An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

CHAP. XIV. Of Division, and Definition.

I. Transition, or Connex∣ion of the following Matter, with what goes before. HAving explained the Nature of Propositions, and clearly and distinctly unfolded their Affections of Affirmation and Negation, Univer∣sality and Particularity, Truth and Falshood; it only now remains, that we add something con∣cerning Distribution and Definition, which are ac∣counted the most Scientifical, or conducive to Science of all other Propositions; and are nothing else, but Tokens or Instances of a clear and distinct Perception; or, if you will, they are Primary Enun∣ciations, Axioms of solid Judgment, and Maxims worthy of all belief.

II. What Di∣vision is. DIVISION therefore is the Distribution of some Whole into Parts; As, of a Living Creature into Man and Beast; of Number into Even and Uneven. Now Division will not a little conduce to our acquiring a clear and distinct Knowledge of Things, if so be we know how dexterously to make use of it. For seeing that almost in every Object there are many things to be considered, which because of the Difficulties wherewith they are involved, cannot be clearly apprehended by us; it is needful to resolve them into Parts, that so having by Division removed all Confusion, the Particulars may more clearly appear such as they are.

III. Division is either Real, or Mental. Division is twofold, the one Real, the other Mental: The Real is, whereby a Whole is really and indeed divided into Parts; as a House into the Roof, Walls, Foundation, &c. of which it consists. A Mental Division is, when we divide a Whole only by the help of our Understanding: As when we consider in GOD, his Goodness, Omnipotence, Eternity. For it doth not always follow, that the thing which our Mind distributes into Parts, is compounded and divisible; but that only our Conception of it is compounded, and unable to understand so many Attributes under one and the same Notion.

IV. The Pri∣mary Di∣vision of Genus and Species; and of an Integral, and Essen∣tial Whole. Division is manifold, according to the threefold kind of a Whole and its Parts. For it is either of the Whole Genus into its inferiour Species, or of the Species into its Individuals: As the Division of Substance into Mind and Body; of Mind, into an Angel, or Man's Soul: The other is of an In∣tegral Whole into its Parts; which is properly to be called Partition: As the Division of the Body of Man into Head, Teeth, Hands, and Arms. The third and last, is the Division of an Essential into its Essential Parts; as the division of Man into Mind and Body. And these Three are called Primary Divisions.

V. The Diffe∣rence be∣tween the Division of a Genus into Spe∣cies, and of a Whole into its Members. There is this difference between the two former Divisions: In the Division of a Genus into Species, and of a Species into Individuals; the thing Divi∣ded may in the Nominative Case be predicated, of the several Parts that divide it: As when Living Creature is divided into Man and Beast, Living Creature is exprest in the Nominative of Man and Beast; as Man is a Living Creature; a Beast is a Living Creature. But in the Division of an In∣tegral into its Members, the thing divided cannot be predicated of the Dividing Members, but in an Oblique case; as when a Body is divided into Head, Breast, Belly, &c. it cannot be pronounced of the Parts, but in an Oblique: For we cannot say, the Head is the Body, the Belly is the Body, but part of the Body. And the reason of this difference is, because the whole Essence of the Genus is included in the Species, whereas the Nature of the Whole is not in every Part.

VI. The Secon∣dary Divi∣sion of an Accident into Sub∣jects, or contrari∣wise. The other Divisions are called Secondary; as a Division of an Accident into the Subjects, in which it is found. As if we should say of the things that are moved, one is the Earth, another is the Moon, &c. A Second, is the division of a Sub∣ject into its Accidents; as when a Subject is ranged or distributed according to its Accidents. As for Example, Some men are Learned, others Ignorant; some Good, and others Wicked. The Third, of an Accident into its Accidents; by which an Ac∣cident is divided, not by its own Differences, but by other Accidents of a different kind: As when we say of White things, some are hard, others soft, &c.

VII. Conditions of a good Division. The First. Moreover, there are some Conditions required to the constituting of a right Division. First, That all and every one of its Parts be exactly enume∣rated, without omitting any that belong to it; so that the Dividing Members may exhaust the Di∣vided Whole, and neither be more extended or contracted than it: As, Even, and Uneven, do com∣prehend the whole extent of this Term, Number, seeing there is no Number which is not in it self either Even, or Uneven.

VIII. The Second. The Second is, That both parts of the Division, be as far as may be expressed in positive Terms. For the Attributes of a thing that is distributed,

may be better understood by Positive Terms, than by Negative. I add, as far as may be, because it sometimes happens, that the Positive Thing wants a Positive Name, and so we are forced to use a Negative in the dividing of it: As when we divide Living Creature into Rational and Irrational: Or Substance into Material and Immaterial.

IX. The Third. The Third Condition is, That the Whole be distributed into its nearest Parts: According to this Rule, it would not be well done to divide Sub∣stance into Rational and Irrational; because these are not immediately contained under Substance, but under Living Creature.

The Sixth Rule. Of the Judgment of Distribution.

X. The Sixth Rule. That Distribution or Division is the most perfect of all, which doth honestly and equally divide a Whole into its Parts; whether it be a Genus into Species, or an Integral into its dividing Members, or a Subject with respect to its Accidents, or an Accident into the Subject, to which by the Right of Division they belong.

XI. Explication of the Rule. Thus the most perfect Distribution of a Genus is, when all its Species are Enumerated: As if one should say of Living Creatures, some Walk, others Fly, others Swim, others Creep, and others are Plant-Animals. An Integral Whole is well divided, when all the Parts that constitute it are in∣stanc'd: As the Parts of a Man are, Head, Breast, Belly, Arms, Legs, &c. That is a perfect Distribution of a Subject, with respect to its Adjuncts, when the Adjuncts are reduc'd to certain Heads, and these again subdivided into others: As when we say, In Man there are some Adjuncts of the Soul, and others of the Body; those of the Soul, are Knowledge, Virtue, &c. those of the Body are Health, Beauty, Tallness, Strength, &c.

XII. What a De∣finition is, and of what Parts it consists. DEFINITION is that which manifests the Nature of Things, shewing why they are, and how they are distinguisht from others. There are two things principally that constitute a Definition, Genus and Difference. By the first we understand the agreeableness which the Thing Defined hath with others, that are of the like nature with it. By the Difference we are informed, how it differs from the same, and what Rank it keeps amongst Real Beings. As for Example, when we define Man to be a Reasonable Living Creature; by a Living Creature which is the next Genus of Man, we understand something that is common to other things like unto us, viz. the Beasts. And by Reasonable, which is the Difference, we clearly perceive our Distinction from them; forasmuch as no Beasts are partakers of Reason. Definition there∣fore is that, which by exhibiting the Essential Parts of the Thing Defined, expresseth its Nature; as in the foregoing Example.

XIII. In Defini∣tions we must make use of the nearest Ge∣nus. We are to observe, that every Genus is not suffi∣cient to lay open the Nature of a Thing, but the Nearest only: Partly, because it contains all the Genera above it, so that by expressing it we include all the rest: For he that affirms Man to be an Ani∣mal, doth consequently affirm him to be Living, Corporeal and a Substance, and whatsoever else can be imagined higher. Partly, because there is no other Genus can more fitly be joyned with the Specifical Difference, than the nearest, nor which doth more correspond with it.

XIV. Of Defini∣tions some are Essen∣tial, others Accidental. Amongst Definitions some are Essential, which properly deserve the Name of Definition; and are those which are explained by their Essential De∣grees. By Essential Degrees, I mean Essential Attributes, which constitute the Nature or Essence of a thing. And these are only Genus and Differ∣ence, as, Animal and Reasonable with respect to Man. Other Definitions are Accidental and less exact, which express the thing by some Properties or External Causes, as when we define Man, to be a Creature made after the likeness of God. For tho' Property be an Essential Attribute, yet not in that Sense as if it did constitute the Essence or Nature of a Thing, but because it immediately follows the Nature of a thing already constituted: As, Parti∣tion and Mobility with relation to a Body. Where∣fore the first Definition is called a Perfect Defini∣tion, because it consists only of Causes that do con∣stitute the Essence, and by them doth most fully and perfectly lay open the Nature of the thing: Whereas the second Definition is called imperfect, or a Description, because it defines and explains the Thing by other ways, than by its Causes.

XV. What things are required to a p••rfect Definition. Yet we are not to think, that all things that are objected to the Mind, may be comprehended in a Definition; but it is required, that the Thing which is to be defined be One, that is of one Essence; for those Things which involve a manyfold. Nature, cannot be manifested by a Genus and Difference. The Second is, That it be Universal; for seeing that Definition is a Declaration of the Nature of a Thing, it is necessary that we divest it of all par∣ticular Circumstances, that it may be viewed such as it is. Thirdly, No Universal Nature but a Species can be exactly defined; and that because nothing but a Species can consist of a Genus and Difference; and therefore seeing that the Supream Genus does want them, it follows that the Things which are defined must be either Species of the lowest Rank, or Inter∣mediate: Which also will but be obscurely defined, without their immediate Genus and nearest Difference.

XVI▪ Rules of a right Defi∣nition. The First There are Rules and Precepts of a right Definition. First, That the Definition must be of the same ex∣tent with the Thing defined, and agree to all those things which the Thing defined agrees with. As for Example, because Animal agrees to a Man, there∣fore a Corporeal Substance endowed with Life, Sense and Motion, which is the Definition of an Animal, must agree to Man also.

XVII. The Second Secondly, That nothing be wanting or redound∣ing in the Definition, but that only those Words be made use of, that are necessary for the explain∣ing of its Nature: Wherefore this Definition of a Man, That he is a Reasonable, Mortal Animal, is Superfluous, because the Word Mortal is not needful to the Definition of a Man.

The Third. The Third, That the Definition consist of that which is more known: For seeing that a Definition is declarative of the Essence, it must therefore em∣ploy clearer Terms; lest we should be guilty of endeavouring to explain an unknown thing, by that which is more unknown, and so instead of attaining a clear and distinct Perception, should fall into Obscurity and Confusion. Wherefore the common Definition of time, that it is, The Number or Measure of Motion, cannot be good, seeing it is evi∣dent, or apparent, that Time doth as well Measure Rest, as Motion, since we say, as well that a thing hath rested so long, as that it hath been in Motion for that time.

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Booke 1. Part 1. Chap 12.

G. Freman Inv.

I. Kip Sculp.

To the R^t. Worshipfull S^r. William Thomson Knight, their Majesties Sergeant at Law, only Son and Heyre of Henry Thomson of Hollin Hall near Rippon in yorkshire Gent, by Elizabeth Daughter and Coheyre of S^r. Henry Blencow, of Blencow in Cum∣berland Knight.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated, by Richard Blome.

The Seventh Rule. Concerning the Judgment of Definition.

XIX. The Se∣veath Rule. That Definition is the most perfect and consum∣mate of all others, which defines the Thing by its Essential Attributes, or constituent causes of its Nature and Essence.

As if one should define the Soul to be a Cogitating Substance, or a Body to be a Substance consisting of three Dimensions. Because Substance as the Genus doth constitute the Soul and Body; and Cogitation as the Difference, distinguisheth the Soul from the Body; As Extension in Length, Breadth and Depth, doth difference the Body from the Soul: Neither is there any thing else required to the understand∣ing of them both.