divisible: The Minor is to be suppos'd from Natural Philosophy.
XXVII. Or a Pro∣priety. So to demonstrate a Mans being Rational, we may take his Property, which is the Faculty of Speaking, and Reason thus: The Power of Speak∣ing, that is, the Faculty of expressing ones Mind by Words, Signs, or Gestures, belongs ot Man; But whatsoever enjoys this Faculty doth partake of Reason; therefore Man doth partake of Rea∣son.
XXVIII. Or a Defi∣nition. So likewise a Definition may serve for a Middle Term, to prove that Oysters are Animals, thus: Oysters are Bodily things, endued with life and mo∣tion: But whatsoever hath life and motion is an Animal: therefore Oysters are Animals.
XXIX. Or a Cause. And so also a Cause acting necessarily, may be the Middle Term; for thus a Lunar Eclipse may be proved from its Efficient Cause, viz. the Sun and Moon being placed in opposite Nodes, or in the Intersections of their Orbs, after this manner: It is necessary for the Moon to be Eclipsed, as often as the Globe of the Earth interposeth between the Moon and the Sun, from which the Moon borrows her Light; but then the Globe of the Earth inter∣poseth between the Moon and the Sun, when the Sun and Moon are in opposite Nodes; (because at that time they are Diametrically opposite, and the Earth plac'd in their Diameter) therefore there must necessarily be an Eclipse of the Moon, when the Sun and Moon are constituted in their Nodes, or the opposite intersection of their Orbs.
XXX. The Mid∣dle Term in a pro∣bable Syl∣legism, may be fetch'd first from the Genus. We make use also of like places in a Probable or Suasory Syllogism; yet so as that tho' the Middle Term agree to the Subject, (yet the Attribute does not to the Middle Term, as a Genus, Propriety, &c. as before:) As if a Man to prove Rhetorick to be profitable for Mankind, should argue thus; Rhe∣torick is an Art, but every Art is profitable to Man∣kind; therefore Rhetorick is profitable to Mankind. In which Syllogism, the Middle Term Art, is in∣deed the Genus of the Subject Rhetorick; but the Attribute is profitable, is not its Genus, but only a contingent Adjunct, or common Quality; and therefore neither doth the Mind assent to it without something of Doubtfulness, whether or no Rheto∣rick may not be reckon'd amongst those Arts, which tho' they be accounted Subtil, yet are esteemed by some as unprofitable, or at least indifferent.
XXXI. From a Propriety. In like manner one may prove, from a Propriety of Logick, that Logick is a thing desirable, thus: It is the Property of Logick, to direct the Mind in the knowledge of things; but what directs the Mind in the Knowledge of things, is something de∣sirable; therefore Logick is a thing desirable. This Argument also leaves some hesitation in the Mind, because the directing of the Mind in the Know∣ledge of Things, doth not necessarily conclude the thing to be desirable; because there are many who rather desire to continue in their Ignorance, than to be instructed in Logick.
XXXII. From the Cause. We may also argue from the Cause thus: This Picture is drawn by Apelles; but the Pictures drawn by Apelles are very exact: Therefore this is an exact Picture. Which enforceth only a Pro∣bable, but not a certain Conclusion; because the best Painters do not always Paint alike, nor so exa∣ctly, but that sometimes Faults may be spied in their Works.
XXXIII. Ambiguity is the only place for a Sophisti∣cal Syllo∣gism. A Paralogistical, or Sophistical Syllogism, has but one only place, viz. Ambiguity; which being once detected, its Imposture lies open; and that which seem'd to be a good Syllogism appears to be none at all. Because the Reason of Syllogism requires, that it have only one Middle Term, one Subject, and one Attribute; whereas in a Sophistical Syllogism there are two Subjects, and as many Attributes without a Middle Term: As when a man Argues, some Mountain is Taurus, Taurus is a Lowing Animal: Therefore some Mountain is a Lowing Animal. For the Ambiguity here lies in the word Taurus, which agreeing to two different things, is in the Major taken for a Mountain, and in the Minor for a Four-footed Animal. Whence it appears, that the word Taurus is no Middle Term, foras∣much as it doth not agree with the Subject and Predicate.
XXXIV. Ambiguity is the cause of Decep∣tion in all things. For Ambiguity is that which occasions deception in all things; for he that concludes, that a Man asleep is awake, because it hath been before granted, that it is possible for a man that sleeps to be awake, doth not do it for any other Reason, but because this Proposition may be understood either dis∣joyntedly, with respect to different times; or con∣junctly, with regard to the same time. And he who concludes that the Buyer hath eaten raw flesh, because it may be, he confess'd that he had eaten what he had bought, doth so because of the Am∣biguity of the words, What he had bought; which may either be taken only for the substance of the Flesh; or also for an Accident of it, viz. Rawness. And the like may be said of all Sophistical Places, Amphibology, Composition, Division, Account, &c. forasmuch as they all agree in this, that they have some Ambiguity either in a Word, or in a Phrase; or that one Sense is taken in the Proposition, and ano∣ther in the Assumption. So that it is no wonder, that when both are admitted for True, an Absurdity follows from them.