An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

CHAP. VIII. How the Name of Substance agrees to GOD and the Creatures.

I. How many ways Names agree to a Thing. FOr the better clearing of this Difficulty, we are to suppose with Logicians, that a Name may after divers manners be communicated to a Thing. First, Univocally, when it agrees to many Things for the same Reason; as when the name Triangle is given to all Figures contained within three Lines. Equivocally, when we call many things that are Essentially distinct by the same common Name, for divers Reasons: As when in Latin we use the Name Gallus, to signifie a Cock and a Frenchman; or when we use the word Pa∣rabola, to signifie an Allegory, or Similitude, and a Geometrical Figure. Analogically, as when we give the same Name to many Things; but to one Principally, and to the other Secondarily: As when we say that an Animal, a Pulse, and Physick are Healthful; for Health principally and chiefly agrees only to an Animal, to the Pulse as it is a sign of it, and to Medicine, because it procures it. Having briefly observed these things,

II. The Idea of Sub∣stance does not agree Univocally to GOD and the Creatures. I say, First, that the Name of Substance doth not agree to God and the Creatures Univocally. Which I prove thus: Different Participation de∣stroys Univocation; but God and the Creatures participate the Name of Substance after a different manner therefore. The Minor is proved, because God is a Substance Independent of any other; but all other Creatures are Substances dependent of

Him: GOD alone is He, who needs no other to his Existence; but all Creatures stand in need of the Divine Concourse for their Existence, neither can they without it be conceived to exist in the Nature of Things.

III. The same exprest in other words. Or otherwise thus: The Idea of Substance, is the conception of a Being subsisting of, or by it self; but there is no Creature so exists by it self, as to be sufficient for its own Existence, or so Powerful, as to be able to keep and preserve it self: Wherefore the Name of Substance cannot Univocally agree to God and the Creature.

IV. A Being from him∣self and from ano∣ther, are absolute Differences. And if with more attention we consider the Matter, we shall find that God and the Creature do not agree in the Idea of any Genus whatso∣ever; and that the word Being, Ens, which is commonly by Logicians attributed to God and the Creature, is perfectly Equivocal; and that the Equivocation is not more plain in the word Dog, when attributed to a Constellation in Heaven, and to a Beast on Earth; or in the Latin word Jus, which signifies Law or Right, and Broth, than in the word Ens, or Being, when given to a Being which is of it self, and to one that is from another and altogether dependent. For to exist of ones self, or to be made by another are meer Differences, which do not admit any common Genus; and as God is distinguished by the former, so are all Crea∣tures by the latter: God being a purely Self∣existent and Independent Being, and the Crea∣tures purely dependent Beings, and existing from another.

V. God is above Substance. Wherefore S. Denys calls GOD Super-substantia, and Super-ens, (Above-substance, and Above-entity) because he is raised above all Substances, and sepa∣rate and distinct from all other Things whatsoever. Accordingly he that would make a true Scheme of the Predicaments, must set down Ens à se, or a Self∣existent Being by it self, and distinct from the Series of other things; and afterwards Ens ab alio, or a Being that is from another, as the Original of Dif∣ferences, placing at the Right hand of it Intelle∣ctual, and on the Left Corporeal, and then put the next Division of Things. Because the Name of Entity, or Being, only agrees with the Being, which is of it self, and can only Equivocally be assigned to Creatures, that have their Being from another.

VI. An Obje∣ction an∣swer'd. If any one say, that the word Substance agrees in common both to God and the Creatures, and that all the Inequality that is found in them doth arise only from the Differences of it? I answer, That this is not true, forasmuch as Dependency is invol∣ved in the Essential Conception of a Creature. Now it is required to the Nature of Univocal Words, that they be equally communicable to all, and not to one Primarily and to the other Secon∣darily, or with dependance on the First.

VII. The Idea or Notion of Sub∣stance is Univocally competent to Crea∣tures. I say in the Second place, that the word Sub∣stance doth Univocally agree to all Creatures. For all Creatures are conceived under this Common Notion, that all of them stand in need of the Di∣vine Concourse for their Existence. Now that Name which is attributed to many for the same Reason, and equally participated by them, is Uni∣vocal; therefore the Name of Substance is di∣stinctly understood to be Common to all Creatures, according to the property of Univocals.

VIII. Why the Genealogy of Things and Modes is here annexed. Having thus explained these Things, I think I have with one and the same labour explained all Metaphysicks, concerning Entity and its Affe∣ctions; yet that no Body may complain, that the same has been left out in this Institution, seeing the consideration of it doth indeed belong to Lo∣gick, I shall subjoyn here such a Genealogy of Things and Modes, by means of which the Student of Philosophy may, as it were at one View, con∣template the whole University of Things.

The Fifth Rule of Truth.

It avails much to the clear and distinct Percep∣tion of Truth, to retain in ones Mind an accurate Genealogy of Things and Modes, that with one cast of an Eye we may be able to take a view of the whole Universe of Things, beginning from the most General, and ending in the most Special.

IX. The Use of the fore∣going Rule. The Reason is, because this will be a great Help towards the thorough Knowledge of Things, as pointing us to what Tribe they do belong, what Affinity they have with some, and what Difference from other Things; neither will it be of less Use to us in the defining, describing, and distributing of Things. And to the end you may have a short Compendium at hand, of all those Things in gene∣ral, which fall under the Perception of our Mind, and consequently also of those Idea's, which the Mind forms to it self, whilst it beholds them: Be∣hold I here furnish you with such a Genealogy, as contains all and every one of the Genera of Things and Modes, each in its proper order and degree.

The Genealogy of Things and Modes.

Whatsoever falls under the clear and distinct Perception of our Mind, is somewhat.

And that Somewhat, is either

• A Thing, A or,
• The Mode of a Thing, B

[A.] I. A Thing, (or an Entity or Substance, for they are Synonymous) is something which hath an Es∣sence and Existence distinct from all other Things. Essence is the Natural and Invariable Constitution of the Thing, by which it is that which it is. Existence is a Consequent upon the Essence of a Thing, by which it now actually is, or is the Essence it self now existing in the University of Things. The Consideration whereof belongs to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by some called First Philosophy, and by others Metaphysicks, which treats of Things Universally, and therefore also is called Catholi••k, or Uni∣versal.

A Thing or Substance in Gene∣ral, is twofold

• Thinking, a or,
• Extended, b

Thinking, or a Mind is either

• [a.] 1. Infinite, as GOD, whence is Natu∣ral Theology.
• 2. Finite, as the Mind of
  • an Angel, whence is Angelography.
  • a Man; whence Psy∣chology.

This part of the Genealogy of a Thinking Sub∣stance is handled in Noetica, that is, Pneumatica, as others term it; the Parts whereof I have just now mentioned.

[b.] A Thing Extended, or a Body, is twofold.

I. An Element; that is, a Principle whence other mix'd Bodies have their Original, and into which they are resolved again at last. Which again is Threefold.

• 1. Subtil Matter, which constitutes the Stars.
• 2. The Heavenly Globular Matter, whence the Light and Heavens are.
• 3. The Grosser Particles of Matter, whence are the Planets and Comets.

II. Elementatum, or Principiatum; that is, all those things that have their Original from the Elements.

And these are again Twofold:

I. Without Life, or Concrete; which branch them∣selves into,

1. Simple Concretes; as the Heaven, which consists of the Globuli of the Second Element; and the Stars, of the Matter of the First Element.

2. More Compound Concretes.

• 1. Those on high, as Planets, Comets, &c.
• 2. Those beneath, as Fire, Air, Wa∣ter, Earth, and things consisting of these: As,
  • 1. Meteors, as Vapours, Wind, Rain, Snow, Hail, Thun∣der, &c.
  • 2. Fossils; that is, Minerals, Me∣tals, and Stones
    • Common,
    • or
    • Precious.

II. Living, or Animated.

• 1. Without Sense, or Vegetable, As all kind of Plants, whe∣ther
  • Herbs,
  • Shrubs, or
  • Trees.
• 2. Endowed with Sense; as an Animal,
  • 1. Rational, as Man.
  • 2. Irrational, as a Beast.

This Part of the Genealogy, concerning Ex∣tended Substance, or Body, is unfolded in Physio∣logy, or Natural Philosophy, which is also called Somatica.

[B.] II. The Mode, (that is, the Attribute, Affection, Accident) of a Thing, is somewhat of an Entity or Being, that is and exists by the assistance of another thing.

These are Twofold,

• General, a or
• Special, b

[a.] I. General; Such are the Modes or Attributes of all Things in General, commonly called Tran∣scendentals: As,

• 1. Unity; by which every thing is always one and the same, and Undivided. Multitude is a Collection of Unities.
• 2. Truth; by which a thing is conformable to its Idea. Falsity contrariwise.
• 3. Goodness; whereby it is fit for Use.
• 4. Perfection; whereby it is whole and entire, and hath whatsoever it ought to have.
• 5. Locality; whereby it is every where, as God; or somewhere, as all other Things besides God.
• 6. Duration; whereby a Thing continues in its Existence either always, or for a certain time:
  • As
    • Eternity.
    • Time
      • Present,
      • Past,
      • Future.

These Things are explained in the First Philo∣sophy, or Metaphysicks, which treats of Things, and of their Modes and Affections Universally.

[b.] II. Special; Such are the Modes or Attributes of Things in Specie.

(1) For the Division of Things: As,

1. The Modes, that is, the Attributes of a Thing Cogitating:

As,

• Intellection, and Volition.
• Power to act of it self, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

2. The Modes or Attributes of a Thing extended, or Corporeal:

As

• 1. Quantity, or Magnitude; which Mathe∣maticks, or Posotica treats of.
• 2. Figure, or the different Termination of Magnitude, handled in that Part of Ma∣thematicks, which is called Geometry.
• 3. Situation, or the certain Position of a Thing in Place and Space.
• 4. The Quiet or Rest of the Parts of any Thing.
• 5. Local Motion, or the Variation of Situa∣tion, whence proceed Active and Passive Qualities; as Rarity and Density, Fluidity and Hardness, Heat and Cold, Moisture and Driness, and the rest; which are treated of in Natural Philosophy.

(2.) From the Conjunction of a thing

• Thinking, and
• Extended.

result the following Modes and Affecti∣ons.

• 1. The Appetite of Hunger and Thirst.
• 2. The Senses
  • Internal; Phantasy or Imagination and Memory.
  • External; Seeing, Hearing, Smel∣ling, Tasting, and Feeling.

And their Affections, as Waking and Sleep.

3. The Affections or Passions; as Love, Joy, Hatred, Sorrow, Hope, Fear, and the several kinds of them, which are also handled in Phy∣siology.

X. The Scope of a Phi∣losopher is, to know the Natures of Things. Hence we may gather in the first place, that Philosophy considered in all its Parts, is nothing else but a Scientifical Explication of this or a like Genealogy. For a Philosopher pretends nothing else, and is content with this alone to understand the Natures of Things, to know their Forms, Differences, Affections, and that from the nearest Causes, if the Mind can reach them. Now this will hardly be obtained by him who is not well vers'd in the Genealogy of Things.

In the next place, That this Genealogy is abun∣dantly sufficient to supply the place of the Com∣mon Categories and Predicaments of the Aristo∣teleans.

XI. What the Peripate∣ticks un∣derstand by Predi∣caments. By Predicaments and Categories, they under∣stand such a Series and Disposition of Things, in which the Superiour is always predicated, that is, affirmed Univocally, that is, according to Name and Thing, of its Inferiours in the same Predica∣mental Line. Taking this for granted, as a thing known to all Men, there are many things which I cannot approve of in the Constitution of those Predicaments.

XII. What is to be dispro∣ved of in the Cate∣gorical Series. First, That they divide Ens into Substance and Accident without any Reason: Forasmuch as an Accident is no Entity, as appears from the fore∣going Definition of Ens (A. I.); but rather is some∣thing belonging to an Ens, according to (B. II.)

Secondly, In that they constitute Nine supream Genera of Accidents, which they thus reckon up; Quantity, Quality, Action, Passion, Relation, When, Where, Situation, and Habit.

Where first they mistake in this, that they make those to be the Supream Genera, and distinct too, which truly are not so; as Quantity, and Quality: For the greatest part of Physical or Na∣tural Qualities arise from Quantity, Figure and Motion. Secondly, Relation doth not in the least belong to the Genealogy of Things, because it is

no absolute thing, but only an Affection framed by Reason, viz. an Opposition, with or under some respect. Thirdly, Action and Passion in Bodies are reducible to Motion, whose Species or Modes they are. Fourthly, The Division of Ens into Substance and Accident, invented by Aristotle, deviates from the Rules of a good Division; because the Parts of it are not opposite. Fifthly and lastly, If any true Attributes of Things be fonnd amongst them, the same may be more fitly deduced from our Genea∣logy: As for Example, Quantity belongs to the first Mode of an Extended Being: Quality, if it be Mental, to the Modes of Intellection and Volition; if it be Physical, or Corporeal, to the Fifth Mode of an Extended Being, or to others: When and Where, to Duration and Place, which are the General Attributes of Things: Situation is the Mode of an Extended thing, or the respect of one Body to others, considered as near to it: And Habit is the Common Adjunct or Accident of some Things; as of a Human Body, or some other.