet cannot doubt of its own Thinking, since its doubting is a kind of Think∣ing. Afterwards it proceeds to examin what it is to Think, and when it perceives that nothing is

included in its Idea, of what is involved in the Idea of an Extended Substance, or a Body: Yea, that it may be denied of Cogitation, that it belongs to the Body, forasmuch as it is something extended in Length, Breadth, and Depth, hath Parts, is of such and such a Figure, is Divisible, &c. without destroying the Idea we have of Cogitation: We conclude, that Cogitation cannot be the Mode of an Extended Substance; because the Nature of a Mode is such that it cannot be conceived, when the thing whose Mode it is, is denied of it. Whence it may also be inferr'd, that seeing Cogitation is not a Mode of the Body, it must needs be the Attri∣bute of another thing; and that therefore a Thinking Substance, and an Extended Substance, are two distinct Substances. From which finally we conclude, that the destruction of the one, doth not infer the destruction of the other. Add also, that Extended Substance cannot properly be said to be destroyed, since whatsoever we may call its destru∣ction, is nothing else but a change or dissolution of some parts of the Matter, which still remains the same in Nature as it was. As when all the Wheels of a Watch are broken, we may easily judge that no p••rt of the Watch is destroyed, tho' the Watch it ••elf be commonly said to be spoil'd or destroyed. From which Example it appears, that the Soul, which is not divisible, neither consists of any parts, cannot perish, and consequently that it is Immortal.

XIII. Analytical Method proceeds from a heedful Considera∣tion of a thing. Whensoever therefore the Nature or Cause of any thing is proposed to our Examination, we must in the first place accurately examine all the Condi∣tions of the Question propounded, without minding such as are Extraneous, and do not belong to the Question. Secondly, We are to separate those things which are certain and manifest from those that include any thing of Confusion or Doubt: For we are to search and trace out the thing we enquire for, from clear and evident Idea's. Thirdly, Every Difficulty we meet with is to be divided into Parts, which Parts are to be considered by themselves. For Partition is like a Torch to a Learner, directing him which way he is to go, without uncertainly wandring up and down. Fourthly, We are orderly to dispose of our Perceptions, and the Judgments we frame thence; so that beginning from the most easie, we may proceed by degrees to those that are more difficult. Wherefore our chief business must be, diligently to consider, and well to weigh those Particulars chiefly, which are clear and perspicuous in the Question, and not proceed to those that are unknown, except we find that by those which are already known to us, we are likely to Master them. Fifthly, That the Thing in question, be furnish'd with some Note or other that may determine it, and make us judge it to be the same, whenever we meet with it.

XIV. An Exam∣ple of the aforesaid Analytical Method. As by Example, it is apparent that Water, and all Liquid things, have their Parts in Motion: For we see that Water dissolves Salt and Sugar. which would not be, if the insensible parts of the Water by their continual motion, did not run against the Salt and Sugar. And if we enquire into the Cause of this Motion, we shall find that Water and other Liquid Bodies, are not moved of themselves, because they are Bodies, since all Bodies are not moved▪ and those which rest are Bodies as well as those which are moved. Wherefore we are to seek for a Foreign Cause, which produceth Motion in Liquid Bodies, and makes them to dis∣solve the Particles of Salt And findingthat the Air, by penetrating the Pores of the Water, cannot be the Cause of this Motion; for whence should the Air have the force to agitate all the parts of the Water? it remains that we assign some other Mat∣ter more subtil than Air, and more fluid, which may put the Air, Water, and other Liquid Bodiet into Motion, which in the General Part of our Natural Philosophy we shall declare to be the First Element. For the more subtil any Body is, or di∣vided into less Parts, so much the more easily it is agitated, and being once put into Motion, doth th•• more easily retain it. Wherefore the most subtil Aether, or Celestial Matter, must be supposed to be the first Principle of Motion, which Matter abounds in the Fire, Sun, Fix'd Stars, Spirit of Wine, and other Liquors.

XV. In all Me∣thod we are to pro∣ceed from that which is more known, to that which is less known. Wherefore in the Analytical, as well as Synthe∣tical Method, we are always to proceed from that which is more known, to that which is less known. This Rule is common to all Method, neither is any to be accounted true that deviates from this Prin∣ciple. Yet there is this difference between the Method of Resolution, and that of Composition; that in the former, the Known Truths used in the Examination of the thing, which is propounded to be known, a••e taken from Particulars, and from them we do (as by special Steps) ascend to Generals; not as is done in the latter, where beginning with Generals, we come down to Particulars. So that these two Methods differ, as the Ascent or Descent of the same Hill; or the Way whereby we go up from the Valley to the Top of the Hill, and again come down from thence to the Valley.

CHAP. XXII. Of the Method of Composition.

I. What use we are to make of the Synthe∣tical Me∣thod. THis Method is called the Method of COM∣POSING, because it makes use of Ge∣neral and Common things, to come to things Par∣ticular and Compound: As for Example, If I have a mind to teach another by the way of Synthe∣tical Method, that the Soul of Man is Immortal, I begin with these general Maxims; That Every Being is either a Substance, or a Mode; that there are two Substances, viz. a Thinking Substance, and an Extended Substance; that no Substance can properly be said to perish; that what we call Destruction in a Bodily Substance, is only a Disso∣lution of its Parts: Whence I conclude, that that which hath no Parts, as the Soul, cannot be de∣stroyed, and that by consequence it is Immortal.

II. Why Syn∣thetical Method proceeds from things General, to less Gene∣ral. I have said, that the Method of Compounding proceeds from more Universal things, to such as are less Universal; and it does so, because by this way of proceeding, all Repetitions, which com∣monly occasion Confusion and Tediousness, may be avoided. For should we treat of Species, before we have spoken of the Genus; forasmuch as we cannot know the Species, without knowing the Genus first, we should be fain to explain the Na∣ture of the Genus, as often as we had occasion to treat of any Species. But because this way of De∣monstration is peculiar to Geometricians, and is look'd upon by them as very necessary to persuade Truth, we will borrow from them whatsoever we

have to say concerning it, to the end that we may follow the same way in searching out the Know∣ledge of other things, which they use in the de∣monstration of Matters Geometrical.

III. What things Ma∣thematici∣ans make use of in their De∣monstra∣tions. Mathematicians are wont to deduce those things that are of the greatest moment and weight from known and easie Principles, by a Chain of Simple Truths; which they refer to three kinds; the first whereof includes Definitions: As, a Right Line is that which is the shortest betwixt two Points. A Point is that which hath no Parts. The second contains Postulata, or things demanded or taken for granted, which are so evident as to need no confir∣mation, and want nothing but the Hearers assent, viz. that from any Center, and at any distance, a Circle may be described. The Third comprehends Axioms, or common Notions of the Mind, which are not only manifest and evident in the Science we are treating of, but also in all others: As that all Right Angles are equal amongst themselves; that which is Equal, is bigger than all its Parts taken together.

IV. Three things are required to the Ex∣torting an Assent. Hence three things are chiefly observed by Geo∣metricians, for the forcing of Assent. First, That no Ambiguity be left in the Terms, which is easily avoided by the Definitions of the Terms, which (as was said before) are nothing else but open Expli∣cations of the Terms and Words by which the things under debate are signified. The Second is, That every Ratiocination be founded on clear and distinct Principles, being so evident, that whosoever rightly understands the Words, must needs give his Assent to them. Which is the Reason why Ma∣thematicians do always presuppose their Axioms, which they require to be granted them, as being so evident, that they stand in need of no Explication. The Third is, That every Conclusion they propound be proved demonstratively, making use only of those Definitions they have already alledged, or such Principles as have been granted them: Or lastly, Propositions, which by force of Argument they have deduced from them. So that all which Ma∣thematicians observe concerning this matter, may be reduced to these Heads, which we shall compre∣hend in the following Rules.

Rules of Definitions.

V. First Rule of Defini∣tions. The First, That every Obscure or Equivocal Term be defined.

VI. Second Rule. The Second, That no Terms do enter the Defi∣nition, which are not altogether clear, or have not been before explained.

Which two Rules are of that necessity, that they cannot sufficiently be imprinted in our Minds; forasmuch as by this means many Disputations are taken out of the way, which oft consists only in the Ambiguity of Words; as when the same Term is by divers Persons taken in a different Sense; which is a thing that happens very frequently in Schools. Wherefore, for the Removal of so many Disputations, which often do arise amongst the divers Sects of Philosophers, it will be sufficient if the Disputing Parties take care to explain distinctly, and in few words, what they conceive by the Term about which they Dispute, and what they would have others to understand by it. As for the Qualifications of the Definitions of things, of these we have treated in the Fourteenth Chapter.

The Rule of Axioms.

VII. A Rule for Axioms. This is a Rule of Axioms, That no Propositions be set up for Axioms, but such as are most manifest and evident.

For no body questions, but that there are some Common Notions of the Mind that are so clear and perspicuous, as to stand in need of no Demonstra∣tion, to make them appear more distinctly. For did they involve the least Doubtfulness, they could not be the Foundation of a certain Conclusion. And therefore they are called Axioms, or common E∣nunciations, because they are so clear and manifest, as to stand in need of no Demonstration.

VIII. The Evi∣dence of Axioms doth not arise from the Senses. But we are not to suppose, as some do, that the Certainty and Evidence of Propositions doth in any degree proceed from the Senses; for that is abso∣lutely false. For the Truth-discerning-Faculty is not placed in the Senses, which are often deceived by a Similitude of Things, and are not able to dive into the Difference that lies hid in them. Who is it that doth not experience how narrow and weak our Senses are, and how frequently they deceive us, when we go about to search out any thing by their means?

For altho' this Axiom, That the Whole is greater than any one of its Parts, be in some sort discer∣nible by the Senses, yet not with such a Certainty as is necessary to Science; because whatsoever our Senses discover to us concerning it, is only founded on the observations of ou•• Infancy, which cannot afford us an undoubted, but only a probable Cer∣tainty. For by Induction a thing cannot be cer∣tainly known, except we be certain of the fulness of the Induction; there being nothing move com∣mon, than for us to discern at last the falsity of those things, which from general Inductions we were persuaded to be most True. The whole Truth of this Proposition, the Whole is bigger than its Parts, doth depend on the clear and distinct Notions we have of the Whole and Parts, by which we judge that the Whole is greater than any one of its Parts, and that the Part is less than the Whole. For when we are discoursing of any thing that is firm and stable, we must not have recourse to the Senses, as Plato saith; but to constant, im∣mutable, and impregnable Reasons. Thus we clearly know, that a Triangle is a Figure, that the Number Two is an even Number; because the Notion of a Figure is contained in the Definition of a Tri∣angle; and in that of the Number Two, the Notion of an Even Number.

IX. The Cer∣tainty of Propositions depends on the clear Knowledge we have of them. Wherefore all the Certainty of our Knowledge in Natural things, depends on this Principle, Whatsoever is included in the clear and distinct Idea of any thing, the same may with truth be affirmed of it. Thus because Substance is included in the Conception of a Body, we may affirm a Body to be a Substance. Because it is involved in the Idea of a Circle, to have equal Diameters, we may assert of every Circle, That all their Diameters are Equal. Because it is included in the Idea of a Triangle, that all its Angles are Equal to two Right ones, we may affirm the same of all Tri∣angles. What must be the Qualifications of Axioms, appears from what we have said of the framing of Propositions that are necessarily true, in the Thirteenth Chapter.

Most General Axioms.

X. To have many Axioms in a readiness, is a great help to ready Ar∣guing or Ratiocina∣tion. But forasmuch as it is of great use, to have good store of Axioms at hand, whereby to prove and discover what is obscure and abstruse; it will be ne∣cessary to set down here some general and neces∣sary Propositions, from which as so many Foun∣tains, more special ones as Rivulets may be de∣rived.

I. Whatsoever is comprehended in the clear and distinct Conception of any thing, the same may with Truth be affirmed of it.

For since in the clear and distinct Conception of a Body Extension is contained, and Cogitation in the Idea of the Soul, I can truly affirm of a Body that it is extended; and of the Soul, that it is a Thinking Substance. Wherefore we are to lay down this, as the Foundation of all Sciences; that we must never give our full assent to any Proposi∣tion, which doth not appear evidently true to us, so as that we cannot but assent to it, without doing violence to our Minds.

II. In every Idea or Conception is involved either Possible or necessary Existence.

Since nothing can be apprehended by us, except under the notion of being Existent; that is, neces∣sary Existence is comprehended in the notion of a Being absolutely perfect, that is, of God; and pos∣sible Existence in that of a Creature, or of a limi∣ted and finite Being.

III. Nothing has no Affections or Properties.

So it cannot be said, that nothing is Divisible, that it hath Parts, that it can be moved, &c. Wherefore, wheresoever any Property is found, there we may assert that there is a True and Real Being.

IV. Nothing cannot be the Cause of any Thing.

Forasmuch as the Cause of a Thing is supposed to be, before it can produce any thing, and that Nothing cannot exist, it doth follow, that neither can it be Principle or cause of any thing. For if Nothing could ever be Something, it would follow, in opposition to the foregoing Maxim, that it must have some Property, which is a Contradi∣ction.

From this Axiom, some others are deduced by way of Corollaries; such as are,

V. Nothing, nor any Perfection of a thing, actu∣ally Existent, can have Nothing, or a thing not Existing, for the cause of its Existence.

Another Corollary:

VI. Whatsoever Reality, or Perfection there is in any thing, the same is formally, or eminently in the first, and adequate cause of that thing.

Whence it follows, that the Objective Reality of our Idea's, requires a Cause in which the same Re∣ality, is contained, not only Objectively, but For∣mally, or Eminently. For this Axiom doth not only belong to the Efficient Cause, but also to the Exemplary. For if an Image be made more excel∣lent than its Exemplar or Original, so that more Perfections are found in it, than in the thing it self, after the likeness of which it is made, it cannot be said to imitate its Exemplar, and consequently can∣not properly be called its Image.

VII. A Thing or Substance, cannot naturally be Annihilated.

That is, it cannot so cease to be, as that nothing at all should remain of it. For we easily conceive, that when any thing ceaseth to appear, it doth chage its Nature, or is converted into another thing; As for Example, we can well enough conceive, how Wood comes to cease to be Wood, how it comes to be Fire, and how the several Particles of Fire are subdivided into others, that at last they cannot be perceived by any Sense: But we can by no means conceive, how they should be reduced naturally to nothing, and from Being pass, to not Being.

VIII. That which is clear and evident is not to be denied, because that which is obscure, cannot be comprehended.

For we cannot doubt, but that there is Liberty and Indifferency in us, because we are conscious of it, and comprehend nothing more evidently or per∣fectly, tho' we cannot comprehend, how God doth leave the free actions of Men indetermined.

IX. It is the nature of a Finite Mind, to be un∣able to comprehend that which is infinite.

Because it is the nature of an Infinite being, to be Incomprehensible; for if it could be compre∣hended, it would not be Infinite. What wonder is it therefore, that we cannot conceive matter to be Divisible into Infinite? Or that we cannot under∣stand the Mystery of the Trinity, or the Incarna∣tion of the Divine Word? Because our Mind is Finite, and bears no propotion to the Mysteries. Would but some Men weigh this Axiom, as they ought, they would not with so much obstinacy, rely upon their weak Reason, or trusting to their own Wits, invent a new kind of Divinity.

X. If you take Equals from Equals, what re∣mains will be Equal.

XI. If you add Equals to Equals, the whole will be Equal.

XII. It is in vain to endeavour that by more, which can commodiously be performed by less.

Special Logical Axioms.

Logical Axioms are of great use. To these we may subjoyn some Logical Axi∣oms, which are of great use, in the guiding of our Discourse, and are taken from the Genus, Species, Difference, Division, Causes, &c.

From the Genus.

I. Whatsoever is affirmed or denied of the Genus' the same is affirmed or denied of the Species.

The reason is, because the Genus contains the Species, and because the whole Essence of the Genus is found in them: Thus, because it is affirmed of an Animal, that it is Sensitive, the same is also affirmed of Man and Beast. And because the same Animal is denied to be a Stone, so likewise, the same is denied of a Man and a Beast. Where∣fore, the Genus is of no use to prove the Species, but only to remove it. For that which is not an Animal, neither can it be a Man; but that which is a Man, must therefore be an Animal.

II. The supposing of the Genus, doth not suppose such a Species.

As for Example, supposing any thing to be an Animal, it cannot from thence be concluded, that it is a Man; because it may be a Beast, which is likewise an Animal.

II. The Genus being destroyed, the Species must be destroyed with it.

For seeing that the Genus is an essential part of the Species, it must follow that the Genus being destroyed, that must needs be destroyed with it, which consists of it. Thus if we take away an

Animal, we together take away the Species, that are contained under it. And by taking away a Foursquare Figure, we at the same time take away a Parallelogram and a Trapezium, which are the Species of a Foursquare.

From the Species.

I. The supposing of the Species, supposeth the Genus; but the taking away of one Species, doth not necessarily remove the Genus.

Because the Idea of the Genus, is comprehend∣ed in the Essential Conception of the Species, with∣out which the nature of the Species cannot be ex∣plained. So supposing a Binary or the number two, we suppose a number also; and asserting a Parallelogram, we likewise assert a Square. And if all Beasts were taken out the World, yet would not Animal be therefore taken away, seeing it would be preserved in Man. Hence it is, that the Species is of great force to prove the Genus, but of none at all to deny it. For that which is a Binary, must be a number, but it does not follow, that that which is no Binary, is therefore no number.

II. All the Species being destroyed, the Genus is destroyed likewise.

For in this case all the power of the Genus is ex∣hausted, neither doth there any thing remain, of which it can be affirmed. So supposing the Sight, Hearing, Tasting, Smelling and Feeling to be de∣stroyed; the outward Sense must be destroyed like∣wise: And taking away Prudence, Justice, Tem∣perance and Fortitude, takes away Vertue also.

From the Form or Difference.

I. The Form is that by which a thing is, what it is.

Because the Form or Difference, is the chief Es∣sential Attribute that is found in the Species, and whose property it is to constitute the same, and distinguish it from other Species. Thus Extension constitutes a Body, and Cogitation the Mind or Soul of Man.

II. Where the total Difference or Form can be affirmed or denied, of the same the Species also may be affirmed or denied.

This Axiom as a Corollary is deduced from the former; for seeing the thing is constituted by the difference, where the same is found, it is necessary that there the Species be also. Thus, because Cogi∣tation may be affirmed of the Mind of Man, there∣fore we may affirm it to be a Thinking Being.

III. The Form and Species are reciprocated.

The Reason is, because Difference constitutes the Species, and doth distinguish it from other Species, and therefore must have the same latitude as the Species it self, and therefore must reciprocally be affirmed of one another: As, Every thing that Thinks is a Mind, and every thing that is a Mind Thinks.

From the Property.

I. The Property is consequent on the Form.

For the Property is something flowing from the nature of the Species, and so bound to it, that it agrees to the whole Species: So Divisibility follows Extension, and is so necessarily joyned to it, that no Body can be extended, but that it must be Divisi∣ble also.

II. The supposing of the Form, supposeth the Proper∣ty, and the taking away of it, takes away the Property also.

As when Extension is supposed, Impenetrability and Divisibility are supposed likewise; and if that be taken away, the Properties are taken away also.

From the Definition.

I. Whatsoever agrees with the Definition, agrees also with the thing Defined.

For seeing that a Definition declares the nature of a thing, by its Essential Attributes, viz. by its Genus and Difference, it must include the Whole, contained in the thing defined; and there∣fore whatsoever is Attributed to the Definition, the same must necessarily be also Attributed to the thing defined. Thus, because it agrees to the Art of Discoursing well, to direct the Mind; there∣fore also it must agree to Logick, to direct the Mind.

II. If the Definition belong to a thing, the thing defined must also belong to it.

Thus, because it belongs to the Mind of Man, to be a Thinking Substance, it belongs also to the same to be a Spirit. And because to a Stone, belongs Extension in Length, Breadth and Depth, therefore it also belongs to it, to be a Body.

III. If a Definition agree with a Definition, the thing Defined also, must agree with the thing Defined.

As, That which consists of a Body and Mind, is endowed with Sense; therefore Man is an Ani∣mal. Substance is something which hath an Es∣sence and Existence distinguisht from all other things; and on the contrary.

From Division.

I. If no part of the Division agrees to a thing, neither doth the thing divided agree with it.

Thus, because the notion neither of a Spirit nor Body, doth agree to Substantial Forms (save only the Soul of Man.) Therefore, Substantial Forms cannot be Substances.

II. Every Division must be entire, that is, it Enumerates all and every Part belonging to a thing.

For should any part belonging to a thing, be omitted in the Division, there could not be an Adequate Enumeration of the Parts, neither con∣sequently would the thing, by means of such a Division, be distinctly perceived. Thus the Di∣vision of a Man into Sound and Sick, is not Ade∣quate, because there is a kind of Middle State, as, is that of a Man, that is recovering from Sickness. But the Division of Hand into Right and Left; of a Line into Right and Crooked; of a Number into Even and Odd, is Adequate because it Enu∣merates all and every Part.

III. The Parts of a Division must be opposit.

This Axiom follows from the foregoing. Thus things are better divided into Material and Immate∣rial, than into Visible and Invisible; because some Invisible things, as a very clear Air, and our Breath, are not by nature distinct from Visibles.

From the Cause.

I. The Cause is always before the Effects

For seeing the Cause is that from which a thing hath its Original, or that of which that Being doth in some sort depend, therefore it must needs exist before it. So a Carpenter is before the Building; A Father before the Son, &c. A Cause is in a twofold Sense said to be before its Effect, viz. by a Priority of Nature and Time. A Cause is before

its Effect by a Priority of Nature; because the Effect exists by the Power of the Cause, and not the Cause by the power and virtue of the Effect; yet not always by priority of Time, because some Effects exist at the same time with their Causes, as all those Effects which proceed by Emanation; as the Proprieties do from their Subjects, which therefore exist the same moment with them.

II. Nothing can be a Cause of it self.

For seeing there is a Dependance in the Effect, whereby it proceeds from something that was be∣fore it; it cannot be conceived, how any thing should be prior to it self.

III. Supposing the Cause in Act, we suppose the Effect in Act also.

The Reason is, because when the Cause is con∣stituted in Act, it always does something, and that which it does is called its Effect. As supposing God a Producer, we must necessarily suppose some∣thing produced; and therefore the Cause and its Effect, as well as other Relates, are said to be simul Natura, that is, to be both at once; for no sooner is one Relative named, but at the same time we understand the other. So he is a Father, who hath a Son; and he a Son, who hath a Father.

IV. A Cause cannot give that which it hath not.

For a Cause gives something to another thing, but it cannot give that which it self wants.

V. Whosoever Acts by another, is esteemed to act of himself.

As he who desires, exhorts, and adviseth others to commit some Wickedness, is said to be the Moral Cause; because by Desiring or Commanding, &c. He makes the Effect to be imputed to him.

From the Effect.

I. The Effect is posterior to its Cause.

This Axiom follows from the foregoing: For if the Cause be before the Effect, it follows that the Effect must presuppose it.

II. No Effect exceeds the virtue of its Cause.

For seeing the Effect borrows its Being from the Cause, it is impossible it should take any thing that goes beyond or exceeds the Power of its Cause. For Fire would never be able to warm the Hand, if to warm did exceed the virtue of Fire.

III. That because of which every thing is such, is it self more such.

That is, if the Nature of the Effect be good or bad; the same doth more clearly appear in the Cause. This is true when both are capable of the same Quality: Thus because the Kettle is hot be∣cause of the Fire, the Fire must needs be more hot. But we cannot argue, a Man is satiated with the Meat he eats, therefore the Meat is more satiated.

From the Subjects, and Adjuncts.

I. Where the Subject is, there are the Adjuncts also.

For seeing that the Adjunct is the Mode of the Subject, it does always accompany the fame: As where the Fire is, there is heat; where a Dead Carkass is, there is a stink.

II. Such as the Subject is, such are the Ad∣juncts.

For such as the Orator is, such is his power in Persuading; as the Sick is, such are his symptoms.

III. Where the Adjuncts are, there is the Sub∣ject.

Because Adjuncts are added to the Subject, and are considered as things that belong to it. As where Motion, Magnitude, &c. is found, there must also be a Body.

From the Whole.

I. What agrees to a Similar Whole, agrees also to the Parts of it.

For seeing that a Similar Whole is made up of a Conjunction of Similar Parts, it must needs be of the same Nature with them. Thus, because Lead is heavier than Brass; therefore every part of Lead, proportion being observed, must be heavier than Brass.

II. Where any Whole is, there are all its Prin∣cipal Parts.

For the Principal Parts are Essential to the Whole. I say, the Principal Parts, as the Head, and the like; because there are some Parts which belong to the Entireness, but not to the Essence of the thing.

III. The Entire Whole being supposed, all its Parts are supposed also.

The Reason is, because this Whole is nothing else than the Parts taken all together: As where the Entire Body of Man is, there must be its Skin, Bones, Sinews, Veins, Flesh, and all things that belong to the Entireness of it.

From the Parts.

I. Every Part, with respect to its Whole, is Imperfect, and Incompleat.

So the Soul and Body, with respect to a Man, are Imperfect and Incompleat; because they both belong to make a Perfect Man. So the Hands, Feet, Head, which are the Integral Parts of Mans Body, are more Imperfect than the Whole Body.

II. Where all the Parts are, and joyned together, there is the Whole.

This Axiom is evident from what hath been already said.

From Like and Ʋnlike.

I. Like do agree with Like.

A Prince must govern a Commonwealth after the same manner, as a Father of a Family takes care of his Family.

II. To Unlike things, Opposits do agree.

As we love an Honest man, so we hate a Wicked person. A Shepherd feeds his Sheep, an Hireling neglects them.

From Relates.

I. Relates are by Nature together, or at one and the same time.

For seeing that every Relation is mutual, and one Relative respects the other; it cannot be, but that if you put the Relate, you must put the Correlate likewise: And therefore the Cause and the Effect, that which is before, and that which is after, and all other things that do mutually respect each other, are always at once and together in the Mind. From whence follows also this Axiom.

II. One Relative being put, the other is put also; and being taken away, the other is so likewise.

From Contraries.

I. That which is susceptive of one Contrary, is also susceptive of the other.

As Water can be made hot, therefore it may also be made cold. A Dog cannot act justly, and there∣fore neither unjustly.

II. Of Contraries, it is necessary that the one be in the Subject susceptive of it; the other not.

Thus if a Number be not Even, it must be Un∣even. Yet this Axiom doth not hold in all Con∣traries; for it is not necessary that a Wall should be white, because it is not black.

From Privative Opposits.

I. If the one be Absent, the other must be absent also.

This must be understood in a Capable Subject. As if a Man sees, he is not blind. It is Light, therefore not Dark.

II. For the Most part, there is no going back from a Privation to a Habit.

As from Death to Life, from Blindness to Sight.

III. What in one Subject is Privation, is often a Negation with regard to another.

This appears in our Errors, which with refe∣rence to God, who doth not bestow upon us the whole knowledge of Truth, are only called Ne∣gations; but with reference to us are Defects and Privations. Thus Ignorance of the Laws is blame-worthy in him, who professeth skill in Law; but not to him who is of another Profession.

From Contradictories.

I. One Contradictory being put, the other is re∣moved; and on the contrary.

As supposing that Peter walks, it cannot be that he should not walk.

From Parity, or Equality.

I. Even things with Even things agree, or dis∣agree.

As Faith to the Patriarchs was necessary to Salvation; therefore to us also.

From the Greater.

I. If that which is more Likely is not; much less that which is less Likely.

As if a Woman could not be tempted to Sin by an hundred Guinea's, much less by thirty.

From the Lesser.

I. If that which is less Likely is, much more that which is more likely.

As, a Man hath kill'd the King, therefore he will make no difficulty of killing one of his Fellow-Citizens.

From Divine Authority.

I. The Testimony of a Being Sovereignly In∣telligent, Wise, and True, is of greater efficacy to persuade, than any other the most strong and evi∣dent Reasons that may be.

Thus since God tells us, that they are blessed who are persecuted for Righteousness sake, we are to hold it for an undoubted Truth; because we have a greater Certainty, that he who is Sove∣reignly Intelligent, and Infinitely Good, cannot be deceived, than we can be certain that we our selves are not deceived, even in those things that appear most clear and evident to us. For we are to give credit to the Divine Testimony, not be∣cause of the Affirmation or Negation, but for the Authority of the VVitness, as being Omnipotent, Omniscient, and of the most Sovereign Veracity and Truth.

From Human Authority.

I. VVe ought not to oppose that which is owned by all Men, or most Men, or wise Men, or by the most Famous and most Approved of them.

As for Example, it is a Truth received by the common censent of all Men; that we ought to venture our Lives for the welfare and safety of our Native Country: And that it is the Duty of every Man, to live honestly, to hurt no body, and to give to every Man his Right. For this unanimous Agreement of all Men shews, that their Judg∣ment in these Cases proceeds from common inborn Notions, and not from any Compact to impose upon others, or deceive themselves.

But yet we must not have the same Opinion of those Men, who being over-credulous, deceive others, by reporting Prodigies which they had from others; as that there are Sciopodes, Men that have but one Foot, and that so great, that lying on their Backs they can shade their whole Body with it; or that there are Men that have so great Ears, that they reach down to their Feet, and so broad that they can lye upon them; and others again that have no Heads, and have their Eyes about their Shoulders: Because we are not to believe every one, but only those whose sufficient know∣ledge of the Matters they relate, and Veracity, are fully known to us.

Two Rules of Demonstrations.

I. All Propositions that involve any thing of Obscurity, are to be proved without alledging any thing in proof of them, besides Definitions which have gone before, or Axioms that have already been granted, or Propositions before demonstrated, or the Construction of the thing in discourse, when any Operation is to be done.

II. VVe are never to make an ill use of the Equivocation of Terms. This may be occasioned by not adding their Definitions, to restrain or ex∣plain them. For to every true Demonstration two things especially are required. First, That in the Matter it self nothing be contained, but what is certain and indubitable: The Other, That there be no fault in the Form of Argumentation: Which Faults we shall avoid by the Rules now given, that is, by not making an ill use of Equivocal Terms, and by using no other Propositions in our Demon∣strations, but what are either Definitions of Terms before explained, or Axioms that have been before granted, and which ought not to have been sup∣posed, without being sure of their Evidence; or Propositions, that have been before demonstrated, or the Construction of the Thing of which we treat, when any operation is to be performed. For by observing of these things all Defects or Mistakes will be easily avoided both in Matter and Form.

As to the Constitution of Demonstrations, we have handled it in the Nineteenth Chapter of the Third Part.

CHAP. XXIII. Of Genetical Method.

I. Themes are two-fold, Simple or Conjunct, HAving largly enough, as I suppose, spoken of Method in general, and of Analytical and Synthetical in particular, it may now be fitting to subjoyn something concerning Genetical Method, because it is of use, and belongs to the true Pra∣ctice, or Exercise of Logick. Genetical Method, teacheth us to frame a Discourse upon any Theme, and takes it Name from Genesis, because it is as it were a new Generation of a Thing, and that where∣by we Elaborate a Theme, that hath not as yet been Explained, or Demonstrated. And for as much as the Theme, or Matter proposed to be known, is either One and Simple, or Conjunct and Complex; as when for Example, I consider God, or the Power of God, in Creating the World, I consider something that is Simple or Incomplex: But when I set before me this Sentence, God Created the World (or any other Proposition, whereby any thing is affirmed or denied of another) I think of some∣thing that is Conjunct or Complex.

II. How we are to handle a Simple Theme. The handling of a Simple Theme, consists in the seeking of Arguments, that may declare a Simple Theme, and the disposing of them in a due order. Arguments shew us the manner of invent∣ing the Definitions of Single Terms, such as are the Cause and Effect, Genus and Species, the whole and its Parts, Subject and Adjunct, Opposits, Di¦vers, &c. As for Example, if any one seeks for the Efficient Cause of Man, he must have recourse to the Definition of the Efficient Cause, which is, that from which a thing by true Causality doth proceed: Which Definition of the Efficient Cause, if it be referred to Man, presently, either God will be brought to his Mind, by whom he was Created presently after the Beginning of the World; Or his Parents, by whom all other Men since have been produced. And after the same manner he may find out the Matter of which he is made, the Form by which he is distinguisht from all other things; and the End for which he was Created by God.

III. How the Effects are shewed. So likewise the Effects of Man are manifested by examining the Works that proceed from Man, as the Efficient Cause, &c. and in like manner handle the rest, as far as the Theme propounded will bear: For it is evident, that all Themes will not admit the same Arguments; seeing God, for Exam∣ple, hath neither any Efficient Cause, nor Form, nor Matter, and therefore the same cannot be con∣sidered of in him. The same may be said of the Angels, and the Mind of Man, which have neither Matter, nor Form, nor consist of any Parts.

IV. In a Sim∣ple Theme we are to examin the Word. In the handling of a Simple Theme, this order is commonly observed, as far as the nature of Argu∣ment will permit: First, To examin the Word of the Theme, whether it be derived, and if so, to give its Etymology: Secondly, Whether it be Ambigu∣ous, and then its various Significations are to be Enumerated and expounded. Thirdly, Whether it be Abstract or Concrete.

V. The Genus. In the Second Place, we must enquire into the Genus, from the Predicamental Table set down in the First part, Chap. V. which represents all the Genera and Species, which conduceth much to the knowledge of the Theme, forasmuch as the man∣ner of handling Themes varieth according to the Diversity of the Genera.

VI. The Causes. Thirdly, We must enquire into the Causes, which we have set down and Enumerated, First part, Chap. IX.

VII. Effects. Fourthly, The Effects are to be considered; not every one, but such as are Memorable, and worth the Mentioning.

VIII. Adjuncts. Fifthly, The Adjuncts are to be handled accord∣ing as the Theme is, whether Universal or Proper; as also the Antecedents and Consequents.

IX. Definition. In the Sixth Place, Definition, which, as soon as we have have found out the Genus and Difference, doth present it self unto us.

X. Division. Next comes DIVSION, whereby the Subject is divided into its Integral Parts, if the Theme be an Integral Whole; or into Species, if it be a Genus.

XI. Compara∣tes. In the Eighth Place, COMPARATES, or Things that agree in Quantity or Quality.

XII. Opposits. Lastly, OPPOSITS, are subjoyned to all these, and are of considerable use, according to that common Saying, Contraries set together, Illustrate each other.

XIII. How a Conjunct Theme is to be de∣monstrated. A Complex Theme, or Proposition is Genetically Demonstrated from the Subject and Predicat, which as two Integral Parts do constitute the same. Because by them we judge, whether a Pro∣position be True or False, Universal or Particular, Necessary or Contingent, Affirmative or Negative. As suppose this Conjunct Theme be to be proved, Man is Created after the Image of God, we are to consider both the Parts, viz. the Subject Man, and the Predicat, the Image of God, after which Man is said to be Created: Next the Quantity and Quality of the Proposition are to be Examined: And Lastly, The Reasons or Arguments of the Affirmation are to be investigated from the nature of the Sub∣ject and Predicat.

XIV. How the Subject is to be consi∣dered. The Subject Man furnisheth us with Reasons or Arguments. First, From the Efficient Cause, be∣cause the Holy Trinity entred as it were into Con∣sultation about the Creating of Man, which was not done in the other VVorks of the Creation, which is an Argument of a peculiar Prerogative of Man, before other Creatures, which consists in that he is an Image of God. Secondly, From his Matter, be∣cause he is made with a Face, directed towards Hea∣ven, &c. Thirdly, From his Form, because he only of all sublunary Creatures, had a Mind breathed into him. Fourthly, From Singular Effects, which are the Evidences of a peculiar Virtue bestowed upon him. Fifthly, From his Adjuncts, because he excells all other Creatures, by the Power he has of Understanding, and determining himself. Sixthly, From his Definition, because he is a Substance con∣sisting of Mind and Matter. Seventhly, From the Place of Comparats, because he comes near to the nature of the Angels; and Ninethly, From that of Opposits, because he is not a Beast, devoid of Reason.

XV. How the Predicat is to be considered. The Predicat, made after the Image of God, doth also afford us Arguments taken from the Nature of the Divine Image; viz. from its Formal Rea∣son, or from its Effects, Adjuncts, Parts, De∣finitions, Comparats, Contraries, &c. which Theology handles at large.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The first Mode.
• * 1.2

  Bar-ba-ra.
• * 1.3

  VIII. The first Figure.
• * 1.4

  Ce-la-rent.
• * 1.5

  Da-ri-i.
• * 1.6

  Fe-ri-o.
• * 1.7

  Ce-sa-re.
• * 1.8

  X. The second Figure.
• * 1.9

  Ca-me-stres.
• * 1.10

  Fe-sti-no.
• * 1.11

  Ba-ro-co.
• * 1.12

  XI. The third Figure.
• * 1.13

  Dar-ap-ti.
• * 1.14

  Fel-ap-ton.
• * 1.15

  Di-sa-mis.
• * 1.16

  Da-ri-si.
• * 1.17

  Bo-car-do.
• * 1.18

  Fe-ri-son.