An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

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Title
An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.
Author
Le Grand, Antoine, d. 1699.
Publication
London :: Printed by Samuel Roycroft, and sold by the undertaker Richard Blome [and 10 others],
1694.
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Subject terms
Descartes, René, 1596-1650.
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A50014.0001.001
Cite this Item
"An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A50014.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 15, 2024.

Pages

The First Rule.

V. The First Rule. That is an Affirmative Proposition in which the Subject and Attribute are joyned, or do agree; and Negative, in which they are disjoyned, or dis∣agree.

VI. Explica∣tion of the Rule. For a Thing is then affirmed to be what it is, when the Predicate or Attribute agrees with the Subject, or when it is one and the same thing with it: As when we say, Man is an Animal. But a thing is pronounced not to be, what it is not, when the Attribute differs from the Subject, and agrees not with it: As when we say, Man is not a Beast, because Man is declared not to be such, as indeed he is not. This Division of a Proposition is accord∣ing to Quality; because when any one asks, of what kind the Proposition is, it is answered, Affir∣mative or Negative.

VII. In an Af∣firmative Proposition the Attri∣bute is re∣strained. We are to observe, that in an Affirmative Pro∣position the Attribute is to be taken in all its Com∣prehension, but not in all its Latitude. As when I say, Every Circle is a Figure; whatsoever is con∣tained in the Idea or Essence of a Figure, the same is affirmed of a Circle; but yet the word Figure is not taken in its whole Latitude, for it is of much larger extent than that of Circle; and there∣fore this Proposition cannot be simply converted in saying, Every Figure is a Circle. Wherefore in this Proposition the Attribute is restrained by the Subject, and reacheth no farther than the Sub∣ject doth.

VIII. But not in a Nega∣tive. But the case is different in a Negative Proposi∣tion; as, No Circle is a Square: For here the At∣tribute is taken in its whole Latitude; so as that we may say as well, that No Square is a Circle, and all Squares must be denied of a Circle. But the Attribute is not taken according to the whole Com∣prehension of its Idea, as if all the Attributes of a Square, were to be denied of a Circle: For a Circle and Square agree in the Idea or Notion of Figure.

Page 28

IX. There are Propositions Universal, Particular and Singu∣lar. There is another Distinction between Propositi∣ons, which ariseth from the Subjects, that go before the Copular according to which they are called, Uni∣versal, Particular, or Singular. An Universal Proposition is that to whose Subject a Note of Uni∣versality is annexed; such as Every or All, None: As, Every Man has a Soul; because Man is a com∣mon Term, which is taken in its whole Latiude. But when a common Term is only taken in an un∣determinate part of its Extension, with these Notes; Some, Some Body, &c. then it constitutes a Parti∣cular Proposition, whether it Affirm, as Some Lo∣vers are miserable; or deny as, Some Courtiers are unjust. But if the Subject of the Proposition be Par∣ticular, it makes a Singular Proposition, as Charles. I. now Reigneth in England. And this Distribution of a Proposition, into Universal, Particular and Singular, is said to be made with respect to Quan∣tity, because when any one asks Quanta (of what extent) the Proposition is, we fitly answer, that it is Universal, Particular or Singular.

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